Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) case-analysis-toxic-leadership-final-revised - distributed paper

CASE ANALYSIS: TOXIC LEADERSHIP
[“Widely Distributed within National and International Academic Community”]

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
CALL TO PAPERS SUBMISSION FOR:
THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ENGAGED MANAGEMENT SCHOLARSHIP
TANYA PELCHER-HERRING
DOCTORATE OF M ANAGEMENT GRADUATE STUDENT

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ABSTRACT
This case analysis explores an extreme case of a dysfunctional leadership style –the toxic
leader. The examination investigates the toxic behaviors of dysfunctional leaders, their qualities,
followers, and the range of toxicity factors that render the organization and its members prone to
ethical misbehavior. The case details are extrapolated from the files of the federal civil service’s
Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) and those of the Office of Special Counsel (OSC),
where there is an over abundance of similar cases of public servant dysfunctional leadership.
These cases bring forth research questions of: 1) Whether toxic leadership traits can be screened
before hire and after hire within the federal government. 2) After hire, how can these toxic
leaders be shed and nontoxic leaders recruited?
As human beings, there is an innate psychological need for belonging and security, but
the need for authority and order are how well informed leaders thrive. In times of crisis,
followers long for leadership. Subsequently, a fear exists where there is chaos and no power.
Good leaders communicate a vision that inspires followers. Time-and-time again, toxic leaders
provide a simplistic vision to complex problems; yet, many followers do not understand the
intricate underlying issues, ethical or unethical, of a visionary, but follow them faithfully. Jean
Lipman-Blumen describes the process as an “interaction,” not an action. Blaming toxic leaders
for their faults and failures is easy; however, toxic leadership could not exist without follower
compliance. These questions are examined and discussed under the theories, models, and
concepts of dysfunctional leadership styles, toxic leadership, followership, trust, and
organizational behavior in this analysis.

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THE PROBLEM
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
A small government agency in Washington, D.C. suffered from severe mismanagement
due to unethical, fraudulent, and illegal behaviors. Toxic leadership is described by Lipman and
Blumen (2005) as destructive and dysfunctional behaviors with characteristics that impose grave
and lasting damage. This case presents an index of problems involving the adverse current
operating culture and a host of negative leadership and follower sub-problems resulting in
administrative, civil, and criminal penalties. More importantly, the Office of the Inspector
General, the Senate Subcommittee on Financial and Contracting Oversight, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation are currently involved in the investigation 1. Under the weight of the
legal issues and impending ramifications, the organizational climate has further negatively
diminished2. This analysis will explore the problem from a cause and effect posture to determine
if toxic (destructive and dysfunctional) leadership is the causative factor.
PROBLEM DEFINITION
Voluminous pending administrative, civil, and legal charges are being leveraged against
the agency. Its members’ toxic destructive and dysfunctional leadership are cited as the likely
cause. The detailed fraud, waste, and abuse charges illuminate ethical violations and corruption.
The administrative and human rights charges convey diminished decision-making, a lack of trust,
and a high degree of individual and organizational conflict. A quandary of issues represents
ignored red flags (warning signs) shouting organizational safeguard and structure gaps. Gano
(1999, p. 41) and Anderson and Fagerhaug (2006, p. 12) note that effect has two causes that
formulate the subsequent action and conditions. These fraud, waste, abuse and illegal activities
(or effects) have serious consequences and this case analysis explores what caused the problems
and why.
FACTS OF THE CASE
The public records of the investigative agencies outline the case details. No assumptions
are stated or made in this analysis beyond the events, timelines, names, titles, and statements of
key actors’ described in the official investigation of administrative, civil, and criminal charges. 3.
This case focuses on a small federal agency, a key senior leader, her direct-report
followers, and the organizational culture. The agency consists of over 30 virtual teams,
throughout the nation, with headquarters in Washington, D.C. The female senior leader is the
sister-in-law of the agency director’s assistant and very politically connected. This became
evident throughout her stay, as the agency’s director, who happens to be a presidential appointee,
handpicked her. Her role is to lead the headquarters staff as Agency Deputy Director.
Externally, the agency and the female leader display the epitome of functionality. For years, the
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Information accessible through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and public records from case numbers:
Office of Special Counsel (OSC): OSC DI-12-523, OSC MA-12-019 & OSC MA-12-2422 prohibited practices,
fraud waste and abuse, gross mismanagement of funds and government property charges outline: Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) Case #DC-0752-13-0152-I-1.
2
Federal Equal Opportunity Employment Cases #FMCS-003 and #FMCS-002, Reports of Investigation Equal
Employment Opportunity Complaint; Congressional Inquiry Documents of Congressman Van Hollen of Maryland
3
Charges - The agency name and key actors are omitted from this case analysis, but are disclosed in case files.

