CAFC Chronicles: Costly Tales of Claim Construction Fails
2022-06-03_ JP Kolczyński_Bezwględne prawo podmiotowe prezentacja INP PAN_wersja EN.pptx
1. ABSOLUTE SUBJECTIVE LAW - a vanishing
copyright paradigm?
communication of works or access rules or maybe transaction
rules?
report from the research in progress - outline
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
Doctoral seminar on intellectual property law under the supervision
of prof. dr hab. Helena Żakowska-Henzler
Warsaw, June 2, 2022, English version of June 13, 2022
https://media.istockphoto.co
m/vectors/brain-idea-
illustration-doodle-vector-
concept-about-human-brain-
vector-id816798096
2. Communication as a pretext
Communication is
everything ...
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
3. Technical point of view
From a technical point of
view, individual
communication of works on
the Internet is starting to
play a dominant role.
https://www.thoughtco.com/thmb/KbryK9J2zsjxjT83C9h2MKnQHFQ=/5
760x3840/filters:fill(auto,1)/business--communication--digital--crowd--
audience--494774883-59b090979abed50011452ecd.jpg
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
4. Prohibition law and the effectiveness of the law
In the jurisprudence of the CJEU, the content of the right of
communication to the public of works is classically constructed through
the aspect of its effectiveness - as a prohibition law.
It can be argued that the
jurisprudence still refers to the
traditional, proprietary model of
copyright based on the author's
monopoly, i.e. the exclusive right
effective erga omnes.
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
5. Tension or maybe a crack?
PHOTO KRZYSZTOF KALINOWSKI
The CJEU jurisprudence shows a
tension between the traditionally
understood paradigm of copyright, in
which the author is a specific
“epicentre of events”, and the right as
a reflection of actions taken by users
of rights.
One can see the inspiration from the economic
analysis of copyright hidden in the teleological
interpretation. Combination of legal norms with norms
of trancation.*
* Copyright, and the Production of Music
(eds. Martin Kretschmer and Andy C. Pratt) Pre-print from special issue of iCS (Information, Communication & Society) volume 12, issue 2 (February 2009)
https://ysi.ineteconomics.org/workinggroup/finance-law-and-economics
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
6. Premises of the prohibition law (the content of the law or the norms of
transation - extralegal ones, non-autonomous but interdependent?)
• "new public"
- judgement on SGAE C-306/05 , p. 40-42
• „specific technical means"
- judgement on TVCatchup, C-607/11, p. 24, 25
• “for profit”
- judgement on GS Media, C-160/15
• "knowledge", also alleged knowledge on
infringement
- judgement on: GS Media as above, Stichting Brein I C-527/15 ("Filmspeler")
and C-610/15, Stichting Brein II (Ziggo, the "The Pirate Bay")
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
7. Other examples of the norms of transation?
Contrary to the content of the subjective law, which
assumes that the communication of the work to the
public includes, inter alia, a dispersed (remote)
communication, the CJEU recognizes that it is also
possible from the receiver (e.g. placed in a pub).
The selected criteria for the protection of the prohibition
right are purely transactional (teleological) - it is a ban
on trading decoder cards from one EU country to
another, if the results of this trading are purely
economic (205), i.e. de facto watching a "Premier
League" match in a Greek pub for English money.
CJEU judgment of 4
October 2011 in
joined cases C-
403/08 and C-
429/08, paragraphs
42, 205
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
8. What are the examples of effects of such norms of transaction; are they
not foreseen by the CJEU?
• Blurring the line between
direct and indirect liability.
• Lack of informed consent*
for transactional norms, due
to their unclear designation,
e.g. what is knowledge of an
infringement?
