1. 1
ABSTRACT. How can an SME manage an
internationalization strategy? How can it overcome
obstacles on its growth path? This paper reviews
strategic management theories and applies them to a
specific Belgian SME named “Cockpit Group”. The
Uppsala theory breathes valuable insight into the
internationalization actions of the firm whereas the
analysis of the stages of growth in the company
provides enriching advice for the overcoming of
crises.
KEYWORDS: internationalization, strategy,
management, Belgian, SME, Cockpit Group,
Uppsala theory, growth, crisis.
1. Introduction
It has long been said that SME’s and
entrepreneurs are the engine of our modern
economy. They are sources of innovation,
offer jobs and contribute to the global
economy of countries. But SME’s such as
large or multinational companies face
fierce competition and need to come up
with original strategies in order to maintain
competitive advantages.
Opening up to foreign markets can be a
solution when aiming to remain
economically viable on the long term. The
world we live in is becoming smaller by
the day thanks to the development of new
technologies. Individuals can go from one
part of the world to any other in less than
thirty-six hours. Nevertheless, going
international isn’t a decision that is taken
lightly. Any wrong decision can make the
difference between success and failure and
well thought through strategies have to be
put in place to set a direction for
international projects.
We will start our paper by briefly
explaining the case selection process that
has led us to analyze an SME named
“Cockpit Group”.
We will then continue by analyzing the
internationalization strategy of the
company. The review of two of the
founding theories of internationalization
namely the Uppsala theory and the theory
of networks will precede the illustration of
these two theories with the Cockpit Group
case. We will try to identify the similarities
and differences the theory has with this
practical situation.
We will end the internationalization part of
the paper by identifying key learning point
that need to be taken into account to
successfully undertake the
internationalization processes.
The last section will describe the actions
Cockpit Group has taken to overcome
crises such as a failed internationalization
strategy or a credit crunch. Once again,
theotical frameworks will be used to
analyze the stages of growth in the small
company as well as periods of
development that are surprisingly similar
to potential failure process.
2. Methodology - case selection
2.1 Advantages of case research
Case study reserach offers a more effective
means to finding the causes of
contemporary phenomenons.
Internationalization and the overcoming of
modern crises in SME’s are examples of
contemporary phenomenons that cannot be
explained with an exact science
framework. Case study research manages
to analyze these phenomenons in their real
context (Yin, 1994).
Moreover, this type of analysis gathers
more qualitative information through the
interviewing process of people involved in
the company’s strategy and development.
“Managing an internationalization strategy and
overcoming crises in growth”
Case research on a Belgian SME: Cockpit Group
Université Catholique de Louvain – Strategic management of start-ups
Professor B. Kamp Année académique
2008-2009
Amaku Ubah
Rui Vieira
Grégoire Krieg

2. 2
2.2 Criteria for case selection
SME’s in the high technology and
scientific domains that decide to adopt an
internationalization strategy are plentiful
and increasing in number. We define these
high technological and scientific
companies as the ones who do not only
make heavy use of the latest technology in
their daily operations but who also offer a
product or service whose value is greatly
enhanced by technological features. This
definition is equivalent to companies who
are active, for example, in medical,
pharmaceutical or computer graphic
sectors. We have decided to centre our
research on an SME that is active in a high
technology and scientific sector.
Our second criterion was to select a
company that was relatively young. The
financial crisis has influenced younger
SME’s. Indeed, a Belgian web site
(www.failliteoupas.be) lists the most
recent bankruptcies for Belgian companies
and the majority of them are very young
SME’s.
The size of the company was already
constrained by the fact that the case
analyzes SME’s. Furthermore, the age and
size of the company happen to be
somewhat correlated in our research. The
younger the business is, the smaller its
number of employees. We therefore had a
preference for smaller business and in
particular those that employed fewer than
30 people.
2.3 Filtering SME’s with selection criteria
The Louvain-la-Neuve scientific park
offers a wide array of high technological
and scientific SME’s. Furthermore, our
implication in student organisations has
allowed us to develop a significant social
network. We have managed to establish a
primary list of companies by using both of
these channels:
1. Atypic (design and advertisement
with computer graphics)
2. Netway (applied behavioural
sciences)
3. IBA (medical, cancer treatment
and engineering consultancy)
4. Aepodia (pharmaceutical)
5. Cockpit Group (performance
measurement)
6. SunSwitch (solar panels)
The age and size criteria eliminated IBA
and SunSwitch.
2.4 Choice of the company
The final stage of our selection process
proved to be easier than expected. We
decided to choose the company according
to our personal knowledge of them. For
example, our participation in events where
the founders of these companies presented
their business concepts and strategies of
development proved helpful for striking a
final decision. Cockpit Group’s CEO
Grégoire Talbot presented the company’s
evolution and business model in late
October 2008 in front of a class of students
mastering in innovation. He explained his
internationalization strategy and the
actions he would consider taking to
eventually overcome the financial crisis.
His oral presentation was convincing,
original and interesting. These were the
decisive reasons for the selection of
Cockpit Group as our Belgian SME used
for our case analysis in this paper.
2.5 Cockpit Group
The company’s mission is to “improve
performance by providing management
with performance measurement processes
& tools, supporting them in their decision
making process based on visual Key
Performance Indicators (KPI’s)” (Talbot,
2008).

3. 3
The company offers organisations a
solution to three needs (Talbot, 2009):
1. Structuring information: a company is
confronted with masses of information,
which adds complexity to the
measurement of its performance and
decision making process.
2. Breeding enthusiasm in employees:
visual and aesthetic tools offer people a
more dynamic process to decision
making and they eventually become
more implicated and passionate about
the company’s development. This can
lead to better communication and team
spirit within the organisation.
3. Cost reduction: better measurement of
performance through the definition of
cost centres and working capital
deviations, which leads to an improved
management of a cost reduction action
plan and in fine higher margins.
The company offers a tailored service and
not just a product. Although marketing
tools emphasize Cockpit Group’s visual
KPI’s and “war rooms” (an image this
room in appendix 3), they are but the result
of a significant collaborative service with
the client. An example of the methodology
carried out in the development of a project
with its client is given in appendix 4.
The organisation creates value through
marketing & events, sales & delivery and
partnership & technology. These three
primary activities greatly influence its
competitive advantage. Furthermore,
Cockpit Group benefits from its current
notoriety with multinational clients like
Chiquita, Siemens or Lego.
Founded by neurosurgeon and Professor
Patrick M. Georges, the company was
bought by Grégoire Talbot in July of 2004.
The latter left his job as a strategic
consultant at IBM where he had gained a
great deal of experience on KPI’s. He
wished to fully focus on the organisation’s
growth and he decided to prioritize the
internationalization of the “Management
Cockpit” concept.
Further information on the company’s
business concept and its clients can be
found in appendices 3 and 4, respectively.
3. Internationalization
3.1 Theoretic overview
We can find a large number of theories
explaining the internationalization process
of SME’s through reviewing different
scientific articles. Nevertheless, we’ll
focus on two of these theories which are
the “Uppsala model” and the “theory of
networks” because we feel that they
illustrate best the case of Cockpit Group.
a. Johanson’s Uppsala Model
(Johanson, 2006)
One of the first theories of
internationalization of SME’s was
proposed by Johanson and Vahlne in their
paper: “The internationalization process of
the firm - a model of knowledge
development and increasing foreign market
commitments”. In this paper, it’s stipulated
that a firm’s internationalization is a
sequential process done in the four steps
that are illustrated hereunder:

4. 4
Step 1: National Company
At this stage, the firm operates exclusively
in its own country. Everything from
production to sales is locally done.
Step 2: Exports through independent
agents
Here, the internationalization slowly
begins. The firm starts to export its product
through agents that usually don’t work for
the company. In other words an
intermediary is used for this process. We
notice here that the importance is set on
reducing risks as much as possible. By
going through an independent agent, the
firm can benefit from an expertise it
doesn’t have yet.
Step 3: implementing a sales subsidiary
At this stage, the firm has loyal clients
based in the foreign country it exported to
in the second stage. It’s the first step of a
physical implementation in the foreign
country. A sale subsidiary is planted
abroad yet production is still done at a
local level.
Step 4: Producing in a foreign country
This is the last step of the
internationalization process. The firm is
finally implanted in the foreign country.
All the steps in the value chain that the
firm is responsible of have been exported.
The firm here has become international.
Johanson and Vahlne describe
internationalization as being a slow process
where the firm increases its international
involvement gradually. For the firm to
move from one step to another, the
previous step must be completed first. The
two researchers talk about the importance
of knowledge and more importantly,
market knowledge. The higher the market
knowledge is, the deeper the market
commitment can be. Two kinds of
knowledge are distinguished:
 Objective knowledge: this is simple
to obtain. It can be done by collection
data and information concerning the
partners and the foreign market.
 Experiential knowledge: this
knowledge is learned from
experiences and cannot easily be
thought or transmitted.
The “Uppsala theory” explains that the
firm will firstly export to countries that are
psychically close to its own. This means
that the cultural distances are not very
high. In other words, the objective
knowledge is quite important or can easily
be obtained.
Once a firm has gone through the four
steps of the internationalization, it repeats
the same process when expanding to
another country. The speed this time is
done at a faster pace because the level of
experiential knowledge is higher. This
process goes on and on with other
expansions and every time at a quicker
pace.
b. The theory of networks
The “Theory of networks” complements
“the Uppsala theory” by making it more
compatible with new international ventures
(NIV). It gives a more precise indication
on the reasons that firms try to
internationalize themselves. Authors that
have worked on this theory are Autio,
Sapienza and Zahra (2000). By using
different factors such as networks,
knowledge and resources, they try to
understand and measure those that are
relevant to the speed or level of
internationalization.
The “theory of networks” focuses on the
interactions a company has within its
environment, and by paying a more
specific attention to the social exchanges

