網路治理概念、組織及案例
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This document discusses internet governance concepts, organizations, and cases. It begins by explaining that users see the internet as a simple "black box" and are unaware of its complex internal operations. It then defines internet governance and describes its multi-layered structure. Several key internet governance organizations are mentioned, including ICANN, RIRs, IETF, and others. The roles and responsibilities of these organizations in areas like technical standards, domain name management, IP address allocation, and more are also summarized.
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網路治理概念、組織及案例
- 1. 網路治理概念、組織及案例 Internet Governance 1 Kenny Huang, Ph.D. Executive Council Member, APNIC huangksh@gmail.com 22. Dec. 2017 黃勝雄博士 亞太網路資訊中⼼董事
- 12. 12 網路治理主要機構 Internet Governance 技術標準 Technical Standards 域名與統籌協調 ICANN IP 位址 RIR Regional Internet Registry IAB Internet Architecture Board IETF Internet Engineering Task Force IRTF Internet Research Task Force ASO Address Supporting Org ccNSO Country code Name Supporting Org gNSO Generic Name Supporting Org Verisign; Root DNS; Root Zone; 註冊商 APNIC TWNIC ISP W3C World Wide Web Consortium
- 13. 13 功能領域 項目 主要參與機構 1.Control of “Critical Internet Resources” 網路關鍵資源管制 網路名稱與IP位址監理機構 ICANN, USG, RIR, 交通部/通傳會 IP位址技術規範 IETF; RIR 頂級網域名稱授權 ICANN; 交通部; 通傳會 網域名稱代理註冊 授權代理註冊商 根域檔案監理(Root Zone File) USG IP位址發放 APNIC, 交通部/通傳會; TWNIC; 網路 服務商 根域檔案管理(Root Zone File) IANA; 網路自治號碼ASN發放 APNIC, TWNIC 根伺服器管理 Versign, Cogent, 及其他 DNS查詢解析 DNS伺服器, 公共DNS Resolvers 2.Setting Internet Standards 訂定網路標準 網路協定號碼分配 IANA 網路技術標準 IETF 網頁技術標準 W3C 其他通信標準 ITU, IEEE, MPEG, JPEG, ISO,通傳會 3.Access and Interconnection coordination 網路互連與接取協調 多方互連協調 網路交換中心; 通傳會批發價格管制 網路互連及轉接合約 網路服務商, 內容服務商 網路互連標準(如. BGP) IETF 網路管理 (服務品質) 網路服務商; 通傳會 ? 用戶接取政策 網路服務商; 通傳會? 網路接取法規 (如網路中立) 通傳會 資料來源: Laura DeNardis; 黃勝雄博士整理 網路治理功能領域1/2
- 14. 14 功能領域 項目 主要參與機構 4.Cybersecurity Governance 網路安全治理 維護網路基礎設施安全 網路服務商,機構網管部門 加密標準 相關標準制訂機關, 通傳會, 國安局 網路安全法規/執法 軟體法規, 多國合作協議 修正軟體資安漏洞 軟體公司 軟體更新管理 使用者 維護路由安全, IP位址安全, DNS安全 網路服務商, IETF, APNIC, TWNIC 資安通報 CERTs/CSIRTs, 技服中心 網站信任憑證 Certificate Authorities (CAs)國家憑證 管理中心 5.Information Intermediation 資訊中介 協助商業交易 電子商務網站,第三方金流機構 協助政府內容審查與移除 搜尋引擎, 社群網路, 內容彙整網站 App調解 (規範, 執法) 智慧手機製造商 (如. Apple, HTC) 隱私政策 社群網路, 廣告中介商, Email服務商, 網路服務商 網路霸凌與誹謗 內容中介商 隱私權法規 立法院 政府協調, 個人資訊申請 內容中介商, 網路服務商 6.Architecture-Based Intellectual Property Rights Enforcements 智財權執法 網域名稱爭議處理 ICANN UDRP, TWNIC, 侵權內容移除 內容中介商 演算法執法 (如搜尋排序) 搜尋引擎 侵權使用者禁止接取 網路服務商; 經濟部智慧財產局 DNS侵權執法 TWNIC, .taipei管理局, 代理註冊商 網路智財權法規 立法院 標準形式專利政策 經濟部標準檢驗局 內容商業機密制訂 搜尋引擎 網路治理功能領域2/2 資料來源: Laura DeNardis; 黃勝雄博士整理
- 24. 24The purpose of computing is insight, not numbers APNIC會議前 APNIC會議中 APNIC會議後 提案⼈提出政策案或修正 案送交秘書處 SIG主席將提案送交SIG 郵件群組 網路社群於SIG 郵件群組 討論提案 在APNIC SIG場次⾯對⾯ 討論提案 共識? 共識? 在會員⼤會報告 SIG郵件群組最後公共評論 社群於SIG郵件群組討論 SIG主席送交討論結果 共識? 共識? APNIC董事⽀持提案 完成政策實施 否 否 否 否 ⼀ 週 四 週 ⼀ 週 四 ⾄ ⼋ 週 ⾄ 少 三 個 ⽉ APNIC 政策制定流程 PDP (Policy Development Process) 資料來源：APNIC; ⿈勝雄博⼠整理
