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50 Important Judgments for CLAT PG 2022 by RostrumLegal
Page 1 of 170
Table of Contents
ABHILASHA V. PARKASH AND ORS............................................................................................ 4
ANURADHA BHASIN V. UNION OF INDIA ................................................................................. 7
ANUSHREE GOYAL V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS...........................................10
APARNA BHAT V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ...............................................................12
ARNAB RANJAN GOSWAMI V. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS .......................................15
B.K. PAVITRA V. UNION OF INDIA............................................................................................19
BAGLEKAR AKASH KUMAR V. GOOGLE LLC..........................................................................23
COMMITTEE OF CREDITORS OF ESSAR STEEL INDIA LIMITED V. SATISH KUMAR
GUPTA AND OTHERS....................................................................................................................26
DANAMMA @ SUMAN SURPUR & ANR. V. AMAR & ORS....................................................29
DEVILAL V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ...........................................................................33
GANESH PATEL V. UMAKANT RAJORIA..................................................................................37
GAUTAM NAVLAKHA V. NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY.......................................39
IN RE: PRASHANT BHUSHAN AND ANR. ALLEGED CONTEMNOR(S) ............................42
INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION V. STATE OF KERALA....................................47
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA V. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA ......50
JARNAIL SINGH V. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA......................................................................52
JOSEPH SHINE V. UNION OF INDIA...........................................................................................56
KERALA UNION OF WORKING JOURNALISTS V. UNION OF INDIA ................................59
LALIT KUMAR JAIN V. UNION OF INDIA .................................................................................61

Page 2 of 170
MANISH KUMAR V. UNION OF INDIA.......................................................................................64
MOHD UMAIR @ UMER V. STATE (GOVT NCT OF DELHI) AND ORS.............................69
M/S. IMPERIA STRUCTURES LTD. V. ANIL PATNI...............................................................72
MUKESH KUMAR V. THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND ........................................................75
MUKIS V. STATE OF U.P. ..............................................................................................................78
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR V. UNION OF INDIA............................................................................80
PARAMVIR SINGH V. BALJIT SINGH.........................................................................................84
PRATHVI RAJ CHAUHAN V. UNION OF INDIA.......................................................................86
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA V. STATE(GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) ........................................89
RAJEEV SURI V. UNION OF INDIA, 2021 .................................................................................92
RAMANAND AND ORS V. DR. GIRISH SONI AND ANR.........................................................96
RAMBABU SINGH THAKUR V. SUNIL ARORA & ORS....................................................... 100
S. KASI V. STATE THROUGH THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE............................................. 105
SATISH CHANDER AHUJA V. SNEHA AHUJA ....................................................................... 107
SATISH RAGDE V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA .................................................................. 111
SAURABH SHARMA V. SUB DIVISIONAL MAGISTRATE.................................................. 115
SHAFIN JAHAN V. ASOKAN KM............................................................................................... 118
SHAFIN JAHAN V. K. M. ASHOKAN......................................................................................... 122
SHAFIYA KHAN AND SHAKUNTALA PRAJAPATI V. STATE OF UP.............................. 126
SHAKTI VAHINI V. UNION OF INDIA..................................................................................... 129
SHAYARA BANO V. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ................................................................ 133

Page 3 of 170
SHILPA MITTAL V. STATE OF NCT DELHI AND ORS........................................................ 137
SHREYA SINGHAL V. UNION OF INDIA................................................................................. 139
SUSHILA AGGARWAL AND OTHERS V. STATE (NCT OF DELHI) AND ANOTHER... 142
SWAPNIL TRIPATHI V. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ....................................................... 146
THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE V. BABITA PUNIYA & ORS. ..................... 148
TOFAN SINGH V. STATE OF TAMIL NADU........................................................................... 152
UNION OF INDIA V. KA NAJEEB .............................................................................................. 156
VIDYA DEVI V. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS................................................. 161
VIKAS KUMAR V. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION.............................................. 165
VINEETA SHARMA V. RAKESH SHARMA & OTHERS........................................................ 167

Page 4 of 170
Abhilasha v. Parkash and Ors
Citation - Cri. Appeal No. 615 of 2020
Bench - Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy, M.R. Shah
Date - 15 September, 2020
Facts of the Case
The purpose of this appeal is to challenge the High Court's decision. A woman filed
an application under section 125 of the CrPC against her husband, claiming
maintenance for herself and her three children. The application of the petitioner and
two of her children was denied by the Judicial Magistrate. When the daughter filed
an application for maintenance under section 125 of the CrPC when she was a
juvenile, the magistrate dismissed the case, limiting the daughter's ability to claim
maintenance until she reaches the age of majority. The High Court dismissed the
claim under section 482 of the CrPC, holding that the appellant is not entitled to
maintenance because she has reached majority and is not suffering from any mental
or physical abnormality. The appellant argued that, despite having reached majority
in 2005 and being free of any medical or mental illness, she is entitled to
maintenance from her father under section 20 of the Act of 1956 until she marries.
Issues
1. Whether the appellant is entitled to claim maintenance from her father under
section 125 of CrPC, when she already attained majority and she is not suffering
from any mental or physical disorder but still she is unmarried?
2. Whether the order passed by Judicial Magistrate and the Revisional Court
limiting the appellant’s claim until she attains majority deserves to be set aside
with a direction to the respondent to continue to give maintenance until she is
married?
Laws
1. S. 125, CrPC
2. S. 20(3), Hindu Adoptions and Maintainence Act, 1956

Page 5 of 170
3. S. 482, CrPC
Arguments
The daughter can claim maintenance until she marries, according to the appellant's
lawyer, but this argument was dismissed only on the grounds that she is not suffering
from any mental or physical abnormalities or fatal harm. The child's claim is limited
under Section 125 of the CrPC until they reach the age of majority. By virtue of
section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, a daughter who has
reached majority and is not suffering from any mental or physical disease or fatal
damage can claim maintenance from her father until she marries.
The court held in Lnanak Chand vs. Shri Chandra Kishore Agarwala and Others that
section 488 CrPC. allows a prompt remedy and simple procedure before the
magistrate court against starving of the deserted wife or kid. It is applicable to all
people of all religions. The Family Court also has the authority to issue orders
relating to the support of the wife, children, and elderly parents, which can be
exercised by a Magistrate of First-class under Chapter IX of the CrPC. Where a family
court has not been formed, cases involving the maintenance of the wife, children, and
elderly parents must be brought before the District Court or a subordinate court.
According to the learned counsel for the appellant, an unmarried Hindu woman can
claim maintenance from her father if she argues and establishes that she is unable to
support herself, and that the application for enforcement of such entitlement must be
made under section 20(3) of the Act of 1956.
Judgement
The court while giving its judgement said that under section 125 of the CrPC,
maintenance to a daughter who has reached majority can only be granted if she is
suffering from a mental or physical abnormality or a fatal disability that renders her
incapable of supporting herself. In this case, the petitioner does not appear to be
suffering from any of the injuries listed in section 125, but the question is whether
the daughter is entitled to support until she marries according to section 20 of Hindu
Adoptions and Maintenance Act.

Page 6 of 170
In Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum 1985 AIR 945 it was held that the term
'wife' encompasses not only wedded wives but also women who have married by
following the necessary ceremonies prescribed by personal law.
In Jagdish Jugtawat v. Manju Lata and Others I (2001) DMC 605, the court held that
Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 recognises the
wife's entitlement to support under Section 125 and the minor daughter's right to
maintenance from her parents after achieving majority till marriage. Section 20(3)
deals with the Hindu's legal obligation to support his or her elderly parents and
children, especially unmarried daughters who are unable to support themselves on
their own income.
The court reached its decision based on a combined reading of section 125 of the
CrPC, which is a narrow concept that provides relief to the applicant, and section
20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, which is a broader
concept that relates to ordering for the wife's, children's, and parents' maintenance.
As a result, it recognised the appellant's claim as an unmarried daughter seeking
maintenance from her father under section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and
Maintenance Act, 1956.

Page 7 of 170
Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India
Citation - (2020) 3 SCC 637
Court - Supreme Court of India
Bench - N.V. Ramana and V. Ramasubramanian
Date of Judgement - 10/01/2020
Facts of the Case
The President of India issued Constitutional Order 272 on 05/08/2019 applying all
provisions of the constitution of India in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.The DMs
of various districts invoked powers vested unto them under Section 144 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure which restricted movement and public gatherings on the
apprehension of breach of peace and tranquillity. The petitioner (Executive editor
of Kashmir Times) was aggrieved by restrictions imposed on movement and
communication of journalists, which was hindering the media professionals to
practice their profession and sought an issuance of an appropriate writ to quash all
orders by the respondent which put a bar on any mode of communication and
therefore enable the media to practice its profession while asking the respondent to
create a safe environment for media to work in and also pleaded for the framing of
guidelines to ensure that the rights and means of media personnel to report and
publish news is not unreasonably curtailed.
Issues
1. Whether the Government can claim exemption from producing all the orders
passed under Section 144 Cr.P.C and other orders under the Suspension Rules?
2. Whether the freedom of speech and expression and freedom to practice any
profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business over the internet is a
part of the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution?
3. Whether the Government’s action of prohibiting internet access is valid?
4. Whether the imposition of restrictions under Section 144 CrPC was valid?
5. Whether the freedom of press of the petitioner in WP (C) No. 1031 of 2019 was
violated due to the restrictions?

