2016Gyeszat_Michael

THE TENSION BETWEEN IMMANUEL KANT’S ETHICAL & POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHIES
By Michael Gyeszat
Submitted in Fulfillment of the Requirements of Senior Independent Study
Advisors: Mark Weaver & John Rudisill
Departments of Philosophy & Political Science
The College of Wooster
May 2016

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Table of Contents
Abstract............................................................................................................................................2
Acknowledgements..........................................................................................................................3
Introduction......................................................................................................................................4
Chapter 1: The Ethical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant....................................................................6
Section One: The Good Will ........................................................................................................6
Section Two: Duty........................................................................................................................8
Section Three: The Law & the Categorical Imperative.............................................................10
Section Four: The Moral Worth of Ends ...................................................................................14
Section Five: The Autonomy and Heteronomy of Will...............................................................19
Chapter Two: The Political Philosophy of Immanuel Kant...........................................................23
Section One: A Brief History of Social Contract Theory...........................................................23
Section Two: Kant, Social Contract Theory, and the Formation of the State ...........................43
Chapter Three: The Duties of the State Mixed With Tension .......................................................51
Section One: Kant, Hobbes, and Punishment............................................................................51
Section Two: Punishment and the Categorical Imperative .......................................................55
Section Three: Punishment, Servility, and the Potential Tension..............................................59
Section Four: The Tension.........................................................................................................70
Chapter Four: Tension Tied With Legitimacy...............................................................................73
Section One: A Legacy of Legitimacy........................................................................................74
Section Two: Tension and Legitimacy .......................................................................................79
Section Three: A Kantian Response...........................................................................................83
Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................88
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................89

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Abstract
In this paper, I postulate that Immanuel Kant has a kind of tension between his
ethical and political philosophies that, once properly analyzed, proves to be problematic
to his philosophy as a whole. In the first chapter, I analyze and explain Kant’s claims in
The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals in an effort to understand his ethical
philosophy. In the second chapter, I analyze the major ideas Kant presents in Metaphysics
of Morals in relation to the major works of the social contract theorists, Thomas Hobbes,
John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Within both the second and third chapters, I
examine Kant’s political writings, focusing on what he has to say on the nature of the
state, the duties it possesses in relation to its subjects, and the nature of legitimacy.
After examining and analyzing Kant’s theories on the state and legitimacy in the
third chapter, I conclude that discussion by analyzing contemporary writings concerning
Kant’s work in an effort to aid me in proving that Kant does, in fact, have a tension
present between his ethical and political philosophies. After examining and analyzing
Kant’s theories on the state and legitimacy, I shall critique his work using contemporary
critics, as well as contemporary Kantians in an attempt to show what could be considered
a strong rebuttal to these criticisms. In the fourth chapter, I conclude the paper by
attempting to understand whether or not this tension can be resolved, which I eventually
conclude to be impossible from a Kantian perspective.

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Acknowledgements
This essay is dedicated to both my mother, Denise King, as well my late
grandmother, Helen Schuster, whose constant love and support have made all of this
possible for me.
This project would also not have been possible without the wonderful support
offered to me by my friends, as well as the tireless guidance and mentoring offered to me
by Professors Mark Weaver and John Rudisill.

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Introduction
Immanuel Kant is one of the most influential philosophers of the 18th
century. His works have been an inspiration to ethical, political, and metaphysical
philosophers for nearly two centuries. Specifically, Kant has been a major influence for
both ethical and political philosophers, going so far as to inspire an entire school of
thought that is applicable to these disciplines, Kantianism. To quickly summarize Kantian
ethical philosophy, it rests on the concepts of non-consequentialism and free will.
Kantian ethical philosophy is partly based on non-consequentialism because the moral
worth of actions, according to Kant, depends upon whether one is committing those
actions from out of a sense of duty, which is morally good, or from a sense of inclination
and incentive, which is morally wrong. His ethical philosophy also rests on a concept of
free will. According to Kant, we have a will, and through that will, we can commit
actions, whether they are actions of moral rightness or wrongness depends upon the
attitude a person chooses to adopt. From these concepts of non-consequentialism and free
will, Kant develops his ethical philosophy.
Kant’s political philosophy, on the other hand, is partially based around his own
ethical theory, as well as the political writings of the social contract philosophers,
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Kant outlines what he believes
to be the philosophical foundations of the state by outlining what would have been
considered contemporary social contract theory. Social contract theory, in summary, is
the idea that the power of the state, and by extension the executive forces that enforce
that state’s will, comes from the consent of those that are governed, the people. In order
to feel more secure in a dangerous world, people band together into political