- 28. Public Goods Governance Models 28 Governance Capability & Capacity for Public Goods Non-state Actors X O O Governments O O X Governance Model State Regulation Cooperation Private Self Regulation Co-Regulation Delegation (Knill, 2002) (Tanja, Borzel, 2007)(Neoliberalism) (Tanja Borzel, 2007) (Knill, 2002) source : edited by Dr. Kenny Huang
- 30. 30 Internet (1980’s) Internet Governance ü Computer to computer connection ü Single network-wide addressing model ü Single network-wide routing model ü Hop-by-hop destination-address-based packet forwarding
- 31. 31 Internet (2017) – Carriage Perspective Internet Governance Access ISP Access ISP Regional ISP Access ISP Access ISP Regional ISP Transit ISP
- 32. 32 Content vs. Carriage Internet Governance ü Who pays whom ? ü The only reason why access networks have clients is because there are content services that clients want to access ü To a carriage, content is just another client ü The content folk resolved this fight by going OTT (Over The Top) and created relationships directly with end users
- 34. 34 Content Delivery Network Internet Governance ü Reduced service latency ü Increased service resilience ü Happy customers
- 35. 35Internet Governance Fewer cables being built Those that are being build are single owner cables The majority are self-funded Submarine Cables Source : Tim Stronge, Telegeography Almost all new submarine international cable projects are heavily underwritten by content providers, not carriers
- 36. 36 Today’s Internet Internet Governance Access ISP Access ISP Access ISP Access ISP CDN Data Feeds CDN Service Cone Access Network Tier 91% US Internet traffic flows over CDN in 2021 Source: CISCO 資料來源：⿈勝雄博⼠ Source: Juniper
- 37. Transit and Public Policy • If users don’t send packets to users any more • If content is now delivered via CDNs to users via CDN service cone • Then why do we need Transit Service Providers ? • Once the CDN caches sit “inside” the access ISP then the entire wide area network becomes a marginal activity compared to the value of the content feeds • If CDN feeder networks are private networks, there is little residual public carriage other then last mile access networks, then what do we mean by “public communication policy” ? • Public policy : universal service; network neutrality; rights of access; market dominance • How about CDN operators ? 37Internet Governance
- 38. 38 Content is King Internet Governance The world’s 10 largest publicly traded companies, as ranked by their market capitalization. Sep. 2017 ü None of these five technology technology companies are a telephone company, or even a transit ISP ü All of them have pushed aside carriage networks in order to maintain direct relationships with billions of consumers ü These valuable consume relationships are based on content services, not carriage.
