psychology assignmentfirst question, please readBaldwi.docx

psychology assignment:
first question, please read:
Baldwin, J. M. (1898). The science of the mind--Psychology. In
The story of the mind (pp. 1-7). New York, NY, US: D
Appleton & Company. doi:10.1037/11355-001
Wundt, W. (1894). Lecture first (J. E. Creighton & E. B.
Titchener, Trans.). In Lectures on human and animal
psychology (2nd ed., pp. 1-11). New York, NY, US: Swan
Sonnenschein & Co. doi:10.1037/12937-001
second question, please read:
Wundt, W. (1894). Lecture first (J. E. Creighton & E. B.
Titchener, Trans.). In Lectures on human and animal
psychology (2nd ed., pp. 1-11). New York, NY, US: Swan
Sonnenschein & Co. doi:10.1037/12937-001
Wundt, W. (1907). Problem of psychology (C. H. Judd, Trans).
In Outlines of psychology (3rd rev. English ed. from 7th rev.
German ed., pp. 1-6). Leipzig, Germany: Wilhelm Engelmann.
doi:10.1037/12406-001
James, W. (1890). The scope of psychology. In The principles
of psychology (Vol I, pp. 1-11). New York, NY, US: Henry Holt
and Co. doi:10.1037/10538-001
Third question, please read:
Witmer, L. (1907/1996). Clinical Psychology. American

Psychologist, 51(3), 248-251. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.51.3.248
Gilbreth, L. M. (1947). Scientific management and human
resources. Occupations, 26, 45-49.
Clinical Psychology
Lightner W i t m e r
D uring the last ten years the l a b o r a t o r y o f psychology
at the University o f Pennsylvania has conducted, u n d e r m y
direction, what I have called
" a psychological clinic." Children f r o m the public schools
o f Philadelphia a n d adjacent cities have b e e n b r o u g h t
to
the l a b o r a t o r y b y p a r e n t s or teachers; these
children h a d
m a d e themselves c o n s p i c u o u s because o f a n
inability to
progress in school w o r k as rapidly as other children, or
because o f m o r a l defects which r e n d e r e d t h e m
difficult
t o m a n a g e u n d e r o r d i n a r y discipline.
W h e n b r o u g h t to the psychological clinic, such chil-
d r e n are given a physical a n d m e n t a l e x a m i n a t i o
n ; i f the
result o f this e x a m i n a t i o n shows it to be desirable, they
are then sent to specialists for the eye or ear, for the nose
a n d throat, a n d for n e r v o u s diseases, one or all, as each
case m a y require. T h e result o f this c o n j o i n t medical
a n d
psychological e x a m i n a t i o n is a diagnosis o f the child's

m e n t a l a n d physical condition a n d the r e c o m m e n d
a t i o n
o f a p p r o p r i a t e medical a n d pedagogical t r e a t m e n
t . T h e
progress o f s o m e o f these children has been followed for
a t e r m o f years.
To illustrate the operation o f the psychological clinic,
take a recent case sent to the l a b o r a t o r y f r o m a city o f
Pennsylvania, n o t far f r o m Philadelphia. T h e child was
b r o u g h t b y his parents, on the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o
f the
S u p e r i n t e n d e n t o f Schools. E x a m i n a t i o n
revealed a b o y
ten years o f age, w i t h o u t a p p a r e n t physical defect, w
h o
h a d spent four years at school, b u t h a d m a d e so little
progress t h a t his ignorance o f the p r i n t e d s y m b o l s
o f the
a l p h a b e t m a d e it necessary to use the illiterate c a r d
to
test his vision. N o t h i n g in the child's heredity or early
history revealed a n y g r o u n d for the suspicion o f degen-
eracy, n o r did the child's physical a p p e a r a n c e w a r r a
n t
this diagnosis. T h e b o y a p p e a r e d to be o f n o r m a l
intel-
ligence, except for the r e t a r d a t i o n in school work. T h e
e x a m i n a t i o n o f the neurologist to w h o m he was sent,
Dr.
William G. Spiller, c o n f i r m e d the absence o f
conspicuous
m e n t a l degeneracy a n d o f physical defect. T h e oculist,
Dr. William C. Posey, f o u n d n o t h i n g m o r e serious t h
a n
a slight far-sighted astigmatism, a n d the e x a m i n a t i o n o

f
Dr. George C. Stout for adenoids, gave the child a clean
bill o f health, so far as the nose a n d p h a r y n x were con-
cerned. O n the conclusion o f this e x a m i n a t i o n he was,
necessarily, r e t u r n e d t o the school f r o m which he c a
m e ,
with the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n to the teacher o f a course o
f
t r e a t m e n t to develop the child's intelligence. It wilt
require
at least three m o n t h s ' observation to d e t e r m i n e
whether
his present pedagogical retardation is based u p o n an arrest
o f cerebral d e v e l o p m e n t or is m e r e l y the result o f
inad-
e q u a t e m e t h o d s o f education. T h i s case is
unequivocally
one for the psychologist.
M y a t t e n t i o n was first d r a w n to the p h e n o m e n a
o f
retardation in the year 1889. At that time, while a student
o f psychology at the University o f Pennsylvania, I h a d
charge o f the English b r a n c h e s in a college p r e p a r a t
o r y
school o f Philadelphia. I n m y classes at this a c a d e m y I
was called u p o n to give instruction in English to a b o y
p r e p a r i n g for entrance to college, w h o showed a r e m a
r k -
able deficiency in the English language. H i s c o m p o s i t i o
n s
seldom contained a single sentence that h a d been correctly
f o r m e d . For e x a m p l e , there was little or n o
distinction
between the present a n d the past tenses o f verbs; the end-
ings o f m a n y words were clipped off, a n d this was es-

pecially noticeable in those words in which a final ending
distinguished the plural f r o m the singular, or a n adverb
f r o m a n adjective. As it s e e m e d doubtful whether he
would ever b e able to enter college w i t h o u t special in-
struction in English, I was engaged to t u t o r h i m in the
English branches.
I h a d n o sooner u n d e r t a k e n this w o r k t h a n I saw
the
necessity o f beginning with the e l e m e n t s o f language a
n d
teaching h i m as one would teach a boy, say, in the third
grade. Before long I discovered t h a t I m u s t start still fur-
ther back. I h a d f o u n d it impossible, t h r o u g h oral a n
d
written exercises, to fix in his m i n d the e l e m e n t a r y f o
r m s
o f words as p a r t s o f speech in a sentence. T h i s seemed
to be owing to the fact t h a t he h a d verbal deafness. H e
was quite able to h e a r even a faint sound, like the ticking
o f a watch, b u t he could n o t h e a r the difference in the
sound o f such words as grasp a n d grasped. This verbal
deafness was associated with, a n d I n o w believe was p r o b
-
ably caused by, a defect o f articulation. T h u s the b o y ' s
written language was a fairly exact replica o f his spoken
language; a n d he p r o b a b l y h e a r d the words t h a t
others
spoke as he h i m s e l f spoke t h e m . I therefore u n d e r t o
o k
to give h i m a n e l e m e n t a r y training in articulation t o
r e m e d y the defects which are ordinarily corrected,
t h r o u g h imitation, b y the t i m e a child is three or four
years old. I gave practically n o a t t e n t i o n to the subjects
required in English for college entrance, spending all m y
t i m e on the drill in articulation a n d in perfecting his verbal

audition a n d teaching h i m the simplest e l e m e n t s o f
writ-
ten language. T h e result was a great i m p r o v e m e n t in
all
his written work, a n d he succeeded in entering the college
d e p a r t m e n t o f the University o f Pennsylvania in the
fol-
lowing year.
In 1894-95, I found h i m as a college student in m y
classes at the University o f Pennsylvania. His articulation,
his written discourse a n d his verbal audition were very
Editor's note. T h i s is a r e p r i n t o f a n o r i g i n a l a r
t i c l e f r o m T h e Psy-
chological Clinic, 1 9 0 7 , Vol. 1, p p . 1 - 9 .
248 M a r c h 1996 • A m e r i c a n Psychologist
In the public domain
Vol. 51, No. 3, 248-251
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deficient for a b o y o f his years. In consequence he was
unable to acquire the technical terminology o f m y branch,
and I have n o d o u b t that he passed very few exami n at i o
n s
excepting t h r o u g h the s y m p a t h y o f his instructors w
h o

overlooked the serious imperfections o f his written work,
owing to the fact that he was in other respects a fair stu-
dent. W h e n it c a m e to the final examinations for the
bachelor's degree, however, he failed and was compelled
to repeat m u c h o f the work o f his senior year. He sub-
sequently entered and graduated f r o m one o f the profes-
sional d e p a r t m e n t s o f the University. His deficiencies
in
language, I believe, have never been entirely overcome.
I felt very keenly how m u c h this b o y was losing
t h r o u g h his speech defect. His school work, his college
course, a n d doubtless his professional career were all se-
riously h a m p e r e d . I was confident at the time, an d this
confidence has been justified by subsequent experience
with similar cases, that if he h a d been given adequate
instruction in articulation in the early years o f childhood,
he could have overcome his defect. With the impro v em en t
in articulation there would have come an improved power
o f apprehending spoken and written language. T h a t
nothing was d o n e for him in the early years, n o r indeed
at a n y time, excepting for the b r i e f period o f private in-
struction in English and some lessons in elocution, is re-
markable, for the speech defect was primarily owing t o
an i n j u r y to the head in the second year o f life, an d his
father was a physician who might have been expected to
appreciate the necessity o f special training in a case o f
retardation caused by a brain injury.
T h e second case to attract m y interest was a b o y
fourteen years o f age, who was b r o u g h t to the lab o rat o
ry
o f psychology by his grade teacher. H e was one o f those
children o f great interest to the teacher, k n o w n t o the
profession as a c h r o n i c bad speller. His teacher, Miss
Margaret T. Maguire, now the supervising principal o f a

