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On Bread and Circuses:
Food Subsidy Reform and
Popular Opposition in Egypt
Ram Sachs
Advisor: Professor Lisa Blaydes
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Stanford University
May 21, 2012

iii
Abstract
In January 1977, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat faced tremendous public protest
after implementing relatively small changes to the country’s food subsidy regime. In
contrast, during the 1980s, and more aggressively in the 1990s, the government of Hosni
Mubarak implemented more consequential reductions to subsidies on core food items while
avoiding popular protest on a similar scale. I argue that the Mubarak regime engaged in
covert price increases, distribution controls, temporary policy reversals, and repression,
which allowed it to successfully reduce food subsidies without igniting regime-threatening
public opposition during this period. Following the January 2011 revolution, further reform
efforts are unlikely as the transitional democratic politics and the increased number of
political participants will block change in the short term.

v
Acknowledgements
This thesis has served to unite my academic experience at Stanford. Four years of
preparation, and the past year of writing, have produced this exploration of food, politics, and
the Middle East. The CISAC Honors Program has provided a fantastic interdisciplinary
home for this pursuit.
I am thankful to Professors Blacker and Crenshaw for their guidance in this yearlong
process. I will fondly remember the quarterly presentations, Professor Blacker’s insistence
on concise language, and Professor Crenshaw’s direction on crystallizing the “puzzle”. My
fellow CISAC students were a cornerstone of the thesis experience, both in Washington and
on campus. We gained a community that understood the travails of literature reviews and
last-minute chapters, and the thrills of inside-the-beltway meetings.
At Stanford, Professor Blaydes provided the essential expertise on Egypt to guide my
research. After discussing Egypt in her office for the past year, I hope to one day eat my own
loaf of subsidized baladi bread from a Cairo bakery.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Anat and Avi, for their support throughout
the Stanford experience, and enduring the saga of aborted travel plans to the Middle East.

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Table of Contents
I. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1
II. Literature Review....................................................................................................... 3
III. Two Days in January 1977: The First Crisis in Subsidy Reform .............................. 25
IV. Subsidy Reduction in the 1980s............................................................................... 45
V. The 1990s: Repression, Extremism, and Economic Change...................................... 63
VI. The Food Crisis of the 2000s................................................................................... 69
VII. Conclusion: Assessing Reform in Contemporary Egypt......................................... 75
VIII. Bibliography......................................................................................................... 79
Table of Figures
Figure 1: Incidence of Protests, 2004 - 2011.................................................................... 6
Figure 2: Cereal Prices and Riots in 2007 - 2008............................................................. 7

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Key Terms
Baladi: The simplest type of subsidized Egyptian bread, consisting of 82 percent
extraction. This bread serves as a staple of the Egyptian street.
Shami: Higher quality bread of 76 percent extraction flour. The type is often
included within government subsidy lists.
Fino: Highest quality bread, often baked in a Western style, consisting of 72
percent extraction flour.
Extraction Rate: The amount of flour produced from one pound of grain. Higher extraction
rate refers to the more inclusion of bran, endosperm, and germ,
contributing to a rougher texture.
A Note on the Thesis Title
The Ancient Romans served popular opinion by distributing free bread and public
entertainment during holidays. Modern Egypt has witnessed a similar dynamic, where food
subsidies have fulfilled populist desires. Management of expectations regarding food
subsidies often resembles a circus, where clowns and magicians divert the audience’s
attention.

1
I. Introduction
“We need a radical shift in the way we deal with our bread subsidy system”
-Social Solidarity Minister Gouda Abdel Khaleq, September 20111
Since the economic crises of the 1970s, Egyptian officials have attempted to reform
the bloated food subsidies regime. The new call from the post-Mubarak government
emerges from the same basic prognosis: an untargeted subsidy is draining public coffers.
The government spends $5.5 billion annually on food subsidies that support both rich and
poor. In Cairo, bread often costs no more than 1 American cent. Humans are not the only
consumers of this heavily subsidized imported wheat: loaves are used in place of animal
feed. In an era of higher global food prices and low Egyptian production, the government
faces the choice of reform, resulting in higher consumer prices and popular discontent, or
continued expenditures on increasingly expensive imports. This thesis asserts that while the
1
El Dahan, Maha. "Egypt Inches towards Far-reaching Food Subsidy Reform." Reuters, 28 Sept. 2011. Web. 05
Dec. 2011. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/28/us-egypt-food-idUSTRE78R2SD20110928>.

2
Egyptian subsidy system remains inefficient at alleviating poverty, reform and subsidy
pullback has still occurred, and often in a very aggressive fashion.
In 1977, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat faced tremendous public protest after
implementing relatively small changes to the country’s food subsidy regime. In contrast,
during the 1980s, and more drastically in the 1990s, the government of Hosni Mubarak was
able to avoid popular protest after putting into place considerably more consequential
reductions to subsidies on core food items. This paper argues that the Mubarak regime
engaged in covert price increases, distribution controls, and repression, which allowed it to
successfully reduce food subsidies without igniting regime-threatening public opposition. In
the 2000s, these coping strategies were used to dampen protests during global food price
spikes, but increased tensions forced Mubarak to rely on military forces to resuscitate the
subsidized bakery system. Following the January 2011 revolution, further reform efforts are
unlikely as transitional democratic politics and the increased number of participants in the
political system will block further change.
The following chapters will provide a chronological view of Egyptian food reform,
beginning with a review of relevant literature in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 will discuss the food
riots of January 1977, which dominate the history of Egyptian subsidy reform. Each of the
three subsequent decades will be discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. The final chapter will
analyze the prospects for subsidy reform in post-revolution Egypt.

3
II. Literature Review
The linkage between food and popular support is hardly a new phenomenon. In
Imperial Rome, emperors would provide grain to citizens, and an angry public would riot
against shortages.2
During the food crisis of 22 BC, Augustus cemented his political
influence by buying wheat for the public at his personal expense.3
Modern Egyptian regimes
have similarly viewed food as a tool for political loyalty.
This literature review will explore the linkages between protests, food prices, and
subsidy reform. The concepts outlined below will enable an analysis of Egyptian attempts at
reform from the 1970s onwards, drawing the connection between government policy, local
discontent, and the international context.
The Dynamics of Protest
This thesis will analyze the use of popular action in response to food prices and
subsidy changes. These actions emerge within the context of austerity protests.4
This phrase
typically refers to popular response to cutbacks in government outlays, especially for social
services. The term came to use during the 1970s, when international creditors forced
indebted governments to restructure expenditures. Walton and Seddon propose that these
events, whose more violent permutations have acquired the name IMF riots, include political
demonstrations, general strikes, and riots, driven by opposition to market regulation and debt
reduction policies. The first of these contemporary protests occurred in July 1976 in Peru,
2
Africa, Thomas W. "Urban Violence in Imperial Rome." The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 2.1 (1971):
3-21.
3
Harlan, J. R. "The Early History of Wheat: Earliest Traces to the Sack of Rome." Wheat Science, Today and
Tomorrow. Ed. L. T. Evans, W. J. Peacock, and O. H. Frankel. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981. 10-14.
4
Walton, John, and David Seddon. "Global Adjustment." Free Markets & Food Riots: the Politics of Global
Adjustment. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1994. 1-22.

4
followed by Egypt in January 1977. These events serve in large part as signaling
mechanisms, and as such, ought to be distinguished from revolutions.5
Revolutions aim to
change the status quo government, while riots and protests generally arise from specific
grievances.
Public demonstrations in authoritarian countries provide a useful reference for food
protests in Egypt. Authoritarian rulers fear the escalation of protests from signaling
mechanisms to regime threats. In hybrid autocracies, informational cascades allow the
message of a minority to resonate throughout the public sphere.6
Protests focusing on food,
rather the overthrow of the regime, serve as useful signals in political systems where
bureaucracies and state-controlled media often hide the impacts of public policy.
According to Bienen, authoritarian protests undergo the following stages:
1) Signaling Function: Protests enable dissatisfied citizens to publicize their
policy preferences. Participants must face political costs, such as detention.
2) Informational cues: from the size of the first protests can engage a critical
mass. If a critical mass appears, protesters gain further confidence in
challenging the existing political regime. Without a critical mass, the
protest movement recedes. At this stage, popular opinion judges the utility
of a regime.
3) Order is reestablished: or conversely, protests destabilize a regime.7
5
Hendrix, Cullen, Stephen Haggard, and Beatriz Magaloni. "Grievance and Opportunity: Food Prices, Political
Regime, and Protest." International Studies Association Convention, 15 Feb. 2009. Web. 5 Dec. 2011.
<http://www.kent.ac.uk/brussels/conference/documents/Food_prices-protests.magahaggahendrix_isa.pdf>.
6
Ibid., Kuran, Timur. "Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution." Public
Choice 61.1 (1989): 41-74.
7
Lohmann, Susanne. "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East
Germany, 1989-91." World Politics 47.1 (1994): 42-101.

5
Most protests, particularly food protests, remain in the signaling phase. Their
relatively short existence means that most engage on focused policy issues, forcing
governments to consider policy changes. Bienen and Gersovitz outline an explanation for
food protests’ relative short life-span. First, subsidy protests are spontaneous and hard to
sustain. Next, protests lack an articulated agenda beyond annulling price increases.
Furthermore, there is usually little leadership, and if leadership exists, governments use these
occasions to shut down trade unionists or the opposition.8
These arguments ignore the role of common concerns, such as food, in uniting an
opposition. Organization to develop these protests, and a growing habit of taking to the
street, can enable more forceful future protests that threaten regime legitimacy.
A more compelling reason for the relatively short life span of food riots is that
subsidy cuts are often reversed with relative ease, by bureaucratic fiat.9
Subsidies are
budgetary priorities that can be shaped by determined interest groups. Protests by urban
residents near government centers can demonstrate popular will and change policy
calculations for regime survival. The government can easily placate protesters by renouncing
cuts.
The importance of protests as signaling mechanisms emerges from an analysis of
Egyptian policy choices prior to the 1977 riots. Hopkins outlines the four target groups
assessed before the 1977 food riots in Egypt: The government decided between cuts affecting
8
Bienen, Henry S., and Mark Gersovitz. "Consumer Subsidy Cuts, Violence, and Political
Stability." Comparative Politics 19.1 (1986): 25-44.
Kricheli, Ruth, Yair Livne, and Beatriz Magaloni. "Taking to the Streets: Theory and Evidence on Protests
under Authoritarianism." (2011).
<http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/taking_to_the_streets_theory_and_evidence_on_protests_under_authorit
arianism/>.
9
Gutner, Tammi. The Political Economy of Food Subsidy Reform in Egypt. Rep. no. 77. International Food
Policy Research Institute, Nov. 1999. Web.
<http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/pubs/divs/fcnd/dp/papers/dp77.pdf>.

