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ASP InfoSec India Conference 2012
gust 24th – 25th, 2012                The OWASP Foundati
 el Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon             http://www.owasp.org
p://www.owasp.in




   Real-Time Evaluation of National
    Network Exposure to Emerging
               Threats
                        Fyodor Yarochkin
                        Academia Sinica
                             P1Sec
                          fy@iis.sinica.edu.tw

    OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Yarochkin Fyodor?
                          10+ years infosec & dev
                           experience

                          Phd Candidate (NTU & Academia
                           Sinica


                          Open source enthusiast

                          http://www.o0o.nu

                          Research interests: intrusion
                           detection, correlation, vulnerability
                           research



OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Also...




                    This research is part of
            ●The Cloud Security Intelligence Project

             and numerous open source projects...




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Introduction




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Infosec community vs. …
●   Graphics http://recipeforlowhangingfruit.com/




       Research                                     crime
What makes these things interesting:

●   Globalization of the crime scene (local
    laws don't matter)
●   Volumes of micro-transactions. →
    Stealing a $1USD from 1,000,000 still
    makes a $1,000,000USD – also makes
    AML measures useless
●   There are other means of taking control
    over wealth than stealing cash..



OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Variations of a “wallet”
Getting the global picture

●   Colect and analyze massive amounts of
    data
●   Be able to catch 'lowest hanging fruits'




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Challenges

●   Getting the raw data is non trivial (and
    requires some social engineering ;-))
●   Amounts of data is massive. Not
    suitable for single machine processing.
    Often, not even suitable for store in
    original form due to volume




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
HoneyNet/SCIC
               “Know yer Internet” project




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Disclaimer

●   This is research in progress
●   Semi-public access possible, talk to me
●   Contributions highly anticipated
●   Each of particular ideas isn't that novel
    (portscanning and banner grabbing is
    very 1997 ;-)) but hopefully the fusion of
    concepts is interesting




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Motivation

●   Answer questions like:
    –   “What is the risk of Taiwan networks
        being owned, now”
    –   New worm outbreak: identify potential
        victims and enforce patching through
        automated notification
    –   Identify regional threats – i.e. what are
        the most exploited vulnerabilities in
        Taiwan networks.
    –   Cooperation with CERT, etc etc..

OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Motivation

●   Real-time understanding of exposure levels
    at large scale
●   Threats to “pop and mom” machines as
    “low-hanging fruit”
●   Making use of data from honeypots to
    evaluate level of exposure, emerging threats
    etc etc..

●   Have some fun responding to abuse
    emails ;-)

OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Understanding the threat

●   Server honeypots (mainly python scripts,
    simulating services)
●   Client side honeypots (VM farms)
●   Static analysis (crawling, pattern mining
    etc)




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
“low hanging fruit” simulation

●   Have VM farms running.
●   Have server-honeypots (with some romanian kids
    bruteforcing ssh passwords all the time ;))
●   Crawl networks at large (alexa top 1,000,000 but not
    only)
●   Exploit detection via payload/behavior analysis
●   Additional enhancements to detect variations (user
    behavior simulation, hop-ing through VPN end points
    to detect local threats etc)




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Not really a full-fedged Cuckoobox

●   Focus on detecting exploitation
●   Lightweight version of browser
●   Heavily bundled with static analysis tools




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
VM farm capacity

●   We can do at average 10-20 secs per
    URL render per VM. Average 10+15
    Vms/machine.

●   Off-load VM farm load by doing lots of
    pattern matching (use VM as last
    resource)




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
So..

●   We have some data of what's going on in
    the net. How do we map this to the
    network infrastructure we're trying to
    protect (at organization, or country level
    side)...
●


●   Or maybe see what “*unamed-country*”
    is up to :)



OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Inspirations

●   LHKF → “Low Hanging Kiwi Fruit”
    talk/aftetalk by Adam “MetlStorm” →
    geo-targeted net recon – internet
                    Shodan-HQ
                           wide scanning on 4
                           ports
                              Some academic papers




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Scanning whole internet.. rly?




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Take home notes

●   Targets seeded from BGP routes.
●   At average takes a day to complete
    Internet-wide scan on a single protocol
●   Potentially generates large number of
    abuse reports




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Architecture

●   Network port discovery (agents)
●   Banner collection (agents)
●   Backend Store: SOLR
●   Collectibles: services and ports, OS
    fingerprints,
●   ASN/OWNER/netblock/Country, geographical
    location
●   Risk evaluation → honeypots (VMs, Service
    simulation)



OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Architecture(2)

●   Roughly something like that




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Approach

●   Scan slow (avoid abuse reports)
●   Index time
●   Passive “mapper” (simple sniffer +
    browser fingerprinting at the moment)
●   Larger range of ports (account port
    numbers, which are actively being
    scanned from firewall log analysis,
    honeypot machines etc)



OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Sample search




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
A word on spatial search




 http://www.mhaller.de/archives/156-Spatial-search-with-Lucene.html


OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Seeding for Targets: random?


