Xtreme CQ


Published on

Published in: News & Politics
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

No Downloads
Total views
On SlideShare
From Embeds
Number of Embeds
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide

Xtreme CQ

  1. 1. Extreme Cultural Intelligence Nick Stone Culture Resource Centre nickstone123@gmail.com ‘Cling tight to your sense of humour. You will need it everyday’ -Lawrence of Arabia
  2. 2. Extreme Cultural Intelligence Between CQ…………….&…………..Insider Threat Based on ISAF (et al.) lessons learned Pragmatic Expectations (esp. uncertainty/complexity) In-Context Mental Positioning (Situational Awareness) Some Do’s & Don’ts, more Extreme Negotiation Skills
  3. 3. What makes an effective Advisor? Professional Readiness (credibility) • Cultural awareness briefs & reading • Environment specific culture briefs • Reputation • Management of interpreters • Moral endurance • Culturally adaptive advising and mentoring • Survivability • Negotiation Skills • Adaptability • Situational awareness • Advising & mentoring proficiency • Cultural proficiency • Non-verbal communication & body language • Insider Threat behavioural & activity indicators • Ethics • Communication & negotiation skills • Ability to build rapport & trust Cultural Readiness (acceptability) • Enhanced self awareness & self confidence • Enhanced situational awareness • Reduced stress • Greater Influence • Enhanced force protection
  4. 4. Intercultural Negotiation Discuss with a partner for 3-4 minutes (do in 2 bursts): 1. What negotiation usually involves 2. How culture might affect negotiation? 3. An example of an intercultural negotiation challenge you have experienced (or expect to experience). 4. How successful were you? What would you do differently?
  5. 5. Battered-Spouse Syndrome & Afghan Behavior Refers to effects on a spouse who has been repeatedly abused, physically and/or mentally, over time. 3 components provide insights into the behaviors of Afghans abused by insurgents: • An environment of persistent fear for the victim. • Victim gives the abuser more power by perceiving him as omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient. • The victim’s behavior increasingly becomes one of “learned helplessness.” http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/12-18/ch_2.asp
  6. 6. Shared values & common ground: where? Should men & women have equal access to education? How much sympathy do you have for armed opposition groups?
  7. 7. http://afghansurvey.asiafoundation.org/
  8. 8. http://afghansurvey.asiafoundation.org/
  9. 9. In the latest publicity coup …the Taliban today finished 1st in a newly released survey of the “Best Places to Work 2013” For the Taliban, who had just opened their office in Doha, Qatar, the honor was “totally unexpected and incredibly humbling,” a spokesman for the group said. www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/borowitzreport/2013/06/taliban-named-best-place-to-work-2013.html
  10. 10. “This is the first office we’ve ever opened, so naturally we wanted it to be nice & all,” he said. “But to be named a better place to work than Apple & Google & the other amazing places on this list- whoa.” The atmosphere at Taliban headquarters was described as “relaxed” & “fun.” “People think that just because we observe Sharia law, we walk around with frowny faces all day,” the spokesman said. “The fact is, we have a lot of laughs here.” www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/borowitzreport/2013/06/talibannamed-best-place-to-work-2013.html
  11. 11. President Karzai was not amused & threatened to break off peace talks with the Taliban if they do not immediately admit that the poll was a “total fraud.” He said: “When they did their little ribbon-cutting for their office on Tuesday, I thought they were publicity whores, but they are really taking it to a new sick level.” Hours later, the Taliban spokesman replied: “Karzai doesn’t sound very chill. He’d really have to dial it back if he wanted to fit in at a workplace like this.” www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/borowitzreport/2013/06/taliban-named-best-place-towork-2013.html
  12. 12. www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9575593/Afghan-troops-told-not-to-take-revengefor-Nato-cultural-offenses.html www.kpbs.org/news/2012/oct/01/afghan-soldiers-learn-how-not-get-offended-us-troo/
  13. 13. Abdul Hanan, 20, a soldier … was blunt. “We would have killed many of them (CF) already,” he said, “but our commanders are cowards and don’t let us.” He said the Americans treat the Afghans roughly, cursing at and bullying them. “We like the Americans’ heavy weapons, but we don’t like their soldiers,” he said. Training Afghan Allies, With Guard Firmly Up Matthew Rosenberg, The New York Times, 25 September 2012
  14. 14. “They come here and they look like they are going to fight us,” said an Afghan soldier at the outpost. “They are always talking down to us like we are little children.” Training Afghan Allies, With Guard Firmly Up Matthew Rosenberg, The New York Times, 25 September 2012
  15. 15. Brochure for Understanding Culture of Coalition Forces The Afghan army is trying …to convince Afghan troops that when their Western counterparts do something deeply insulting, it’s likely a product of cultural ignorance & not worthy of revenge: “Please do not get offended if you see a NATO member blowing his/her nose in front of you” “When Coalition members get excited, they may show their excitement by patting one another on the back or the behind,” it explains. “They may even do this to you if they are proud of the job you’ve done.”