Page 8 of 170
Laws
1. The Information Technology Act,2000
2. Section 144 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
3. The Suspension Rules under Section 7 of the Telegraph Act
4. Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act
Contentions made by the Petitioners
It was contended that print media had stopped functioning which is a very important
aspect of modern press due to non-availability of internet and also the petitioner had
not been able to work post 05/08/2019 due to the various restrictions imposed.
The petitioner requested for a test of “reasonableness and proportionality” since it is
necessary for any law curbing the rights of speech and expression to pass the
aforementioned test.
The indefinite restriction on telecom services was arbitrary and contrary to
Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety)
Rules, 2017 where it was contemplated that the restrictions imposed on telecom
services would be of temporary nature and therefore asserted that there was non-
application of mind and also no reasoning justifying the restrictions was given as is
required under the suspension rules.
The situation at the time when the orders were passed did not warrant the passing of
the orders resulting in restrictions.
Contentions made by the Respondents
It was contended that the measures taken were taken in consideration of the high
frequency of internal militancy and cross-border terrorism in the state of Jammu and
Kashmir.
The restrictions imposed are for ensuring safety of citizens based on ground reports
and the facts of petitioners were incorrect.

Page 9 of 170
Internet is very fast and useful for communication from both the sides unlike
newspaper and can be used to spread fake messages and incite violence and has been
used for such purposes many times already even before the abrogation of article 370.
Restrictions were being put on the basis of threat perception and were being relaxed
where they were not required such as in Ladakh and other regions of Jammu where
restrictions were not imposed, proving that the suspension rules were not imposed
without application of mind.
Judgement
The court ordered the respondent to publish all the orders of restrictions being
passed, so that unlike the petitioners, now people can file a case against any order
which they feel violates their rights.
The freedom of speech and expression and to practice any profession, or to carry on
any occupation, trade or business over the internet is a fundamental right protected
under article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) of the constitution.
The government has the right to impose restrictions on the aforementioned rights
under article 19(2) and 19(6).
The power under section 144 of CrPC can be invoked not only when there exists
present danger but also when there is an apprehension of danger but not for
suppressing any legitimate expression of opinion or grievance or exercise of any
democratic rights.
The orders not in accordance with the rule of law laid must be revoked and if need
arises in future for fresh orders, then the law laid down herein must be followed.

Page 10 of 170
Anushree Goyal v. State of Madhya Pradesh &
Ors.
Citation - WP No. 7739/2020
Bench - S.C. Sharma
Date - 8th June 2020
Facts of the Case
The Petitioner sought custody of her two-year-old child through a habeas corpus writ
petition filed under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. In 2013, the Petitioner
married her husband and moved to the United States (State of Columbus), where
they had a kid in 2018. The Petitioner alleged that her husband and in-laws were
nasty to her and that she had been abused multiple times. The Husband secured an
ex-parte judgement from an American court prohibiting the Petitioner from residing
in her husband's matrimonial residence. She then flew back to India and filed a
police report. She later discovered that her husband and child had returned to India,
and that her daughter was living with her in-laws. She was denied access to her child
despite repeated requests. As a result, the mother filed a writ petition to gain custody
of her child. The Respondents (in-laws) claimed that the Petitioner had abandoned
the kid and that the grandparents were the lawful guardians of the child because the
father had signed a Power of Attorney and Authorization in their behalf. During the
case, an order was issued requiring the grandparents to present the child in court for
the hearings.
Issues
Whether a habeas corpus writ petition can be used for gaining custody of child?
Whether the Petitioner should get the custody of her child?
Laws
Article 226, Constitution of India

Page 11 of 170
Contentions
The Respondents, the Petitioner's in-laws, had argued that a habeas corpus petition
in the case of child guardianship could not be maintained. Regardless, the Court
refused to "throw away" the Petitioner on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction or the
availability of an alternative remedy under the Guardians and Wards Act of 1890.
Judgement
The Respondent had relied on Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 to
raise the question of the High Court's jurisdiction to hear a case involving a child
with U.S. citizenship. The Respondents also stated that the grandparents were the
child's guardians, according to an injunction order issued by the Franklin County
Common Pleas Court, Division of Domestic Relations, Columbus, Ohio. The High
Court dismissed the contention that the injunction order was invalid since it was
silent on the child's case and was issued ex parte. The Court ruled that a writ under
Article 226 can be used to obtain custody of a child under unusual circumstances,
citing Capt. Dushyant Somal v. Sushma Somal ((1981) 2 SCC 277). Despite the fact
that there may be alternative options, habeas corpus would be the best option.
During the court procedures, the Court saw that the child was much happier with his
mother than with his grandparents. And, because he was under the age of 5, the
Court determined that it was in the best interests of the kid for him to be with his
mother, citing the "tender years" criterion and Section 6 of the Guardians and Wards
Act.
Thus, the child's custody was granted to his mother, the Petitioner, but the Court also
stated that the parties may seek custody in the future through a Civil Court under the
Guardians and Wards Act, and that this case would not alter the deliberations and
conclusions of that court.

Page 12 of 170
Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Citation - 2021 SCC OnLine SC 230
Bench - AM Khanwilkar and S. Ravindra Bhat
Date of Judgement - 18.03.2021
Facts of the Case
Advocate Aparna Bhat and eight other lawyers filed the appeal against the impugned
decision issued by the Madhya Pradesh High Court on July 30, in which the accused
of sexual assault was ordered to visit the victim’s home on Raksha Bandhan with
Rakhi and be tied by her as a condition of release.On 20.04.2020, the accused, who
is a neighbour of the complainant Sarda Bai, entered her house and attempted to
sexually harass her, prompting the police to file a FIR for offences punishable under
sections 452, 354A, 323 AND 506 of the Indian Penal Code (hereafter referred to as
IPC). A charge sheet was submitted once the case was investigated.
Under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused filed an
application for anticipatory bail (hereafter referred to as Cr. P.C.). The accused was
granted bail with the condition that he and his wife visit Sarda Bai’s house on the 3rd
of August, 2020, on the festival of Raksha Bandhan, with a box of sweets, and ask her
to tie the Rakhi to him with the promise that he will protect her in the future to the
best of his ability.
The accused was also required to hand over Rs. 11,000 as a gesture of a present given
by brothers to their sisters as part of the customary Raksha Bandhan rites, which the
petitioner has challenged in the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
Issues
Whether such bail conditions imposed by the courts are acceptable or not and how
they can impact society?

Page 13 of 170
Laws
Section 438 of Criminal Procedure Code
Judgement
The Supreme Court thanked the petitioner for the valuable suggestions and quashed
the bail conditions imposed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The court also laid
certain guidelines for the same. It also accepted the suggestions regarding the
inclusion of a gender sensitisation curriculum in law schools, for the bar exam and
also for induction training of newly appointed judges.
Guidelines for judges granting bail in sexual assault cases
Even though the law states that there must be a nexus between the object and
purpose of the bail order and that the order should not harass the individual or
infringe any of their constitutional rights, judges have often crossed this limit while
exercising their judicial discretion. In this case, again, the Supreme court has issued
a slew of directions to be followed by judges while granting bail in cases of sexual
assault. They are:
The bail conditions should not either mandate or require contact between the
accused and the complainant or her family members.
If the court suspects that there might be a threat to the victim, then necessary
protection may be provided.
Whenever bail is granted to the accused, the same should be intimated to the
complainant immediately. A copy of the bail order should also be provided.
The verdict granting bail should limit itself to the CrPc and should not reflect any
stereotype or biasness of the judge and no comments on the conduct, dressing
choice, morals or behaviour of the complainant should be made.
The court should not encourage any kind of relationship between the accused and the
complainant such as granting bail because they are getting married. It should also
not mandate or suggest mediation in cases of rape and sexual assault as this goes
beyond the court’s jurisdiction.

Page 14 of 170
The judge should be sensitive to the prosecutrix and should save her from trauma
during the proceedings.
Such words that threaten to shake the confidence of the victim in the fairness of the
justice system should not be uttered by the judge.

Page 15 of 170
Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India and
others
Citation - Writ Petition (Crl) No. 130 of 2020
Bench - D.Y. Chandrachud and M.R. Shah
Date - May 19, 2020
Facts of the Case
The petition was brought by Arnab Goswami, the Editor-in-Chief of Republic TV, an
English television news channel. He also serves as the Managing Director of ARG
Outlier Media Asianet News Private Limited, which owns and manages R Bharat, a
Hindi television news channel, and anchors new programming on both networks.
Multiple FIRs and criminal charges were filed against Mr. Goswami in the states of
Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Telangana, Jharkhand, and
the UT of Jammu & Kashmir following two programmes on Republic TV on April
16th and 21st, 2020.
Both broadcasts were about an incident that occurred on April 16, 2020 in
Gadchinchle village, Palghar district, Maharashtra, in which three people, including
two sadhus, were brutally murdered by a mob in the presence of police and forest
guard officials. He alleged that Sonia Gandhi, the head of the Indian National
Congress, engineered the Palghar massacre in Maharashtra, in which three of them
were lynched by locals on suspicion of being thieves while on their way to Silvassa.
He questioned Sonia Gandhi's silence in the aftermath of the incident, asking if she
would have remained silent if Muslim or Christian religious leaders had been
lynched instead of Hindus.
Concerning the incident's delayed investigation, the petitioner cited a number of
objections. Following that, the petitioner claims, a well-coordinated, vengeful, and
nasty campaign was undertaken. Several members of the Indian National Congress
(INC) submitted charges for offences allegedly committed under Sections 153, 153A,
153B, 295A, 298, 500, 504, 506, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and a

