1. KATHOLIEKE UNVERSITEIT LEUVEN
SEMINAR PAPER
MASTER IN EUROPEAN STUDIES:
TRANSNATIONAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES
Does Israel comply with the human rights standards articulated in Article 2 of the
Association Agreement (2000)?
Diana Boteanu (r0363863)
Raluca Pasarica (r0363807)
Jia Li (r0360616)
Elizabeth Edwards (r0362598)
Ivan Penkov (r0224464)
Everhardus Jan Gerhardus (Evert Jan) Jacobsen (r0292428)
Academic Year: 2012-2013

2. SECTION (I): Introductory Remarks:
Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement (2000) stipulates that the: “[r]elations
between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based on
respect for human rights and democratic principles, which guides their internal and
international policy and constitutes an essential element of [the] Agreement.”1
Note that
Article 2 forms the basis of a general normative framework, which informs the EU’s basic
internal and external policy toward the state of Israel. However, as will become evident
through our assessment of both settlement data, and trade data, Article 2 also forms the basis
for a capability-expectations gap (Hill, 1993), which is situated at the heart of the EU’s
external trade policy toward Israel. This means that the EU is not able to uphold the
normative expectations stipulated in Article 2.
The forthcoming assessment of Israel’s settlement expansion into occupied territories
(Section II), when combined with the basic assessment of trade between the Parties (Section
III), serves to substantiate the possibility that Israel’s internal and international policies are
not based on, nor guided by, respect for international human rights. In fact, our analysis of
data sources reveals that Israel is in violation of Article 2 of the Association Agreement.
Begging the question: does Israel’s violation of Article 2 imply a possible liability for the
EU, which it could address via its trade relations? In particular, after the successful
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, maintaining preferential trade ostensibly undercuts
the legally binding European Charter of Fundamental Rights. In other words, the EU’s
preferential trade toward Israel may in fact be compromising their ability to act as a
legitimate normative power within the rubric of global governance. We shall explore these
elements, along the lines of the aforementioned capability-expectations gap, in our closing
remarks (Section IV). For the purpose of simplicity, our empirical assessment will focus on
the issue of settlements and trade relations since the signing of the Association Agreement
(June 1st
, 2000).
SECTION (II): Settlement Expansion
Israeli settlements are the Jewish civilian communities built on land reserved for the
Palestinians under the 1948 formation of Israel by an alliance of international powers. These
settlements occur in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Both were originally proposed to
become either part of the Palestinian territories or the special international regime of
1
“Euro-Mediterranean Agreement”; Official Journal of the European Communities Vol 147/3 (21/06/2000). Retrieved
on 20th
December 2012 from http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:
147:0003:0156:EN:PDF
2

3. Jerusalem by the Plan of Partition of November 29, 19472
. The following graph embodies the
jumping-off point of our statistical assessment of settlement expansion.
Figure (i)
Figure (i) enables us to conclude that Israeli settlements have continued to expand in
occupied territories over the last four decades, except in the Gaza-strip.3
Moreover, it worth
highlighting that the data revealed in figure (i) comes from the Israel Central Bureau of
Statistics, and the Jerusalem Institute for Israel studies, and is brought together by the
Foundation for Middle East Peace (2012).
According to B'Tselem (2012), the Israeli information center for Human Rights in the
occupied territories, the annual settler population growth was more than three times the
annual population growth in Israel during the 1990s. In the 2000s, the settlement expansion
continued. In the West Bank, settlement population grew at an annual rate of 5–6%. The
settlement population in East Jerusalem grew 15 percent over this decade. In 2011, the
population of Israelis living in settlements had risen to just over 500,000 comprising more
than 10 percent of the Israeli population (ibid.).
Not only does the settlement expansion constitute a breach of international law and
human rights, also Israel’s conduct in the occupied territories further suggest a breach of
article 2. Figure (ii), which is based on data from the Jerusalem Fund, a non-profit
independent research institute devoted to the issues of the Israel-Palestine conflict, illustrates
2
Foundation for Middle East Peace (2009). “Statement on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory” .
Retrieved on 20th
December 2012 from http://www.fmep.org/analysis/analysis/statement-on-israeli-settlements-in-the-
occupied-palestinian-territory?searchterm=Israeli+Settlement+in+the+Occupied+
3
Foundation for Middle East Peace (2012). “Israeli Settler Population” Retrieved on 20th
December 2012 from
http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/settlement-info-and-tables/stats-data/israeli-settler-population-1972-2006
B’Tselem (2012). “Land Expropriation and Settlements Statistics”. Retrieved on 20th
December 2012 from
http://www.btselem.org/download/settlement_population_eng.xls
3

