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N.C.G.S.A. § 15A-404
§ 15A-404. Detention of offenders by private persons
(a) No Arrest; Detention Permitted.--No private person may arrest another person except as
provided in G.S. 15A-405. A private person may detain another person as provided in this
section.
(b) When Detention Permitted.--A private person may detain another person when he has
probable cause to believe that the person detained has committed in his presence:
(1) A felony,
(2) A breach of the peace,
(3) A crime involving physical injury to another person, or
(4) A crime involving theft or destruction of property.
(c) Manner of Detention.--The detention must be in a reasonable manner considering the offense
involved and the circumstances of the detention.
(d) Period of Detention.--The detention may be no longer than the time required for the earliest
of the following:
(1) The determination that no offense has been committed.
(2) Surrender of the person detained to a law-enforcement officer as provided in subsection (e).
(e) Surrender to Officer.--A private person who detains another must immediately notify a law-
enforcement officer and must, unless he releases the person earlier as required by subsection (d),
surrender the person detained to the law-enforcement officer.
Credits
Added by Laws 1973, c. 1286, § 1.
Editors' Notes
CRIMINAL CODE COMMISSION COMMENTARY
This section would replace the old concept of “citizen's arrest” with a concept of
“citizen's detention”. North Carolina has authorized the private citizen to make arrests in certain
limited circumstances-essentially felonies and breaches of the peace in his presence. To those
two situations we here add crimes involving physical injury to another person.
The important conceptual change is from “arrest” to “detention.” The notion of a private
citizen “arresting” another in certain circumstances at times had led persons to act without
authority and at times to place themselves or others in unjustified danger.
Perhaps a safer idea is that the private citizen may detain the offender sufficiently long to
turn him over to a law enforcement officer. Though there may be little or no difference in the
physical actions taken, it is hoped that this will be a clearer and safer concept for the private
citizen.
This section has no effect on the 1971 addition to G.S. 14-72.1, which provides that a
merchant is not civilly liable for reasonably detaining persons believed to have violated the
“shoplifting” statute.
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-404 (West)

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Important Notes:
Courts give 15A-404 its plain meaning with regard to detention:
“…the ordinary meaning of the word “detain,” and the meaning we believe our
legislature intended when it enacted G.S. 15A–404, is “To hold or keep in or as if
in custody.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1976).
State v. Wall, 304 N.C. 609, 615-16, 286 S.E.2d 68, 72 (1982)
Wall held that shooting a gun after a robber fled store property in an attempt to have
merchandise returned could not have been used to “hold or keep” the suspect, as the suspect
already departed the store property. Furthermore, the discharging of a firearm for the purpose to
detain was considered an excessive use of force for the misdemeanor crime and exceeded the
scope of a “reasonable manner” of detention. See NCGS § 15A-404(c)
The question of reasonableness under the circumstances is a fact question that a jury must
decide and one that is not to be determined by the Courts. Contrasting another set of facts against
the facts in Wall, the Court of Appeals found shooting a gun for the purpose to detain was
reasonable under the circumstances.
In Wall, a teenage girl that had not paid a convenience store for two six packs of
beer that she had put in her car and who said she was going to get the money was
shot after her car had left defendant's parking lot and therefore his control; also in
that case, the defendant stated that he shot, not to detain the girl, but in the hope
that it would cause her to bring the beer back. In this case, on the other hand, there
is evidence defendant was trying to “stop” or “catch” the deceased, who was just
a few feet away, still in defendant's parking lot, and inferentially still under his
control. In Wall the victim, at most, was a petty misdemeanant that had done no
physical harm to the defendant or anyone else, while in this case the victim had
apparently committed two felonies—one involving an assault on defendant's
person, the other an assault on defendant's wife with an automobile. Thus,
defendant's case is different from Wall's and different rules of law apply to it. In
Wall the circumstances clearly indicated that the defendant, instead of trying to
detain the victim, shot her without any reasonable basis for doing so; but in this
case, the circumstances permit contrasting inferences and the jury's determination
is therefore necessary.
State v. Ataei-Kachuei, 68 N.C. App. 209, 214, 314 S.E.2d 751, 754 (1984)
A common theme is that of giving the statute its plain meaning defines how far one may
go to detain someone. In multiple cases, pursuing a suspect while the suspect is in flight and has

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left close proximity of where the incident first occurred has been held to defy the plain language
of the statute.
The suspect “was well beyond defendant's control at the time the shots were fired,
such that defendant could no longer “detain” him.”
State v. Hout, 149 N.C. App. 490, 562 S.E.2d 470 (2002)
There may be little or no difference in the physical actions taken between an arrest or a
detention the only requirement is that whatever action is taken it must be in a “reasonable
manner considering the offense involved and the circumstances of the detention.” NCGS § 15A-
404(c)
Courts have found that an employee who was blocked into an office after refusing to turn
over keys, constituted a reasonable detention.
“The restraint in this action consisted of Edwards blocking the door while Linker
reached for the keys in plaintiff's possession. Plaintiff states that after telling
Edwards several times to let her out of the office, Edwards eventually complied.
Plaintiff was restrained for a very brief time and the restraint consisted of having
her exit from Linker's office be temporarily blocked. At no time does plaintiff
allege that any defendant used actual force to keep her in Linker's office. Based
on the evidence presented, no reasonable jury could find that the simple act of
standing in front of a door for a few seconds was a unreasonable given the
circumstances involved in the present action.”
Caldwell v. Linker, 901 F. Supp. 1010, 1015 (M.D.N.C. 1995)
False imprisonment is not defined by the reasonableness of force used, words or acts that
cause restraint against the free will of another satisfy false imprisonment. Actual force or
physical restraint is not required. The manner of restraint whether physical, actual, by words, or
threats bares no difference.
False imprisonment is the illegal restraint of the person of any one against his or
her will. E.g., Hales v. McCrory-McLellan Corp., 260 N.C. 568, 133 S.E.2d 225
(1963). The tort may be committed by words or acts; therefore, actual force is not
required. Restraint of the person is essential, whether by threats, express or
implied, or by conduct. Id. at 570, 133 S.E.2d at 227.
Rogers v. T.J.X. Companies, Inc., 329 N.C. 226, 229-30, 404 S.E.2d 664, 666
(1991)