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Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus 
Uninvited guests: why do hackers all over 
the world love our SAP landscapes?
Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 
About the speaker 
Professor for IT Security at Mannheim University of Applied 
Sciences! 
Previously Dean of Studies for a M. Sc. Programme in Security Management! 
Research professorship through EU Project „OPTET“: Operationally Trustworthiness 
Enabling Technologies! 
Management Consultant! 
SAP Security, Secure Software Engineering, Information Security Management 
Systems! 
Experience! 
8 years with SAP (Director Product Management Security, Chief Security Officer)! 
Prior to this working in SMEs in the area of security solutions and cryptology
Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 
Agenda 
SAP compliance requirements! 
Hackers and SAP systems! 
SAP and the Cloud! 
! 
The software life cycle! 
! 
Potential reasons! 
Recommendations
Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 
SAP compliance requirements 
Many, many different sources: ! 
MA Risk, GoBS, IDW PS 330, KonTraG, …! 
Sarbanes-Oxley, FDA CFR, PCI DSS, …! 
! 
Content:! 
Critical authorizations! 
Critical combinations of authorizations! 
Encryption, secure storage! 
digital signatures 
These are:! 
- functional requirements! 
- on-top solutions! 
- require low communication effort
Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 
Hackers and SAP systems 
How hackers see SAP! 
Very complicated, requires a lot of knowledge, proprietary! 
But: IF interesting, then there is no real obstacle! JUST DO IT! 
Since HANA there is a growing interest of hackers! 
These are protected by:! 
- non-functional requirements! 
- system properties! 
- communication with CISO dept 
! 
Attack surface! 
Insiders, social engineering, etc.! 
Web based access and interfaces (e.g. SQL-Injection)! 
SAP specific weaknesses (e.g. RFC, Trusted Systems)! 
Trojan horses, worms
Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 
SAP and the Cloud! 
Running SAP in the Cloud! 
Public Cloud: are the legal requirements met (e.g. data protection 
regulation)? In which legal system is the data processed? Who has 
(legitimate) access to the data?! 
Public Cloud: Are the risks higher than running SAP in-house? Depends 
against whom to protect…! 
Any Cloud: do you trust your service provider?! 
Using SAP Cloud Services! 
There is a considerable offering with different types of services…! 
… but in most cases they use standard internet technology! 
==> you need to handle standard internet / web security!
Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 
The software life cycle! 
Where do you NEED to work on security?! 
Requirements engineering ! 
Architecture and design (= mostly prescribed by SAP)! 
Coding (specifically customizing)! 
Deployment! 
Support! 
Security is important in ANY of these phases! 
If one piece is missing, all other efforts may! 
not help any more 
! 
Fact: in ALL phases awareness and competence are missing!! 
Ex. 1: Do you know your SAP security requirements?! 
Ex. 2: Do you install SAP Security Notes in a timely manner?
Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 
Potential reasons! 
Fact: in most organizations, SAP Security is way behind „normal“ 
Information Security Management! 
Potential reasons:! 
SAP operations is separated from other IT services ! 
Pure functional view on security, no quality view! 
No acceptance / understanding why firewalls are useless! 
There is not enough damage happening (resp. there is not enough communication 
about attacks)! 
Nobody is responsible! 
The software manufacturer is to blame, I cannot do anything about it! 
Access control is so tedious and costly - there is no space for something else
Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 
Recommendations: top down 
Assign the responsibility for SAP Security! 
You need a name and a face! 
Develop your SAP security strategy! 
Perform risk management - which of the risks am I ready to take? What about SAP 
operations? What about the IT department?! 
Develop your SAP security architecture! 
Choose measures and solutions - what can be done by the SAP standard - what is my 
focus area - how does all this play together?! 
Record and document your SAP security requirements! 
You need to document them to get them transparent - and subsequently addressed! 
Document and let management approve your SAP security strategy and architecture
Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 
Recommendations: organizational topics 
Cooperate with the information security department (CISO)! 
Break down the „SAP“ wall, align with your peers! 
Comparing risks may be demotivating at first, but will improve the overall 
approach! 
Cooperate with the quality assurance department! 
Security is a quality goal - and should be handled as such in the internal QA 
processes! 
Integrate security checks into Procure-to-Pay! 
Your peers do it for desktop software - why not having the same approach 
for SAP add-ons and customization?
Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 
Further recommendations 
Authorizations! 
It is more important to think about „who decides about what“ than to buy the right 
tool! 
Clear and simple organizational structures are making authorizations management a lot 
easier! 
SAP internet security! 
The (new) web- and internet-interfaces of SAP are easily accessible to hackers and 
should be treated with care, specifically SAP HANA! 
Don’t trust too much into third party products that claim to prevent attacks in real 
time (a la „Application Level Firewall“)! 
SAP specifics! 