  16. 16. “When someone feels comfortable in your presence, they may even put their feet on their own desk while speaking with you. “They simply don’t know or have forgotten the Afghan custom.” Pointing the soles of one’s shoes at someone is considered a grievous insult in Afghanistan. The guide also warns Afghan soldiers that Western troops might wink at them or inquire about their female relatives or expose their private parts while showering – all inappropriate actions by Afghan standards.
  17. 17. “As you know, Afghans never shake with their left hands, wink, signal with their fingers, or show their private parts in the presence of others in the same shower. “But coalition forces have a different way of doing things. “If a foreign soldier asks to see a picture of your wife, don't take offense -- but don't show it to him either. And if he blows his nose in your presence, or exits from the shower naked in your presence, don't be alarmed. “These actions are not intended to insult, and are no cause for retaliation.”
  18. 18. The United States is “a little like a lovely carpet. Different colored strands combine to make a beautiful whole.” NATO’s coalition is described as a “work of art.” www.fastcompany.com/3020712/innovation-agents/the-worlds-hardest-consulting-gig
  19. 19. What are the strengths & limitations of ‘pamphlet training’? www.phibetaiota.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/coverinside-the-wire.jpg
  20. 20. Preparing Afghan allies for such missteps is important, but simply distributing a pamphlet isn’t going to get the job done. (Why?) The literacy [not IQ!] rate among ANSF is about 11%. http://nation.time.com/2012/10/03/ cultural-misunderstanding/
  21. 21. Greater respect for local culture & improved treatment of Afghan forces would minimize the odds of Afghan forces becoming willing to kill their NATO partners. There will always be some uncertainty in Afghanistan. But greater cultural understanding would alleviate some of the tension that continues to produce violence. http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-1005/opinions/35502305_1_afghan-soldiersafghan-security-forces-nato-soldiers
  22. 22. “Dealing with the insider threat is counterintuitive…. You need to get closer…talk to them more…and you need to be in proximity to them” “We all are looking for some sort of…analysis that will say ‘If you see this: then this’, and I don't think it exists.” Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAAT) in Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) 13 May 2013 http://mod.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents /61010201294424973553325325.pdf
  23. 23. Get closer to the men who might be thinking of killing you. “that the closer you partner with your Afghan guys- the better you understand each other- the safer you’re going to be” “It’s the guys having friction [with the Afghans] or who are not partnering as well as *they+ should, where I think we’re having some of the issues”
  24. 24. Comparison of Western vs. Afghan Soldiers It is not the purpose of advisors to make the ANA look like a Western Army. The fact is that many facets of the Western army model will not work in the tribal & economically lagging culture of Afghanistan. The country does not possess the financial resources to outfit & sustain the army with the technological weaponry present in most modern armies. Further, the literacy level of the population hinders the rapid introduction & employment of new military equipment & technology. P72 Afghan National Army (ANA) Mentor Guide March 2011
  25. 25. Inside the Wire Threats – Afghanistan Green on Blue https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=6898& filename=/docs/doc6898/12-07.pdf
  26. 26. Afghanistan Update Insider Attacks The insurgents try to claim credit for these attacks, but the truth is the majority of them are the result of individual grievances, cultural misunderstandings or personal stress. The 32 attacks on ISAF forces this year (figure correct as at 22 Aug) are challenging, but they don't define the 350,000 soldiers and police of the Afghan National Security Forces. The 32 incidents make up less than 0.01 % of all ANSF personnel.