Page 16 of 170
social media campaign was purportedly launched using the hashtag
#ArrestAntiIndiaArnab.
The petitioner claimed that all of the complaints and FIRs were filed by accident in
states where the governments owed allegiance to the INC, and that the motion was
brought with an ulterior motive. He also referred to an incident on April 23, 2020,
between 12:30 and 1:00 a.m., when he was returning home by car with his wife and
was confronted by two individuals on a motorcycle and assaulted. Both of them are
said to have revealed their INC membership. The petitioner thus denied the
propagation of any views of communal nature and asserting his fundamental right to
freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution
moved the court under Article 32 for the protection of those rights.
Issues
1. Whether Arnab Goswami, who stands accused, can get the case investigated by an
authority of his choice?
2. Whether the Courts can consolidate the various similar FIRs under Article 32?
3. Whether the statements made by Arnab Goswami on live TV fall under the
protective ambit of Article 19 (1) (a) or can be restricted as per the provisions
under Article 19 (2)?
Laws
1. Constitution of India - Articles 14, 19,21, 32 and 226
2. Indian penal Code, 1961 - Sections 34, 153, 153A, 153B, 500, 504, 505, 506, 188,
290, 499
3. Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 - Sections 41 (a), 91, 160, 482, 199, 173 (2), 154,
162
Contentions bade by the Petitioners
According to the petition filed under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, he
debated on live television only to question the inadequate investigation of the
Palghar event, as well as the contradicting stories of the authorities and the State
government's silence. The fact that the horrible incident took place in front of police
officials sparked a number of concerns regarding the coalition government's

Page 17 of 170
authority in Maharashtra. The petitioner refuted the claim that he was spreading
communal ideas. Under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Indian constitution, he requested the
court to declare his unambiguous freedom of expression. The principal reliefs sought
were the dismissal of all complaints and FIRs filed against Mr. Goswami in various
states, as well as a request from the Union Government for safety for his family.
The petitioner claimed that the inquiry into his case was biased and unjust.
According to him, the inquiry approach invites anyone to believe that the authorities
operated in ill faith against the petitioner. Mr. Goswami went on to say that the probe
is politically motivated and that it was launched solely to harass the petitioner. Using
this as a foundation, he said that the news station was challenging the Maharashtra
police's delay in the Palghar event, and that this institution is controlled by the state
government, resulting in a blatant conflict of interest.
Contentions made by the Repondents
The petitioner's actions, according to the Mumbai police, were hindering the inquiry.
It stemmed from the fact that Mr. Goswami was accompanied by a swarm of media
when he went to the NM Joshi Marg Police Station. Some remarks were delivered
here and broadcast live on television. After four hours of questioning, Republic
Bharat's twitter account released a message saying, "Truth shall triumph." Further
messages were sent on Republic Bharat's Twitter account, giving the appearance that
the Mumbai police are biased. The accusation was that the investigating agency was
being subjected to constant pressure, which was causing the probe to come to a
standstill.
Judgement
The division bench of Justices D Y Chandrachud and M R Shah handed down the
decision.
Except for the one filed in Nagpur, which has now been relocated to Mumbai, the
court invalidated all other identical FIRs filed against Arnab Goswami in different
states.

Page 18 of 170
Arnab's request for the inquiry to be transferred to the Central Bureau of
Investigation was denied by the court. It did, however, give him the freedom to
pursue any legal remedies available under the CrPC before the competent venue.
The court cited the decision in Romila Thapar v. Union of India ((2018) 10 SCC 753),
which stated that "accused does not have a say in the question of appointment of
investigative agency," and thus Arnab Goswami's request to transfer the application
was denied. It can be deduced that Arnab Goswami has no say in the designation of
the investigating agency and has no influence in how the inquiry should be
conducted; the investigating agency is free to determine the form of the questions
and the time of questioning in this case.
The court also cited the case of TT Antony v. the State of Kerala ((2001) 6 SCC 181),
in which the court stated that subjecting an individual to many proceedings for the
same offence is contrary to the state's goal of criminal prosecution.
When a counter-case is brought, the Court decided that conducting a new
investigation based on a related cognizable offence would be an "abuse of the
statutory power of investigation" and could be a suitable cause for exercising power
under Section 482 of the CrPC or Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
The court declined to dismiss the FIR filed against Goswami for allegedly injuring
religious sentiments by making insulting statements about a religious community on
his channel Republic TV during a show on migrants congregated in Bandra.
The court also dismissed Maharashtra police's interim appeal, which sought a
directive to 'protect' the investigative agency from any 'pressure, intimidation, or
coercion' from Arnab Goswami. It left the door open for the police to present their
case to the Competent court.
The court asked Commissioner of Police, Mumbai to provide police protection to
Arnab Goswami, if it is considered appropriate, for the period during which the
threat perception is there..

Page 19 of 170
B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India
Citation - (2019) 16 SCC 129
Bench - Uday U. Lalit and D.Y. Chandrachud
Date - 10/05/2019
Facts of the Case
The Karnataka Determination of Seniority of Government Personnel Promoted on
the Basis of Reservation (to Posts in the Civil Services of the State) Act, 2002 gave
government servants from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes promoted under
reservation policy consequential seniority. The petitioners filed a lawsuit challenging
the law's constitutionality.
The case was heard by a two-judge bench consisting of justices Uday U. Lalit and
A.K. Goel in the Supreme Court.
The court decided in favour of the petitioners, citing a lack of measurable data to
support the state's claim of the need for reservation in public service promotions with
consequential seniority, while the creamy layer concept was applied.
On the basis of the Ratna Prabha Committee's recommendations, the state of
Karnataka established a new law, the Reservation Act, 2018. The petitioner filed a
second petition, this time challenging the new statute's legitimacy.
Issues
1. Is the 2018 Reservation Act still in effect?
2. Doesn't it overturn this Court's judgement in B.K. Pavitra Vs Union of India,
(2017) 4 SCC 620: (2017) 2 SCC (L&S) 128 without changing the decision's
foundation?
3. Is it in violation of the law on seniority established by this Court in M.G.
Badappanavar Vs State of Karnataka, (2001) 2 SCC 666: 2001 SCC (L&S) 489?
4. Is there a clear desire to override the decision in B.K. Pavitra Vs Union of India,
(2017) 4 SCC 620: (2017) 2 SCC (L&S) 128 in the context of the enactment of the
Reservation Act, 2018?

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5. Was the Governor of Karnataka's referral of the Bill to the President under Article
200 of the Constitution, as well as the ensuing events, constitutionally valid?
Could the Bill have gone into effect without the Governor's approval in this case?
6. Is the Reservation Act, 2018 in compliance with the principles enunciated in the
Constitution Bench decisions in M. Nagaraj vs Union of India, and Jarnail Singh
vs LachhmiNarain Gupta? Is the Ratna Prabha Committee's Report, dated 5-5-
2017, sufficient and relevant evidence to support the Act's legality and
implementation?
7. Is the Reservation Act, 2018 applicable in the current writ petitions (filed by B.K.
Pavitra and Shivakumar) to those departments or public corporations not covered
by the Ratna Prabha Report or the law where there is over-representation?
Laws
1. Section 3, 4, 5, 9, 1(2) of the Karnataka Determination of Seniority of the
Government Servants Promoted on the Basis of Reservation (to the Posts in the
Civil Services of the State) Act, 2002
2. Section 3,4 of the Reservation Act, 2018
3. Articles 14, 15, 16, 335,141 of the Constitution of India
Contentions by the Petitioners
The petitioners' counsel argued that the Reservation Act, 2018 was enacted by the
state of Karnataka to overturn the court's judgement in B.K. Pavitra.
The new legislation was believed to be identical to the prior legislation.
The enactment of the statute disobeyed the bench's decision by failing to make the
necessary changes to the parts of the legislation that rendered it ultra vires,
indicating an overruling of the law and a violation of the separation of powers
because the legislature has no authority to overrule a Supreme Court decision.
The Ratna Prabha Committee report was criticised for not taking into account data
from public sector undertakings, boards, and municipal bodies, among other things.
The report misidentified grades A, B, C, and D for cadres, demonstrating that the
information is incorrect.

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In this example, the concept of a creamy layer was not adequately implemented.
It was mentioned that there were no compelling reasons for consequential seniority,
and that a state must offer reasons for exercising its powers under 16(4)(A) to confer
consequential seniority.
Contentions by the Respondents
The enactment, it was argued, did not intend to overturn the B.K.Pavitra verdict.
The State Legislature has the authority to pass legislation that has retrospective or
retroactive effect.
The reasons for a legislature's enactment are not subject to judicial review.
Because seniority is not a vested or accruing right, the legislature has the authority to
adopt legislation to address it.
The Ratna Prabha Committee study gathered quantitative data on all three elements
(backwardness, inadequacy of representation, and overall efficiency) that are needed
to determine whether reservations are necessary or not, and the evidence proved that
the enactment is warranted.
The creamy layer notion only applies to OBCs, not SCs or STs, and it can only be used
at the entry level, not in promotions.
Judgement
The court upheld the Reservations Act 2018's constitutional legality and rejected the
petition.
The Honorable Supreme Court ruled that the state did not change the foundation of
B.K. Pavitra's ruling.
The court determined that the enactment complied with the principles set forth in
the Nagaraj judgements of the Constitution Bench.
The court decided that the enactment followed the principles laid out in the
Constitution Bench decisions in Jarnail, which established that the creamy layer

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notion was applicable to OBCs but not to SCs and STs, and that the reservations in
the current case were for SCs and STs but not for OBCs.
The court held that the reservation in promotion for SCs and STs has been provided
until their representation in these categories reaches 15% and 3%, respectively, and
that the above Government Order applies to departments with over-representation of
SCs and STs, as well as departments not covered by the RPC report, because the
departments not covered fall under the administrative control of one or the other.