6
the military, industrialists, financial leaders, and the poor.10
The first three groups had
sufficient access to political leaders to shift the burden of reform to the Egyptian masses.
Protests in 1977 and 1984 provided an important channel of communication in the political
system. The elites’ seclusion from the masses, and a largely dysfunctional political system,
resulted in hidden or misleading signals from the poor.
The Relationship between Protests and Price
The literature is in agreement that protests coincide with higher price on the global
level. Statistical analyses of the food prices during the most recent peaks of high food prices
demonstrate an increased number of food protests. Lagi records food prices from 2004 to
2011, identifying price peaks coinciding with protests in 2008 and 2011. The study focuses
on protests incidents in Africa and Asia during the 2004 – 2012 time frame.
Figure 1. Incidence of protests, 2004 - 2011. Protests increase in frequency past a threshold level at 210
points on the FAO price index.11
10
Hopkins, Raymond F. "Political Calculations in Subsidizing Food." Political Calculations in Subsidizing
Food. International Food Policy Research Institute. Web.
<http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/pubs/pubs/books/ppa88/ppa88ch07.pdf>.
11
Lagi, Marco, Karla Z. Bertrand, and Yaneer Bar-Yam. "The Food Crises and Political Instability in North
Africa and the Middle East." New England Complex Systems Institute, 28 Sept. 2011. Web.
<http://necsi.edu/research/social/food_crises.pdf>.

7
Similar analysis by Brinkman and Hendrix focused on cereal prices during 2007 and
2008, analyzed on a monthly scale, reveals a similar trend.
Figure 2. Cereal Prices and Riots in 2007-2008. An increase in the FAO cereal price index from 150 to
250 resulted in a sharp and limited increase in riots during May and August 2008.12
Underlying these analyses is the increasing globalized nature of modern food
systems, which exposes consumers and producers to price pressures beyond the local
market.13
Food riot literature discusses previous changes on the scale of food systems in the
case of the European states in the 1700s. During that time, locals were increasingly angered
at the loss of food to a national market, often under growing central control and taxation.14
In these cases, a smaller harvest in other regions had adverse affects on the price and
availability of food in producer markets.
12
Brinkman, Henk-Jan S., and Cullen S. Hendrix. "Food Insecurity and Conflict: Applying the WDR
Framework." World Bank Development Repot 2011. World Bank, 2 Aug. 2010.
13
Bonanno, Alessandro. From Columbus to ConAgra: the Globalization of Agriculture and Food. Lawrence,
KS: University of Kansas, 1994.
14
Tilly, Charles, and Gabriel Ardant. "Food Supply and Public Order in Modern Europe."The Formation of
National States in Western Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Publishing, 1975. 380-455.

8
The research on modern foot protests, noted above, largely ignores local
differentiation. While the literature generally agrees about the positive relationship between
global food prices and protests, policy disparities within each country cause producer and
consumer prices to vary substantially from global indices.15
National Government Policies
The agricultural industry is significantly impacted by government policies through
both budgetary actions and trade policies. Budgetary support directly impacts consumers
through subsidies on basic commodities. Under this lower price structure, consumers will
consume more of these subsidized products.16
Agricultural producers also benefit from a
wide variety of budgetary support, including infrastructure investment, research and
development, and direct reimbursement for production.
Trade policies emerge as an important determinant of local food costs. Countries
may choose to pursue export taxes and bans to reduce local prices. This was the case in
2008, when Ukraine, seeking to blunt local consumers from higher world prices, instituted
wheat export bans. For importing nations, like Egypt, tariff structures remain important. The
Egyptian government has responded to past food crises by lowering tariffs, which may
reduce government revenues but lowers domestic food prices.
In sum, general studies focusing purely on the relationship between global price and
rioting provide a reassuring affirmation of an intuitively understandable phenomenon.
However, these studies fail to fully explain the dynamics within the local environment.
15
Alston, J. M., J. M. Beddow, and P. G. Pardey. "Agricultural Research, Productivity, and Food Prices in the
Long Run." Science 325.5945 (2009): 1209-210.
16
Besley, Timothy, and Ravi Kanbur. "Food Subsidies and Poverty Alleviation." The Economic Journal 98.392
(1988): 701-19.

9
While the basic commodity price appearing to consumers in Egypt is decoupled from
international rates, Egypt’s low food self-sufficiency does expose government budgets to
swings in international food prices.
Mechanisms for Food-Related Protests
In Political Order in Changing Societies, Huntington argues that political instability
arises from tensions within the political systems, particularly unfulfilled popular
expectations, social change, and political mobilization of dissatisfied groups.17
Drawing on
this explanation, the academic literature debates the drivers of riots through both the rational
response theory and moral economy arguments. These mechanisms are important for
understanding the groups mobilized against subsidy reform in Egypt.
The rational response theory favors an approach to riots as rebellions of the belly
based on direct linkage to economic grievances. Bohstetd describes these riots as dependent
on events like harvest failures, unemployment, depressions as the principal causes of riots.18
Affected groups riot in order to bolster their material well being by redistributing food,
changing existing political structures, and forcing government action.19
Grievance literature
ties protest to the relative deprivation theory, where the poor take to the streets in opposition
to prosperity among specific groups.20
Walton and Seddon dismiss this argument as insufficient as “it fails to explain the
process in which people decide how and when to act”.21
Tilly asserts that food riots in
17
Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
18
Bohstedt, John. Riots and Community Politics in England and Wales: 1790-1810. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1983.
19
Walton and Seddon 24.
20
Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton
University Press, 1970.
21

10
France often occurred as harvests improved, rather than during the depth of famine.22
While
one might excuse the grievance model for its limited explanations, Lichbach further
undercuts this approach with analysis countering that unequal income distribution is a strong
determinant of political unrest.23
Clark asserts that price discrepancies, rather than absolute prices, drove European
protests.24
These discrepancies could be described on the geographic scale, between town
and countryside, on the moral scale, between the “fair” conception of price and the market
status, or the temporal scale, referencing past price trends. Before discussing theories of
moral economy, it is important to note that Clark’s analysis elucidates the most recent food
research along the price-riot nexus. The previously noted research demonstrates that a slow,
gradual increase would remain unproblematic, but a sudden inflation in food prices, as
witnessed in the past decade, drives popular anger. The spike in prices during the last
decades may have stronger roots in the popular memory of affordable bread, rather than the
actual economic impact of higher prices. Bienen and Gersovitz’s analysis of previous
decades’ food riots underlines the connection linking protests to immediate and large
increases (at least 25%) in food prices.25
The shouts of dignity and fairness resonated from the town squares of 18th
century
England to Tahrir Square. In The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth
Century (1971), Thompson opposed the tendency of rational response theory to connect data
22
Tilly, Louise A. "The Food Riot as a Form of Political Conflict in France." The Journal of Interdisciplinary
History 2.1 (1971): 23-57.
23
Lichbach, Mark I. "An Evaluation of "Does Economic Inequality Breed Political Conflict?" World
Politics 41.4 (1989): 431-70.
24
Clark, Peter. "Popular Protest and Disturbance in Kent, 1558–1640." The Economic History Review 29.3
(1976): 365-82.
25
Bienen and Gersovitz 1986.

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in economic history, such as unemployment rates, with popular protest.26
Instead, Thompson
argues for a greater understanding of the social norms. He explains food riots in the 18th
and
19th
century as a result of changing market practices that disrupted accepted social patterns.
During this time, Adam Smith argued for free corn trade, among other liberal ideas.27
Market practices, liberated from protectionist local regulations, helped develop a national
market for agricultural products. While benefits accrued from more efficient distribution of
bountiful harvests, an insufficient harvest would ripple across a nation. The local tradition of
social norms and obligations was exchanged for a more unified domestic market in food.28
Tilly (1971) demonstrates in a similar analysis of seventeenth century French food riots.
Reduced government regulation broke up the extremely local paternalism and noblesse
oblige that had previously provided for the poor. The formation of a national market in grain
eroded local control and stability.
In the modern context, the moral economy argument relates to a perceived decline in
living standards and attachment to a particular foodstuff. In 1905, rioters in Santiago, Chile
protested food prices for cultural reasons: Increasing meat prices reduced access to only the
richest residents.29
An emotional attachment to a certain foodstuff is also apparent in the
most recent food riots. Italians launched ‘pasta protests’ in response to the 2007 price peaks,
which had raised prices of the basic staple by 30%. The perceived overpricing of cottage
cheese, a staple of the Israeli breakfast, sparked demonstrations in the summer of 2011 that
26
Thompson, E. P. "The Moral Economy Of The English Crowd In The Eighteenth Century." Past and
Present 50.1 (1971): 76-136.
27
Smith, Adam. "Digression concerning the Corn Trade and Corn Laws." Wealth of Nations.
28
29
Orlove, Benjamin S. "Meat and Strength: The Moral Economy of a Chilean Food Riot."Cultural
Anthropology 12.2 (1997): 234-68.

