climate policies and institutions in pakistan tariq banuri

1. As Pakistan gears up for a new election, it is essential to
ask how the next government could and should
respond to major challenges. ere is broad
agreement among all political parties and
independent experts that climate change is one of
these challenges, and that it is one of the most critical
threats to future life and prosperity, not only in
Pakistan butintheworld atlarge.
TwoDimensionsofClimateAction
e climate agenda can be divided into two major
components: (a) climate policy itself (or policies,
more correctly), i.e., what needs to be done; and (b)
climate institutions, namely the how of climate
action. In this note, I will focus mainly on climate
institutions. However, a brief synopsis of the rst
component (climatepolicies)isgiven below.
BriefDescriptionofOptimalClimatePolicies
Elsewhere, I have argued that climate policies need to
be framed not as stand-alone policies but as an
extension of Pakistan's development and trade
policies. While details of this argument are elaborated
elsewhere,abrief synopsisisas follows.
Ÿ Climate change is here to stay. In other words,
the foreseeable future will be de ned by the
nature and intensity of climate change. e aim
of climate policy, therefore, should not merely
be one of surviving its worst impacts, but of
pursuing other national agendas, especially the
agenda of sustainable development in a world
that willbe de ned by climate change.
Ÿ Hitherto, a narrow framework, which envisages
climate change mainly as a net burden on the
economy, has driven climate policy. is
framework focuses, e.g., on the expenses to be
incurred on such challenges as disaster
prediction and management, development of
climate resistant agriculture, or on incremental
costs of renewable energy technologies. I have
argued that this approach is both myopic and
unfruitful. A better approach, would take
climate change as a description of the world to
come, and ask how the people of Pakistan can
bene t fromthisknowledge.
Ÿ A simple insight is that the entire world is
looking for answers to the challenge of climate
change. e countries that are able to progress in
this world are those that can supply such
answers, not those who wait for others to deliver
packaged solutions in the form of aid or charity.
Indeed, this approach characterizes the unique
response of the Chinese government to climate
change mitigation. Instead of asking how to
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions in China,
they asked how Chinese businesses could be
supported to develop climate solutions and
associated products for export. In doing so,
China has succeeded in developing the economy
of the future, supported its businesses,
promoted exports, brought down the costs of
climate related technologies, and therefore made
it easier for China itself to apply these
technologies.
Ÿ As such, instead of thinking of climate policy as a
singular set of actions focused on a narrow
agenda, the optimal approach is to think of
climate change as an essential and inseparable
component of every other major national
agenda: foreign policy, resource mobilization
policy, energy policy, water policy, agriculture
and food security policy, health policy, security
policy,and moregenerally,development policy.
Ÿ In particular, the government needs to support
Pakistani businesses develop their export
potential in the expanding markets for climate
solutions: renewable energy, energy efficiency,
water efficiency, climate resistant agriculture,
climate resilient infrastructure, early warning
systems, energy and water storage systems,
public health systems,andeducation systems.
ClimateInstitutions
is background is useful for the analysis of the
optimal institutional landscape for addressing climate
change.
CLIMATE POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN PAKISTAN
TARIQ BANURI
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125

2. It is fair to say that until now the government has
responded to the threat of climate change by creating
new institutions or revamping or strengthening
existing institutions. Broadly speaking, this was done
in a piecemeal fashion, rather than on the basis of an
overarching vision. e time is ripe to take a look at
the existing landscape and propose alterations on the
basis of considerations of efficiency, effectiveness, and
sustainability.
Admittedly, some institutional development was
necessitated by changing political realities unrelated
to climate change, especially the passage of the 18th
Amendment, which led incidentally to the
establishment of the Federal Ministry of Climate
Change (MOCC) as well as provincial departments
and agencies. However, some institutions were
created or strengthened explicitly by the imperative of
climate change itself; these include in particular the
Global Change Impact Studies Centre (GCISC), the
disaster management system, the strengthening of the
Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD). Others
were established or strengthened by the lure of global
climate nance, e.g., the Alternative Energy
Development Board (AEDB), the National Energy
Efficiency and Conservation Authority (NEECA,
formerly ENERCON) and the National Climate
Authority (NCA).
Pakistan boasts having one of the few dedicated
ministries on climate change. However, the Ministry
of Climate Change (MOCC) is widely perceived to be
a weak and ineffectual ministry, which has struggled
to achieve even minimal results. is is not a unique
situation, as far as such ministries go. Many
developing countries nd themselves in similar
situations. e reasons have to do mainly with the
complexity of the climate agenda, which makes it
difficult for a conventional ministry to handle it
successfully.