g r a m m a r school o f Philadelphia, was at that t i m e a stu-
d e n t o f psychology at the University o f Pennsylvania; she
was i m b u e d with the idea that a psychologist should be
able, t h r o u g h e x a m i n a t i o n , to ascertain the causes
o f a
deficiency in spelling and to r e c o m m e n d the appropriate
pedagogical t r e a t m e n t for its amelioration or cure.
With this case, in March, 1896, the work o f the psy-
chological clinic was begun. At that time I could no t find
t h a t the science o f psychology had ever addressed itself
to the a s c e r t a i n m e n t o f the causes and t r e a t m e n t
o f a
deficiency in spelling. Yet here was a simple develop-
mental defect o f m e m o r y ; a n d m e m o r y is a mental
pro-
cess o f which the science o f psychology is supposed to
furnish the only authoritative knowledge. It appeared to
me that i f psychology was worth anything to me or t o
others it should be able to assist the efforts o f a teacher
in a retarded case o f this kind.
" T h e final test o f the value o f what is called science
is its applicability" are words q u o t e d from the recent ad-
dress o f the President o f the A m e r i c a n Association for
the A d v a n c e m e n t o f Science. With H u x l e y and
President
Woodward, I believe that there is no valid distinction
between a p u r e science and an applied science. T h e prac-
tical needs o f the a s t r o n o m e r t o eliminate the personal
equation f r o m his observations led to the invention o f
the chronograph and the chronoscope. Without these two
instruments, m o d e r n psychology a n d physiology could
n o t possibly have achieved the results o f the last fifty years.
I f H e l m h o l t z h ad n o t m a d e the c h r o n o g r a p h

an instru-
m e n t o f precision in physiology an d psychology; i f Fech-
her had n o t lifted a weight to d e t e r m i n e the threshold o
f
sensory discrimination, the field o f scientific work rep-
resented to-day b y clinical psychology could never have
been developed. T h e p u r e an d the applied sciences ad-
vance in a single front. W h a t retards the progress o f one,
retards the progress o f the other; what fosters one, fosters
the other. Bu t in the final analysis the progress o f psy-
chology, as o f every other science, will be d e t e r m i n e d b
y
the value a n d a m o u n t o f its co n t ri b u t i o n s t o the
advance-
m e n t o f the h u m a n race.
T h e absence o f an y principles to guide m e m a d e it
necessary to apply m y s e l f directly to the study o f these
children, working o u t m y m e t h o d s as I went along. In
the spring o f 1896 I saw several o t h er cases o f children
suffering fro m the retardation o f some special function,
like that o f spelling, or f r o m general retardation, and I
u n d e r t o o k the training o f these children for a certain
n u m b e r o f hours each week. Since t h at t i m e the
psycho-
logical clinic has been regularly c o n d u c t e d in c o n n e c t
i o n
with the l ab o rat o ry o f psychology at the University o f
Pennsylvania. T h e study o f these cases has also f o r m e d
a regular p art o f the instruction offered to students in
child psychology.
In December, 1896, I outlined in an address deliv-
ered before the A m eri can Psychological Association a
scheme o f practical work in psychology. T h e proposed
plan o f organization comprised:

1. T h e investigation o f the p h e n o m e n a o f mental
development in school children, as manifested m o r e par-
ticularly in mental an d m o ral retardation, b y m e a n s o f
the statistical an d clinical methods.
2. A psychological clinic, supplemented b y a training
school in the nature o f a hospital school, for the t reatment
o f all classes o f children suffering f r o m ret ard ation or
physical defects interfering with school progress.
3. T h e offering o f practical work to those engaged
in the professions o f teaching an d medicine, an d t o those
interested in social work, in the observation an d training
o f n o r m a l and retarded children.
4. T h e training o f students for a new p r o f e s s i o n - -
that o f the psychological expert, w h o should find his career
in co n n ect i o n with the school system, t h r o u g h the ex-
a m i n a t i o n an d t r e a t m e n t o f mentally an d
morally re-
tarded children, or in c o n n e c t i o n with the practice o f
medicine.
In the s u m m e r o f 1897 the d e p a r t m e n t o f
psychology
in the University o f Pennsylvania was able t o p u t the larger
p a r t o f this plan into operation. A four weeks' course was
given u n d e r the auspices o f the A m e r i c a n Society for
the
Extension o f University Teaching. In addition to lecture
and l a b o r a t o r y courses in ex p eri m en t al an d
physiological
psychology, a course in child psychology was given to
M a r c h 1996 • A m e r i c a n Psychologist 249

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The child is diagnosed of mental and physical condition and the
recommendation of appropriate medical and pedagogical
treatment. I therefore undertook to give him an elementary
training in articulation to remedy the defects which are
ordinarily corrected, through imitation, by the time a child is
three or four years old. I gave practically no attention to the
subjects required in English for college entrance, spending all
my time on the drill in articulation and in perfecting his verbal
audition and teaching him the simplest elements of written
language. The result was a great improvement in all his written
work, and he succeeded in entering the college department of
the University of Pennsylvania in the following year. He failed
again in university. Perhaps he had been not given adequate
instruction in articulation in the early years of childhood, he
could have overcome his defect.
demonstrate the various methods o f child psychology, b u t
especially the clinical method. T h e psychological clinic
was conducted daily, and a training school was in oper-
ation in which a n u m b e r o f children were u n d e r the
daily
instruction o f Miss M a r y E. Marvin. At the clinic, cases
were presented o f children suffering from defects o f the
eye, the ear, deficiency in m o t o r ability, or in m e m o r y
and attention; and in the training school, children were
taught t h r o u g h o u t the session o f the S u m m e r

School, re-
ceiving pedagogical t r e a t m e n t for the cure o f stamm eri
n g
and other speech defects, for defects o f written language
(such as bad spelling), and for m o t o r defects.
F r o m that t i m e until the present I have con t i n u ed
the examination and t r e a t m e n t o f children in the psy-
chological clinic. T h e n u m b e r o f cases seen each week
has been limited, because the means were not at h an d
for satisfactorily treating a large n u m b e r o f cases. I felt,
also, that before offering to treat these children on a large
scale I needed some years o f experience and extensive
study, which could only be obtained t h r o u g h the pro-
longed observation o f a few cases. Above all, I appreciated
the great necessity o f training a group o f students u p o n
whose assistance I could rely. T h e t i m e has now c o m e
for
a wider development o f this work. To further this object
and to provide for the adequate publication o f the results
that are being obtained in this new field o f psychological
investigation, it was d e t e r m i n e d to found this journal,
The Psychological Clinic.
My own preparation for the work has been facilitated
through m y c o n n e c t i o n as consulting psychologist with
the Pennsylvania Training School for Feeble-Minded
Children at Elwyn, and a similar c o n n e c t i o n with the
Haddonfield Training School a n d Miss Marvin's H o m e
School in West Philadelphia.
Clinical psychology is naturally very closely related
to medicine. At the very beginning o f m y work I was
m u c h encouraged by the appreciation o f the late Provost
o f the University o f Pennsylvania, Dr. William Pepper,
who at one time proposed to establish a psychological

laboratory in connection with the William Pepper Clinical
L a b o r a t o r y o f Medicine. At his suggestion, psychology
was made an elective branch in what was then the newly
organized fourth year o f the course in medicine. At a
subsequent reorganization o f the medical course, however,
it was found necessary to drop the subject fro m the
curriculum.
I also desire to acknowledge m y obligation t o Dr. S.
Weir Mitchell for co-operation in the e x a m i n a t i o n o f a
n u m b e r o f cases and for his constant interest in this line
o f investigation. I have also enjoyed the similar co-oper-
ation o f Dr. Charles K. Mills, Dr. William G. Spiller, the
late Dr. H a r r i s o n Allen, Dr. Alfred Stengel, Dr. William
Campbell Posey, Dr. George C. Stout, and Dr. Joseph
Collins, o f New York. Dr. Collins will continue this co-
operation as an associate editor o f The Psychological
Clinic.
T h e appreciation o f the relation o f psychology to the
practice o f medicine in general, and to psychiatry in par-
ticular, has been o f slow growth. T h e first intelligent
treatment o f the insane was accorded by Pinel in the latter
p art o f the eighteenth century, a c e n t u r y t h at was m a r
k e d
b y the rapid development o f the science o f psychology,
and which b ro u g h t forth the work o f Pereire in teaching
oral speech to the deaf, an d the " E m i l e " o f Rousseau. A
few medical m e n have had a natural aptitude for psycho-
logical analysis. F r o m t h em has c o m e the c h i e f
develop-
m e n t o f the medical aspects o f p s y c h o l o g y , - - f r o
m Seguin
and C h a r c o t in France, Carp en t er an d Maudsley in
England, and Weir Mitchell in this country. Psychological

insight will c a r r y the physician or teacher far o n the r o a d
to professional achievement, b u t at the present day the
necessity for a m o r e definite acq u ai n t an ce with psycho-
logical m e t h o d and facts is strongly felt. It is n o t eworthy
that perhaps the m o st p r o m i n e n t n a m e co n n ect ed
with
psychiatry to-day is that o f Kraepelin, w h o was among
the first to seek the training in experimental psychology
afforded b y the newly established l a b o r a t o r y at Leipzig.
Although clinical psychology is closely related to
medicine, it is quite as closely related to sociology and to
pedagogy. T h e school r o o m , the juvenile court, and the
streets are a larger l ab o rat o ry o f psychology. An abun-
dance o f material for scientific study fails to be utilized,
because the interest o f psychologists is elsewhere engaged,
and those in constant t o u c h with the actual p h e n o m e n a
d o n o t possess the training necessary to m ak e their ex-
perience an d observation o f scientific value.
While the field o f clinical psychology is to some ex-
tent occupied b y the physician, especially by the psychi-
atrist, and while I expect to rely in a great measure u p o n
the ed u cat o r an d social worker for the m o r e i m p o r t a
n t
contributions to this b r a n c h o f psychology, it is neverthe-
less t ru e that n o n e o f these has quite the training necessary
for this kind o f work. F o r t h at matter, neither has the
psychologist, unless he has acquired this training from
o t h er sources t h a n the usual course o f instruction in psy-
chology. In fact, we must look forward t o the training o f
m e n to a new profession which will be exercised m o r e
particularly in connection with educational problems, but
for which the training o f the psychologist will be a
prerequisite.