Page 23 of 170
Baglekar Akash Kumar v. Google LLC
Citation - Case No. 39 of 2020
Court - Competition Commission of India
Bench - Ashok Kumar Gupta Chairperson Ms Sangeeta Verma Member Mr Bhagwant
Singh Bishnoi Member
Date of Judgment - 29/01/2021
Facts of the Case
Google provides its users with a variety of online products and services. Gmail and
Google's Meet App were the subject of the current case. It lets users to send and
receive emails, direct messages, and other types of messages through Gmail, as well
as hold video conferences and meetings using the Meet App.
Gmail and Meet App were connected by Google. The Informant challenged this
integration as an abuse of dominant position under the Competition Act of 2002.
Because Gmail possessed a dominant position in the relevant market, the Informant,
a university student, claimed that Google utilised its dominant position in one
relevant market to join another relevant market in violation of section 4(2)(e) of the
Act.
Issues
1. What were the relevant markets in the instant case, viz., the relevant market in
which Google was alleged to hold a dominant position, i.e., the primary relevant
market and the relevant market which it sought to enter?
2. Whether Gmail was in a dominant position in the former relevant market?
3. Whether the act of integration of Gmail and Meet App by Google amounted to an
abuse of dominant position?
Laws
1. Section 4 of the Competition Act,
2. Section 26(2) of the Competition Act

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3. Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act,
4. Section 4(2)(e) of the Competition Act
Contentions made by the Informant
In the market for "internet connected service and products," Google held a
commanding dominance.
It was taking use of its dominant position in the aforementioned area to expand into
a new market through Meet App.
Google claimed that the information provided by the informant was unfounded and
based solely on conjectures, speculation, and fear.
Furthermore, the Informant had to show that there was a prima facie case that
warranted the Director-investigation. General's The informer's locus standi was
contested by the opposing party.
It stated the following arguments in response to the charge of misuse of a dominating
position levelled against it:
Google did not have a dominant position in the market for "internet related services
and products," because there is no such sector. It could hardly be claimed to be in a
dominant position in such a market if one exists.
It was not dominating in India's "emailing and direct messaging" industry due to the
presence of competitors with similar or higher market positions.
The integration was made to help Gmail users. The restriction of such functionality
additions, such as Meet App, would be harmful to customers.
The integration was established in response to the competition provided by
competitors like Facebook and Microsoft.
Decision of the Competition Commission of India

Page 25 of 170
CCI stated that, In the argument, Google stated that Gmail does not have a dominant
position in emailing and direct messaging in India, and that it is up against a slew of
messaging services, many of which are on par with or better than Gmail. The CCI was
of the opinion that, regardless of whether Gmail is a dominant app in the relevant
market of providing email services in India or not, Google's conduct did not violate
the provisions of Section 4(2) (e) of the Act because the Informant did not place any
substantive material on record in support of the assertions made.
The argument stated by CCI was that Gmail users were not obligated to use Google
Meet, and there were no negative consequences for refusing to use Google Meet, such
as the removal of Gmail or any of its functions or other Google services currently
available. Any of the competing video conferencing apps can be used by a Gmail user
at their 'free will.'
It was also mentioned that anyone with a Google Account (but not necessarily a
Gmail user) can use Google Meet to create an online meeting. Furthermore, the user
does not need to be a Gmail user to create a Google account. He or she can create a
Google account with an email address created on any other platform. As a result,
Google Meet is also available as a standalone app outside of the Gmail ecosystem.
Consumers can pick from a variety of video-conferencing apps such as Zoom, Skype,
Cisco Webex, We Conference, Microsoft Teams, and Google Meet, which are all
competing for the same services.
The CCI also looked at the Meet tab's connection with Gmail from the standpoint of
imposing supplemental duties under Section 4(2)(d) of the Act. The CCI believes that
customers should have the option of using either of the Apps with all of its features
without having to use the other. Despite the fact that the Meet tab has been
integrated into the Gmail app, Gmail does not force users to use Meet solely as
Google has requested, and consumers are free to use Meet or any other Video
Conferencing software. Finally, the CCI decided that the complaint against Google
was not viable since their actions did not violate Section 4 of the Act.

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Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India
Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others
Citation - (2020) 8 SCC 531
Bench - R.F. Nariman, J.
Date - November 15, 2019
Facts of the Case
Reserve Bank of India identified 12 accounts for resolution under IBC.1 Essar Steel
was one of them with outstanding dues of Rs. 55,000 crores.2 Hence, this matter was
brought before NCLAT by Standard Charter Bank and SBI and resolution
professional was appointed.
Resolution plan for Essar Steels was submitted by ArcelorMittal and Numetal. But
the resolution professional declared them ineligible as per section 29A of IBC.
ArcelorMittal and Numetal challenges disqualification in NCLT. During this period
fresh bids were invited and Vedanta ltd also submitted its resolution plan. However,
the resolution professional was instructed by NCLT to re-examine the first bid since
the provisions of IBC were not clearly followed. But the ArcelorMittal and Numetal
challenged their disqualification in first bid by appealing in NCLAT. NCLAT held that
the Numetal Second Bid is qualified but still gave two days’ time to ArcelorMittal to
clear dues to become qualified. But ArcelorMittal appealed to Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court held that both are ineligible, but the court by using its powers under
Article 142 gave 2 weeks’ time to pay dues to become eligible. CoC was also given 6
weeks’ time to reconsider resolution plan. ArcelorMittal filed the resolution plan
again but Numetal didn’t.3
1
RBI Press Release, “RBI identifies Accounts for Reference by Banks under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code (IBC)”,2017, https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=40743
2
Satish Kumar Gupta, “The journey of Resolution of Essar Steel India Limited (ESIL) under IBC”, IIIPI,
www.iiipicai.in
3
Nandani Anand, “Essar Steel Case: How Supreme Court Revised the Revolutionary IBC Regime”, SSRN,
2020 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3643327

Page 27 of 170
ArcelorMittal’s plan was approved CoC and by NCLT. But NCLT said that “…we are
of the view that the dues of the operational creditors must get at least similar
treatment as compared to the dues of the financial creditors on the principle of
equity and fair play as well as the Wednesbury Principle of Unreasonableness and the
Doctrine of Proportionality, so as to avoid disparity in making payments to the
operational creditors having debt value of Rs.1 crore and above (a token of Re.1) and
the allegation of discriminatory practice could be ruled out…”. ArcelorMittal plan
was challenged and appeals were filed in NCLAT. The final judgement of NCLAT
admitted ArcelorMittal plan but also stated that “In a resolution plan there can be no
difference between a financial creditor and an operational creditor in the matter of
payment of dues, and that therefore, financial creditors and operational creditors
deserve equal treatment under a resolution plan”.4
Challenging the order of NCLAT, several appeals and writ petitions were filed in
Supreme Court which were clubbed together by the court. Along with several issues,
the issue of equal treatment of financial and operational creditors was also raised.
But during the pendency of this case, the IBC amendment act was instituted. The
amendment included various changes which also included amendment to section 30,
mandatory completion of corporate insolvency resolution process in 330 days,
distribution of funds to operational creditor etc. This amendment act was also
challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court clarified all issues in its
judgement dated 15th November, 2019.
Issues
The main question in the case was whether both Resolution Applicants should be
barred from submitting resolution plans because they violated Section 29A of the
Code.
Laws
1. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
2. Section 4, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019
3. Section 6, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019
4
Committee Of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd vs Satish Kumar Gupta and others, 2019 SCC OnLine SC
1478

Page 28 of 170
4. Section 29A, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019
5. Section 30(2)(b), Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019
6. Section 53,Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019
Judgement
The Supreme Court in its judgement5 held that:
The Supreme Court ruled that negotiating and approving a resolution plan, which
may include discriminatory payments to different classes of creditors, is the business
wisdom of the majority (66 percent) of the Committee of Creditors under the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC).
The Supreme Court overturned the required 330-day timeframe for resolving
insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings. When the resolution plan was about to be
finalised, the bench provided for flexibility by accepting exceptions. The Supreme
Court has granted the adjudicating authority the right to determine whether it
requires additional time to decide on a specific resolution method.
Tribunals do not have any "residual equity jurisdiction" to interfere in the merits of a
Committee of Creditors judgement. This means that the tribunals cannot interfere
with the Committee of Creditors' commercial judgments.
The Supreme Court ruled that the equality principle cannot be used in the context of
treating unequals alike since it would defeat the IBC's goal of resolving burdened
assets. Each creditor can receive equitable treatment based on the class to which it
belongs: financial or operational, secured or unsecured.
In the disbursement of funds received under the insolvency process, the Court
affirmed the precedence of financial creditors over operational creditors.
5
Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8766-67 OF
2019.

