A conflict case approach to be

A Conflict Case Approach to Johannes Brinkmann
Business Ethics Knut J. Ims

ABSTRACT. Departing from frequent use of moral flict in business contexts, with a focus on moral
conflict cases in business ethics teaching and research, the aspects (cf. as drafts of such a perspective French
paper suggests an elaboration of a moral conflict approach and Allbright, 1998, pp. 177–178, with further
within business ethics, both conceptually and philo- references, or Brinkmann, 2002b, pp. 161–162).
sophically. The conceptual elaboration borrows from This paper suggests taking a better look at such a
social science conflict research terminology, while the
potential conflict management function of business
philosophical elaboration presents casuistry as a kind of
practical, inductive argumentation with a focus on para-
ethics.
digmatic examples.

KEY WORDS: case approach, casuistry, conflict man- The use of moral conflict cases in business
agement, ethics teaching, moral conflict ethics teaching and research

Moral conflict cases are the most popular way of
teaching business ethics, consisting of more or less
complex and authentic conflicts without an easy self-
evident solution. Business ethics casebooks are
Introduction readers of business life, of conflict histories and issues
(see e.g. Beauchamp, 1997; Donaldson and Gini,
Business ethics as an academic field has two main 1995; Harvey et al., 1994; Hoffman et al., 2001;
functions. On the one hand it challenges self-satis- Jennings, 2002). While full-format cases are meant as
fied business people by inviting moral criticism and representatives of real-life conflict complexity,
self-criticism of business practices. On the other teaching sometimes (and research normally) uses less
hand, business ethics is potentially helpful when it representative and more focused short versions of
comes to analyzing, handling and preventing con- conflict cases, often called ‘‘scenarios’’ or ‘‘vignettes’’
(see e.g. Bain, 1994; Brinkmann, 2002a; Chonko,
1995; Peck et al., 1994; Weber, 1992). Such con-
Johannes Brinkmann is professor at BI, the Norwegian School of flicts or dilemmas, short ones or long ones, real ones
Management in Oslo Several of his articles have appeared in or constructed ones are normally designed as a
the Journal of Business Ethics, Teaching Business Ethics, hopeless choice between contradictory responsibili-
Business Ethics: A European Review. He has also published ties where at least one stakeholder will be hurt. The
two business ethics books (in Norwegian, 1993 and 2001). follow-up question is usually in the format of ‘‘what
Knut Johannessen Ims is associate professor at NHH, the would you do if you were person X?’’ or ‘‘which
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administra-
conflict party would you side with, and how would
tion, Bergen, Norway doing research and teaching within
business ethics and relational ethics. His thesis and his articles
you justify your choice?’’ or ‘‘identify and clarify
are mainly published in Norwegian. Some of his articles have main issues, parties and stakeholders, options and
appeared in the Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, wisest solutions’’.
Scandinavian Journal of Management, Business Ethics: A Cases and case teaching market ethics as useful
European Review. He has also published a book on Infor- tools for analyzing and handling understandable and
mation Ethics (in Norwegian, 1992). interesting moral conflict stories, trigger standpoint

Journal of Business Ethics 53: 123–136, 2004.
Ó 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

124 Johannes Brinkmann and Knut Ims

taking and discussion. There is a danger, however, vant and useful concepts, either as a language in
that cases can be ‘‘too’’ entertaining and too super- which one can describe and understand conflict cases
ficial as a genre. Students and even teachers or as stories (cf. van Luijk, 1994, pp. 4–5) or for asking
researchers can easily forget that moral conflict cases individuals questions and understanding their an-
are examples, i.e., are not about themselves or swers, about such conflict situations. Since there is a
interesting in themselves only.1 The challenge is to risk of over-representing big cases with media
reach a compromise between respect for uniqueness attention one can often defend a further detour and
and desirable generalizability. On one hand one delay by asking individuals questions about their
needs to be loyal to the single case (in the classroom conflict perceptions before describing cases as a
or in the real business world), i.e., to come up with a whole.
best possible (or at least good enough) solution. On When mapping individual conflict experience in
the other hand, the question is what one can learn professional or business contexts one would probably
from one case for all the other cases, more or less ask individuals, in an open question, for any conflict
similar ones, and not least how a case solution definitions and/or conflict examples. Perhaps, one
functions as a test case for moral philosophy and for would ask, in addition, questions about individual
moral conflict management. conflict handling experiences and ideas. Most
More complex checklists for moral conflict case respondents would probably understand such a
analyses such as the 7-point list suggested by van question in one of the following formats:
Luijk (1994, pp. 8–9) or the 12-point list suggested
by Nash (1989, p. 246) have a common denomi- • Are you experiencing any conflict in your
nator. They all require a combined analysis of facts work situation, as an observer or as a party, and
and of norms, or a situation and normative analysis. if yes related to which issues, how frequently
Instead of a focus on practical suggestions and rules and how seriously?
of thumb for case teaching and conflict-case ques- • Can you recall any (recent, serious, or just any
tion formats we want to address, more principally, …) conflict in your work situation, as an ob-
the possible strengths and weaknesses of a moral server or as a party, and if yes can you describe
conflict case focus. Our draft of a further elaboration it briefly in your own words?
of a moral conflict focus borrows from social science • If you experience or believe you experience a
and from philosophy. By social science we think conflict in your work situation, how do you
mainly of conflict research terminology. Our typically react?
philosophical elaboration exploits primarily casuistry
as a kind of practical, inductive argumentation with a
focus on paradigmatic examples. Such questions about conflict concepts and conflict
experiences are a good entry to professional morality
studies. Coding the answers to such (more or less
open) questions, however, requires a theoretical
Moral conflict case analysis as conflict analysis conflict concept and at least a minimum of indicators
to look for and to compare by. Five conceptual
In order to prevent case teaching and case research distinctions could serve as a start:2
from being too quick and too superficial, a delayed-
judgment approach seems fruitful (Lustig and Ko- • conflicts as units versus conflict as a social sys-
ester, 1996, pp. 333–336, suggest in their textbook tem property,
an acronym, a ‘‘D–I–E’’-approach). Instead of • conflict attitudes, conflict behaviors and con-
jumping from a quick case description to a quick flict contents,
recommendation for how to handle the case Lustig • conflict of interest versus conflict of values,
and Koester suggest asking for a sufficient descrip- • conflict versus conflict management perspec-
tion (‘‘D’’) and understanding (interpretation, ‘‘I’’), tives and
i.e., for a deliberately delayed judgment (evaluation, • conflict (case) outcomes versus conflict modi-
‘‘E’’). Description and understanding require rele- fication.