For this reason n o t a small p art o f the work o f the
laboratory o f psychology in the University o f Pennsylvania
for the past ten years has b een devoted to the training o f
students in child psychology, an d especially in the clinical
method. T h e greater n u m b e r o f these students have been
actively engaged in the profession o f teaching. I m p o r t a n t
contributions to psychology and pedagogy, the publication
o f which in the f o r m o f m o n o g r a p h s has already
been
begun, will serve t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t original
research
o f value can be carried on by those w h o are actively en-
gaged in educational or other professional work. T h e r e
have been associated in this work o f the l ab o ratory o f
psychology, S u p eri n t en d en t Twitmyer, o f Wilmington;
S u p eri n t en d en t Bryan, o f Cam d en ; District
Superinten-
d en t C o r n m a n , o f Philadelphia; Mr. J. M. McCallie,
Su-
pervising Principal o f the T r e n t o n Schools; Mr. Edward
A. H u n t i n g t o n , Principal o f a Special School in Phila-
delphia; Miss Clara H. Town, Resident Psychologist at
250 March 1996 • A m e r i c a n Psychologist
Holly
the Friends' Asylum for the Insane, and a n u m b e r o f spe-
cial teachers for the blind, the deaf, and mentally deficient
children. I did n o t venture to begin the publication o f
this j o u r n a l until I felt assured o f the assistance o f a n u
m -
ber o f fellow-workers in clinical psychology as contributors
to the journal. As this work has grown up in the neigh-

b o r h o o d o f Philadelphia, it is probable that a greater
n u m b e r o f students, equipped to c a r r y on the work o f
clinical psychology, m a y be f o u n d in this n e i g h b o r h
o o d
t h a n elsewhere, b u t it is hoped that this j o u r n a l will
have
a wider influence, and that the co-operation o f those who
are developing clinical psychology t h r o u g h o u t the c o u n
t r y
will be extended the journal.
T h e phraseology o f " c l i n i c a l psychology" and "psy-
chological clinic" will doubtless strike m a n y as an o d d
juxtaposition o f terms relating to quite disparate subjects.
While the t e r m "clinical" has been b o r r o w e d from med-
icine, clinical psychology is n o t a medical psychology. I
have b o r r o w e d the word "clinical" from medicine, be-
cause it is the best t e r m I can find to indicate the character
o f the m e t h o d which I d e e m necessary for this work.
Words seldom retain their original significance, an d clin-
ical medicine, is not what the word i m p l i e s , - - t h e work
o f a practicing physician at the bedside o f a patient. T h e
t e r m "clinical" implies a m e t h o d , and not a locality.
W h e n the clinical m e t h o d in medicine was established
on a scientific basis, mainly t h r o u g h the efforts o f Boer-
haave at the University o f Leiden, its developmen t cam e
in response to a revolt against the philosophical an d di-
dactic m e t h o d s that m o r e or less d o m i n a t e d
medicine u p
to that time. Clinical psychology likewise is a pro t est an t
against a psychology that derives psychological and ped-
agogical principles f r o m philosophical speculations and
against a psychology that applies the results o f l a b o r a t o r
y
e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n directly to children in the school r o
o m .

T h e teacher's interest is and should be directed t o
the subjects which comprise the c u r r i c u l u m , and which
he wishes to impress u p o n the minds o f the children as-
signed to his care. It is not what the child is, b u t what he
should be taught, that occupies the center o f his attention.
Pedagogy is primarily devoted to mass instruction, that
is, teaching the subjects o f the c u r r i c u l u m to classes o f
children without reference t o the individual differences
presented b y the m e m b e r s o f a class. T h e clinical psy-
chologist is interested p r i m a r i l y in the individual child.
As the physician examines his patient an d proposes treat-
m en t with a definite purpose in view, namely the patient's
cure, so the clinical psychologist ex am i n es a child with a
single definite object in v i e w , - - t h e n ex t step in the
child's
mental an d physical development. It is here t h at the re-
lation between science an d practice becomes w orthy o f
discrimination. T h e physician m a y have solely in m i n d
the cu re o f his patient, b u t i f he is to be m o r e t h a n a
m e r e
practitioner and to contribute to the advance o f medicine,
he will look u p o n his efforts as an experiment, every fea-
ture o f which must indeed have a definite p u r p o s e , - - t h
e
cure o f the p a t i e n t , - - b u t he will study every favorable
or
unfavorable reaction o f the patient with reference to the
patient's previous condition an d the remedial agents he
has employed. In the same way the p u rp o se o f the clinical
psychologist, as a c o n t r i b u t o r to science, is to discover
the relation between cause an d effect in applying the var-
ious pedagogical remedies to a child w h o is suffering from
general or special retardation.

I would n o t have it t h o u g h t t h at the m e t h o d o f
clin-
ical psychology is limited necessarily to mentally and
morally retarded children. These children are not, prop-
erly speaking, ab n o rm al , n o r is the condition o f m a n y
o f
t h e m to be designated as in an y way pathological. T h e y
deviate f r o m the average o f children only in being at a
lower stage o f individual development. Clinical psychol-
ogy, therefore, does n o t exclude f r o m consideration other
types o f children that deviate fro m the a v e r a g e - - f o r
ex-
ample, the precocious child an d the genius. Indeed, the
clinical m e t h o d is applicable even to the so-called n o r m a
l
child. For the m e t h o d s o f clinical psychology are neces-
sarily invoked wherever the status o f an individual m i n d
is d e t e r m i n e d b y observation and experiment, and ped-
agogical t r e a t m e n t applied to effect a change, i.e., the
development o f such individual mind. W h e t h e r the sub-
ject be a child or an adult, the examination and t reatment
m ay be conducted and their results expressed in the terms
o f the clinical method.
M a r c h 1996 • A m e r i c a n Psychologist 251
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Scientific Management and Human Resources*
LILLIAN M. GILBRETH
Consulting Engineer, and Professor of Management, Purdue
University
T IS SIGNIFICANT that a group such as this is I interested in
the relationship of scientific
management to human resources. It indi-
cates a consciousness of the so-called “cul-
tural lag” that seems to many people to be
growing larger, in our country. Are we al-
lowing technical progress to advance faster
than human progress? Does scientific man-
agement, as i t utilizes and. contributes to
technical progress, contribute t o a disregard
of the human element? In attempting to in-
crease production, t o make every machine
and every man as useful as possible, t o elimi-
nate waste time and energy, d o we restrict
rather than expand the social, human side of
men and women’s lives, and make robots
rather than men!
It will perhaps be useful t o trace a little of
the history of scientiiic management, t o note
the trends. Scientific management developed
t o meet the need of answers to several ques-
tions. It was the product of work experi-
ence, and not of an arm chair type of thinking.
“How long does i t take a man to do a given

piece of work?” “How can obvious waste
of time and energy be eliminated?” “Is it
possible t o plan work so that the greatest
amount of quantity and quality of product
will result, at the least cost in money, time,
and energy?” “Can simplified work methods
be evolved, through motion study, which
will enable a man t o do more, with greater
ease?” “What will become of skill?” “How
can one select and train men, so that human
waste will be lessened or eliminated?”
It is obvious, as one considers these and
similar questions, that, while study of ma-
terials and machines is indicated, study of
human beings is also needed. As a matter of
fact, the realization that the human element
is the most important element in any work
situation was early evident, and became more
1 An address at the meeting of the Council of Gui-
dance and Personnel Association, Columbus, Ohio, March
28, 1947.
and more important as time went on. That
is a distinct trend, perhaps the most evident
trend, as one considers the development of
scientific management.
EFFECTS OF WORLD WAR I
During World War I “waste in industry”
became a matter of prime importance.
Scientific management men, in all areas of the
field, contributed t o pointing out causes of
waste and outlining the remedies. Here

again, while material resources were shown
t o be of tremendous importance, human waste
was given the more important place, Tech-
niques of discovering the waste were evolved.
Everything done or planned was questioned.
“Is i t necessary?” and “Why?” were asked,in-
cessantly. If the thing involved was not
necessary, in part or as a whole, a method of
eliminating the activity was evolved. Often
it was a case of the result being necessary, but
possibilities of finding less wasteful methods
of achieving i t were the jobs at hand. More
easily available materials; more effective
tools; a machine t o take the place of a man;
simpler skills to take the place of more com-
plicated or less available skills-everything
possible to conserve and utilize resources!
The more one studied work, in close detail,
paying attention t o the time and energy ex-
pended, the more the importance of the
human element became evident. War has a
way of saving the human element-in civilian
life-to spend i t in the Armed Services. The
iighting men are drawn from industry, and
their places taken by less usable personnel, so
far as combat is concerned, by women, often
by youth, and by the disabled. All this puts
emphasis on the human element, as human re-
sources are teamed w i t h material resources,
under tremendous pressure.
After World War I both the motivation and
the emphasis on the elimination of waste
grew less. But farsighted planners, with the
possibility of another war in mind, con-

