134. Seminarium mBank – CASE
Globalny kryzys finansowy: zmiany stanu konkurencji w sektorze bankowym w Europie, rola regulacji i interwencji rządów oraz banków centralnych
16 października 2014, 15:00
centrala mBanku S.A., sala nr 5.3, V p., ul. Senatorska 18 w Warszawie
dr Małgorzata Pawłowska
Wykładowca, SGH; Doradca ekonomiczny, Instytut Ekonomiczny NBP
Jak kształtowała się konkurencja w sektorze bankowym w Polsce i w Europie przed kryzysem,
i w okresie kryzysu
Atrakcyjność inwestycyjna Europy 2013 - raport EYEYPoland
Prezentacja raportu Atrakcyjność inwestycyjna Europy 2013 - przygotowanego po raz 11 przez firmę doradczą EY. Prezentacja przygotowana pod kątem oceny Polski jako kierunku inwestycyjnego.
Pokazana po raz pierwszy na konferencji prasowej w Ministerstwie Gospodarki 6 czerwca 2013 r.
Raport EY Atrakcyjność inwestycyjna Polski 2017EYPoland
Inwestorzy zagraniczni wskazują na poprawę atrakcyjności inwestycyjnej Polski w 2016 r. – wynika z badania „Atrakcyjność inwestycyjna Polski”, przeprowadzonego przez firmę doradczą EY.
Raport EY Atrakcyjność inwestycyjna Europy 2015EYPoland
Coroczny raport Atrakcyjność Inwestycyjna Europy został przygotowany przez EY po raz trzynasty. Opracowanie składa się z dwóch części: pierwszej obejmującej dane gromadzone w ramach EY European Investment Monitor o inwestycjach w Europie w roku 2014 (z wyłączeniem inwestycji portfelowych oraz fuzji i przejęć) oraz drugiej - badania postrzegania przez inwestorów poszczególnych krajów Europy oraz regionów świata. Badanie ankietowe obejmujące 808 decydentów z międzynarodowych firm odbyło się na przełomie stycznia i lutego 2015.
Szanse i wyzwania dla gospodarki Polski i PomorzaEYPoland
Województwo pomorskie wyróżnia się przedsiębiorczością swoich mieszkańców. Znajduje się na drugim miejscu, po województwie mazowieckim, pod względem nowo rejestrowanych firm na 10 tys. mieszkańców. http://bit.ly/1p4X71w
Atrakcyjność inwestycyjna Europy 2013 - raport EYEYPoland
Prezentacja raportu Atrakcyjność inwestycyjna Europy 2013 - przygotowanego po raz 11 przez firmę doradczą EY. Prezentacja przygotowana pod kątem oceny Polski jako kierunku inwestycyjnego.
Pokazana po raz pierwszy na konferencji prasowej w Ministerstwie Gospodarki 6 czerwca 2013 r.
Raport EY Atrakcyjność inwestycyjna Polski 2017EYPoland
Inwestorzy zagraniczni wskazują na poprawę atrakcyjności inwestycyjnej Polski w 2016 r. – wynika z badania „Atrakcyjność inwestycyjna Polski”, przeprowadzonego przez firmę doradczą EY.
Raport EY Atrakcyjność inwestycyjna Europy 2015EYPoland
Coroczny raport Atrakcyjność Inwestycyjna Europy został przygotowany przez EY po raz trzynasty. Opracowanie składa się z dwóch części: pierwszej obejmującej dane gromadzone w ramach EY European Investment Monitor o inwestycjach w Europie w roku 2014 (z wyłączeniem inwestycji portfelowych oraz fuzji i przejęć) oraz drugiej - badania postrzegania przez inwestorów poszczególnych krajów Europy oraz regionów świata. Badanie ankietowe obejmujące 808 decydentów z międzynarodowych firm odbyło się na przełomie stycznia i lutego 2015.
Szanse i wyzwania dla gospodarki Polski i PomorzaEYPoland
Województwo pomorskie wyróżnia się przedsiębiorczością swoich mieszkańców. Znajduje się na drugim miejscu, po województwie mazowieckim, pod względem nowo rejestrowanych firm na 10 tys. mieszkańców. http://bit.ly/1p4X71w
The report examines the social and economic drivers and impact of circular migration between Belarus and Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. The core question the authors sought to address was how managing circular migration could, in the long term, help to optimise labour resources in both the country of origin and the destination countries. In the pages that follow, the authors of the report present the current and forecasted labour market and demographic situation in their respective countries as well as the dynamics and characteristics of short-term labour migration flows between Belarus and Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, concentrating on the period since 2010. They also outline and discuss related policy responses and evaluate prospects for cooperation on circular migration.
Podręcznik został opracowany w celu przekazania trenerom i nauczycielom podstawowej wiedzy, która może być przydatna w prowadzeniu szkoleń promujących pracę rejestrowaną. Prezentuje on z jednej strony korzyści z pracy rejestrowanej, z drugiej – potencjalne koszty związane z pracą nierejestrowaną. W pierwszej kolejności informacje te przedstawiono w odniesieniu do pracowników najemnych (rozdział 2), podkreślając w sposób szczególny to, że negatywne konsekwencje pracy nierejestrowanej są ponoszone przez całe życie. Ze względu na specyficzną sytuację cudzoziemców pracujących w Polsce konsekwencje ponoszone przez tę grupę opisano oddzielnie (rozdział 3). Ponadto zaprezentowano skutki dotyczące pracodawców z szarej strefy z wyodrębnieniem tych, którzy zatrudniają cudzoziemców (rozdział 4). Uzupełnieniem przedstawionych informacji jest opis działań podejmowanych przez państwo w celu ograniczenia zjawiska pracy nierejestrowanej w Polsce (rozdział 5) oraz prowadzonych w Wielkiej Brytanii, czyli w kraju będącym liderem w walce z szarą strefą (rozdział 6).
European countries face a challenge related to the economic and social consequences of their societies’ aging. Specifically, pension systems must adjust to the coming changes, maintaining both financial stability, connected with equalizing inflows from premiums and spending on pensions, and simultaneously the sufficiency of benefits, protecting retirees against poverty and smoothing consumption over their lives, i.e. ensuring the ability to pay for consumption needs at each stage of life, regardless of income from labor.