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agency’s leadership team has been highly admired in government and political arenas. At one
point, the agency held the honor as one of the top ten small agency places to work. However,
internally, within four years of the new leader’s arrival, there has been a high level of team
discord and organizational conflict at the headquarters level.
Within approximately 18-months of the new leader’s arrival, there was an antagonistic
departure of three out of five of the existing headquarters’ department heads. The new leader
quickly replaced the department heads with loyal followers, one with substantially less
experience and qualifications. By the second year, internal rumors of funding mismanagement,
management interference, complaints of discrimination, and conflict ran rampant. Formal
complaints soon followed from new team members, including discrimination violations,
management interference, misuse of technology, reporting fraud, and violation of rules for
purchases and acquisitions. A pattern of circumventing and overt ignoring of the rules had
emerged. Over time, extravagant and lavish purchases, use of alcohol at government events,
travel arrangements, and select follower celebrations - ‘identified’ as employee recognitions became a norm. Direct-report followers and other senior leaders ignored, justified, validated,
and verified transactions that were clearly beyond the scope of the policies, subsequently
becoming complicit. In 2011 and 2012, a coalition of new followers refused to comply with
contractual acquisition authorizations and blew the whistle.
THE ANALYSIS - ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The objective of this case analysis is to separate the case material or abstract entity to its
constituent elements to determine if the cause is toxic leadership. The chosen process is the Root
Cause Analysis4 (RCA) Method (Andersen & Fagerhaug, 2006, p. 12). The RCA is a
constructive process for investigating a problem. The analysis methodology will provide insight
of the complex systems in and around the problem. The next step is for the analysis to reveal
key failure points as candidates for levers of change. To capture the complexities of destructive
and dysfunctional behavior, Lipman-Blumen (2004, 2005) and Kellerman (2004) recommend a
multidimensional framework. As a result, two resource models were identified to assist in
building the framework for this case analysis.
ROOT CASE ANALYSIS TOOL: THE CIRCUMPLEX M ODEL
The first analytical tool is the Plutchick’s (1980) Circumplex Model5 presented in Figure
1. The Circumplex Model is used to examine the primary and secondary problematic outcomes
to the contextual components of toxic leadership, ethics, trust, decision-making, and
organizational culture. More specifically, the Circumplex Model’s role with the RCA is to help
identify the orientation direction (current state/operating culture) and degree of intensity with the
case targeted parties. According to Cook (1987) and Kotter (1992), cultures that lack direction
are typically the result of misalignment among internal structures, systems, technology, and
skills/qualities.

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Root Cause Analysis (RCA) can be traced to the broader field of Total Quality Management (TQM). Root cause
analysis is an integral part of problem analysis and problem solving (Anderson & Fagerhaug, 2006, p. 12).
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Circumplex Model – Figure 1, developed by Robert Plutchik (1980), the wheel of emotion used in this case
analysis as an analytical framework to illustrate different emotions, compelling and nuanced behaviors.