12
quickly evolved into countrywide protests against the high cost of living.30
In developed
economies, food prices hardly affect the household budget. Instead, consumers view
cherished food items as proxies for social well-being. Egyptians may also view the heavily-
subsidized baladi bread as a marker for social welfare.
Sharp counters the moral economy argument by accusing Thompson of understating
the “pain, desperation, and anger [the poor] felt in times of depression and scarcity.”31
However, in cases of true hunger, it is unlikely that political action would result, as popular
protest would not fulfill immediate individual needs.
Other authors note the role of community dynamics and the state in these
mechanisms. Snyder and Tilly reject the grievance-based approach, pointing to changing
relations between individuals and coercive power of the government as a determinant force
in protest.32
Borrowing from literature on civil war, Fearon and Latin demonstrate that it is
political opportunity that determines the rise of opposition.33
Hendrix similarly focuses on political structure as an important element of food
protests.34
In a study of different regime types, hybrid autocratic regimes face more political
protest during food price fluctuation than do democracies or full autocracies. The authors
define a hybrid regime as one with formal democratic institutions like elections, but run by a
single party. Examples include Mexico under the PRI and the subject of this thesis, Egypt.
30
Golan, Galia. "The Domestic Impact on Israel of the “Spring,” “Summer,” and September." Middle East
Program: Occasional Paper Series. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011. Web.
<http://wilsoncenter.net/sites/default/files/Domestic%20Impact%20on%20Israel.pdf>.
31
Sharp, Buchanan. In Contempt of All Authority: Rural Artisans and Riot in the West of England, 1586-1660.
Berkeley: University of California, 1980.
32
Snyder, David, and Charles Tilly. "Hardship and Collective Violence in France, 1830-1960." American
Sociological Review 37.5: 520-32.
33
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War."American Political Science
Review 97.01 (2003): 75.
34
Hendrix et al. 2009.

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Food Subsidies and Egyptian Society
While tariffs and trade policy do play some role in determining the price of food in
Egypt, consumer subsidies have historically had the largest impact. Consumers, rather than
producers, are the key constituencies for Egyptian political leaders. As a result, consumer
subsidies and their withdrawal determine the relationship between protests and food prices in
Egypt.
Thomson posits that the Egyptian subsidy system emerges out of the aims of
government development policies and the characteristics of the Egyptian population.35
Subsidies provide food supply at a stable price level, alleviating hunger and maintaining
human capital. Egypt’s high degrees of urbanization and population concentration provided
the opportunity for an interventionist state to develop a subsidized commodities distribution
and bakery network.
Egyptian government policy has viewed industrialization as the key development
strategy. The government attempted to support new industry by ensuring low wages by
maintaining a low cost of living. Food, the most basic commodity, emerges as a primary
means of managing these costs.
While agreeing that economic forces play a role in setting subsidies, Hopkins
discounts the development-driven argument by highlighting that “political leaders value
tenure in office.” Instead, he argues that political calculations “are usually decisive and that
they fully explain the expansion and contraction of state intervention in the food system.”36
These political calculations are focused on regime survival. A careful balancing of political
35
Thomson, Anne. "Egypt: Food Security and Food Aid." Food Policy 8.3 (1983).
36
Hopkins 1988.

14
support and opposition to food subsidies determines a regime’s propensity towards reform or
further entrenchment.
Hopkins outlines the origins of subsidies as one of three factors: social welfare goals,
external international factors, and the political impacts of subsidy policies. It is important to
note that social welfare, in his critical view, arises primarily from ideological calculations by
socialist and populist leaders.
This model fits well for the Egyptian case. As in other former British colonies, the
external pressure of World War II brought about a system of food rationing to control the
supply and price of basic goods. Following the end of hostilities, Egypt maintained these
controls. Nasser’s socialist ideology and cheap American wheat enabled the expansion of the
food subsidy system.
Hopkins’ argument emerges as particularly salient in Egypt’s experience of dictators
concerned about public opinion of certain groups, rather than extensive economic reforms.
While emerging for war exigencies, food rationing became embedded as a citizen’s right and
While emerging for war exigencies, food rationing became embedded as a citizen’s right and
blame fell on the government for price increases.
Vocal constituencies become a central element in a political analysis of food
subsidies. Subsidies can instill support for the regime by providing “material side payments”
to these constituencies and providing a “diffuse symbolic fulfillment of a social contract.”37
These arguments combine the rational response and moral economy theories of food protests.
Singerman, writing in 1995, explains that:
“The Egyptian Government's policies of political exclusion have gone hand in hand
with their public commitment to provide for the basic needs of the population... the
37
Hopkins 1988.

15
government maintains its legitimacy by providing goods and services to the
population."38
Sadiki has defined this arrangement, prevalent in the Arab World, as demuqratiyat al-
khubz39
, in which bread or other basic commodities are the currency for regimes to buy
popular support.40
Food subsidies are particularly attractive to rulers worried about large urban
populations, who have a propensity to politically organize and instigate policy change.
Urban areas contain civil servants and urban labor, which often form the strongest non-
military interest groups. In many decolonized nations, the large low-income urban class
worked for the government. Subsidies targeted towards these groups strengthen the link
between government and population. The “selectorate”, made up of the subset of the
population that threatens regime rule, is thus coopted.41
It is important to note that price controls also negatively impact agricultural
producers. The Egyptian food system, particularly wheat controls, has substantially reduced
producer incentives. Between 1950 and 1980, domestic wheat production grew by only 76%
while overall consumption grew nearly 450%.42
Imports financed through government
purchase and food aid provided the bulk of this difference. As demonstrated later in this
chapter, PL-480 food aid and its provision of cheap American wheat encouraged the shift in
consumer demand.
38
Singerman, Diane. Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1995.
39
The phrase can be literally translated as “democracy of bread.” Thought often used to refer to other social
service provisions, the phrase’s focus on the food-governance link highlights its importance.
40
Sadiki, Larbi. "Towards Arab Liberal Governance: From the Democracy of Bread to the Democracy of the
Vote." Third World Quarterly 18.1 (1997): 127-48.
41
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. 2003. The Logic
of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
42
Thompson 1983.

16
The Role of Food Aid
Egypt received extensive food aid from the United States through the Public Law 480
program, which in turn solidified the Egyptian demand for bread and built government
capacity for distribution. Food thus became deeply political, involving both domestic
political consideration and Egypt’s foreign policy orientation.
The Egyptian government has maintained these stable prices through extensive
imports and the Public Law 480 food aid program. During earlier decades, food aid
comprised more than 50% of food imports, reducing pressure for budgetary reform.43
Egypt’s government was able to fully develop the subsidy system, and later extend its
survival, using food subsidies.44
The role of Public 480 aid in Bangladesh demonstrates the impact of food aid on
recipient nations. Public Law 480 helped bolster the rationing system of the then-East
Pakistan, dramatically changing local diets. Bengalis moved from a traditional rice diet,
produced locally, towards higher wheat consumption, enabled by American farms. This
evolution exposed Bangladesh towards greater dependence on foreign food sources.45
A similar trend can be witnessed in Egypt. Income growth and population do not
fully explain the 450% rise in consumption for wheat during the thirty years preceding 1977.
During the post-war era through the 1970s, Egypt maintained stable nominal bread prices. In
real terms, prices declined, driving an increase in consumption.46
43
Thompson 1983.
44
Hopkins 1988.
45
Ahmed, Raisuddin, Steve Haggblade, and Tawfiq-e-Elahi Chowdhury. Out of the Shadow of Famine:
Evolving Food Markets and Food Policy in Bangladesh. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2000.
46
Alderman, Harold, Joachim Von Braun, and Ahmed Sakr. Egypt's Food Subsidy and Rationing System: a
Description. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1982.

17
The Political Economy of Economic Reform in Egypt and Developing Economies
The era of economic reform in Egypt began in October 1974, when President Anwar
Sadat announced the new policy of Infitah. The “opening” of the Egyptian economy
included allowing direct private investment, reducing state intervention in the economy, and
partnering with international finance organizations.47
Sadat’s new orientation marked a
dramatic policy shift from the import-substitution and self-sufficiency promoted under
Nasser.
Conditions placed on the government of Egypt by creditors, mainly Western nations
and international organizations, slowly pushed forward this economic liberalization. These
programs included privatization of state enterprises, foreign exchange adjustments, and
subsidy reform.
The literature on economic reforms, and the requirement for their success, will guide
the subsequent analysis of Egyptian food subsidies from the 1970s to the present. Haggard
and Webb outline the successful elements of an economic reform policy.48
The literature on
policy design largely aligns with the same general framework, but provides differing
diagnoses on the challenges of implementation.
Successful reform programs generally share the following characteristics:
1. Acting without delay builds public credibility. Rapid implementation following the
formulation and announcement of reforms strengthens the potential for success. In
cases where macroeconomic balances are not as severe, slower reforms may also be
successful.
47
Abdel-Khalek, Gouda. "Looking Outside, or Turning Northwest? On the Meaning and External Dimension of
Egypt's Infitah 1971-1980." Social Problems 28.4 (1981): 394-409.
48
Haggard, Stephan, and Steven B. Webb. "What Do We Know About The Political Economy Of Economic
Policy Reform?" The World Bank Research Observer 8.2 (1993): 143-68.

18
2. Instituting reforms at the onset of a new administration allows shifting political blame
to previous leaders and ensuring sufficient time for the full implementation of the
reform package.
3. Reforms result in both gains and losses to social groups. Bundling reform measures
can better distribute the impacts of reform. In addition, compensation is an important
means of winning the support of a negatively impacted group.
Given Egypt’s closed political structure until January 2011, it is also important to
discuss economic reform within the context of authoritarian states. Many economists view
states with strong executives or limited checks-and-balances as successful implementers of
reform. Pinochet’s liberalization of the Chilean economy, later reaffirmed by democratic
elections in 1989, takes a prominent place among supporters of the “authoritarian
advantage.”49
However, neither autocracies nor democracies are immune to the challenges
faced by reformist governments.
Reform efforts require commitment and perseverance, as the benefits of liberalization
may only bear fruit after several years. The delayed rewards of policy adjustment raises the
barrier for leaders beholden to public opinion. The election cycle of democracies may
impede strategic longer-term thinking. In contrast, long-lasting authoritarian regimes may
include the distant benefits to immediate policy calculations.50
In less-developed countries, income disparities and social stratification emerge as a
primary area for conflict. Alesina and Tabellini demonstrate that greater inequality leads to
49
Rodrik, Dani. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform." Journal of Economic Literature 34.1 (1996).
50
Haggard and Webb 1993.

