1. The opposition in both the formal political opposition and civil society has broadly been
unable to affect major influence in government policy. This has arisen largely out of the
unique historical context of South Africa that has seen political parties largely refraining from
overly robust challenges to the state, while alternate strategies influencing the incumbent
have largely failed. Furthermore, the civic society entities that had served the opposition’s
cause in the past are now the composition of government. Old avenues of addressing
government inefficiencies are no longer present and this void has only partially been filled by
new civil society in the forms of NGOs and social movements, even with the support the
highly developed and independent constitution. The inability of opposition has been seen to
provide little to the consolidation of a democracy and the lack of capable opposition tends to
reduce the pressure of accountability on the government; a mechanism that is meant to
regulate the extent of the incumbent’s control. Without in-system means of challenging the
issue of government, it is only expected that eventually unanswered frustrations will boil over
into more radical and illegal methods of affecting change. In looking at the contemporary
events of violent protest within South Africa, there are clear illustrations of the need for a
greater developed channel for opposition that is viable in influencing policy without the need
of violence to gain recognition.
In considering the characteristics and influence of opposition within South Africa, an apt
analysis cannot be conducted without an extensive consideration of the country’s political
past that has made South Africa largely distinctive from other comparative and theoretical
models. The conditions of the Apartheid era and the eventual transition have influenced the
characteristics and nature of current formal opposition parties and civil society.
In the latter part of the Apartheid era, opposition to the government came through two
streams; the legal white opposition parties and civil society movements, and the illegal
struggle movement symbolised largely by the ANC (Habib, 2005:675). The state-legitimised

2. civil society of the Apartheid era was largely insignificant as a popular entity in that it was
largely composed of pro-business and pro-apartheid interest groups that held a relatively
collegial relationship with the state (Habib, 2005:675). Alternatively, the illegal opposition,
national liberation movement (NLM), garnered huge popular support in the 1980s and,
despite attempts by the regime to repress this leftist opposition, the movement did impose
certain levels of pressure upon the government. The ANC had been the symbolic entity of the
liberation movement and with their re-entry back into SA at the start of transition; the
liberation movement largely absorbed previously independent unions and other social
movement and recast them as branches of the broader movement (Neocosmos, 1998). The
ANC became the leadership that negotiated the transition with the Apartheid government,
and eventually formed the political organisation that represented the united civil society in
the first elections. Through their chief role in the NLM and their continued dominance in
government, the ANC built up a self-perception that they were the selected medium through
which South Africa could become a consolidated democracy; their mission was to fulfil this
role. Although the commitment of the ANC is to democracy in the new era of South African
politics with apparent tolerance and acceptance of the official opposition, the ANC does not
intend the opposition to develop into a viable political alternative to their national leadership
(Butler, 2003:3). In any case, the possibility of an opposition developing to this extent does
not seem to be a pending short-term threat. The context of the apartheid regime and transition
period has provided the method through which we can now understand the contemporary
opposition in parliament and civil society and explore their extent of their shortcomings.
The introduction of the new inclusive democracy in South Africa has seen the emergence of a
far broader array of political parties than that was ever seen in the Apartheid regime. While
this has been the case, the ANC have built and maintained hegemony in government in spite
of this. In response to this the opposition have had to alter their behaviour in order to find

3. new means to influence policy without the possibility of ever dominating the decision
making. Their function has been seen then as more of political entity that serves to regulate
the incumbent rather than to compete for the majority vote (Schrire, 2001:139). The new
formal opposition that has developed has been observed to operate in three prominent styles
of opposition behaviour, that of; robust, co-optive and co-operative.
Within the robust characteristic group, the DA is the only current political opposition that
truly represents such similarities. The robust style of opposition politics is seen as the
traditional style of opposition that markedly disagrees with the ruling party over both
ideological and instrumental issues of governing. The DA has been seen throughout its post-
Apartheid history to consistently challenge the ANC over many strategies from redistribution
to economic policy (Schrire, 2001:141-142). The party has also consistently made open
attacks on the ANC with regards to lack of service delivery, abuses of state authority and
corruption. However, the DA is considerably too small to represent any real threat to power
on the ANC despite their authority in the Western Cape, and with the majority of its
constituencies made up by white and coloured population it is confronted by a huge barrier of
attaining black vote. Its robust opposition style has thus won the support of the minority races
and attained some electoral success, but the relative electoral representation is minuscule
compared to the ANC and thus has not been able to competitively influence government
policy (Schrire, 2001:142). Other parties have thus altered behaviour in order to influence
policy through more collaborative means.
The IFP can be seen as a prime example of co-optive styled opposition. While maintaining a
strong identity and independence as a political organisation, the party has often entered into
coalitions with the ruling ANC in order to gain presence at the decision-making table
(Schrire, 2001:142). The extent of this can be noted in the offering of deputy presidency to
Buthelezi in 1998 by Mbeki. However, this method has largely failed as the IFP have either

