Applied intelligence analysis

Applied Intelligence Analysis
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Applied Intelligence Analysis Plans 2
Introduction
Admiralty scale is referred to as the system that is used to measure the credibility of
the source of the information, and reliability of the information gathered. This is taken into
consideration so that the intelligence may be able to make viable decision based on the
information that has been gained in the investigation. This system usually comprises of two
known character notation which are adequately implemented in assessing the source of
information reliability and evaluation of the information confidence and accuracy. This system is
usually executed by the military enforcement and National Security Intelligence of the NATO
member nations and also by the AUSCANZUKUS members. However, analyst also uses this
system to evaluate and validate the authentication of the information gathered. This system
involves four stages for the information gathered to be assumed reliable and credible this
includes evaluation, reliability, credibility and reporting (Beesly, 1989).
Development of the Admiralty Scale
The development of admiralty scale is mostly influenced by very many functions
which projects toward intelligence analysis. This is because there are very many applications for
strategic and tactical intelligence analysis available within law enforcement, intelligence and
defense communities. Analysts have articulated that there are many factors which harbor the
attempts to mitigate adversary deception as exemplified by Clark (1996). The most common
factors which are deemed to be affecting this system are the analytical model choice, nature of
formal representation induced and knowledge in addressing problems raised in information
credibility and source reliability.

According to Marrin (2007) the stages which allow the development of the
information gathered articulates that this system has to be developed using this angle of
evaluation, reliability, credibility and reporting. Usually when these procedures are mixed or not
closely administered the results are usually deceptive and have impact on the expected outcome.
Evaluation: this usually arises in the early stages of intelligence cycle which confirms that the
information that has been gathered cannot be readily accepted. Every information item which is
implemented in the creation of evaluation offers a hint of source reliability and reviewed
accuracy; this is usually founded on validation or other evaluation. Every descriptor is officiated
differently to guarantee source reliability and that it does not distort the evaluated report
accuracy (George, 2004).
Reliability: usually after sourcing the source is evaluated for reliability through various technical
assessments to evaluate it capability, the history is sourced in the cases of human intelligence
sources. The notation of this development ensue the Alpha coding which is from the letter A-F to
document and report the reliability of the source (Seward, Et al, 2006). The scale here uses the
6x6 information evaluation systems; this is where each number represents different grading of
the information assessed. 1or A) Completely reliable, 2 or B) Usually reliable, 3 or C) Fairly
reliable, 4 or D) Not Usually reliable, 5 or E) unreliable and 6 or F) unworthy
The grading variation depends on the intensity of the research being carried out and the
importance of the outcome thus simple assessment use 2x4 or 4x4 information evaluation system
(Heuer, 1990).
Credibility: usually the item is evaluated for credibility through the ground of likelihood and
other sources levels of justification. The grading is usually notated in the numeric code grading

of from 1 to 6 that aims at achieving the accuracy of the data. 1) Other sources definite, 2)
Perhaps true, 3) maybe true, 4) Doubtful, 5) Improbable and 6) Accuracy cannot be judged
Reporting: the evaluation will then outline the next course of action to be executed based on the
item coding from the collected information. Usually the assumption is not coded as the wording
can question the conclusion because of the confidence level which the code authorizes (Jøsang,
2001).
Importance of Admiralty Scale to Intelligence
There are several major importances why this system is helpful to intelligence. One
of the major importances is that it regulates major international threat that a nation may be
imposed on. This is usually achieved through collecting, processing, analyzing, evaluating,
integrating and interpreting of the information obtained from foreign nation which may pose
threats. Heuer (1999) articulates that the aims of this assessment are projected toward mitigating
activities which may be hostile to the human existence of a certain region. The remedy and
conclusion acquired from this assessment will then be used to devise means of how these threats
can be neutralized for the benefit of human existence. Some of the intelligence committee in the
United State that are concerned about mitigating threats posed by hostile foreign adversaries
include; National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, National Reconnaissance Office, ), Telemetry
Intelligence (TELINT), Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Photography (PHOTINT),
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Army, Naval and Air
force Intelligence Agencies.