Conflict Case Approach 125

Conflicts as units versus conflict as system property

In questionnaire-based research, some respondents A
might refer to one specific conflict (or to several
conflicts), while others might read the question as a
question of whether or not the workplace is more or
less ‘‘full’’ of conflict. For grasping this subtlety, one
could distinguish, in methodology language, be-
tween a unit and a property concept of conflict. In
B C
the first case one would think of the conflict x, taking
place in social context y, during time-span z. One
given conflict is studied as a specific, time-space-
Figure 1. Galtung’s ‘‘conflict triangle’’. (A) conflict atti-
unit, often with a focus on properties such as issue tudes, (B) conflict behavior, (C) conflict as incompati-
types (such as value dissensus, or incompatible bility.
interests related to scarce resources), number of
parties involved or power-relationships. In the sec-
ond case, conflict denotes a system state or an actor conflict, as suggested by Johan Galtung in various
relationship state, such as a level or degree of con- lectures and papers (see e.g. 1989, pp. 2–4; as a
flict. There can be, e.g., much conflict in a post- visualization as a triangle cf. Figure 1). When coding
merger organization. This means that conflict (and responses the question would be if answers refer to
conflicts in the plural form) can be thought of in the self-other images, to events or actions or more
indefinite form, grammatically speaking. There can specifically to conflict issues, i.e. more or less ab-
be much or little, destructive or productive, basic or stract, underlying, incompatible goals, right-versus-
superficial conflict. Ralf Dahrendorf ’s widely quo- right and right-versus-wrong choices (Kidder,
ted dichotomy between conflict and consensus 1996), interests or values.
models of society (1958, 1959) applies a property
concept of conflict, by implicitly postulating a
continuum or variable from consensus to conflict Conflict of interest versus conflict of values
when talking about societies or organizations, with
conflict almost as the opposite of consensus. The A third distinction relates closely to business ethics
unit and property concepts of conflict are related. and to the core of this paper. It is a dichotomy by
Conflicts-as-units are symptoms or manifestations of primary conflict theme, between conflicts of interest
conflict-as-system-property. In most organizations, and conflicts of values. The main idea is that the
there is some latent conflict, e.g. about profit/wage most important conflict issues are competing inter-
ratios or about proper degrees of workplace- ests versus moral disagreement respectively, or with
democracy. Such latent or built-in quite normal a lengthy quotation from Aubert’s article where this
conflict manifests itself from time to time, normally dichotomy is suggested (1963, pp. 27–30, our ital-
again, in identifiable conflicts-as-units, i.e. conflict ics): ‘‘A conflict of interest between two actors stems
processes or episodes. from a situation of scarcity. (Both) … want ‘the same
thing’, but there is not enough available for each to
have what he wants. In this general sense the basis
Conflict attitudes, conflict behaviors and conflict contents for a conflict is present in all trading transactions.
The seller would like to have more money than the
A second distinction could be between what the buyer is willing to part with … This conflict po-
conflict is about, if and/or how the conflict is per- tential is eliminated through the operation of the
ceived by the parties and if and/or how the parties market, usually so smoothly that no overt signs of
show any overt signs of conflict-related behavior. In conflict appear. If a conflict comes into the open, the
other words, one could distinguish between attitu- solution will often be a compromise … It is a type of
dinal, behavioral and content aspects (or concepts) of social interaction in which it seems that solutions are


facts, event, identify decide, i.e.
situation, e.g. formulate as a alternatives choose
a moral solvable and apply alternative by
conflict case problem checklists if criteria/ good
available reasons

Figure 2. Solving conflicts as problems.

reached by discouraging the actors from getting the dysfunctional conflict is a second goal, and if this
morally involved in a major aspect of the interaction, fails, minimizing or decreasing it becomes the fall-
the condition being that the interests are not dia- back position …’’ The opposite perspective would
metrically opposed … Competing or contrasting ask critically if conflicts and if the parties’ standpoints
interest does not in itself imply any disagreement have been addressed thoroughly and constructively,
between Ego and Alter concerning values. It may in their own right. Sometimes there is a suspicion
even be claimed that a conflict of interest presup- that institutions primarily try to justify themselves as
poses a consensus, at least on the value of the good, well functioning (if necessary by redefining conflicts
which is sought after by both parties… A conflict of to fit with the possibilities of the institution).4
value is based upon a dissensus concerning the nor- The second question about how conflict is man-
mative status of a social object. … (The) illicit nature aged is not independent of the first one. Rewarding
of compromise on the level of value and of empirical or persuading parties respects the parties’ conflict
truth makes it hard to discuss matters quite candidly ownership more than coercing them (cf. Kriesberg,
… It is especially when … questions of factual 2003, pp. 110–124, in particular his diagram on p.
responsibility, of guilt and merit, become parts of 111 which is shown here as Figure 3).
value-conflicts … that a solution through compro-
mise becomes so difficult …’’
Conflict (case) outcomes versus conflict modification