5. 5
that exist. This can be done on a
microeconomic level by analyzing the
interactions between the firm and other
firms or on a macroeconomic level by
analyzing the interactions between the firm
and the organization within which it
performs.
A company willing to export itself into a
foreign country will learn to do this step by
step through the experiences it gets from
being in contact with other firms and actors
in the network. The network can thus be
used as a tool to minimize uncertainties of
the internationalization process and is at
the same time a source for finding new
international opportunities.
Based on this, Johanson in cooperation
with Mattson, created an analytical tool
that proposes an internationalization model
that takes the network into consideration
(Bigler, 2006). This is done by relating the
level of internationalization of the firm to
the level of internationalization of the
market.
Low
international
experiences
High
international
experiences
Low
internationalization
of the market
« early
starter »
« lonely
international »
High
internationalization
of the market
« late
starter »
« international
among others »
“Early starters” are firms that have very
little international experience and operate
in a market where internationalization is
not very common. These firms tend to
follow the traditional Uppsala theory by
following the four steps mentioned above.
“Lonely internationals” are firms which
already benefit from considerable
international experiences whereas the
markets they are on are not yet very
international. This strategy can offer a
competitive advantage in most cases.
“Late starters” are active on a high
internationalized market but have very low
international experiences. According to the
theory of networks, this enables them to
benefit from clients and suppliers that have
a more global way of operating which
ultimately pushes the firm to enter on the
global market.
“Internationals among others” are firms
with high international experiences that
operate on highly international markets.
3.2 The internationalization of Cockpit
Group
a. Reasons to go international
The Cockpit Group service was and
remains a new, thrilling and innovative
concept in the actual international market.
Their offer had no precedent before and it
was clear during company presentations
that their service was unheard of but
nevertheless extremely useful and value
adding. The market of strategic
management Cockpit operates on was in
need of innovation. As first movers,
competition was inexistent and the market
size was important on a national scale as
well as on an international level. The
principal of “Cockpit management” can be
used for all types of organizational
structures ranging from NGO’s to SME’s
and multinational companies (MNC’s) as
long as there’s a long term strategy needed.
The untapped potential for the company
was thus enormous.
By being the first to introduce this idea in
the market, the company had the advantage
of getting a high level of expertise. In
addition to this, an important advantage
they had was to focus only on improving
the company’s strategic management
which positioned them as specialist in this
field. However, the competition is catching
up quite rapidly with the company and so
it’s of the upmost importance for Cockpit
Group to remain innovative in their
processes and activities.

6. 6
What we basically notice is that the
potential to develop is immense and going
international is very important to secure
new markets and shake off the upcoming
competition. This process will also be
facilitated through clients that operate on
foreign markets.
b. Actions towards internationalization
Grégoire Talbot (actual CEO of Cockpit
Group) took advantage of a once in a
lifetime opportunity and took over the
company in 2004, for the symbolical price
of one euro. However, he knew that the
company had a negative debt balance and
would have to do some restructuring
before beginning to grow.
His priorities were to put the company on
the right track. Global strategies were set
up, goals were defined and an overall
direction was now noticeable at Cockpit
Group. By defining the core of the firm
and gradually paying back the debt of the
company, Grégoire Talbot was now ready
to start developing the firm by taking over
the high potential market.
By the end of 2004, the company was
starting to get back on the right track.
During these first months an important
client database was beginning to set itself
up nationally as well as internationally
with clients like Thai Airways mainly
through the network of contacts of the
CEO. We will later on see that this
network is going to be important for
Cockpit Group to concretize its
internationalization intentions in the future.
However, at this point in time Grégoire
Talbot was more worried about
establishing himself nationally to
strengthen the company.
By the end of 2005, the company was
healthy and growing on both national and
international levels. More employees were
hired to help manage the new clients.
Furthermore, during this year the company
signed some international contracts, like
for example, ING Lux. Once again, these
came as a result of his network of contacts.
However, at this point all the international
operations were made from the
headquarters in Belgium, forcing Grégoire
Talbot and his management team to travel
regularly to clients locations and visit them
to help solve their problems. We can
conclude that this kind of behaviour was
expensive.
These expenses were justified because the
company needed to have a human contact
with the client. The service requires
constant communication between both
entities to forge a common understanding
of the problem and for Cockpit Group to
offer concrete ways of dealing with these
issues.
The internationalization according to the
Uppsala Model
During the initial two years, Cockpit
Group goes through a few steps of
Johanson’s Uppsala Model. The firm starts
out like most others as being a national
company and only operates on the Belgian
market. The intention of going
international arose in 2006 and the
resources had to be put into place to
facilitate this process. Therefore, in 2006,
an internationalization development plan
was justified and started to be prepared
within the company. Grégoire Talbot hired
people with the required skills, consulting
and sales skills; he duplicated his staff, and
welcomed a senior team inside the
company. In addition, he made a capital
injection into the company to finance the
internationalization goals he wanted to
reach. As the company was witnessing an
important growth at the same time, the
organisational structure had to be
reviewed. A middle management was
implemented and he appointed three
managers to handle the international

7. 7
market, one in each market, France,
Switzerland and Singapore.
These three countries were on the top of
the internationalization plan list because
the company already had clients based
there. At the second stage of the Uppsala
Model, the services were offered to
international clients through agents.
Although not all of them were independent
this process fits the sequential
internationalization process so far.
Nevertheless, entering these markets isn’t
very obvious at first hand. Getting
contracts was done through the hard work
of the salesmen hired but the continuous
expansion in these countries couldn’t be
done without the help of the networks that
were being setup. In countries such as
France where the mentality is very
arrogant and close-minded, Grégoire
Talbot managed to sign huge contracts
with companies such as Accor by being
able to enter networks like ENA. This
obviously creates a reputation and Cockpit
Group had the potential to be a reference to
other potential clients.
The motivations to expand to Asia were
aroused by an investor whom had lived and
worked in Singapore for several years. He
was very knowledgeable about the culture
and had an objective overview of the
market potential. This investor also
detained a strong and powerful network of
contacts that he had build all throughout
his years living there, so the opportunity
seemed to be up for grabs. At this period,
lots of companies were finding success in
exporting themselves to Singapore which
was considered as the place to be. In
addition, Cockpit Group had experienced
successful deal with Thai Airways.
The third step of the Uppsala model cannot
be clearly identified in the case of Cockpit
Group. This is also because “Cockpit
Management” is a strategic service that has
to be developed in the headquarters of the
company before being sold anywhere else.
The result of this internationalization
investment was very profitable in
Switzerland and Luxembourg, where the
company gained clientele. The main reason
for the positive reaction was that the
manager responsible for developing the
company on the Swiss market had the right
skills to sell and to manage the clients with
success. Regarding Luxembourg, the “old”
clients offered them opportunities to meet
new clients and enrich their network of
contacts. All the Luxembourg operations
remained under the responsibility of the
Belgium office.
In France the close-minded market was a
difficult obstacle to overcome for the
manager responsible there. However, the
results were more than satisfactory and the
company signed a few new contracts. As
explained by Grégoire Talbot, France is a
difficult market to exploit as a foreigner
because you can only catch the attention of
company CEO’s by belonging to close
formal social networks, which sometimes
are difficult to enter.
The company finally finds itself in the last
stage of the Uppsala model when it builds
its offices in France and Switzerland and
runs operations from there. Having gone
through the whole cycle, the process can
now potentially be repeated from these
offices towards other foreign countries.
Even though the internationalization
strategy delivered good results in Europe
the same couldn’t be said about the Asian
market where Cockpit Group was
struggling to take off. The results were less
exciting and the Thai Airways client
continued to be managed from Belgium.
In Singapore, Cockpit Group didn’t
manage to close deals with new clients.
The results were poor and Grégoire Talbot
attributed the reasons of this failure to the
misunderstanding of the product by the
market as well as the failure of Cockpit

8. 8
Group to understand the cultural values of
the market.
Analyzing the results, Grégoire Talbot
made some simple conclusions. Each
market is specific and unique, with their
values and modes of operation as well as
the entering mode. It’s thus not only
important to have a network that can be
relied upon but it is also very crucial to
have some cross cultural knowledge and
flexibility when developing a company on
foreign markets.
As explained by Johanson and Vahlne,
firms tend to internationalize themselves to
countries that have a close psychic
distance. The reason this is done is because
they have a better understanding of the
culture and habits in these countries. They
are basically able to acquire objective
knowledge on these countries quite easily
and minimize the risks on exporting
themselves there. Venturing into the Asian
market wasn’t so easy because the psychic
distance was too great. The culture
couldn’t be correctly identified too and the
experiential knowledge wasn’t important
enough to explore such different markets at
such a moment in time.
The internationalization according to the
Theory of Networks
The countries Cockpit group
internationalized itself towards were not
chosen randomly. In France, the company
had already worked with big companies
such as Accor and Suez. This enabled them
to have a certain level of credibility on this
market and eased the process of
internationalization. The same went for the
Swiss markets where contacts and clients
were able to support the
internationalization of Cockpit Group.
Similarly, an investor was used to support
the implantation on the Asian market but
his contacts and knowledge were not
enough to successfully complete this.
According to the tool developed by
Johanson and Matson, Cockpit Group can
be categorized as an “early starter”. The
“Cockpit Management” sector is not very
notorious and still in development.
Companies competing with Cockpit Group
aren’t significantly internationalized and
the strategy of going abroad can become a
huge competitive advantage for anyone
who moves first. Moreover, the company
has a low internationalization experience.
Everything was learned on the spot during
the first international projects.
Future internationalization
Having the European business covering the
damages endured in Asia, the year of 2007
was not very good for the company who
made notorious losses. Following this
scenario, Grégoire Talbot only had one
choice to make which was to abandon the
Asian expansion at the end of 2007. This
was a very difficult decision for Grégoire
Talbot like he said in the interview, but it
needed to be done.
However, in Europe, the
internationalization strategy was being
profitable in terms of new contracts.
In 2008, Grégoire Talbot and his
management team decided to have another
increase in capital to reach a more financial
equilibrium inside the company, but at the
end of 2008 the effects of the financial
crisis started to be felt and Grégoire Talbot
with his senior team had to lay off some
personnel to avoid entering the red and
keep a financially stable company.
Nowadays, the internationalization strategy
is more “quiet” and the company is more
focused on surviving through this
economical crisis.

