1. Richard A. Baum February 2, 2007
Oceanic Games of Terror
Consider a continuum of the political spectrum ranging from pacifist to terrorist.
Suppose a type pre-orders political type on the open interval (0, 1). One person’s type is self
known but is not known to others in the global political world. In an attempt to form a polis
based on type and pre-order, suppose an individual may engage in some observable signaling
activity such as organizing a peace rally or destroying the World Trade Center. Suppose
signals may also be pre-ordered on the open interval (0, 1) by a type. To begin with, nobody
knows who is who nor what the distribution is of the terms of bargaining between types.
Choosing signals may evolve a metric which is some measure of distance between
types or a measure of the distance between typical activities of different types. A heuristic
step is to model the flow and evolution of this metric according to the Ricci flow. The Ricci
flow involves two terms: a reaction term and a diffusion term. The reaction term, say during
a crisis, tends to concentrate curvature surrounding a type: picturesquely, the concentration
of curvature surrounding a type in a crisis may be seen as drawing the wagons in a tighter
circle for protection against terrorists, or terrorist cells concentrating in smaller circles of
influence. The diffusion term tends to disperse concentration of curvature and is felt as the
crisis subsides and normalcy sets in again: picturesquely, the wagons unwind and begin their
journey West again or members of terrorist cells start associating with outsiders again.
Competition or conflict evolves the flow of the metric (the Ricci flow). In pre-
modern times, the types would sort themselves out into poleis or nation-states, seeking to
minimize tension within their state by so associating. In a global political world, such
separation to ease internal tension may no longer be viable, precipitating bargaining.