Different conflict management perspectives A fifth aspect can be seen as a follow-up to the first
distinction and to the fourth one. Conflicts-as-units
A fourth distinction relates to differences in conflict are almost defined, as processes, by their history, e.g.
management perspectives. A first question asks if with pre-history, emergence, development, termi-
conflict is looked at from a conflict management nation, i.e. they have an outcome (or end) and con-
perspective or if conflict-handling institutions are
looked at from a conflict perspective. In the first persuade
case, conflict or conflicts are treated as a problem.
Conflicts as problems need to be handled and ask for
a solution (or resolution, cf. Figure 2, cf. also more
in social science terminology Galtung, 1965, p. 355),
in order to avoid potential negative effects of unre-
solved conflict.3
Or in Weiss’ words (1996, p. 170): ‘‘The goals of
conflict management are, first and foremost, to
prevent negative or dysfunctional conflict from reward coerce
occurring while, at the same time, encouraging
healthy conflict that stimulates innovation and per- Figure 3. Kriesberg’s conflict management style types
formance. If prevention does not work, eliminating (2003, p. 111).


A gets all 1 5 governments representing them, when individually
A gets all, A gets all and or collectively they deliberate about what to do … –
B gets nothing B gets all
between conflicting obligations …, purposes, ends,
goals, or ‘values’ …, moral codes or systems or
world views …, different kinds of moral claim (e.g.
4
Both A gets consequentialism, deontology, partiality, authors’
B get half each add.) …’’ (Lukes, 1991, pp. 5–9).5 In terms of the
five conceptual distinctions presented above one
3 2 can, more simply, consider moral conflict and moral
A gets A gets nothing A gets nothing
nothing B gets nothing
conflict management as special cases of conflict and
conflict management, i.e. intra- or inter-party
B gets B gets conflict situations related to moral standpoint dif-
nothing all
ferences (or incompatibilities, or incommensurabil-
Figure 4. Galtung’s conflict outcome typology. ities, cf. Lukes, 1991, pp. 9–17). Instead of or in
addition to a conventional definition of moral
sequences (cf. e.g. Kriesberg, 2003, with a figure on conflict, it can often be as fruitful to treat moral
p. 23). Conflict-as-property typically changes or not, conflict as a conflict ideal type or counter type as
i.e. increases, stagnates or decreases, either by itself suggested by Aubert (1963, cf. once more the
or by management in the above-mentioned sense. quotation above and our Table I which repeats
Unless one employs a purely attitudinal and/or Aubert’s dichotomy).
behavioral conflict definition, the core criterion in With or without such a typology in mind, one
the conflict-as-unit case and of a possible conflict-as- should leave it an open empirical question if (and
unit solution is incompatibility or a contradiction of how) moral conflict bases or moral significance of
party interests and/or moral positions. The following conflicts affect conflict history – how conflict cases,
fivefold typology (Figure 4, source: Galtung, 1965, conflict levels, conflict attitudes, behaviors and
p. 351 and still Galtung, 2003, p. 11, 26 – authors’ contents or conflict management develop, if self-
simplification) can serve as an illustration. administered moral conflict management is more
For the conflict-as-property concept tradition one difficult (as claimed by Aubert), or not.
can refer to another fivefold typology, of conflict
management styles (cf., widely quoted, Thomas, 1976,
quoted here after Weiss, 1996, p. 171): Five assumptions about moral conflict in (business)
organizations
Moral conflict defined
Related to the distinctions presented above, we see
‘‘Moral conflicts are conflicts between moral claims five fruitful assumptions when it comes to
that may face persons or groups or communities or understanding conflict in business organization

TABLE I
A comparison of moral versus non-moral conflict

Non-moral conflict Moral conflict
Focus Incompatible interests Incompatible moral positions
Action Ends-rational Value-rational
Perception Rational perception Tendency towards judgemental perception
Outcome Negotiable Often non-negotiable, hence imposed sen-
tence or segregation