9. 9
Lessons learned from internationalization
experience
From the internationalization to Singapore,
Grégoire Talbot learned from some
mistakes he made there. First, he was
having a very speedy internationalization
strategy as he tried to reach different
markets in different locations in a short
period of time.
Also, in Singapore, he felt that the product
was never really understood by the
companies. The cultural and market values
were different from European values,
which created additional obstacles for the
company.
The fact that each market is different and
unique was also experienced in France by
Grégoire Talbot. He realized that the entry
mode to the French market was completely
different from the Belgian or Swiss market.
To have the opportunity of selling their
concept to a CEO in France, Cockpit
Group had to mainly pass through a formal
network of contacts.
After witnessing the success in Switzerland
and the failure in Singapore, Grégoire
Talbot now realized that personality,
consulting and sales skills are very
important for a Cockpit manager. Even
though it is a consulting service that
Cockpit is selling, it’s very important to
also have savvy selling skills and a strong
network of contacts.
Human contact with clients is extremely
important for the company. The reason for
this is because it’s very difficult to deal
with clients that have unexpected
problems. Therefore it’s required to have a
manager near the client’s location. To
address this problem, in 2006, Grégoire
Talbot appointed managers to some
specific areas, giving them an office inside
the targeted market.
Building the right senior team and
appointing the right managers to very
important and specific tasks is never easy.
That is the why partners should be selected
carefully. If the manager or employee
doesn’t yield the results that were expected
of him then the CEO will go through the
painful experience of laying off these
partners. It can be very difficult
emotionally and sometimes financially for
the company, seeing at some point in time
dreams and visions for the company had
been shared with them.
After reflection, Cockpit Group realized
that a “tache d’huile” internationalization
strategy would be most adequate. This
would be done by starting to develop a
strategy from Belgium and exporting it in
countries having similar cultural values but
also customer and market behaviors like
for example, the Netherlands or Germany.
These countries fit the description and
would prove to be very high potential as
well. The reasons these markets were
unexploited was because of the lack of
time and resources at disposal and also the
lack of personnel inside the company that
detains a good network of contacts in those
countries.
4. Overcoming crises in growth
4.1 Measuring the growth of the company
Thanks to its internationalization, Cockpit
Group has experienced an overall steady
growth from 2004 till the financial crisis in
2008. This growth can be measured by
these figures:
 Volume: the annual turnover
increased from 30K€ in 2004 to
roughly 2.5M€ in 2008 (Talbot,
2008). The EBIT has also known a
steady growth except for 2007 where
the internationalization strategy cost
more than expected.
 Employment: the number of
personnel has risen from 4 in 2004 to
25 in 2008.

10. 10
Another means of measuring growth is
through the analysis of the company’s
entity ownership (Kamp, 2009). However
Cockpit Group has not focused on
external growth through acquisitions and
mergers and this measure is therefore
irrelevant.
4.2 Identifying the stages of growth of the
company
For this analysis, we will mainly refer to
the first two stages of growth in small
businesses (Kamp, 2009). The latter three
stages (delegation, coordination,
collaboration) were not analysed because
they had no significant comparative points
to the case research.
The diagram above exposes the four
critical moments of the company’s
development since its creation.
a. A ‘balanced entrepreneur’(2004)
The arrival of Grégoire Talbot can
undeniably be seen as the catalyst of
growth for Cockpit Group. Despite great
technical and creative talents, his
predecessor was not able to overcome a
lack of marketing, sales and leadership
skills.
This moment can be seen as a crisis
because the organisation was falling into
bankruptcy. However it ended up being the
real kick off the start up needed to grow.
An important page of the company was
turned when Professor Georges, creator of
the “Management Cockpit” concept,
accepted Grégoire Talbot’s offer to
become the main proprietor and CEO of
N.E.T Research (name of the company at
that period of time). He also agreed to the
commercialization of his concept by Talbot
in exchange of royalties.
In the end of 2004, the newly proclaimed
CEO of N.E.T Research was only 28 years
old. Despite his young age, he held a
wealth of knowledge and experience
thanks to his academic and professional
life (for more information on Grégoire
Talbot’s biography, see appendix 1).
On the one hand, he brought direction to
the company. He made his intentions clear
right from the start: N.E.T Research was to
become an international company (Talbot,
2008). Moreover, he conceived a more
structured and controlled organisation with
more transparent and rigorous management
of financial and administrative tasks.
On the other hand, he brought a substantial
amount of creativity, which gave the
company an entrepreneurial orientation.
The entity quickly became pro-active,
innovative and risk-taking, which complies
with the definition of a business that
detains an entrepreneurial orientation
(Wiklund, 2007). Grégoire Talbot’s efforts
were huge and consisted of travelling to
clients to sell his concept, hiring of
employees and making decisions for the
development of the company. His dynamic
attitude was crucial in making the small
business pro-active. He managed to bring
great creativity through the combination of
his knowledge in business and engineering
and the result was a more effective selling
technique through a tailored consultancy
process. He later made the right choice of
drivers for his competitive advantage with,
for example, the use of the notoriety that
the “Cockpit Management” concept had
already acquired. He also had leadership

11. 11
skills, which played an important role in
motivating his future employees.
His contributions to the direction and
creativity of the company made him a
‘balanced entrepreneur’.
b. Internationalization development
(2006)
This moment marked an increase in capital
of 450K€, whose main purpose was to fuel
the organisation’s internationalization
strategy.
Up to this point in time, the company
experienced a high growth with the annual
turnover jumping to 1,2M€ and the number
of personnel climbing to 14 (Talbot, 2008).
The exponential growth was mainly
explained by the organisation’s creativity.
Indeed, communication was very much
informal with employees regularly talking
to each other as well as sharing ideas. The
amount of effort was well above the
remuneration that the CEO offered himself
at first. The company’s drive was very
much focused on a single person and
charismatic leader: Grégoire Talbot.
The end of 2006 therefore created change
in the company but it was not due to a
crisis. It was destined to boost Cockpit
Group’s internationalization strategy. The
result was a switch to a company that
would grow through direction. Middle
management was hired to support the
strategy. As the number of personnel stood
at 14, the CEO felt it was time for an
improvement in the organisational
structure. A 3-level hierarchy was put in
place and comprised of the CEO, middle
management and the employees. It meant
that the company’s leadership was less
person based. More professional business
techniques for various tasks were used in
the company and communication became
more formal. Grégoire Talbot recalls the
change (see Appendix 1) as he says he
started to rely more on communicating
with his employees through e-mail with,
for example, regular updates on the
company’s general situation. We can also
observe that the number of employees
continued to increase up to the financial
crisis where the maximum it had reached
was 25.
c. Internationalization crisis (2007)
The failure of internationalizing to Asia
would prove to be the company’s first real
crisis under Grégoire Talbot.
Description of the implications of this
crisis can be found in the
internationalization section of this paper.
From a growth’s perspective, the
company’s annual turnover and the number
of personnel still grew steadily whereas the
margins plumeted to a total loss of 180K€
in 2007.
d. Financial crisis (2008)
The credit crunch hit Cockpit Group hard
in late 2008. The consequences were:
 A reduction of clients’ budget: out of
the 30 clients, 25 were in private
sectors that were negatively influenced
by the crisis. The demand of the
clients’ products has decreased heavily
and with the panic surrounding the
drop of share prices, they reduced their
budget. This had the direct effect of an
important drop in turnover of the 3rd
quarter 2008 for Cockpit Group. All
projects they were working on were
stopped.
 Quick Loss: since they are an SME that
invests a large constant amount in
human capital (salaries for an
employee can be estimated at
10000€/month including salary,
transport, accommodation costs when

12. 12
seeing the client abroad), when
turnover starts to fall, the company
quickly makes a loss.
 Loss of line of credit: a line of credit
can be seen as a protection for when a
company experiences large costs and
needs cash. Grégoire Talbot’s banker
called him to say that they could no
longer offer him a credit line. So that
was one airbag that could help
overcome the crisis that had suddenly
popped.
The CEO had prepared himself to this
eventual recession of the economy and
here are the actions he took to overcome it:
 He put pressure on clients to pay him
and he paid employees later than
expected
 He decided to lay off several
employees: the consultants who had the
most problems in selling the service
were laid off. Salesmen that had been
hired in France and Switzerland were
told that they could continue working
for the business but only as
independent workers without a fixed
salary. There were 25 workers for
Cockpit Group in October 2008 and
there are currently 18
 He says that he has now adopted a zero
error tolerance stance with his
employees and the company has
increased its focus on efficiency. This
is an important characteristic of the
direction growth stage of a small
business (Kamp, 2009).
 He changed the organizational
structure: he decided to lay off a
manager. He put the manager who had
the most capabilities in consulting and
sales head of all the teams who were on
a project. He put the other manager in
charge of more the technical aspects of
the service.
 Marketing: he adapted his product and
his message to the market. Today his
message is “what are the 20
performance indicators that a company
absolutely needs to get through the
crisis?” (See Appendix 5).
There were also potential actions that the
CEO could have used but in the end he
decided not to. They are:
 Simple loans (client, supplier, solicitor,
etc.)
 Convertible debt: a loan that can be
turned into equity as the compny
grows. It is generally converted upon
the occurrence of future financing. It
was the tool all the companies were
using to tackle the crisis; the board of
directors had agreed that it was a good
solution. However, in the end, the
adminstrative paperwork was too much
of a hassle compared to the benefit that
could be gained from it.
4.3 Identifying the company’s profile of
failure process
This identification and comparison tries to
establish potential links between Cockpit
Group’s evolution and the four different
types of failure processes determined by
Ooghe (2006).
a. Start up company bankruptcy
Prior to Grégoire Talbot’s arrival, N.E.T
research was heading for bankruptcy. The
company was characterized by a CEO who
held a deficiency in managerial skills.
Grégoire Talbot on the other hand had
gained a tremendous amount of business
knowledge on KPI’s in his work
experience with IBM. It proved to be a key
factor in turning the company’s fortunes
around.