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communities. From there, Kant continues to outline his political philosophy by
developing what he calls the Public Right and the Private Right. The Public Right
consists of the rights Kant perceives to be owed to the entire population within a state.
The Private Right, by contrast, consists of the rights owed to single individuals within the
state. These concepts of Public and Private Right, combined with Kant’s ideas of state
legitimacy originating from the citizenry consenting to be governed in a social contract,
make up the major ideas of his political philosophy.
Kant’s ethical philosophy is highlighted by the idea that we ought to never treat
others, or ourselves, as a means to an end, lest we hinder the personal autonomy of either.
His political philosophy, on the other hand, contains within it the idea that the public and
private spheres of citizenship within a state consists of slightly differing rights, and that
these rights and duties must be fulfilled as a matter of both moral goodness and legal
obligation. This leaves me with one question regarding Kant’s ethical and political
philosophies. If Kant argues that we ought to respect the autonomy of both ourselves and
others, than how can we bind ourselves to the duties and obligations that come with being
a citizen in a civil society? Are we really respecting our own personal autonomy if we are
being ruled over by a state? From these questions, I can postulate that there is a tension
within Kant’s ethical and political philosophies on the basis that, according to Kant, we
have both a duty to respect our own autonomy, while also fulfilling our duties to obey the
state. In this paper, I shall argue that there is a tension between Kant’s ethical and
political philosophies by analyzing the major arguments within them.

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Chapter 1: The Ethical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant
To understand if there is any tension between Kant’s ethical and political
philosophies, I shall analyze important aspects and details contained within each of his
philosophies. In this first chapter, I shall examine Kant’s ethical philosophy, where he
explains several important concepts, such as the will, the law, autonomy of will,
heteronomy of will, and the categorical imperative. To properly understand his ethical
philosophy, I shall examine and analyze what Kant says regarding these ideas in his
book, The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals.
Section One: The Good Will
Kant opens the first section of the Grounding stating that “there is no possibility
of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as
good without qualification, except a good will.”1
In this opening statement, Kant lays out,
as we shall see, what will become one of the core tenants of his ethical philosophy. What
Kant expresses in the opening statement of the book is that there is nothing in the world
that can be constituted as morally good, without qualification, except for a good will. He
argues for this idea, noting that “intelligence, wit, judgement, and whatever talents of the
mind one might want to name are doubtless, in many respects good and desirable…but
they can also become extremely bad and harmful if the will…is not good.”2
Kant argues
that while there are qualities that persons’ possess that can be considered good, these
qualities cannot be considered the good. These qualities cannot be considered the good,
because they can be corrupted. Kant states as much when he notes that “happiness makes
1
Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 7.
2
Ibid.

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for pride and often hereby even arrogance, unless there is a good will to correct their
influence on the mind.”3
Qualities such as intelligence, courage, and judgement are generally considered to
be signs of a morally righteous person. Therefore, it seems quite puzzling that these
qualities are not, as Kant argues, what constitutes the good. If what we generally
perceive as good qualities is not purely good on account of their corruptibility, then what
is good? I noted earlier that the only thing that is good without qualifications, according
to Kant, is a good will, and therefore, we can conclude, as Kant does, that the only thing
that can be considered as wholly good is a good will.
It is here that it becomes clear that the concept of one’s will constituting the good
is a core tenant of Kantian ethical philosophy, as I noted earlier. This tenant of Kantian
ethical philosophy argues that it is not consequences that constitute the morally good act,
but rather, the motivations, or will, behind that action. Kant states as much when he
argues that “a good will is good not because of what it affects or accomplishes, nor
because of its fitness to attain some proposed end; it is good only through its willing,”4
and in this way, Kant develops a non-consequentialist stance on morality, i.e., that it is
not the consequences of our actions that constitute a morally good act, but rather, the
reasons behind that action.
By analyzing the text in Kant’s Grounding, I have been able to determine a
number of points that will aid in the understanding of his ethical philosophy. First, there
is no action that is good without qualification. That is because actions and qualities are
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.