(or not). Sooner or later, conflict analysis will turn
Assertive Competing Collaborating into an analysis of incompatibilities and of incom-
(satisfying one’s
own concerns) patibility removal (cf. still Bergstrom, 1970, esp. his
¨
figure on p. 213 and once more Galtung’s recent
Compromising book, 2003). To Galtung, the proper handling of a
conflict is ideally a question of conflict transcendence.
In other words, any conflict outcome is sub-optimal
as long as better, more fruitful conflict transcendence
Unassertive Avoiding Accomodating
is possible (following Aubert, 1963, one could assume
that value conflict transcendence is more difficult
Uncooperative Cooperative
(satisfying the other party’s concerns) than a transcendence of measurable interests).
A conflict case solution means often the same as a
Figure 5. Thomas’ conflict management style typology. transcendence of a logical contradiction towards a
contradiction-free final statement. As a contrast,
conflict-as-property, e.g. in the conflict-and-con-
contexts, with a weaker or stronger moral compo- sensus-antinomy represents a dialectical contradic-
nent: tion.6 In an older paper Pruzan and Thyssen (1990)
offer an interesting elaboration of the conflict versus
(1) Conflict as system property and single conflict consensus antinomy, which is of special interest here
cases are normal rather than exceptional in since it builds a bridge to another important antin-
organizations. Moral conflict can often be a omy, of morality versus ethics:
sign of cultural and moral diversity.
(2) Conflict or conflict cases, moral ones or not, ‘‘In a pluralistic society there is no agreement as to what
should be dealt with constructively, as long as is morally right and wrong. Each subculture maintains
such conflict management is not biased and its own values and therefore its own discriminatory
respects the given conflict(s) on their own norms as part of its identity. This creates a variety of
premises. morals. No formal arguments can substantiate one
(3) Moral conflict can represent a (productive) subculture’s moral principles and deny the validity of
test of principles and identity, i.e. it can another’s … The question is whether it is possible to
provoke and engages often more than non- develop a set of values which are shared among the
subcultures and which can contribute to replacing such
moral conflict (for a similar reason, moral
confrontation within a political culture, which respects
blaming and moralizing can create conflict conflicts and differences and still is able to create con-
escalation and often function destructively). sensus … When subcultures cannot justify their own
(4) Ethics represents a chance to handle intra- rules for right and wrong via intuition or an appeal to
organizational conflict of different kinds (i.e. universally valid rules, what is required if groups with
moral or non-moral conflict) in a civilized different moral rules are to coexist can be considered as
and constructive manner. a second order morality. We will call this second order
(5) The question of conflict outcomes repeats the morality ‘ethics’ … Ethics is distinguished from juris-
ambiguity between conflict cases (units) and prudence by its search for the legitimate rather than just
conflict as system property. Conflict cases can the legal. An action or decision is legitimate if it can be
end, i.e. have outcomes, while conflict as rationally accepted by all stakeholders. Ethics is also
property cannot ‘‘end’’, but continues, in- distinguished from morality. Moral rules are rules for
dissolving substantive conflicts within a subculture. In a
creases or decreases, modified or not.
pluralistic society ethics leads to value-oriented com-
munication aimed at dissolving conflicts in the social
The last assumption suggests that conflict manage- relationships between subcultures. A gap arises between
ment should be sustainable. The typologies with the moral substance, created by the tradition of a sub-
different conflict management styles and outcome culture, and the ethical form, created by the need for
types (cf. Figures 3–5 above) are less a question of non-violent coexistence of many traditions and sub-
truth than of usefulness for further conflict analyses cultures …’’ (1990, pp. 136–137).


TABLE II and should follow from combining casuistry with a
A comparison of morality and ethics discourse ethics approach, claiming that the parties
own their conflict case.
Morality Ethics
Subcultural Intercultural
Internal External A few references
Particularist Universalist
Potentially furthering Potentially furthering A quick literature search indicates that there are only
conflict conflict solution (consensus) a few business ethics sources, which provide a more
Moral substance Ethics as legitimate form (in comprehensive presentation of casuistry as a useful
contrast to legal forms) and important method for our field. The first source
is Ciulla’s (1994) short but thorough history of phi-
One could try to simplify the two authors’ way losophy presentation and literature review of casuistic
of reasoning by still another simple typology (see thinking, printed in a business ethics anthology.
Table II). Calkins (2001) addresses the compatibility of casu-
For the remainder of the paper the focus will be istry and the business case method, by describing the
on conflicts as units, i.e. conflicts as cases, shortened key features of casuistry and the case method, not
or not, possibly with additional information available least as inductive and practical methods of reasoning
from the individual parties in the case. As already with a focus on particular settings and real-life situ-
indicated above, the suggestion is that moral conflict ations. A similar, more general professional ethics
cases should, as a start, be described and understood focus is found in Toulmin’s paper (1973) who claims
as conflicts, that professional or applied ethics, in this case medical
ethics, ‘‘saved the life of ethics’’, by forcing it back to
real-life moral conflict diagnosis and prescription.
• with a focus on attitudinal, behavioral and
Boeyink (1992) who is concerned with journalism
incompatibility aspects whenever appropriate,
ethics discusses casuistry as a method and a ‘‘middle
• as conflicts or interest, of values or as a com-
ground’’ between practice and principle. As a third
bination of both,
applied ethics example one could refer to another
• which balance between loyalty to the conflict
piece of work of Calkins, showing how casuistry
and conflict management considerations,
could handle the triangle conflict between GM-food
• and not least which make learning from the
proponents, GM-food opponents and the farmers in
handling of the single conflict relevant to future
between (2002). Calkins is optimistic when it comes
conflict handling.
to potential synergies between casuistry and virtue
ethics.8 Our contention is that there is a need for
‘‘much more’’ casuistic business ethics, i.e., we claim
that casuistry represents an important and underuti-
Casuistry – case-focused moral philosophy lized9 potential for both academic and practitioner
business ethicists. As a first step towards a substanti-
If one’s ambition is to outline how moral philosophy ation of such a claim we will now draft a critical and
can make sure that a given moral conflict case is not constructive overview of the potential benefits and
only described and understood on its own premises, weaknesses of the casuistic method.
but also evaluated on its own premises, there is no
way around casuistry as a philosophical tradition.
The challenge is first to take a critical look at the Casuistry – a negative or a neutral term?
potential strengths and weaknesses of such an ap-
proach. In a next step, one could ask how ethical One standard definition of casuistry can be found in
casuistry could function without the power standing the Oxford English Dictionary: ‘‘Casuistry is that
behind legal casuistry (following from law positivity, part of ethics which resolves cases of conscience,
‘‘legality’’).7 In our opinion, such legitimacy could applying the general rules of religion and morality to


