1. An Efficient DynamicAn Efficient Dynamic
Router Approach toRouter Approach to
DefeatDefeat
“DDOS Attack“DDOS Attack ””
Presentation byPresentation by
B. Rajeswara Reddy,B. Rajeswara Reddy,
N.V.S.L. Swarupa.N.V.S.L. Swarupa.

2. ContentsContents
Denial-of-Service attacksDenial-of-Service attacks
Necessity for solutionNecessity for solution
Cooperative Technological SolutionsCooperative Technological Solutions
Existing SolutionExisting Solution
Proposed SolutionProposed Solution
ConclusionConclusion

3. Denial-of-ServiceDenial-of-Service
 Attempt to makeAttempt to make
resources unusable toresources unusable to
intended usersintended users
 Largest threat faced byLargest threat faced by
present day internetpresent day internet
 More among SocialMore among Social
Networking SitesNetworking Sites
 If more attackers itIf more attackers it
becomes DDoSbecomes DDoS

4. Necessity For SolutionNecessity For Solution
Media: 2.8% lossMedia: 2.8% loss
Two StagesTwo Stages
Recruiting ZombiesRecruiting Zombies
Flooding VictimFlooding Victim
DrawbackDrawback
Service DelaysService Delays
Dynamic RouterDynamic Router
Approach.Approach.
Mechanism of DDoS attacks.

5. COOPERATIVE TECHNOLOGICALCOOPERATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL
SOLUTIONSSOLUTIONS TO “DDOS ATTACKS”TO “DDOS ATTACKS”
ComponentsComponents
1.1. Internet CoreInternet Core
2.2. Internet CloudInternet Cloud
3.3. Edge of InternetEdge of Internet
4.4. Servers and ClientsServers and Clients
Service By D.S.C.Service By D.S.C.
1.1. Direct CommunicationDirect Communication
2.2. Cache CommunicationCache Communication
1.Digital Supply Chain
The digital supply chain.

6. Steps in CooperativeSteps in Cooperative
Filtering:Filtering:
1.1. AlarmingAlarming
2.2. TracingTracing
3.3. FilteringFiltering
Simple ApproachSimple Approach
 Delete Same IPDelete Same IP
PacketsPackets
Ban IP spoofingBan IP spoofing
The process of cooperative filtering.
a. Cooperative Filtering

7. b. Cooperative Cachingb. Cooperative Caching
 Draw Backs of FilteringDraw Backs of Filtering
 ExpensiveExpensive
 Legal Packets LostLegal Packets Lost
 Traffic Shared By RoutersTraffic Shared By Routers
 Routing Tables NeededRouting Tables Needed
 Bandwidth efficientlyBandwidth efficiently
Utilized.Utilized.
 Combining both resultsCombining both results
in Effective Performancein Effective Performance
Fig Cooperative Caching

8. Incentive ChainIncentive Chain
 Major Sources ForMajor Sources For
Digital Content flowDigital Content flow
 End Users DemandEnd Users Demand
 ICP’s DemandICP’s Demand
 Chain links all parties forChain links all parties for
end to end transmissionend to end transmission

9. Broken Incentive ChainBroken Incentive Chain
 Lack of IncrementalLack of Incremental
Payment Structure andPayment Structure and
Failure of CooperativeFailure of Cooperative
FilteringFiltering
 Have unused residueHave unused residue
bandwidthbandwidth
 Cost and Benefits for ISPCost and Benefits for ISP
in Cooperative Filteringin Cooperative Filtering
 Payment to ISP’sPayment to ISP’s
 With Congestion noWith Congestion no
profit to ISP’sprofit to ISP’s
Fig 3: Incentive Chain

10. Broken Incentive ChainBroken Incentive Chain
 Caches on the Edge of the Internet: InaccessibleCaches on the Edge of the Internet: Inaccessible
TreasuresTreasures
 Missisippi rule For Cooperative CachingMissisippi rule For Cooperative Caching
 Cost efficient than FilteringCost efficient than Filtering
 Reasons for breaking incentive chainReasons for breaking incentive chain
 ICP’s does not provide money for cachingICP’s does not provide money for caching
 Resource becomes inactiveResource becomes inactive
 ICP’s not sure about DDoS: No PaymentICP’s not sure about DDoS: No Payment

11. Existing Soln: Capacity ProvisionExisting Soln: Capacity Provision
NetworkNetwork
 Network of CacheNetwork of Cache
ServersServers
 Demand side CacheDemand side Cache
tradingtrading
 Owner of ISP playsOwner of ISP plays
main role in it.main role in it.
 Dilution of traffic by theDilution of traffic by the
best Cachebest Cache

12. Proposed SolutionProposed Solution
Difficult to locateDifficult to locate
origin of attackorigin of attack
Request ConstraintsRequest Constraints
Size: 2GBSize: 2GB
Fields: 100Fields: 100
Check header info, atCheck header info, at
first routerfirst router
Router DatabaseRouter Database Restricting Fake Packet

13. Sample Data And ResultsSample Data And Results
Nodes in theNodes in the time takentime taken
networknetwork
100 0.078125100 0.078125
200200 0. 1093750. 109375
300300 0.1093750.109375
400400 0.156250.15625
500500 0.156250.15625
600600 0.156250.15625
700700 0.1718750.171875
800800 0.2343750.234375
900900 0.2343750.234375
10001000 0.2656250.265625
Series 1
-200 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
0.1
0.2
0.3
x
y
Nodes in the Network
T
i
m
e
T
a
k
e
n
CPN method

14. Identifying the AttackIdentifying the Attack
Nodes in theNodes in the Time takenTime taken
networknetwork
100 0.078125100 0.078125
200200 0.0781250.078125
300300 0.50.5
400400 0.0781250.078125
500500 0.0781250.078125
600600 0.0781250.078125
700700 0.0781250.078125
800800 00781250078125
900900 0.0781250.078125
10001000 0.0781250.078125

15. Results in Dynamic RouterResults in Dynamic Router
MethodMethod
No..of packets Transfer rates
(No’s) (Mbps)
100 100
200 96
300 84
400 77
500 55
200 90
210 96
220 94
215 98

16. ConclusionConclusion
 Previously proposed methods concentrated mostly onPreviously proposed methods concentrated mostly on
determining the attack path only.determining the attack path only.
 In Our proposed solution we can easily safe guard anyIn Our proposed solution we can easily safe guard any
network from attack.network from attack.
 Here for LAN congestion problem add theHere for LAN congestion problem add the
implementation of multiple cache servers on networkimplementation of multiple cache servers on network
by complex congestion control algorithm.by complex congestion control algorithm.

17. ..

18. ..