One of the key instruments applied toward these goals is the retirement age. Formally it is a legally established boundary: once people have crossed it – on average – they significantly lose their ability to perform work (the so-called old-age risk). But since the 1970s, in many developed countries the retirement age has become an instrument of social and labor-market policy. Specifically, in the 1970s and ‘80s, an early retirement age was perceived as a solution allowing a reduction in the supply of labor, particularly among people with relatively low competencies who were approaching retirement age, which is called the lump of labor fallacy. It was often believed that people taking early retirement freed up jobs for the young. But a range of economic evidence shows that the number of jobs is not fixed, and those who retire don’t in fact free up jobs. On the contrary, because of higher spending by pension systems, labor costs rise, which limits the supply of jobs. In general, a good situation on the labor market supports employment of both the youngest and the oldest labor force participants. Additionally, a lower retirement age for women was maintained, which resulted to a high degree from cultural conditions and norms that are typical for traditional societies.
Until now, the banking sector has been one of the strong points of Poland’s economy. In contrast to banks in the U.S. and leading Western European economies, lenders in Poland came through the 2008 global financial crisis without a scratch, without needing state financial support. But in recent years the industry’s problems have been growing, creating a threat to economic growth and gains in living standards.
For an economy’s productivity to increase, funds can’t go to all companies evenly, and definitely shouldn’t go to those that are most lacking in funds, but to those that will use them most efficiently. This is true of total external financing, and thus funding both from the banking sector and from parabanks, the capital market and funds from public institutions. In Poland, in light of the relatively modest scale of the capital market, banks play a clearly dominant role in external financing of companies. This is why the author of this text focuses on the bank credit allocation efficiency.
The author points out that in the very near future, conditions will emerge in Poland which – as the experience of other countries shows – create a risk of reduced efficiency of credit allocation to business. Additionally, in Poland today, bank lending to companies is to a high degree being replaced by funds from state aid, which reduces the efficiency of allocation of external funds to companies (both loans and subsidies), as allocation of government subsidies is not usually based on efficiency. This decline in external financing allocation efficiency may slow, halt or even reverse the process, that has been uninterrupted for 28 years, of Poland’s convergence, i.e. the narrowing of the gap in living standards between Poland and the West.
The economic characteristics of the COVID-19 crisis differ from those of previous crises. It is a combination of demand- and supply-side constraints which led to the formation of a monetary overhang that will be unfrozen once the pandemic ends. Monetary policy must take this effect into consideration, along with other pro-inflationary factors, in the post-pandemic era. It must also think in advance about how to avoid a policy trap coming from fiscal dominance.
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 deals with the economic characteristics of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the effectiveness of the monetary policy response measures undertaken. In Chapter 3, we analyse the monetary policy decisions of the ECB (and other major CBs for comparison) and their effectiveness in achieving the declared policy goals in the short term. Chapter 4 is devoted to an analysis of the policy challenges which may be faced by the ECB and other major CBs once the pandemic emergency comes to its end. Chapter 5 contains a summary and the conclusions of our analysis.
Purpose: This paper tries to identify the wage gap between informal and formal workers and tests for the two-tier structure of the informal labour market in Poland.
Design/methodology/approach: I employ the propensity score matching (PSM) technique and use data from the Polish Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the period 2009–2017 to estimate the wage gap between informal and formal workers, both at the means and along the wage distribution. I use two definitions of informal employment: a) employment without a written agreement and b) employment while officially registered as unemployed at a labour office. In order to reduce the bias resulting from the non-random selection of
individuals into informal employment, I use a rich set of control variables representing several individual characteristics.
Findings: After controlling for observed heterogeneity, I find that on average informal workers earn less than formal workers, both in terms of monthly earnings and hourly wage. This result is not sensitive to the definition of informal employment used and is
stable over the analysed time period (2009–2017). However, the wage penalty to informal employment is substantially higher for individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution, which supports the hypothesis of the two-tier structure of the informal labour market in Poland.
Originality/value: The main contribution of this study is that it identifies the two-tier structure of the informal labour market in Poland: informal workers in the first quartile of the wage distribution and those above the first quartile appear to be in two partially different segments of the labour market.
This document provides a comparative analysis of the rule of law and its impact on economic development in Poland and Germany. It finds that while both countries have strong rule of law frameworks de jure, there are significant differences de facto, with Polish firms showing less trust in the state and courts compared to German firms. Empirical analysis suggests higher levels of investment and economic development in Germany can be partially attributed to firms' greater recognition of the rule of law's ability to reduce transaction costs. Erosion of the rule of law in Poland since 2015 has likely negatively impacted investment and capital accumulation compared to Germany.
The report analyzes the VAT gap in the EU-28 member states in 2018. It finds that the total VAT gap in the EU was an estimated €137 billion, representing 12.2% of the total VAT liability. This is an increase compared to 2017, when the gap was €117 billion or 11.2% of the total liability. The report examines VAT revenue, total VAT liability, and VAT gap estimates for each member state from 2014 to 2018. It also conducts econometric analysis to identify factors influencing VAT gap levels across countries.
The euro is the second most important global currency after the US dollar. However, its international role has not increased since its inception in 1999. The private sector prefers using the US dollar rather than the euro because the financial market for US dollar-denominated assets is larger and deeper; network externalities and inertia also play a role. Increasing the attractiveness of the euro outside the euro area requires, among others, a proactive role for the European Central Bank and completing the Banking Union and Capital Market Union.
Forecasting during a strong shock is burdened with exceptionally high uncertainty. This gives rise to the temptation to formulate alarmist forecasts. Experiences from earlier pandemics, particularly those from the 20th century, for which we have the most data, don’t provide a basis for this. The mildest of them weakened growth by less than 1 percentage point, and the worst, the Spanish Flu, by 6 percentage points. Still, even the Spanish Flu never caused losses on the order of 20% of GDP – not even where it turned out to be a humanitarian disaster, costing the lives of 3-5% of the population. History suggests that if pandemics lead to such deep losses at all, it’s only in particular quarters and not over a whole year, as economic activity rebounds. The strength of that rebound is largely determined by economic policy. The purpose of this work is to describe possible scenarios for a rebound in Polish economic growth after the epidemic.
A separate issue, no less important, is what world will emerge from the current crisis. In the face of the 2008 financial crisis, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel said: “You never want a serious crisis to go to waste. And what I mean by that is an opportunity to do things that you think you could not do before.” Such changes can make the economy and society function better than before the crisis. Unfortunately, the opportunities created by the global financial crisis were squandered. Today’s task is more difficult; the scale of various problems has expanded even more. Without deep structural and institutional changes, the world will be facing enduring social and economic problems, accompanied by long-term stagnation.