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46 OCCUPATIONS
tinued t o urge research and increasing knowl-
edge of our resources, including human re-
sources, and information as to where they
were t o be found. The profits made by in-
dustries which utilized time-and-energy sav-
ing work-methods, and the spur of competi-
tion meant that some progress was made.
This progress constantly pointed up the reali-
zation that human resources are the most im-
portant of resources.
Progressive, farsightedManagement helped.
There ws a conviction, born of actual first-
hand experience, that men and women placed
at work that they could do and liked t o do,
and helped t o d o i t in the best and easiest
way, not only could earn more money, but
were better satisfied, granted, of course, that
working conditions, hours, wages, etc., were
properly handled. Unions helped, in so far as
they stressed good working conditions, fair
wages, and hours, the necessity of basing jobs
on factual data and careful research. The
worker himself helped, by cooperating in the
elimination of fatigue; the working out of

simplified work methods; the conservation
and utilization of skills; and the necessity of
developing these processes in the framework
of a management and administration that
were adequate, stable, and progressive.
WORLD WAR I1
With the coming of World War 11, again
the motivation increased, and every available
management help was explored. The Armed
Services had preferences, not only in materiel
but also in personnel, this time including
women (who volunteered) as well as men.
The Armed Services also took over many of
the effective people and methods of scientific
management. This meant two things. The
Armed Services utilized what they had, t o the
betterment not only of the Services, but of
civilian life. Industry lost, but also gained,
for methods were tried out; people were
tested; results were relayed back into the
civilian areas contributing t o the war effort.
Much experience that was accumulated but
not available to industry a t the time was t o
be made available in the post-war. period.
Personnel were in many cases trained to be
useful through expanding opportunities; new
and challenging problems were solved; case
material was gathered to be later turned over
for peace use. This concerned both personnel
and operating people and problems.
On the other hand, the workers w h o car-
ried on the jobs in the industries, both “essen-

tial” and “non-essential,” were often pro-
moted faster and farther than they could
have hoped to be in peace times. New work-
ers were recruited, placed, and trained, in
industry-women, youth, the “minority
groups,” and the handicapped-as in World
War I, but to a greater degree. New methods
of conserving, utilizing, and developing the
human element came into being, or were
adapted or expanded.
Perhaps this can be illustrated by what
happened in the field of motion study. There
we have always supplemented the questions
“Is it necessary?” and “Why?” with the
questions “What is the job?” “Who is t o d o
it?” “Where?” “When?” and “How?” For-
tunately, during the peace years there had
come a realization that things are necessary
not only for tangible but for intangible rea-
sons. We knew that not only must goods be
produced because they are needed, and be-
cause men need the wages t o buy the goods
they need, but that people must get satisfac-
tions in their work, and in the goods that
they buy with what they receive for their
labor. This implies an understanding and a
consideration of the human element that
comes only when one considers not only uni-
versal likenesses, but individual differences.
We have found that human resources include
more than physical energy, that psychologi-
cal factors are also important. We have
learned t o supplement the findings of the so-
called exact sciences w i t h those of the social
sciences.

We have learned t o consider the total situa-
tion, and the twenty-four hour day. We have
utilized the studies of the anthropologist, the
physiologist, the psychologist, the pyschia-
trist, the sociologist, and the educator.
A NEW SLANT ON JOB ANALYSIS
During these last war years we found that
the available “who” made it even more neces-
sary than it had been to know exactly
“what” was to be done. We reviewed our
job analyses, not only t o find out the results
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES 47
desired, but also the qualities of the person
needed t o do the job. There were increased
demands to simplify the work methods, per-
haps even to re-group the factors in the spe-
cific jobs, in order t o utilize new, less skilled,
less able or more handicapped people. There
was also the necessity of trying to find more
people able t o d o the work. This meant a
more adequate screening, based on a clearer,
more exact classification of jobs and their re-
quirements, and a better understanding of
people and their abilities and possibilities. It
meant development of new tests and new test-
ing methods and devices like the Orthorater,
which has contributed so much to the elimi-
’ nation of eye fatigue. It meant the transfer

of body mechanics, or bio-mechanics, from
schools and colleges t o plant health and
safety departments and on-the-job situations.
Here people were conditioned for their jobs,
and unnecessary fatigue eliminated, or neces-
sary fatigue compensated for. It meant ex-
panded visual education, and tests t o locate
eye-minded people, ear-minded, etc. It meant
simpler and more interesting training, like
the courses developed ,by the Training
Within Industry group, where Job Instructor
Training, Job Methods Training, and Jobs
Relations Training gave t o every man and
woman w h o handled others, in industry,
simple, effective ways of teaching, simplify-
ing work, and solving human relations prob-
lems. It meant attempting t o develop better
work methods and more capable and satisfied
people, a t the same time. It meant an inten-
sive study of motivation and incentives, to
get people on jobs, to help them to work hard
and continuously with no ill effects, physical
or psychological, t o themselves. This was
no easy task, through the stresses and strains
of a world war.
In spite of the fact that industry had given
so many people t o the Armed Services, and
was short of research men, teachers, personnel
specialists, supervisors, etc., miracles were
performed. War needs made exchanges of ex-
perience vital. Government support and
finance were available, and the progress was
astonishing. New groups, like counselors,
entered industry, with a diversified experi-
ence that furnished a t times difficult problems

of adjustment, but with resources that imme-
diately widened the scope of industrial think-
ing, on the human side, and with a willing-
ness to work hard that was contagious. These
women and men, for they were mostly
women, often relieved over-burdened foremen
and superintendents of personnel work that is
an essential part of their jobs. But at the
same time they furnished examples to both
worker and supervisor of how such work
should be done. They often served as most
effective liaison, helping worker and super-
visor t o understand each other better, and
leaving as so many did at the close of the war
a new conception of human relations, “on
the job.”
OTHER FACTORS
The “where” during the war years fur-
nished challenging problems to be studied.
The location of the war plant, and of the
place where the worker was supposed to
work, rest, eat, or “recreate,” the location
of the worker’s home, transportation prob-
lems-the complexity of the “where” is evi-
dent. Its relation to health, fatigue, and
safety is also apparent. Again the total
situation and the twenty-four-hour day of the
worker, and often of his family and group had
to be considered.
In the field of the “when,” the importance
of “time how long” as determining “time
when” was clearly realized. Here were first-

hand demonstrations of demands of the part-
time, full-time, and over-time schedule.
Here were the day shift, the night shift, the
swing shift, working before one’s eyes. Here
were the needs and the ways of meeting them
plainly presented. Here was a laboratory
that intrigued both research man and operat-
ing man alike. Here, above all, was the liv-
ing demonstration t h a t technical problems
and human problems are inseparable and con-
cern us all, however our job may be labeled.
Here were the intangibles as well as the tan-
gibles that motivate men and women, in con-
stant operation.
As for the “how,” i t became evident that
incentives can postpone fatigue, but cannot
eliminate it, if it is real fatigue. Physical fit-
ness, mental alertness, emotional stability,
social adjustment-jobs require these in dif-
ferent proportions, workers possess them t o
48 OCCUPATIONS
different degrees. The “how” must consider
all of these. It did. Motion Study elabo-
rated where it needed to, simplified where i t
could!
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?
Now we come to the post-war years. The
material we have accumulated must be evalu-
ated. The problems that face us must be

solved. First they must be stated, then ways
in which we are going t o attack them must be
worked out. Industry is returning to its re-
stricted sphere. Personnel demanded by war
needs are returning to industry, either di-
rectly, or after a training period in school or
college.
What have we learned? One can attempt
t o list only a few indications of progress:
Human resources have proved to be
the most im ortant resources of industry,
2. Adequately trained human beings
can handle material resources more effec-
tively than the less adequately trained.
The training must result not only in
the needed- skills to d o the work required,
but in appreciation of the needed satis-
factions that the work should bring.
4. Skills include knowledge, dexterity,
and ability to meet a changing situation.
5. Satisfaction may be intangible as
well as tangible. Wages, bonuses, etc., must
be supplemented by liking for the work it-
self, its pace, its rhythms, the method by
which i t is done, the companionship i t
offers, the prestige one acquires by doing it,
etc.
6 . Personnel work and operating work
alike are concerned with human relations.

Both may become technical, with little re-
gard for the human element. Both have
possibilities of developing better human
relations.
7. Education is essential. It should
prepare not only for the first job, but for all
jobs. It takes place everywhere-in the
home, the school, the plant. It takes place
all the time, and concerns itself w i t h the
whole life of the individual, from re-natal
die. It must concern itself with the re-
sources of each of us, as a person, and as a
member of a group, and w i t h the ever-
changing development and relationships
that life should bring. Planned education
1.
of the Arme a Services, of the country.
3.
care t o learning how to retire an cr how t o
or training has its important place, but
should permeate everything that influences
activity.
The arts of communication are the
effective ways in which human relations
are carried on. They can be learned, if the
learner wants t o use them; they can be
taught if real cooperation between teacher
and student is established.

9. Individual differences are important,
but likenesses, are just as important. We
learn t o think, feel, and act together by
starting w i t h likenesses, and sup lement-
contribute to group thinking.
10. Scientific management has reached
the point where i t is today by recognizing
the importance of the human element, and
can go as far and as fast as i t uses all that
the human sciences have t o offer.
8.
ing by the differences that indivi a uals can
Scientific management is only one of the
forces that have made contributions t o such
findings as these. It has helped in urging
that the scientific method and objectivity be
used. It has helped in urging the importance
of the human element in industry, where i t
has not always been recognized, as well as in
the other institutions of this modern world.
It has helped by showing that technical prog-
ress need not be “delayed so that social
progress can catch up,’’ but that technical
progress is dependent upon people, is eager
t o serve human progress, can be fused w i t h
human progress; that invention and all that
it brings w i t h i t can free, develop, and inspire
man.
By and large, scientific management is in-
articulate. It does rather than talks, and

what it says i s phrased in technical language.
It deals largely in practice and from that i t
evolves its theories or leaves them for some-
one else t o evolve. It stands in the popular
mind for “work in industry or business,” al-
though it concerns itself with activity in
many other fields, w i t h hospitals, surgery,
teaching, sports, agriculture, the home. It is
equally interested in problems of personnel
relations and in problems of operation, in-
cluding production and sales. It is often
supposed t o be simply a means of getting
things done, although it concerns itself with
getting things done w i t h greater satisfaction
to everyone concerned I
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SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES 49
firm of consulting management engineers, director of courses in
motion study,
Professor of Management, Purdue University, she has also made
outstanding
contributions t o the literature in her field. Among her
publications are
husband); “The Homemaker and Her Job”; “Normal Lives for
the
Disabled” (with Ednd Yost); “Tbe Foreman and Manpower

Manage-
“The Psychology of Management”; “Applied Motion Study”
(with her
Educators can be of great service in study-
ing, translating, and interpreting scientific
management. They may find i t of use i n their
own work. They will surely find i t interest-
ing, because part of their responsibility is t o
train people for jobs. They may find i t a help
if they need arguments as to why people
require education for life, in all its aspects,
including training for work. They may
welcome its reenforcement of their own belief
I)
that human resources are of prime impor-
tance, requiring t o be discovered, used, con-
served, and developed. They may include
among their responsibilities finding adequate
members of their own group to work in in-
dustry itself, cooperating with those w h o
work in schools and colleges, in order that
human beings and human relations may come
ro be as fine and constructive as they ought
t o be.
I N T R O D U C T I O N .
§ i . PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGY.