To put it simply, climate change is a horizontal
agenda, namely it is one that requires coordination
across other ministries, provinces, and independent
agencies. However, most governments are organized
in a vertical structure, namely where power, in uence,
resources, and effectiveness depends on the number of
personnel and the amount of nancial resources
controlled directly by the entity concerned. Managing
a horizontal agenda is a specialized task that requires a
dedicated group of professionals with experience in
diplomacy, facilitation, incentivization, coordination,
monitoring and evaluation, and motivation. Career
civil servants are not trained in such skills, and
although the best of them manage to acquire them
through trial and error, it is always a difficult task to
attract these special types of civil servants to ministries
thatarenot viewedaspowerful andeffective.
e result of the mismatch is that on the one hand, the
MOCC has abandoned a huge chunk of the national
agenda on climate change, namely the one that
pertains to the mandate of other ministries (water,
agriculture, food, energy, health, and so forth); and on
the other hand, it is highly jealous of the few privileges
andpowersremainingwithinitsmandate.
It was apparently in response to this impasse that the
government decided to establish two new climate
related bodies, a high-level policy making body, the
National Climate Council, to be chaired by the Prime
Minister, and including the heads of all relevant
ministries, agencies, and provincial governments as
members; and a professionally staffed executive body,
the National Climate Authority (NCA) to act on the
directives of the NCC and facilitate the coordinated
pursuit of the national climate agenda by all
concerned governmental and non-governmental
entities. is is a good solution, but it will be difficult
to operationalize it through the MOCC. More on this
below.
eHorizontalAgendaofClimateChange
A moment's re ection will reveal that there is no such
thing as climate policy. Rather, climate related
activities are being undertaken by a variety of
governmental entities on the basis of independently
crafted policy frameworks. Ideally, in such
circumstances, the role of the MOCC or other central
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3. entity would be to catalyze and promote agreed
actions by the appropriate agencies and institutions
rather than get into turf battles or duplication of
effort.Togiveafewexamples:
Ÿ Foreign Policy: e reason that the Federation
was able to retain the portfolio of climate change
subsequent to the passage of the 18th
Amendment, notwithstanding the absence of
any mention in the Federal List, is that it is part
of an international agenda (which also includes
other multilateral agreements on such subjects
as biodiversity, chemicals, hazardous substances,
and forests). ese agreements involve
international obligations as well as international
opportunities (especially for resource
mobilization) for developing countries. is
agenda operates through a kind of awkward
collaboration between the MOCC and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). us far,
the government of Pakistan has not been very
successful in communicating the national
responses on such commitments; nor has the
country been able to bene t from available
resource ows or opportunities for access to
technologies or capacity building.
Ÿ Water Policy: Virtually all the impacts of climate
change are associated with water. Too much
water means oods, cyclones, land erosion, or
sea level rise. Too little water means drought,
water scarcity, deserti cation, saltwater
intrusion, food insecurity, and health insecurity.
e country now has a water policy, to be
overseen by a National Water Council, whose
proposed remit will extend to all these areas, and
will include coordination between federal and
provincialentities.
Ÿ Agriculture Policy: Future changes in
temperature as well as water availability will
affect agricultural productivity, and the country
needs to develop strategies to ensure food
security and economic sustainability despite
these impacts. As it happens, there is an
elaborate institutional infrastructure to address
agriculture and food security. is includes the
network of agricultural research institutions
(coordinated by the Pakistan Agricultural
Research Council), provincial agricultural
departments and research bodies, agricultural
universities, nancial institutions, seed and
fertilizer companies, and various private and
public institutions catering to the development
and adaptation of agricultural technology.
Ÿ Energy Policy: e bulk of the climate
mitigation agenda focuses on renewable energy
and energy efficiency. is is the subject of a full-
edged federal ministry, a powerful executive
agency (WAPDA), a regulatory body (NEPRA),
focused catalytic agencies, namelyAEDBand
NEECA, and a network of distribution and
transmission institutions. Not only are these the
appropriate agencies to handle these subjects,
there is some indication of new actions being
initiatedbythem.
Ÿ Health Policy: Another major impact of climate
change is on human health, not only through
heat waves and extreme weather events, but also
through likely changes in disease vectors, which
could lead to new epidemics. Again, there are
federal and provincial institutions that deal with
public health and health systems, and these are
best placed to handle the additional health-
related challenges precipitated by future climate
change.