• Strict dependence of law on
technology - no
technological neutrality
The rules of indirect liability for copyright
infringement have not been harmonized in the
EU. The CJEU bypassed this "deficiency" by
extending the principles of direct liability to
intermediaries in access to content, in
particular by introducing the condition of
"knowledge" of the infringement as an
element of the content of the right to
communication the public.
https://www.experto24.pl/kadry/prawa-i-obowiazki-
pracownika/zakazana-jest-zarowno-dyskryminacja-
bezposrednia-jak-i-posrednia.html#.Ypiw86hBxPY
*Jan Bloxx, The proposal for a Digital Markets Act and the need for flexible economic regulation , 2022, p. 4 with
reference to Lock's philosophy
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
9. Technological context
The keystone of thinking about copyright in the
context of the right of communication of works to
the public is the principle of technological neutrality
of copyright - a paradigm enshrined in secondary EU
law and international copyright law - e.g. article 8
WCT.
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
10. Possible inspirations of the CJEU - the social function of law, what
does it mean?
Literature recognizes that a new construct of subjective copyright should
be proposed. The right of the author should be reflected in the mirror of
its social function and actions taken by the right users themselves.
An example is personal (moral)
rights, but also (which is new)
property rights, especially the right
of communication to the public.
see Dan Wielsch, Die Praxis der Rechte [in:] Die Idee subjektiver Rechte , De
Gruyter 2020, p. 175. See also J.P. Kolczynski, A local (residual) right or a future
trend for all?, "European intellectual property review" 2019, vol. No. 4-41.
https://hatalska.com/kategoria/spoleczenstwo/
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
11. The content of the right - prohibited activities, and not the right in itself?
In the new model, the content of
the exclusive right is sought in
the activities prohibited by this
law, only the infringement of
which is to describe this right.
The law does not exist abstract
here and now, in an erga omnes
effective manner, but its
effectiveness is filtered through
the social function and actions
taken by users of rights.
Wielsch, Die Praxis der Rechte Die Idee subjektiver Rechte…
https://pch24.pl/czy-istnieje-absolutne-prawo-do-wolnosci/
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
12. Where does the law "in itself" come from - the concepts of
Planiol and Kant
The tension seems to
stem from the
criticism of the theory
of personalization of
subjective law known
for the protection of
property rights, a
theory developed at
the turn of the 19th
and 20th centuries in
the French science of
civil law.
The source of
the tension lies
in the specific
understanding of
the philosophy
of Immanuel
Kant (1724-
1804)
Marcel Planiol
(1853-1931)
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
13. Kant and Kelsen foundations
Kant laid the
foundations for positive
law and normativism,
for example, of Kelsen
with his concept of
"pure theory of law".
Hegel was also inspired
by it.
Die Idee subjektiver Rechte , p. 158 ff. See also K. Kuźmicz, Immanuel Kant jako inspirator
polskiej teorii i filozofii prawa w latach 1918-1950, Wydawnictwo Temida 2 2009 p. 62. See
also K. Gliściński, Wszystkie prawa zastrzeżone: historia sporów o autorskie prawa
majątkowe, 1469-1928, Warsaw 2016 p. 383.
According to Kelsen, the law
(the ideal embodiment of
freedom of mind and human
morality) is an "exclusive
system", "the world itself."
A. Sylwestrzak, Herbert L. A. Hart – pozytywizm umiarkowany, op. cit., p. 153. This author quotes
Kelsen: “Legal cognition examines the law as an exclusive system, as a world in itself. Within this system, it makes
no sense to ask what law is as relating to a differentiam specificam, because inside this system there is nothing
but the law, everything is law[...], any similar attempt by a lawyer is hopeless".
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
14. Criticism of Kelsen - Hugh McCarthy's ASC Blog
"Pure theory [of law] does not have
the right machinery to analyze the
law".
„However, legal interpretation
uses things like ‘purpose’ that
are beyond legal science. So
these other disciplines have
another way to bleed into the pure
theory”. - bold font added by me
„legal law and a scientific law”
„[law] looking at its effects”
https://hughmccarthylawscienceasc
.wordpress.com/2014/12/09/impur
ities-in-kelsens-pure-theory/
https://redro.pl/plakat-miec-
cel,120050383
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
15. Others inspired by Kant - examples
Jellinek (1851-1911)
Austin (1790–1859)
W. L. Jaworski (1865-1930)
Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart (1907-1992)
Hart's concepts are sometimes called
moderate or „soft” positivism*, combining
continental normativism with Anglo-Saxon
common law.