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corruptible, and the only thing not corruptible is a good will, and a good will is not good
because of the consequences of its actions, but rather, is “good in itself.”5
I can conclude
that the will is our ability to perform desired actions, i.e. to will them into being, and
therefore, a good will is our ability to will into being actions that can be considered
morally good.
Section Two: Duty
We understand that a good will consists in the ability to will morally good actions
into existence, but how can one do that? To be able to comprehend how it could be
possible for a person to develop a good will, one must first understand the Kantian
concept of duty. Kant introduces the concept of duty, all while simultaneously connecting
it to the concept of a good will, stating that duty “includes that of a good will…which far
from hiding a good will or rendering it unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and
make it shine forth more brightly.”6
Kant then goes on to illustrate what duty is by showing us what it is not. In order
to understand the concept of duty, Kant sets out to omit “all actions already recognized as
contrary to duty, even though they may be useful for this or that end…I also set aside
those actions which are really in accordance with duty, yet to which men have no
immediate inclination, but perform them because they are impelled thereto by some other
inclination.”7
It is in this excerpt of the Grounding that Kant illustrates the meaning of
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid., 9.
7
Ibid., 9–10.

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duty. Duty, according to the above passage, does not consist of actions performed by
persons for a specific reason, or inclination.
People often perform actions for specific reasons. The reasons for their willing
these actions can be, as Kant notes, caused by specific inclinations or even the possibility
of some sort of gain for that individual. A person might perform an act because it leads to
them gaining something from it, whether that is wealth, fame, or power, and a person
might also perform an action because that action gives them a kind of happiness, or
utility. What these reasons for actions have in common, for Kant, is that they are not done
according to the concept of duty, and they are not done so because their “maxim lacks the
moral content of an action done not from inclination but from duty.”8
I noted earlier that a key feature of Kantian ethical philosophy is that it is non-
consequential, i.e. that it is not consequences that determine the moral goodness of an
action, but rather, the reasons and motivations behind those actions. A person might
commit actions based on specific inclinations, and the consequences of those actions
might even be overwhelmingly positive. Kant, however, argues that even if a person
commits an action that yields positive consequences, or if their reasons for committing an
action are positive, they are not committing a morally good act.
If positive consequences and positive inclinations do not constitute a morally
good act, then what does constitute a morally good act? Kant states that when
determining the moral worth of our actions, we must understand that their “worth is
8
Ibid., 11.

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moral and incomparably the highest of all…not from inclination, but from duty.”9
From
this we can determine that a morally good act, according to Kant, is an act committed
from duty, and not inclination. Having outlined a non-consequential ethical philosophy,
Kant has argued that morally good acts are committed by someone with a good will.
Someone with a good will, in turn, is a person for whom selfishness and personal bias is
not an issue. Morally good actions, in Kantian ethical philosophy, are not committed out
of reasons based on what would make us happier, or more successful, or even what
would make those around us more happy and successful. Moral goodness, we can
conclude, comes from actions done not out of inclination, but for the sake of duty.
Section Three: The Law & the Categorical Imperative
Up to this point I have been able to conclude, through textual analysis of the
Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, what constitutes both a good will, and a
morally good action. What still remains a mystery, however, is how one can evaluate the
doing of one’s duty. If the moral goodness of our actions comes from committing them
out of a sense of duty, as opposed to inclination, then what constitutes as doing one’s
duty? It is at this point that Kant gives us an answer to that question, stating that:
Even in this case, if the universal inclination to happiness did not determine his
will and if health, at least for him, did not figure as so necessary an element in his
calculations; there still remains here, as in all other cases, a law, viz., that he
should promote his happiness not from inclination but from duty, and thereby for
the first time does his conduct have real moral worth.10
In order for a person to be able to commit an action of moral worth, Kant determines that
they must have a good will, and that good will commits actions not out of a sense of
9
Ibid., 12.
10
Ibid.

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inclination, but instead out of a sense of duty. That duty, Kant concludes, “is the
necessity of an action done out of respect for the law.”11
Morally good actions are done
out of duty, and for Kant, to do one’s duty is to respect the law.
That leads us to another question. If doing one’s duty makes one’s actions morally
good, and to do one’s duty is to respect the law, then what is the law? While discussing
why we commit the actions that we do, whether they be out of an inclination for
happiness or for our own well-being, Kant points out that “there still remains here, as in
all other cases, a law, viz., that he should promote his happiness not from inclination but
from duty, and thereby for the first time does his conduct have real moral worth.”12
This
law, then, is being able to act out of duty, and not inclination.
When we analyze the text, we find that the above conclusion regarding the law
becomes the first preposition in what Kant later calls the categorical imperative. Up to
this point, Kant has argued that actions done from duty are the only actions that have
moral worth. The second proposition that he lays out goes as follows: “An action done
from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the
maxim according to which the action is determined.”13
Kant continues to build up a non-
consequentialist ethical philosophy, arguing that even when we commit an action out of
duty, it ought to be done out principle, or according to a maxim in his words, and not for
the, presumably, positive consequences.
11
Ibid., 13.
12
Ibid., 12.
13
Ibid., 12–13.