All these intelligence agencies have diverse concerns in their line of work which
mainly categorized on political assessment, economics, foreign nation intentions and military
capabilities. The agencies works are to collect information which is later used to assess the
population and living condition of the population of a certain nation so that they may be able ton
design a comprehensive solution to that situation. Usually the information is hard to interpret
when it is gathered from the public. The agency assessment and evaluation enables this
information that is gathered to be transformed into intelligence through arrays of scientific
procedures accurately authenticated and verified for the best result (Austin & Rankov, 1995).
After the information has been acquired then the analysts evaluate and conclude the
threats and opportunities thus analyst are able to designs solution to each case. The result will
have outlined the adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities in each case which have been
evaluated. In cases of military combat the assessment is used to indicate the defended or most
fragile resources which are essential in military capabilities (Calder, 1999). Usually point of
targeting the energy and how to penetrate the enemy territory without targeting the civilians are
among the few angle which military intelligence of the admiralty scale addresses.
Intelligence details and outlines critical vulnerabilities to the expense and disposal of
the advisors and intelligence personnel who then in turn convey it to the policy makers and the
military personnel on the war front. According to Whaley (1982) intelligence mostly outline to
the nation possible attack method which the enemy may attempt to make on the soil of that
particular nation. When all this possible medium of attack are outlined and the possible counter
attack measures are outlined then the intelligence will enforce all kind of alert within their
capacity to keep all intelligence alert. They will then ensure that the security of the land is tight
and no loopholes are available to the attackers. This will be done in a highly profiled manner

that none of the occupation of the nation is told of the threats so that they may not panic and
create public unrest. The enemy preparation time and impact target are all analyzed and
appropriate measures place to mitigate this threats (Bruce, Et al, 1990).
Another major realization which opens new importance of intelligence is assisting
the world power nation to regulate nuclear war head creation and sales to rogue nations like Iraq,
Palestine and Afghanistan. This usually play major roles in controlling sanity in the world as
rogue politician or mercenaries might strike deals with nation which produce this mass
destruction weapons and use them against humanity as noted by Keegan (2003).
Support Word of Estimative probability to the Scale/Confuse Intelligence Message
Intelligence analyst when in the fabrication of analytic report concerning the
likelihood of an incoming or future occurrence usually use the term Words of Estimative
Probability (WEP or WEPS). Usually experts of the intelligence information accumulation
usually express the confidence finding extent in this way to distort confusion in the message.
Documented and well analyzed WEP usually offers the decision maker with estimate which is
unambiguous base which is based on accuracy. However, this system is usually very vague and
misleading when injected ineffectively when assessing the likelihood of an event. Usually WEP
fully supports the admiralty scale however, twist by the decision makers and the policy makers
would result to confusion. Usually when WEP is considered to be ineffective then it positions the
decision maker in the position of the analyst as echoed by Kent (1964). This makes the decision
maker to infer the forecast alone, usually this has been associated with the poor result on the
likelihood or haste decision which has dire consequences on the target audience.

Kent Sherman (1964) who is the first contributors of intelligence discipline outlined the
confusion and misleading expression which were fostered in the National Intelligence Estimates
(NIE). Kent in his thesis distinguished between poets (wordy probabilistic statements
preferences) and mathematicians (quantitative odds preferences). Kent designed a paradigm
which bridged the gap between decision makers and analyst which fathered estimative terms to
odds. The main agenda of the paradigm was to elucidate the finding of the intelligence in a way
that the readers would be able to articulate, what reasoned judgment and certain knowledge
entails. This also intended to elucidate the misconception of the varying degrees of certitude
surmounted from the huge judgment realm what consequences may follow any key judgment
concluded. Major influence that brings about confusion on the decision if the WEP is accurate
maybe political mileage and interference, another factor is world power, religious conflict and
global market competition.
One of the most documented confusion brought about by WEP is the vagueness and
misleading information on the likelihood of Osama Bin Laden attack on American soil. The
President’s Daily Brief (PDB) is the agency which entitles that the president of the United State
is debrief of any threat that may have been assessed and their likelihood and the impact and
threat that they posses as echoed by Dvornik (1974). The agency although had detected the
activities which Osama had been anticipating and the likelihood of attacks were high however,
the PDB report did not offers the president with the clear likelihood of the attack based on the
history data gathered and evaluated. Thus the confusion arises and the decision made was that al
Qaeda would not attack America and the focus was shifted to overseas targets by this radical
group.