SAP is a critical infrastructure: limit the use and accessibility of SAP specific protocols! 
Assure secure coding in ABAP!
Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus 
Uninvited guests: why do hackers all over 
the world love our SAP landscapes?

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Uninvited Guests: Why do hackers love our SAP landscapes?

  • 1. Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus Uninvited guests: why do hackers all over the world love our SAP landscapes?
  • 2. Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 About the speaker Professor for IT Security at Mannheim University of Applied Sciences! Previously Dean of Studies for a M. Sc. Programme in Security Management! Research professorship through EU Project „OPTET“: Operationally Trustworthiness Enabling Technologies! Management Consultant! SAP Security, Secure Software Engineering, Information Security Management Systems! Experience! 8 years with SAP (Director Product Management Security, Chief Security Officer)! Prior to this working in SMEs in the area of security solutions and cryptology
  • 3. Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 Agenda SAP compliance requirements! Hackers and SAP systems! SAP and the Cloud! ! The software life cycle! ! Potential reasons! Recommendations
  • 4. Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 SAP compliance requirements Many, many different sources: ! MA Risk, GoBS, IDW PS 330, KonTraG, …! Sarbanes-Oxley, FDA CFR, PCI DSS, …! ! Content:! Critical authorizations! Critical combinations of authorizations! Encryption, secure storage! digital signatures These are:! - functional requirements! - on-top solutions! - require low communication effort
  • 5. Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 Hackers and SAP systems How hackers see SAP! Very complicated, requires a lot of knowledge, proprietary! But: IF interesting, then there is no real obstacle! JUST DO IT! Since HANA there is a growing interest of hackers! These are protected by:! - non-functional requirements! - system properties! - communication with CISO dept ! Attack surface! Insiders, social engineering, etc.! Web based access and interfaces (e.g. SQL-Injection)! SAP specific weaknesses (e.g. RFC, Trusted Systems)! Trojan horses, worms
  • 6. Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 SAP and the Cloud! Running SAP in the Cloud! Public Cloud: are the legal requirements met (e.g. data protection regulation)? In which legal system is the data processed? Who has (legitimate) access to the data?! Public Cloud: Are the risks higher than running SAP in-house? Depends against whom to protect…! Any Cloud: do you trust your service provider?! Using SAP Cloud Services! There is a considerable offering with different types of services…! … but in most cases they use standard internet technology! ==> you need to handle standard internet / web security!
  • 7. Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 The software life cycle! Where do you NEED to work on security?! Requirements engineering ! Architecture and design (= mostly prescribed by SAP)! Coding (specifically customizing)! Deployment! Support! Security is important in ANY of these phases! If one piece is missing, all other efforts may! not help any more ! Fact: in ALL phases awareness and competence are missing!! Ex. 1: Do you know your SAP security requirements?! Ex. 2: Do you install SAP Security Notes in a timely manner?
  • 8. Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 Potential reasons! Fact: in most organizations, SAP Security is way behind „normal“ Information Security Management! Potential reasons:! SAP operations is separated from other IT services ! Pure functional view on security, no quality view! No acceptance / understanding why firewalls are useless! There is not enough damage happening (resp. there is not enough communication about attacks)! Nobody is responsible! The software manufacturer is to blame, I cannot do anything about it! Access control is so tedious and costly - there is no space for something else
  • 9. Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 Recommendations: top down Assign the responsibility for SAP Security! You need a name and a face! Develop your SAP security strategy! Perform risk management - which of the risks am I ready to take? What about SAP operations? What about the IT department?! Develop your SAP security architecture! Choose measures and solutions - what can be done by the SAP standard - what is my focus area - how does all this play together?! Record and document your SAP security requirements! You need to document them to get them transparent - and subsequently addressed! Document and let management approve your SAP security strategy and architecture
  • 10. Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 Recommendations: organizational topics Cooperate with the information security department (CISO)! Break down the „SAP“ wall, align with your peers! Comparing risks may be demotivating at first, but will improve the overall approach! Cooperate with the quality assurance department! Security is a quality goal - and should be handled as such in the internal QA processes! Integrate security checks into Procure-to-Pay! Your peers do it for desktop software - why not having the same approach for SAP add-ons and customization?
  • 11. Hackers love SAP systems- Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus - © paulus.consult 2014 Further recommendations Authorizations! It is more important to think about „who decides about what“ than to buy the right tool! Clear and simple organizational structures are making authorizations management a lot easier! SAP internet security! The (new) web- and internet-interfaces of SAP are easily accessible to hackers and should be treated with care, specifically SAP HANA! Don’t trust too much into third party products that claim to prevent attacks in real time (a la „Application Level Firewall“)! SAP specifics! SAP is a critical infrastructure: limit the use and accessibility of SAP specific protocols! Assure secure coding in ABAP!
  • 12. Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus Uninvited guests: why do hackers all over the world love our SAP landscapes?