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It is at this point that Kant continues outlining his argument with a third
proposition. The third proposition goes as follows: “Duty is the necessity of an action
done out of respect for the law.”14
This proposition makes it clear that the actions we
commit must be done out of necessity for the law, and not on a whim; that, according to
Kant, is what duty is. Remembering that the law is described earlier as committing
actions out of a principle of duty, and not based on inclinations or the possibility of
beneficial consequences, then one can determine that to commit to upholding this law is
the purpose of duty, and to commit actions for any other reasons but out of a sense of
duty for this law is to commit actions of no moral worth.
When we take all of the discussion up to this point into account, we can see that
Kant has outlined an argument for understanding the moral worth of our actions. First, an
action must be done from duty in order to have any moral worth. An action must be done
out of this duty, and not out of any superfluous inclinations. Second, an action done from
duty has its moral worth in the maxim according to which the action is determined, and
not the purpose or consequences that could be attained from that action.
It would, at this point, be appropriate to quickly determine what counts as a
maxim. A maxim could be thought of as a principle that one can will into action when
using their reason. Kant states as much when he notes that “an object of respect can only
be what is connected with my will solely as ground and never as effect…only the law
itself can be an object of respect…hence there is nothing left which can determine the
will except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law.”15
14
Ibid., 13.
15
Ibid.

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Kant supposes that if we use our reason, then we can determine that we ought to have
respect for the law, i.e. perform actions out of principle and not necessity, and by
understanding that, we might be able to will into being the principles needed to commit
such actions.
It is at this point that Kant outlines the third, and final, premise of his argument.
The third premise, as I noted earlier, was that duty is the necessity of an action done out
of respect for the law. To do one’s duty out of necessity and not out of inclination is to
respect the law, and the law itself implies that I ought to use my will to create principles,
or maxims, that can aid us in willing morally good actions into being. Taking all of this
into consideration, Kant concludes his argument, stating that “I should never act except in
such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law.”16
This
conclusion, I note, is the first utterance of the categorical imperative in the Grounding.
The categorical imperative can be described as the sort of law that “can be
thought of which must determine the will without reference to any expected effect, so
that the will can be called absolutely good without qualifications.”17
In other words, the
categorical imperative can be thought of as a principle that guides us on what we ought to
do when willing actions into being. We have a will; the will consists of our ability to
commit actions. For those actions to be considered morally good, they must be done from
a sense of duty, and not inclination, which can have corruptible influences on the will, as
noted earlier in the essay.
16
Ibid., 14.
17
Ibid.

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Our duty is to commit actions out of respect for the law. That law states that one
ought to form principles, or maxims, out of necessity. From this it can be concluded that
to respect the law is to respect the categorical imperative, because the categorical
imperative, as Kant argues, is the principle used to commit actions that are necessarily
good in and of themselves. Such actions do not require inclinations or the possibility of
positive or beneficial consequences to be considered morally good; they are necessarily
good.
Up to this point, I have determined that a good will is a will that commits actions
from a sense of duty, and that its duty is to follow the law, or categorical imperative. To
be able to do this, one must be able to commit acts that are good in and of themselves.
Kant summarizes this point when he states that “the will is thought of as a faculty of
determining itself to action in accordance with the representation of certain laws.”18
In
order to determine what actions are in accordance with the law, one must be able to
determine what sort of actions are in accordance with the categorical imperative.
Section Four: The Moral Worth of Ends
Actions that are in accordance with the categorical imperative are actions that are
good in and of themselves, as opposed to actions guided by inclinations or incentives. But
how does one determine if those actions that they are willing into existence are actually
good in and of themselves? Kant answers this question in the second section of the
Grounding, when he notes that what “serves the will as the objective ground of its self-
determination is an end; and if this end is given by reason alone, then it must be equally
18
Ibid., 35.