 ●   ASN/whois data to mine targets seems
     like a good start



      Xkcd.net again :p




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Some stats from VM farms

           Call-back Source (by country)   Browser vuln distribution (as detected)




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Unanswered questions

●   Threat detection results are very
    specific to the VM farm environment
●   Realistic survey of client machines –
    need passive agents at large ISPs
●   Honeypot useability questionable
●   .. throw yours :)




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
HoneyNet

●   Lets see the videoz
●


●   We get hits like that every day :p




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Cat and mouse game

●   Of course all of this is easy to evade.
    Once you know the method. But
    security is always about 'cat-n-mouse'
    game ;-)




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Demo time



               ●lets look at some videos :)




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
Conclusions

               contact us:
          benson.wu@gmail.com
           fygrave@gmail.com




OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)

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Real time evaluation of national network exposure to emerging threats - fyodor yarochkin

  • 1. ASP InfoSec India Conference 2012 gust 24th – 25th, 2012 The OWASP Foundati el Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon http://www.owasp.org p://www.owasp.in Real-Time Evaluation of National Network Exposure to Emerging Threats Fyodor Yarochkin Academia Sinica P1Sec fy@iis.sinica.edu.tw OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 2. Yarochkin Fyodor?  10+ years infosec & dev experience  Phd Candidate (NTU & Academia Sinica  Open source enthusiast  http://www.o0o.nu  Research interests: intrusion detection, correlation, vulnerability research OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 3. Also... This research is part of ●The Cloud Security Intelligence Project and numerous open source projects... OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 4. Introduction OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 5. Infosec community vs. … ● Graphics http://recipeforlowhangingfruit.com/ Research crime
  • 6. What makes these things interesting: ● Globalization of the crime scene (local laws don't matter) ● Volumes of micro-transactions. → Stealing a $1USD from 1,000,000 still makes a $1,000,000USD – also makes AML measures useless ● There are other means of taking control over wealth than stealing cash.. OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 7. Variations of a “wallet”
  • 8. Getting the global picture ● Colect and analyze massive amounts of data ● Be able to catch 'lowest hanging fruits' OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 9. Challenges ● Getting the raw data is non trivial (and requires some social engineering ;-)) ● Amounts of data is massive. Not suitable for single machine processing. Often, not even suitable for store in original form due to volume OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 10. HoneyNet/SCIC “Know yer Internet” project OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 11. Disclaimer ● This is research in progress ● Semi-public access possible, talk to me ● Contributions highly anticipated ● Each of particular ideas isn't that novel (portscanning and banner grabbing is very 1997 ;-)) but hopefully the fusion of concepts is interesting OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 12. Motivation ● Answer questions like: – “What is the risk of Taiwan networks being owned, now” – New worm outbreak: identify potential victims and enforce patching through automated notification – Identify regional threats – i.e. what are the most exploited vulnerabilities in Taiwan networks. – Cooperation with CERT, etc etc.. OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 13. Motivation ● Real-time understanding of exposure levels at large scale ● Threats to “pop and mom” machines as “low-hanging fruit” ● Making use of data from honeypots to evaluate level of exposure, emerging threats etc etc.. ● Have some fun responding to abuse emails ;-) OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 14. Understanding the threat ● Server honeypots (mainly python scripts, simulating services) ● Client side honeypots (VM farms) ● Static analysis (crawling, pattern mining etc) OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 15. “low hanging fruit” simulation ● Have VM farms running. ● Have server-honeypots (with some romanian kids bruteforcing ssh passwords all the time ;)) ● Crawl networks at large (alexa top 1,000,000 but not only) ● Exploit detection via payload/behavior analysis ● Additional enhancements to detect variations (user behavior simulation, hop-ing through VPN end points to detect local threats etc) OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 16. Not really a full-fedged Cuckoobox ● Focus on detecting exploitation ● Lightweight version of browser ● Heavily bundled with static analysis tools OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 17. VM farm capacity ● We can do at average 10-20 secs per URL render per VM. Average 10+15 Vms/machine. ● Off-load VM farm load by doing lots of pattern matching (use VM as last resource) OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 18. So.. ● We have some data of what's going on in the net. How do we map this to the network infrastructure we're trying to protect (at organization, or country level side)... ● ● Or maybe see what “*unamed-country*” is up to :) OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 19. Inspirations ● LHKF → “Low Hanging Kiwi Fruit” talk/aftetalk by Adam “MetlStorm” → geo-targeted net recon – internet Shodan-HQ wide scanning on 4 ports Some academic papers OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 20. Scanning whole internet.. rly? OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 21. Take home notes ● Targets seeded from BGP routes. ● At average takes a day to complete Internet-wide scan on a single protocol ● Potentially generates large number of abuse reports OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 22. Architecture ● Network port discovery (agents) ● Banner collection (agents) ● Backend Store: SOLR ● Collectibles: services and ports, OS fingerprints, ● ASN/OWNER/netblock/Country, geographical location ● Risk evaluation → honeypots (VMs, Service simulation) OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 23. Architecture(2) ● Roughly something like that OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 24. Approach ● Scan slow (avoid abuse reports) ● Index time ● Passive “mapper” (simple sniffer + browser fingerprinting at the moment) ● Larger range of ports (account port numbers, which are actively being scanned from firewall log analysis, honeypot machines etc) OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 25. Sample search OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 26. A word on spatial search http://www.mhaller.de/archives/156-Spatial-search-with-Lucene.html OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 27. Seeding for Targets: random? ● ASN/whois data to mine targets seems like a good start Xkcd.net again :p OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 28. Some stats from VM farms Call-back Source (by country) Browser vuln distribution (as detected) OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 29. Unanswered questions ● Threat detection results are very specific to the VM farm environment ● Realistic survey of client machines – need passive agents at large ISPs ● Honeypot useability questionable ● .. throw yours :) OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 30. HoneyNet ● Lets see the videoz ● ● We get hits like that every day :p OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 31. Cat and mouse game ● Of course all of this is easy to evade. Once you know the method. But security is always about 'cat-n-mouse' game ;-) OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 32. Demo time ●lets look at some videos :) OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)
  • 33. Conclusions contact us: benson.wu@gmail.com fygrave@gmail.com OWASP InfoSec India Conference 2012. Hotel Crowne Plaza, Gurgaon (India)