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Danamma @ Suman Surpur & Anr. v. Amar &
Ors.
Citation - Civil appeal nos. 188-189 of 2018
Bench - A. Bhushan and A.K Sikri
Date - 1st February 2018
Facts of the Case
The issue at hand is an appeal from a decision by the high court, which supported the
trial court's ruling and refused to grant the appellants coparcenary rights because
they were born before the act's introduction.
Mr. Gurulingappa Savadi, the propositus of a hindu undivided family, died in 2001,
leaving behind his widow and four children, according to the circumstances of the
case. Vijay and Arunkumar are two sons, and Danamma and Mahananda are two
daughters. Amar, Arun Kumar's son, applied for a partition deed and separate
ownership of the joint family property in 2002. However, he refused to give the
daughters any share because they were born before the act was passed, and they had
received dowry at the time of their marriages, thus they had surrendered any claim to
the property.
Daughters are not coparceners in this case because they were born before the Hindu
succession legislation was enacted, and the trial court also rejected the notion that
they received their part as dowry at the time of marriage because they had no share
in the property. The same was upheld by the high court. The trial court issued its
decision in 2007, and during the course of the case, a 2005 amendment to Section 6
of the HS Act was implemented, establishing the right of daughters as coparceners.
However, neither the trial court nor the high court, which issued its decision in 2012,
took into account the appellants' argument.

Page 30 of 170
Issues
1. Whether, the appellants, daughters of Gurulingappa Savadi, could be denied their
share on the ground that they were born prior to the enactment of the Act and,
therefore, cannot be treated as coparceners?
2. Whether, with the passing of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, the
appellants’ become coparcener like sons, therefore entitled to equal share as that
of a son?
Arguments For The Appellants
The appellant maintained that they had a right to their part of the land as well. The
trial court, in its judgement and decree of August 09, 2007, found that the suit
schedule properties, with the exception of CTS No. 774, were joint family properties
after formulating the issues and recording the evidence (one of the house properties
in plaint C schedule).
Arguments For The Respondents
The respondent claimed that the joint family's residential properties were included in
the plaint schedule C. The joint family's retail properties were included in the plaint
schedule D. The joint family's machineries and movables were included in the plaint
schedule E. The respondent claimed that the suit schedule properties belonged to the
joint family and that defendant no. 1, the respondent's father, was ignoring the
respondent and his siblings, so he sought division of the suit schedule properties.
The respondent claimed that all of the properties listed on the suit schedule belonged
to the plaintiff's family.
In paragraph 5 of the plaint, the respondent claimed that the propositus,
Guralingappa, died one year before the complaint was filed. The plaintiff claimed in
paragraph 7 of the plaint that defendant no. 1 owned 1/3rd of the suit schedule
properties, while defendants 5 and 8 each owned 1/3rd. The respondent further
claimed that defendants 6 and 7 had no interest in the properties listed in the suit
schedule.

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Judgement
With respect to issue 1 in its decision, the Hon'ble court construed section 6 by
considering the purpose of the statute's alteration and the legislature's objective,
which was to make the act more fair and equal, as required by the Indian
constitution's article. As a result, it was declared that this amendment act will apply
to all daughters, whether born before or after the Act's enactment, as long as they are
alive on the day the modified act 2005 is enacted. This decision clarified the
interpretation of Section 6 of the HS Act, preventing an entire generation of women
from losing their coparcenary rights.
The Hon'ble court applied a literal interpretation, stating that both the father and the
daughter must have been alive on the day of the amendment act's implementation in
2005. This case, on the other hand, shed some light on the statute's implications.
However, when interpreting the law, it did not inquire into the legislature's intent.
The amendment act's legislative intent was to preserve female heirs' coparcenary
rights, and this ruling does not help them. The amendment legislation of 2005 was
enacted during the pendency of the current action. The Ganduri Koteshwaramma v.
Chakiri Yanadi ratio was applied, and the right of daughters did not lapse just
because the court issued a preliminary decree. As a result, since the finality of the
partition deed is determined by the court's final order, the amendment legislation of
2005 applies. In 2007, it was granted.
Finally, upholding the Supreme Court's authoritative precedent set in the Prakash v.
Phulavati case, the court ruled that daughters will be allocated their portion of
property if they were living when the amendment act of 2005 was enacted.
The second question raised by this decision was resolved by applying literal
interpretation to the plain meaning of the clause. Which stipulates that a
coparcener's daughter becomes a coparcener in her own right upon birth, just as sons
do. In the Hindu mitakshara law, this revised rule attempted to provide female heirs
the same rights as sons.
As can be seen, Hindu mitakshara law is patriarchal and patrilineal. As a result,
India's 174th law commission addressed the issue and made recommendations. The

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Hindu Succession Act has several problematic aspects, according to the law
commission's assessment.
The report's major goal was to eradicate girls' current unequal status under Hindu
Mitakshara law and promote the right to equality guaranteed by Article 14 of the
constitution. As a result, it was suggested that the daughter be given coparcenary
status at birth. Thus, the Hon'ble court made it very apparent that coparcenary is by
birth by citing incidences of coparceneryship from SBI v. Ghamandi Ram. As a result,
since the daughters have attained the status of coparcener, they are coparcener by
birth in the same way as sons are.

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Devilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Citation - Criminal Appeal No: 989 of 2007
Bench - Uday Umesh Lalit and K.M. Joseph
Date of Judgement - 25th of February, 2021
“In this case, the Court considered to what extent could the benefit under the
Juvenile Justice Act be extended where the offender was above 16 years and less
than 18 years of age on the day the offence was committed.
The Court held that in such a case, even if the accused were guilty, the matter must
be remitted to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board.”
Facts of the Case:
In F.I.R. no: 212 of 1998, filed at 11:10 p.m. on July 19, 1998, Ganeshram stated that
on July 14, 1998, while walking to his house, he saw Devilal armed with a Kulhari, his
son armed with a talvar, and Amritlal armed with a lathi in front of Devilal's
residence. Ganeshram was abused by Devilal, who referred to him as a Chamar and
claimed that Chamars had advanced too far. Then Devilal and his son, Amritlal, beat
Ganeshram with their Kulahri, Talvar, and lathis, fractured his right hand, cut his
right calve, kicked him in the face below both eyes, and the swelling was visible at the
time of the report, Ganeshram screamed for help, and his mother Gattubai, wife
Sajan Bai, and sister-in-law Saman Bai came out to protect him. While guarding
Ganeshram, Saman Bai was struck in the elbow by Devilal's lathi. Ganeshram's
sister-in-law and Satyanarain then loaded him into a tractor and drove him to the
police station to fill out an F.I.R.
Ganeshram died at 1.00 a.m. while being treated at Mandasaur District Hospital
while Kothari was completing the legalities.
By its judgement and order dated 01.05.1998, the Trial Court found that the FIR
recorded at the instance of the deceased could be relied upon as a dying declaration,
Sajjan Bai, Saman Bai, and Laxminarayan, as well as the recoveries at the instances

Page 34 of 170
of accused Devilal, Gokul, and AmratRam, proved the prosecution's case. The
prosecution had proved the offence under section 302 read with section 34 IPC,
according to the trial court.
The case against Gattubai, on the other hand, was deemed to be unproven, and it was
also determined that none of the defendants could be charged with crimes
punishable under the SC-ST Act.
The Juvenile Justice Act of 1986 was in effect when the offence was committed in
1998, and it stated that anyone under the age of 16 was deemed a juvenile. Amrat
Ram, Devilal's second son, was 16 years, 11 months, and 26 days old at the time the
crime was committed. As a result, he was plainly not a minor under the Juvenile
Justice Act of 1986. However, under the requirements of the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act of 2000, this age was raised to 18. The Supreme
Court had ordered the sessions court to investigate and report on the matter of
juvenility.
Issue
At the commission of crime in 1998, the Juvenile Justice Act 1986 was in force,
which stated that any person below the age of 16 was considered a juvenile. The age
of Amrat Ram, the second son of Devilal, was 16 years, 11 months and 26 days at the
time of commission of the offence. Therefore, he clearly wasn’t a juvenile within the
meaning of Juvenile Justice Act 1986. But this age was raised to 18 in terms of
provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. The
Supreme Court had directed the sessions court to investigate this issue of juvenility
and submit the report.
Laws
1. Section 34 of Indian Penal Code
4. Section 20 of Juvenile Justice Act 2000

Page 35 of 170
Arguments and Decision of the Court:
The prosecution showed that Devilal and his two sons were guilty under Sections 302
and 34 of the Indian Penal Code by the decision and order of the trial court
(05.01.1999). It's also worth noting that, despite the alleged caste-based altercation,
the court did not find them guilty of crimes punishable under the SC/ST Act. A
separate judgement found the appellants guilty of violating Sections 342 and 34 of
the IPC and sentenced them to life in prison and a punishment of Rs. 5000/- each.
Later, the appellants filed a Criminal Appeal 700 of 1999 at the High Court,
requesting that Dr. Kothari's medical evidence be considered. They argued that it was
exceedingly unlikely that the deceased, Ganeshram, would have given any statements
to the police prior to succumbing to the injuries that led to the filing of the FIR in this
case. The High Court rejected the appellants contentions and thus upheld Devilal's
conviction and sentence, as well as that of his sons Gokul and Amrat Ram, and
dismissed the accused's Criminal Appeal No. 700 of 1999. This decision was handed
out on September 14, 2006.
Furthermore, it was claimed that Amrat Ram, Devilal's second son, was a minor at
the time the crime was committed. The statement of the accused's juvenility could be
presented for the first time before the Court in light of the Hari Ram vs. State of
Rajasthan ruling. The Sessions Judge, Neemach, was directed by this Court to
conduct an inquiry into this issue of juvenility by order dated 3.10.2018, and it was
discovered that the accused, Amrat Ram, was 16 years, 11 months and 26 days old in
1998, and he was found to be a juvenile for the purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act
2000 on the date of the offence.
Because the age of juvenility was raised to 18 years by the Juvenile Justice Act 2000,
it was now up for discussion what should be done with the accused's juvenility. It was
noted that, notwithstanding anything in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a
juvenile pending in any court on the date on which this Act comes into force, if the
court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding
and, rather than passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile
to the Board, which shall deal with the juvenile in accordance with the Juvenile
Justice Act 2020.