I. Two definitions of psychology have been the most
prominent in the history of this science. According to one,
psychology is the "science of mind", psychical processes being
regarded as phenomena from which it is possible to infer
the nature of an underlying metaphysical mind-substance.
According to the other, psychology is the "science of inner
experience"; psychical processes are here looked upon as
belonging to a specific form of experience, which is readily
distinguished by the fact that its contents are known through
"introspection", or through the "inner sense" as it is called
if one uses the phrase which has been employed to distin-
guish introspection from sense-perception through the outer
senses.
Neither of these definitions, however, is satisfactory to
the psychology of to-day. The first or metaphysical defini-
tion belongs to a period of development that lasted longer
in this science than in others, but is here, too, forever left
behind, since psychology has developed into an empirical
discipline, operating with methods of its own; and since the
"mental sciences" have gained recognition as a great de-
partment of scientific investigation, distinct from the sphere
of the natural sciences, and requiring as a general ground -
Wundt, Psychology. 3. edit. I
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problem of the first definition
2 Introduction.
work an independent psychology, free from all metaphysical
theories.
The second or empirical definition, which sees in psychol-
ogy a "science of inner experience", is inadequate because
it may give rise to the misunderstanding that psychology has
to do with objects totally different from the objects of so-
called "outer experience". I t is, indeed, true that there are
certain contents of experience which belong in the sphere of
psychological investigation, and are not to be found among
the objects and processes studied by natural science; such
are our feelings, emotions, and decisions. On the other hand,
there is not a single natural phenomenon that may not,
from a different point of view, become an object of psychol-
ogy. A stone, a plant, a tone, a ray of light, are, when
treated as natural phenomena, objects of mineralogy, botany,
physics, etc. In so far, however, as they are at the same
time ideas, they are objects of psychology, for psychology
seeks to account for the genesis of these ideas, and for their
relations, both to other ideas and to those psychical pro-
cesses, such as feelings, volitions, etc., which are not referred
to external objects. There is, then, no such thing as an
"inner sense" which can be regarded as an organ of intro-
spection, and as distinct from the outer senses, or organs
of objective perception. The ideas of which psychology seeks
to investigate the attributes, are identical with those upon

which natural science is based; while the subjective activities
of feeling, emotion, and volition, which are neglected in
natural science, are not known through special organs, but
are directly and inseparably connected with the ideas referred
to external objects.
2. I t follows, then, that the expressions outer experience
and inner experience do not indicate different objects, but
different points of view from which we take up the
consideration
and scientific treatment of a unitary experience. We are
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problem of the second defintion
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§ i . Problem of Psychology. o
naturally led to these points of view, because every concrete
experience immediately divides into two factors: into a content
presented to us, and our apprehension of this content. We
call the first of these factors objects of experience, the second,
experiencing subject._ This division indicates two directions
for the treatment of experience. One is that of the natural
science ,̂ which concern themselves with the objects oJL~e_x-
perience, thought of as independent of the subject. The other
is that of psychology, which investigates the whole content of
experience in its relations to the subject and also in regard
to the attributes which this content derives directly from jthe
sjibject. The point of view of natural science may, accord-
ingly, be designated as that of mediate experience, since it
is possible only after abstracting from the subjective factor

present in all actual experience; the point of view of psy-
chology, on the other hand, may be designated as that of
immediate experience, since it purposely does away with this
abstraction and all its consequences.
3. The assignment of this problem to psychology, making
it a general, empirical science coordinate with the natural
sciences, and supplementary to them, is justified by the method
of all the mental sciences, for which psychology furnishes
the basis. All of these sciences, philology, history and
political and social science, have ag the,ir yihjprt-ma-H-gr,
immediate experience as determined by the interaction^ of
objects with knowing and acting subjects. None of the
mental sciences employs the abstractions and hypothetical
supplementary concepts of natural science; quite otherwise,
they all accept ideas and the accompanying subjective
activities as immediate reality. The__eifott is then made
to explain the single components of this reality through
their mutual interconnections. This method of psychological
interpretation employed in each of the special mental sciences,
must also be the mode of procedure in psychology itself.
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a Introduction.
3 a. Since natural̂ science investigates the content of ex-
perience after abstracting from the experiencing subject, its
problem is usually stated as that of acquiring ̂ knowledge of
the outer world". By the expression outer world is meant the
sum total of all the objects presented in experience. The
problem
of "psychology has sometimes been correspondingly defined as
"self-knowledge of the subject". This definition is, however,
inadequate, because the interaction of the subject with the outer
world ana with other similar subjects is just as much a part
of the problem of psychology as are the attributes of the single
subject. Furthermore, the expression can easily be interpreted
to mean that the outer world and the subject are separate
components of experience, or, at least, components which can
be
distinguished as independent contents of experience, whereas,
in
truth, outer experience is always connected with the
apprehending

and knowing functions of the subject, and inner experience
always
contains ideas from the outer world as indispensable
components.
This interconnection is the necessary result of the fact that in
reality experience is not a mere juxtaposition of different
elements,
but a single organized whole which requires_in_each of its
components the subject which apprehends the content, and_£he
nhjpr.ts which are presented as content. For this reason natural
science can not abstract from the knowing subject entirely, but
only from those attributes of the subject which either disappear
entirely when we remove the subject in thought, as, for
example,
the feelings, or from those attributes which must be regarded on
the ground of physical researches as belonging to the subject,
as, for example, the qualities of sensations. Psychology, on the
contrary, has as its subject_of treatment the total content of
PYpprifn^p jn ifs immpdiate character.
The only ground, then, for the division between natural
science on the one hand, and psychology and the mental
sciences
on the other, is to be found in the fact that all experience
contains as its factors a content objectively presented, and an
experiencing subject. I t is to be noted, however, that it is not
asserted that a logical definition of these two factors must
precede
the separation of the sciences from one another, for it is obvious
that such definitions are possible only after they have a basis
in the investigations of natural science and of psychology, they
can never precede these investigations. The common point of
departure. in both natural science and psychology is the
conscious-

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Natural science abstracts the little thing, and because its too
little, so sometimes you can only look at one particular instead
of having a big picture.
§ i. Problem of Psychology. c
ness which accompanies all experience, that in this experience
objects are being presented to a subject. There can, at first,
be no knowledge of the conditions upon which the distinction is
based, or of the definite characteristics by which one factor is
to be distinguished from the other. Even the use of the terms
object and subject in this connection must be regarded as the
application to the first stage of experience, of distinctions
which
are reached only through developed logical reflection.

The forms of interpretation in natural science and psychol-
ogy are supplementary, not only in the sense that the first
considers objects after abstracting, as far as possible, from the
subject, while the second has to do with the part which the
subject plays in the rise of experience; but they are also sup-
plementary in the sense that each takes a. different pnint of
view in considering any single content of experience. Natural
science seeks to discover the nature of objects without reference
to the subject. The knowledge that it produces is therefore
mediate or conceptual. In place of the immediate objects of
experience, it sets concepts gained from these objects by ab-
stracting from the subjective components of our ideas. This
abstraction makes it necessary continually to supplement reality
with hypothetical elements. Scientific analysis shows that
many components of experience — as, for example, sensations
—.are subjective effects of objective processes. These objective
processes in their objective character, independent of the
subject,
can therefore never be a part of experience. Science makes up
for this lack of direct contact with the objective processes by
forming supplementary hypothetical concepts of the objective
properties of matter. Psychology, on the other hand, investigates
the contents of experience m their complete and artTia1_fgrrn_l
both the ideas that are referred to objects, and also the sub-
jective processes which cluster about these ideas. The
knowledge
thus gained in psychology is, therefore, immediate and
perceptual,
— perceptual in the broad sense of the term in which, not only
sense-perceptions, but all concrete reality is distinguished from
all that is abstract and conceptual in thought. Psychology can
exhibit the interconnection of the contents of experience, as
these interconnections are actually presented to the subject,
only
by avoiding entirely the abstractions and supplementary
concepts

of natural science. Thus, while natural science and psychology
are both empirical sciences in the sense that they aim to explain
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g Introduction.
the contents of experience, though from different points of
view,
it is obvious that, in consequence of the special character of its
problem, psychology must be recognized__as the more_ strictly
empirical.
§ 2. GENERAL FORMS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
i . The view that psychology is an empirical science which
deals, not with a limited group of specific contents of ex-
perience, but with the immediate contents of all experience,
is of recent origin! I t encounters even in the science of to-
day hostile views, which are to be looked upon, in general,
as the survivals of earlier stages of development, and which
are in turn arrayed against one another according to their
attitudes on the question of the relations of psychology to
philosophy and to the other sciences. On the basis of the
two definitions mentioned above (§ i , i ) as being the most
widely accepted, two chief forms of psychology may be dis-
tinguished: metaphysical psychology and empirical psychology.
Each is further divided into a number of special tendencies.
Metaphysical psychology generally values very little the

empirical analysis _and causal interpretation of psychical
processes. Regarding psychology as a part of philosophical
metaphysics, the chief effort of such psychology is directed
toward the discovery of a definition of the "nature of mind"
which shall be in accord with the metaphysical system to which
the particular form of psychology belongs. After a meta-
physical concept of mind has thus been established, the attempt
is made to deduce from it the actual content of psychical ex-
perience. The characteristic which distinguishes metaphysical
psychology from empirical psychology is, then, to be found in
the attempt of metaphysical psychology to deduce psychical
processes, not from other psychical processes, but from some
substratum entirely unlike these processes themselves: either
from the manifestations of a special mind-substance, or from
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Compared to natural science, psychology is more strictly
empirical because Wundt believes psychology is immediate
experience.
L E C T U R E I
§ I. Philosophical Anticipations of Psychology. § I I . Spiritual-
ism and Materialism. § I I I . Methods and Aids of Psycho-
logical Investigation.
§ I
P S Y C H O L O G Y , even in our own day, shows more
clearly
than any other experiential science traces of the con-
flict of philosophical systems. We may regret this influence
in the interest of psychological investigation, because it has