13. 13
The company also lacked a stable and
transparent operational structure. Grégoire
Talbot brought a more efficient and clear
way of managing the financial and
administrative structure.
It is fair to say that the current CEO of the
company saved it from going bankrupt in
2004.
b. Ambitious growth company
Cockpit Group can be associated to a
certain degree to the process of failure of
an ambitious growth company the moment
it felt the consequences of its failed
internationalization strategy to Asia (see
point c. of growth stage).
Grégoire Talbot took a too big of a risk by
investing rapidly and even carelessly on
the Asian market. Due to not only over-
optimism but also inadequate information,
the predicted sales were never met and the
company quickly became vulnerable to
bankruptcy as all the cash that was created
from profitable projects in Europe was
being drained into the Asian market. The
loss of 2007 proved to be discouraging,
especially when Grégoire Talbot’s banker
decided to value his company according to
its profitability.
However, the CEO had assembled a
motivated team and could count on them to
continue reaping benefits in European
countries’ markets. His decision to
abandon the Asian market in 2007 was
necessary. If he had decided to develop a
recovery plan, then he would have been
vulnerable to the credit crunch the next
year. This threat of the environment would
have proved a lot harder to tackle if not
deadly for Cockpit Group, had Grégoire
Talbot not left the Asian market.
c. Lessons learned to protect company
against potential failure process
We believe that Cockpit Group’ current
situation cannot be associated to any as a
potential failure process.
The company has managed to escape two
potential bankruptcies because of two
reasons.
The first is the CEO’s “entrepreneurial
balance” that allows him to have not only
entrepreneurial skills but also managerial
skills.
The second is the CEO’s new found
methodology that has been in part insipired
from the failure of internationalization to
Asia. His methodology can be explained in
three steps:
Step1: Gathering of information to forge
own opinion
The CEO reads on the current and future
economic situation. For example, in
prevision to the financial crisis, he read a
book in March 2008 and believed the
authors’ insight was right. It ended up
being true and allowed Grégoire Talbot to
make the right decisions at the right time.
Step 2: He asks for advice from trusted
sources
He asks for advice from smart and
experienced people on his board of
directors as well as University Professors.
He takes their opinions into consideration
for his strategy.
Step 3: Preparing for the worst case
scenario
He takes actions to prepare for the worst
case scenario. He is very prudent. He has
learnt to cool down his “wanting too much
too fast” entrepreneurial spirit and is now
adopting a prudent mentality.
This methodology has been crucial in
Cockpit Group’s survival of the credit
crunch.

14. 14
Two additional reasons have been learnt
when tackling the financial crisis and they
are explained as follows:
 A climate of consciousness: months
before the crises exploded, the CEO
made the employees become conscious
of the difficult times ahead and that the
company needed them to be
determined and focused in order to get
through the crisis.
 Being aware of opportunities: threats in
the environment bring about new
opportunities. The financial crises
brought about the opportunity for
Cockpit Group to sell a tool and
process, which offers aid in tackling
the credit crunch.
5. Limitation
It was decided to not carry out a
comparison of Cockpit Group with SME’s
from the same industry or sector. Although
this analysis could have brought additional
insight on Cockpit Group’s situation and
sharing, the comparison was not done
because of these two reasons:
 We believe that Cockpit Group holds
characteristics that are very specific
and unique, which makes a sectoral
comparison less pertinent. Indeed, the
company has very few competitors that
are as specialized in the domain of
performance measurement where
Cockpit Group has positioned itself.
Furthermore, the company is not only a
first mover but it has also known a
radical change of orientation due to the
arrival of a “balanced entrepreneur” in
Grégoire Talbot. This renewal has
given the company a competitive
advantage as it has gained in direction,
control and innovation.
 The second reason is due to our
decision of scope for this work. We
believed that a sectoral comparison
would eventually slow down an in
depth analysis of Cockpit Group’s
situation and strategy.
Nevertheless, we welcome any scientific
research that will establish a comparison of
Cockpit Group’s case with potential
competitors in its sector. It will not only be
beneficial for the company but also for
SME’s that face the same environment and
crises that this company has encountered.
6. Conclusion
Cockpit Group lived up to our expectations
of a company that was not only interesting
to analyze but that would also be enriching
to compare with theoretical tools learned
during our academic curriculum.
On the French and Swiss markets, the
company has fulfilled the cycle of the
Uppsala model and the offices in these
countries can be used to repeat the process
to neighbouring countries. The failed
internationalization in Asia showed that
cross cultural understanding and flexibility
are two crucial drivers of a successful
internationalization strategy.
According to the theory of networks,
Cockpit Group can be categorized as an
“early starter”.
The analysis of the growth stages in a
small business has portrayed Cockpit
Group as having passed through the
creativity stage and is currently located on
the direction stage of the growth path. Four
significant events in time marked the
evolution of the organisation. The first
refers to the change of CEO’s and Grégoire
Talbot’s actions to save the company from
the start up bankruptcy profile. The second
relates to the actions took to fuel the
internationalization strategy in 2006 and
marked the crossing from growth through
creativity to growth through direction. The
third was the internationalization failure in
Asia, which placed the company on the
process of bankruptcy for ambitious

15. 15
growth companies. The company would
have gone bankrupt had Grégoire Talbot
not decided to quit the Asian market and
keep a motivated team focused on reaping
benefits from the European market as well
as overcoming the financial crisis. The
latter crisis is the fourth event and it has
caused Cockpit Group to lay off several
employees, restructure and adopt an
extremely prudent approach to
internationalization.
Acknowledgements
We would like to finish our paper by
thanking Grégoire Talbot for his time and
support because without his valuable
contribution, none of this analysis would
have been possible. We would also like to
thank Professor Bart Kamp for giving us
the opportunity to understand the work and
effort that goes into the composition of a
scientific article.
References
Autio, E., Sapienza, H.J., Almeida, J.G., 2000, ‘ Effects of age at
entry, knowledge intensity and imitability on international
growth.’, Academic Management. Journal, 43 (5), 909–924.
Bigler, J-M., Nyffelen, N., 2006, « Processus d’internatio-
nalisation de la PME : la nécessité d’une approche
intégrative », 8ième
édition du CIFEPME, Fribourg, P.10.
Johanson, J., Vahlne, J.E, 2006, ‘Commitment and
Opportunity Development in the Internationalization Process:
A Note on the Uppsala Internationalization Process Model’,
Management International Review.
Kamp, B., 2009, “Growth management of small businesses”,
Strategic management of strat-ups course.
Ooghe, H., De Prijcker, S., 2006, ‘Failure processes and causes
of company bankruptcy: atypology”, Vlerick Leuven Gent
Working Paper series 2006/21
Talbot, G., 2008, Presentation slides for
‘Innovation Mangement’ class given by Professor B. Gailly,
Louvain-la-Neuve.
Talbot, G., 2009, Presentation slides “Pilotage en temps de
crise” for ‘Cercle du Lac’.
Wiklund, J., Holger, P., Dean, S.A., 2007, ‘Building an integr-
ative model of small business growth’, Small Business
Economics,
Yin, R.K., 1994. ‘Case Study Research Design and Methods’
Sage Publications, London.

16. 16
Appendices
Appendix 1 : Entretien avec Grégoire
Talbot (CEO Cockpit Group) le mercredi
29 avril 2009
1. Renseignements généraux sur
Cockpit Group
 Pouvez-vous nous introduire
brièvement à votre carrière ?
J’ai fait des études d’ingénieur civil à
Louvain-la-Neuve. Je suis parti aux Etats-
Unis pendant un an (ndlr : il était au MIT à
Boston où il a travaillé avec l’entreprise
Aspentech en tant qu’ingénieur) et puis je
suis revenu en Belgique où j’ai travaillé
pour IBM pendant 5 ans. J’étais consultant
en stratégie et balance scorecard chez IBM
et c’est là que j’ai tout appris sur les
indicateurs de performance. En 2004, j’ai
fait un executive MBA à Solvay et j’ai
rencontré le professeur Georges qui m’a
proposé de reprendre la direction de son
entreprise qui était autour du concept
« management cockpit » qu’il avait créé. Il
s’agit de mettre en place des salles qui
permettent de présenter des indicateurs de
performance. En 2004, je négociais avec le
professeur en lui disant que j’étais
d’accord de reprendre sa société à
condition d’en devenir un actionnaire
majoritaire. J’ai donc repris 75% de
l’entreprise et je me suis mis en tête de la
relancer, de l’internationaliser et
d’industrialiser le concept pour le rendre
plus accessible pour les patrons
d’entreprises.
On a donc réussi à construire un concept
qui fonctionnait bien et qui répondait à un
besoin réel du marché. Petit à petit,
l’entreprise a grandi en Belgique en
signant quelques contrats à l’étranger : un à
Paris avec le groupe Accor et deux ou trois
contrats en Suisse avec des petites
entreprises. Ensuite, j’ai fait une grosse
augmentation de capital en 2006 dans le
but d’internationaliser la société. Donc les
deux premières années étaient plutôt des
années de nettoyage de la société. J’ai mis
au point une stratégie, j’ai construit une
équipe de 8 personnes et j’ai essayé d’avoir
une bonne petite croissance. J’ai donc
vraiment construit une petite société qui
était capable de s’internationaliser juste
après.
 Quelle était la mission du professeur
Georges avant votre reprise de N.E.T
Research/Cockpit Group ? Est-ce qu’il
avait une stratégie
d’internationalisation ?
Il n’avait pas du tout de stratégie
d’internationalisation. Lui, il avait une
société en faillite virtuelle. J’ai racheté son
entreprise à un euro symbolique mais qui
avait 100.000/150.000€ de dettes. Je
n’avais pas d’argent et je trouvais que
c’était une opportunité rêvée pour moi de
reprendre une société en payant par des
dettes que j’ai remboursées petit à petit. Le
professeur Georges vendait sa personne.
Lui et N.E.T Research n’étaient qu’une
seule personne à l’époque. Les clients
achetaient pour le professeur Georges et il
avait fait des gros coups dans le passé mais
c’était toujours des « one-shots ». Il
n’existait pas de stratégie avec de la
récurrence et du business long terme. Il ne
gérait l’entreprise qu’à mi-temps parce que
l’autre moitié du temps il le consacrait à la
chirurgie.