particular instances in which circumstances alter cases or reflection: ‘‘‘Business ethics’ … is to ethics what soft
in which there appears to be a conflict of duties’’ porn is to the Platonic Eros; soft porn too talks of
(our italics).10 This definition is standard in its ref- something it calls ‘love’. And insofar as ‘business
erence to conflict situations but narrow in its ethics’ comes even close to ethics, it comes close to
unnecessary reference to specified systems of norms casuistry and will, predictably, end up as a fig leaf for
such as legal rule systems or Christian moral theo- the shameless and as special pleading for the pow-
logy. Another and even more important definition erful and the wealthy.’’ (1981, p. 34). Drucker’s
criterion of the casuistic method should be its main concern is business ethics instrumentalization,
inductive, analogical, and dialectical form of argu- not least by cynical profit seekers.14 Drucker’s
mentation, independently of such specified systems. expectation seems to be that ethical theory without
We should therefore rather like to follow the defi- virtuous habits and attitudes makes one clever rather
nition of casuistry suggested by Ruyter (1995, p. 9)11 than moral.15 In their interesting paper ‘‘A reply to
as a ‘‘… case-oriented and example-based way of Peter Drucker’’ Hoffman and Moore (1982) depart
argumentation (…) Morally relevant similarity be- from the premise that casuistry to them ‘‘remains an
tween good examples and the situation of moral important aspect of ethical reasoning’’. In a next step
doubt can be used as an argument for similar treat- Drucker is criticized for his pejorative interpretation
ment of the new case, while morally relevant dif- and use of the term casuistry and then for blaming
ferences can be used as an argument against such Business ethics for being casuistry.16 To them,
similar treatment. Arguments for and against need to casuistry has to do with ‘‘the application of general
be balanced which in turn requires good judgment. principles in specific circumstances’’, thus repre-
Usually such an approach can lead to a preliminary senting ‘‘the mechanical aspect of ethics’’ (p. 297).
conclusion with more or less hypothetical and Klein (2000), with a focus on Drucker’s more
acceptable solutions. Such a way of argumentation comprehensive management works, concludes that
furthers dialogue and aims at reaching a consensus Drucker is a ‘‘business moralist’’, that he really ‘‘takes
…’’ (authors’ free translation from Ruyter, 1995, business ethics seriously’’ and that he holds an
p. 9). ‘‘essentially Platonic’’ view of business manager
The label matters, too. Instead of the dyslogism12 responsibility.
of ‘‘casuistry’’ we should prefer the German/Nor-
wegian/Scandinavian term Kasuistik. In this way one
could avoid the pejorative connotation related to the Strengths of casuistry
abuse of casuistry in its mature period from 1650 to
1750, with moral probabilism and moral minimalism With reference to Jonsen and Toulmin’s use of
as the main blame. During this period the French casuistry in a National Commission (for the Pro-
philosopher Blaise Pascal started his powerful attack tection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
of the Paris Jesuits in his Provincial Letters (1656). Not Behavioral Research, in 1974) Keenan (1998) con-
least due to Pascal, the word casuistry carries a siders modern casuistry as ‘‘a moral taxonomy for
negative connotation. But casuistry criticism is older. distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable ways of
The founding father of Protestantism, Martin Luther involving humans as subjects in medical or behav-
(1483–1546) included the most famous casuistry ioral research’’, i.e. as different from 16th century
textbook of his time (Angelus Claretus’ Summa casuists’ use of it, due to contemporary complexity
Angelica) in his bonfire of books in 1520, since he being based on an incommensurable diversity of
judged it to be destructive to Christian faith.13 ethical systems. In a next step Keenan (1998) dem-
onstrates the sustainability of casuistry as a conse-
quence of its turn to the subject and emphasis of
‘‘Business ethics’’ as casuistry context dependency. Deontology and consequen-
tialism are in effect inhibiting the beliefs of the
The abuse of casuistry is not unknown to contem- commission members, i.e. functioning as ideologies.
porary business writers. The following quotation of Casuistry ‘‘on the other hand (is) a formal conveyor,
Peter Drucker is worth while sharing and further a translucent mediator bringing beliefs more directly