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FIGURE I – CIRCUMPLEX MODEL

Figure 1. Diagram Source: Cook, 1987; Cook & Lafferty, 1987 & Kotter, 1992
The model brings together the leadership impact on individuals and the organization by identifying the 12 styles of
thinking, behaving, and interacting into three general orientations:
1) 11 to 2 o’clock, Constructive Styles–Members interact with others and approach tasks in ways that will help
them to meet their higher-order satisfaction needs,
2) 3 to 6 o’clock, Passive Defensive Styles-Members interact with people in ways that will not threaten their own
security,
3) 7 to 10 o’clock, Aggressive Defensive Styles - Members approach tasks in forceful ways to protect their status
and security.
The three orientations aid in interpreting the organization’s current culture and movement to the ideal culture. When
considering the current culture, both direction (reflected by the orientation arrows) and the intensity (reflected
by the color and color levels in the inner circle rings) have specific interpretation roles. Direction explains what
is (and is not) expected for culture transition; intensity informs the level or degree (Cook, 1987; Cook & Lafferty,
1987 & Kotter, 1992).

ROOT CASE ANALYSIS TOOL: THE TRAPEZOID M ODEL
Next, the trapezoid model6, illustrated in Figure 2, flushes out the problematic causal
factors, identifies empirical methods, theories, and practices as levers of change to transition the
agency’s current operating culture with the values, skills, and qualities needed to transform the
leadership team to an ideal culture. The role of the trapezoid model in the RCA process is to
assist in determining the analysis causation and potential remedies: 1) What happened (primary
actions and behaviors)? 2) Why did it happen – (what safeguards were ignored)? 3) What to do
to prevent the likelihood it will occur again – (plausible remedies to propel the levers of change)?

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Root Cause Analysis Principles are constants and are unchangeable from problem to
problem (Anderson &Fagerhaug, 2006). Similarly, the cause-and-effect principle is universal to
a myriad of problems. In this case, the Trapezoid Model isolates the causative factors that feed
into the current operating state of corruption, organizational relationship conflict, and failures.
The shift can occur when the focus moves to address the identified causes and the subsequent
effects. The Trapezoid Model further illustrates empirical resources for change, to include Lewin
and Schein’s Change Theory model of “cognitive redefinition” (Schein, 1995), whereas Levels
of Action 1 and 2 - Stage 1–unfreezing causative factors and current operating culture and Stage
2–unfreezing current operating culture and moving to an ideal culture/or new state, and Level of
Action 3 - Stage 3 – refreezing to ideal culture (new state becoming permanent) (Schein, 1995;
Schein, 1999; Smith, 2001).
FIGURE 2. TRAPEZOID M ODEL – ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
Erosion of trust,
Bradenburger & Nalebuff (1996)
Trampled on Rights
of Others,
Hickman
(2010)

Causative Factors
• Power-based Leadership
• Lack of integrity that
reveals leaders as
cynical, corrupt, or
untrustworthy
• Insatiable ambition that
prompts leaders to put
their own sustained;
power, glory, and
fortunes above their
followers’ well-being
• Egotism and Arrogance
• Leadership Borderline
Personality
Disorder

Operating Culture
• Violating the basic
human rights of their
own supporters and
others
• Deliberately feeding
their followers illusions
that enhance the
leader’s power and
impair the followers’
capacity to act
• Engaging in corrupt,
criminal, and/or other
unethical activities

Schein’s Model (1992),
3 cognitive levels of
Organizational Culture

Ideal Culture
• System II Thinking,
Debias Judgment in
Managerial Decision
Making
• Individual and Corporate
Trust
• Organization and
member resilience
• Constructive
Organizational Culture:
achievement, selfactualizing, humanistic
encouraging, and
affiliative
Simon’s
Rational Model
Lewin’s Force
Field Analysis

Bad Management, Kellerman (2004);
Handy (1976); Harrison (1972)
Linking organizational culture
& organizational structure; Power Culture

Level of Action #1 (Cause)

Toxic Leadership,
Destructive & Dysfunctional,
Followers shoulder much of the blame
Lipman-Bluman (2006)

Level of Action #2 (Effect)

Levers of Change

Unfreezing;
Bazerman & Moore (2010);
Lewin/Schein’s Change Theory (1995)

Level of Action #3 (Change)

Figure 2. (Diagram – Pelcher-Herring, 2013) The Trapezoid Model represents components of the case analysis to
show grouped and related values; the figure depicts the causative factors, dysfunctional and destructive behaviors,
creating the toxic leadership operating culture; illustrates the how and why; identifies the change leadership skills,
qualities, and values needed to transform the current operating culture to an ideal operating culture. Source:
Bazerman & Moore (2010); Bradenburger & Nalebuff (1996); Ford, Ford & D’Amelio (2008); Handy (1976);
Harrison (1972); Hickman (2010); Kellerman (2004, p. 38); Kumar (1999); Lipman-Bluman (2006); Mintzberg &
Westley, 1992; Schein (1992); Simon (1997).