17. 17
 Vous considérez que quand Cockpit
Group/N.E.T research a débuté, c’était
une entreprise qui avait un service
innovant par rapport à la
concurrence ?
A l’époque le concept « Management
Cockpit » était incroyable et les personnes
présentes à nos conférences étaient
éblouies. Aujourd’hui, 60-70% des gens
ont déjà entendu parler du concept et ceci
est à cause du fait que globalement le
besoin du marché a augmenté, l’avancée de
la « business intelligence» et pas seulement
à cause de Cockpit Group. Il s’agit d’une
évolution naturelle des tableaux de bord.
On reste aujourd’hui les meilleurs et les
plus innovants dans ce domaine de
nouvelle génération de tableaux de bords.
Mais la concurrence nous rattrape et il
nous arrive d’aller chez un client et de voir
qu’un de nos concurrents lui a proposé le
même concept avec nos images, nos
références, etc.
 A partir de quel moment est ce que
vous avez été rentable ?
Il faut bien distinguer la rentabilité et la
capacité de remboursement. On a été très
rentable dès le début sauf en 2007. En
2007, on a fait des grosses pertes suite à
l’internationalisation.
En 2006, j’ai engagé des gens de
gement, des niveaux supérieurs
pour internationaliser. J’ai engagé
une personne pour développer la
Suisse, une personne pour
développer la France et on a lancé
une filiale à Singapour. J’étais
d’ailleurs venu chez Benoît Gailly
pour expliquer la stratégie
d’internationalisation.
Les résultats ont été assez divers. La
grande conclusion que j’ai tirée de cette
expérience d’internationalisation c’est que
cela ne dépend que d’une chose : la
personnalité du gars que j’envoie pour
développer un marché à l’étranger. Notre
métier c’est de vendre la capacité de mettre
en œuvre un tableau de bord. Certains
employés ont été bons à ce métier et
d’autres moins bons. La consultance est un
métier particulier qui demande une
méthode de vente particulière. On a perdu
150.000€ en Asie avec les trajets, salaire et
les évènements marketing qu’on a
organisées et on n’a rien vendu. En France,
on a travaillé avec un gars et ça a marché
plus ou moins mais ça a couté très cher
parce que le marché français est un marché
assez difficile. Chaque marché est
particulier. Le marché singapourien est un
marché où il faut faire le business avec des
chinois. A Paris, qui est très différent du
reste de la France, c’est un marché où le
réseautage est fondamental. Mes clients
d’entreprises c’est des patrons
d’entreprises ou des CFO et la seule façon
d’accéder à ces gens là à Paris c’est de
faire partie de réseaux comme l’ENA qui
sont généralement difficiles d’accès.
 Et ici en Belgique ?
En Belgique et en Suisse c’est très
différent. Les CEOs sont beaucoup plus
accessibles et la mentalité belge et suisse
est beaucoup plus ouverte à quelque chose
d’innovant. Il n’y a pas cette arrogance qui
existe chez les Français. Ils sont prêts à
prendre des risques. Les marchés belge et
suisse sont donc des marchés beaucoup
plus accessibles pour une petite société
comme nous qui offre un service de haut
niveau à du top management.

18. 18
 Est-ce que vous avez une template pour
la balance scorecard que vous utilisez
pour toutes les entreprises ou est-ce
que vous modifiez toutes les
« templates » pour les entreprises en
fonction du secteur ou de la stratégie ?
On a différentes « scorecards » pour
différents secteurs. Pour les sociétés de
service, ça va toujours être plus ou moins
la même scorecard. Une société qui fait de
la vente de produits, ça va aussi être plus
particulier. Une société qui fait de la
production (exemple : Electrabel,
Glaverbel), c’est spécifique aussi. Il y a
aussi une balance scorecard pour tout ce
qui est ministère, fédération, asbl où
l’objectif social est beaucoup plus
important. Pour cette dernière, la scorecard
est fort différente des autres.
La structure est différente mais par contre
on retrouve souvent les mêmes indicateurs.
Ces indicateurs sont structurés
différemment et ils ont des importances
différentes. Par exemple, pour une
asbl/fédération/ministère, l’objectif n’est
pas de maximiser l’EBIT mais c’est de
maximiser la satisfaction du client et
d’optimiser le service que l’on rend à une
population donnée.
 Quel est votre plus grand concurrent
pour l’instant ? Est-ce que vous tenez
compte de la concurrence dans votre
stratégie de croissance?
Notre plus grand concurrent c’est l’
« interne » des entreprises, c’est-à-dire le
contrôleur de gestion en interne qui va
faire sa propre balance scorecard. C’est
donc quelqu’un qui a les compétences
techniques mais qui croit qu’il a
suffisamment de compétences pour dire
que l’entreprise n’a pas besoin du service
offert par Cockpit Group.
Le deuxième concurrent c’est Accenture,
KPMG ou des plus petites boîtes de
consultance comme Business et Décision.
 Il n’existe pas vraiment un concurrent
qui se démarque et qui fait presque la
même chose que vous?
Non. Il n’y en a pas qui offre le même
service que nous, sauf peut-être la société
de David Norton et Robert Kaplan aux
Etats-Unis. (ndlr : le nom de la société
s’appelle Balanced Scorecard
Collaborative, Inc. ou BSCol).
Mais par contre, objectivement, la
concurrence c’est positif dans notre secteur
parce qu’il y a 4 ans, j’étais un originel.
Quand je présentais le « cockpit », on
n’avait jamais rien vu de pareil, c’était
quelque chose d’original et le besoin
n’existait pas. C’était plus une
évangélisation que je faisais tandis que le
besoin aujourd’hui est énorme. Et ceci est
grâce au fait qu’on a poussé le concept et
que de plus en plus de concurrents font la
même chose, peut-être moins rapidement
mais ils le font quand-même. Les gens ont
besoin d’une balance scorecard et ils sont
conscientisés du fait que leur SAP est
installé et qu’ils ont toutes les données
mais qu’ils les utilisent mal donc ils
doivent faire une mission de « reporting »
et après ils cherchent le meilleur consultant
qui peut le faire.
Le marché est énorme. On n’est pas
concentré sur un secteur ou des entreprises
d’une taille spécifique.
 Comment est-ce que vous vous
différenciez de vos concurrents ?
La différence c’est notre concept, nos
compétences et le fait qu’on se spécialise
dans la vente et la mise en place de
tableaux de bord pour le comité de
direction. Chez la plupart des sociétés
comme Accenture ou Ernst & Young, elles
n’ont que quelques personnes dans leurs
équipes qui savent faire ça mais le client

19. 19
est obligé d’acheter un partenaire avec un
junior. Donc ça va coûter trois plus cher,
ça va prendre trois fois plus de temps et ce
ne sera pas toujours la même qualité parce
qu’ils n’auront pas la même expertise que
nous.
 Vous avez peut-être aussi eu un
problème de crédibilité quand vous
avez repris l’entreprise pour vendre
votre concept ?
Oui, tout à fait. J’avais que 28 ans quand
j’ai commencé et je n’étais pas crédible
devant un CEO.
 Quelle évolution y a-t-il eu au niveau
de la communication entre vous et les
employés depuis votre reprise de
l’entreprise ? Est-ce que la
communication est plus formelle
aujourd’hui ?
Il est vrai qu’auparavant, la
communication était beaucoup plus
informelle car l’équipe était plus petite et
tout le monde pouvait communiquer
fréquemment ensemble. Ce mode de
communication informelle a duré jusqu’à
ce que l’équipe atteigne 14-15 employés. A
partir de ce moment, la structure
organisationnelle a changé et donc la
communication au sein de l’entreprise
aussi. Les trois niveaux hiérarchiques de
l’entreprise (CEO, middle management,
employés) ont eu pour conséquences que je
communique plus indirectement et
formellement à mes employés. J’envoie
plus souvent des mails à mes employés sur
les tâches importantes qu’il reste à réaliser
ou encore sur l’état général de l’entreprise.
2. Analyse des récentes activités
d’internationalisation de Cockpit
Group
 Généralement quand on voit les
théories d’internationalisation, on dit
qu’une entreprise va d’abord
s’internationaliser dans un pays qui est
psychiquement proche de lui, qui a la
même culture, le même langage, etc. Je
peux donc comprendre
l’internationalisation vers la Suisse et
la France mais pourquoi Singapour ?
Singapour parce que l’investisseur a dit
« moi je veux Singapour, je veux l’Asie ».
Il venait d’Asie, il avait passé quatre
années en tant que CFO d’un grand groupe
en Asie, il avait plein de contacts en Asie,
il connaissait la famille royale d’Indonésie,
etc. Il avait un très très bon réseau mais ça
ne suffisait pas pour vendre notre service et
être efficace dans notre métier.
 Est-ce qu’il y avait réellement une
demande dans le marché asiatique ?
C’est difficile à dire. Nous étions
convaincus que oui parce qu’en 2006, les
gens qui n’allaient pas en Chine ou en Asie
rataient des opportunités. Tout le monde
devait aller sur ce marché et puisqu’on
connaissait quelqu’un qui était d’Asie, qui
croyait prêt à mettre de l’argent dans la
société et croyait être capable de vendre
notre service sur ce continent, on a dit OK.
Et si la question devait se reposer
maintenant, j’aurais surement refait la
même chose car le résultat c’est seulement
que le gars n’a pas vendu.
 Et quelle était la raison de
s’internationaliser sur le marché
français ?
On avait déjà des clients, on avait le
groupe Accor qui est un énorme client. On
avait le groupe Suez aussi et on avait donc
une crédibilité. Mais de nouveau, tout
dépend de la personnalité du partenaire qui
était envoyé sur place pour développer le
marché. Et il était moyen donc j’ai dû, à
cause de la crise, me séparer de ce
partenaire. J’ai du le faire passer en tant
qu’indépendant parce qu’il coûtait trop
cher par rapport à ce qu’il me rapportait. Il
avait vendu quelques projets, il avait