into the concrete world … Casuistry is free of such totelian sense, so to speak as a quality insurance (cf.
ideological biases … because … casuistry is ‘pre- also MacIntyre, 1984, pp. 152–155, Jonsen and
theoretical’…’’ (Keenan, 1998, p. 165). The one bias Toulmin’s view, 1988 and once more Calkins,
of casuistry is its suspiciousness towards ‘‘ideology’’ 2002).18
and ‘‘generalities’’. Therefore casuistry represents
and expresses the beliefs that form us, the practitio-
ners’ way of thinking17, their presuppositions and Casuistry as a procedure for moral conflict management
presumptions. Furthermore, casuistry is ‘‘… unin-
telligible as an activity separated from its communal Casuistry has more or less implicit theoretical
context …’’ (Keenan, 1998, p. 166). assumptions. Most important, perhaps, is the
assumption of inductive reasoning. Moral decision
making should be organized bottom up rather than
Weaknesses of casuistry top down, or with the words of Buchholz and
Rosenthal (2001, p. 28) claiming that ‘‘a sense of
Even more important, perhaps, than an awareness moral rightness comes not from indoctrination of
and exploitation of the potential strengths of casu- abstract principles but from attunement to the way
istry is an awareness and avoidance of its weaknesses. in which moral beliefs and practices must be rooted
This concerns less the traditionally bad reputation of naturally in the very conditions of human exis-
casuistry addressed already than a number of more tence.’’ Beyond their main thesis that classical
specific traps or limitations. After quoting more American Pragmatism could link principle and case
well-known objections such as ‘‘lack of critical dis- approaches they show that moral reasoning demands
tance, … methodological stringency and determi- a return to concrete situations as the very foundation
nacy’’ and in addition mentioning a possible for context-sensitive moral decision making. We
conservative bias, Ruyter (2003) lists altogether five have now returned where the paper started: casuistry
limitations ‘‘worthwhile considering’’ (presentation is, essentially, a practical procedure for moral conflict
shortened, in part extended and reformulated by management.
authors): As such ‘‘moral conflict management’’ it starts
with a problematic case, a case that contains some
1. the authentic case is not as self-evident as often conflict. Keenan (1998) suggests using the threat of
presented (but normally ‘‘constructed’’, i.e., AIDS as an example, since it (like the threat of nu-
exposed to selective perception, authors’ add); clear war) forces us to rethink our moral principles
2. case solutions are typically ‘‘probable’’, i.e., and presuppositions (p. 167). Then follows a search for
often neither acceptable to most stakeholders paradigm cases i.e. resolved accounts of real-life situ-
nor resolutions in a stricter sense; ations or ‘‘touchstone cases that have intrinsic and
3. casuistry can be narrow-minded, i.e., can extrinsic certitude’’ (Calkins, 2001). The interesting
overlook larger perspectives and should be question is, of course, what makes a case paradig-
supplemented by an interdisciplinary perspec- matic. According to Aristotle, there are five paradigm
tive; types (distinguished by acknowledgement types,
4. there is a tendency and temptation to overstate endoxa), where a case either is recognized by all, by a
similarities and analogies across cases; majority, by the wise, by most wise, by the most
5. there is no easy way of identifying paradigm well-known and respectable among the wise,
cases – conscious and cautious use of analogies respectively.19 Another alternative of paradigm
‘‘in order to assure relevance and significance legitimacy could be tradition, i.e. case testing over a
in the comparison of context embedded long time.20 As Keenan (1998) demonstrates with
cases’’(p. 11). AIDS as a case, it is indeed a challenge to find a
paradigmatic case with fruitful and interesting paral-
The remedy against actual or potential weaknesses of lels (relevant similarities) to the present case. On the
casuistry (formulated by Ruyter or others) is perhaps other hand, modern information technology makes it
simply a ‘‘virtuous user’’ requirement in the Aris- much easier to find, classify, store and retrieve


facts: particular
moral conflict paradigmatic
case with con- case(s)
ceptualizations
of properties
C1, C2, C3 etc.
(cf. above)
weighing provisional
non- conclusion
uniqueness about the
against present case
uniqueness (“presumably
of the case so”)
norms,
e.g. “treat equal
cases equally”,
“respect the absent
particular case” exceptional
and other circumstances
general norms (“rebuttals”)

Figure 6. Revised and extended from Jonsen and Toulmin, 1988, p. 35.

paradigmatic cases. The next step is inductive • recognizing such cases as conflict cases (or even
analogical reasoning. Deliberation (pro aut contra dicere) better as a range of different conflict types,
draws analogies between the paradigm case and the discovered and focused on by different con-
present situation, attempting to identify relevant ceptualizations) and
similarities and differences. Such dialectical argu- • recognizing popular case analysis as a kind of
mentation consists in a dialogue-based attempt to casuistry light raising the same critical main
promote critical ethical reflection, departing from question as casuistry, namely to weigh
common acknowledged meanings, through ques- uniqueness and exceptions against general and
tions and answers, arguments and counter-arguments generalization considerations, balancing be-
(cf. Ruyter, 1995, p. 13 note 20). According to tween justice to the specific case in its context
Ruyter (1995) this very step makes the casuistic and justice more generally across cases.
method more action-oriented, because one asks for
arguments, which can lead to recommendations or In addition, one should not forget the typical
solutions. Brown’s argumentative model has also a lot ambiguity of models or approaches.22 On the one
in common with casuistry (see 1990, ch. 3).21 Brown hand a model or an approach (e.g. a conflict con-
asserts that such a way of reasoning stimulates ethical cept) may be better than none; on the other hand
reflection, because it shows the necessity of value any focus includes a risk of overlooking non-focused
judgments and assumptions in making policy deci- aspects and narrowing rather than opening up our
sions. In other words, casuists are not satisfied with an minds. The best remedy against such narrowness or
abstract discussion of theoretical necessity and eternal bias is a similar kind of approach combination as it is
conclusions. Figure 6 summarizes the casuistic way well known from research methodology – triangu-
of resolving moral conflicts as problems. lation.
Figure 6 can be read as a repetition of the main
thoughts in the different sections of this paper. We
claim that any shortcut from moral conflict case Open end: Casuistic moral conflict
descriptions to checklists is problematic. Conflict management
theory and casuistry can hopefully delay and im-
prove case description and understanding as an What is a vice in a research report financed by the
alternative to jumping to a quick solution, by business community is a virtue at a conference