  27. 27. A Crisis of Trust & Cultural Incompatibility Executive Summary In April 2011, Jeffrey Bordin surveyed both ANSF & U.S. soldiers & came to a series of conclusions. ANSF grievances against ISAF personnel: ○ ISAF does not respect Afghan women or their privacy. ○ ISAF personnel exhibit extreme arrogance & refuse to take advice. ○ ISAF personnel urinate in public & expose themselves in front of Afghan women.
  28. 28. Insider Threats- Afghanistan Handbook: Observations, Insights & Lessons, Oct.2012 Personal Altercation Attacker becomes belligerent from a disagreement with or a perceived socio-cultural transgression committed by CF targets. Yelling, swearing & humiliating greatly aggravate the situation. Never do this to an Afghan; they have a strong predilection to resort to violence under these circumstance. This is driven by their tribal concept of ‘ghairet’ – the necessity to preserve honor, & violent retribution is an accepted norm to maintain such honor. Always show respect towards them, their religion & their culture.
  29. 29. As soldiers work closely with Afghan units, including as advisers, they are warned that many confrontations occur because of cultural ignorance or "lack of empathy" for Muslims, or for perceived American lack of respect for the Quran, Afghan women or elders. As an example, it notes that soldiers should not eat in front of Afghans during the holy month of Ramadan, when Muslims fast from dawn to dusk http://bigstory.ap.org/article/afghan-attacks-down-overall-insider-threat-rises
  30. 30. Strategies for a Better Way to Engage Understand their choice & why it’s in their interest to say, “No” Develop options that meet their interests well Brainstorm options & ask for criticism: “What would be wrong with this?” Ask your counterpart to jointly brainstorm options: “What other solutions might meet your concerns & my objectives?”
  31. 31. Strategies for a Better Way to Engage Suggest ways that the alternatives may not actually be so attractive: “It seems to me that the implications of that are X, Y, and Z. Am I missing something?” Make it easy for them to defend the agreement Take the time to understand their perspective and share yours Explore their story and understand their perceptions and how that is leading to their conclusion Stay curious: even if you don’t agree, you can always benefit from understanding their story and hearing their interests and concerns
  32. 32. It’s often as much about the process as the outcome There’s one piece of pie left. I’ll share it with you if you agree in principle, that it’s mine.
  33. 33. Break
  34. 34. Vignette Exercise For your vignette, identify what seems to be happening with respect to: a) Emotions & motivations (Heart) b) Relevant CQ knowledge (Head) c) Possible responses: chose one from each of the following option lists (Body)
  35. 35. Avoid: (Option 1) 1. Slander any religion or host nation or coalition partners (even if only jokingly) 2. Assuming you have all the facts: “Look, it’s obvious that.…” 3. Assuming the other side is biased—but you’re not 4. Assuming the other side’s motivations and intentions are obvious- and probably nefarious 5. Making open-ended offers: “What do you want?” 6. Making unilateral offers: “I’d be willing to.…” 7. Simply agreeing to (or refusing) the other side’s demands 8. Threats: “You’d better agree, or else.…” 9. Close-mindedness: “Under no circumstances will I agree toor even consider- that proposal.” 10. Trying to “buy” a good relationship
  36. 36. Instead, try to: (Option 2) 1. Be curious: “help me understand how you see the situation.” 2. Be humble: “What do I have wrong?” 3. Be open-minded: “Is there another way to explain this?” 4. Ask “Why is that important to you?” 5. Propose solutions for critique: “Here’s a possibility— what might be wrong with it?” 6. Explore how a breakdown in trust may have occurred and how to remedy it. 7. Treat counterparts with respect, and act in ways that will command theirs.