19
polarization of society, particularly during points of policy change.51
These groups, with
hardened opinions, may begin a “war of attrition,” with little desire for compromise.
Subsequent studies by Alesina and Drazen demonstrate that in more unequal societies, a
longer delay occurs before stabilization and reforms are implemented.52
An argument may
emerge that authoritarian regimes are more free from these rent-seeking groups prevalent in
democratic processes. However, Olson demonstrates that “decreased turnover and political
competition result in more entrenched interest groups.”53
Authoritarian regimes have greater
coercive force to suppress dissent, but policy implementation may be less informed as public
debate is stifled. Only select interest groups may have the sufficient resources and access to
opine on policy, thus excluding significant portions of the public interest. On the topic of
these entrenched interest groups, Ranis and Mahmoud assert, “resistance to vested interests
can be overcome only when the system has no other ways of avoiding the required
adjustment.”54
This element comes into play during Egypt’s reforms in the 1980s and 1990s.
Richards highlights extensive economic rents as the key differentiator between Egypt
and other countries attempting reform.55
Egypt’s use of oil revenues, remittances, and most
critically, strategic rent, serves as an escape hatch for the regime. Strategic rent refers to the
extensive aid agreements between the United States and Egypt, which grew dramatically
following Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel. While Egypt shares the characteristics of other
less developed countries in its large and ineffective government and powerful interest groups,
51
Alesina, Alberto, and Guido Tabellini. "External Debt, Capital Flight and Political Risk."Journal of
International Economics 27.3 (1989): 199-220.
52
Alesina, Alberto, and Allan Drazen. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?" American Economic Review 85.5
(1991): 1170-88.
53
Olson, Mancur. "Autocracy, Democracy, and Prosperity." Ed. Richard Zeckhauser. Strategy and Choice.
Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1991.
54
Ranis, Gustav, and Syed Akhtar. Mahmood. The Political Economy of Development Policy Change.
Cambridge, MA: B. Blackwell, 1992.
55
Richards, Alan. “The political economy of dilatory reform: Egypt in the 1980s.” World Development. 19.12
(1991): 1721-30.

20
it is these three rents that decouple government budgets from the domestic economic
situation. Given Egypt’s declining oil revenues and unstable remittance flows, strategic rent
has become the most dependable external support for the government. The country’s foreign
policy orientation has enabled a closer relationship with the United States, increased access
to aid, by extension, increased bargaining power with international lending organizations.
Multiple and competing goals, including strategic interests and economic agreements,
complicate the relationship between loan providers, aiming for better government
accountability, and the recipient state. The United States - Egypt relationship, which
intertwines foreign aid and American regional goals, has undercut efforts towards aid
effectiveness through conditionality. Rodrik notes, “promises of aid, even when tied to
economic improvements, can result in groups delaying stabilization until aid reduces…
costs” for the groups in question.56
The use of strategic rent may exacerbate the social
gridlock caused by inequality. In the following case studies of failure, one is likely to
witness the effect of aid in dissuading the follow-through of reform. As noted economic
Jeffrey Sachs explains, “Aid is only helpful once a government is committed to reform”.57
Providing conditional-based aid to a government that lacks sufficient will or intent to reform
may only result in disappointment for the donor.
As a final note to this section, price fluctuations of subsidized food commodities will
likely to provide added incentive for reform. Ranis and Mahmoud demonstrate that reform
efforts in less developed countries can be tied to world price shifts for primary products and
56
Rodrik 1996.
57
Sachs, Jeffrey. “Life in the Economic Emergency Room.” The Political Economy of Policy Reform. Ed. John
Williamson, 1994.

21
business cycles in developed economies.58
Given Egypt’s exposure, via import dependency,
to world food prices, reform will likely be intertwined with these commodities’ fluctuations.
Applying Economic Liberalization Lessons to Food Subsidy Reforms
The integration of concepts in economic liberalization and food subsidies reform
serves as a final step towards developing an analytical baseline for the following case studies.
Hopkins compares food subsidies reform in developing countries using Egypt and Sri
Lanka as opposing examples. Hopkins criticizes the ineffectiveness of Egyptian reform,
particularly in 1977, over the following issues: “First, government actions were neither well
prepared nor undertaken in a way that promoted acquiescence. Second, the Egyptian
government was divided over the issue. And third, the government was less legitimate than
was the Sri Lankan government.”59
This framework provides three criteria for explaining relative success and failure:
First, public outreach and preparation ensure public consent. Second, bureaucratic and
political unity ensures implementation. Third, regime legitimacy, distinct from this policy
action, is an important element towards strengthening implementation.
Beyond these three reasons, we must also include some measure of public confidence
in government functions. For public consent, the withdrawal of subsidies must rebalance the
social contract with some other form of positive government involvement. The public must
believe that in some form, its economic status will improve. An ineffective government
58
Ranis and Mahmoud 1992.
59
Hopkins 1998.

22
promising to cut a seemingly effective program draws the ire of a public dissatisfied with
previous reforms and changes.60
A leading scholar of the Egyptian subsidy system, Tammi Gutner, highlights
government commitment to reform, public perception towards reform, and strategic
implementation of reform as key determinants of success.61
Her analysis dovetails with
existing economic reform literature, but tailors recommendations to the Egyptian political
context and food subsidy reform.
Gutner agrees that government commitment to reform is strongest after elections,
when legitimacy is strongest. New regimes can demonstrate popular support among
entrenched constituencies or against groups angered by the cuts.62
Long-lasting regimes that
attempt cuts, but lack popular legitimacy, face greater challenges. Regime change
engineered by a small military cohort (Sadat-Mubarak, for example), may not maintain
legitimacy to implement reform.
In contrast to previously cited authors, Gutner explains that an incremental approach
towards subsidies prevents individuals groups from linking up in opposition and instead
“spreads the burden of adjustment.” This represents an important distinction from the
literature on economic liberalization, which usually cautions against gradualism in favor of
bundling. Gutner thus targets her advice to the authoritarian context of the Egyptian political
system, where the regime can determine policy without extensive public consultations.
In addition to defusing tension through gradual reforms, public outreach is another
successful tactic. Public perception towards reform often revolves around issues of equity.
60
Graham, Carol. Safety Nets, Politics, and the Poor: Transitions to Market Economies. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1994.
61
Gutner 1999.
62
Alderman 1991.

23
Dialogue with middle class groups can engage actors in ensuring that the withdrawal of
subsidies to the better off does not result in protests. Governments can provide an economic
vision in return.63
Compensation, originally broached during the economic reform discussion, is
particularly important for food subsidies reform. Compensation helps offset the increased
cost of food. Gutner cites Pakistan’s approach, where government salaries increased or taxes
were lowered when subsidy withdrawal occurred. However, this approach has major failings
for individuals in the informal economy: Minimum wage or government salary increases do
not apply to many poor urban constituents.
The preceding literature review has discussed the theoretical context of food riots and
reform efforts. When discussing Egypt, the literature primarily focuses on the 1977 food
riots with only passing mention to other incidents. This following chapters will apply
theories and understandings about food riots and reforms to the range of incidents since
1977. Drawing together these incidents will reveal a progression of Egyptian policy
responses, demonstrating how reform of the food subsidy system takes place within the
larger political context.
63
Nelson, Joan M. Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment. New Brunswick, USA:
Transaction, 1989.

25
III. Two Days in January: The First Crisis in Subsidy Reform
The Riots and Aftermath of January 18 – 19, 1977
The origin of Egypt’s challenge with food subsidy reform emerges from the aborted
reforms of January 1977. The government’s abrupt announcement of policy changes
interlocked with existing social complaints to create the riots and demonstrations that
engulfed Egypt for two days. As a result of these events, the Egyptian government retreated
in its reform efforts. In later years, reform was dominated by a more cautious and gradual
approach to prevent a reoccurrence of mass popular unrest. The riots of 1977 provide the
essential starting position for understanding how the Egyptian government accomplished
later subsidy reform.
The following chapter first introduces the economic and political background to
contextualize the aborted reforms and popular opposition. Subsequent sections describe the
events of the January 1977 and their implications both for reform and Egypt’s domestic and
regional standing. The final section covers subsidy changes and reform efforts later in the
decade.
The Beginnings of Infitah: The Open Door Policy
Anwar Sadat came to power in 1970 with the heavy burden of economic challenges
and the need for modernization. Nasser’s Egypt had created a government-dominated
economy with excessive and growing external imbalances and debts. Sadat’s decisions to
turn rightward, towards Western capitalism, riled Nasserites and left-wing Egyptians.

26
The shift of power between establishment Nasserists to the new capitalists supportive
of liberalization naturally upset the existing social balance. Egyptian left-wing critic Nadime
Lachine characterizes the Nasser regime as a “new bourgeoisie” to replace the pre-1952 rural
and urban capitalist alliance. Army officers, professionals, and mid-level bureaucrats
dominated this class.64
The state expropriated the means of production, leading to a socialist
outlook and central planning. In contrast, Sadat embraced private capital, particularly from
abroad, as a key towards reforming the economy. Waterbury highlights Law 65 of 1971 as
the first step towards securing foreign investment with a loosened corporate tax regime and
the autonomy of joint ventures.65
A marked shift from the nationalization campaigns of
Nasser can be seen by the 1974 decision by the Highest Court of Appeals “declaring all
confiscation and sequestration of private property illegal.”66
Thus, Sadat realigned economic
policy towards the West, creating a more robust framework of property rights protection and
private capital investment.
Separate from ideological considerations, subsidies ballooned prior to the January
1977 riots due to global macroeconomic changes. In particular, the increase in world oil
prices impacted the cost of petroleum and all goods transported in the economy. In 1972, by
consequence, food security became a major policy issue, as world grain prices increased
from $60 to $250/ton. The infitah era, Waterbury states, “marks a sharp break with the
socialism of the 1960’s, at which time consumer subsidies first gained some importance.”67
Until 1977, the Egyptian government had largely resolved to insulate the Egyptian people
from this inflation.
64
Lachine, Nadime. "Class Roots of the Egyptian Regime." MERIP Reports 56 (1977): 3-7. Print.
65
Waterbury, John. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton UP, 1983. 129. Print.
66
Lachine 1977.
67
Waterbury 218.

27
Semblances of Political Liberalization
While the Open Door policy markedly reshaped the economy and threatened existing
institutional and social interests, Sadat also began pursuing political liberalization.
During the early transition years of the regime, Sadat demonstrated a desire to realign
Egypt away from the one-party system of Nasser, dominated by the Arab Socialist Union
(ASU). In May 1977, Sadat told a crowd of Nasserite students, “What does Nasserism
mean? It turned out that we must reintroduce the detention camps, custodianship, and
sequestration. We must revert to a one-opinion, one-party system, abandon democracy, and
adopt Marxism.”68
The ASU and its leadership represented a competing power base to
Nasser’s successor.
The Corrective Revolution of 1971 enabled Sadat to take control of ASU functions
and distance his rivals. After increasing opposition and an attempted coup attempt by Ali
Sabri and other figures of the ancien regime, Sadat dismissed Sabri from his position as Vice
President and demoted his co-conspirators. Rivlin characterizes this period as “the ousting of
the leftists,” given Sadat’s increasing focus on private capital.69
Waterbury characterizes
Sadat’s perception of the left as his primary source of opposition. “In retrospect it appears
that Sadat must have anticipated most of his political opposition from the left in the form of
Nasserists, Marxists, and assorted radical student. He may have overestimated their
potential, but given the disturbances of 1972 and 1973 that is understandable.”70
These
68
2 May 1977 Press Review, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Database, Cairo Domestic Service in
Arabic
69
Rivlin, Paul. The Liberalization of the Egyptian Economy: An Examination of the Decision-making Process.
Tel Aviv: Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1981. 7.
70
Waterbury 359.

28
disturbances, led by students immersed in Nasserist ideology, opposed the increasingly
obvious change of official ideology.
Sadat’s standing among the Egyptian public rose following the 1973 October War,
which helped disperse the anti-Sadat student sentiment of the previous two years. In April
1974, Sadat issued the October Paper, which rejected the single party governance of the
previous decades.71
The new political outlook incorporated platforms (manabir) into the ASU. By 1976,
Sadat organized politics through three groups, representing the “Right” (Liberal Socialist
Organization, Al-Ahrar Al-Eshtarakyeen), “Left” (National Progressive Unionist
Organization, al-Tagammu ), and “Center” (Egyptian Arab Socialist Organization, Tanzim
Masri Al-Araby Al-Eshtraky). The subsequent parliamentary election that year tilted heavily
rightwards. The centrist party, openly supported by Sadat, won 280 of 352 seats. A strong
contingent of 48 Independents successfully won office, but the designated parties of the
“Right” and “Left” won merely twelve and two seats, respectively. Waterbury characterizes
this period, including the fall of 1976 and the first two weeks of January 1977, as “the
heydey of Sadat’s liberal experiment”.72
While Egypt desperately required an infusion of foreign aid to cover its balance-of-
payments deficit, timing for reform was key. Subsidy announcements were only made
following the 1976 elections.
In Waterbury’s judgement, Sadat was more open to political diversity than Nasser,
but ultimately, Sadat “reverted to the Nasserist style he nominally abhorred.”73
In large part,
this was undoubtedly due to the events of 1977, which pushed against the political
71
Beattie, Kirk J. Egypt during the Sadat Years. New York: Palgrave, 2000. 167.
72
Waterbury 366-367.
73
Waterbury 354.

29
liberalization of the earlier decade. Sadat’s liberalization likely intended to undermine the
Arab Socialist Union, the vanguard of Nasser’s rule, but also raised expectations regarding
political openness and change.
Following the election, Sadat strengthened the reformist elements within the
government. In November 1976, a cabinet reshuffle focused on bringing more reform-
minded players into the cabinet.74
Ironically, these changes actually highlight the ongoing
disagreements among the elite on ongoing liberalization and proposed changes to the subsidy
system.
Financial Decisions, International Creditors, and the Road to January
During the entirety of the Sadat era, Egypt suffered an increasing budget deficit and a
significant balance-of-payments challenge from excessive imports. Hirst and Beeson
calculated that in 1973, national debt stood at 1.25 billion Egyptian pounds (EP), with an
additional 2 billion Egyptian pound military debt to the USSR. Each subsequent year saw a
significant rise in the annual deficit, from 249.8 million EP in 1973, 670 million in 1974, to
1,386 million in 1975. In the second half of 1976, Egypt witnessed 1.25 billion EP deficit.75
The increasingly deteriorating situation forced Prime Minister Mamdouh Salem to confront
the budget imbalance.
In order to close the deficit, the GOE had three options: tax the rich, cut military
expenditures, or rely on external borrowing.76
Egypt’s tax collection rates are notoriously
low, and given the Infitah reliance on bourgeois support, taxes would not fit within the GOE
policy orientation or capacity. Despite ongoing American shuttle diplomacy on Arab-Israeli
74
Feiler 193.
75
Hirst, David, and Irene Beeson. Sadat. London: Faber and Faber, 1981. 123.
76
Ansari, Hamied. Egypt, the Stalled Society. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986. 185.

30
peace, the continued threat of war with Israel discarded any possibility of cutting military
expenditures. As a result, external borrowing became the most viable option. Egypt’s two
most appealing sources of funding were the oil-rich Arab states and Western finance
agencies under the guise of the United States.
Egypt had an extensive aid relationship with the wealthier Gulf states. Pan-Arab
support for Egypt, a front-line country in the fight against Israel, intended to bolster its
strategic position. Feiler highlights the year 1976 as a major turning point in policy, when
the individual Arab states began funneling funding through the Gulf Organization for the
Development of Egypt (GDFE). Managers of this fund evaluated Egyptian requests for aid,
and added the primary condition that Egypt accept IMF reforms. Upon its founding its July
1976, the GDFE received only $2 billion in funding, much less than the $12 billion requested
by Sadat.77
In October 1976, the GDFE, a consortium of Arab countries, refused to provide a
$1-1.2 billion loan to fund Egypt’s balance of payments deficit.78
In this context, Egypt’s
situation was clearly dire, as its balance of payment gap stood at around $4 billion in 1975.79
The Western finance agencies remained the next appealing options. However, the IMF took
a strong approach against Egypt’s widely-applied subsidies on basic goods.
Throughout this period, posturing on Egyptian national sovereignty became common.
Minister of the Treasury Muhammad Zaki Shafi stated: “We will not bow to any pressure,”
even while Egyptian officials repeatedly traveled abroad with requests for aid.
77
Feiler, Gil. Economic Relations between Egypt and the Gulf Oil States, 1967-2000: Petro Wealth and
Patterns of Influence. Brighton, England: Sussex Academic, 2003. Print.166.
78
Adams, Richard H. Self-targeted Subsidies: The Distributional Impact of the Egyptian Food Subsidy System.
Washington, DC: World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, Poverty Division,
2000. Print; Feiler 139.
79
Waterbury, John. Egypt : Burdens of the Past, Options for the Future. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1978. 307.

31
Riots in the Street: A Popular Uprising and the Official Response
In January 1977, Egypt complied with IMF negotiators and undertook a first step
towards reducing subsidies. The Egyptian food subsidy system has three types of bread and
flour – 82 percent extraction, know as baladi, 76 percent extraction, know as shami, and 72
percent extraction, know as fino. In 1977, the price of lower-grade baladi and shami bread
remained untouched. Meanwhile, price increases were announced for high-grade fino bread
(50 percent increase), 72 percent grade flour (67 percent), sugar (4 percent), rice (20 percent),
tea (canceled subsidy), butane cooking gas (46 percent), gasoline (26-31 percent), and
cigarettes.80
While the most essential commodities remained unchanged, the public
responded with extreme opposition.
Following the announcement of the subsidy cuts on January 17, thousands took to the
streets in major Egyptian cities, representing a major affront in Egypt’s repressive political
system. In Cairo, 2,000 – 4,000 protestors riots.81
In Alexandria, 20,000 people marched.
Authorities placed a nighttime curfew over major cities and set up barricades.82
Local
newspapers highlighted the damage done to private property and institutions through fires
bombs and crowd violence.83
The government suspended studies at universities and schools
for two days.84
In sum, 79 were reported killed and 566 injured during the rioting, with
around 1,250 arrested.85
80
Alderman, Harold, and Joachim Von Braun. Egypt's Food Subsidy Policy: Lessons and Options. Washington,
D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1986.
81
Daines, Victoria, John Walton, and David Seddon. Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global
Adjustment. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994. Print. 184.
82
19 January 1977 Press Review, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Database, Paris AFP in English
83
19 January 1977 Press Review, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Database, Cairo MENA in Arabic
84
19 January 1977 Press Review, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Database, Cairo Domestic Service in
Arabic
85
Arabic. Tanner, Henry. "A Stringent Decree Put to Vote in Egypt." New York Times 11 Feb. 1977. Print.

32
Official Response to Riots: Rhetorical Explanations and Attacks
The government engaged in a multi-pronged approach towards confronting popular
protest. On media outlets, officials reiterated the need to reform the subsidy system to
protect the poor and resuscitate state finances. Simultaneously, blame for violence was
firmly placed on left wing elements and the Soviet Union, rather than legitimate popular
sentiment.
On January 18, Deputy Prime Minister Kaysuni, Minister of the Economy Hamid Al-
Sayih, Minister of Finance Salah Hamid, and chief editors of the country’s leading
newspapers participated in a televised debate on the proposed reforms. Kaysuni argued that
in order to overcome the “severe and profound” economic situation, Egypt must directly
confront in deficit. Interestingly, in a relatively closed authoritarian government, Kaysuni
argues that GOE must submit an “honest budget” that “refrains from making promises that
we cannot keep… we cannot deceive the people.” In essence, openness appears to be the
underlying strategy for this first preliminary round of subsidy cuts. The GOE leadership
publicly disclosed and discussed these subsidy changes, and engaged in a well-publicized
campaign to explain its eventual decision.86
As the leader of these reforms, Kaysuni argues that in Egypt’s hierarchy of interests,
subsidy cuts were the best option. The Egyptian budget, in his conception, was divided along
three main objectives. The budget protects military and investments targeted towards social
and economic development, while targeting the allocations for expenditure items. Kaysuni
appealed to nationalist sentiment, asking rhetorically how the military, “on which we pin our
86
19 January 1977 Press Review, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Database, Cairo MENA news service
in Arabic

33
hopes for the liberation of our lands,” could face cuts in its one-fourth stake of the national
budget. In hindsight, this ironic appeal highlights not nationalist sentiment, but the integral
role of the military in Egyptian public life. Within a year, Sadat will have traveled to
Jerusalem, and in 1979, signed a peace treaty with Israel.87
Kaysuni attempts to differentiate the elements of subsidy reform from the anger of the
masses. In his view, “the toiling masses” will be unaffected by the reforms, which will
instead cut into the “huge profits” of commodity dealers. Salah Hamid attempts to reiterate
that basic commodities, such as bread, meat, and lentils, will be unaffected. The “toiling
classes” remain an important element throughout this discussion, in attempt to paint these
reforms as populist attempts.88
Finally, in an important note given the aforementioned discussion regarding foreign
creditors’ role in these reforms, Kaysuni “denies… this decision was made under pressure
from any foreign source such as the IMF.”89
This statement underlines the desire from the
GOE to maintain the semblance of independence, although continuing to rely heavily of
foreign infusion of aid and loans.
On January 18, Dr. Fu’ad Muhyi ad-Din, Minister of State for People’s Assembly
affairs, during the plan and budget committee meeting, stated, “The government is ready to
join in making an objective review of the price list announced yesterday in such a way as not
to affect the toiling classes.” In the same report, Vice Premier Kaysuni mentioned the further
discussions of prices among assembly members would be taken into consideration.90
This
87
in Arabic
88
in Arabic
89
in Arabic
90

34
quick questioning of the policy, emerging from the highest reaches of the elite, only served to
further embolden protests in the following day.
The Arab Socialist Party statement, released on January 19, appeared to further
highlight splits within the elite. The party’s parliament “announced its disapproval of
commodity price increases that would harm broad masses of the people.” In contrast to
Kasyuni’s attempts to differentiate these commodity cuts from the “toiling masses”, the party
statement instead takes on the populist narrative. The General Federation of Students issued
a similar call to “revise” the recent decisions on raising prices, appealing to the People’s
Assembly to stop the reforms.91
A statement from the Interior Ministry on the evening of January 18 sets up the
government’s assault on violent protests as the work of leftist agents. The statement places
blame on Communist and Marxist elements for attacks and violence in Cairo, Helwan, and
Alexandria. In particular, the statement singles out groups calling themselves “Nasserites.”
Given Sadat’s uneasy relationship with the legacy of his predecessor, such as a statement
identifies these groups as highly subversive. A related statement issued by the Ministry of
the Interior on the morning of January 19 warned that “communist-led demonstrations”
would be fired upon.92
On January 22, newspapers ran papers highlighting a plan to burn Cairo, discovered
in the hands of the banned Communist Labor Party. These reports portrayed a far-reaching
conspiracy with “command committees” present in several Egyptian provinces.93
91
24 January 1977 Press Review, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Database, Paris AFP
92
Arabic
93
Arabic

35
The government not only used the riots to harass leftist elements, but also publicly
assailed wealthier Arab nations from skirting their obligations to Egypt, which had so
fiercely championed Arab nationalism. The Arab Socialist Party statements calls on other
Arab nations to remember their commitments to Egypt’s continued war effort. Egyptian
author Naguib Mahfouz highlights officialdom’s anti-Arab feelings: “Why should our
nationalism create hunger and suffering only? …I implore with all my strength that we
abandon the Arabs if they have decided to abandon us.” Trade unions all moved to support
the government, calling for calm and a halt to disturbances.94
By the afternoon of January 19, Prime Minister Salim suspended the decision on
commodity prices. On January 20, the People’s Assembly Plan and Budget committee,
composed of Kaysuni and other relevant figures, decided on the cancellation of all increases
in the commodities to their status prior to January 17.95
The regime quickly attempted to consolidate the official line away from the
conflicting statements emerging from Parliament, political parties, and individual officials.
Reports in the subsequent days aimed to portray the regime as united, highlighting President
Sadat and Vice President Mubarak meeting with leaders of state institutions. Letters of
support are noted from King Khalid of Saudi Arabia and Sudanese President Numayri. On
June 23, a new $20 million US-Egyptian loan agreement is announced, forming part of the
$1 billion aid for the US to Egypt.96
These attempts appear calculated to reaffirm regime
stability.
94
Arabic
95
Arabic
96
Arabic

36
Sadat only publicly addressed the nation via radio on February 3, two weeks
following the outburst of riots. He repeatedly highlights the role of “institutions” in quelling
the recent riots, and reiterates government accusations against the left. Specifically, he
accuses new members of the Leftist party, Tagammu, recently formed in the semi-pluralist
electoral system, of supporting civil disturbances as agents of the Soviet Union. The
President reminisces about previous conflicts with political rivals, and strongly regrets not
full purging communist elements. He highlights the riots as a fully-designed attempt to
weaken Egypt’s negotiating position with Israel, by demonstrating the disconnection between
Sadat and his people. In a nod to the country’s populist sentiment, Sadat rescinds taxes on
the very poor and requires a declaration of all wealth for the rest of society. Simultaneously,
the government prohibits strikes, congregations, or sit-ins which threaten the national
economy – a broad definition fitting for post-crisis repression.97
A scheduled referendum of the Presidential Decrees occurred on February 10, with
99.4% of voters in support.98
These efforts aimed to reassert government control over Egypt,
and reaffirm the people’s backing of Anwar Sadat. The New York Times viewed the regime
as striking in two directions, attempting to “salvage… Sadat’s policy of political
liberalization while at the same time readying the tools by which any political challenge to
the President could be repressed.”99
In the aftermath of the riots, the left-leaning plank in Egyptian politics found itself
attacked by the Sadat loyalists. The party’s head, Khaled Mohiedin, attempted to defend his
organization in a press conference. The New York Times reported that major local
97
4 February 1977 Press Review, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Database, Cairo Domestic Service in
Arabic
98
Nohlen, Dieter, Michael Krennerich, and Bernhard Thibaut. Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook. Oxford:
Oxford UP, 1999. 336.
99
Tanner, Henry. "A Stringent Decree Put to Vote in Egypt." New York Times 11 Feb. 1977. Print.

37
newspapers had rejected printing his statements. The party had opposed the referendum on
Sadat’s proposed clampdowns following the riots, making itself the most prominent
organization to oppose the President during the period of national reconsolidation.100
Contemporary Analysis and Historical Revision
Contemporary analysts highlighted the most immediate and apparent reasons for the
riots, while later scholars placed the events of 1977 within the context of transitions in social
classes.
The Al-Ahram daily argued in January 1977 that “the perpetrators of these incidents
exploited the prevailing climate of democracy in which the authorities restrained themselves
up to the last moment, permitting peaceful demonstration until the nature of the plot became
clear. Hence, strict firmness was inevitable.”101
The climate of democracy may have
increased these protests. In the spirit of openness and press liberalization, the straightforward
policy presentation by Kaysuni and the public opposition may have expanded further than it
would have been under a more repressive system.
Tawfiq al-Hakim, appearing in a January edition of Al-Ahram, explains that protests
erupted for both mismatched expectations and a procedural reason: First, the high cost of
living led to popular expectations of price reductions, rather than increases. Second, the
announcement had occurred before the proposal was submitted to the People’s Assembly.
100
Ibid.
101
Arabic

38
Proper discussion, according to Hakim, would have lessened the shock of subsidy
withdrawal.102
Journalist Henry Tanner, writing on January 24, observed that the riots demonstrated
the newly-robust influence of the Egyptian masses. He asserts that, “Egypt’s poor… are no
longer prepared to take foreign policy success and internal political reform as a substitute for
the improvement of their personal living conditions.” Furthermore, Tanner raises the
dilemma of continued political liberalization in the midst of opposition, reporting that several
members of the official Leftist party were arrested.103
This analysis foreshadows later efforts
by the Government of Egypt to push through reforms during a time of repression. The Sadat
regime chooses to halt political liberalization, and instead bolsters consumption with further
funding for subsidies.
The regime had placed blame for the riots on Communist agitators, but Soliman
argues civil servants and those who expected to join the civil service (e.g. university
students) mustered the 1977 riots.104
The urban poor who joined the fray were not the
primary drivers, but may have contributed to its violent nature.
As has been demonstrated previously, the regime failed to adequately argue for the
distinction between these cuts, aimed at non-essential products, and the basic commodities
needed by the poor. Soliman overlooks the “messaging” component of the form’s
implementation, instead arguing that the subsidy reform was important for its symbolic
nature. In his analysis of budget data, the subsidy cuts amounted to only $28 million. The
102
Arabic
103
Tanner, Henry. "Egyptian Riots Have Seriously Sadat’s Freedom of Action at Home and Abroad." New York
Times 25 Jan. 1977: 3.
104
Soliman, Samir, and Peter Daniel. The Autumn of Dictatorship : Fiscal Crisis and Political Change In Egypt
Under Mubarak. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011. 59.

39
cutbacks represented the decline of the civil servant, the Nasser era’s elite class, into their
lower-middle class status.
Waterbury largely agrees with the class-based transition. “The truly depressed
stratum,” he asserts, “…are the 2 million or so civil servants on fixed salaries who are kept
afloat only by large annual cost-of-living bonuses and holding two jobs.”105
These, rather
than the leftists of Sadat’s accusations, were likely the driving factor for the riots. The
subsidies threatened the livelihoods of a highly urban class reliant on the state’s provision of
affordable food.
Beyond the discussion of the relatively educated urban classes, the subsidy cutbacks
also threatened the poorest Egyptians with a revision of the social contract. Subsidy cuts
included some discussion of wage increases, ignoring Egyptians with informal jobs or those
unemployed. An estimated 25% of Egypt’s work force was unemployed or underemployed,
and thus particularly vulnerable to commodity price rises even with official salary
adjustments.106
Because of this incident, the Egyptian government clearly came to believe that frank
and public discussions on the subsidy issue could not pass in Egyptian public life. Following
the events of January 1977, the Egyptian government adopted a more restrained and gradual
approach towards reform.
105
Waterbury, John. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat : the Political Economy of Two Regimes. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1983. 42.
106
Howe, Marvine. "Egypt Weighs Food-Aid Cuts Again." New York Times 19 Aug. 1977: A4.

40
Implications of the January Riots
The Egyptian government had effectively demonstrated the domestic constraints for
reform. International creditors, sufficiently concerned for Egyptian instability, became more
forthcoming in funding.
The reticent leaders of the Gulf states agreed to provide more lenient financial terms
for Egypt. Arab financial ministers arrived in Egypt two weeks following the start of the
riots, assessing the situation with their Egyptian counterparts. In April, the countries
announced a $1.474 billion grant to Egypt’s central bank, as well as delayed repayment of
existing loans and delayed withdrawal of funds from the Egyptian Central Bank, totaling
close to $4 billion.107
Further funding from the IMF and the United States continued
following the riots, particularly following Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in late 1977. In the week
following the riots, the IMF announced a $140 million loan.108
On February 1, the Carter
Administration informed Congress that it would reallocate $190 million in aid funds for
immediate disbursal to Egypt, which was seen as “a major gesture of support.”109
In
negotiation with the IMF and international creditors, Egypt could now leverage this historical
incident to loosen terms for loans and financial support.
In the years following the riots, the government expanded financial support for the
subsidy system to avoid passing increased global costs to the Egyptian consumer. In 1977,
subsidies accounted for 15.5% of government expenditures. By 1980/81, that figure rose to
107
Feiler 144.
108
2000.
109
"US Plans to Bolster Aid to Egypt by $190 Million to Ease Unrest." New York Times 2 Feb. 1977.

41
20.5%.110
The government could not confront this major outflow from the treasury, hobbled
by fears of instability.
The cost of subsidies increased not only due to increasing prices, but also because of
an expanded subsidies regime. Sadat began to finance imports of chicken and beef while
further increasing subsidies. Public sector workers, a major urban interest group, received a
new system of bonuses given on national holidays. Finally, Sadat brought rural consumers
into the government-run food subsidy system by ordering the Ministry of Supply to expand
subsidized flour coverage to rural areas.111
The riots also fundamentally undercut the more glorious perception of Egyptian
success. The 1977 riots highlighted the regime’s weakness, as Sadat consistently battled the
pan-Arab popularity of the Nasser regime.112
Domestically, Egypt could no longer view
itself on an upward trajectory. Hamied Ansari notes that, “the euphoria in the wake of the
October War and the economic promise of the Open Door policy died suddenly amid the
Food riots of 18 and 19 January 1977.”113
Sadat clearly aimed to regain public trust in the
regime through increasing hand-outs targeted towards specific groups.
Beyond domestic perceptions, Egypt’s looming bankruptcy and the regime’s limited
flexibility in the domestic arena for cutting spending likely caused additional pressure to find
alternative revenue sources. By negotiating a peace agreement with Israel, Sadat was able to
sidestep domestic reform pressures and access growing funds from the West, and the United
states in particular. Several scholars, including Arie Kacowicz, notes that, “paradoxically,
looming economic bankruptcy had been a critical factor in driving Sadat to choose war in
110
Soliman and Daniel 58.
111
Sadowski, Yahya M. Political Vegetables? Businessman and Bureaucrat In the Development of Egyptian
Agriculture. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991. 160.
112
Feiler 193.
113
Ansari 185.

42
1973 and peace in 1977-79. By 1977 Egypt was in a critical economic situation, exacerbated
by the rising expectations from the ‘open door’ economic policy introduced after 1973.
Hence, the link between the foot riots of January 1977 and Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in
November of the same year, though not linear, should not be underestimated.”114
Within the context of domestic contestation and weakness, Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem
may be seen as a means of realigning the domestic conversation away from economic
challenges towards a foreign policy achievement. By visiting Jerusalem, Sadat attempted to
achieve not only the “international fame” that his foreign minister, Ismail Fahimi, stated he
craved, but also to reassert Egypt’s distinct geopolitical identity.115
Sadat embarked on a
policy of “Egypt First,” where Egyptian benefits from peace outweighed any damage the
agreement dealt to the pan-Arab cause.116
Fouad Ajami notes that, “Sadat could hope to
compete with his predecessor in Egypt proper, but in the Arab world his predecessor was
larger than life.”117
In fact, these domestic travails, coming on the heels of the Arab’s 1976
rejection of loan pleas, may have further accentuated Sadat’s sense of Egyptian nationalism.
Karawan advances an alternate argument connecting Sadat’s perception of Soviet
involvement in the January riots to the Jerusalem visit. Sadat’s anti-Sovietism arose from his
perception of Soviet support for his domestic rivals. For example, Ali Sabri, Sadat’s rival in
succession to Nasser, was widely perceived to hold implicit Soviet support, or at the very
least, preference.118
In 1972, Sadat expelled Soviet advisors and began seriously embarking
114
Kacowicz, Arie Marcelo. Peaceful Territorial Change. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press,
1994.134.
115
Fahmy, Ismail. Negotiating for Peace In the Middle East. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1983. 283-90.
116
Karawan, Ibrahim A. "Sadat and the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Revisited." International Journal of Middle East
Studies 26.02 (1994): 249-266.
117
Ajami, Fouad. The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1981. 94.
118
Karawan 249-266.

43
on the Open Door policies. Sadat’s blame on leftist and communist elements fits the
atmosphere of heightened Egyptian-Soviet tensions and decisions to strengthen the alliance
with the United States. Karawan conducted a personal interview with Deputy Prime Minister
Hassan al-Tuhami, who summarized the connection:
“The January riots had shown us the deliberate intentions of the
Soviet Union to bring the regime down. The local communists moved
all over the country, repeating the same slogans and using the same
tactics. But we know that local communists cannot do anything by
themselves, and without the orders, or at least approval, of the Soviet
Union. The response of the president was a decision to kick the Soviet
Union and its agents out of the area.”119
Furthermore, the visit can be seen as a subversion of the Carter’s administration’s
attempts to include the Soviet Union as a cosponsor of the Geneva conference. The
surprising initiative realigned Egypt from a participant to a driver of the peace process. In
this position, Sadat could better exclude the Soviet Union from regional peace discussions.
Subsequent Subsidy Reform in the 1970s
Attempts to cut back on subsidies following the January 1977 riots occurred slowly
and meticulously, with trial balloons floated and little substantial action taken.
In August 1977, the Egyptian government announced that Prime Minister Mamdouh
Salem would convene a government committee to study a proposal for food subsidy cuts.120
The proposal appears not to have progressed any further, but instead served as reintroduction
of a controversial topic into the public sphere.
In December 1978, the government engaged in a new program to increase the prices
of nonessentials and luxuries. On December 29, cigarettes increased by 5 cents, to 42 cents
119
Karawan 249-266.
120
Howe, Marvine. "Egypt Weighs Food-Aid Cuts Again." New York Times 19 Aug. 1977: A4.

44
per pack, lower grade gasoline increased by 4 cents, to 37 cents a gallon, and premium
gasoline increased by 3 cents to 65 cents per gallon. Other measures, including raising the
prices of beer, soft drinks, and color television sets, were expected to increase in the near
future as well. In addition, Western economists began hinting at other means of reducing the
burden of subsidies, including limiting the number of ration card holders.121
The timing of
this announcement occurred during the midst of peace talks with the Israelis. In much of the
Cairo press, the conversation was dominated by foreign policy. The 1977 subsidy reform
announcement occurred during a momentary lull for Egyptian foreign affairs, and followed
an election where domestic issues became prominent. In contrast, the minor December 1978
announcement occurred while Egyptian eyes were focused on the prospect of peace and self-
rule in the Sinai.
By December 1979, the Egyptian government’s strategy for the following decade was
becoming clear: The government would focus on withdrawing the easier subsidies and price
controls first, and restrict access to ration cards. Under this new policy, the government
determined that:
• The prices of goods sold on ration cards, including cooking gas and staple foods,
would remain constant. The government faced particular budgetary pressure for
cooking gas, as Gulf producers have cut off supplies following the peace treaty with
Israel. Previously, the government paid concessionary rates of $50 to $192 per ton.
Under new contracts from Mediterranean suppliers, the government began to buy gas
for $490 per ton.
• Sugar in private stores would increase by 16 cents per pound (3 cent increase).
121
"Egypt Raises Some Prices but Holds the Line on Food." New York Times 30 Dec. 1978.

45
• Regular Gasoline prices would increase 60 cents per gallon (11 cent increase);
Premium Gasoline would increase 71 cents per gallon (11 cent increase).
• Local Cigarettes would increase 47 cents (4 cent increase); Foreign Brands would
increase 87 – 92 cents, (8 cent increase). 122
During this period of policy change, wage adjustments in the public sector played a
calming role. The government proposed for monthly wage increases in the public sector and
public companies from $4.30 for unmarried workers to $14.30 for married workers.
The dynamic between subsidy policy change and popular response, already
perceptible in the late 1970s, would continue to dominate Egyptian food subsidy reform in
the following decades. Stealth reform and other calming mechanisms would emerge as key
elements of any subsidy withdrawal process. These strategies aimed to avoid a repetition of
the January 1977 riots, which continued to loom over the any prospective reforms.
122
Tatro, Earleen. "Egypt's Proposed Budget For 1980 Sets Off Price Increases for Most Items." New York
Times 26 Dec. 1979.

47
IV. A Slow Period of Change: Subsidy Reduction in the 1980s
Hosni Mubarak ascended to power in 1981 following the assassination of his
predecessor, President Anwar Sadat. The Mubarak regime successfully reduced food
subsidies during the 1980s through largely covert policy changes and distribution controls.
As in 1977, the government responded to protests with both repression and retreat from
policy changes. While the subsidy reductions were largely minimal, these policies
demonstrate the tenuous steps undertaken by the regime to reduce the food subsidy bill. This
chapter will also include Egypt’s relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
and the means by which it received loan guarantees and approvals without fully complying
with requirements for subsidy reform. The successful management of the IMF relationship,
using American leverage, enabled Egyptian leaders to determine the pace of domestic
reform, enabling less abrupt and more covert implementation.
Conceptualizing Reform in the 1980s
In contrast to outside analyses faulting the regime for continuing an efficient subsidy
system, the record from the 1980s demonstrates high sophistication in balancing fears of
social unrest, outside pressure (mainly from the IMF), and an internal recognition of the need
for reform. The legacy of the 1977 riots, in addition to continued media scandals over food
prices, reinforced the government’s fear of open reform.
Sadowski describes three primary strategies by which the Mubarak regime changed
the subsidy regime without inflaming public opinion: Distribution controls, cash
compensation, and reform by stealth. Distribution controls, aimed at limiting access to

48
goods, enabled the government to attempt more sophisticated targeting strategies. Cash
compensation, in the form of higher wages, remained a promising means of placating urban
workers with formal employment. A final subset of reforms, “reform by stealth,” covers the
remaining reforms. By changing policies, adding options, and recalibrating prices and
quality, the government encouraged shifts in consumption patterns more beneficial to the
budgetary bottom line.
The snail’s pace of reform was not sufficient to stem the rising tide of import
expenditures. Towards the end of the 1980s, food prices rose substantially, while Egypt’s
main commodity export, oil, suffered from the low prices caused by OPEC overproduction.
In the mid-1980s, wheat sold for $70/$80 per ton. By July 1988, Egypt paid $149 per ton for
wheat, with prices increasing to nearly $300 by the next year. Simultaneously, outside
support for wheat declined. The United States had previously provided Egypt with
concessional loans totaling $2.7 billion in the previous decade. During times of low prices,
the United States government supported agricultural exporters through such foreign deals.
However, during times of high prices, few government policies are needed to support
agricultural interests, and instead, recipient governments like Egypt needed to buy wheat on
the open market.123
The increasing prices also affected other staples. Corn rose $84 to $132
per ton, cooking oil rose from $458 to $790 per ton, and sugar from $171 to $270 per ton.124
These prices drove Egypt back into the hands of international creditors, and by extension, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The dynamics of these interactions will be discussed in
depth later in this chapter.
123
Singerman and Hoodfar 1996.
124
“Mubarak 23 July Revolution Anniversary Speech” 21 July 1988 Press Review, Foreign Broadcast
Information Service Database.

49
The country’s food subsidy system, while seeming irrational to both international ad
domestic observers, actually contained measures directly targeting products towards the poor.
Subsidized foods, at the onset of the decade, included a whole range of goods for both daily
sustenance and more special occasions. In 1980, subsidized foods included bread (baladi,
shami, and fino), flour, sugar, rice, tea, edible oil, beans, lentils, macaroni, coffee, sesame,
shortening, imported cheese, frozen meat, fish, egg, and chicken.125
This extensive list
included sources of animal protein, a highly expensive expenditure. By 1995, the subsidy
regime only covered baladi bread, wheat flour (82% extraction), edible oil, and sugar.126
The
poor consumed these “inferior” goods, particularly the coarse bread, whose subsidy was
maintained through the reform process until the present day.
Khouri describes the perception of food prices in Egypt as a scale, with bread and
meat on opposite ends.127
Bread represents the cheapest product, while meat the most
expensive. Thus, the prices of goods are judged within the hierarchy of household
expenditures, rather than on an independent basis.
Playing Around with Bread Size: Changes at the Margins
The Egyptian government’s “reform by stealth” took advantage of small, gradual
changes to increase public acceptance of changes to the bread subsidy. The loaves available
at bakeries served as a dietary staple infused with expectations. Provision of bread
125
2000.
126
ʻAbd al-Khaliq, Judah, and Karima Korayem. Fiscal Policy Measures In Egypt: Public Debt and Food
Subsidy. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2001.
127
Singerman, Diane, and Homa Hoodfar. Development, Change, and Gender In Cairo: a View From the
Household. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.

50
represented a primary connection between the citizenry and regime. Thus, tweaking this
system required finesse.
In May 1983, a parliamentary discussion on raising the price of bread from 1 to 2
piastes provoked a national outcry. Instead of pushing through complete reform, the
government circumvented the public process by theoretically maintaining consumer choice,
while in actuality, pushing the populace toward the decided policy. In 1981, the government
began providing a two piastre bread made of higher quality wheat, while simultaneously
reducing the quality and availability of the one piastre staple.128
Other sources note this
change happening in earnest in 1983 and 1984 when prices rose and the government-
mandated size of baladi bread decreased from 168 to 160 grams.129
Small changes continued to occur. In 1986, the government reduced the size of the
two piaster loaves, reducing the standard weight from 160 grams or above to only 135 grams.
In 1988, the quality of loaves further declined, as the government reduced wheat content in
loaves by 20 percent. These measures resulted in savings of 1 million tons of wheat,
translating to 350 million Egyptian pounds.130
The process of reduction appears to have
continued over several years. In 1988 and 1989, the price of bread increased to five piasters,
while bread size was reduced to 130 grams.131
Corruption remained a challenge for all subsidized products. The open market prices
for subsidized goods were much higher than the government price. Naturally, a secondary
informal market developed for goods bought cheaply at government cooperatives and
subsidized bakeries. The government subverted these black markets by creating new
128
129
Adams 2000.
130
131
Adams 2000.

51
products to capture the unauthorized market and increasing surveillance. Thus, government
tinkering with the bread system attempted to confront corruption.
In 1989, Egypt faced a bread crisis, with long lines and increasing prices. Bakers had
diverted flour for use in higher-priced types of bread, primarily tabaqi loaves, which were
sold on the open market. In response to this trend, Minister of Agriculture Yusuf Wali
created two official tabaqi loaves, costing less than the bread at open market. As a result of
the increased product offering, the government recaptured part of the subsidized flour
leakage and encouraged consumer demand to migrate toward more expensive subsidized
bread.132
The Distribution System: Withdrawing the Availability of Subsidies
The government attempted to cut back on subsidies without explicit policy changes
by limiting the reach of subsidized goods. In 1981, the Ministry of Trade and Supply began
limiting the number of ration cardholders. These initial reforms took on common sense
approaches – the names of people abroad or the deceased were removed from public rolls.
The government also began to attempt to discriminate provisions based on income.
Householders of higher net worth, including investors, owners of buildings, shops, or cars,
and proprietors of more than 10 feddans of land were divided into a separate category than
the poor, who maintained fully subsidized green ration books. Partially subsidized red ration
books failed to take root, as by 1994, only 3 percent of the Egyptian population had
transferred to the limited subsidy group.133
132
133
Adams 2000.

52
During the 1980s, the Egyptian government continued to maintain some subsidies on
non-essential consumer goods, such as cigarettes. In July 1986, the government attempted to
confront the black market by establishing a two-tiered distribution system. Poorer
neighborhoods received cheaper but lower quality goods, while better-off neighborhoods
benefited from more availability of goods at higher prices. The discrepancy led to informal
means of distribution in poorer areas, where supplies were diverted and often sold at higher
prices. Managers allocated limited supplies of goods by selling under the counter, charging
more for skipping queues, and selling goods in advance to legions of women peddlers who
would resell at higher prices.
Attempts to limit the number of Egyptians on the subsidy rolls had largely failed by
the end of 1994. 78 percent of the population remained on ration books. Far more effective
in reducing actual subsidy expenditure was the pullback in the goods covered by public
subsidies.134
Civil Disorder: Recurrences of 1977
Sporadic protests linked to increases in food prices and shortages reaffirmed
government suspicions of overly ambitious liberalization. The government response aimed
to reduce the motivation for protest, by reverting temporarily to previous policies, and
controlling opposition figures through arrests and political repression.
In September 1984, workers in Kafr el-Dawwar rioted over price increases. This
industrial city in the Nile Delta holds significance as a historical hotbed of the Egyptian labor
134
Ibid.

53
movement.135
A 30 percent unannounced hike in the price of cooking oil and pasta, the
disappearance of the one-piaster loaf, and an increase in wage deductions of social security
led workers to refuse wage packets in protest.136
Violent demonstrations eventually resulted
in three killed and 26 wounded.
This government response followed the established to relieving social pressure:
retreat followed by repression. President Mubarak calmed protesters by intervening directly
to rescind the price increases and promising to halt any further increases.137
Mubarak
promised to limit the “new and improved” two-piaster loaves to higher income areas, while
poor areas would maintain availability of the one-piastre standard baladi bread. Reporters on
the ground noted the difficulty of finding the cheaper loaves in poorer urban districts
throughout the country.138
Simultaneously, the regime arrested leftist leaders. In Minya, seven local leaders of
the National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP) were arrested.139
On September 29, as the
government publicized the role of extremists in fomenting these revolts, Interior Minister
Kamal Hasan ‘Ali announced an extension of the Emergency Law by almost two years.140
In
October, security forces arrested leftists, student activists, workers, and other affiliates of the
NPUP throughout Egypt on charges of coup plotting.141
135
El-Hamalawy, Hossam. "Egypt: Revolt of the Hungry." Egypt: Revolt of Hungry. Socialist Worker, 17 Feb.
2005. Web. 12 Mar. 2012. <http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php?article_id=10705>.
136
Miller, Judith. "Egyptians Worry Despite Riot's End." New York Times 7 Oct. 1984: 17.
137
“Mubarak Prohibits Further Price Increases.”1 October 1984 Press Review, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service Database, Cairo MENA news service in Arabic.
138
Miller 1984.
139
"Egypt August 1986." Keesing's Record of World Events 31: 33817.
140
“ Ali on Extending Emergency Law by 19 Months.” 29 September 1984 Press Review, Foreign Broadcast
Information Service Database, Cairo MENA news service in Arabic.
141
“Authorities Reportedly Arrest Communist Group” 16 October 1984 Press Review, Foreign Broadcast
Information Service Database, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat.

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