4. not had the proficiency or will to assert their presence in the coalition. While their traditional
support has been maintained by the Zulus in Natal, the IFP has not acted in a way that
deserves an increase in electoral performance (Schrire, 2001:142).
An even more subtle and collaborative method has been used by the former party of the NNP.
The old guard of the political regime have followed a co-operative style of opposition that
has tried to align the party with the ANC, so as to build links with the ruling party. In so
doing, the NNP would be able to be heard more clearly in advising policy amendments
(Schrire, 2001:143). This method has clear not been successful as the NNP have since ceased
to exist due to rapidly decreasing support (Schrire, 2001:143). In the contemporary political
realm of South Africa then, parties that contribute to the formal opposition of the incumbent
have largely been unable to impose their interest and influence upon the nation’s
administration, nor have they been able to regulate policy implemented by the ANC (Schrire,
2001:144). Therefore, the ANC has been able to maintain electoral dominance as the formal
hegemonic authority of the state.
In terms of less formal opposition in the form of civil society the influence and regulation of
government policy is still not entirely imposed. Although a civil society has been able to re-
establish since the ANC ascendancy to power, there are still certain characteristics lacking
that have limited its effectiveness on government policy influence (Ballard et al., 2005:631).
From the perspective of NGOs, the organisations have been well accommodated into the new
political system and are seen as necessary components to the democracy. The relationship
with the ANC is one of co-operation, with government providing funding and other subsidies
for the development of the sector (Habib, 2005:678). Moreover, the extent to which this
cooperative relationship has gone can be seen by the frequency of subcontracting of NGOs by
the government in fulfilling specific aspects of state functioning (Habib, 2005:678). Despite
these accommodations, concern has been raised regarding the affect that such close a close

5. relationship has on the effectiveness of NGOs as challengers to government. Fiscal support
grants have created a dependency of NGOs on government assistance that has provided
means for government to manipulate their severity and development in terms that are
favourable to the incumbent. NGOs can in some sense be seen as accountable to their
effective funders, the government, and therefore are required a certain behavioural shift for
the sake of pragmatism in that they cannot expected harsh criticism to return greater
assistance from government (Habib, 2005:680). Moreover, the fact that such a collegiate
relation exists brings into question the degree to which NGOs truly represent the
marginalised sectors that they are stated to be representing (Habib, 2005:680).
In terms of social movements, two observed features tend to undermine the marginalised
sectors that are most prone to violent protest. Firstly, it has been observed that the new forms
of civic action have not arisen independently from grassroots frustration but have rather been
reliant on the presence of human and capital resources. In the case of the much lauded
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), the backing of Zackie Achmat has been seen to have
greatly contributed to the success of the campaign due to his connections and support from
actors within the public establishment that he used to leverage the position of the TAC
(Ballard et al. 2005:627). This case does not stand alone in support of this observation, with
other cases sharing clear similarities. The second observation cited that movements have
largely arisen out the opportunities and constraints of the political environment. The
omnipotent presence of the constitution within the post-Apartheid democracy has provided
undeniable means through which challenges to government can be successful (Ballard,
2005:628). Moreover, government have not only respected the majority of the Constitutional
Court rulings, but have stressed the necessity of dialogue between social movements and the
state for the consolidation of democracy. Despite this however, there is a growing trend to be
noted that the ANC are beginning to reflect a more authoritarian rule as greater challenges to