Ÿ Disaster Management Policy: It is a truism that
the frequency and intensity of natural disasters
has increased dramatically in recent years,
largely (though not exclusively) because of
climate change. ese include recurrent heat
waves, persistent drought, oods, sea level rise,
land erosion, and health crises. One of the
national success stories is the establishment of an
effective disaster management system, with the
National Disaster Management Authority
(NDMA) at its apex. While it is associated with
the Ministry of Climate Change, it is clear that it
is an entity with a broader remit, and should be
driven by itsownagenda.
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127

4. eResidualVerticalAgenda
e upshot is that Pakistan's climate agenda is caught
in a kind of institutional limbo. e ministry has no
substantive agenda to speak of. e bulk of what
constitutes the climate agenda is already allocated to
other ministries, which, it turns out, are far more
powerful in the political and bureaucratic hierarchies,
and therefore far from beholden to the MOCC. More
importantly, while the Government of Pakistan has
undertaken a number of important actions on climate
related matters, these have happened, invariably, in
spiteof rather thanbecauseoftheMOCC.
Looking at this landscape, it appears that the only
fourmatters are left to the MOCC as a form of a
residual vertical agenda: (a) participation in
international climate (and other) negotiations, (b)
climate research, (c) the aspiration to mobilize
international nance for climate related projects, and
(d) climate impact assessment of policies or projects.
However, thesewill not be handled effectively unless
the Ministry goes through a major revamping exercise
involving bothitsstructureand personnel.
eInternationalNegotiationsAgenda
It is widely rumored that the main attraction for civil
servants to join the MOCC is the opportunity to
travel abroad for international negotiations or related
events. However, with the sole exception of the
Director General (Environment), the staff of the
ministry consists of non-technical personnel, with no
prior experience either in climate change or in
international diplomacy. Many are likely to move as
soon an appointment at a "better" ministry becomes
available. e result is that instead of building a strong
corps of professional negotiators to represent the
national interest, the country has come to rely on part-
time negotiators who may be more interested in the
opportunity to travel abroad than in learning more
about the subjects entrusted to them. is is most
unfortunate.
As mentioned, the international agenda is discharged
through a kind of awkward partnership between
MOCC and MoFA. e latter has highly experienced
and professional staff, but the arrangement is far from
ideal. e best situation would be if both the
participating entities were able to cooperate in
building a national corps of experts in international
climate negotiations. As it turns out, this happens
more by the accident of personal interest rather than
the imperative of institutional design. e MOCC
has no institutions to groom or train such
professionals, but it occasionally gets a staff member
who is both knowledgeable and willing to learn.
Similarly, while MoFAno longer has a clear career
track for diplomats with expertise in climate
negotiations, a number of its stars have chosen to
investinthesubject because oftheirowninterest.
Nevertheless, this is a dismal situation. ere are two
alternatives for overcoming this situation. One option
is to convert the MOCC into a professional body,
with permanent staff members selected on the basis of
merit, experience, and aptitude. is institution
would develop a formal partnership with MoFA for
developing expertisein international negotiations.
e other alternative is to operationalize the NCA as
soon as possible, appoint an experienced person as its
head, develop it as a high quality professional
institution with expertise in all matters relevant to the
national climate agenda, including climate
negotiations, and transfer the negotiation functions to
thenewentityin collaboration withMoFA.
eClimateResearchAgenda
In terms of the second agenda, climate research, the
government had the foresight to establish, in 2002, a
dedicated climate research institute, the (GCISC),
initially as a development project, and later formalized
as a body corporate under the GCISC Act 2013. Since
then, unfortunately, it has been placed in a kind of
receivership relationship with the MOCC, which has
vehemently resisted any attempts to build it up as a
strongandeffectiveinstitution.
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5. e only solution is to operationalize the terms of the
GCISC Act 2013, which envisage the Centre as an
independent research institution, headed by and
answerable to an independent Board of Governors,
albeit chaired by the Minister of Climate Change,
with its separate budget and plan of action. e
GCISC has recently reached out to other national
research bodies in order to develop a truly national
research agenda on climate change, an agenda that
would involve universities, governmental research
institutions, and provinces in a synergistic endeavor.
is will be difficult to sustain unless if the MOCC
transforms itselfor isrelegatedto thebackground.
eClimateFinanceAgenda
A third component of the agenda that has (as yet) no
other takers is climate nance. e Paris Agreement
succeeded in establishing a framework for mobilizing
climate nance for developing countries, especially
through the Green Climate Fund (GCF). It was
hoped that the MOCC would get into position to
attract signi cant funding for both adaptation and
mitigation projects. e reality has been otherwise.