- 41. 41Internet Governance Significant Market Power ISP Source: Kenny Huang, Ph.D. CDN CDN CDN Netflix CEO: “Neutrality is really important for the Netflix of 10 years ago, it didn’t matter for the company anymore.”
- 43. Cyber War Case - Afghanistan • Two-way cyber war measures • Cyber offensive capability • Cyber dependence : • Degree to which a nation relies upon cyber-controlled systems • Cyber defensive capability • “We have the most bandwidth running though our society and are more dependent on that bandwidth. We are the most vulnerable.“ – former Admiral McConnell. • Afghanistan 2001 • US had conducted a cyber war plan, but no targets for cyber warriors, that gives Afghanistan an advantage. • If Afghanistan had any offensive cyber capability, the cyber war would have shifted in different way 43
- 44. Cyber War Case - China • Offense vs. defense • US has the most sophisticated offensive capability, but it can’t make up its weaknesses in defensive position. Cyber defense trainings are offensive focus. • China cyber warriors are tasked with both offense and defense in cyberspace. • China advantages in cyber war • Ownership : Internet in China is like an intranet of a company. Government is the only service provider • Censorship • Great Firewall of China provides security advantages • The technology that Chinese use to screen emails/message provide the infrastructure to stop malware • Install software on all computers to keep children from gaining access to pornography – Give China control over every desktop in the country. • Critical infrastructure: For electric power system, US relies on automation controlled system, but China require a large degree of manual control. 44
- 45. Cyber War Strength 45 US Cyber Offense: 8 Cyber Dependence : 2 Cyber Defense: 1 Total : 11 Russia Cyber Offense: 7 Cyber Dependence : 5 Cyber Defense: 4 Total : 16 China Cyber Offense: 5 Cyber Dependence : 4 Cyber Defense: 6 Total : 15 Iran Cyber Offense: 4 Cyber Dependence : 5 Cyber Defense: 3 Total : 12 North Korea Cyber Offense: 2 Cyber Dependence : 9 Cyber Defense: 7 Total : 18 Source:Richard Clarke,2010
- 46. DDoS vs. Cyberwar 46 Cyberwar initiated country Counterpart country Internet DMZ 1. DDoS can only attack DMZ zone. DMZ was built for that purpose. 2. DDoS attacks are compelling. The targets can be easily identified. It gives enemy an advantage of increasing defensive capability, or relaxing cyber dependence.
- 47. OECD 47 Critical Information Infrastructure üInformation components supporting the critical infrastructure üInformation infrastructure supporting essential components of government business üInformation infrastructure essential to the national economy US Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual to the US that the incapacity of destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. EU Directive (EU) 2016/1148 ANNEX II : IXP、Root DNS、TLD Registry 能源 ⽔資源 通訊傳播 交通 ⾦融 醫療 中央地⽅機構 ⾼科技園區 DNS IX Registry CI CII
- 49. Internet Routing Security - Detour 49 A path that originates in one country, cross international boundaries and returns back to origin country
- 50. China Telecom hijacks Verizon Wireless 50 AS 4134 China Telecom AS 7018 AT&T AS 3356 Level 3 AS 2828 X0 Comm. AS 6167 Verizon AS 22394 Verizon 4134, 22724, 22724 66.174.161.0/24 3356, 6167, 22394 66.174.161.0/24 AS 22724 China Telecom Apr, 2010 Prefix Hijacks China Telecom announced 50,000 prefixes (15% routes)