Another case which lacked and was confused is the Iraq evaluation of the mass
destruction weapons. These two vague and misleading analyses were made within the same
duration which complies that they were politically motivated. However, the cause of the failures
has been associated with the lack of the focus and no enough present fresh intelligence from the
analysis. Proper use of the WEP would guarantee intelligence the likelihood of the exact time
and the location of the attacks. Proper information communication also allows the smooth
running of this system to function properly. Uncertainty when conveying information reduces the
vagueness and the misleading factors (George, 2004).
Oversight committee’s difference/similarities of U.S and Australia
The Australia intelligence communities also have a committee which mostly works on
detecting flaws in this system and offering remedy. This is just like the United State Intelligence
Committee (IC) which role is mostly to facilitate major reform on the intelligence communities
so that they may offer accurate and uncertain information (Kahneman, ET al, 1982). The
Australian Intelligence committee is emplaced to safe guard toward uncertainty in the
information shared about through clarity and capabilities which defines the strength of this
system. Unlike America where there are very numerous intelligence agency Australia have three
intelligence collection agency ASIS, DIGO and DSD there are only two agency which governs
assessment this are ONA and DIO. After all this have been executed then the analysis are
conveyed Australia Security Intelligence Agency (ASIO), they have the sole responsibility of
combining information assessment and collection and also policy advice and formulation. In the
united state this is done by the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) as they advice the policy makers
which action to take based on the evaluation they have done (Haselton, Et al, 2005).

Research has articulated that there is always some kind of competition between the
intelligence agencies in the United State. However, major research conducted about Australia
Intelligence Agencies articulate that they operate effectively and cooperatively. This has been
articulated to be a success because of the functioning mechanism instilled in Australian
Intelligence Agencies which follows the minimal duplication of function to all three
communities. This has also been because of lack of bureaucratic infighting like the American
Agencies which are filled with each agency trying to out do the other limiting sharing of critical
information or distorting this information and making it harbor uncertainty which result to bad
consequences as echoed by Beesly (1989). However, the relation between Australian intelligence
agencies and the American agencies has been performing well to counter terrorist activities. This
articulates besides bureaucratic infighting both Australia and American intelligence agencies are
projected toward counter terrorist activities mitigation.
Political Bias in Intelligence Analysis
Usually intelligence analysis management is usually responsible for the process which
details classifying and administration of the assessment process, which mainly indulges in the
dispensation of crude intelligence information to analyzed intelligence. However, there is few
biases whi8ch cloud this process such as cognitive bias. Cognitive biases are referred to as the
tendency of the human in making systematic errors on particular circumstances and this is mostly
based on rather than evidence but on cognitive factors. These errors are what are termed as
Heuristics which is defined as the information processing shortcut. Usually political biases are
rooted here where majority of the politician convey heuristics which are half baked analysis and
base them on intelligence to make decision like the one of Iraq on Weapon of Mass Destruction
(WMD) (Marrin, 2007).

Usually political biases in intelligence analysis is tainted by the authority asserted by
politician who short charge the whole scenario to suit individual outcomes and agendas. This
will include doctored errors in the statistical judgment, memory and social attribution. Usually as
the cognitive biases is based on the human erroneous thoughts politician skew legal and
anecdotal reliability (Kent, 1964). These biases are termed as biases at an individual level which
mostly construe individual desires, sometimes it may be a way of getting back or settling
political grudges and then the policy makers exaggerate the probability of the case and then
make hasty decision which affects the other target audience. These mostly are designed to affect
decision which is to be issued concerning certain assessment. Political biases in intelligence
usually rely on consistency bias so that they may coin their own agenda based on the target
audience past behaviors and attitudes and then induce them to their present (Keegan, 2003).
Analysts have articulated that political biases are mostly influenced by Egoistic bias; this
is usually on the psychological satisfaction of the political leaders to satisfy their positive image
desire. They mix this with cold cognition biases and this intermixing of biases usually results to
ignoring of important information and thus neglects the probability evaluation. This orchestrated
through giving too much emphasis on the unimportant feature to generate attention on that
particular circumstance (Austin, & Rankov, 1995; Bruce, Et al, 1990). Usually the decisions
which result from this are erroneous and have no moral judgment like the Iraq case. These cases
originate from one of the American Presidents father attempt to conquer Sadam Hussein but
failed to base his intelligence and the whole operation failed. The junior of this president with the
cold and egoistic biases then enters and attempts to finish the fathers attempt basing intelligence
on political biases on weapon of mass destruction and putting much emphasis on this issue.
Threats in Iran due to invasion by the United State