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valid for all rational beings.”19
To be able to determine if an action has a positive moral
worth, one must first determine if that action has an end.
An end could mean multiple things. As a result, Kant makes a distinction between
the types of ends that follow actions in order to determine what sort of ends follow a
morally good action. He accomplishes this by noting that there “arises the distinction
between subjective ends, which rest on incentives, and objective ends, which depend on
motives valid for every rational being.”20
The distinction Kant makes between these two
types of ends, subjective and objective ends, rests on the earlier claims he makes
regarding what constitutes a morally good and morally bad action. Morally bad actions
are considered, by Kant, to be morally bad because those actions are done not from duty,
but from inclinations and incentives. In other words, morally bad acts are morally bad
because the act of willing that action into existence is subject to one’s inclinations and the
possible incentives one would receive from committing that act. Morally good acts,
however, are not subjective to our desires and whims, but are instead objective ideals that
we can determine by using our reason to come to comprehend our duty. I can conclude
from this that the kind of ends that would come from a good will would be objective ends
rather than subjective ends, because subjective ends would be determined by our
inclinations and the possibility of incentives, while objective ends can be determined by
using our reason to comprehend our duty.
By understanding the kind of ends that we could will into existence, we could
then use that knowledge to create principles to help us make the decision on whether
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.

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those actions are indeed in accordance with duty, i.e. to be able to will an objective end in
accordance with the categorical imperative. Kant identifies these principles, noting that
“practical principles are formal when they abstract from all subjective ends; they are
material, however, when they are founded upon subjective ends, and hence upon certain
incentives.”21
What Kant means by this is that we could use these practical principles if
they are abstracted from, or in other words free of, subjective ends.
To be able to commit actions in accordance with duty, we must create principles
that aid us in determining if the end of an action is subjective or objective, which for
Kant, determines if that action is morally bad or morally good. Earlier in the chapter, I
was able to determine that, for Kant, morally good actions are actions that are good in
and of themselves, and at this point, we can also determine that morally good acts
consequentially also consist in the willing of ends that are good in and of themselves. It is
at this point that Kant begins to outline the second version of the categorical imperative.
He does this by stating that “man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in
himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will.”22
If man, as
a rational being, is to be considered an end in and of himself, then he must construct
practical principles that guide him into being able to will actions into being that are good
in and of themselves; and to be able to do that, we must be able to determine if willing
those actions is for an objective end, or in other words, one that is free of corruptible
inclinations and incentives. I can conclude, then, that man has a duty to himself to
commit morally good actions, because doing so would directly benefit him, as he is to be
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.

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considered an objective end. Kant summarizes this point when he states that man must
“in all his actions, whether directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be
regarded at the same time as an end.”23
Kant determines that a rational being can be considered as an end in and of itself,
and because man is considered to be a rational being, Kant determines that man is an end
in and of himself. Throughout the chapter I’ve been able to determine that a good will, in
Kant’s ethical philosophy, is a will that commits morally good acts. Morally good acts, in
turn are acts that are done from a duty to the categorical imperative, and to be able to
determine if our acts are morally good, we use practical principles to determine if our
actions are for an objective end, rather than a subjective one. With all of this in mind,
Kant concludes that we can reformulate the categorical imperative in the following way:
“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person
of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.”24
The previous formulation of the categorical imperative was based around the idea
that we ought to only act in such a way so that if we could, we would only willfully
commit actions that could form the basis for a universal principle, or maxim. For
example, one would not want to commit the act of deceit if one were operating under the
categorical imperative, because it would create a self-defeating maxim. If I were to will a
deceitful act, then I would be doing so under the guise of willing into an existence a
universal maxim, which in this case, would be to commit deceitful acts. If we then
imagine a hypothetical situation in which everyone was aware of this universal maxim, to
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid., 36.

18
be deceitful, then everyone would be aware that other agents are committing deceitful
actions. As a result, the maxim becomes self-defeating because when one creates a
universal maxim to be deceitful, everyone is aware of this maxim, and thus would not be
deceived by others because of their knowledge of these deceitful acts. This can be shown
in contrast to one willing the universal maxim of honesty. If one commits an act of
honesty in the guise of making that action the basis for a universal maxim, then everyone
would be aware of other agents’ honesty and have no reason not to trust them; so long as
others followed the universal maxim, which according to Kant our reason compels us to
do, then the maxim would not be contradictory, paradoxical, or self-defeating.
The second formulation of the categorical imperative, as I have shown, is that one
ought to treat both others and themselves as ends in and of themselves, and never as a
means. Therefore, on could easily form maxims that go against using other people as a
means. For example, imagine a situation in which there is a slave and a slave owner. The
slave owner uses the slave for the purpose of creating products that give the slave owner
an economic profit. In other words, the slave owner is using the slave as a means to an
end; that end being economic profit. This directly violates Kant’s second formulation of
the categorical imperative, and thus, is immoral from a Kantian perspective.
As I noted earlier, Kant has also argued that we have a duty to ourselves, meaning
that the law, or categorical imperative, applies to us, as individuals, just as it applies to
the people around us. Therefore, Kant concludes that not only should we treat others as
ends in and of themselves, but we must also treat ourselves as ends in and of ourselves.
We could, then, imagine a hypothetical situation in which we dedicate our lives to
another, or to a cause. If we committed actions solely dedicated to the fulfillment of a