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EXAMINATION OF THE CAUSATIVE FACTORS
TOXIC LEADERSHIP CONSTRUCTS
This government leader’s management style clearly exemplifies the toxic constructs of
leaving her followers worse off than as she found them. However, Lipman-Blumen (2004, 2005,
2006) describes toxic leadership as vexing, while other scholars dissected the characteristics.
Other scholarly researchers share similar and broader views. For example, Hogan and Hogan
(2001, p. 40-51) portray bad management as the dark side of leadership. The author’s concepts
of bad leadership are shared by Erickson, Shaw and Agabe (2007, p. 26-43) and Kellerman
(2004). Ferris, Zinko, Brouer, Buckley, and Harvey (2007, p. 195-206) broaden the scope to
bullying as a component of toxic leadership. Case files show credence in Ferris’, et al (2007)
views where followers feared senior leader actions and their abusive supervision tactics (Tepper,
2000, p. 178-190). Paunonen, Lonnqvist, Verkasalo, Leikas, and Nissinen (2006, p. 475-486)
label the senior leader’s destructive behavior as narcissistic (Einarsen, Aasland & Skogstad,
2007, p. 207-216; Kellerman, 2004; Lipman-Blumen, 2006) and explore borderline mental
disease and defect. Collectively, these investigative approaches to behaviors and organizational
leadership styles carry the label of “destructive and dysfunctional” leadership.
THE INDIVIDUAL LEADER
Referring to the Circumplex Model, bad leadership, bullying, and abusive supervision
characteristics of this case have the strongest extensions to the Aggressive/Defensive cluster. In
the Aggressive/Defensive cluster, the primary style of leadership is power (Lukes, 2005). Power
is depicted in the Trapezoid Model as a causal factor of the agency’s toxic leadership operating
culture. House and Aditya (1997) explore the Power Motivation Theory and note that traits are
derived from satisfaction through influencing others (p. 414). Additionally, Handy (1976) and
Harrison (1972) identify leaders in this cluster are expected to be “winners” at any cost, outperform their peers, be seen and noticed. According to Kotter (1992), leaders expect to use their
authority and position extensively. Subsequently, the Circumplex Model shows the likelihood
that the Aggressive/Defensive style’s movement pushes followers toward the direction of the
Passive/Defensive cluster and away from the constructive cluster (Argyris, 1998, p. 98-105;
Follett, 2011; Porter, Steers & Mowday, 2007). Kellerman (2004) indicates that toxic leaders
are motivated by the fear of their followers. Hence, the toxic leader manipulates and stifles
followers with criticism. The reactionary behavior from followers was a fear to question leader
actions or judgment (Kellerman, 2004; Follett, 2011). This behavior is indicative of the
dependent and avoidance characteristics of the Passive/Defensive cluster. In this case, the senior
leader was infamous for bludgeoning followers at meetings or behind closed doors. Statements
indicate the senior leader had swayed her loyal followers to carry out her orders. Obediently, her
followers carried out her orders despite the foreknowledge that her orders violated federal rules,
policies, and human decency. Hickman (2010) described this behavior as, “…unethical
leadership fails to distinguish between right and wrong. Because common codes of decency and
good conduct are in some way violated, the leadership process is defiled” (p. 393). A Gellerman
(1989) state that the example set by senior management is vitally important (p. 74). As a result,
the case facts show followers assimilated oppositional behaviors and traits. Therefore, under this
concept, the red in the intensity scale of the Circumplex Model would show a significant
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increase. These behaviors would support Gellerman’s (1989) posits that conscience is a factor in