"Many brilliant prophecies have appeared for the future of the EU and our entire planet. I believe that Europe, in its own style, will draw pragmatic conclusions from the crisis, not revolutionary ones; conclusions that will allow us to continue enjoying a Europe without borders. Brussels will demonstrate its usefulness; it will react ably and flexibly. First of all, contrary to the deceitful statements of members of the Polish government, the EU warned of the threats already in 2021. Secondly, already in mid-March EU assistance programs were ready, i.e. earlier than the PiS government’s “shield” program. The conclusion from the crisis will be a strengthening of all the preventive mechanisms that allow us to recognize threats and react in time of need. Research programs will be more strongly directed toward diagnosing and treating infectious diseases. Europe will gain greater self-sufficiency in the area of medical equipment and drugs, and the EU – greater competencies in the area of the health service, thus far entrusted to the member states. The 2021-27 budget must be reconstructed, to supplement the priority of the Green Deal with economic stimulus programs. In this way structural funds, which have the greatest multiplier effect for investment and the labor market, may return to favor. So once again: an addition, as a conclusion from the crisis, and not a reinvention of the EU," writes Dr. Janusz Lewandowski the author of the 162nd mBank-CASE seminar Proceeding.
Dla wielu rodaków europejskość Polski jest oczywista, trudno jest im nawet wyobrazić sobie, jak kształtowałyby się losy naszego kraju bez uczestnictwa w integracji europejskiej. Szczególnie młode pokolenie traktuje osiągnięty przez nas dzięki uczestnictwie w Unii ogromny postęp cywilizacyjny jako coś danego i naturalnego. Jednak świadomość tego, jaki był nasz punkt wyjścia, jaką przeszliśmy drogę i jak przyczyniły się do tego unijne działania oraz jakie wynikały z tego korzyści powinna nam stale towarzyszyć. Bez tej świadomości, starannego weryfikowania faktów i docenienia naszych osiągnięć grozi nam uleganie niesprawdzonym argumentom przeciwników integracji europejskiej i popełnienie nieodwracalnych błędów. Dla tych, którzy chcą poznać te fakty, przygotowany został raport "Nasza Europa. 15 lat Polski w Unii Europejskiej". Podjęto w nim ocenę 15 lat członkostwa Polski z perspektywy doświadczeń procesu integracji, z jego barierami i sukcesami, a także wyzwaniami przyszłości.
Raport jest wynikiem pracy zbiorowej licznych ekspertów z różnych dziedzin, od wielu lat analizujących wielowymiarowe efekty działania instytucji UE oraz współpracy z krajami członkowskimi na podstawie europejskich wartości i mechanizmów. Autorzy podsumowują korzyści członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej na podstawie faktów, nie stroniąc jednakże od własnych ocen i refleksji.
This report is the result of the joint work of a number of experts from various fields who have been - for many years – analysing the multidimensional effects of EU institutions and cooperation with Member States pursuant to European values and mechanisms. The authors summarise the benefits of Poland’s membership in the EU based on facts; however, they do not hide their own views and reflections. They also demonstrate the barriers and challenges to further European integration.
This report was prepared by CASE, one of the oldest independent think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe, utilising its nearly 30 years of experience in providing objective analyses and recommendations with respect to socioeconomic topics. It is both an expression of concern about Poland’s future in the EU, as well as the authors’ contribution to the debate on further European integration.
Poland’s new Employee Capital Plans (PPK) scheme, which is mandatory for employers, started to be implemented in July 2019. The article looks at the systemic solutions applied in the programme from the perspective of the concept of the simultaneous reconstruction of the retirement pension system. The aim is to present arguments for and against the project from the point of view of various actors, and to assess the chances of success for the new system. The article offers a detailed study of legal solutions, an analysis of the literature on the subject, and reports of institutions that supervise pension funds. The results of this analysis point to the lack of cohesion between certain solutions of the 1999 pension reform and expose a lack of consistency in how the reform was carried out, which led to the eventual removal of the capital part of the pension system. The study shows that additional saving for old age is advisable in the country’s current demographic situation and necessary for both economic and social reasons. However, the systemic solutions offered by the government appear to be chiefly designated to serve short-term state interests and do not create sufficient incentives for pension plan participants to join the programme.
The document summarizes the evolution of the Belarusian public sector from a command economy to state capitalism. It discusses how the Belarusian economic model has changed over time, moving from a quasi-Soviet system based on state property and central planning, to a more flexible hybrid model where the public sector still dominates the economy. The paper analyzes the role and characteristics of the state sector in Belarus and how it has developed since independence. It considers various theoretical perspectives for understanding statist economies like Belarus, but concludes that a new multidisciplinary approach is needed to fully capture the dual nature of the Belarusian economic system.
Belarusian economy has been stagnating in 2011-2015 after 15 years of a high annual average growth rate. In 2015, after four years of stagnation, the Belarusian economy slid into a recession, its first since 1996, and experienced both cyclical and structural recessions. Since 2015, the Belarusian government and the National Bank of Belarus have been giving economic reforms a good chance thanks to gradual but consistent actions aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability and economic liberalization. It seems that the economic authorities have sustained more transformation efforts during 2015-2018 than in the previous 24 years since 1991.
As the relative welfare level in Belarus is currently 64% compared to the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries average, Belarus needs to build stronger fundaments of sustainable growth by continuing and accelerating the implementation of institutional transformation, primarily by fostering elimination of existing administrative mechanisms of inefficient resource allocation. Based on the experience of the CEE countries’ economic transformation, we highlight five lessons for the purpose of the economic reforms that Belarus still faces today: keeping macroeconomic stability, restructuring and improving the governance of state-owned enterprises, developing the financial market, increasing taxation efficiency, and deepening fiscal decentralization.
Inflation in advanced economies is low by historical standards but there is no threat of deflation. Slower economic growth is caused by supply-side constraints rather than low inflation. Below-the-target inflation does not damage the reputation of central banks. Thus, central banks should not try to bring inflation back to the targeted level of 2%. Rather, they should revise the inflation target downwards and publicly explain the rationale for such a move. Risks to the independence of central banks come from their additional mandates (beyond price stability) and populist politics.
Estonia has Europe’s most transparent tax system (while Poland is second-to-last, in 35th place), and is also known for its pioneering approach to taxation of legal persons’ income. Since 2000, payers of Estonian corporate tax don’t pay tax on their profits as long as they don’t realize them. In principle, this approach should make access to capital easier, spark investment by companies and contribute to faster economic growth. Are these and other positive effects really noticeable in Estonia? Have other countries followed in this country’s footsteps? Would deferment of income tax be possible and beneficial for Poland? How would this affect revenue from tax on corporate profits? Would investors come to see Poland as a tax haven? Does the Estonian system limit tax avoidance and evasion, or actually the opposite? Is such a system fair? Are intermediate solutions possible, which would combine the strengths or limit the weaknesses of the classical and Estonian models of profit tax? These questions are discussed in the mBank-CASE seminar Proceeding no. 163, written by Dmitri Jegorov, deputy general secretary of the Estonian Finance Ministry, who directs the country’s tax and customs policy, Dr. Anna Leszczyłowska of the Poznań University of Economics and Business and Aleksander Łożykowski of the Warsaw School of Economics.