- 52. Why Bother Internet Governance 52 Jurisdiction Law Organization Rules International Law / Treaty Internet Governance Multistakeholder Standard Technology Architecture Policy Procedure Best Practices Cooperation Coordination IG Regime
- 53. Code is Law 53
- 54. Cybersecurity Attributes Recap 54 Confidentiality pPhishing pPacket sniffing pPasswordattack Integrity pMITM (Man-in- The-Middle) pIP spoofing Availability pDDoS pSYN flooding
- 56. Secure Internet Routing - RPKI 56 APNIC 8.0.0/8 Level 3 8.8.8.8/24 Google 66.174.0.0/16 Verizon Wireless 66.174.0.0/24 AS22394 66.174.0.0/16 AS6167 8.0.0.0/9 AS3356 ROA 8.8.8.0/24 AS15169 cert legend PRKI : Resource PublicKey Infrastructure
- 57. Secure Communication : Technology 57 RFC 7457 Summarizing Known Attacks on TransportLayer Security (TLS)and Datagram (DTLS) RFC 2409 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) RFC 3526 More Modular Exponential(MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE) RFC 7258 PervasiveMonitoring Is an Attack RFC 7525 Recommendations for SecureUseofTransport Layer Security (TLS)and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) RFC 4307 CryptographicAlgorithm for Usein the Internet Key ExchangeVersion 2 (IKEv2) Remove support for DH1024 Proposed DH1024 Proposed DH 2048
- 59. Potential Cooperation for Cybersecurity and Internet Governance 59 Case : Crypto–Ransomware Source : EUROPOL
- 62. 62 Scenario 1 : Romania company cooperate Found server is in Germany Second MLAT from French to Germany 5 6 Scenario 2 : Romania company uncooperative, victim of ID theft 5 Source : EUROPOL
- 64. LEA and RIRs Cooperation 64 Question ? ü How can we ensure that IP addresses are announced in the country where they are actually registered? ü Can the RIR database reflect the location of an ISP handling an IP address? Internet Policy Proposal ü Require registration of all IP sub-allocation to downstream ISPs to entire chain of sub-allocations are accurately reflected in WHOIS ü NOT disclose end-user information but instead focus on downstream ISP providing connectivity to the end-user Source : EUROPOL
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- 76. 內容過濾問題 • 網路效能 • 澳洲政府網路效能衰退 2%-75% • 倫理 / ⾔論⾃由 / ⼈權 • 過度過濾 : 錯誤過濾內容 • 2億5000萬網站過度過濾，影響近20億使⽤者 (資料來源 : Pingdom) • 使⽤者仍可使⽤中繼⽅式連網 76Internet Governance 埃及茉莉花⾰命 ⽰威者不滿國家緊急安全法， 公民缺乏⾃由選舉權和⾔論⾃由權
- 77. 內容過濾問題 • 如果每個國家建構⾃⼰的過濾軟體引擎 • 成本⾼、效能低 • 澳洲 : 政府編列4500萬美元預算建構過濾引擎，此政策導致過濾每組 URL 花費成本⾼達 9000 美元 (資料來源 smh.com.au) • 全球性問題 • 網路犯罪、病毒軟體、⾊情內容、賭博、毒品買賣、網路安全 • 是否應該建⽴⼀套全球過濾機制的標準 77Internet Governance
- 79. 79 換位思維: 過濾機制、服務成本與商業模式 Internet Governance 網路服務供應商ISP國內網路 終端接取 設備 終端接取 設備 終端接取 設備 國際⾻幹 設備 過濾成本低 過濾成本⾼ 服務範例：兒少上網 覆蓋範圍：少數簽約⽤⼾ 受益者 ：簽約⽤⼾ 商業模式：使⽤者付費 法律⾵險：低 服務成本：低 服務範例：境外侵權內容 覆蓋範圍：全體境內使⽤者 受益者 ： 智財權⼈ 商業模式： ? 法律⾵險：中 服務成本：中 境外
- 80. 80 導⼊網路治理可能模式 Internet Governance 智財權組織電信公司ISP 通傳會 網路內容治理實驗計畫 合作協議 監理沙盒 豁免權 網路治理 產業⾃律政策 1. 期程短 (6-12⽉) 2. 微量過濾清單 (實驗期程少於10組) 3. 智財權組織提供單⼀窗⼝(電話、網站)服務 4. 智財權組織提供訴願管道與訴願程序
- 83. Data Minimization • The more data are collected, higher are the risks • One should focus on most pertinent data • One should focus on most recent data 83Internet Governance