where researchers meet. We are offering a number aspects of a case, in a similar way as what is meant by
of open questions and suggestions for a discussion the term casuistry, used in a derogative way. Donaldson
about desirable future work and possible research talks of the case method as ‘‘not foolproof’’, since business
cooperation, rather than a conclusion. cases are necessarily looked at ex post, as static simplifi-
cations, often presented in a hurry with too little
• Having presented both conflict diagnosis and discussion time (Donaldson and Gini, 1993, p. 21).
2
There are further heuristic schemes and distinctions one
casuistry on their own premises prepares a
could have referred to – e.g. checklists of starting
desirable synthesis of these two related ways of questions, such as: who is in conflict with whom, about
thinking. There are also other streams of re- which issues, why, by acting how, with which outcomes and
search which should be taken into consider- consequences, regulated by third parties or relevant institu-
ation when trying out such a synthesis, not least tions (or not – cf. also the checklist provided by Weiss,
discourse ethics for ensuring legitimacy of the 1996, p. 176). In addition, one could have referred to the
procedure.23 traditional social science distinction between micro and
• The possible synergy effects between conflict macro, or even micro-meso-macro system levels. And
theory and casuistry could also be tried out in there are inter- and intra-group-conflict, inter- and intra-
critical-empirical analyses of cases, ranging from organizational conflict. Inter-party-relationships often
standard length single business ethics cases to represent another important conflict dimension, such as
short scenarios. power equality versus inequality, or party autonomy
versus interdependence. If one distinguishes three rela-
• Finally, the topic of this paper could contribute
tionship types (symmetry, superiority, membership) one
to a better theoretical grounding of case can combine this dimension with the micro-macro-
teaching in business ethics.24 dimension to a 15-cell-typology (cf. Dahrendorf, 1972, p.
27, with several examples for each type).
If there is any short and simple conclusion (as a 3
Criteria or good reasons (in terms of the last diagram
repetition of a reference above): in spite of any po- box) could be, e.g., legitimate procedure, rules and
tential weaknesses, casuistry seems indispensable as a principles, desirable/undesirable consequences.
4
method and a ‘‘middle ground’’ between practice The first author’s PhD-thesis (Konfliktpraxis und Rec-
and principle. The alternative seems to be blind htspraxis, Munster and Oslo, 1975) suggests that this
¨
practice and empty principles.25 distinction is the core of the Habermas–Luhmann-
controversy in German social science in the early 1970s,
cf. still Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren, Neuwied,
Acknowledgement 1969 and Habermas and Luhmann, Theorie der Gesellschaft
oder Sozialtechnologie …, Frankfurt, 1971.
5
This quotation could have been continued over half a
We should like to thank, in addition to the
page or so, as an elaboration of the distinction that ‘‘…
reviewers, Tore Nordenstam, Knut W. Ruyter, and
conflict may signify diversity, incompatibility, or incom-
Roberta Wiig Berg for valuable help with comments mensurability … (ibid., p. 9). These quotations are taken
and native language proof-reading. Any remaining from a text which is a convincing bridge-builder between
imperfections are, of course, the authors’ responsi- social science and moral philosophy (the latter looked at
bility. from outside), eventually ending up with a liberal defense
of taking moral conflict seriously and making sense of it,
as opposed to its ‘enemies’, i.e. moral philosophers who
Notes try not to make sense of it (cf. esp. pp. 3–5 and p. 20). For
a less theoretically and more practically sophisticated
1
Cf. e.g. van Luijk (1994, pp. 6–7) who distinguishes conceptualization of moral conflict see e.g. the book by
between two dangers of case-teaching. A ‘‘minor, Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997, which includes the following
didactical’’ danger overemphasizes case-teaching (hoping suggestion: ‘‘Although abstract definitions of moral
that many cases per se generate understanding and of conflicts are useful for certain purposes, they should not
looking at cases as puzzles to be solved by almost guessing be pushed too far. Matters of definition involve a
one solution only, instead of focusing on balancing necessary trade-off between abstract terms that are useful
arguments and comparing cases). A ‘‘major, normative’’ for delineating categories and more specific terms that
danger overemphasizes and excuses the exceptional help describe actual events …’’ (p. 50).