The trade war between the U.S. and China began in March 2018. The American side raised import duties on aluminum and steel from China, which were later extended to other countries, including Canada, Mexico and the EU member states. This drew a negative reaction from those countries and bilateral negotiations with the U.S. In June 2018 America, referring to Section 301 of its 1974 Trade Act, raised tariffs to 25% on 818 groups of products imported from China, arguing that the tariff increase was a response to years of theft of American intellectual property and dishonest trade practices, which has caused the U.S. trade deficit.
Will this trade war mean the collapse of the multilateral trading system and a transition to bilateral relationships? What are the possibilities for increasing tariffs in light of World Trade Organization rules? Can the conflict be resolved using the WTO dispute-resolution mechanism? What are the consequences of the trade war for American consumers and producers, and for suppliers from other countries? How high will tariffs climb as a result of a global trade war? How far can trade volumes and GDP fall if the worst-case scenario comes to pass? Professor Jan J. Michałek and Dr. Przemysław Woźniak give answers to these questions in the mBank-CASE Seminar Proceeding No. 161.
This Report has been prepared for the European Commission, DG TAXUD under contract TAXUD/2017/DE/329, “Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States” and serves as a follow-up to the six reports published between 2013 and 2018.
This Study contains new estimates of the Value Added Tax (VAT) Gap for 2017, as well as updated estimates for 2013-2016. As a novelty in this series of reports, so called “fast VAT Gap estimates” are also presented the year immediately preceding the analysis, namely for 2018. In addition, the study reports the results of the econometric analysis of VAT Gap determinants initiated and initially reported in the 2018 Report (Poniatowski et al., 2018). It also scrutinises the Policy Gap in 2017 as well as the contribution that reduced rates and exemptions made to the theoretical VAT revenue losses.
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The report examines the social and economic drivers and impact of circular migration between Belarus and Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. The core question the authors sought to address was how managing circular migration could, in the long term, help to optimise labour resources in both the country of origin and the destination countries. In the pages that follow, the authors of the report present the current and forecasted labour market and demographic situation in their respective countries as well as the dynamics and characteristics of short-term labour migration flows between Belarus and Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, concentrating on the period since 2010. They also outline and discuss related policy responses and evaluate prospects for cooperation on circular migration.
Podręcznik został opracowany w celu przekazania trenerom i nauczycielom podstawowej wiedzy, która może być przydatna w prowadzeniu szkoleń promujących pracę rejestrowaną. Prezentuje on z jednej strony korzyści z pracy rejestrowanej, z drugiej – potencjalne koszty związane z pracą nierejestrowaną. W pierwszej kolejności informacje te przedstawiono w odniesieniu do pracowników najemnych (rozdział 2), podkreślając w sposób szczególny to, że negatywne konsekwencje pracy nierejestrowanej są ponoszone przez całe życie. Ze względu na specyficzną sytuację cudzoziemców pracujących w Polsce konsekwencje ponoszone przez tę grupę opisano oddzielnie (rozdział 3). Ponadto zaprezentowano skutki dotyczące pracodawców z szarej strefy z wyodrębnieniem tych, którzy zatrudniają cudzoziemców (rozdział 4). Uzupełnieniem przedstawionych informacji jest opis działań podejmowanych przez państwo w celu ograniczenia zjawiska pracy nierejestrowanej w Polsce (rozdział 5) oraz prowadzonych w Wielkiej Brytanii, czyli w kraju będącym liderem w walce z szarą strefą (rozdział 6).
European countries face a challenge related to the economic and social consequences of their societies’ aging. Specifically, pension systems must adjust to the coming changes, maintaining both financial stability, connected with equalizing inflows from premiums and spending on pensions, and simultaneously the sufficiency of benefits, protecting retirees against poverty and smoothing consumption over their lives, i.e. ensuring the ability to pay for consumption needs at each stage of life, regardless of income from labor.
One of the key instruments applied toward these goals is the retirement age. Formally it is a legally established boundary: once people have crossed it – on average – they significantly lose their ability to perform work (the so-called old-age risk). But since the 1970s, in many developed countries the retirement age has become an instrument of social and labor-market policy. Specifically, in the 1970s and ‘80s, an early retirement age was perceived as a solution allowing a reduction in the supply of labor, particularly among people with relatively low competencies who were approaching retirement age, which is called the lump of labor fallacy. It was often believed that people taking early retirement freed up jobs for the young. But a range of economic evidence shows that the number of jobs is not fixed, and those who retire don’t in fact free up jobs. On the contrary, because of higher spending by pension systems, labor costs rise, which limits the supply of jobs. In general, a good situation on the labor market supports employment of both the youngest and the oldest labor force participants. Additionally, a lower retirement age for women was maintained, which resulted to a high degree from cultural conditions and norms that are typical for traditional societies.
Until now, the banking sector has been one of the strong points of Poland’s economy. In contrast to banks in the U.S. and leading Western European economies, lenders in Poland came through the 2008 global financial crisis without a scratch, without needing state financial support. But in recent years the industry’s problems have been growing, creating a threat to economic growth and gains in living standards.
For an economy’s productivity to increase, funds can’t go to all companies evenly, and definitely shouldn’t go to those that are most lacking in funds, but to those that will use them most efficiently. This is true of total external financing, and thus funding both from the banking sector and from parabanks, the capital market and funds from public institutions. In Poland, in light of the relatively modest scale of the capital market, banks play a clearly dominant role in external financing of companies. This is why the author of this text focuses on the bank credit allocation efficiency.
The author points out that in the very near future, conditions will emerge in Poland which – as the experience of other countries shows – create a risk of reduced efficiency of credit allocation to business. Additionally, in Poland today, bank lending to companies is to a high degree being replaced by funds from state aid, which reduces the efficiency of allocation of external funds to companies (both loans and subsidies), as allocation of government subsidies is not usually based on efficiency. This decline in external financing allocation efficiency may slow, halt or even reverse the process, that has been uninterrupted for 28 years, of Poland’s convergence, i.e. the narrowing of the gap in living standards between Poland and the West.
The economic characteristics of the COVID-19 crisis differ from those of previous crises. It is a combination of demand- and supply-side constraints which led to the formation of a monetary overhang that will be unfrozen once the pandemic ends. Monetary policy must take this effect into consideration, along with other pro-inflationary factors, in the post-pandemic era. It must also think in advance about how to avoid a policy trap coming from fiscal dominance.