been the chief obstacle in the way of an impartial examination
of mental life. But in the light of history we see that it was
inevitable. Natural science has gradually taken shape from a
natural philosophy which paved the way for it, and the effects
of which may still be recognised in current scientific theory.
That these effects are more fundamental and more permanent
in the case of psychology is intelligible when we consider the
problem which is set before it. Psychology has to investigate
that which we call internal experience,—i.e., our own sensation
and feeling, our thought and volition,—in contradistinction to
the
objects of external experience, which form the subject matter
of natural science. Man himself, not as he appears from with-
out, but as he is in his own immediate experience, is the real
problem of psychology. Whatever else is included in the circle
of psychological discussion,—the mental life of animals, the
common ideas and actions of mankind which spring from simi-
larity of mental nature, and the mental achievements of the
individual or of society,—all this has reference to the one
original problem, however much our understanding of mental
life be widened and deepened by the consideration of it. But
the questions with which psychology thus comes into contact
are at the same time problems for philosophy. And philosophy
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2 Lectures on H u m a n a n d A n i m a l PsycJiology
had made various attempts to solve them long before psycho-
logy as an experiential science had come into being.

fThe psychology of to-day, then, neither wishes to deny to
philosophy its right to occupy itself with these matters, nor is
able to dispute the close connection of philosophical and psy-
chological problems. But in one respect it has undergone a
radical change of standpoint. It refuses to regard psychological
investigation as in any sense dependent upon foregone meta-
physical conclusions. I t would rather reverse the relation of
psychology to philosophy, just as empirical natural science long
ago reversed its relation to natural philosophy,—in so far, that
is, as it rejected all philosophic speculations which were not
based upon experience. Instead of a psychology founded upon
philosophical presuppositions, we require a philosophy to whose
speculations value is ascribed only so long as they pay regard
at every step to the facts of psychological, as well as to those
of scientific, experience.
It will, therefore, be a matter of principle for us in these lec-
tures to stand apart from the strife of philosophic systems. But
since the thought of to-day is subjected on all sides to the in-
fluence of a philosophic past which counts its years by thou-
sands, and since the concepts and general notions under which
an undifferentiated philosophy arranged the facts of mental life
have become part of the general educated consciousness, and
have never ceased to hinder the unprejudiced consideration of
things as they are, it is our bounden duty to characterise and
justify the standpoint which we propose to adopt. We will,
therefore, first of all glance for a moment at the history of
philosophy before the appearance of psychology.
In the beginnings of reflective thought, the perception of the
external world preponderates over the internal experience of
idea and thought, of feeling and will. The earliest psychology
is therefore Materialism : the mind is air, or fire, or ether,
always some form of matter, however attenuated this matter
may become in the effort to dematerialise it. Plato was the

first among the Greeks to separate mind from body. Mind he
regarded as the ruling principle of the body. And this separa-
tion paved the way for the future one-sided dualism which con-
sidered sensible existence as the obscuring and debasing of an
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Philosophical Anticipation s o f Psychology 3
ideal, purely mental being. Aristotle, who combined with the
gift of speculation a marvellous keenness of observation, at-
tempted to harmonise these opposites by regarding mind as Jhe
principle which vitalises and informs matter. He saw the'
direct operation of mental powers in the forms of animals, in
the expression of the human figure at rest and in movement,
even in the processes of growth and nutrition. And he gene-
ralised all this in his conclusion that mind is the creator of all
organic form, working upon matter as the sculptor works on
marble. Life and mentality were for him identical terms ;
even the vegetable world was on his theory endowed with
mind. But, apart from this, Aristotle penetrated more deeply
than any of his predecessors into the facts of mental experience.
I n his work upon the mind, the first in which psychology was
ever treated as an independent science, he sharply separates
from one another the fundamental mental activities ; and, so
far as the knowledge of his time allowed, sets forth their causal
connections.
The Middle Ages were wholly dominated by the Aristotelian
psychology, and more especially by its basal proposition that
mind is the principle of life. But with the dawn of the modern
period begins in psychology, as elsewhere, the return to
Platonism. Another influence combined with this to displace

Aristotelianism ; namely, the development of modern natural
science and the mechanical metaphysics which this develop-
ment brought with it. The result of these influences was the
origin of two psychological schools, which have disputed with
one another down to the present day,—Spiritualism and
Materialism. I t is a curious fact that the thought of a single
man has been of primary importance in the development of
both these standpoints. Descartes, the mathematician and
philosopher, had defined mind, in opposition to Aristotle, as
exclusively thinking substance ; and following Plato, he
ascribed
to it an original existence apart from the body, whence it has
received in permanent possession all those ideas which
transcend
the bounds of sensible experience. This mind, in itself
unspatial,
he connected with the body at one point in the brain, where it
was affected by processes in the external world, and in its turn
exercised influence upon the body.
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4 Lectures on H u m a n a n d A n i m a l Psychology
Later Spiritualism has not extended its views far beyond
these limits. I t is true that Leibniz, whose doctrine of monads
regarded all existence as an ascending series of mental forces,

attempted to substitute for the Cartesian mind-substance a more
general principle, approximating once more to the Aristotelian
concept of mind. But his successor Christian Wolff returned to
the Cartesian dualism. Wolff is the originator of the so-called
theory of mental faculties, which has influenced psychology
down to the present day. This theory, based upon a superficial
classification of mental processes, was couched in terms of a
number of general notions,—memory, imagination, sensibility,
understanding, etc.,—which it regarded as simple and funda-
mental forces of mind. I t was left for Herbart, one of the
acutest thinkers of our century, to give a convincing proof of
the
utter emptiness of this ' theory.' Herbart is at the same time
the last great representative of that modern Spiritualism which
began with Descartes. For the works of Kant and of the other
philosophers who came after him,—Fichte, Schelling, and
Hegel,
—belong to a different sphere. In Herbart we still find the
concept of a simple mind-substance, which Descartes introduced
into modern philosophy, but pushed to its extreme logical
conclusion, and at the same time modified by the first principles
of Leibniz' monadology. And the consistency of this final
representative of speculative psychology makes it all the more
plain that any attempt to derive the facts of mental life from
the notion of a simple mind and its relation to other existences
different from or similar to itself must be vain and fruitless.
Think what lasting service Herbart might have done psychology,
endowed as he was in exceptional measure with the power of
analysing subjective perception, had he not expended the best
part of his ingenuity in the elaboration of that wholly imaginary
mechanics of ideation, to which his metaphysical
presuppositions
led him. Still, just because he carried the concept of a simple
mind-substance to its logical conclusion, we may perhaps
ascribe
to his psychology, besides its positive merits, this negative

value,
—that it showed as clearly as could be the barrenness of
Spiritualism. A l l that is permanent in Herbart's psychological
works we owe to his capacity of accurate observation of mental
fact; all that is untenable and mistaken proceeds from his
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S p i r i t u a l i s m a n d M a t e r i a l i s m 5
metaphysical concept of mind and the secondary hypotheses
which it compelled him to set up. So that the achievements
of this great Spiritualist show most plainly that the path which
he travelled, apart from all the contradictions into which it led
him, cannot ever be the right road for psychology. This notion
of a simple mental substance was not reached by analysis of
mental phenomena, but was superimposed upon them from
without. To assure the pre-existence and immortality of the
soul, and (secondarily) to conform in the most direct way with
the logical principle that the complex presupposes the simple,
it seemed necessary to posit an indestructible and therefore
absolutely simple and unalterable mind-atom. I t was then the
business of psychological experience to reconcile itself with
this
idea as best it might.
§ H
When Descartes denied mind to animals, on the ground that
the essence of mind consists in thought, and man is the only
thinking being, he could have little imagined that this proposi-
tion would do as much as the strictly mechanical views which
he represented in natural philosophy to further the doctrines

which are the direct opposite of the Spiritualism which he
taught,—the doctrines of modern Materialism. I f animals are
natural automata, and if all the phenomena which general
belief refers to sensation, feeling, and will are the result of
purely
mechanical conditions, why should not the same explanation
hold of man ? This was the obvious inference which the
Materialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries drew
from Descartes' principles.
The naive Materialism with which philosophy began had
simply ascribed some kind of corporeality to mental existence.
But this modern Materialism took as its first principles
physiological hypotheses; thought, sense, and idea are
physiological functions of certain organs within the nervous
system. Observation of the facts of consciousness is of no avail
until these are derived from chemical and physical processes.
Thought is simply a result of brain activity. Since this activity
ceases when circulation is arrested and life departs, thought is
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nothing more than a function of the substances of which the
brain is composed.
More particularly were the scientific investigators and
physicians of the time inclined, by the character of their
pursuits,
to accept this explanation of mental life in terms of what
seemed
to them intelligible scientific facts. The Materialism of to-day

has made no great advance in this or in any other direction upon
the views promulgated in the last century, e.g. by de la Mettrie,
and developed by Helvetius, Holbach, and others. But this
equating of mental process and brain function, which makes
psychology a department of cerebral physiology, and therefore
a part of a general atomic mechanics, sins against the very
first rule of scientific logic,—that only those connections of
facts
may be regarded as causal which obtain between generically
similar phenomena. Our feelings, thoughts, and volitions cannot
be made objects of sensible perception. We can hear the word
which expresses the thought, we can see the man who has
thought it, we can dissect the brain in which it arose ; but the
word, the man, and the brain are not the thought. And the
blood which circulates in the brain, the chemical changes which
take place there, are wholly different from the act of thought
itself.
Materialism, it is true, does not assert that these are the
thought, but that they form it. As the liver secretes bile, as the
muscle exerts motor force, so do blood and brain, heat and
electrolysis, produce idea and thought. But surely there is no
small difference between the two cases. We can prove that bile
arises in the liver by chemical processes which we are able, in
part at least, to follow out in detail. We can show, too, that
movement is produced in muscles by definite processes, which
are again the immediate result of chemical transformation. But
cerebral processes give us no shadow of indication as to how
our
mental life comes into being. For the two series of phenomena
are not comparable. We can conceive how one motion may be
transformed into another, perhaps also how one sensation or
feeling is transformed into a second. But no system of cosmic
mechanics can make plain to us how a motion can pass over into
a sensation or feeling.