ethical dealings and management should shield employees from “circumstances that strain their
ethical standards” (p. 78). Lipman-Blumen (2004) addressed “toxic leadership” as not just an
average mismanagement issue. Instead, the author describes these leader actions more intensely
as those with a “dysfunctional personal characteristic” and “destructive behavior.” The author
also explains that these leaders have the capacity to, “… inflict reasonable serious and enduring
harm” (p. 373). Barbara Kellerman (2004) joins Lipman-Blumen (2004) to explain that a toxic
leader’s pattern is so predictable that the behavior and outcome has been coined as a “rule of
thumb” (p. 15-38).
The problem of toxic leaders has become such a concern that new scholarly research has
attached psychological disorders to the behavior. Goldman (2006) has conducted extensive
research on the topic of toxic leaders and published works with the American Journal of
Psychology. He has espoused, “… borderline personality disorder is a prototype of preexisting
toxic behavior (p. 733-746).” Goldman (2006) escalates the issues the problem raises by stating,
“… the toxic behavior centers in an individual leader and permeates throughout an organization
(p. 733).” The author captured a statement by Kets de Vries, when he explained, “some leaders
go far beyond the abnormal ways of functioning… they go off the deep end” (Kets de Vries,
1995, p. 217). The “deep end” is probably the best way to explain some of the extreme
behaviors exhibited by the senior leader and her followers. As an illustration, the EEO reports
denote that this senior leader denied reasonable accommodations for a handicapped follower,
who refused to conform, and initiated removal and police escort removal for other another
nonconforming follower. The handicapped follower filed Congressional complaints, as well as
federal noncompliance complaints (outlined on the Trapezoid Model: loss of trust, violation of
human rights). Consequently, the agency is currently pending potential huge financial fines and
damages (refer to the Trapezoid Model, operating culture, result of unethical activities). The
agency and key actors have received subpoenas for documents and individual depositions.
Multiple complaints from varying people should have been a red flag to the agency
director. The senior leader’s actions reflect an innate power-hungry persona. In addition, the
events appeared to illustrate some level of utopia from the abuse and use of her power (LipmanBlumen, 2004; Kellerman, 2004). Plotted on the Circumplex Model, the leader actions would
show a high intensity red rating in the Power, Aggressive/Defensive cluster. The senior leader’s
court and deposition records repeatedly convey her declarations of a lack of intent or even
knowledge that she had been a part of anything wrong. Despite her legal background, the senior
leader made multiple conflicting official statements throughout the investigation. However,
Hickman (2010) provides a moving statement that surmises the senior leader’s proclamations of
no intent and innocence. Hickman (2010) states, “if ethical behavior intends no harm and
respects the rights of all affects, and unethical behavior willfully or negligently tramples on the
rights and interests of others, then leaders cannot deny the rights of others” (p. 351). LipmanBlumen (2005) provides clarity to the intentions of toxic leaders by stating, “… those leaders
who deliberately injure others or enhance themselves at others’ expense are regarded as
intentionally toxic” (p. 2). On the other end of the spectrum, “… unintentionally toxic leaders,
whose careless or reckless action, including incompetence, nonetheless cause significant
negative effects” (p. 2). The facts of the case would lead a reasonable man to surmise that there
were significant negative effects from the bullying, harassment, abuse of power, and unlawful
personnel actions.