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 deals with the economic characteristics of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the effectiveness of the monetary policy response measures undertaken. In Chapter 3, we analyse the monetary policy decisions of the ECB (and other major CBs for comparison) and their effectiveness in achieving the declared policy goals in the short term. Chapter 4 is devoted to an analysis of the policy challenges which may be faced by the ECB and other major CBs once the pandemic emergency comes to its end. Chapter 5 contains a summary and the conclusions of our analysis.
Purpose: This paper tries to identify the wage gap between informal and formal workers and tests for the two-tier structure of the informal labour market in Poland.
Design/methodology/approach: I employ the propensity score matching (PSM) technique and use data from the Polish Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the period 2009–2017 to estimate the wage gap between informal and formal workers, both at the means and along the wage distribution. I use two definitions of informal employment: a) employment without a written agreement and b) employment while officially registered as unemployed at a labour office. In order to reduce the bias resulting from the non-random selection of
individuals into informal employment, I use a rich set of control variables representing several individual characteristics.
Findings: After controlling for observed heterogeneity, I find that on average informal workers earn less than formal workers, both in terms of monthly earnings and hourly wage. This result is not sensitive to the definition of informal employment used and is
stable over the analysed time period (2009–2017). However, the wage penalty to informal employment is substantially higher for individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution, which supports the hypothesis of the two-tier structure of the informal labour market in Poland.
Originality/value: The main contribution of this study is that it identifies the two-tier structure of the informal labour market in Poland: informal workers in the first quartile of the wage distribution and those above the first quartile appear to be in two partially different segments of the labour market.
This document provides a comparative analysis of the rule of law and its impact on economic development in Poland and Germany. It finds that while both countries have strong rule of law frameworks de jure, there are significant differences de facto, with Polish firms showing less trust in the state and courts compared to German firms. Empirical analysis suggests higher levels of investment and economic development in Germany can be partially attributed to firms' greater recognition of the rule of law's ability to reduce transaction costs. Erosion of the rule of law in Poland since 2015 has likely negatively impacted investment and capital accumulation compared to Germany.
The report analyzes the VAT gap in the EU-28 member states in 2018. It finds that the total VAT gap in the EU was an estimated €137 billion, representing 12.2% of the total VAT liability. This is an increase compared to 2017, when the gap was €117 billion or 11.2% of the total liability. The report examines VAT revenue, total VAT liability, and VAT gap estimates for each member state from 2014 to 2018. It also conducts econometric analysis to identify factors influencing VAT gap levels across countries.
The euro is the second most important global currency after the US dollar. However, its international role has not increased since its inception in 1999. The private sector prefers using the US dollar rather than the euro because the financial market for US dollar-denominated assets is larger and deeper; network externalities and inertia also play a role. Increasing the attractiveness of the euro outside the euro area requires, among others, a proactive role for the European Central Bank and completing the Banking Union and Capital Market Union.
Forecasting during a strong shock is burdened with exceptionally high uncertainty. This gives rise to the temptation to formulate alarmist forecasts. Experiences from earlier pandemics, particularly those from the 20th century, for which we have the most data, don’t provide a basis for this. The mildest of them weakened growth by less than 1 percentage point, and the worst, the Spanish Flu, by 6 percentage points. Still, even the Spanish Flu never caused losses on the order of 20% of GDP – not even where it turned out to be a humanitarian disaster, costing the lives of 3-5% of the population. History suggests that if pandemics lead to such deep losses at all, it’s only in particular quarters and not over a whole year, as economic activity rebounds. The strength of that rebound is largely determined by economic policy. The purpose of this work is to describe possible scenarios for a rebound in Polish economic growth after the epidemic.
A separate issue, no less important, is what world will emerge from the current crisis. In the face of the 2008 financial crisis, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel said: “You never want a serious crisis to go to waste. And what I mean by that is an opportunity to do things that you think you could not do before.” Such changes can make the economy and society function better than before the crisis. Unfortunately, the opportunities created by the global financial crisis were squandered. Today’s task is more difficult; the scale of various problems has expanded even more. Without deep structural and institutional changes, the world will be facing enduring social and economic problems, accompanied by long-term stagnation.
"Many brilliant prophecies have appeared for the future of the EU and our entire planet. I believe that Europe, in its own style, will draw pragmatic conclusions from the crisis, not revolutionary ones; conclusions that will allow us to continue enjoying a Europe without borders. Brussels will demonstrate its usefulness; it will react ably and flexibly. First of all, contrary to the deceitful statements of members of the Polish government, the EU warned of the threats already in 2021. Secondly, already in mid-March EU assistance programs were ready, i.e. earlier than the PiS government’s “shield” program. The conclusion from the crisis will be a strengthening of all the preventive mechanisms that allow us to recognize threats and react in time of need. Research programs will be more strongly directed toward diagnosing and treating infectious diseases. Europe will gain greater self-sufficiency in the area of medical equipment and drugs, and the EU – greater competencies in the area of the health service, thus far entrusted to the member states. The 2021-27 budget must be reconstructed, to supplement the priority of the Green Deal with economic stimulus programs. In this way structural funds, which have the greatest multiplier effect for investment and the labor market, may return to favor. So once again: an addition, as a conclusion from the crisis, and not a reinvention of the EU," writes Dr. Janusz Lewandowski the author of the 162nd mBank-CASE seminar Proceeding.
Dla wielu rodaków europejskość Polski jest oczywista, trudno jest im nawet wyobrazić sobie, jak kształtowałyby się losy naszego kraju bez uczestnictwa w integracji europejskiej. Szczególnie młode pokolenie traktuje osiągnięty przez nas dzięki uczestnictwie w Unii ogromny postęp cywilizacyjny jako coś danego i naturalnego. Jednak świadomość tego, jaki był nasz punkt wyjścia, jaką przeszliśmy drogę i jak przyczyniły się do tego unijne działania oraz jakie wynikały z tego korzyści powinna nam stale towarzyszyć. Bez tej świadomości, starannego weryfikowania faktów i docenienia naszych osiągnięć grozi nam uleganie niesprawdzonym argumentom przeciwników integracji europejskiej i popełnienie nieodwracalnych błędów. Dla tych, którzy chcą poznać te fakty, przygotowany został raport "Nasza Europa. 15 lat Polski w Unii Europejskiej". Podjęto w nim ocenę 15 lat członkostwa Polski z perspektywy doświadczeń procesu integracji, z jego barierami i sukcesami, a także wyzwaniami przyszłości.
Raport jest wynikiem pracy zbiorowej licznych ekspertów z różnych dziedzin, od wielu lat analizujących wielowymiarowe efekty działania instytucji UE oraz współpracy z krajami członkowskimi na podstawie europejskich wartości i mechanizmów. Autorzy podsumowują korzyści członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej na podstawie faktów, nie stroniąc jednakże od własnych ocen i refleksji.