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Thus, Amrat must be remitted to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for
determining appropriate quantum of fine that should be levied up on him.

Page 37 of 170
Ganesh Patel v. Umakant Rajoria
Citation - S.L.P. (CRL.) NO. 9313 OF 2021
Bench - Sanjiv Khanna and Bela M. Trivedi
Facts of the Case
In this case, the accused filed a plea with the High Court under section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, claiming that he and the defacto complainant had
reached an agreement. The High Court ruled in favour of the petition. Following that,
the de-facto complainant filed an application for the order to be recalled, claiming
that it was made in his absence and based on incorrect information. The High Court
granted the application and overturned the previous order. The appellant challenged
the order of recall before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether the application for recall of the order was maintainable?
Laws
1. S. 482, CrPc
2. S. 362 CrPc
Arguments By The Appellants
The appellant relied on Section 362 CrPC in his appeal to the Apex Court, which
states that "except as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other for the time
being in force, no Court shall alter or review a judgement or final order disposing of a
case after it has been signed, except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error."
Judgement
"This appeal for recall of the order was maintainable because it was an application
seeking a procedural review, not a substantive review under Section 362 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973," the Apex Court bench stated while dismissing the
accused's Special Leave Petition. Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government

Page 38 of 170
Industrial Tribunal & Ors. 1980 (supp) SCC 420 was cited by the court in this regard.
The expression'review' is used in two distinct senses, namely (1) a procedural review
which is either inherent or implied in a court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably
erroneous order passed under its misapprehension, and (2) a review on merits when
the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the
record, as stated by the court in Grindlays Bank. In the latter meaning, the Court in
Narshi Thakershi's case decided that no review lies on merits unless the status
expressly allows such. Obviously, when a review is sought because of a procedural
flaw, the Tribunal's unintended error must be addressed ex debito justitiae to
prevent misuse of its procedure, and every court or Tribunal has this ability.
The court also cited a decision in Budhia Swain and Others v. Gopinath Deb (1999),
which explains the difference between recall and review and when a recall order
might be issued. The High Court was correct in recalling the order and scheduling a
hearing and determination on the merits, according to the court.

Page 39 of 170
Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation
Agency
Citation - SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1796/2021
Bench - K.M. Joseph and U.U. Lalit
Date of Judgement: May 12, 2021
Introduction:
Gautam Navlakha is charged in the Bhima-Koregaon case and is suspected of being
one of the perpetrators of the violence. His bail application was initially denied due
to his ties to the maoists and Elgar-Parishad under the UAPA. Following that, the
accused was asked to surrender to the National Investigation Agency, where it was
discovered that the accused met with Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai (the Maoist group's
commander) to combine and fight against government forces in order to beat them
physically and mentally. Navlakha is another person who has been vocal in writing
against the administration, and he gained notoriety after being denied access to
Kashmir and labelled a threat.
Facts of the case:
Navlakha was detained at his home in Delhi on charges related to the Bhima-
koregaon case. The accused was placed under house arrest by the Delhi High Court
for 34 days, from August 28 to October 1, 2018. The arrest was declared illegal by the
Delhi High Court on the 34th day. Following that, the accused was placed in 11 days
of police custody and 46 days of judicial custody; at this point, he had served 90 days
of his sentence and applied for bail at the Bombay High Court; however, the court
denied the bail application, stating that house arrest had protected the accused's
liberty. The accused was ordered by the Supreme Court to surrender to the NIA
within three weeks on March 16, 2020, and he did so on April 4, 2020.
The accused's counsel submitted a habeas corpus writ to the Supreme Court, which
was granted.

Page 40 of 170
Issues
1. Whether a period of 34 days when Navlakha was in custody by way of house
arrest would count as custody for the purpose of default bail?
2. Whether the apex court would entertain Writ of habeas corpus in a case where
remand order has already been issued?
Laws
1. Article 32, constitution of India
2. Section 153A, 505(1B) and 34 and Section 120(B) IPC
3. Sections 13, 16, 17, 18, 18B, 20, 38 and 40, Unlawful Activities Prevention Act
Contentions made by petitioner
Navlakha had already served 90 days in detention, according to the accused's lawyer,
and thus is eligible for default bail.
The counsel further claimed that the Delhi High Court had already overturned the
arrest and declared it illegal, citing the case of Romila Thapar v. Union of India as an
example.
The counsel also argued that because the accused was constantly interrogated by
police officers while under house arrest, it should not be included in the period of
default bail because he was completely cut off from the outside world – he couldn't
leave his house, he couldn't meet anyone except police officers, lawyers, and ordinary
house residents.
Contentions made by Respondent
Even though he was charged with serious crimes, the National Investigation Agency
offered him a residence and did not treat him like a regular criminal, according to the
attorney.
The counsel contended that because the magistrate's authorization was found to be
invalid by the Delhi High Court, the entire detention was illegitimate, and so the
incarceration under Section 167 of the CrPC is utterly undesirable, rendering the
default bail scenario unclaimable.

Page 41 of 170
The counsel also stated that the Delhi high court had suspended the transit remand
and set it aside, ruling that detention was unconstitutional and that there had been
no allowed custody by a magistrate's order.
Judgement
The hon'ble supreme court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus and dismissed the
accused's bail plea, plainly stating that "home arrest" is not included in the time
period required for default bail.
In its decision, the Supreme Court said unequivocally that a Writ of Habeas Corpus
will only be considered against a remand order if the remand is wholly
unconstitutional or was acquired by orders of a court with no power to do so.
The petition of the accused was dismissed by the Supreme Court because it had not
been passed by a court with erroneous jurisdiction and was not fully illegitimate.

Page 42 of 170
In Re: Prashant Bhushan and Anr. Alleged
Contemnor(S)
Case Number - Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Crl.) No.1 OF 2020
Bench - Arun Mishra, B. R. Gavai and Krishna Murari
Date - August 14, 2020
Facts of the Case
Prashant Bhushan, the contemnor, is a senior counsel who has spent more than three
decades pursuing public interest litigation in a number of high-profile cases. On July
22, 2020, a petition was filed in the Supreme Court of India against him and Twitter
Inc., calling to the Court's attention two tweets issued by Prashant Bhushan. The
purported tweets, which were directed against the Chief Justice of India (CJI) and
the Supreme Court, revealed a deterioration in the judiciary's independence and the
Supreme Court's role in safeguarding Indian democracy. Twitter finally took down
the tweets. The Court filed suo moto contempt proceedings against Prashant
Bhushan on July 22, 2020, claiming that his tweets were defamatory.
Issues
1. Whether the tweets published by Mr. Prashant Bhushan are healthy criticism of
the Indian judiciary or has dashed the public confidence in the institution of the
supreme court?
2. Whether these tweets were against the CJI's as Individuals or CJI's as the CJI of
the Supreme Court?
3. Whether the acts of Twitter Inc. have also tampered the reputation of the Indian
judicial system?
Laws
1. Article 19(1), Constitution of India
2. Article 129, Constitution of India
3. Article 142 (2) (5), Constitution of India

Page 43 of 170
Arguments
During the hearing, Prashant Bhushan clarified that the initial tweet was intended to
express his outrage at the inconsistency between the CJI's reckless attitude in riding
a motorcycle without a mask while also preventing the SC from physically
functioning and hearing cases during the COVID-19 lockdown. He further claimed
that the contempt proceedings were an attempt to restrict free speech and a violation
of the Indian Constitution's Article 19(1)(a). Prashant Bhushan argued that the
second tweet was a genuine expression of his views on the Court's (and previous four
CJIs) role in undermining democratic ideals in the last six years (since the ruling BJP
party came to power), and that it could not be considered contempt because it was
protected under the Indian Constitution.
According to established Supreme Court of India conventions, the CJI is the 'Master
of the Roster,' with the authority to assign cases to judges. The use of this authority
by CJIs to facilitate the rise of authoritarianism, majoritarianism, and the suffocation
of dissent in the country has been brought into question in the past. In that context,
Prashant Bhushan contended that raising issues about the way CJIs behave
themselves in their individual roles does not constitute scandalising the Court. As a
result, the tweets cannot be claimed to be interfering with the administration of
justice or the due course of justice by the Court.
Judgement
The Court began by asserting that there is a strong link between comments
influencing judges' strict performance of their duties and their ability to obstruct the
administration of justice. It stated that such insinuations (as in the present case)
implicitly degraded the Court's dignity and amounted to eroding public faith in
judges' integrity by looking back at precedents. By doing so, the Court necessarily
associated criticism of judges with criticism of the Court, dismissing Prashant
Bhushan's contention that comments about judges' individual conduct had no
bearing on the administration of justice.
The Court, on the other hand, tried to make a key distinction. It was noted that while
vilifying a judge as a judge merits contempt, vilifying a judge as an individual does
not; in such circumstances, judges are left to seek private remedies. To adjudicate