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THE FOLLOWER
Kellerman (2004) posits that how followers react to bad leaders determines the bad
leaders reign. The author continues her perspective by stating, “… an intentional investigation of
the natural man shows a tendency for incompetence, rigidity, intemperance, callousness,
corruption, insular, and evil” (p. 15-38). Kellerman (2004) concludes, “Followers are every bit
as important to leadership as are leaders… since you can’t have bad leadership without having
bad leaders and bad followers” (p. 38). Lipman-Bluman (2004, 2005, 2006) advocates that
toxic leadership depends upon the followers, many of whom recognize, but tolerate it. The
Circumplex Model illustrates intensity and the rotational movement of toxic behaviors from
Lipman-Blumen’s (2005, p. 5) three key values: 1) Security: internal psychological perspective,
2) Fears: external environment, and 3) Satisfaction: psychosocial. Lipman-Blumen’s (2004)
theory is founded upon Maslow’s revised (1971) hierarchy of needs, which progresses through
the primitive basic needs, e.g. food, shelter and basic necessities and accents that, “followers
seek safety, love, esteem, cognition, aesthetics, and self-actualization, and culminate in
transcendence” (p. 5). From this examination, a conclusion can be drawn that the agency’s
followers appear to fit the Security Needs, People, and Satisfaction Needs orientation of the
Circumplex Model. This insular vacuum of long-term and egregious illegal actions from
leadership is how the organization operated for years, scaffolding the current operating culture
reflected in the Trapezoid Model – Level Action 2. In many instances, the follower’s actions
were similar to Argyris’ (1998) “Empowerment: The emperor’s new clothes.” Everyone knew
what was going on, but pretended nothing was wrong. However, during the formal investigation,
the same followers acknowledged wrong doings, but cited fear of losing their jobs as reasons for
failing to report allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse. Based upon these actions, other
deductions can be inferred that the leader’s direct-report followers have a high need for security.
If plotted on Circumplex Model, these followers would be in the Passive/Defensive Styles with a
high intensity in dependent and avoidance. On the Trapezoid Model – Level Action 1, these
behaviors are causative factors, flowing to the current operating culture at Level Action 2;
therefore, the agency’s behaviors meet the toxic leadership definition. Unsurprisingly, the senior
leader along with each of her direct report followers are lead actors in each formal complaint of
prohibited personnel practices, management interference, and discrimination (Hickman, 2010;
Kellerman, 2004, p. 29-38; Porter, Steers & Mowday, 2007; Price, 2005). The multiple
complaints from stakeholders and followers should have been yet another red flag for the
Agency Director. Nevertheless, the case files show the Agency Director’s behavior is one of
denial and ambivalent of the troubled environment (Frost, 2003).
THE ORGANIZATION
Practitioners and management scholars identify an interrelationship between leadership
and organizational dysfunction (Frost, 2003; Fox & Spector, 2005; Kellerman, 2004; Levinson,
1972, 1976, 1981, 1991; Lowman, 2002; Lubit, 2004). Most definitely, the senior leader, her
follows, and others outside their circle left the organization worse than found. The agency was
established in 1947 and revered as an organization of high integrity, comradeship among its
teams, and excellent in fulfilling its mission. Under the toxic leader’s leadership, the
organization has transformed from one revered to one under high legal scrutiny that may result in
individual and organization level civil and criminal penalty (Frost, 2003). Despite the glowing
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history and reputation to uphold, the organization’s executive director ignored several red flags
(Fox & Spector, 2005). Schein (2010) describes organizational culture as an abstraction, and the
forces created in organizational situations from the culture are powerful. Further, Schein posits
that a lack of understanding of these forces submits the organization as prey (p. 7).
Organizational options allow safeguards to prevent or deter toxic leadership. An open
and transparent process averts corruption (Lubit, 2004). Transparency includes processes for
selection and identification to eliminate individuals with toxic leadership propensities and
histories. The senior leader was handpicked, versus exercising the traditional federal hiring
process, illustrating a predisposition to by-pass rules. Though many followers were aware of the
skirting of this rule, no one acted upon the issue… another red flag. Lipman-Blumen (2005)
recommends the use of tools, e.g. screening assessment, to preclude toxicity. Also, the author
recommends reviews that include all relevant groups with whom the leader interacts. The
federal agency again failed another safeguard. Hence, followers, at all levels, were left without
an indirect venue to address issues. The agency record shows professional development
assessments, such as the 180 and 360-degree assessments (skill, competency, and behavioral gap
tools), were recommended, but not elected to be utilized by the Training Director, who is a direct
report of the female senior leader. Again, the agency made a conscious and deliberate act to
exclude tools for employee productive and safe feedback. These repetitive actions align the
agency with the causative factors of egotism, arrogance, and power-based leadership outlined in
the Trapezoid Model. Again, another red flag ignored. In yet another instance, leadership
purposely evaded vehicle acquisition requirements and purchased a luxury vehicle on a