20. 20
développé un pipeline de clients
intéressants mais il ne signait pas assez.
Et au niveau de la Suisse ?
Au niveau de la Suisse, ça fonctionne bien
jusqu’à la crise. Ca a très bien fonctionné à
cause de Christophe Haulet qui lui était un
ancien manager d’Accenture, un vrai
consultant, qui avait plus ou moins mon
âge et qui était vraiment motivé. Il a signé
beaucoup de contrats et ça allait tellement
bien qu’on s’est dit qu’on allait engager un
gars local pour développer le marché en
Suisse. Il faut savoir que faire des trajets à
Genève c’est vivre des journées de travail
épuisantes et puis ça coûte cher pour le
client. Le client se demande pourquoi il
devrait payer un tel prix alors qu’il a plein
de consultants à Genève. Ca se justifie tant
que notre concept et notre expertise sont
différenciateurs par rapport aux autres mais
nos concurrents nous rattrapent de plus en
plus en termes de compétences. Et à ce
moment là on est obligé d’abaisser nos prix
et on fait la différence grâce à notre
crédibilité et notre expérience (le nombre
de clients qu’on a eu dans le passé).
Pourquoi n’avez-vous pas essayé de vous
étendre vers l’Allemagne et les Pays-Bas ?
Nous avons fait l’expérience d’une
mauvaise communication avec des clients
allemands. Nous estimions que pour
vendre de manière efficace en Allemagne,
il serait nécessaire d’avoir un consultant
qui serait en mesure de parler l’allemand
couramment. Nous avons donc préféré
s’attaquer à d’autres marchés. Il faut aussi
savoir que nous n’avons pas beaucoup de
clients sur le marché allemand. Siemens en
est un mais nous travaillons surtout sur ce
que la firme fait en Belgique.
Nous n’avons pas décidé de nous étendre
aux Pays-Bas par manque de temps. Il
nous manquait aussi des ressources locales
et des contacts pour pouvoir s’y établir
efficacement. Nous avons donc surtout
décidé de s’internationaliser là où nous
avons le plus d’opportunités pour vendre
notre service. Cette stratégie était
fortement influencée par l’existence de
clients et de contacts dans le pays ciblé.
 Si vous devriez revenir en arrière avant
la décision d’internationaliser vers
Singapour, qu’est-ce que vous auriez
fait différemment ?
En réfléchissant quand même, j’aurais
décidé de ne pas m’internationaliser vers
Singapour. Parce que ce qu’on a apprit de
cette expérience c’est qu’on a un métier où
on a énormément besoin de parler pour
résoudre des problèmes techniques du
client ou des problèmes pour assurer la
vente chez le client. Il y a aussi une
complémentarité des compétences dans
l’équipe qui a besoin d’être très forte et
communiquer par téléphone ou
vidéoconférence pour expliquer ce genre
de trucs, ça n’a pas de sens. Pour moi, c’est
le contact humain qui est avant tout
important et aussi la réactivité par rapport
au client. On avait fait une mission chez
Thai Airways qui a réussi et c’est suite à ça
qu’on s’est dit qu’on allait se lancer en
Asie. Moi j’allais tous les mois et j’avais
des employés qui y allaient toutes les trois
semaines. Il y avait toujours un problème
de réactivité du client parce que le client
pendant les trois semaines qu’on n’était
pas là, il lui arrive de faire des bêtises et
c’est difficile à gérer à distance. Déjà à
Genève c’est difficile parce qu’on ne peut
pas réagir dans l’après-midi ou dans les
deux jours. C’est difficile de trouver du
temps pour se libérer et résoudre un
problème inattendu. Et alors pour
Singapour, c’était encore plus difficile. La
leçon c’est donc clairement de
s’internationaliser vers un marché de
proximité et avec la crise actuelle, cela
devient encore plus évident de viser un
marché de proximité.

21. 21
 Quelles ont été les plus récentes
activités d’internationalisation ?
On a quelques contrats à Paris et à Lille, on
a cinq/six contrats à Genève, on a quelques
contrats au Luxembourg et quelques
contrats en Belgique. On pilote le tout à
partir de la Belgique. La masse critique de
contrats est plus haute que ce que l’on
imaginait parce qu’on s’était dit qu’avec
trois contrats c’était la masse critique. On
se disait qu’avec trois contrats en main en
période de croissance, on peut en signer
encore 6 ou 7 demain. Mais maintenant en
période de crise on ne pense plus comme
ça, on pense à garder ces trois contrats et
on se contente de ces trois contrats. Avant
la crise, ça se justifiait d’engager
quelqu’un de local en disant qu’il allait
gérer ces trois contrats et il allait essayer
d’en trouver d’autres en même temps. Mais
avec la crise cette logique n’existe plus.
 Avez-vous fait appel à de l’aide externe
tels que des relations B2B ou des
consultants pour votre stratégie
d’internationalisation ? Si oui, qui
sont-ils et en quoi est-ce que ces
entreprises vous ont concrètement
aidé ?
Non, si ce n’est mon conseil
d’administration où j’ai des
administrateurs de très haut niveau. Je leur
propose ma stratégie et ils me donnent des
conseils.
J’ai fait appel à des organismes publiques
pour des subsides d’abord et ensuite à
Genève on a un contact avec l’attaché de
l’AWEX qui nous a introduit chez un
client. Cet attaché nous a aussi permis
d’assister à des évènements de rencontre
d’entreprises. Mais pour ce qui est de ma
stratégie d’internationaliser, je ne l’élabore
pas avec l’aide d’un organisme extérieur.
Parfois on essaie aussi de se créer un
réseau local. Par exemple, en Suisse on a
beaucoup travaillé avec quelqu’un qui
avait créé une entreprise avec un business
model très proche du notre. Il avait
revendu son entreprise et il était devenu
consultant indépendant. On a donc travaillé
localement avec lui pour qu’il nous
communique son carnet d’adresse de
clients et on a demandé qu’il nous
introduise chez eux. On le payait un salaire
fixe et il recevait une commission si on
signait un contrat grâce à lui.
Ma conclusion au niveau de ma stratégie
d’internalisation c’est que si je devais
refaire ma stratégie, elle serait plus
orientée vers une stratégie de « tâche
d’huile ». Donc, on augmenterait petit à
petit mais à partir du cœur ici à Bruxelles.
Je ne créerai plus des bureaux qui n’ont
que deux/trois clients parce que ce n’est
pas assez.
L’erreur que j’ai faite et c’est là où je
pense avoir perdu beaucoup d’argent en
voulant aller trop vite. C’est la fougue de
l’entrepreneur et le fait d’avoir des
investisseurs qui te soutiennent.
Un point lié à la crise que j’ai envie
d’ajouter, c’est le fait qu’arrêter une
stratégie d’internationalisation ou du moins
la calmer c’est très difficile. Lancer la
stratégie c’est facile parce que tout le
monde est enthousiaste, optimiste et c’est
vraiment une expérience excitante. Et puis
il y a un moment où les choses
commencent à aller mal, la trésorerie
commence à plonger et malgré des
employés qui bossent super bien en
Belgique, l’argent est perdu en Asie. Il
vient donc un moment où il faut aller voir
le partenaire en Asie et lui dire qu’on va
devoir arrêter et ça devient très difficile.
Emotionnellement, on doit faire face à
l’échec et devoir virer un gars avec qui on
a partagé les mêmes rêves avant c’est dur.