Only a trickle of funds have materialized, and none for
high priority projects. e Ministry has one staff
member loaned by the UN to oversee such efforts, but
there has been no attempt to build up a larger corps of
professionals inthis eld.
One reason is an obvious one. Donors are not
interested in abstract climate projects. ey are
interested in projects in the areas of energy, water,
food security, health, or disaster management.
However, unless the Climate Ministry is thoroughly
revamped and gets a different type of leadership, it will
be impossible for it to champion projects that fall
withinthemandateofotherministries.
Finally, even in a coordinating role, donors are
comfortable in working through the External Affairs
Division (EAD) of the Ministry of Finance, and there
is no need to complicate the bureaucratic processes by
adding yet another layer in the form of MOCC. e
latter's optimal role, therefore, needs to be a
professional one, of providing technical assistance and
support to other ministries in preparing proposals,
working with the private sector, and working with
EAD to oat fundable proposals.
As such, we are again left with two alternatives. Either,
the MOCC is reborn as a professional body, which
would have the expertise and the interest to work with
other ministries as well as developing a cadre of
dedicated professionals; or this task too is handed over
to the NCA, assuming that the NCA is headed by
someone who realizes the urgency of building it as a
professional institution.
ClimateImpactAssessment
A major concern of climate policy is to ensure that
future development projects and development
policies are "climate resilient", namely that their
impact is not undermined by future climate change;
and conversely, that they are "climate friendly, i.e.,
they do not further exacerbate climate change. In
many countries, such responsibility is written into
laws, and is overseen by environmental protection
agencies.
In Pakistan as well, this responsibility would normally
redound either to the MOCC or the various EPAs. In
practice, this is carried out mainly at the behest of
foreign donors or under the guidance of the Planning
Commission.
APlanforAction
One can summarize the above discussion. As in most
countries, what is viewed as the climate agenda is a
composite of a number of different agendas, the vast
majority of which fall decisively within the mandates
of other, often far more powerful agencies and
ministries. Even the residual component is not
uncontested. e current institutional structure has
developed organically, in response to some critical
challenges (e.g., disaster management) or the
imperatives of the 18th Amendment. However, it is
not based on a clear understanding of the national
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6. objectives, the mechanisms needed to pursue these
objectives, and the type of skills required within
different institutions to carry out the tasks assigned to
them.
It is clear that vast majority of the climate related tasks
will be carried and should be carried out by the
ministries and associated agencies within whose
mandates these tasks may fall. ese include the
Ministries of Water, Energy, Agriculture/ Food
Security, and Health; in addition, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Planning,
Development, and Reform, and the Economic Affairs
Division. Furthermore, a signi cant share of even
these functions will have to be undertaken by the
corresponding institutions in provincial
governments. is is as it should be, and should be
encouraged.
is will leave a shorter list of core responsibilities that
must be handled by a "hub" agency within the
government. eseinclude thefollowing:
1. Normative Agenda: A hub agency should
shepherd a consensus on the national climate
change agenda, i.e., what are goals, what are
the priorities, what are the actions, what are
the targets, and what are the responsibilities
of various stakeholders (governmental
agencies as well as others) in achieving the
goals andthetargets.
2. Technical Agenda: Supporting and
promoting research by independent research
institutions, with GCISC at the apex, and in
collaboration with other national research
institutions, universities, and international
experts, on various aspects of climate change.
is is needed both to help build and sustain
the national consensus on climate change,
and to forecast trends and identify solutions
and remedies.
3. Capacity Building Agenda: Climate change
is a complex technical subject, whose
complexity is further compounded by the
existence of a large body national and
international laws, policies and agreements.
e "hub" agency must have the
responsibility of investing in the capacity of
all stakeholders, regardless of whether they
are in the federal or provincial governments,
in the private sector or civil society, or in
universities or thinktanks.
4. Financial Mobilization Agenda: is follows
from the previous point. e role of the
"hub" agency is to support other entities in
mobilizing funds for national projects.
5. Monitoring and Evaluation: Finally, a "hub"
agency is needed to provide an oversight
function, both to assess performance of the
other agencies involved, and to cater to the
reporting and monitoring needs of Pakistan's
international commitments.
At this point it is not clear whether the MOCC can
handle these responsibilities. It is neither structured in
a manner that would enable it to do so, nor does it
have the kind of personnel and expertise that such
roles will require. If this is correct, the appropriate
course would be to operationalize the National
Climate Council and the National Climate Authority
as quickly as possible, explicitly with a view to making
them responsible for the role of a "hub" agency as
outlined above. However, this will not happen if the
MOCC is given the responsibility of establishing,
nurturing, staffing, andenvisioning theNCA.
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