This report is the result of the joint work of a number of experts from various fields who have been - for many years – analysing the multidimensional effects of EU institutions and cooperation with Member States pursuant to European values and mechanisms. The authors summarise the benefits of Poland’s membership in the EU based on facts; however, they do not hide their own views and reflections. They also demonstrate the barriers and challenges to further European integration.
This report was prepared by CASE, one of the oldest independent think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe, utilising its nearly 30 years of experience in providing objective analyses and recommendations with respect to socioeconomic topics. It is both an expression of concern about Poland’s future in the EU, as well as the authors’ contribution to the debate on further European integration.
Poland’s new Employee Capital Plans (PPK) scheme, which is mandatory for employers, started to be implemented in July 2019. The article looks at the systemic solutions applied in the programme from the perspective of the concept of the simultaneous reconstruction of the retirement pension system. The aim is to present arguments for and against the project from the point of view of various actors, and to assess the chances of success for the new system. The article offers a detailed study of legal solutions, an analysis of the literature on the subject, and reports of institutions that supervise pension funds. The results of this analysis point to the lack of cohesion between certain solutions of the 1999 pension reform and expose a lack of consistency in how the reform was carried out, which led to the eventual removal of the capital part of the pension system. The study shows that additional saving for old age is advisable in the country’s current demographic situation and necessary for both economic and social reasons. However, the systemic solutions offered by the government appear to be chiefly designated to serve short-term state interests and do not create sufficient incentives for pension plan participants to join the programme.
The document summarizes the evolution of the Belarusian public sector from a command economy to state capitalism. It discusses how the Belarusian economic model has changed over time, moving from a quasi-Soviet system based on state property and central planning, to a more flexible hybrid model where the public sector still dominates the economy. The paper analyzes the role and characteristics of the state sector in Belarus and how it has developed since independence. It considers various theoretical perspectives for understanding statist economies like Belarus, but concludes that a new multidisciplinary approach is needed to fully capture the dual nature of the Belarusian economic system.
Belarusian economy has been stagnating in 2011-2015 after 15 years of a high annual average growth rate. In 2015, after four years of stagnation, the Belarusian economy slid into a recession, its first since 1996, and experienced both cyclical and structural recessions. Since 2015, the Belarusian government and the National Bank of Belarus have been giving economic reforms a good chance thanks to gradual but consistent actions aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability and economic liberalization. It seems that the economic authorities have sustained more transformation efforts during 2015-2018 than in the previous 24 years since 1991.
As the relative welfare level in Belarus is currently 64% compared to the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries average, Belarus needs to build stronger fundaments of sustainable growth by continuing and accelerating the implementation of institutional transformation, primarily by fostering elimination of existing administrative mechanisms of inefficient resource allocation. Based on the experience of the CEE countries’ economic transformation, we highlight five lessons for the purpose of the economic reforms that Belarus still faces today: keeping macroeconomic stability, restructuring and improving the governance of state-owned enterprises, developing the financial market, increasing taxation efficiency, and deepening fiscal decentralization.
Inflation in advanced economies is low by historical standards but there is no threat of deflation. Slower economic growth is caused by supply-side constraints rather than low inflation. Below-the-target inflation does not damage the reputation of central banks. Thus, central banks should not try to bring inflation back to the targeted level of 2%. Rather, they should revise the inflation target downwards and publicly explain the rationale for such a move. Risks to the independence of central banks come from their additional mandates (beyond price stability) and populist politics.
Estonia has Europe’s most transparent tax system (while Poland is second-to-last, in 35th place), and is also known for its pioneering approach to taxation of legal persons’ income. Since 2000, payers of Estonian corporate tax don’t pay tax on their profits as long as they don’t realize them. In principle, this approach should make access to capital easier, spark investment by companies and contribute to faster economic growth. Are these and other positive effects really noticeable in Estonia? Have other countries followed in this country’s footsteps? Would deferment of income tax be possible and beneficial for Poland? How would this affect revenue from tax on corporate profits? Would investors come to see Poland as a tax haven? Does the Estonian system limit tax avoidance and evasion, or actually the opposite? Is such a system fair? Are intermediate solutions possible, which would combine the strengths or limit the weaknesses of the classical and Estonian models of profit tax? These questions are discussed in the mBank-CASE seminar Proceeding no. 163, written by Dmitri Jegorov, deputy general secretary of the Estonian Finance Ministry, who directs the country’s tax and customs policy, Dr. Anna Leszczyłowska of the Poznań University of Economics and Business and Aleksander Łożykowski of the Warsaw School of Economics.
The trade war between the U.S. and China began in March 2018. The American side raised import duties on aluminum and steel from China, which were later extended to other countries, including Canada, Mexico and the EU member states. This drew a negative reaction from those countries and bilateral negotiations with the U.S. In June 2018 America, referring to Section 301 of its 1974 Trade Act, raised tariffs to 25% on 818 groups of products imported from China, arguing that the tariff increase was a response to years of theft of American intellectual property and dishonest trade practices, which has caused the U.S. trade deficit.
Will this trade war mean the collapse of the multilateral trading system and a transition to bilateral relationships? What are the possibilities for increasing tariffs in light of World Trade Organization rules? Can the conflict be resolved using the WTO dispute-resolution mechanism? What are the consequences of the trade war for American consumers and producers, and for suppliers from other countries? How high will tariffs climb as a result of a global trade war? How far can trade volumes and GDP fall if the worst-case scenario comes to pass? Professor Jan J. Michałek and Dr. Przemysław Woźniak give answers to these questions in the mBank-CASE Seminar Proceeding No. 161.
This Report has been prepared for the European Commission, DG TAXUD under contract TAXUD/2017/DE/329, “Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States” and serves as a follow-up to the six reports published between 2013 and 2018.
This Study contains new estimates of the Value Added Tax (VAT) Gap for 2017, as well as updated estimates for 2013-2016. As a novelty in this series of reports, so called “fast VAT Gap estimates” are also presented the year immediately preceding the analysis, namely for 2018. In addition, the study reports the results of the econometric analysis of VAT Gap determinants initiated and initially reported in the 2018 Report (Poniatowski et al., 2018). It also scrutinises the Policy Gap in 2017 as well as the contribution that reduced rates and exemptions made to the theoretical VAT revenue losses.
More from CASE Center for Social and Economic Research (20)
Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States: 2019 Final Report
134. Seminarium mBank – CASE_prezentacja M. Pawłowska
1. Małgorzata Pawłowska
Wykładowca, SGH; Doradca ekonomiczny, Instytut Ekonomiczny NBP
Warszawa, 16 października 2014
134. Seminarium mBank –CASE
Jak kształtowała się konkurencja w sektorze bankowym w Polsce i w Europie przed kryzysem i w okresie kryzysu
Niniejszy artykuł przedstawia osobiste poglądy i nie przedstawia stanowiska NBP.