22. 22
3. Analyse de la gestion de la crise
d’étranglement de crédit par
Cockpit Group
 Quel(s) sont le(s) effet(s) que votre
entreprise a ressenti suite à la crise
d’étranglement de crédit?
Sur le chiffre d’affaires réalisé dans le Q3
de 2008, on voit une chute parce que tous
nos projets se sont arrêtés. Les clients ne
savaient pas ce qui se passait, leurs actions
avaient perdu 70% de leurs valeurs et ils
ont décidé d’arrêter tout. Puis ça a repris
un petit peu en fin d’année et maintenant
ça stagne. Par contre la croissance sur les
quatre dernières années est super forte
mais on voit un fléchissement de la
croissance dans l’année 2008.
En ce qui concerne l’EBITDA, les deux
première années j’étais tout seul. En 2006,
c’était une très bonne année où j’étais seul
avec ma petite équipe. En 2007, c’est
l’année où j’ai embauché mon middle
management et où on a engagé
énormément de gens pour la croissance et
l’internationalisation ce qui coûte très cher.
Ensuite en 2008 on a « resserré les
boulons » et on a coupé là où ça n’allait
pas.
La conséquence de la crise est tout d’abord
que les sociétés ont moins de budget parce
qu’ils paniquent à cause de la chute de la
demande de leurs clients. Par exemple,
Glaverbel aujourd’hui a diminué sa
production de plus de 36%. Arcelor n’a
plus que 4 haut-fourneaux sur 20 qui
fonctionnent encore. Vu que ces gens-là ne
peuvent plus vendre leurs produits, ils sont
obligés d’adapter leurs structures par
rapport à leur marché qui a fortement
diminué. Sur mes 30 clients, j’ai 25 clients
qui sont dans le privé et qui subissent la
crise. Et même ceux qui vont bien sont
prudents et disent qu’ils vont moins
dépenser. Et c’est ceci qui fait que mon
chiffre d’affaires diminue.
Le deuxième élément c’est que quand mon
chiffre d’affaires diminue et que mes coûts
restent plus ou moins les mêmes, il y a un
moment d’inflexion qui fait qu’on
commence à faire une perte. Cette perte
arrive très très vite, surtout quand on est
une petite entreprise en pleine croissance et
qu’on investi beaucoup dans le potentiel
humain. Puis quand on se rend compte que
son marché a beaucoup chuté, la croissance
à laquelle je m’attendais n’est plus
réalisable et les personnes qu’on vient
d’embaucher n’ont pas encore assez
d’expertise pour être rentables pour
l’entreprise. Il faut donc prendre des
décisions. J’ai deux alternatives : soit je
réduis mes coûts, soit je vais voir mes
banquiers. Il faut savoir que quand on
commence à ne pas être profitable, la
trésorerie plonge, les clients paient en
retard et les fournisseurs commencent à
mettre la pression. Avec ma trésorerie,
mon indicateur de faillite, qui était à
100.000€ et puis après avoir engendré des
coûts, elle commence à diminuer jusqu’à –
200.000€ et je sais qu’il me reste 100.000€
parce que j’ai une ligne de crédit. Mais à
ce moment là mon banquier m’appelle et
me dit qu’il supprime ma ligne de crédit. Il
t’informe que la banque ne peut plus
donner des lignes de crédit aux entreprises
qui font moins de 4 ou 5 millions en chiffre
d’affaires comme il le fait avec moi. Alors
tu appelles tes clients pour qu’ils te paient
mais ça n’arrive pas à enlever la pression
supplémentaire de savoir que tu n’as plus
de ligne de crédit. Donc à ce moment là
j’ai du réduire des coûts. Les consultants
qui avaient le plus de difficultés à vendre,
j’ai dû me séparer d’eux. Les vendeurs en
France et le gars engagé en Suisse, je leur
ai dit qu’ils pouvaient travailler en tant
qu’indépendant pour nous mais que ce
serait complètement variable. Il faut savoir
qu’ils ont des grands salaires et ça coûte
très cher. Donc aujourd’hui on est revenu à
une taille plus raisonnable avec 18
personnes. On était 25 en octobre 2008 et
maintenant on est 18 mais j’ai réduit à
temps parce que j’étais assez pessimiste

23. 23
vis-à-vis du futur et j’ai préparé ma boîte
au pire.
 Quand les vendeurs en France et en
Suisse étaient sous contrat avec
l’entreprise ils engendraient un coût
fixe. Et donc maintenant qu’ils sont
repassés à un statut d’indépendant, il
s’agit plus d’un coût variable, c’est
bien ça ?
Oui, exactement. Au début quand j’engage
quelqu’un, je donne un salaire fixe plus un
variable en fonction des résultats. Et quand
j’ai jugé que le fixe était beaucoup trop
élevé pour le résultat rapporté, je lui dis
qu’il doit devenir indépendant. Donc, sur
tous les contrats qu’il rapporte, il a le droit
de prendre une commission et il peut
prester comme consultant sous ces
contrats. Par exemple, pour un contrat de
50.000€, il prend 5% de commission et il
peut prester une dizaine de jours à par
exemple 900€.
 Est-ce que cette crise était prévisible ?
Il faut avoir du pragmatisme, un
raisonnement logique et dire que quand on
consomme trop, ça va forcément te
retomber sur la tête. J’ai remarqué qu’il y
avait un déséquilibre total qui était en train
de s’installer, j’ai beaucoup lu, je me suis
beaucoup renseigné et c’est comme ça que
j’ai vu pas mal de signes. J’avais acheté un
livre en mars 2008 qui analysait la crise
des années 30 et l’auteur prévoyait
exactement la crise qu’on traverse
actuellement. Tout ce qu’il a écrit se passe
réellement maintenant. Et il prévoit encore
une crise sociale et des changements dans
nos façons de fonctionner pour après.
 Comment est-ce que vous pensez que la
crise va évoluer ? Est-ce qu’elle va
s’atténuer ou au contraire se
développer ?
Ma vision a toujours été qu’en septembre
et en octobre 2009, il y aura un deuxième
gros coup et on touchera le fonds à ce
moment là. Je ne sais pas si la crise sera
beaucoup plus importante que ce que l’on
vit maintenant mais pour l’instant on est de
nouveau dans une vague d’optimisme.
Janvier, février ont été catastrophiques ;
mars et avril ont été un peu meilleur. On le
voit d’ailleurs avec notre carnet de
commandes, on commence à revendre pas
mal de missions ces deux mois-ci. Je pense
que ça va continuer à avancer comme ça
jusqu’en juin puis il va y avoir les
vacances, ça va stagner et puis en
septembre/octobre, les boîtes vont
commencer à préparer leurs comptes de
fin d’année et ils vont voir que c’est
catastrophique. Il y aura une deuxième
vague de licenciements. Après
septembre/octobre, il y aura une remontée
progressive, il s’agira d’une croissance très
légère avec des hauts et des bas. Ca va
durer comme ça je pense pendant deux ans.
Il y a un grand débat aujourd’hui qui se fait
sur la rémunération du capital et la
rémunération du travail. Ces dernières
années, le bénéfice généré par les
entreprises retourne beaucoup plus chez les
actionnaires. Donc le capital était
beaucoup plus rémunéré par rapport à
l’investissement d’un travailleur. La crise
va faire en sorte qu’on se dirige petit à petit
vers un système où le travail est un peu
plus rémunéré que le capital. Ceci ne peut
que se réaliser par une crise sociale, par
des réglementations de taxation du capital.

24. 24
 Lors de votre conférence donnée en
octobre 2008, vous avez mentionné que
pour combattre la crise d’étranglement
de crédit, la première action à faire
était de trouver du « cash ». Pouvez-
vous répéter ce que vous avez voulu
dire ? Est-ce que vous avez réussi à
concrétiser cette recherche de
« cash » ?
Le « cash » est l’indicateur de faillite, c’est
ça qui montre que l’entreprise est en faillite
ou pas. Et à ce moment là, j’ai pris des
actions très fortes comme par exemple j’ai
payé les employés plus tard. Grâce à ceci
je me suis retrouvé avec un niveau de
« cash » largement supérieur à ce que
j’avais estimé donc je n’ai pas dû faire
d’augmentation de capital, d’emprunts
chez le notaire, etc. J’ai pu réduire les
coûts à temps ce qui a fait que mon niveau
de « cash » est bon et je suis pas du tout
dans une situation de faillite potentielle.
La deuxième chose qui était importante a
été de créer très tôt un climat de
conscience dans l’entreprise. J’ai essayé
déjà de les sensibiliser et donc aujourd’hui
ils sont beaucoup plus conscients que des
employés dans d’autres entreprises qui ne
comprennent pas encore ce qui leur
arrivent. Donc maintenant les employés
sont très motivés et déterminés.
La troisième chose c’est que j’ai essayé
d’adapter mon offre au marché. J’ai changé
mon produit. Aujourd’hui, mon message
c’est « quels sont les 20 indicateurs de
crise que vous devez absolument mesurer
pour piloter en temps de crise ? ». Je n’ai
plus de logiciels à 40.000€, on fait ça avec
Excel parce que c’est le court terme qui est
le plus important. Mon message et mon
produit ont fortement évolué sur base de la
crise. Donc c’est vraiment du marketing.
 Suite aux licenciements réalisés chez
Cockpit Group, est-ce que la structure
organisationnelle de l’entreprise a été
modifiée ?
Oui, à la fin de l’année passée j’ai changé
la structure organisationnelle. Dans
l’équipe de management, on était quatre :
j’ai licencié le belge qui développait le
marché français. Maintenant on est plus
que trois : Christophe Haulet (ancien
d’Accenture) qui développe le marché
suisse et qui est très compétent, Joris Oster
qui est brillant d’un point de vue technique
mais ce n’est pas un bon manager. Donc ce
que j’ai fait c’est que j’ai mis toutes les
équipes chez Christophe Haulet qui est un
bon manager en disant à Joris que tu te
concentres sur tes clients. Disons que
j’étais très gentil dans le sens où je laissais
l’opportunité aux gens de se planter et
d’apprendre avec la croissance de
l’entreprise et maintenant plus. J’ai un
niveau de tolérance qui a fortement
diminué.
 Est-ce que ce changement de structure
a bien fonctionné ? Vos collègues sont
contents du changement ?
Oui, tout à fait. Ils savent ce qu’on attend
d’eux.
 Lors de la conférence vous avez
mentionné que vous allez utiliser un
outil appelé « convertible debt » (ndlr :
obligation convertible) pour combattre
la crise. Avez-vous utilisé cet outil pour
finir ?
Je ne l’ai pas utilisé pour finir. Tout
d’abord, on n’en a pas eu besoin. Et
ensuite, légalement je devais compléter
tout un dossier approuvé par tel organisme.
La mise en place demandait un dossier
administratif disproportionné au bénéfice
qu’on pouvait en retirer.
A la conférence, je pensais que c’était
l’outil que toutes les entreprises étaient en
train de mettre en place et c’était ce que le
conseil d’administration avait décidé de