4. an increase in settler violence towards the local Palestinians.4
The Israeli authorities address
the issue of violence in the context of a dual system of law, which extends the rights of Israeli
Penal Law to settlers, while Palestinians living on the same ground are subjected to military
law. To be clear, military law inhibits the basic principle of equality before the law5
.
Furthermore, the EU released a report on Israeli settler violence with a cover note from the
EU Heads of Mission (2010) stressing the link between a dual legal system and settler
violence, claiming that “settler activity is a leading cause of violence against Palestinian
civilians, destruction of Palestinian property and the abuse of Palestinian rights under
international law.”6
Figure (ii)
Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, to which Israel is a party, states are prohibited
from transferring civilians from the occupying power's territory into the occupied territory,
and from creating permanent changes in the occupied territory that are not for the benefit of
the occupied population. UN Security Council Resolution 465 (1980) established that the
Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem “constitute a flagrant violation of the
Fourth Geneva Convention”. Furthermore, this resolution states that Israel’s settlements in
occupied territories embody an unequivocal violation of international human rights (UNSC,
1980)7
. Yet, in spite of the fourth Geneva Convention, and UN Resolution 465, Israel
continues to expand its settlements in occupied territories along with a proliferation of
violence. Thus, Israel’s continual disregard of human rights places them in violation of
Article 2. As such, it is also an important case where the EU could possibly intervene, to
4
The Jerusalem Fund (2012). “When Settlers Attack”. Retrieved March 24, 2013 from
http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/32678
5
B’Tselem (2011). ‘Dual Legal System’. Retrieved March 26, 2013 from
http://www.btselem.org/settler_violence/dual_legal_system
6
EU Heads of Mission in Jerusalem and Ramallah (2010). “Cover Note from EU Heads of Mission”. Retrieved March
24, 2013 from http://www.rightsforum.org/eur1.html
7
The Security Council of the United Nations (1980). “Resolution 465” Retrieved on December 20th
, 2012 from
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/5AA254A1C8F8B1CB852560E50075D7D5
4

5. exercise its normative power. However, it has only done this to a limited extent, as will be
shown in the next section.
SECTION (III): Trade Analysis
Figure (iii)
As indicated above, at present, Israel's trade with the EU occupies approximately one
third of Israel’s total foreign trade value. According to trade data from Eurostat (2012)8
, EU-
Israel total trade value rose from 26.89 billion (EUR) in the year 2000 to 29.52 billion in the
year 2011. The lifting of trade barriers after the signing of the agreement, which took effect
on June 1, 2000, allowed for an increase in trade in the 2000s. However, there is no
continuous growth during this decade, as trade between the EU and Israel declined during
2001-2003 as well as in 2009. These declines can, in part, be accounted for by the EU’s
official response to Israel's human right violations in the Second Intifada, in particular,
operation "Cast Lead". However, the 2009 fall in trade is linked to the global economic crisis.
Figure (iv)
During the Second Intifada (2000-2003), the EU accused Israel of expanding
settlements and obstructing the peace process. Oded Eran (2009), a researcher at the Israeli
8
Eurostat (2012). “Extra-EU trade by partner: EU-Israel trade from 1999-2011.” Retrieved December 15th
, 2012 from
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-016893_QID_-14F8E50E_UID_-
3F171EB0&layout=PERIOD,L,X,0;REPORTER,L,Y,0;PARTNER,L,Z,0;PRODUCT,L,Z,1;FLOW
5

6. Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), argues that the EU has successfully delayed
the conclusion of another bilateral agreement in the framework of the ENP. Consequently,
this was only reached in late 2004.9
In 2008, during operation Cast Lead, the EU criticized
Israel for its violation of human rights and decided to not upgrade the 2nd generation ENP
Action Plan. In the EU’s view, upgrading bilateral relations was always conditional on
progress in the process of reaching a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and it remains
the EU approach. However no economic boycotts against Israeli products took place (Eran,
2010). 10
This shows that the capacity to act as a normative power is confined to a refusal to
engage in further deepening of relations. Neither our data, nor academic sources establish a
direct link between settlement expansion and trade declines.
There has never been more trade between Israel and the EU than in 2011 (see figure
IV). The same year also found yet another expansion of settlements (figure I). Clearly the
EU’s leverage is vast yet its ability and willingness to use it is limited, calling into question
its normative power.
SECTION (IV): Closing Remarks
Given Israel’s violation of Article 2, which forms the basis of the normative expectations that
accompany the Association Agreement, there is a theoretical basis for legal action against
Israel. Respect for human rights and dignity, together with the principles of freedom,
democracy, equality and the rule of law, are values common to all EU Member States. They
also guide both the internal and external actions of the Union. This normative commitment is
codified in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), as well as the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Post Lisbon (2009), this normative commitment
is further reinforced by way of the legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The violation of human rights by the settlements expansion suggests a breach of
several articles in The European Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR). This is a direct
breach of Article 2 of the Association agreement. For example Article 17(1) of the ECFR
specifies one’s right to property. Similarly, several articles of the Treaty of the European
Union are potentially in breach: Article 21(2) which states that the EU shall work for a high
degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations in order to consolidate and
support human rights and the principles of international law, preserve peace, prevent conflicts
and strengthen international security.
The EU’s reluctance to fully exercise its normative power creates a gap between
words and practices, a capability-expectations gap. As has been shown, the EU has not
9
This may be interpreted as an expression of the EU’s normative power.
10
Oded, E. (2009). “A Reversal in Israel-EU Relations?”; Strategic Assessment 12(1), 59-68. Retrieved 14th
December
2012 from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-
a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=101461
6

7. engaged in trade penalties, whereas it potentially has a vast leverage. This problematic
behavior is characterizing a more general feature of the EU’s capability-expectation gap. An
attempt to address this, whether via trade, or legal action, could narrow this gap.
The refusal to fulfill normative expectations is symptomatic of the EU’s conflicted
nature: it is a beast with diverging interests. In itself, a detailed analysis of trade interests by
way of the trade flows between the EU and do not fully show the whole picture. One must
consider the complex historical relation between the EU and Israel. Also, the EU conducts
affairs with a strategic geographical partner. Yet, its inaction can also be economically
motivated, as the trade between the two benefits both. Such important factors would be useful
fodder to explore this topic in another research area.
However, the basic idea here is that by doing so, the EU is undermining its own
principles and values. As this paper has attempted to show, the EU has not acted to its full
potential as a normative power to address the human rights violations conducted by Israel.
The only action it has engaged in is postponing deepening of bilateral relations as a reaction
to military action by Israel rather than a reaction to its settlement expansion policy. We can
therefore say that the EU has not acted in accordance with its own principles of human rights,
which are in fact legally binding for the EU. The EU’s inaction is making a mockery of its
own foreign policy, altogether being in breach of its fundamental values.
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a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=101461
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http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/32678
B’Tselem (2011). ‘Dual Legal System’. Retrieved March 26, 2013 from
http://www.btselem.org/settler_violence/dual_legal_system
EU Heads of Mission in Jerusalem and Ramallah (2010). “Cover Note from EU Heads of
Mission”. Retrieved March 24, 2013 from http://www.rightsforum.org/eur1.html
The Security Council of the United Nations (1980). “Resolution 465” Retrieved on
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10. 2012 from http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/?MIval=cw_usr_view_SHTML&ID=461
Manners, I. (2002) “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” in Journal of
Common Market Studies Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 235-258
Oded, E. (2009). “A Reversal in Israel-EU Relations?”; Strategic Assessment 12(1), 59-
68. Retrieved 14th
December 2012 from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-
a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=101461
The Jerusalem Fund (2012). “When Settlers Attack”. Retrieved March 24, 2013 from
http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/32678
B’Tselem (2011). ‘Dual Legal System’. Retrieved March 26, 2013 from
http://www.btselem.org/settler_violence/dual_legal_system
EU Heads of Mission in Jerusalem and Ramallah (2010). “Cover Note from EU Heads of
Mission”. Retrieved March 24, 2013 from http://www.rightsforum.org/eur1.html
The Security Council of the United Nations (1980). “Resolution 465” Retrieved on
December 20th
, 2012 from
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/5AA254A1C8F8B1CB852560E50075D7D5
9