2. Plan
Pojęcie konkurencji w sektorze bankowym
Metody pomiaru konkurencji
Wpływ konkurencji w sektorze bankowym na jego stabilność przed i po upadku Lehman Brothers
Sytuacja w sektorze bankowym UE
Wyniki badań poziomu konkurencji w sektorach bankowych UE
Rola badań nad konkurencją i nad systemem bankowym po kryzysie finansowym –podsumowanie
| 2
4. Pojęcie konkurencji w sektorze bankowym
Konkurencjadotyczystrukturycałegorynku,naktórymdziaładanypodmiot,wodróżnieniudokonkurencyjności,którawiążesięzcharakterystykąposzczególnychpodmiotównatymrynku
Teoriabadaniakonkurencjiwsektorzebankowym,którawliteraturzeangielsko-języcznejnosinazwę(IndustrialOrganizationApprochofBanking,IOAB)wykorzystujemodelezteoriiprzedsiębiorstwiobejmujeidentyfikacjękluczowychczynnikówwpływającychnapodejmowaniedecyzjiprzezbanki, ocenęipomiarstrukturykonkurencjinarynkachbankowych, związanychztymimplikacjidlasektorabankowegoispołeczeństwaorazocenęskutkówregulacjiwsektorzebankowym
| Seminarium mBanku - | 4
5. Metody pomiaru konkurencji
zmianykonkurencjiwsektorzebankowymodbywająsięgłówniedwomakanałami:(1)fuzjeiprzejęcia(M&A)(2) regulacjestymulującebarierywejściaiwyjścia,sąteżinnedeterminantyodstronypodażowejipopytowej(np. zróżnicowanieproduktów,powiązaniasieciowe, charakterystykiklientów)
różnicamiędzykonkurencjąakoncentracją:
miarykoncentracji:indeksyHHI,CR5(Paradygmatstruktura-taktyka-wynik(SCP)opierającysięnatestowaniuzależnościmiędzystrukturąrynku,taktykądziałaniaorazjegowynikiemzapoczątkowanyprzezBaina(1951)
miary konkurencji: indeks Lernera mierzy tzw. marżę monopolisty, statystyka H, metoda Boona(Teoria NEIO)
6. Rola konkurencji w sektorze bankowym
Niektórzyekonomiściuważają,żetonadmiernywzrostkonkurencjiiinnowacjefinansowenarynkachorazniewłaściweregulacjedoprowadziłydoglobalnegokryzysufinansowegoponieważwiększakonkurencjaprowadzidopodejmowaniawiększegoryzykaimanegatywnywpływnastabilność(RaportBankuŚwiatowego,2013).Zdrugiejstrony,uważasię,żewiększakonkurencjazwiększafinansowąstabilnośćpoprzezwypchnięciezrynkutzw. niestabilnychbanków(BikkeriLeuvenstein,2014)
Vieves,2010stwierdził,żekonkurencjamożezwiększyćniestabilnośćfinansowązarównopostroniedeponentów,jakikredytobiorców,przezzwiększaniepodejmowanegoryzyka. Dlategoważnejestokreślanieoptymalnegopoziomukonkurencji
7. Relacja między koncentracją sektora oraz strukturą własnościową, a konkurencją w sektorze bankowym
Wwiększościpracstwierdzono,żeniemajednoznacznychzwiązkówmiędzywzrostemkoncentracjiapoziomemkonkurencjim.in.ClaessensiLaeven,2004orazBergeriin.,2004
Przedkryzysem:Cetorelli(2004)wskazałnakwestiętypuwłasności, jakoistotnądeterminantękonkurencji;LaPortaiin.(2000)wykazali,żedużyudziałwłasnościpaństwowejwsektorzebankowymnegatywniewpływanakonkurencję
Pokryzysie:autorzywielupractwierdzą,żetypwłasnościniemawpływunapoziomkonkurencjiidecyzjepodejmowaneprzezbanki(Barryiin.,2010),wynikibadańdotyczącepolskiegosektorabankowegowykazałypozytywnywpływkapitałuzagranicznegonapoziomkonkurencjiwpolskimsektorzebankowymiujemnywłasnościpaństwowej,poupadkuLehmanawpływtenbyłjużnieistotny(Pawłowska2014)
Państwopełnibardzoważnąrolę,zwłaszczawzapewnieniunadzorufinansowego,zapewnianiuzdrowejkonkurencjiprzezwłaściwąpolitykęregulacyjnąorazpoprzezwzmocnienieinfrastrukturyfinansowej(RaportBankuŚwiatowego,2013)
| Seminarium mBanku - | 7
9. Mnożnik kapitałów własnych: dźwignia (%) w sektorach bankowych UE
| 9
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Estonia
Słowacja
Bułgaria
Węgry
Rumunia
Luksemburg
Polska
Słowenia
Łotwa
Malta
Grecja
Cypr
Finlandia
Irladnia
Austria
Hiszpania
Włochy
Portugalia
Litwa
Wielka Brytania
Francja
Dania
Belgia
Czechy
Niemcy
Szwecja
Holandia
2008
2010
2013
Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie EBC (Statistical Data Warehouse).
10. Współczynnik adekwatności kapitałowej (tierI ratio)
| 10
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Litwa
Włochy
Cypr
Szwecja
Portugalia
Hiszpania
Austria
Łotwa
Holadnia
Malta
Słowenia
Grecja
Francja
Irlandia
Wielka Brytania
Polska
Czechy
Bułgaria
Niemcy
Finlandia
Belgia
Węgry
Słowacja
Dania
Estonia
Rumunia
Luksemburg
2008
2010
2013
Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie EBC (Statistical Data Warehouse).
11. Wskaźnik kredytów zagrożonych (NPL) w UE (w %)
| 11
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Niemcy
Luksemburg
Szwecja
Austria
Holandia
Belgia
Dania
Wielka Brytnia
Estonia
Francja
Polska
Czechy
Słowacja
Hiszpania
Malta
Portugalia
Cypr
Włochy
Słowenia
Węgry
Łotwa
Rumunia
Grecja
Bułgaria
Irlandia
Litwa
2006
2012
Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie IMF.
12. Wskaźniki rentowności w UE: ROA (w %)
| 12
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
Grecja
Słowenia
Cypr
Irland
Włochy
Portugalia
Rumunia
Niemcy
Austria
Wielka Brytania
Litwa
Czechy
Dania
Holandia
Francja
Belgia
Hiszpania
Bułgaria
Szwecja
Finlandia
Luksemburg
Węgry
Malta
Słowacja
Łotwa
Polska
Estonia
2008
2010
2013
Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie EBC (Statistical Data Warehouse).