A t the same time modern Materialism pointed out a more
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Methods a n d A ids o f Psychological Investigation 7
legitimate method of research. There are numerous experiences
which put beyond all doubt the connection of physiological
cerebral function on the one hand and of mental activity on the
other. And to investigate this connection by means of experi-
ment and observation is assuredly a task worth undertaking.
But we do not find that Materialism, even in this connection,
has
made a single noteworthy contribution to our positive
knowledge.
I t has been content to set up baseless hypotheses regarding the
dependence of mental function upon physical process ; or it has
been concerned to refer the nature of mental forces to some
known physical agency. No analogy has been too halting, no
hypothesis too visionary, for its purpose. It was for some time
a matter of dispute whether the mental force had more resem-

blance to light or to electricity. Only on one point was there
general agreement,—that it was not ponderable.
In our day the conflict between Materialism and Spiritualism,
which was raging in the middle of the century, has almost worn
itself out. It has left behind it nothing of value for science ; and
that will not surprise any one who is acquainted with its details.
For the clash of opinion was centred once more round the old
point: in the questions concerning mind, the seat of mind, and
its connection with body. Materialism had made the very same
mistake which we have charged to the spiritualistic philosophy.
Instead of plunging boldly into the phenomena which are pre-
sented to our observation and investigating the uniformities of
their relation, it busied itself with metaphysical questions, an
answer to which, if we may expect it at all, can only be based
upon an absolutely impartial consideration of experience, which
refuses to be bound at the outset by any metaphysical
hypothesis.
§ H I
We find, then, that Materialism and Spiritualism, which set
out from such different postulates, converge in their final result.
The most obvious reason of this is their common
methodological
error. The belief that it was possible to establish a science of
mental experience in terms of speculation, and the thought that
a chemical and physical investigation of the brain must be the
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first step towards a scientific psychology led alike to mistakes
in method. The doctrine of mind must be primarily regarded
as an experiential science. Were this otherwise, we should not
be able so much as to state a psychological problem. The
standpoint of exclusive speculation is, therefore, as
unjustifiable
in psychology as it is in any science. But more than this, so
soon as we take our stand upon the ground of experience, we
have to begin our science, not with the investigation of those
experiences which refer primarily only to objects more or less
closely connected with mind, but with the direct examination of
mind itself,—that is, of the phenomena from which its existence
was long ago inferred, and which formed the original incentive
to psychological study. The history of the science shows us
that mind and the principal mental functions were distinguished

before there was any idea that these functions were connected
with the brain. I t was not any doubt as to the purpose of this
organ which led to the abstraction which lies at the foundation
of the doctrine of mind, but simply observation of mental
phenomena. Sense, feeling, idea, and will seemed to be related
activities ; and they appeared, further, to be bound together by
the unity of self-consciousness. The mental processes began,
therefore, to be looked upon as the actions of a single being.
But since these actions were found again to be intimately
connected with bodily functions, there necessarily arose the
question of assigning to mind a seat within the body, whether
in the heart, or the brain, or any other organ. I t was reserved
for later investigation to show that the brain is the sole organ
which really stands in close connection with the mental life.
But if it be sensation, feeling, idea, and will which led in
the first instance to the assumption of mind, the only natural
method of psychological investigation will be that which begins
with just these facts. First of all we must understand their
empirical nature, and then go on to reflect upon them. For it
is experience and reflection which constitute each and every
science. Experience comes first; it gives us our bricks : reflec-
tion is the mortar, which holds the bricks together. We cannot
build without both. Reflection apart from experience and ex-
perience without reflection are alike powerless. I t is therefore
essential for scientific progress that the sphere of experience be
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Methods a n d A i d s o f Psychological Investigation 9
enlarged, and new instruments of reflection from time to time
invented.
But how is it possible to extend our experience of sensations,
feelings, and thoughts ? Did not mankind feel and think
thousands of years ago, as it feels and thinks to-day ? I t does,
indeed, seem as though our observation of what goes on in the
mind could never extend beyond the circle to which our own
consciousness confines it. But appearances are deceptive. Long
ago the step was taken which raised the science of psychology
above the level of this its first beginning, and extended its
horizon almost indefinitely. History, dealing with the expe-
rience of all times, has furnished us with a picture in the large
of the character, the impulses, and the passions of mankind.
More especially is it the study of language and linguistic de-
velopment, of mythology and the history of religion and custom,
which has approached more and more closely, as historical
knowledge has increased, to the standpoint of psychological
inquiry.
The belief that our observation is confined to the brief span
of our individual life, with its scanty experience, was one of the
greatest obstacles to psychological progress in the days of the
earlier empiricism. And the opening up of the rich mines of
experience to which social psychology gives us access, for the
extension of our own subjective perceptions, is an event of
importance and of promise for the whole circle of the mental
sciences. Nor is that all. A second fact, of still greater import
for the solution of the simplest and therefore, most general
psychological problems, is the attempt that has been made to
discover new methods of observation. One new method has
been found ; it is that of experiment, which, though it revolu-

tionized the natural sciences, had not up to quite recent times
found application in psychology. When the scientific inves-
tigator is inquiring into the causes of a phenomenon, he does
not confine himself to the investigation of things as they are
given in ordinary perception. That would never take him to
his goal, though he had at his command the experiences of all
time. Thunderstorms have been recorded, indeed carefully
described, since the first beginnings of history ; but what a
storm was could not be explained until the phenomena of
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i o Lectures on H u m a n a n d A n i m a l Psychology
electricity had become familiar, until electrical machines had
been constructed and experiments made with them. Then the
matter was easy. For when once the effects of a storm had
been observed and compared with the effect of an electric
spark, the inference was plain that the discharge of the machine
was simply a storm in miniature. What the observation of a
thousand years had left unexplained was understood in the
light of a single experiment. Even astronomy, a science which
we might think must of its very nature be confined to observa-
tion, is in its more recent development founded in a certain

sense upon experiment. So long as mere observations were
taken, the general opinion that the earth was fixed, and that
the sun and stars moved round it, could not be overthrown. I t
is true that there were many phenomena which made against
this belief; but simple observation could not furnish means for
the attainment of a better explanation. Then came Copernicus,
with the thought: ' Suppose I stand upon the s u n ! ' and
henceforth it was the earth that moved, and not the sun ; the
contradictions of the old theory disappeared, and the new
system of the universe had come into being. But it was an
experiment that had led to this, though an experiment of
thought. Observation still tells us that the earth is fixed, and
the sun moving; and if the opposite view is to become clear,
we must just repeat the Copernican experiment, and take our
stand upon the sun.
I t is experiment, then, that has been the source of the
decided advance in natural science, and brought about such
revolutions in our scientific views. Let us now apply experi-
ment to the science of mind. We must remember that in every
department of investigation the experimental method takes on
an especial form, according to the nature of the facts investi-
gated. In psychology we find that only those mental pheno-
mena which are directly accessible to physical influences can
be made the subject matter of experiment. We cannot experi-
ment upon mind itself, but only upon its outworks, the organs
of sense and movement which are functionally related to mental
processes. So that every psychological experiment is at the
same time physiological, just as there are physical processes
corresponding to the mental processes of sensation, idea, and
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Wundt wanted to figure out how psychology works and
encouraged scientists to do experiments.
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Methods a n d A i d s o f Psychological Investigation 11
will. This is, of course, no reason for denying to experiment
the character of a psychological method. I t is simply due to
the general conditions of our mental life, one aspect of which is
its constant connection with the body.
The following lectures are intended as an introduction to
psychology. They do not attempt any exhaustive exposition
of the methods and results of experimental psychological inves-
tigation. That would have to assume previous knowledge
which cannot here be presupposed. Neither shall we include
in the range of our discussion the facts of social psychology,
whose contents is extensive enough to demand an independent
treatise. We shall confine ourselves to the mental life of the
individual ; and within those limits it will be the human mind
to which we shall for the most part devote ourselves. A t the
same time it appears desirable, for the right understanding of
individual mental development, that we should now and again
institute a brief comparison with the mental life of animals.
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THE STORY OF THE MIND.
CHAPTER I.
THE SCIENCE OF THE MIND—PSYCHOLOGY.
PSYCHOLOGY is the science of the mind. It
aims to find out all about the mind—the whole
story—just as the other sciences aim to find out
all about the subjects of which they treat—as-
tronomy, of the stars; geology, of the earth;
physiology, of the body. And when we wish to
trace out the story of the mind, as psychology
has done it, we find that there are certain general
truths with which we should first acquaint our-
selves ; truths which the science has been a very
long time finding out, but which we can now re-
alize without a great deal of explanation. These
general truths, we may say, are preliminary to
the story itself; they deal rather with the need
of defining, first of all, the subject or topic of
which the story is to be told.
i. The first such truth is that the mind is not
the possession of man alone. Other creatures have
minds. Psychology no longer confines itself, as it
formerly did, to the human soul, denying to the
animals a place in this highest of all the sciences.
It finds itself unable to require any test or evi-
dence of the presence of mind which the animals
do not meet, nor does it find any place at which
the story of the mind can begin higher up than