  37. 37. Instead, try to: (Option 2, cont’d) 8. Talk about the negotiation process: “We seem to be at a roadbloack- perhaps we should spend some more time exploring our respective objectives & constraints.” 9. Slow down the pace: “I’m not ready to agree, but I’d prefer not to walk away either. I think this needs further exploration.” 10. Issue warnings without making threats: “Unless you’re willing to work with me toward a solution we can both accept, I’m afraid I can’t afford to spend more time negotiating.”
  38. 38. Sample Vignette You, the colonel go around the room introducing yourself. Suddenly, one of the Afghans stood up, pointed at you, and says (in front of all the other Afghan officers): “This man is a jerk.” Option 1: You think: Now, I’ve left my family behind. I’m deployed and I don’t need to take this crap. I say, “Hey mate, I’m here to help you guys, you’re not doing anything for me here.” Option 2: I bite my tongue and swallow it. I don’t know where he is going with this ... But, I understand that to be effective I can never show that I've lost my temper. So I say, “Clearly, you are a wise man, for my wife too thinks I’m a jerk.” Laughter breaks out. . . . The Afghan officer becomes my biggest advocate through the whole deployment. Later on, I was able to deduce that he was trying to demonstrate in front of his peers that he was a man of importance and was using me as a way to demonstrate that by calling me a jerk.
  39. 39. www.newsweek.com/afghanistan-green-blue-killings-explained-64561
  40. 40. How do Afghan & Western negotiation styles differ? Bottom Line Up Front (Western style) · There is no silver bullet. There is no set way of Afghan negotiation. · Keep it personal. All decisions are based on personality. Get to know them, let them know you. It generates trust, which generates action. ·Accept ambiguity. There simply will not be definite answers or even necessarily predictable outcomes from negotiations. Put in the time. Time undergirds relationship. To establish a friendly relationship with an elder or a group of elders requires a lot of time. · HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEM- CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE REPORT
  41. 41. “The process of decision making is far from clear-cut for important matters, it is almost never limited to a single sitting of a group of elders, no matter how prestigious they are, it is not even subject to written commitments made by people who are acknowledged as the leaders of communities.”
  42. 42. HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEM- CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE REPORT Gaining community support is a complex and lengthy process. “Few understand the way that decisions are made” “Our failure to comprehend how such things are done here can lead us to become upset and frustrated with the Afghans and accuse them of being duplicitous, unable to keep their word or lacking resolve,” “It is all about relationships,” he said. “People need to get off the FOBs permanently, get behind the Afghans, and get after development.”
  43. 43. “Every valley, tribe, village is DIFFERENT! Each has its own issues. There are no “cookie cutter” approaches or solutions.” We need to understand that basic people skills• showing respect, • being friendly & open • treating them as one would expect [us] to be treated … goes a long way.
  44. 44. People are peopleeverywhere. The trick is to boost humanisation: us of them & them of us.
  45. 45. HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEM- CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE REPORT …all agreed on the need for close, repeated small group interactions. This not only encourages the development of personal bonds, but works against the tendency of some Afghans to view … body armor as evidence of cowardice. If possible, spending the night in a given community … sitting through long sessions of informal talk, is universally considered a best practice. While this may seem like a great deal of effort just to get an agreement in place, agreements in Pashtun areas mean little without a personal relationship to back them up. It all rests upon the relationship. Without a personal relationship, any negotiation or meeting will mean little.
  46. 46. A normal occurrence in Western militaries, such as being shouted at by your superior officer, can a grave insult to Afghan soldiers. Afghan troops share a greater "brotherly bond" … hand-holding and other common gestures that are generally taboo among foreign soldiers. Afghan soldiers' shabby uniforms, lack of discipline, sometimes scruffy appearance & you have the building blocks for a negative stereotype of Afghan soldiers that portrays them as lazy and untidy.
  47. 47. The seven habits of highly effective warrior-diplomats
  48. 48. What key point(s) do you think you’ll take away with you today?
  49. 49. Thank you & tread the tightrope safely