6
The difference between these two contradiction types considered casuistry to be more than devilish (plus quam
is not always clear, since finding – or guessing – a logical diabolica).
14
contradiction transcendence is one thing while marketing Jonsen and Toulmin (1988) remind us of the double
it can be quite another. As indicated above, conflict and roots of casuistry, both in moral philosophy and in
consensus almost form a dialectic opposition, where rhetorics traditions, the latter with a major purpose of
conflict and consensus concepts define one another, test inventing arguments likely to convince an audience.
15
and transcend one another and offer critical evaluation Cf. similarly Williams, 1982, p. 19: ‘‘Morality is
criteria for one another. It has also been mentioned that primarily a way of life, an ethos, and what one does in
the conflict versus consensus theme is one of the classical business ethics courses is to reflect on the ethos and its
antinomies in social science. See in addition to the two implications for business practice.’’
16
classical works of Dahrendorf (1958, 1959) textbook In the same paper Hoffman and Moore also offer an
chapters and sections such as Ritzer (1996, ch. 7), Wallace insightful analysis of a case with conflicting moral
and Wolf (1995, ch. 3), Collins (1994). obligations (Henry VIII’s dilemma to divorce Catherine
7
There is another important difference between morality of Aragon versus ‘‘to govern his country wisely’’).
17
and law, which needs to be mentioned. Law has typically Cf. Toulmin’s formulation, quoted by Keenan (1998,
a strong preference for predictability, precedences and note 14): ‘‘… Catholic principles say more about
prejudicats (cf. the stare decisis rule – what is decided Catholics than about the issue they are addressing …’’
18
should not be changed). Morality, on the other hand, is A virtuous person would simply not instrumentalize
not necessarily bound by precedences, but rather a ethics in order to obtain disputable purposes. In particular,
question of what is fair in the given situation, all things phronesis (or prudence, practical wisdom) is the most
considered (cf. Sundby, 1978, p. 291). relevant virtue for casuistry. In a strict sense, phronesis is
8
Calkins (2002) also suggests searching for more exem- not an ethical but an intellectual virtue (such as techne,
plary ‘‘hero’’ stories – such as the one of the 1970 Noble nous, episteme and sophia), though intimately connected to
Peace Prize winner Nils Borlaug. ethical virtues (cf. Aristotle, 1985, e.g. book 6, 1139 b11–
9
According to Jonsen and Toulmin (1988) such b18). Cf. also Toulmin’s references to Aristotelian
‘‘underutilization’’ of the casuistic method is partly due arguments in favor of casuistry (1973, pp. 93–95),
to its (pre-modern) abuse by the Jesuits and to the MacIntyre’s illustration case for the importance of
(modern) drive towards deductive and abstract science. Aritotelian phronesis (the Wampanoag Indians’ tribal land
10
Cf. Ciulla’s (1994) definition of casuistry, as ‘‘… the art claim case, 1984, pp. 133–134), or as more general
of reasoning from cases. The Latin word ‘casus’ means the supplementary readings of Wheelwright, (1935). Differ-
falling away or declension of a noun. By analogy, the term ent terms are used in different translations. While T. Irwin
‘casuistry’ implies a kind of deflection or falling away from uses the term ‘‘intelligence’’ and Wheelwright uses
a law or principle. Casuistry serves the dual purpose of ‘‘sagacity’’, we prefer the term phronesis, or practical
applying principles to cases and using cases to help us wisdom as used in Aristoteles’ Nicomachean Ethics (trans-
understand and sometimes alter principles …’’ (p. 172). lated by Ross), Oxford University Press 1925, or in Den
Cf. also the short casuistry definition suggested by Calkins ˚
Nikomakiske etikk (translated by Ø. Rabbas and A. Stigen
(2002), as ‘‘… a method of moral deliberation that relies to Norwegian), Bokklubben Dagens bøker, Oslo, 1999.
on settled cases to resolve present moral dilemmas. It has The emphasis on phronesis in Aristotelian ethics means
users reach a decision about an ambiguous present that practical issues should be discussed and deliberated in
situation by comparing that situation to previous incidents ‘‘rhetorical’’ terms. Rhetorics and ethics are both practical
in which judgments have already been rendered.’’ (p. 312) fields where formal proofs or intellectual precision are
11
About casuistry as an attempt to practical handling of a replaced by real life-experience.
19
particular, morally difficult situation cf. Jonsen and About moral probabilism (see Jonsen and Toulmin,
Toulmin (1988, p. 13). 1988, pp. 164 –175).
12 20
Cf. Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary (Collins, Such an aspect of ‘‘acknowledged meaning’’ builds, by
et al., 1987: ‘‘ … reasoning that is extremely subtle and the way, a bridge between the casuistic tradition and
designed to mislead people…’’ See Jonsen and Toulmin, common, empirical morality – i.e., a paradigmatic case
1988 about the word ending -ry in the word ‘‘casuistry’’ solution must be acceptable in the context where it
which communicates family resemblance to other dyslo- applies.
21
gistic terms such as wizardry, ‘‘sophistry’’, ‘‘harlotry’’ and Brown elaborates on Stephen Toulmin’s five-concept
‘‘popery’’. argumentative model (conclusion, data, warrant, backing,
13
According to Ruyter (1995, p. 122), Luther suggested and qualification; cf. also Figure 2 in Jonsen and Toul-
Summa diabolica as a more suitable title because he min, 1988, p. 35).

22
Cf., almost as a paradigmatic case, Allison (1971) about Brinkmann, J.: 2002a, ‘Moral Reflection Differences
the 1962 Cuba Crisis, referring to three organizational among Norwegian Business Students’, Teaching Busi-
‘‘conceptual lenses or frames of reference, or perspec- ness Ethics 6, 83–99.
tives’’ for explaining the course of events, with an Brinkmann, J.: 2002b, ‘Marketing Ethics as Professional
emphasis on (exploring, authors’ add.) ‘‘… the influence Ethics. Concepts, Approaches and Typologies’, Journal
of unrecognized assumptions upon our thinking about of Business Ethics 41, 159–177.
events like the missile crisis … (By, authors’ add.) ‘‘… Brown, M. T.: 1990, Working Ethics. Strategies for Decision
comparing and contrasting the three frameworks, we see Making and Organizational Responsibility (Jossey-Bass
what each magnifies, highlights, and reveals as well as Publishers, San Francisco).
what each blurs or neglects …’’ (Allison, 1971, p. v) Buchholz, R. and S. B. Rosenthal: 2001, ‘A Philosoph-
23
We are aware of the important differences between ical Framework for Case Studies’ Journal of Business
discourse ethics universalism and casuistic particularism. Ethics 29, 25–31.
There is some complementarity, too. The acknowledge- Burton, J. and F. Dukes: 1990, Conflict: Readings in
ment of different views within casuistry, for example, Management and Resolution (Macmillan, London).
could profit from the discourse ethics approach to reaching Chonko, L. B.: 1995, Ethical Decision Making in Marketing
a consensus, cf. once more Pruzan and Thyssen, 1990. (Thousand Oaks CA, Sage).
24
Cf., perhaps as a paradigm, Ruyter’s paper about how Calkins, M.: 2001, ‘Casuistry and the Business Case
to teach bioethics (2003). Method’, Business Ethics Quarterly 11, 237–259.
25
Cf. C. Wright Mills’ classical sociology-quotation of Calkins, M.: 2002, ‘How Casuistry and Virtue Ethics Might
empty theory (without data) and blind data (without Break the Ideological Stalemate Troubling Agricultural
theory) in Sociological Imagination (Penguin, Harmonds- Biotechnology’, Business Ethics Quarterly 12, 305–330.
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the bicycle (practice) with the balloon (ethical theory), Ethics’ in T. Donaldson and R. E. Freeman (eds.),
referred to and recycled by Ruyter (2003). Business as a Humanity (University Press, New York),
pp. 167–181.
Collins, R.: 1994, Four Sociological Traditions (Oxford
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