13. Wskaźniki rentowności w UE: ROE (w %)
| 13
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
Grecja
Słowenia
Cypr
Włochy
Portugalia
Irlandia
Rumunia
Austria
Niemcy
Wielka Brytania
Litwa
Czechy
Dania
Bułgaria
Holadnia
Francja
Luksemburg
Hiszpania
Słowacja
Belgia
Węgry
Finlandia
Polska
Malta
Łotwa
Szwecja
Estonia
2008
2010
2013
Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie EBC (Statistical Data Warehouse).
14. Wartość wskaźnika CR5 w krajach Unii Europejskiej w % (2004, 2008 i 2010, 2013)
| Seminarium mBanku - | 14
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Niemcy
Luksemburg
Austria
Włochy
Wielka Brytania
Polska
Francja
Irlandia
Bułgaria
Węgry
Rumunia
Hiszpania
Słowenia
Szwecja
Cypr
Czechy
Belgia
Łotwa
Dania
Słowacja
Portugalia
Malta
Holandia
Finlandia
Litwa
Estonia
Grecja
2004
2008
2010
2013
Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie EBC (Statistical Data Warehouse).
15. Wartość wskaźnika HHI w krajach Unii Europejskiej % (2004, 2008 i 2010, 2013)
| Seminarium mBanku - | 15
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Niemcy
Luksemburg
Austria
Włochy
Wielka Brytania
Polska
Francja
Irlandia
Bułgaria
Węgry
Rumunia
Hiszpania
Słowenia
Szwecja
Cypr
Czechy
Belgia
Łotwa
Dania
Słowacja
Portugalia
Malta
Holandia
Finlandia
Litwa
Estonia
Grecja
2004
2008
2010
2013
Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie EBC (Statistical Data Warehouse).
16. Udział wyniku odsetkowego w aktywach w sektorach bankowych UE (%)
| Seminarium mBanku - | 16
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Szwecja
Finlandia
Portugalia
Niemcy
Dania
Francja
Luksemburg
Belgia
Wielka Brytania
Irlandia
Holandia
Włochy
Austria
Czechy
Bułgaria
Malta
Łotwa
Słowenia
Hiszpania
Litwa
Grecja
Polska
Cypr
Rumunia
Słowacja
Węgry
Estonia
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie EBC (Statistical Data Warehouse).
17. Wyniki badań nad konkurencją w sektorach bankowych krajów UE przed kryzysem i w trakcie kryzysu, w tym w polskim sektorze bankowym
przedkryzysem,generalniewykazanowzrostkonkurencjiwsektorachbankowychkrajówUE-10(zobacz.m.in.Pawłowska(2014),Clerides(2013),EfthyvoulouiYildrim(2013),Weill(2013)),wynikidotyczącekrajówUE-15sąjużniejednoznacznenp.BikkeriSpierdijk(2008)
powybuchuGlobalnegoKryzysuFinansowegowynikizmianpoziomukonkurencjiwsektorachbankowychkrajówUE,wykazująwyraźnyspadekkonkurencjimierzonejindeksemLerneraistatystykąH:Weill(2013),Clerides(2013),Pawłowska(2014)
| Seminarium mBanku - | 17
18. Wartości oszacowanego indeksu Lerneradla sektorów bankowych krajów UE w latach 2002- 2007
| 18
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
Austria
Belgia
Bułgaria
Cypr
Czechy
Dania
Estonia
Finlandia
Francja
Niemcy
Grecja
Węgry
Irlandia
Włochy
Łotwa
Litwa
Luksemburg
Malta
Holandia
Polska
Portugalia
Rumunia
Słowacja
Słowenia
Hiszpania
Szwecja
Wielka Brytania
UE15
Nowe12
UE27
2002
2004
2005
2006
2007
2007-2002
Uwaga: czerwonysłupekoznaczaróżnicew poziomiekonkurencjimiędzy2007a 2002rokiem.
Źródło: opracowaniewłasnenapodstawiedanychWeill (2013).
IndeksLerneraLprzybierawartościzprzedziału(0,1).Imwiększawartość,tymwiększasiłarynkowaprzedsiębiorstwa/bankuimniejszakonkurencjanarynku.
19. Wartości oszacowanego indeksu Lerneradla sektorów bankowych krajów UE w latach 2008- 2010
| Seminarium mBanku - | 19
Uwaga: czerwonysłupekoznaczaróżnicew poziomiekonkurencjimiędzy2010 a 2008rokiem.
Źródło: opracowaniewłasnenapodstawiedanychWeill (2013).
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
2008
2009
2010
2010-2008
20. Wartości oszacowanej statystyki H dla sektorów bankowych krajów UE w latach 2002-2007
| 20
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
Austria
Belgia
Bułgaria
Cypr
Czechy
Dania
Estonia
Finlandia
Francja
Niemcy
Grecja
Węgry
Irlandia
Włochy
Łotwa
Litwa
Luksemburg
Malta
Holandia
Polska
Portugalia
Rumunia
Słowacja
Słowenia
Hiszpania
Szwecja
Wielka Brytania
UE15
Nowe12
UE27
2002
2004
2005
2006
2007
2007-2002
Uwaga: czerwonysłupekoznaczaróżnicew poziomiekonkurencjimiędzy2007a 2002rokiem.
Źródło: opracowaniewłasnena podstawiedanychWeill (2013).
Rosnąca wartość statystyki H wskazuje na wzrost konkurencji.
21. Wartości oszacowanej statystyki H dla sektorów bankowych krajów UE w latach 2008-2010
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Źródło: opracowaniewłasnenapodstawiedanychWeill (2013).
-1
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
Austria
Belgia
Bułgaria
Cypr
Czechy
Dania
Estonia
Finlandia
Francja
Niemcy
Grecja
Węgry
Irlandia
Włochy
Łotwa
Litwa
Luksemburg
Malta
Holandia
Polska
Portugalia
Rumunia
Słowacja
Słowenia
Hiszpania
Szwecja
Wielka Brytania
UE15
Nowe12
UE27
2008
2009
2010
2010-2008
Uwaga: czerwonysłupekoznaczaróżnicew poziomiekonkurencjimiędzy2010 i 2008a rokiem.
22. CR5 oraz NPL w polskim sektorze bankowym dla lat 1997-2012
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1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
0,00
5,00
10,00
15,00
20,00
25,00
40,00
42,00
44,00
46,00
48,00
50,00
52,00
54,00
56,00
NPL %
CR5 %
Źródło: opracowaniewłasnena podstawiedanychPawłowska(2014).Uwaga różnica w poziomie NPL między 2003 i 2004 r. była m.in. spowodowana zmianami regulacyjnymi.