6. China’s Consideration on
Pursuing RCEP Track
Open regional market with enormous potential for
development
Present an immediate market base to counterbalance the
TPP, from which China is excluded.
Build hub-and-spoke ecosystem—China sits in the joint
of trade (everyone to every one/every one to China)
Use RCEP as a test ground to unify its tracks of bilateral
and multilateral economic cooperation, as well as its
regional and sub regional free trade and investment
arrangements.
Integration with China’s OBOR initiative
7. China’s Consideration on
Pursuing TPP Track 1
Arguments inside China: conspiracy theory,
pessimism theory, standby theory, spoiler theory,
rival theory, the US-dominate theory, the exclusive
theory and the “get involved immediately” theory.
It’s not realistic for China to enter TPP
negotiations now.
Realistic difficulties for China to participate TPP:
1.lowering tariff and nontariff barriers 2.solving on-
the-border issues 3.solving behind-the-border issues
8. China’s Consideration on
Pursuing TPP Track 2
On-The-Border Issues:
Trade in Service: Market Access Is the Challenge
It’s commitment to open up levels of trade in service when entering the
WTO is the minimal requirement of the TPP as well, however, that
opening process has not been completed.
Investment: The Issue of National Treatment Before Market Access
For the establishment, acquisition, and expansion of foreign direct
investment (FDI) enterprises, national treatment before market access
and negative list management have not bee committed. (Ps. China’s
authority announced in 10/19/2015 that China will take trail implement
in certain fields and form exposure draft form the public since
12/1/2015)
9. China’s Consideration on
Pursuing TPP Track 3
Behind-The-Border Issues:
1. The Unification of Standards (U.S.-enterprises and industrial
organizations/China- State certificating and lack of third-party
certification )
2. Environmental Protection (weak institutional mechanism)
3. Labor Standard Protection (freedom of association and collective
bargaining of wages)
4. State-owned Enterprises Governance (share of government capital and
preferential treatment)
5. Government Procurement (no transparency and third-party monitoring)
6. Intellectual Property Protection ( lower standards for IP protection)
7. E-commerce and Internet Freedom (China needs to take necessary
restrictive measures on media)
10. China’s Option
–RCEP/TPP
China is not yet qualified to be a party of the TPP
negotiations. In the future, China can positively
participate and promote the RCEP negotiations, and
seek the integration of the RCEP pathway and TPP
pathway, which may be a practicable course for
China.
China’s worrisome: Losing the right to help formulate
the trade and investment rules of the twenty first
century if it’s excluded from the TPP negotiations.
11. A Perspective beyond the
Case of China
The existing pathways of integration may have
different applicability for developing and developed
countries. Radical integration may cause systemic
risks.
The establishing of super-sovereignty global values
chain management principles may ignore the
individual economies’ demands of designing their
domestic regulatory system accordingly, and it may
also cause systemic risks. (ISDS-Investor-state
dispute settlement)
12. Questions
How do sovereign states prevent the risks brought
by the expansion of the cross-border capitals that
going beyond the supervision of the sovereignties?
Should the rule-setting principles of integration be
common bottom line upgrading focused or it should
be optimal path focused?
The scholars who hold the exclusive theory maintain that the developed economies, led by the U.S., took advantage of the TPP to exclude China on purpose, a position that does not tally with the fact that government and academic circles in the U.S., Japan, and other states maintain a positive attitude about the TPP.///The “get involved immediately theory ignores the gap between China and the TPP standards, and it does not consider practical ways to ease China’s entry into the TPP