*A. Sylwestrzak, Herbert L. A. Hart – pozytywizm umiarkowany, 2016, Miscellanea Historico-Iiuridica, Vol. XV, book 2, 2016. Herbert L.A. Hart
was born in England. He came from a Jewish family with Polish origins.
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
16. Hart, Znamierowski and others - extralegal factors in law
„Pure theory [of law by Kelsen]
does not have the right
machinery to analyse the law”.
https://hughmccarthylawscienceasc
.wordpress.com/2014/12/09/impur
ities-in-kelsens-pure-theory/
„However, legal interpretation
uses things like ‘purpose’ that
are beyond legal science. So
these other disciplines have another
way to bleed into the pure theory”
[of Kelsen]. - bold font and additions by me
„legal law and a scientific law”
„[law] looking at its effects”
Hart (before him Znamierowski - and his thetical
norms) extended his research to extralegal factors
- secondary rules of a normative nature; primary
law - ideal (basic rules) - cannot be applied
without them.
Hart listed as secondary rules: religious beliefs,
common law or already existing jurisprudence.
According to A. Sylwestrzak*, Hart is a remedy for
the weaknesses of positivism and normativism,
based on obligation and duty, following Kant.
*He believes that the so-called thetical norms or construction norms - categories invented before Hart by the Polish philosopher, psychologist, ethicist, lawyer
and translator Czesław Znamierowski (1888-1967), correspond to the outlines of Hart's concept of secondary rules - cf. Z) Ziembiński, Normy tetyczne a normy
aksjologiczne w koncepcji Cz. Znamierowskiego (Studia Filozoficzne 1963, No. 2, p. 87—112) and the literature referred to there.
A. Sylwestrzak, Herbert L. A. Hart – pozytywizm umiarkowany, op. cit. p. 156. Secondary rules in a more strict sense were to be rules of recognition, rules of
change, rules of adjudication - ibid., p. 144.
Ibidem p. 157.
https://redro.pl/plakat-miec-
cel,120050383
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
17. Kant's deontology - duty, abstraction and morality
Kant distinguishes the person
in the legal sense* from the
personality in the ethical sense
as independent spheres of
human life. What they have in
common is human reason - the
common source of law and
morality. The categorical
(moral) imperative is at the
same time normative, of a legal
obligation.
*Not to be confused with a legal entity within the meaning of civil or commercial law.
D. Rogóż, Metafizyka praktycznego rozumu. Autonomia i heteronomia wedle Kanta i Lévinasa, „Logos i
Ethos” 2016, vol. 41, No. 1.
"Act in such a way that you would always use humanity both in your own person and in the person of
everyone else as an end, never only as a means"
A person's morality is
expressed in duty. “A person is
only acting morally only when
he suppresses his feelings and
inclinations and does that which
he is obliged to do”***
"The transition to absolute
completeness is on the
empirical path** quite
impossible", hence "pure
reason" has a need to build
abstract concepts.
***Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason: Wolne Lektury ,
https://wolnelektury.pl/katalog/lektura/krytyka-czyego-rozumu.html [May 12, 2022] according to a
translation by Piotr Chmielowski, Lviv, January 19, 1904, p. 232.
**Kant wrote in this context about the weakness of what he called: physical-theological proof.
Fragment of the painting
from
https://filosophuj.eu/stephen
-r-palmquist-czy-
oswieceniowa-religia-kanta-
ma-korzenie-kwakierskie-
wyklad-online-relacja/
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
18. Are we students of Kant’s student Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-
1814) - a trap for subjective copyright?
Fichte introduced the concept of a protected, abstract form of expression
of a work and an unprotected idea to the discussion in copyright law.
The person of the creator was expressed by the form, not the
content of what he prepared. This form was and is to be
protected until today. Abstract expression is to be secured.
The idea was to control the form of the text to be communicated, not to
honour the creative effort and content as such.
Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Beweis der
Unrechtmäßigkeit des
Büchernachdrucks: Ein Räsonnement
und eine Parabel (1793)
https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/Buchhandel
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
19. Why a trap?
It is believed that through
Fichte's concept, the norms
of interpersonal
communication and the
norms of transactions, i.e.
economic norms, were
combined in the subjective
(prohibition) copyright.*
In the information society, it is important to
separate the norms of communication and
transaction: copying must be judged based
on the attribution of the source and the
degree to which the original and copied work
compete with each other, not the abstract
form of expression.*
Is the minimum level
of protection in
copyright a defect in
itself?
* Copyright, and the Production of Music (eds. Martin Kretschmer and Andy C. Pratt) Pre-print from special issue of iCS
(Information, Communication & Society) volume 12, issue 2 (February 2009)
** K. Gliściński, Wszystkie prawa zastrzeżone: historia sporów o autorskie prawa majątkowe, 1469-1928, Warszawa 2016,
p. 210 and footnote 856 ibid - quoting Seweryn Markiewicz in Prawa autorskie, czyli tak nazwana własność literacka i
artystyczna w Królestwie Polskim i zagranicą, Warszawa 1867.
It is easier to make the difference
between the content of a thought and
its form overbearingly than to
demonstrate it and divide these two
concepts by strict boundaries.**
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
21. Main allegations against Kant - synthesis
• Lowering the level of protection of the work to a minimum
• The concept of beauty has been reduced to the abstract
concept of form
• Limiting the importance of empiricism - in the legal practice
of applying the law
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
22. Then - abstraction it is!
Konrad Gliściński concludes:
"Supporters of positive law treat every kind
of law, including copyright and property law,
as abstract entities (...)".
K. Gliściński, Wszystkie prawa zastrzeżone: historia sporów o autorskie prawa majątkowe, 1469-1928, Warszawa 2016 p.
383
The subjective copyright is assigned, within the
framework of the personalization theory, the
abstract obligation of not interfering with it (e.g. in
a personal interest, property right, intellectual
property right, etc.).
https://starecat.com/i-want-to-stop-philosophizing-
but-i-kant-immanuel/
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
23. Criticism in the Polish civil law studies of the abstract approach
M. Pyziak-Szafnicka believes: “(...) the
obligation of all mankind to respect the
right of the owner is not reflected in the
liabilities of its individual members.”
And further on: “The concept of a
universal obligation not to infringe the
right of the owner is unrealistic and
contrary to the generally accepted
principles of contract law.” - underlining and bold font by
me
see M. Pyziak-Szafnicka [in:] System Prawa Prywatnego. Prawo cywilne – część ogólna, t. 1, ed. M. Safjan, Warszawa
2012, § 55 pojęcie prawa podmiotowego nb 23., electronic publication.
https://www.prawo-budowlane.com.pl/prawo-wlasnosci-nieruchomosci-ziemi-
gruntu-domu-poznan/
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
24. Or maybe access rules instead of norms of transaction?
The concept of a new social
understanding of subjective law has
recently been developed by Dan
Wielsch, referring, inter alia, to ideas
of Habermas’ philosophy regarding
the concept of symbolic (spiritual)
reproduction of a society devoid of
coercion, authority, based on
cooperation and the power of
argument that highlights the
individual through the community
(contrasted with material
reproduction - the system)
Wielsch is responsible for
developing the theory of
“access rules” (Ger.
"Zugangsregeln")
Ireneusz C. Kamiński even believes, in the
context of the latest case law of the
European Court of Human Rights, that,
contrary to the Founding Fathers, the
freedom of expression under Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights now
also means the right to seek / access
information as an autonomous contractual
law.
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
25. „Copyright Law 2030 – The Future of the Creative Ecosystem in Europe”
Wielsch's concept also has its design and academic dimension under
the name “Copyright Law 2030 - The Future of the Creative Ecosystem
in Europe”, which was presented on December 9, 2021 and was
immediately criticized by prof. Lucas-Schloetter
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences
26. THANK YOU FOR YOUR
ATTENTION
Janusz Piotr Kolczyński, Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences