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Rmo pca-publication

  1. 1. Linking Security Risk Management and Conflict Sensitivity Afghanistan and beyond
  2. 2. 2 Impressum Impressum Published by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH Dag-Hammarskjöld-Weg 1-5 65760 Eschborn, Germany T +49 61 96 79-0 F +49 61 96 79-11 15 E I Author Maurice D. Voyame Senior Adviser and Head of Peace & Conflict Advisory Unit Country Risk Management Office Taimani 9 Kabul, Afghanistan E | Editorial Team Dana Hruby, Nikolaus Schall, Maurice D. Voyame Graphic Design Barbara Reuter, Oberursel E Print Aksoy Print & Projektmanagement, Eppelheim Photos Cover Picture: Local Security Guard in Baluchi Valley at km 20 of Chora Road, Uruzgan Province, © Michael Misch, GIZ IS UPDP Uruzgan. Backside: 20 km south-east of Kabul, Kabul Province, © Sascha Bilke, GIZ CRMO Afghanistan
  3. 3. 3Acknowledgement | Preface Acknowledgement The idea to present a paper on the links between conflict sensitivity and risk management evolved in the daily work and discussions within the Risk Management structure of the German Governmental Development Organizations in Afghanistan. The insight and ideas, the practicality and implemen- tation which are described in the paper are grounded in the committed and dedicated work of our national risk management staff and their international counterparts. Equally the experience of projects in Afghanistan and elsewhere greatly contributed to the content of this paper. Furthermore, I am grateful for the comments and advise of various people, especially Nikolaus Schall, Koenraad Van Brabant, Peter Lehmann, Wolfgang Herdt, Mandy Zeckra, Oliver Haas, and Dr. Stephanie Schell-Faucon. Last but not least I would like to thank Dana Hruby for the meticulous editing, review work and several great contributions. Needless to say that any mistakes made are solely mine. Maurice D. Voyame Kabul, 2011 Preface The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH is a federal enterprise with worldwide operations. It supports the German Government in international cooperation for sustainable development and in international education work. GIZ supports people and societies in shaping their own futures and improving living conditions. GIZ has been supporting the reconstruction of Afghanistan since 2002, primarily on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and other German federal ministries, such as the German Federal Foreign Office (AA) and the German Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg). It also works on behalf of international donors, including the World Bank and the Government of the Netherlands. The focus of its work is on improving the livelihoods of the Afghan people, particularly those living in rural areas. One of GIZ’s core tasks in Afghanistan is to shape sustainable processes in an intercultural context and to develop the capacity of governmental institutions. 328 seconded experts and more than 1,500 local staff are currently working on over 60 projects for GIZ in Afghanistan – more than in any other country. In addition, integrated experts from Germany, placed by the Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM), are working in key positions within Afghan ministries, state institutions, and other organisations. GIZ cooperates closely in Afghanistan with German and international development organisations, including KfW Entwicklungsbank, the United Nations, and various local non-governmental organisations. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH established a Risk Management System for Afghanistan, which is acting as facilitator for safe and effective project implementation as well as mitigating risks for employees of the German development cooperation. GIZ is conducting the project on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Federal Foreign Office (AA) since November 2008.
  4. 4. 4 Preface The three main elements of the project’s risk management strategy are acceptance, protection and conflict sensitivity. ½ An acceptance strategy is linked to a broad range of operational choices and values that affect perception, and is consequently aiming at generating a level of trust and acceptance among stakeholders. In doing so the acceptance approach attempts to reduce or remove threats by increasing the political and social consent of the German Development Cooperation and its work in Afghanistan. ½ Security measures such as means of communication distributed to employees, armored vehicles, safe rooms, and guarding as well as emergency procedures are part of protection strategy. ½ Development projects shall - within its capacities - aim attending to conflicts and tensions in a constructive way and not exacerbating any conflict unintentionally. In consequence, conflict sensitivity is a critical success factor for effective and efficient development projects. Thus, conflict sensitivity and therefore Risk Management is decisively contributing to the safety of employees.
  5. 5. 5Table of Contents Table of Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Chapter I Context Matters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Context & Conflict Analysis – A Methodological Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Step I: Information Gathering and Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Step II: Blackbox/Method of Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Step Two-Point-Five: Bridging Analysis & Implementation Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Multi-Criteria Decision Making Analysis: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Chapter II Why Process equally matters – Linking Risk, Acceptance & Conflict Sensitivity . . . . 20 The Acceptance Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Chapter III Reality always wins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Straightjacket vs. Ballistic Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
  6. 6. 6 Introduction | Background Introduction Working in volatile and armed conflict environments, specific challenges are prevalent to an extent not usually encountered in stable contexts. The complexity and dynamic of the context as well as the security risk level are normally beyond those in other contexts. Hence working in such an environment is very much about dealing with complexity and staying abreast and flexible in planning and intervention to respond adequately to changes. This paper examines the required linkages between programmatic interventions with security risk management. Understanding risks as uncertain future events they, much alike conflicts, are not inherently negative. Most risks can be examined from a transformative point of view by asking the question how a particular risk can be transformed into an opportunity. This question bears certain relevance in the development field. How can a particular risk, i.e. of being abducted, be transferred into an opportunity by adopting an acceptance approach? To allow for such an approach certain conditions must be met. First, this paper argues for the need to go beyond mere conceptual ideas and focus on the key elements or, as it will be argued, pre-requisites. Those are: a) context knowledge; b) appropriate process design and steering; c) addressing the realities and relationships on the ground within the program and beyond. A flexible approach emphasizing on context and process with a focus on the interdependence between conflict sensitivity and security risk management will not substitute existing methods and concepts. It rather adds a systemic and procedural thinking to the application of other instruments in a dynamic context. Any notion of blue print solutions is inadequate for working in insecure environments. Complexities cannot necessarily be fully understood. However complexities can be mitigated through an adaptive and flexible approach. Second, this paper will try to link conflict analysis with decision-making approaches that are suitable for dynamic settings, and third, translate these aspects into the relationship of security risk management and conflict sensitive program management. These two overlap to some degree when the acceptance approach is the main strategy applied in risk management. While the link between conflict sensitivity (and Do No Harm) and risk management has been elaborated on, for example in the BMZ Peace & Conflict Assessment Handbook of 2007, the present paper will focus on a specific linkage, namely the acceptance approach and how it contributes to the reduction of threats. This will set forth the understanding that conflict sensitivity must be conceived as an inherent part within a holistic and proactive risk management that seeks to actively reduce threats by systematically help fostering acceptance. Background The approach to design and implement programs in a conflict sensitive manner evolved in the 1990’s particularly after witnessing the disasters in Somalia (1991/1992) and Rwanda (1994). From then on concepts, ideas and approaches developed and eventually culminated in the principle enshrined in the OECD DAC debates and guidelines on working in conflict and fragility. These principles were translated into German Governmental Policies including the Action Plan “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building” (2004) and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of Germany (BMZ) Strategy for Peacebuilding 2005 (ÜSK). The Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA) Handbook was developed by BMZ in order to achieve the requirements of Conflict Sensitive Program Management (CSPM) stipulated in the relevant national and international policies. But despite overwhelming evidence and examples it is often hard for development organizations to fully embrace the fact that societies in transition
  7. 7. 7Background transform differently from an often-assumed linear continuum – contiguum approach.1 Conflict Sensitive Program Management builds on the experiences of peace building and development organizations that have been utilizing methods such as Conflict Analysis or Do-No-Harm (DNH) and Peace and Conflict-related Impact Assessment (PCIA) in the planning and steering of development interventions. Conflict sensitivity is defined as a structured steering-process that aims at quality standards, coherence and coordination on project, program and portfolio level in the German Governmental Development Organization (GGDO) setting in Afghanistan. A Peace and Conflict Advisory Structure was established in the Risk Management Office in Afghanistan to provide technical advice as well as support for projects and programs with regard to conflict sensitive planning and implementation. A short working definition of conflict sensitivity is provided before introducing interdependencies and links between conflict sensitive program management and security risk management and possible methods to embrace these linkages. The OECD DAC once used the following working definition: “Conflict sensitivity – systematically taking into account both the positive and negative impacts of interventions, in terms of conflict or peace dynamics, on the contexts in which they are undertaken, and, conversely, the implications of these contexts for the design and implementation of interventions.” * * This is also the used working definition of the technical working group conflict sensitivity in Afghanistan (as enshrined in its constitutive statute endorsed 24th May 2011). For both, pro-active security risk management and CSPM it is important to grasp and then keep abreast of the context and its dynamics. Conflict sensitive approaches and their contribution to pro-active security risk management is meant to facilitate the implementation of development interventions in a non-discriminatory manner. It is worthwhile noting that development aid has primarily a developmental impact in conflict prone regions, but does not necessarily show a correlation or causal link to a reduction of violent militancy. While much more research and assessments on the correlations and causal links between development and militancy must be conducted, conflict sensitive approaches as such are not targeting nor designed to target a reduction of militancy in the short run. But it is instead aiming at avoiding negative and unintended conflict creation or escalation factors. However as development interventions in the long run are targeting sustainable changes in society, including values, knowledge, attitudes and practices, these changes in society clearly will impact on the prevalence of militancy and how a society and state deals with such tendencies. These preliminary explanations lead us to the core concepts calling for prioritization as well as understanding of context and process design for any development and humanitarian intervention in conflictive settings. 1 For an in depth and state of the art overview on the challenges for societies in transformation and witnessing conflict and violence see World Bank (2011); World Development Report 2011. Conflict, Security and Development. Washington 2011.
  8. 8. 8 Context Matters Chapter I Context Matters Several studies, especially on peace building stipulate the need for a more comprehensive emphasis on context and process2 . Feedback from projects in Afghanistan confirm that there is a high level of expertise in the respective technical realm (such as water, livelihood, rule of law and others) but also substantive challenges to match these technical competencies with the dynamic context. This particularly applies to dynamics and context/conflict analysis on a sub-national level where little or no structured information exists. Conflict analysis shall not only focus on one layer (macro, meso or micro). Instead the analysis as well as subsequent planning and where appropriate implementation should follow a multi-layer approach. In peace processes and mediation this has become a well-established notion according to which sustainable agreements must be rooted in a multi-track approach to safeguard post-settlement ownership and implementation.3 The same is true for development interventions in fragile settings, which require a multi-layered and multi-sector approach with strong community involvement (formal and informal systems). A review of the context is not complete only by looking at relevant variables for one project but requires the identification of interdependencies and possible – wanted and unwanted – chain reactions caused by one activity in combination with another. One activity can be adapted to the context and be conflict-sensitive while the sum of activities in one region is not. In consequence, organizations implementing in a volatile environment must bear in mind the need for coordinative platforms that ensure information sharing and possible project-adaptation already in the planning process and throughout the implementation phase. Another challenge is relevant analysis. Many reports remain on a rather descriptive level or analyze the contexts and its actors but abstain from giving recommendations for action of implementing agencies on both, their strategically planning/ policy processes as well as their direct implementation in the field. Overcoming this uncertainty by focusing on probable prospects of future impact (scenario thinking based recommendations) was identified to bridge the gap between analysis and recommendation for action. To fill this gap and meet the identified demand, structured conflict analysis on a district level, and in the conjunction of various districts on a regional level have been established. The method used and applied is drawing on several best practices, ranging from early warning, over conflict analysis, to scenario building and decision-making analysis. Subsequently, the separate elements are combined into one analysis product. This methodology is then translated in a process where the contributions of several stakeholders and end users constantly feed into a feed-back loop to adjust and maintain the greatest level of relevance and ownership. Furthermore the analysis is designed to serve multiple purposes. First, to provide background and intervention methods and options to project staff and team leaders; second as advisory service and discussion base to country management; and third for the political/policy and strategic steering structures. 2 Seding, O.J.: Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and be Sensitive to Context, NUPI Working Paper 775, 2009. 3 See Bächler, G. (2011): Macht & Mediation im Umfeld militärischer Gewalt, in: Perspektive Mediation 2011/2.
  9. 9. 9Context & Conflict Analysis Context & Conflict Analysis – A Methodological Approach “[Under uncertainty] there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know. Nevertheless, the necessity for action and for decision compels us as practical men to do our best to overlook this awkward fact (…)” John Maynard Keynes (1937) Each analysis should be relevant, tailored to the needs, action oriented as well as providing options with a multi-layered focus. To be relevant and efficient the analysis must be practical and resource efficient rather than academic. In a first step any analysis provides an initial mapping and evaluation of data and information that is readily available. In the case of Afghanistan data availability for a disaggregated sub-national level (District) was mapped, including data from rapid assessments. This limits the scope of quantitative probability in early warning to a certain degree, which is academically an issue but is a valid option4 for a rapid assessment. Major early warning indicators for conflict detection and prevention5 are a) youth bulges6 ; b) child mortality; c) trade openness; d) political stability7 ; and e) GDP per capita. Context specific additional indicators are equally important. Those relevant for Afghanistan are land issues, urban-rural divide, and ethnic compositions. It is important to note that ethnic grievances are worth mapping whereas they are rarely the root cause of a conflict but rather the fault line or trigger along which conflicts erupt. 4 Bond, D.: Operationalizing and Assessing “TRACE”. A Tool for the Rapid Assessment of Complex Emergencies, Virtual Research Associates Inc. 2002. 5 This paper does not provide for an in depth discussion of relevance and reliability of different early warning indicators, it simply refers to commonly agreed indicators of high relevance. Furthermore the entire discussion if and in how far indicators which proofed valid for early warning on a national level (e.g. trade openness) do actually have a relevance for sub-national or regional early warning analysis and if / how data in this regard is available or could be gathered. 6 The term “youth bulge” is a misnomer: although few authors use the same definition of youth bulge, nearly all researchers measure it as the number of young people (generally between ages 15 and 24) as a percentage of the adult population. A bulge, literally defined as an “irregular swelling”, should be visible in the young adult section of the age pyramid”, in: Woodrow Wilson Center, ECSP Report, 11(2005): The Young and the Restless: Population Age Structure and Civil War, see also, World Bank (2004): Devil in Demographics. The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic armed violence 1950-2000, also Urdal, H. / Barakat, B.: Breaking the Waves? Does Education Mediate the Relationship between Youth Bulges and Political Violence?, World Bank 2009. It is worth noting that Youth Bulge as standalone indicator does not necessarily provide sufficient evidence for the probability of conflict outbreak, but the interplay between youth bulges with other indicator, such as economic opportunities (trade openness encapsulates to some extend this notion), education or livelihood is significant. 7 Goldstone, J. A. A Global Model for forecasting Political Instability, in: American Journal of Political Science 54(2010)1, pp. 190-208.
  10. 10. 10 Context & Conflict Analysis The structural data is processed in a classic Strategic Conflict Analysis (SCA) looking into structural and root causes, actor analysis and mapping and a dynamic analysis8 . The findings are summarized by selecting information which contains explanatory relevance for development interventions and possible correlations with other parameters.9 A variety of methods have been looked at in order to identify the appropriate method for analysis as well as decision-making and how to visually present such findings.10 To gain an understanding how actors and structural aspects interlink the Multi-Causal Role Model is a simple but powerful tool. It originated from environmental conflict analysis but eventually matured to also being used for conflict sensitive program management as well as in peace mediation and peace processes.11 Process Flow: Analysis of Operational Space Clusstering Iden tification of Needs Guidance for Respo nses& Analysis InformationCollection& & Fe edback via Projects Implementatio n FormulationofOptions Conflict & Cooperat ion Vali dation & Monitoring Review & Cross-Checking of Data Comprehensive Analysis Structural, Actor & Dynamic Analysis Scenario- Building Multi Criteria Decision Making Analysis Peer Review & Competence Teams District Profiles & Vulnerability Assessments Data&Informati on Project Implementation An alysis(Blackbox) Figure 1 8 For an explanation of SCA (Strategic Conflict Analysis) see; DFID (2002): Conducting Conflict Assessments Guidance Note, pp. 10-15. 9 See particularly Wane, G. The Continental Early Warning System: Methodology and Approach, in: Engel, Ulf, Gomes Porto, Joao (Eds.): Africa’s New Peace & Security Architecture. Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions, pp. 91-111. 10 These include critical path analysis, analysis of competing hypothesis, Linchpin Analysis, Social Network Analysis, Game Theory, Morphological Analysis, Nominal Group Techniques, Early Warning Systems and Analysis, Critical Environmental Security Analysis and others. 11 See Bächler, G. (1999): Violence through environmental discrimination: Causes, Rwanda Arena, and Conflict Model, Kluwer Academic Publisher, Dordrecht / Boston / London and in a short applied and adapted version see Swiss Development Coopera- tion (SDC) (2005): Conflict Analysis Toolkit, DEZA COPRET, Bern, p. 11.
  11. 11. 11Information Gathering and Validation These findings of the analysis and decision-making process are then processed regarding how, when, and where particular interventions make sense. The used method is based on Multi-Criteria Decision-Making Analysis (MCDMA), which is simple and fast to conduct and can easily be done in a participatory way, be it with partners, within a project or in a peer group with other projects. This decision analysis is conducted12 along OECD DAC conflict prevention parameters to evaluate what interventions can be deemed a 1st, 2nd and 3rd selective priority in this particular area in the short or medium run. The Method Circle above shows a triad approach combining information collection and validation, analysis steps, including scenario thinking and decision making analysis with decisions on program implementation, recommendations and guidelines. Conceived as a process a constant feed-back loop reassures a constant assessment of the relevance of the analysis and recommendations. This approach is comprehensive but can be conducted with the investment of more or less resources, and depending on the identified need, the risk level in a country, portfolio size and other considerations. The methodology is equally feasible for regional, national or sub-national analysis and therefore can embrace demands of various countries. The three process steps of Data and Information, Analysis (Blackbox) and Project Implementation are explained below. Step I: Information Gathering and Validation A key element is the gathering of relevant information and its validation. Crucial in this process is to distinguish between the gathering of information from primary and secondary sources. In many settings the real issue is not necessarily the lack of information, but where to find the information relevant for working in the particular context and with it information selection and analysis. All analysis as part of an information exchange for action is based on selection. Communication evidently is the processing of selection.13 Once again the major challenge is and remains to provide some standard tools and methods that are able to address diversity without falling victim of a standardization or generalization approach which is contrary to the systems dynamic in conflict- affected and violent settings. Especially on the part of root causes and structural aspects of the conflict the analysis will most likely rely on secondary, but reliable sources of information. Good information in many countries is obtainable from the governmental statistics office, census and household surveys, DevInfo (a joint UN country team tool with statistical data available for all countries worldwide), HDI country specific data and specialized agencies and organizations, such as the UN World Food Program’s worldwide Market Survey on Food Price Development which is publicly available with monthly updates. Concerning dynamic and actor analysis more work will have to be done within the own portfolio or program. While some good sources, such as International Crisis Group, Human Security Gateway Country Specific Conflict Monitor, Brookings Fragility Index and others exist as open source information, more detailed information will still be needed. 12 See Montibeller, G. Combining Scenario Planning and Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis in Practice, in: Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis 14(2006), pp. 5-20; for a specific applicability on Security Development Programs contain- ing a 9-field matrix adopted and used in our analysis see Fitz-Gerald, A. / Tracy, M.: Developing a Decision-making Model for Security Sector Development in uncertain Situations, in: Journal for Security Sector Management 6(2008)2. 13 See Luhmann, N. (1987): Soziale Systeme. Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie, Frankfurt am Main, pp. 191-207.
  12. 12. 12 Information Gathering and Validation “While the importance of producing good quality analysis cannot be overstated, the extent of an assessment’s influence is rarely, if ever, solely determined by the content or quality of analysis.” IPI 2010 The most valuable resource for a good actor mapping are often national staff as well as media reports, given that free media exists in the respective country. Briefings on actors and actors mapping in team meeting with national staff and/or in planning workshops is a suitable approach. On the part of dynamic analysis (sometimes also referred to as incidence analysis) things become slightly more complicated. A good media monitoring seems feasible here as well but will probably be too constrain. Normally dynamic conflict indicators or indicator baskets are established (see Figure 2) and monitored. This is common practice in most regional early warning systems in Africa14 (CEWS, ECOWARN etc) and also adopted for example in the Threat and Risk Mapping and Analysis (TRMA) of the UN in Sudan, as well as for the District Analysis of the Risk Management Office (RMO) in Afghanistan. The indicator baskets shall serve as a toolbox and guide awareness and attention. It is good to maintain close contact to relevant agencies with the capacity to monitor incidents daily in order to increase the access to available and relevant information. Possible additional sources of information include the German Embassy, other Embassies, Department for Safety & Security (UN DSS), the ICRC, ICC Analyst, and NGOs with a long-standing history and good track record in the country. 14 Wane, G. The Continental Early Warning System: Methodology and Approaches, in Engel, U. / Porto, J.G. (Eds.): Africa’s New Peace & Security Architecture. Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions, 2010, pp. 91-110.
  13. 13. 13Information Gathering and Validation Conflict Indicator Baskets Example Conflict Baskets Ethnic Tensions Conflict or conflict potential affecting community stability/recovery caused by inter/intra-ethnic community tension or dispute. Distribution Conflicts Conflict or conflict potential affecting community stability/recovery caused by disputes over access to resources. Conflict driven by AOGs/IM/ ANSF/PGM Conflict or conflict potential affecting community stability/recovery caused by police/AOG/military/paramilitary presence or activities. Banditry/Criminal Activity Conflict or conflict potential affecting community stability/recovery caused by banditry or criminal activities. Governance Conflict or conflict potential affecting community stability/recovery caused by weak governance. Antagonism between IDPs/ Returnees/ Migrant Workers and Local Population Conflict or conflict potential affecting community stability/recovery caused by weay IDPs/Returnees/Migrants Workers. Livelihood Conflict or conflict potential affecting community stability/recovery caused by disputes over sources of livelihood. Hazards Risk or potential risk to human life, livestock and/or crops caused by natural catastrophes or diseases. Civil Society Conflict or conflict potential affecting community stability/recovery caused by civil society or acts against civil society. Others: Please suggest a category in case none of the above fit the incident occurring. Basket Governance Conflict or conflict potential affecting community stability/recovery caused by (weak) governance Basket Categories: a. Externally driven change of government by AOGs/IM/ANSF/PGM or any other group b. Lack of provision of services or unequal provision of services benefitting one specific group c. Shortfalls in rule of law including law enforcement and judiciary (e.g. torture, lack of due process, inappropriate punishment, use of excessive force) and cases of impunity d. Corruption e. Imbalances in community representation/dominance of one group in government f. Newly enacted laws/policies discriminating against a specific group g. Loss of control over territory (e.g. no access or operational space for ANSF, no tax collection via government) h. Others Figure 2
  14. 14. 14 Blackbox/Method of Analysis Step II: Blackbox/Method of Analysis After this step, which forms the centerpiece of the analysis, the pieces of information shall be brought together. Experiences from Afghanistan and the feedback from projects show that an analysis should not have more than 5 pages of text to be digestible. It is often significantly more difficult to conduct and write a relevant and solid analysis on 4-5 pages than on 35-40 pages. Furthermore for later comparison with other analysis and updates it makes sense to develop a format, which also provides visualized representation of data. This could include having chapters looking at structural and root causes, dynamic and actor analysis chapters, recommendations and conclusion but also elements linking everything to the respective needs of organizations (e.g. where the organization is already present or how the organization sees its partner’s capacity etc). The sub-national district analysis conducted in Afghanistan by RMO along the aforementioned method includes the following information on the first page: Spider webs showing major patterns prevalent in the respective district, including ethnic composition, power structure, socio-economic parameters and population parameters. Moreover, the first page includes graphs such as a chart on project activities by the German Development Cooperation, an indication on the security trend and accessibility of the area and a map including clusters indicating a particular characteristic relevant for projects. ! Wider view on context analysis to understand dependencies in post-Tsunami Sri Lanka As the Tsunami hit Sri Lanka in 2004 the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the affected communities along the coast received a great deal of attention and resources. Rapid assistance was provided to local fishermen from the East of Sri Lanka in order to compensate for the loss of their boats, which were the building block of their family’s income. The part of the population further down the value chain of the fishing industry was as deprived of their sources for livelihood as those immediately affected by the disaster, but received little or no help. In the multi-ethnic East of the country the fishery industry value chain essentially was divided along ethnic/religious lines, where often Tamils dominated the fishing, Muslim merchants the trading of fish and Sinhalese functioned as money lenders for the Tamils to purchase boats and fishing material. These Muslim merchants and Sinhalese lenders, in the wake of the Tsunami, did not all live in coastal areas but lost their primary income source as well. Therefore, the reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts did not take the interdependency of directly affected and so called non-affected communities into account and thus aggravated the Tamil-Muslim-Sinhalese divide by creating grievances over unequal distribution of aid. Moreover it shut the window of opportunity for reviving peace initiatives building upon examples of solidarity where people of different ethnic and religious background stepped in for each other. This example illustrates the importance of understanding multiple layers of the context and the relationships therein. A narrow focus on a seemingly relevant geographical area (in this case the destroyed coast line) does not suffice and can aggravate or even create conflicts. Schell-Faucon, S.; Team Leader Conflict Sensitive Resource and Asset Management Program (GIZ), Philippines; and Stephanie Schell-Faucon (2005): Disaster Management in Conflict Situations - International Experience before and after the Asian Tsunami, in: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: A New Dynamic for Peace? Post-Tsunami Conflict Resolution and its Impact on Conflict Resolution (
  15. 15. 15Bridging Analysis & Implementation Planning District Analysis Cover Figure 3 GGDO Projects 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 DETA / Agricultural Diversification* *two programs Economic Dev. Education Water Energy Governance (RCDF/RIDF)* *two programs GGDO Planned GGDO Ongoing GGDO Completed Power Structure: PBN Pillar 2 Population: PBN Pillar 1 0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000 160000 Total Population Total under 18 ReturneesTotal Rural Total urban PCA Monitoring District Analysis: Baghlan-e-Jadid PCA Analysis 02.05.2011 1 CIRCULATION RESTRICTED Basic Data Total Population 154,900 Number of Villages 104 Total Area / km2 TBD Agriculture Land / ha TBD Irrigated area / ha TBD Number of CDCs 61 Economic & Social Development: PBN Pillar 1 0% 10% 20% 30% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% Water Literacy ElectricityHealth care Road Access Ethnic Groups: PBN Pillar 1 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% Turkmen Pashtun Tajik Uzbek Min. Max. Source: AIMS Map Center Security: PBN Pillar 3 Colour Code Range Baghlan-e-Jadid TREND → International Staff Limited access to approx. 60% of district area National Staff Limited access to approx. 40% of district area Step Two-Point-Five: Bridging Analysis & Implementation Planning The analysis mostly focused on interlinks between actors and identified triggers, channels, resources and targets of conflict and risks. As a subsequent step these findings and observations can be translated into recommendations for action. More tangible outcomes ranging from practical recommendations and references to e.g. check lists for project to recommendations for steering structures, including policy level can easily be extracted with the right method. ½ Recommendations are the cumulating point of the information extrapolated from the analysis summing up relationships between actors and conflict dynamics and informing the project implementation on the meaning of characteristics of the identified area. Recommendations and checklists provide concrete sector and project specific advice on HOW to deliver and implement at a given moment in a given geographical context. For the second steering and policy level the recommendations can be arranged along two axes (x and y);
  16. 16. 16 Multi-Criteria Decision Making Analysis ½ Strategic value & ability to implement. This draws on an adopted approach of multi-criteria decision making analysis used in strategic steering structures. The matrix uses a nine-field two dimensional approach where qualitative criteria (5-6) are quantitatively rated. Ideally this is done in a participatory way involving a relevant peer-group. As a result the matrix can help decision makers to prioritize measures and interventions as well as the allocation of resources to consequently enable certain measures in the middle or long run. By plotting different modes of delivery or sectorial interventions into 1st, 2nd and 3rd respective priorities the matrix provides options for HOW (modes & sector of delivery) and WHEN (1-3 priority) to implement on a strategic response level. Multi-criteria decision making analysis, derived from strategic planning such as national defense planning, is briefly explained below. Multi-Criteria Decision Making Analysis The discipline of MCDMA and scenario thinking15 , is vast. It has been used for planning and conducting of national security strategies in developing and developed countries as well as for security and development programming16 . This more refined and complex approach was adopted and further tailored to the analysis needs in Afghanistan. However, in this abstract only the general framework is presented which can easily (especially in smaller country teams and portfolios) be adopted and conducted in the management team and/or with partners to foster ownership and participation. In Afghanistan the criteria for the two axes derive from OEDC DAC discussions and best practice in program management and are the following: ½ Strategic Value: Conflict Prevention, Sustainability, Poverty Reduction, Ownership, Quick Start/Impact. ½ Ability to Implement: Acceptable Risks (veto criteria), Capacity (to monitor), Funding, Logistics and Infrastructure. 15 Montibeller, G. Combining Scenario Planning and Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis in Practice, in: Journal of Multi- Criteria Decision Analysis 14(2006), pp. 5-20. 16 Fitz-Gerald, A. / Tracy, M.: Developing a Decision-Making Model for Security Sector Development in uncertain Situations, in: Journal for Security Sector Management 6(2008)2.
  17. 17. 17KapitelMulti-Criteria Decision Making Analysis Rating | Weighting Intervention Cluster Criteria Strategic Value Intervention A Rating Weighting Rating Weighting WR Conflict prevention 9 6 9 54 Sustainability 6 7 6 42 Poverty reduction 2 5 2 10 Ownership 8 9 8 72 Quick start/impact 5 3 5 15 Total 193 Ability to Implement Rating Weighting Rating Weighting WR Acceptable risks 9 9 81 Capacity (to monitor) 7 5 35 Funding 5 8 40 Logistics & infrastructure 6 3 18 Coordinated 4 6 24 Total 166 Overall total 359 Figure 4 Once criteria have been established and possible interventions identified the criteria are rated (usually from 1-10) and then weighted in accordance to the relevance of a particular intervention (from 1-10). As a result a quantitative figure is established along qualitative indicators and criteria. Each criterion can have generic sub-criteria and therefore can be seen rather as a criteria basket. Strategic Value & Ability to Implement Matrix 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. High Medium Low HighMediumLow StrategicValue Ability to Implement Glossary/Explanation 1. priority 2. & 4. selective 2nd priority 3. outsource immediately and/ or develop approaches to increase ability to implement in medium & long term 5. selective 3rd priority 6. monitor in case value & ability increases 7. & 8. monitor in case value increases 9. do not consider B A C D E Figure 5
  18. 18. Chapter18 Multi-Criteria Decision Making Analysis The plotting of the various interventions can either occur according to pre-defined given scores, e.g. to be a 1st priority (Field 1) an intervention must score 350 or above, OR the different types of interventions are plotted relative to one another and not in absolute terms. In the matrix above the highest score relative to the others was plotted as 1st selective priority. Beside the advantage of linking analysis with practical recommendations the decision making analysis can be linked to an additional mapping. In the case of Afghanistan the incorporation of security risks and secondary indicators to attain conflict sensitivity (such as a coordinated approach, fostering conflict prevention and others) is also linked to an evolving discussion in risk management. In risk management the threshold of acceptable risk is mapped along the lines of likeliness (of occurrence of a risk) and impact. These two dimension should be extended with a third dimension, that of attained benefit deriving from a particular intervention. The higher the attained benefit, for example a life-saving intervention, the higher the threshold of acceptable risk. By using MCDMA this third dimension can be implicitly thought of and link conflict sensitivity in regards to threshold with risk management17 . 3-Dimensional Risk Assessment Impact Likelihood Attained Benefit Figure 6 17 See van Brabant, K.: Managing Aid Agency Security in an Evolving World: The larger Challenge, EISF Article Series 2010.
  19. 19. 19Multi-Criteria Decision Making Analysis ! Sudan: Education in Abyei – Building connectors UNICEF Abyei Education Project in Sudan - supported by DFID – illustrates a positive response to the risk of doing harm as a donor . Abyei is an area claimed by governments of north and south Sudan respectively and is populated by a mix of Dinka and Misserya communities. It is generally regarded as the “make it or break it” area in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Following the peace agreement, large numbers of IDPs were encouraged to return to the area, putting pressure on limited resources. In the meantime especially Misserya youth were dissatisfied that they were not integrated into the formal police force after fighting for years for the government which would provide them with an alternative livelihood opportunity. Relief efforts focused on the groups most affected by the war, and thus tended to favor the Dinka, creating resentment amongst Misserya. Analysis identified this imbalance as potentially aggravating the conflict between the two groups, which would increase the risk for either group to be used again as proxy force in an anticipated outbreak of armed conflict. The Integrated Strategic Plan for Abyei identified education as a key priority for both communities. In response to rising tensions and against a background of limited local capacity, UNICEF developed and implemented a rapid school building and education programme. The goal of the project was to reduce conflict and support the implementation of the peace agreement through the creation of 7,000 school places and basic education programmes serving both communities. By creating benefits equally for both communities, the education programme has become a point of common interest, or ‘connector’ in the Do No Harm terminology. Following a conflict, development activities creating benefits across the lines of division between communities can play a significant role in building peace. This shows how a thorough understanding of the context and a solid process design can facilitate meeting realities on the ground and contribute to a peace building outcome by fostering behavioral change through a joint education programme. Maurice D. Voyame
  20. 20. 20 Why Process equally matters Chapter II Why Process equally matters - Linking Risk, Acceptance & Conflict Sensitivity For an advisory service to be successful it is insufficient to tailor the analysis products to the particular need of the client. To align the focus of the analysis with the respective needs (in the case of Afghanistan sub-national territory units and prospective scenarios) and deliver it in an appropriate format, it is at least equally important to embed the analysis in a proper process. The same is true for project implementation where not only assessment and planning must be appropriate but also the entire implementation shall be embedded in a process that ensures quality and sustainability. There are many great analyses or initiatives that have little impact due to negligence or under- estimation of process. In this regard one has to identify the window of opportunity or platform to introduce the content and questions the analysis raises into real decision-making. This can either happen via Country Management Teams, Coordination Groups at various levels, Project Team Meetings or in communities of practice with likeminded. “If the analysis misses the window of influence, it is likely to have little impact” IPI 2010 In Afghanistan a structure of competence teams, consisting of focal points of every project or program in a given province was established and endorsed not only to contribute to the development of analysis but also to feed the results back into the programs and implementation. In doing so competence teams function as a group for peer-advice and create some sort of community of practice18 . Furthermore, regular updates are presented in the Country Management Team and discussions with representatives of the Embassy, BMZ and Federal Foreign Office (AA) are conducted. 18 A Community of Practice understood as a “Self-organized network of peers with diverse skills and experience in an area of practice or profession, the group is held together by the members’ desire to help others (by sharing information) and the need to advance their own knowledge (by learning from others)”.
  21. 21. 21Why Process equally matters In hybrid political orders19 , conflict sensitive program management, including the need for a solid analysis and assessment does not stand alone, but needs to involve key stakeholders as well as define windows of opportunity for analysis and dialogue with partner structures. It is equally important to identify and use other synergies, especially with like-minded organizations. A synergy that can reduce transaction costs is the link between conflict sensitivity, conflict and context analysis and security risk management. Basic security risk management sets forth that every person is first and foremost responsible for his/ her own safety and security. However, as a member of an organization and with it a program or project, individual attitude, behavior and program performance/approaches can reciprocally impact on each other’s security. A conflict sensitive approach and program management can in some ways mitigate or reduce certain risks (especially those originating from people and groups) while a conflict fostering or Do Harm, even if unintended, will increase certain security risks. The level and nature of the risk is evidently dependent on the particularities of the conflict. How and along which parameters can conflict sensitive approaches positively (or none attentiveness to conflict sensitivity negatively) affect security risks? To answer this question it is useful to get a structured understanding of what constitutes a risk. There are various possible definitions of Risk, one of the most commonly referred equation20 also used in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), Protection Programming, and Security Management is shown below RISK (L,I) = (THREAT + VULNERABILITY)M x TIMEM Risk equals threat plus vulnerability multiplied by time (of exposure). The Risk Level is assessed and dependent on the likeliness of its occurrence (L) and the anticipated or factual impact upon the occurrence of the risk (I), while the level of threat and vulnerability is dependent on the adopted mitigating or treatment measures and strategies (M). Essentially there are five major sources of security threat baskets21 , namely ½ Military and terrorist actions & violence ½ Politically motivated action & violence ½ Criminal action & violence ½ Action by disaffected populations ½ Actions by disgruntled staff22 19 See Boege, V. / Brown, A. / Clements, K. / Nolan, A. (2008): On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of “Fragility”, Berghof Handbook Dialogue No. 8. 20 But slightly refined equation 21 If we exclude threats staff can be pose to them by risky behavior, see van Braband p. 49. 22 See ibdi, p. 50.
  22. 22. 22 Why Process equally matters ! Conflict sensitive Micro Hydro Power Grids – When process determines an outcome InNalan,thedistrictcapitalofYaftalePayaninBadakhshanProvinceofAfghanistan,segregation of Pashtu from Uzbek communities was prevalent. The implementation of a Hydro Power project aiming at connecting the communities to Farghambow Mini Hydro Power (MiHP) grid was not perceived positively. A context analysis looking deeper into the roots of the ethnic divide revealed that those “Manetakas” (socially coherent valleys) expressed their loyalty to two different commanders during the Mujaheddin time and this divide was transcended up until today.Taking this into consideration the construction of two smaller MiHPs instead of one large MiHP was initiated. The participating workers (cash for work) from both areas cooperated and exchanged on technical questions during the implementation of the MiHPs and the installation of the respective networks. Furthermore, a street connecting both “Manetakas” was completed and increased the social and economic exchange via increased accessibility. Both stations (Farghambol 280kW and Nalan 125 kW) are operational since early 2011. The Fargambol MiHP also supplies Bazaar Etefaq, which is used by both parties and thus serves as a forum for economic exchange of goods between the two groups. This rather slow approach to facilitate exchange between the two parties is matching the attainable speed of the process whereas a joint MiHP would have overcharged the fragile relation and thus reinforced already existing cleavages. Since people have now learned about the benefits of sustainable quality electricity supply and trainings have supported their technical understanding both communities started discussing under which conditions both stations could be connected in order to provide this service to more people and villages. This example illustrates how a pure understanding of the context is not sufficient for conflict sensitivity. Equally important is an emphasis on process where windows of opportunities are identified and each intervention must be appropriate to the level of trust or animosity between the groups determining the context. Oliver J. Haas; INTEGRATION Environment & Energy and Energy Supply for Rural Areas Program (ESRA), Afghanistan.
  23. 23. 23Why Process equally matters Risk Treatment Channels & Strategies Risk Channels of Response & Treatment Threat Reduction Modes of Delivery Transfer/Share Avoidance Vulnerability Time Treatment Strategy Protection Deterrence Deterrence Acceptance Figure 7 To address risks there are three commonly used strategies that both target your vulnerability (and intend to reduce or transfer it) or the posed threat (and try to reduce and/or avoid it) or a mixture of both. These are the so-called treatment strategies, namely acceptance, protection and deterrence.23 Figure 7 shows the different treatment strategies and what they primarily address. It furthermore indicates channels of response and treatment. In addition to the aforementioned strategies modes of delivery are of increased importance for working in insecure environments, especially in the light of ongoing discussion on remote management and remote control. Evidently these aspects interlink and are interdependent to a certain extent. For example risk transfer is closely linked to modes of delivery, if an organization e.g. deems to outsource all implementation to a local implementing partner. Moreover, choosing remote control as a mode of delivery has direct and often adverse implications on the acceptance of an organization. Therefore the interdependence between the various strategies and channels of response to a given set of risks is paramount and should not be underestimated. Having a clear mandate or doctrine in this regard is certainly of great assistance when looking into the security risk management of an organization. For the purpose of this paper the primary focus will be on an often neglected field which is linked to conflict sensitivity, namely the adoption and operationalization of an acceptance-based approach to security risk management.24 However, it must be kept in mind that no security risk management can solely focus or adopt only one of the three treatment strategies. But, depending on the context and the freedom of maneuver and access, aspects of acceptance become more crucial for generating operational space. Moreover, acceptance is the sole treatment strategy which is actually focusing entirely on the reduction of threats while the others are mainly designed for reducing the vulnerability vis-à-vis a particular threat or risk. It must be said, that deterrence is also addressing threats in some ways but is often not suitable for humanitarian or development agencies as it involves in most parts the threat to force to deter a risk. This also deems through by reducing the vulnerability, e.g. armed protection. 23 See ibdi, p. 58/59, p 71. 24 See O’Neill, M. Acceptance White Paper, USAID / Safe the Children, Collaborative Learning Approach to NGO Security Management, January 2011.
  24. 24. 24 The Acceptance Approach “As uncertain future events, risks can always be influenced by human behavior and decision-making, but it can never be predicted with absolute certainty whether or how they will arise and evolve over time” CSS 2008 The Acceptance Approach Acceptance in most organization is rooted in a set of specific values. The most prominent are humanitarian values guiding the work of the ICRC and other core humanitarian organizations. The ICRC although probably the organization with the longest standing acceptance approach, does not define acceptance. Acceptance is rather linked to a range of values and operational choices that affect perception of and trust in the organization among stakeholders.25 Therefore, acceptance is based on effective relationships and the continuous cultivation of consent among beneficiaries.26 Acceptance as opposed to protection measures in security risk management is inherently outwards looking. This is further evident in the fact of acceptance being a treatment strategy to threats which, by definition, are external.27 An acceptance approach is constituted by at least four pillars connected with each other. ½ First and foremost acceptance is “software” and therefore skill based. Based on aspects not quantitatively measurable - unlike the thickness or height of a perimeter wall - acceptance is grounded in establishing trust with all relevant actors and stakeholders, communication and cultural sensitivity. Mutual benefit and understanding of what an organization or project strives to achieve, which closely relates to the notion of ownership, is finally grounded in the ability to establish and sustain relationships. ½ Derived from this notion of acceptance as software the second constitutive element is the contention that fostering an acceptance approach is genuinely skill based. Not only people and social skills like those referred to above, but also a humble appearance, good negotiation skills (which include the skill also to say no or oppose a partners wish, but in a respected, well communicated and mutually agreeable manner). Those rather soft skills are often not thought of in classical program cycle management processes and theories. In the last chapter a short elaboration on particular challenges for planning and project management in dynamic settings will be given. 25 See Brugger, P.: ICRC operational security: staff safety in armed conflict and internal violence, in: International Review of the Red Cross 91(2009)874, p. 436. 26 See Brüderlein, C.: Towards a common security framework: Securing access and managing risks in hazardous missions, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard University 2004, p. 4. 27 Evidently we speak here of man made threats and human driven threats rather than threats originating from natural hazards or disasters which cannot be mitigated by an acceptance approach.
  25. 25. 25The Acceptance Approach ½ Another distinction of acceptance from other risk treatment approaches is the third notion that evolves of the fact that acceptance is software and skill based, namely that acceptance is fostered (or put at risk) by every single staff member and his/her behavior. This can be either advantageous or disadvantageous depending on staff, their skills and knowledge, HR policy for recruitment and with it the organizational doctrine or culture, which is probably most important for a sustainable acceptance approach. Organizational doctrine and culture is relevant as far as it can serve both as enabler or disabler of skill based approaches. A sharp and clear mandate for example is often easier to communicate. Certain intervention types, for example non-political and humanitarian interventions, are more likely to generate some preconceived credit.28 In the end the prevalent and unanswered question is: “At what point does the acceptance gained by an individual transfer to the organization that the individual represents?”29 Moreover acceptance is process and interaction based, dynamic rather than static. This statement expresses the demand for a good understanding of the context and the buildup of relationships to all relevant actors. With this the acceptance strategy is particularly suitable for dynamic settings and arguably less suitable to settings where threats and instability merely or purely derive from organized violence and crime. Acceptance is based on an understanding of the context, actors, their interaction with one another and your organization. Hence, it is distinctively relationship focused and systems thinking based. Gradually and genuinely the interdependence and complexity of the relationship between conflict sensitivity, security risk management and in it threat reduction through acceptance has been pinpointed throughout this paper. Without a good understanding of the context and multi-causal roles for conflict reduction or escalations that go beyond pure connectors and dividers an acceptance approach will likely not materialize. Therefore, an in depth analysis and approach to context is indispensible. However, standing alone such analysis is limited in reach and impact. Linking the acceptance approach with the project process, especially planning and implementation, such an analysis is a significant asset. ½ Finally the last part in the holistic equation to address threats in a pro-active way through a conflict sensitive and acceptance approach is the one of linking context knowledge and the proper process design (for analysis and implementation) to the ever changing dynamic in fragile contexts. Here genuine links to process design are needed. If planning and project cycle management does not take the context analysis adequately into consideration and is steered in a coordinated way, conflict sensitivity and with it the acceptance approach can barely be sustained or even established. The biggest challenge here is how to overcome problems, such as the need for flexible planning and implementation in systems with stiff annual budget allocation or financial/ administrative requirements, to name just some challenges. However, if an organization and in it its program fall short of flexibly adjusting to changes in the environment, the mutual benefit of stakeholders, beneficiaries and implementers is likely to be reduced or to vanish as reality beats 28 Political or non political action in this context have to be seen as those actions conceived and perceived by the relevant actors as being political or non political which does not necessarily connote or be congruent with the notion the international develop- ment establishment bears in this regard. 29 Quote from Acceptance White Paper, p. 5, see FN 25.
  26. 26. 26 The Acceptance Approach the project plan. In the light of these findings the last chapter examines the need and chances to adapt to reality and sustain investments and development impacts. When reality is not adequately reflected at all stages this becomes a great restraint. Reality is not polite, it does not wait for an invitation, but just barges in.30 ! Conflict Sensitive Value Chains and the Risk for Exposure from militant parts of society In Kosovo the breakdown of trust between actors formerly participating and cooperating in the same value chain mirrored the wider conflict. In Kosovo’s dairy value chain, Kosovo Serb farmers had to wait outside their village to sell their milk surplus below market price due to the lack of storage facilities. Kosovo Albanian processors complained that the milk was watered down. Both parties were reluctant to access each other’s villages because they felt threatened by each other. Discussing activities to re-establish mutually beneficial links between Serb dairy cattle owners and Albanian processors the decision was made to provide a storage facility in between an Albanian and Serbian village respectively. This option could generate an anticipated positive outcome as well as an unexpected negative outcome. On the one hand the storage facilities could improve quality standards and increase the willingness of Albanian processors to buy from Serb cattle owners. In doing so a conflict along ethnic lines might be mitigated and economic profit generated for both parties. On the other hand project participants and the project itself runs the risk to become targeted by hardliners of both communities. Moreover, competition and conflict over the project resource - storage facility - could erupt. This indicates that conflict sensitivity is not only about “what” but also about “how” to do things. Possible unwanted ramifications need to be anticipated and possibly countered. This example also shows the link between conflict sensitivity and risks. Even if if presumably planned in a conflict sensitive way short-sighted planning might expose the participating communities as well as the project and implementing organization to adverse action by hardliners and spoilers. This shows how acceptance can be fostered within certain stakeholders while in the meantime it can be lost within other, potentially violent groups. Care and International Alert (2008): Towards a Conflict Sensitive Care Kosovo – Final Report and Learning Manual; International Alert (2006): Local Business, Local Peace – The Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector, Case Study Kosovo. 30 See ISSAT (International Security Sector Advisory Team) Community of Practice Discussion, and blog “the myth of a plan” by Ausland, A. posted 20. July 2011.
  27. 27. 27Reality always wins | Straightjacket vs. Ballistic Planning Chapter III: “Reality is not polite, it does not wait for an invitation, it just barges in – reality always wins” Aaron Ausland Reality always wins This last chapter is bringing together the two previous aspects of context and analysis as well as process and translates them into possibilities to sustain them and with it also sustain the highest attainable level of acceptance. It has been shown that quite frequently, the source of failure of interventions is the overemphasis on output and with it the underemphasize on process. This applies particularly to fragile contexts and is accelerated when political scrutiny is prevalent, such as in Afghanistan, In consequence, this directly impedes on how outputs are sustained on an outcome level. However, this should not happen if the cornerstones of due process introduced in the first two chapters are adequately paid attention to. Certainly some of the introduced aspects call for the allocation of additional resources and most of them take time to materialize. Nevertheless, the return on this investment makes it worth pursuing when looking at the level of risk reduction and sustainability of interventions and with it efficiency of investment. An often observed pattern is the notion of “successful outputs with failed outcomes”.31 Straightjacket vs. Ballistic Planning Due to a confined allocation of budget and resources to result/output driven plans at the early stage of implementation and insufficient review, adaptation and rerouting throughout the project cycle, interventions are likely to fall short of taking the dynamics and complexity of the environment adequately into account. This straightjacket often exists when project and managers vigorously try to show a comprehensive and coherent causal impact chain from input through activities, results (on output level), outcomes and impacts. This is not to say that managers should not plan. Quite the contrary is the case in fragile and volatile environments. But such planning should refrain from putting one’s intervention into a straightjacket and rather focus on the highest amount of flexibility with clear goals (outcomes) and solid baselines (including qualitative analysis). Instead of narrowly monitoring outputs and results, progress markers should be identified and incorporated into a comprehensive outcome mapping. On the planning side, clearly defined outcomes should be established along a ballistic planning approach. By aiming to define outcomes and further desired impacts but remaining flexible in the way to achieve them, programs remain open for adapting to dynamic changes. However, such an approach demands more monitoring of progress, continuous analysis and systems thinking. But eventually it is more sustainable than narrow planning and a focus on outputs, which leads to self- deception rather than rooting plans in reality. The previous chapters have established not only the need for good context knowledge, the software and skill based approach as well as an acceptance- 31 Ausland, A.: Staying for Tea. Five Principles for the Community Service Volunteer, in: The Global Citizen, p. 7.
  28. 28. 28 Straightjacket vs. Ballistic Planning based approach through conflict sensitive strategy. Furthermore, it showed that is indispensible to look into relationships and with it into the socio-topography of a context and subsequently the adaptation of a flexible ballistic planning and outcome mapping. The development of a monitoring system based on the aforementioned strategies, as well as analysis and planning tools can be seen as genuine last step in this process. Outcomes can be defined as changes in behavior, relationships, activities or action of people, groups or organizations with which a project or program works directly. Outcome mapping is closely related to the conflict sensitive ideas prevalent in conflict and fragility. It focuses essentially on how people relate to one another and their environment, providing for complementarities to the systemic thinking in the analysis part of the first chapter. Essentially risk management, project management and conflict sensitive program management all are processes that can only succeed when adapted to the particularities of the complex context one is working in and the acceptance by beneficiaries. While not all aspects can be transcended, facts on the ground call for utmost flexibility and professionalism in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. If instruments on all levels are not tailored to match, are coherent and congruently interlinked with one another, sustainability and achievement of goals, which are conflict sensitive and foster an acceptance approach, are at risk. Or in the words of the Economist in an article on failed states: “Given that failure comes in so many variances, fixing them is bound to be more of an art than a science”. ! When context reality meets programmatic thinking – Agriculture development in an insurgency prone Province in Afghanistan An agriculture and livelihood program aiming at processing the agriculture products in a sustainable economic value chain and production in the province is being implemented in a strategically relevant province of Afghanistan, marked by heavy fighting already during the Russian invasion. Up until today the province has been marked by political and ethnic fragmentation. This nowadays translates into prevalent intrusion by insurgents and clashes between insurgent groups with Afghan and International Military forces, including frequent IED (Improvised Explosive Devises) attacks on Convoys and Supply Convoys. Against this background the agriculture project in the province has done a great deal to mobilize farmers and land owner. Several shuras have been conducted which eventually peaked in a significant amount of farmers aligning to the agriculture and manufacturing production of specific goods. Outreach was conducted in an ethnically and politically inclusive manner avoiding exclusion or grievances. Later on the project distributed free fertilizers to the participating farmers meant to increase their revenue in the harvest season and with it to increase their income. Some days later military forces raided the respective farmer’s compounds, confiscated the fertilizer and temporarily took most farmers into custody for interrogation. The distributed type of fertilizer serves insurgents as primary ingredient for IEDs. This exemplifies how a well designed and participatory program approach can be reasonable from a sector and programmatic point of view, but in the end backfires as the particularities of the provincial context beyond the agriculture sector and actors operating therein, were not taken into account. This shows the need to match context and process to the reality on the ground beyond the specifics of the sector one intervenes in. Source: Country Risk Management Office for GGDO, GIZ Office Kabul, Afghanistan.
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  31. 31. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH Dag-Hammarskjöld-Weg 1-5 65760 Eschborn/Germany T +49 61 96 79-0 F +49 61 96 79-11 15 E I