The invasion of Iraq has been highly triggered to the resolving of the invasion to Iran.
Recently the unites State has been contemplating on engaging this nation on military combat if
they don’t account for their nuclear activities and abandon this activity as it is assumed that they
will sell this war heads to nation which are threats to the United States. However, analysts have
articulated that this invasion are based on political intelligence bias and are forced just like the
Iraq case (Marrin, 2007). Basing this on Barrack Obama peace and harmony speeches one would
be able to account that the pressure is politically motivated and backed by neoconservative
blocks of power. One of the major pointed out political bias which could also affect Barrack
Obama regime based on the failing economic on the domestic level then he will like all other
political figures attempt to invade Iran to earn outside supremacy so to get a reelection in the
next term.
Among the most devastating implication which may arise from this invasion is that it
may have greater impact than that of Iraq or Afghanistan. This has prompted radical groups to
put threats on the United State and Israel as they are the major power blocks behind this
invasion. The political process of Iran is made up of a strong opposition and being Muslims
radicals have a dislike for both United Sate and Israel. However, because the assessment of the
intelligence is not fully pledged and their threat outline then one can only hope that the accuracy
of the intelligence would not be bias like that of Iraq (Keegan, 2003).
Key Intelligence Needs to Mitigate the Threats
Key intelligence needs which are requirement to attempt in mitigating threats that
arise from the finding of this assessment. First and foremost there is the case of bias which has
been the number one source of misinterpretation of the intelligence. When biases are mitigated

then the only problem now will be the accuracy of the information that is acquired and procured
by the agency. Structured methods of analysis in the intelligence are one major idea which is
projected toward mitigating threats which are accorded by the assessment. This with positive
intuition thinking will help solve major implication that affects and makes the threats to bloom
while concentrating on areas which are less threatening and neglecting the real threats making
the repercussion is enormous (Clark, 1996).
Usually when intuition thinking is complied with bias information does not fit into the
rigid framework fostered by the structured method. This is because structured methods
proponents usually offer valid points which are requisite on the benefit associated with
implementing this method to aid the analysis of intuition. Thus structured thinking then is the
key to mitigating the threats which may arise as it compliment both accuracy and nuance through
cognitive bias and judgmental error mitigation (Dvornik, 1974). This method allows swift and
accurate decision making which then allows neutralizing of all threats which are present.
Conclusion
Admiralty when induced in the intelligence analysis assists the government to outline
major threats and evaluate how to mitigate and neutralize these threats. However biases fostered
by political and other biases indicate that the repercussion of the probability assessment can have
undesired outcome like that of Iraq. Proper implementation of structured analysis would help pin
point convey information which is accurate and works for the good of the situation but not for an
individual to gain political mileage.

References
Austin, E. & Rankov, B. (1995). Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman
World From the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople. London: Routledge.
Beesly, P. (1989). Very Special Intelligence: The Admiralty’s Operational Intelligence Centre,
1939-1945. London: Greenhill Books
Bruce, W., Watson, S. & Hopple, G. (1990). United States Intelligence: An Encyclopedia. New
York: Garland Press.
Calder, J. (1999). Intelligence, Espionage and Related Topics. Connecticut: Greenwood Group
Press.
Clark, R. (1996). Intelligence Analysis: Estimation and Prediction. Baltimore: American Literary
Press, Inc.
Dvornik, F. (1974). Origins of Intelligence Services. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
George, R. (2004). Fixing the problem of analytical mind-sets: Alternative analysis.
International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence. 17, 3. 385-405.
Haselton, M., Nettle, D. & Andrews, W. (2005). The evolution of cognitive bias. Handbook of
Evolutionary Psychology. 34. 724–746.
Heuer, J. (1999). Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence
Agency Center for the Study of Intelligence.
Heuer, J. (1990). Strategic deception and counter-deception: A cognitive process approach.
International Studies Quarterly. 25, 2. 294-327.

Jøsang, A. (2001). A logic for uncertain probabilities. International Journal of Uncertainty,
Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems. 9, 3. 279-311.
Kahneman D., Slovic P., and Tversky, A. (1982) Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases. New York: Cambridge University Press
Kent, S. (1964). Words of estimative probability (WEP or WEPs). Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Marrin, S. (2007). Intelligence Analysis: Structured Methods or Intuition? American Intelligence
Journal. 25, 1. 7-10.
Keegan, J. (2003). Intelligence in War. New York: Knopf.
Seward, R., Altman, K. & Kelly, J. (2006). Structured Analysis of Competing Hypotheses:
Theory and Application. Pennsylvania: Mercyhurst College Institute of Intelligence
Studies Press
Whaley, B. (1982). Military Deception and Strategic Surprise: Toward a General Theory of
Deception. New York: St Martin Press.

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