government credit card. Even without knowing the specifics, other members of the organization
should have questioned this luxury vehicle acquisition versus the standard government sedan.
Lipman-Blumen (2005) additional recommendations for safeguards and structure.
Trust - Employees may allude to a sense of betrayal of trust, when the performance goals
of the organization far outweigh the expectations and welfare of staff (Meyerson, Weick &
Kramer, 1993; Vroom, 2007). The senior leaders placed unbalanced workloads on the
employees, who resisted their unlawful orders (Kellerman, 2004). The conclusion of Mowday
(2006) is that organizations rely more on tools that may erode the trust deposit between
managers and reports. Instead, the case shows that the organization pushed for technology coverups (personal computers and cell phones to nonemployees and family members) and other report
fudging, further degenerating trust. Deutsch (1960, 1962) defines trust as confidence in the
intentions and capabilities of another person and the belief that person will keep his word. Trust
is also viewed as a “social glue” (Fukuyama, 1995) or “social lubricant” (Spreitzer and Mishra,
1999) that can hold diversified, global organizational structures together. Creed and Miles (1996)
opine that many organizations have failed due to a lack of trust amongst partners and staff.
According to Lewicki (et al. 1998), organization members must know not only when to trust
others, also when to monitor others closely. Multiple red flags went up, yet the senior leader was
unchecked. Further, Lewicki avers that the functional coexistence of trust and distrust may be a
central component in high-performance teams (p. 453). More importantly, both trust and distrust
can co-exist within multiplex relations, and individuals experience ambivalence when positive
and negative attitudes toward a single target exist (p. 448). In court documents, whistleblowers
indicated they were the “enemy of the agency.” The whistleblowers complained of quid pro quo
activities among the staff and contract personnel. It appears select followers had identified the
whistleblowers as the single target. However, in court, the agency attempted to cover and deny
its approved actions against the whistleblowers.
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Decision-Making – Expending government funds without authorization, management
interference, and discrimination are indeed questionable decision-making practices. Again, the
question of why remains. Simon’s (1997) theory of administrative behavior provides some
insight. Specifically, Simon’s concepts of bounded rationality or satisficing appear to be in the
forefront in this case, whereas the conceptual ideas of the agency leadership (bias, power,
arrogance) and direct-report followers (insatiable ambition) was limited by the cognitive
limitations of their minds. In other works, Simon states, "boundedly rational agents experience
limits in formulating and solving complex problems and in processing (receiving, storing,
retrieving, transmitting) information" (Williamson, 1991, p. 553). As a deterrent to System 1
(intuitive-biased, quick automatic and emotional) decision-making, Lipman-Blumen (2005)
recommend regularly scheduled accountability forums to prompt pragmatic, effortful, logical and
explicit thinking outcomes relative to System 2 thinking (Bazerman & Moore, 2010; LipmanBlumen, 2005). The case record shows that direct-report followers approved acquisitions and
refused to deny the leader any request. The agency had little to no safeguards in place for the
adopted decision process and became the prey of toxic leadership team (Schein, 2010).
On the other hand, the organization’s exercise of a rational decision-making model would
effectively optimize outcomes and provided quantifiable information or verifiable alternatives.
Lukes (2005) identifies a two-dimensional view that involves examining both decision-making
and non-decision making, (p. 192). In this case, the record shows that leadership and several
followers elected to utilize System 1 thinking, delay in the decision to stop the behavior, and in
many instances become complicit (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963, p. 632; Bazerman & Moore, 2009).
RECOMMENDATIONS
Change is the ultimate recommendation (Dent & Goldberg, 1999; Senge, 2000). The
agency will need to reverse the direction of the Circumplex Model’s Aggressive/Defensive and
Passive/Defensive styles to Constructive Styles, including rebuilding trust in throughout the
virtual and headquarters offices (Germain, 2011; Senge, 2006). After the series of illegal and
unethical events, Lewicki’s (et al. 1998) purports increasing monitoring is vital. The value-laden
ethics principles of Hickman (2010) incorporated into ongoing professional development would
be essential. Additionally, Trapezoid Model illustrates method(s) available to transform the
current toxic, dysfunctional, and destructive leadership styles and culture to one of an ideal
culture (Bazerman & Moore, 2010; Gelatt, 2005; Kanter, 1973, 1975; Wirth, 2004). Trapezoid
Model also outlines the resource tools structured to assist in the levers of change (Ayoko &
Hartel, 2006; Follett, 2011; French & Raven, 1959, p. 150-167; Kumar, 1999; Parker, 2007).
Change is difficult, but Ford, Ford and D’Amelio (2008) prescribe accepting and labeling
resistance to change to defuse its power (Burnes, 2004; Vroom, 2007).
Conclusion
Redefinition of the problem
This case analysis examines a small federal agency under investigation by several federal
government and law enforcement agencies for gross mismanagement of government funds and
property, as well as fraud, waste, and abuse. The analysis explores whether the behaviors of the