25. 25
faire. Mais en le faisant on a remarqué
qu’on devait faire un tas de démarches
administratives. De toute façon, pour finir
on n’en a même pas eu besoin.
Mais c’est vrai que j’avais envisagé un tas
d’actions et un tas de remise en question et
c’est bien parce que maintenant je me sens
d’attaque ; Pendant que d’autres
entreprises sont toujours en mode panique,
j’ai assimilé la crise, je me suis fait une
idée de comment la gérer et je suis motivé.
La conclusion pour cette société c’est que
c’est une affaire d’hommes et que
l’humain est au centre de tout. Il est au
centre des décisions de marketing, de
produit et autres. Gagner de l’argent c’est
ce qui fait que la société grandisse. C’est le
fait d’avoir des gens qui sont compétents et
tenaces.
 Y a-t-il eu des opportunités qui se sont
présentées suite à cette crise ? C’est
clair que oui puisque vous avez bien dit
que vous avez changé votre produit
pour qu’il s’adapte au marché. Votre
produit se positionne donc maintenant
comme étant un outil de pilotage en
temps de crise.
Oui. Cela dit, il existe aussi d’autres
opportunités. Par exemple, aujourd’hui il y
a des possibilités énormes de rachats
d’entreprises. Je pense notamment à une
société de marketing qui a été mal géré et
qui est en faillite ou qui va tomber en
faillite dans les mois qui viennent. Parce
qu’entre le moment où une société va mal
et où elle tombe en faillite, ça prend du
temps, entre six mois et un an. Les vraies
faillites intéressantes vont arriver d’ici
quelques mois, en septembre par exemple.
 Est-ce que la crise a eu des effets sur
votre stratégie d’internationalisation ?
A-t-elle eu plus d’effets sur un marché
spécifique ?
La crise a calmé la stratégie
d’internationalisation. En Suisse, on
maintient ce qu’on a, on n’engage plus et
on n’investit plus pour le futur. Je
maintiens mon effectif comme il l’est et
tant que je ne vois pas clair sur le futur, je
ne réinvestis pas 10000€/mois pour payer
un gars (tout frais compris : transport, etc.)
pour développer un marché dont j’aurais
un return un an après. Donc ça a clairement
un effet.

26. 26
Appendix 2 : Group dynamics
Individual report of Grégoire Krieg
Group functions
As a group, we decided that it would be
better that each member assumed a
responsibility throughout the work. Amaku
Ubah and Rui Vieira took alternative roles
at governing meetings and being a scribe
for the group whilst I was mainly
responsible for the conception and updates
of our Gantt chart. An example of this
Gantt chart is given on the second page.
Tasks
We broke down the work into tasks that
were independent from one another,
measurable and that could be integrated
together. It was important for us to
decompose the project into a number of
tasks that were neither too many for fear of
overspecification nor too few to respect the
scope of the work.
We divided our work into six important
substasks that follow each other in a
chronological manner:
1. The case selection process
2. The interview process (getting in
touch with company CEO,
preparing questions and
interviewing)
3. Knowledge reseach process
(interpreting interview answers and
reading up on theory)
4. Group interpretation process I
(comparing the theory with the
practice)
5. Intermediairy presentation
6. Group interpretation process II
(asking additional comprehension
question to CEO and comparing
theory to empirical results)
These substasks were subdivided into a
level of tasks that respected the
specifications mentionned above.
Delegation
We decided to delegate responsibilities for
each task as it would ensure an extra safety
net against the risk of not respecting time
constraints.
Tasks where discussion was necessary
between group members fell under the
responsibility of the team as a whole. It
was also important to have, at certain
stages of the work’s development, a
simultaneous advancement in different
tasks. For example, comparison of the
company’s internationalization strategy
could be done by two team members while
the comparison of the financial crisis and
coping with unforeseeable problems could
be carried out by the other team member.
Meetings
Meetings had to be planned out in order to
merge and filter the questions that would
be asked to the CEO of Cockpit Group, to
delegate various tasks and to strike an
agreement on everything that was written
in the final report.
Establishment of priorities for specific
tasks
We quickly noticed that prioritizing our
work would lead to a higher performance.
As soon as we received the requirements
for this paper we set out to find the SME
which could prove to be interesting to
analyze. This case selection process was
our first priority and the whole team was
involved in the research. The next priority
was to book an interview with the CEO of
the company we chose (Cockpit Group). It
seemed the most rational choice as our new
priority since a CEO of an SME does not
have a lot of time on his hands. Once we
were able to gather the empirical
information for our case, we felt that the
prioritisation of tasks was less important.
For the later stages of the case study’s
completion, we relied heavily on

27. 27
delegating remaning tasks (ie. comparison
of theory-practice) and setting up reunions
to merge each group member’s individual
progression.
Example of Gantt chart

28. 28
Individual report of Amaku Ubah
Forming stage:
Having worked together with both
individuals on different occasions, I was
already aware of what to expect. I’ve had
to opportunity to work on a business plan
for an international venture with Grégoire
Krieg during a period of four months so we
already know how each of us functions and
operates. During the first part of the
Strategic Management of Start-up class, I
was teamed up with Rui Jorge to work on a
fictive business and set up its strategy
which helped me to understand his ways of
working beforehand. The only two who
hadn’t worked together yet were Grégoire
and Rui.
Storming stage:
This stage of our group dynamics was
neither very long nor too turbulent. Having
personally worked with both individuals on
different occasions, I knew exactly what to
expect. Both individuals are trustworthy
and have a good idea on how to perform
tasks correctly as well as being critical
about it. During the group work, we had
very few conflicting ideas. The main focus
was to understand how to project would be
done and what our main objectives would
be.
Norming stage:
This stage was all about having the same
vision and idea about the group work. It
was important for us to all be on the same
page because we were going to work on a
delegation basis. The tasks were going to
be subdivided between all of us and it was
crucial for us to have a common idea of
how the paper would look like and with
goals we needed to achieve. This was done
during our first meetings as well as trying
to select the most adequate case.
Performing stage:
This is where most of the work was done.
All three group members were involved in
the crucial parts of the group work. For us
to perform at best we divided our work in
six main parts:
1. The case selection process
2. The interview process
3. Knowledge research process
4. Group interpretation process I
5. Intermediary presentation
6. Group interpretation process II
For us to be more effective each member
somehow specialized himself in a field.
Grégoire was in charge of the financial and
crises aspects, I would be in charge of
more analyzing the internationalization
process whereas Rui would be analyzing
the important learning factors out of the
case as presented during the intermediary
presentations. We nevertheless continually
confronted our ideas with each other
during our meetings in order to have a
collective perspective on the group work
and to have a solid and thought over case.
Individual report of Rui Vieira
Since from the beginning, each one of us
have some responsibilities and decided to
coordinate and interlink tasks between
each other. Therefore, Grégoire Krieg was
assigned to Gantt chart conception and
keeping it updated, through all the process.
Amaku Ubah and I had roles of match up
meetings and make an efficient and
flexible communication channels inside the
group.
Throughout the whole process, we
separated the work into independent tasks,
independent individually and between the
tasks. Nevertheless, it we knew it was
important for each of us to have in mind
that these tasks would be integrated

29. 29
together later on, so we kept
communication with each other, informing
each other about the status of that task but
also the direction that we were giving it.
Meetings were usual between us, to gather
information together and to share and
brainstorm data. The communication inside
the group was very informal. In addition to
this all members of the group have high
listening and understanding skills.
Communication channels, besides the
meetings, were mainly through exchange
of emails and phone calls.
Work Process
Our first objective was to find a company
that would meet the course requirements.
The whole team did a careful research for
possible companies and after screening and
evaluating all possibilities, we decided to
choose Cockpit Group.
Therefore, we passed to our second
objective, gathering of all possible
information about the group and get in
touch with Cockpit Group CEO, Grégoire
Talbot, to setup a meeting with him for a
quick interview. For that reason, all
member of the group prepared some
questions for the interview. During all this
interview process Grégoire and Amaku
performed more work than I did, due to my
poor skills of French language.
After a very profitable interview with
many data for our work, we started
interpreting all the answers but also, started
to research the theory that would match up
the data. At this point, Grégoire had a role
of interpreting and transcription of the
interview, while Amaku and I started to
look up for theory data.
Having all the practical and theory data,
we focused in compare the theory with
practical company behaviors. Once again, I
worked with Amaku in comparing the
internalization strategy of Cockpit Group
to theory. Grégoire was in charge of cross-
data of actual financial crisis effects,
practices from the company and theory that
could be suitable.
As requested by the course, in May of
2009, we did a short presentation of our
work, presenting the company as well as
presenting our analyze method and how we
would structure our work. This was a very
short process, and all the team played a
role.
With the developing of our work, we had
some new questions regarding the
internationalization strategy of the
company. Therefore, Grégoire got in touch
with Grégoire Talbot to ask the new
questions. After gathering this new data,
we followed the same distribution of work
that we used before, having Grégoire
comparing the financial crisis data and
theory, and Amaku and I more focus on
internationalization strategy and theory. At
this point Amaku played a role of more
research and writing the theory and I, more
interlink the practical company practices
with the theory. This was a very well
coordinated work, between Amaku and I,
having him explained and clarified detailed
me some contexts of theory, and I giving
some examples of the company practices
for him to assess. Later then, we argued if
we had made the correct connection
between theory and practical practices.
This last process was long and arduous
work that ended up with the integration of
all members work and their correction and
reflection of the final work.

30. 30
Appendix 3: Business concept of Cockpit Group

31. 31

32. 32
Appendix 4: Talbot, G., 2008, Presentation
slides for ‘Innovation Mangement’course.
(Slides 1,3,5-7 and 24)

33. 33

34. 34

35. 35
Appendix 5: Talbot, G., 2009,
Presentation slides “Pilotage en temps de
crise” for ‘Cercle du Lac’.(Slides 1 and
29)