Page 44 of 170
contempt cases, it primarily relied on six elements proposed by Justice V.R. Krishna
Iyer in Re: S. Mulgaokar, (1978) 3 SCC 339: I prudent use of the Court's contempt
power, (ii) balancing constitutional values of free speech and the need for fearless
curial process, (iii) separating personal protection of libelled judges from community
confidence in the prevention of obstruction of justice, (iv) discretionary exercise of
authority, (v) not being hypersensitive even when criticisms exceed limits, and (vi)
declaring contempt in cases of malicious, scurrilous, intimidatory, or threatening
conduct beyond acceptable limit.
The Court then went into a study of the tweets, using Justice V.R. Iyer's multifold
tests as a guide. It split them into multiple pieces, noticing that the initial section of
the first tweet ('CJI rides a 50 lakh motorcycle belonging to a BJP leader without a
mask or helmet at Raj Bhavan, Nagpur without a mask or helmet') was a personal
attack on the CJI as an individual. The second half of the initial tweet, however, was a
'undisputed' attack on CJI in his function as administrative head of the judiciary ('at
a time when he puts the SC in lockdown mode, depriving citizens their fundamental
rights to access justice').
It's worth noting that the Court found various problems in the initial tweet's factual
correctness. Despite being physically unable to function, the Court was able to carry
out its duties via video conferencing facilities during the period of the disputed
tweets. According to the Court, a "patently false" and "wild charge" about the CJI has
the potential to shatter public trust in the judiciary as well as undermine the
authority and administration of justice in that setting. As a result, the Court
dismissed Prashant Bhushan's claim of genuine criticism based on his distress about
the courts' physical non-functioning.
The Court issued three observations in response to the second tweet. First, Prashant
Bhushan's statement that the Supreme Court had played a significant role in allowing
the breakdown of democracy, as well as the role of the previous four CJIs in
sustaining it, was a direct attack on the Supreme Court and the CJI. Second, the
Court determined that Prashant Bhushan acted irresponsibly, and that the tweets
were not qualified for good faith protection, based on the vast reach of the tweet and
the character of the contemnor (who is a lawyer).

Page 45 of 170
The tweets had the impact of dissuading an ordinary applicant and risked losing faith
in the Supreme Court and the CJI when taken together. The Court also concluded
that if it failed to protect itself from vicious insinuations like the one in this instance,
it would open the floodgates to other judges facing similar attacks. Preventing
malicious attacks was, in effect, a matter of national honour and reputation in the
community of countries, and it had to be handled with determination. Prashant
Bhushan was found guilty of contempt of the court by the Supreme Court.
Regarding Twitter's role in the contempt proceedings, the Court discharged the social
media site as an intermediary, taking cognizance of its action in suspending tweets in
July after receiving notice from the Court. According to a number of campaigners,
the company created a hazardous precedent that could apply to future defamation
claims. Twitter stated in a statement that it was committed to defending free speech
in India and around the world.
Prashant Bhushan asked the Court to have the proceedings invalidated on procedural
grounds following an adjudication by the Court on August 14, 2020, in which the
Court found Prashant Bhushan guilty of contempt claiming that a copy of the
complaint on the basis of which the suo motu notice was issued was not served on
him. He also challenged the decision on other grounds, including vagueness (due to
inconsistency with other Court decisions on the subject), free speech, truth (as a
defence), the principle of proportionality (tilting the balance in favour of rights over
restrictions), and an attempt to compel him to apologise.
Given the widespread public debate that followed the Supreme Court's decision, the
Court decided on some of the aforementioned points in its sentencing order of
August 31, 2020. It determined that shaming the Supreme Court constituted a
violation of the right to free speech. While fair criticism was a legal defence, it was
subject to reasonable limitations under Article 19(2) due to public interest concerns.
The Court noted, among other things, that judicial criticism was not protected under
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and amounted to contempt. When there was a
contradiction between freedom of expression and maintaining judicial
independence, one could not win.
"While it was not possible to control the thinking process and words functioning in
one individual's mind, when it came to expression, it had to be within the

Page 46 of 170
constitutional bounds," the Court concluded. Without a doubt, legitimate criticism of
the system is desirable while exercising one's right to free expression, and judges
cannot be overly sensitive, even when distortions and criticism go too far. The same
cannot, however, be expanded to allow nasty and scandalous statements. The
contemnor's other arguments were similarly dismissed for similar reasons."
As a result, instead of a harsh punishment, Prashant Bhushan was convicted to a
modest fine of INR 1.

Page 47 of 170
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of
Kerala
Citation - Writ Petition (Civil) No. 373 of 2006, 2018 (8) SCJ 609
Bench - Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar, R.F. Nariman, D.Y. Chandrachud and Indu
Malhotra
Date of Judgement - 28.09.2018
Facts of the Case
Women of menstrual age were denied entry to the Sabarimala sanctuary, one of
Kerala's most important temples. Bindu and Kanaka Durga, both in their early 40s,
attempted to access the hilltop shrine around 3.45 a.m. but were denied owing to
threats of physical harm.
In the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, a group of five women from the Indian Young
Lawyers Association filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) contesting the temple
officials' century-old restrictive practise. Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of
Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965, states that "Women who are not
permitted to join a site of public worship by tradition and use shall not be entitled to
enter or offer worship in any place of public worship," was argued to be a violation of
the Indian Constitution's basic fundamental rights.
Issues
1. Whether this restriction imposed by the temple authorities violates Articles 15, 25
and 26 of the Indian Constitution?
2. Whether this restriction violate the provisions of the Kerala Hindu Place of Public
Worship Act, 1965?
3. Whether the Sabarimala Temple has a denominational character?

Page 48 of 170
Laws
1. Articles 15(3) of the Constitution of India
2. Articles 14 of the Constitution of India
3. Article 17 of the Constitution of India
4. Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act,
1965
Arguments made by the petitioners
Senior Counsel Indira Jaising argued that the widespread social stigmas that label
menstruation women as "impure" and "polluting" are both provocative and
damaging. Due to the dogmas surrounding menstruation in general, preventing
women from attending the temple is a type of untouchability. According to the
lawyer, there is a violation of Article 17 of the Indian Constitution, which condemns
and outlaws all forms of untouchability. On the question of whether the Sabarimala
temple has a denominational character, the counsel argued that the religious rituals
performed in the temple during 'pujas' and other religious rites are comparable to
those performed in any other Hindu temple.
Senior Advocate Raju Ramachandran, who was nominated as an amicus curiae in the
case, claimed that Article 25(2) (b) is a substantive right, not only an enabling
provision. The above-mentioned Article grants women the right to enter the temple
and give worship.
The Nair Service Society's senior counsel, K. Parasaran, stated right away that the
limits put on women were not the result of patriarchal beliefs. Instead, the practise
was founded on the god Lord Ayyappan's celibacy. Kerala has a matrilineal structure,
according to the lawyer. The state's women are noted for being well-educated and
self-sufficient in their decision-making responsibilities. As a result, he maintained
that the prohibition enforced on young women was the outcome of Sabarimala
temple norms and usages, not misogyny. Furthermore, the defendant's lawyer
pointed out that temples are not specifically mentioned in Article 15(2) of the Indian
Constitution, which grants individuals the right to access public areas.

Page 49 of 170
J. Sai Deepak, who represents "People for Dharma," a group dedicated to keeping the
government and temple management apart, chastised the opposing counsel for
failing to distinguish between religious diversity and prejudice. The petitioner, he
argued, twisted a conversation about the deity's celibacy into purported concepts of
impurity related to menstruation.
The decision of the Court
On September 28, 2018, the Supreme Court removed the prohibition, allowing
women of all ages to visit the Sabarimala shrine in Kerala. The tribunal ruled with a
4:1 majority that the temple practise violates Hindu women's rights and that
prohibiting women from entering the shrine is gender discrimination.
The majority verdict reveals that the Indian Constitution's essential principles are
superior. Even in questions of religious beliefs, the Hon'ble Chief Justice and his
companion judges unambiguously said that governments, religious communities,
and citizens are obliged and must comply with the country's Constitution. All other
laws of the land, as well as customary customs, beliefs, and traditions of other
religions, are superseded by this historic judgement.
Dissenting opinion
Justice Indu Malhotra wrote the dissenting opinion. The Justice dismissed the
petition as frivolous and unworthy of consideration, arguing that courts lack
jurisdiction to decide whether religious activities should be abolished unless there
are issues of social ills, such as 'Sati.' According to Justice Malhotra, constitutional
morality would allow everyone to practise their views, and the religious community
would decide what constituted vital religious practise.
Indu Malhotra carefully says in her dissenting view that the decision to eliminate the
prohibitions on women would have significant repercussions, amounting to undue
meddling in religious emotions of many communities.
Article 25 of India's Constitution protects both the temple and the deity, according to
her claim. She believes that religious practises should not be judged exclusively on
the basis of Article 14.