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actors met the criteria for toxic leadership (dysfunctional and destructive leadership) and
rendered the organization and its members prone to ethical misbehavior.
Findings
The RCA allowed factor-producing effects of components to be isolated and examined.
Specifically, the focus was on the organizational culture and leadership styles depicted in the
Circumplex Model, constructs of the causative factors, and the behavioral outcomes from the
data input (court records and case investigations). The analytical seminal review of each
component part indicated that the styles and behaviors were characteristic of toxic, dysfunctional
and destructive, leadership (Kellerman, 2004; Lipman-Bluman, 2005, 2006). In approximately
four years, the leader created an Aggressive/Defensive culture to propel and rotate the direction
of the leadership styles orientation of the agency from a vibrant organization, a Constructive
Style, to a Passive/Defensive Style. The unethical behaviors of the senior leader and directreport followers can be plotted on the Circumplex Model under the highest red intensity level of
power, opposition, competitiveness, and perfectionist behavior.
According to the case records, followers and other key leaders turned a blind-eye to the
behavior and ignored glaring red flags to become an equal part of the problem. Additionally, it
appears that the direct-report followers adopted their leader’s behaviors and created a second and
more intense (first line leadership) prong of toxic, destructive and dysfunctional leadership,
thereby shifting their styles to the Aggressive/Defensive cluster of the Circumplex Model
(Kellerman, 2004; Lipman-Bluman, 2004, 2005, 2006).
Organizationally, the theoretical principles espoused by Pacanowsky and O’DonnellTrujillo (1983), along with Schein (1999) outline the linkage of the members of the organization
with the behaviors and activities. By default, the organization can be viewed as toxic,
destructive, and dysfunctional. Identifying which causative factors had the most failures and
influence on the organization is rendered for levers of change. The Circumplex Model and the
Trapezoid Model, coupled with the examination of the case content, convey the analytical
processes to associate the sentinel events, behaviors and outcomes to answer the following three
primary questions:
1) What happened? A senior leader, her direct-report followers led an agency down a
path that meets the seven type criteria of toxic leadership identified by Barbara Kellerman
(2004): Incompetent, Rigid, Intemperate, Callous, Corrupt, Insular, and Evil. More importantly,
these public servants wasted public dollars and betrayed the public trust. Compared with each of
the seminal and theoretical constructs of toxic, destructive and dysfunctional leadership, each of
the actors met the construct and the causative factors for the current operative culture.
2) Why did it happen? Lipman-Blumen (2004, 2005, 2006) suggests that it was
psychological. She argues the need for security explains the psychological phenomenon that
allows followers to allow the unethical and human rights conditions (Gelatt, 2005). The
Trapezoid Model highlights the lack of integrity and power as causative factors.
3) What to do to prevent the likelihood it will occur again? The Trapezoid Model
identifies the need for change and levers of change to transition to an ideal culture. Transitioning
to an ideal culture would entail unfreezing the undesired by adding new forces for change and
removal of some of the existing factors. The organization would need to refreeze the new
behaviors until they become the norm. Orlikowsky & Hofman say that “adopting an
improvisational model implies that managers relinquish… ‘command and control’ or “power” (p.
20). Adopting the new model would require a realignment of key leaders and practices.
12

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