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2 THE STORY OF THE MIND.
the very beginnings of life. For as soon as we
ask, " How much mind is necessary to start with ? "
we have to answer, "Any mind at a l l " ; and all
the animals are possessed of some of the actions
which we associate with mind. Of course, the
ascertainment of the truth of this belongs—as the
ascertainment of all the truths of nature belongs
—to scientific investigation itself. It is the scien-
tific man's rule not to assume anything except as
he finds facts to support the assumption. So we
find a great department of psychology devoted to
just this question—i. e., of tracing mind in the
animals and in the child, and noting the stages of
what is called its "evolution" in the ascending
scale of animal life, and its " development " in the
rapid growth which every child goes through in
the nursery. This gives us two chapters of the
story of the mind. Together they are called
"Genetic Psychology," having two divisions, "Ani-
mal or Comparative Psychology" and " Child
Psychology."
2. Another general truth to note at the outset
is this: that we are able to get real knowledge
about the mind. This may seem at first sight a
useless question to raise, seeing that our minds
are, in the thought of many, about the only things
we are really sure of. But that sort of sureness

is not what science seeks. Every science requires
some means of investigation, some method of
procedure, which is more exact than the mere
say-so of common sense; and which can be used
over and again by different investigators and
under different conditions. This gives a high de-
gree of verification and control to the results once
obtained. The chemist has his acids, and re-
agents, and blowpipes, etc.; they constitute his in-
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THE SCIENCE OF THE MIND-PSYCHOLOGY. 3
struments, and by using them, under certain con-
stant rules, he keeps to a consistent method. So
with the physiologist; he has his microscope, his
staining fluids, his means of stimulating the tis-
sues of the body, etc. The physicist also makes
much of his lenses, and membranes, and electrical
batteries, and X-ray apparatus. In like manner
it is necessary that the psychologist should have
a recognised way of investigating the mind, which
he can lay before anybody saying: " There, you
see my results, you can get them for yourself by
the same method that I used."
In fulfilling this requirement the psychologist
resorts to two methods of procedure. He is
able to investigate the mind in two ways, which
are of such general application that anybody of
sufficient training to make scientific observations
at all can repeat them and so confirm the results.

One of these is what is called Introspection. It
consists in taking note of one's own mind, as all
sorts of changes are produced in it, such as emo-
tions, memories, associations of events now gone,
etc., and describing everything that takes place.
Other persons can repeat the observations with
their own minds, and see that what the first re-
ports is true. This results in a body of knowl-
edge which is put together and called " Introspec-
tive Psychology," and one chapter of the story
should be devoted to that.
Then the other way we have is that of experi-
menting on some one else's mind. We can act on
our friends and neighbours in various ways, mak-
ing them feel, think, accept, refuse this and that,
and then observe how they act. The differences
in their action will show the differences in the feel-
ings, etc., which we have produced. In pursuing
this method the psychologist takes a person—
called the "subject " or the "re-agent"—into his
laboratory, asks him to be willing to follow cer-
tain directions carefully, such as holding an elec-
tric handle, blowing into a tube, pushing a but-
ton, etc., when he feels, sees, or hears certain
things; this done with sufficient care, the results
are found recorded in certain ways which the
psychologist has arranged beforehand. This sec-
ond way of proceeding gives results which are
gathered under the two headings " Experimental "
and " Physiological Psychology." They should

also have chapters in our story.
3. There is besides another truth which the
psychologist nowadays finds very fruitful for his
knowledge of the mind; this is the fact that minds
vary much in different individuals, or classes of
individuals. First, there is the pronounced differ-
ence between healthy minds and diseased minds.
The differences are so great that we have to pur-
sue practically different methods of treating the
diseased, not only as a class apart from the
well minds—putting such diseased persons into
institutions—but also as differing from one an-
other. Just as the different forms of bodily dis-
ease teach us a great deal about the body—its
degree of strength, its forms of organization and
function, its limitations, its heredity, the inter-
connection of its parts, etc.—so mental diseases
teach us much about the normal mind. This gives
another sphere of information which constitutes
u Abnormal Psychology " or " Mental Pathology."
There are also very striking variations between
individuals even within normal life; well people
are very different from one another. All that is
commonly meant by character or temperament as
Holly
THE SCIENCE OF THE MIND-PSYCHOLOGY. 5
distinguishing one person from another is evi-
dence of these difierences. But really to know

all about mind we should see what its variations
are, and endeavour to find out why the variations
exist. This gives, then, another topic, " Indi-
vidual or Variational Psychology." This sub-
ject should also have notice in the story.
4. Allied with this the demand is made upon
the psychologist that he show to the teacher how
to train the mind; how to secure its development
in the individual most healthfully and produc-
tively, and with it all in a way to allow the varia-
tions of endowment which individuals show each
to bear its ripest fruit. This is "Educational or
Pedagogical Psychology."
5. Besides all thes-e great undertakings of
the psychologist, there is another department of
fact which he must some time find very fruitful,
although as yet he has not been able to investi-
gate it thoroughly : he should ask about the place
of the mind in the world at large. If we seek to
know what the mind has done in the world, what
a wealth of story comts to us from the very be-
ginnings of history ! Mind has done all that has
been done: it has built human institutions, indited
literature, made science, discovered the laws of
Nature, used the forces of the material world, em-
bodied itself in all the monuments which stand to
testify to the presence of man. What could tell
us more of what mind is than this record of what
mind has done ? The ethnologists are patiently
tracing the records left by early man in his uten-
sils, weapons, clothing, religious rites, architec-
tural remains, etc., and the anthropologists are
seeking to distinguish the general and essential
from the accidental and temporary in all the his-

Holly
Holly
tory of culture and civilization. They are mak-
ing progress very slowly, and it is only here and
there that principles are being discovered which
reveal to the psychologist the necessary modes
of action and development of the mind. All this
comes under the head of " Race Psychology."
6. Finally, another department, the newest of
all, investigates the action of minds when they
are thrown together in crowds. The animals
herd, the insects swarm, most creatures live in
companies; they are gregarious, and man no less
is social in his nature. So there is a psychology
of herds, crowds, mobs, etc., all put under the
heading of "Social Psychology." It asks the
question, What new phases of the mind do we
find when individuals unite in common action ?—
or, on the other hand, when they are artificially
separated ?
We now have with all this a fairly complete
idea of what The Story of the Mind should in-
clude, when it is all told. Many men are spend-
ing their lives each at one or two of these great
questions. But it is only as the results are all

brought together in a consistent view of that won-
derful thing, the mind, that we may hope to find
out all that it is. We must think of it as a grow-
ing, developing thing, showing its stages of evo-
lution in the ascending animal scale, and also in
the unfolding of the child; as revealing its nature
in every change of our daily lives which we ex-
perience and tell to one another or find ourselves
unable to tell; as allowing itself to be discovered
in the laboratory, and as willing to leave the
marks of its activity on the scientist's blackened
drum and the dial of the chronoscope; as subject
to the limitations of health and disease, needing
Holly
THE SCIENCE OF THE MIND—PSYCHOLOGY. 7
to be handled with all the resources of the asy-
lum, the reformatory, the jail, as well as with the
delicacy needed to rear the sensitive girl or to
win the love of the bashful maid; as manifesting
itself in the development of humanity from the
first rude contrivances for the use of fire, the first
organizations for defence, and the first inscrip-
tions of picture writing, up to the modern inven-
tions in electricity, the complex constitutions of
government, and the classic productions of liter-
ary art; and as revealing its possibilities finally in
the brutal acts of the mob, the crimes of a lynch-
ing party, and the deeds of collective righteous-
ness performed by our humane and religious so-
cieties.

It would be impossible, of course, within the
limits of this little volume, to give even the main
results in so many great chapters of this ambitious
and growing science. I shall not attempt that;
but the rather select from the various departments
certain outstanding results and principles. From
these as elevations the reader may see the moun-
tains on the horizon, so to speak, which at his
leisure, and with better guides, he may explore.
The choice of materials from so rich a store has
depended also, as the preface states, on the writ-
er's individual judgment, and it is quite probable
that no one will find the matters altogether wisely
chosen. All the great departments now thus
briefly described, however, are represented in the
following chapters.
PSYC 308: Assignment #1 Due: Oct. 21, 2016, by 11:59 p.m.
Submission Requirements: [Points may be deducted for failure
to adhere with these requirements.]
• Name, student number, and tutorial on the first line [no title
pages and no headers, please].
• Answer all three questions, one question per document (i.e.,
upload as three separate documents).
• Word limits: 150 to 350 words per question [don’t type the
question…just your answer].
• Formatting: 1" margins, 12-point Times New Roman font,
single-spaced, and left-justified.

• Use A.P.A. style guidelines for all in-text citations.
• A reference list is required if any external resources are
utilized;
no reference list is required if only course materials are
utilized.
• You must be the sole originator of the answers you submit and
the ideas of others must be duly
credited [i.e., in accordance with the requirements of academic
honesty].
Each question will be graded out of 10; their combined score
will account for 15% of students’ grades.
Question 1 Compare/contrast the roles of introspection and
experimentation in psychology as
postulated by Baldwin and Wundt.
Question 2 Respond to the following characterization of
William James and Wilhelm Wundt:
“James’s [sic] stream of thought metaphor permitted him to
focus on mental
activities and avoid the sterile trap of … Wundt…, who
analyzed the discrete
contents of consciousness” (author’s name withheld*, 1978, p.
13).
That is, given the material covered in this course, describe and
discuss Wundt’s

and James’ characterization of consciousness and its study,
making clear whether
this claim accurately portrays Wundt and James.
Question 3 Using the perspectives or practices of the
psychologists covered in the course,
describe and discuss the distinctions drawn between academic
and applied
psychology.
*Full citation withheld for pedagogical purposes; it will be
revealed when the graded assignments are released.
--------------------------
Some tips:
� These questions do not call for students’ opinions. Rather,
students are to draw out relevant and compelling
similarities and differences when they “compare/contrast” or
“describe and discuss” the perspectives and
practices of the historical figures encountered in this course.
� Read the questions carefully and address each of their
elements (e.g., in the case of multi-faceted questions).
� Substantiate central points. For example, if you wished to
claim psychologist X has a particular theoretical
commitment, describe/explain in what manner X’s theories or
practices evidenced that particular commitment,

psychology assignmentfirst question, please readBaldwi.docx

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