Page 50 of 170
Internet And Mobile Association of India v.
Reserve Bank Of India
Citation - MANU/SC/0264/2020
Bench - Rohinton Fali Nariman, S. Ravindra Bhat and V. Ramasubramanian
Date of Judgement - 04/03/2020
Facts of the Case
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued a circular on April 6, 2018, prohibiting banks
and other entities from trading in virtual currencies. The banks were also prohibited
from providing services to the organisation or any individual dealing with or settling
virtual currency, according to the circular. This circular was published with the belief
that virtual currency trade is vulnerable to hacking, which could lead to terrorist acts,
money laundering, and other problems. The RBI has instructed the bank to refrain
from providing the following services: clearing, lending against virtual currencies,
account maintenance, registration, trading, settling, accepting virtual currency as
collateral, opening exchange accounts, and the sale/purchase or transfer of such
virtual currencies. The Internet and Mobile Association of India filed a case with the
Supreme Court challenging the circular. On the basis of proportionality, the court
authorised the same. Earlier in 2013, merchants and holders of the virtue money
were advised to be wary of the security and legal risks linked with it.
Issues
Whether the RBI lacks jurisdiction to disallow the trade of virtual currency and it
based such ban imposed on the misunderstanding.?
Laws
1. Section 35A read with Section 36(1)(a) Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and
2. Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and
3. Section 45JA and 45L of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934

Page 51 of 170
4. Section 10(2) read with Section 18 of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act,
2007
Contentions made by the Petitioner
The petitioner contended that the RBI lacked the authority to prohibit crypto-
currency trading, and that the restriction was also the result of a misunderstanding.
It went on to say that cryptocurrency, or virtual money, is a store of value or medium
of exchange rather than a currency note or coin. The Petitioner further argued that
virtual currency or cryptocurrencies are a medium of trade or a store of value rather
than a monetary note or coin.
The respondent disputed with the first argument, claiming that the RBI lacks
jurisdiction and that it is a form of digital payment over which the RBI has control.
In response to the claim that cryptocurrency or virtual currency is a store of value or
medium of exchange rather than a type of currency note or coin, the respondent
stated that such virtual currency is a stainless digital currency that is used for
trading, and that cryptocurrency operates independently and without government
interference.
The decision of the Court
In this case, the Honourable Supreme Court found that, while the Reserve Bank of
India has broad powers and plays an important role in the development of the Indian
economy, it is unable to establish any harm to its regulated firms. As a result, the
Reserve Bank of India's directives urging banks to stop engaging with or providing
services to commodities traders using virtual currency are illegal and so
unenforceable.

Page 52 of 170
Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta
Citation - Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.30621 of 2011
Bench - R.F. Nariman
Date - 26 September, 2018
Facts of the Case
In the matter of M. Nagraj and Others vs. Union of India and Others, a decision was
reached in 2006 that was challenged by numerous states and the Centre. According
to the petitioner, the Nagraj decision had made it unjustly difficult to award
reservations in government posts and public sector promotions. With this in mind, it
was deemed appropriate to examine the circumstances in the Nagraj case and submit
it to a seven-judge panel. In India, reservation is regarded as a severe issue. Article 16
of the constitution provides for equality of opportunity in terms of public
employment, but until the Indra Sawhney case in 1992, this clause did not contain
anything linked to the reservation. In this situation, a few observations were made,
beginning with Article 16 (4), which authorises the state to create measures for the
reserve of any backward class of persons in appointments or offices, but not in
promotions. This had a significant impact on the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and in
order to keep the promotions going, Clause 4A was added, which said that nothing in
the mentioned article prevents the State from making any reservation in matters
pertaining to the promotion. Articles 16(4A) and 16(4B) were added by the 81st
Amendment.
The constitutional validity of these provisions was challenged in the Nagraj Case,
with a five-judge bench ruling that if the State wanted to make a provision for
reservation in promotions for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, it would have
to collect "quantifiable data" sufficient to show the class's backwardness and
inadequacy of representation in public employment. The state must also ensure that
the reserve provision does not, in any case, exceed the 50 percent ceiling limit or
wipe away the creamy layer. The requirement to acquire quantitative data to
demonstrate backwardness was deemed illegal since it contradicted the Indira
Sawhney decision. Even the application of the creamy layer to Scheduled castes and

Page 53 of 170
tribes seemed odd, given that it was only applied to the other backward classes. The
introduction of the creamy layer idea to promotions also generated issues of equality.
Finally, a petition to review the Nagraj decision was filed.
Issues
Whether the Nagraj Judgement needed reconsideration by a seven-judge bench.
The second issue questioned whether the States had to collect quantifiable data to
prove the backwardness and inadequacy of the class while being promoted.
The third issue was whether the creamy layer among the scheduled castes and the
scheduled tribes should be barred from obtaining promotions through the
reservation.
Arguments
In the current case of Jarnail Singh, the Supreme Court refused to have the Nagraj
ruling reconsidered by a seven-judge bench and instead had the verdict reviewed by a
five-judge court. It did not believe that the terms of the Nagraj case needed to be
reviewed by a bigger court.
According to the Nagraj Verdict, in order to make a provision for the promotion of
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in employment and posts through reservation,
the states required to collect measurable data to show that they were
underrepresented in the public sector. The Attorney General of India, KK Venugopal,
contended that the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes were 'backwards' in
character, socially and economically excluded, as stated in the Indian constitution.
This means that there are no more examinations that may be used to prove their
class's backwardness and inadequacy. Those in favour of gathering measurable data
pointed out that when it comes to gaining a promotion, people will go to great
lengths, therefore keeping an eye on a person's backwardness was only the correct
thing to do. Furthermore, it did not jeopardise anyone's integrity or cause any loss;
rather, it served as a double-check. They also considered data gathering as a
government responsibility, which being removed would show that the government
was just interested in reducing its own burdens.

Page 54 of 170
The Indra Sawhney case, according to Justice Nariman, does not allow for the
collection of quantifiable data as a requirement for giving promotions under
reservation, and the Nagraj decision contradicts a nine-judge bench's ruling.
In the case of Jarnail Singh, the court interpreted Article 14, 15 and 16 to include the
concept of the creamy layer as part of the equality principle. Some arguments were
given in support of this equality, the first of which being that the fundamental
essence of a backward class was to exclude the socially and economically advanced
persons. Second, it was determined that the creamy layer must be excluded in order
to ensure that the truly backward members of the class have access to reservations
and that the creamy layer does not have exclusive access to all reservation benefits.
Third, if the creamy layer is not excluded, it will violate the equality principles by
treating equals differently, such as the general classes and those who are forward
among the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, while treating unequals in the
same way, such as the backward classes and those who are forward among the
backward classes.
The entire aim of reservation, according to Justice Nariman, is to provide the
backward classes a chance to advance so that they might be on an equal footing with
the rest of India's residents. If the creamy layer folks are included in this reservation,
the backward classes will likely remain backward since they will have little
opportunities in front of the advanced backward layer of people. He further pointed
out that individuals who are classified as creamy layer are not eligible for reservation
benefits because they do not belong to the backward classes.
Another argument was made based on the idea that applying the creamy layer
principle to Scheduled castes and Scheduled tribes is a significant risk that the court
is ready to take. It's critical to grasp the distinctions between the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes and the other backward classes. A constitutional court cannot
overlook these factors, and it must remember that equality is a fundamental
principle that must be protected at all costs.
Those in favour of the inclusion of the creamy layer argue that the truly backward
will still be able to benefit from reservation in promotions after the creamy layer is
included because, in terms of promotions, all Scheduled castes and Scheduled tribes
fall into the same economic bracket at a certain level of employment. As a result, the

Page 55 of 170
violation of equality argument only works at the entry level, not at further levels. It's
possible that excluding the creamy layer will only benefit the general classes. Because
India has a history of workplace discrimination, where Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes are not considered worthy, all backward groups, especially those
from the creamy layer, can be given a chance to prove their merit in front of the
general classes.
Judgement
The court decided that the Nagraj case's decision did not need to be forwarded to a
seven-judge panel. Furthermore, the requirement that the State collect quantifiable
data demonstrating the backwardness of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
is in conflict with the nine-judge Bench's decision in the Indra Sawhney case,
rendering this clause null and void. In the Indra Sawhney case, it was also
demonstrated that any discussion of the "creamy layer" has no bearing on Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In addition, the Supreme Court upheld the Nagraj
Judgement's application of the creamy layer to promotions for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes. Thousands of employees had been denied their due promotions as
a result of it.

Page 56 of 170
Joseph Shine v. Union of India
Citation - 2018 SC 1676
Bench - Dipak Mishra, A. Khanwilkar, R.F. Nariman, D.Y. Chandrachud, and Indu
Malhotra
Date - 27th September, 2018
Introduction
In India, adultery was sanctioned by patriarchy and male chauvinism. A guy who has
sexual intercourse with a woman who is the wife of another man is guilty of this
crime. And if the spouse agrees or colludes in the conduct, it is no longer considered
adultery. In the event that her husband commits adultery, she has no rights. Adultery
was once thought to be a bad conduct committed by either a married man or a
married woman. In India, a woman who commits adultery is treated as a victim who
has been persuaded by a man into doing so.
Facts of the Case
Joseph Shine filed a writ case under Article 32 contesting the legality of Section 497
of the IPC read with Section 198 of the Cr. P.C., for violating Articles 14, 15, and 21 of
the Constitution. This started out as a PIL against adultery. The rule for adultery,
according to the petitioner, is arbitrary and discriminatory on the basis of gender.
The petitioner stated that such a law degrades a woman's dignity. The petition was
heard by a constitutional bench of five judges.
Issues
1. Whether the provision for adultery is arbitrary and discriminatory under Article
14?
2. Whether the provision for adultery encourages the stereotype of women being the
property of men and discriminates on gender basis under Article15?
3. Whether the dignity of a woman is compromised by denial of her sexual
autonomy and right to self-determination?

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