6. the government have emerged. Some authors consider while on the one hand the ANC does
act as a good democrat, if their power comes under serious threat, the ANC will put the
maintenance of power ahead of democratic ideologies (Schrire, 2001:140). As with the
opposition, the ANC do believe the transition to require the input of all members of society,
they hold reservations to serious oppositional challenges as a threat not only to their power,
but as a threat to transition (Schrire, 2001:140). Evidence of this authoritarian nature can be
seen in the social movements of the Anti-Eviction Campaign and the Landless People’s
Movement, which has come under harsh repression from the ANC hegemony at times
(Ballard et al., 2005:628-629). Although civil society has been able to re-establish itself in
South Africa and has to some degree been able to be effectual, it still has created enough
institutional channels for all opposition to be brought forward through normative in-system
processes. There is still a significant gap in representation that has forced the hand of some
citizens to bring forward their frustrations through more illegal and radical means (Habib,
2005:687).
The combination of an ineffectual parliamentary opposition and the significant room for
improvement that the new civil society still has not filled has resulted in violent protest
becoming an increasingly viable option in achieving the demands citizens have put forward.
This has developed for two reasons. Firstly, the lack of an effective opposition in parliament
has allowed the ANC to shift its focus away from the needs of the citizens and towards
consolidating its position in power by ensuring a continued unity amongst its alliance
partners. This has meant that the government has become less accountable in terms of
meeting their needs and providing sufficient service delivery (Alexander, 2010:37). This has
grown frustrations amongst the citizens, especially the poor, as their standards of living have
not improved in majority, while the standards of their representatives have been significantly
raised, creating a feeling of relative deprivation. Secondly, the weak opposition has more

7. directly influenced the viability of violent protest by not being able to present itself as a
realistic alternative and furthermore, by not providing broadly inclusive institutional channels
through which the frustrations can be legally presented with the system structures
(Alexander, 2010:35). Violent protest has become a more effective option in some cases
because it does not require the human and capital resources that other movements require to
gain public attention (Ballard et al., 2005:231). Moreover, its radical nature develops a
certain urgency in government to resolve the issue quickly due to the negative implications
domestically and internationally.
Violent protests have been on the rise in recent years in South Africa, with the themes of
housing, service-delivery and corruption in the municipalities being the prominent areas of
citizen frustrations (Alexander, 2010:27). The continued lack of living standard development
and the ever increasing gap between the rich and poor have developed have contributed to a
new generation of aggrieved citizens. The aging youth of the honeymoon years of Apartheid
have not seen their representative government fulfil the promises laid out by the ANC
(Alexander, 2010:28). Poverty remains prominent within South African society despite the
benefits that global reintegration has provided for the economy, while the education system
has failed to appropriately develop the skills need for the continuation of labour-intensive
industries (Alexander, 2010:34). Unemployment has therefore remained at excessively high
levels. With these factors present, the youth have formed a new generation of protestors that
do not hold the same strength of loyalty to the ANC that their senior kin have held, removing
the restraint that was present in previous generations (Alexander, 2010:38). Since there is no
realistic alternative to ANC power in government and support for the causes at an in-system
institutional level are limited, violent protest emerged as the preferred means. With its
successes in achieving the protestors’ aims, option has only provided further justification for
its use (Alexander, 2010:37). In the evidence provided by commentators and participants of

8. violent protest within South Africa then, it is evident that the weakness of opposition has
been a large contributing factor to causality of violent protest.
The opposition within the Apartheid years has had huge significance on the forms of
opposition that have developed within South Africa. The contemporary opposition that is
present in the post-Apartheid era has been relatively ineffectual on influencing the ANC
dominance in government and it has continually failed to assert itself in government policy.
This has resulted in the presence of violent protests that have presented the frustrations of the
citizens effectively to the public and have clearly been successful at achieving the demands of
the protestors. Due to the reduced accountability of government for its citizens and the lack of
viable in-system channels of voicing frustrations to the government, the viability of violent
protest has increased.

9. References:
Alexander, P. 2010. Rebellion of the Poor: South Africa’s Service Delivery Protests – A
Preliminary Analysis. Review of African Political Economy, 37(123): p. 25-40.
Ballard, R, Habib, A. Valodia, I. & Zuern, E. 2005. Globalisation, Marginalisation and
Contemporary Social Movements in South Africa. African Affairs, 104(417): p. 615-634.
Butler, A. 2003. South Africa’s Political Futures The Positive and Negative Implication of
One-Party Dominance. Government and Opposition, 38(1): p.1-15.
Habib, A. 2005. State-Civil Society Relations in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Social
Research, 72(3): p. 671-692.
Neocosmos, M. 1998. From People Politics to State Politics: Aspects of National Liberation
in South Africa 1984-1994. (In Olukoshi, A. (eds.), The Politics of Opposition in
Contemporary Africa, Uppasala: Nordic Africa Institute. Also available at:
<http://www.unisa.ac.za/Default.asp?Cmd=ViewContent&ContentID=11627>
Schrire, R. 2001. The Realities of Opposition in South Africa: Legitimacy, Strategies and
Consequences. Democratisation, 8: p. 1-14.