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cause or the happiness of another person, then we can conclude that we are not treating
ourselves as ends, but rather as means to an end when applying the logic that Kant does
in his ethical philosophy.
Morally good actions consist of having that moral goodness because, according to
Kant, they are necessarily good. To commit these necessarily good actions is to will them
into being. It is from this concept, the concept of the will and willing actions into being,
that Kant develops the categorical imperative. As we have seen, Kant has developed
multiple versions of the categorical imperative, and that I have chosen to focus on the
first two formulations in this paper. Kant uses the second formulation of the categorical
imperative, which states that one must will actions that treat others and ourselves as ends
as opposed to means, to outline two principles, known as the autonomy of will and
heteronomy of will, respectively.
Section Five: The Autonomy and Heteronomy of Will
The autonomy of will is, as we shall see, the conclusion Kant comes to when
taking into account the concepts of will combined with the second formulation of the
categorical imperative. We have, according to Kant, a will which we use to will actions
into being, and only a good will can will good actions into being. It follows that a good
will is only good if it wills actions done solely from duty, and that duty, as we have
noted, is to commit actions that follow the principle of the categorical imperative. Kant
concludes that we have a will, and through that will we can commit actions that, for them
to be morally good, must not only be able to create a possible universal maxim, but must
also respect others and ourselves as ends, rather than means. From this logic foundation,

20
Kant outlines the principle of the autonomy of will in the following passage near the end
of the Grounding:
Autonomy of the will is the property that the will has of being a law to itself
(independently of any property of the objects of volition). The principle of
autonomy is this: Always choose in such a way that in the same volition the
maxims of the choice are at the same time present as universal law. That this
practical rule is an imperative, i.e., that the will of every rational being is
necessarily bound to the rule as a condition, cannot be proved by merely
analyzing the concepts contained in it, since it is a synthetic proposition.25
In other words, the will that an individual possesses ought to be considered a law to itself,
and that, and the maxims it is able to will into existence, ought to be respected. To act in
such a way that doesn’t respect the autonomy of the will that an individual possesses
would, of course, lead to an individual being unable to create and will their own maxims.
The moral imperative, then, is to “abstract from every object to such an extent that no
object has any influence at all on the will.”26
To infringe on another’s will, or to dominate
them, is to rob that person of their autonomy of will, and thus, their ability to create
maxims and will actions into being.
To act morally, one must, according to Kant, respect the will both others and
himself. To do so, as we have seen, is to establish and respect the principle of the
autonomy of the will. A question follows from this line of thinking, however. What
happens when the principle of the autonomy of will is not followed or respected, and
what constitutes not following that principle? Kant postulates that “if the will seeks the
law that is to determine it anywhere but in the fitness of its maxims for its own legislation
25
Ibid., 44.
26
Ibid.

21
of universal laws, and if it thus goes outside of itself and seeks this law in the character of
any of its objects, then heteronomy always results.”27
I can conclude from the following passage several ideas presented by Kant. If we
seek out the law, or categorical imperative, through maxims that are willed by anyone
other than ourselves, then a heteronomy of wills follows from this. To be able to will
actions and create maxims from our own principles is to have a kind of sovereignty or as
Kant puts it, autonomy, over us and our wills. We are in control of our wills and can
create our own maxims from that will. If we choose to find maxims and principles from
others, then we do not have autonomy over our wills. As Kant puts it, “The will in that
case does not give itself the law, but the object does so because of its relation to the
will.”28
Rational human beings, according to Kant, use their reason to find principles to
properly guide their wills so that they might perform actions of moral worth. To use
principles from another person’s reason rather than one’s own reason is to not have
autonomy over one’s own will, and thus, one fails to respect oneself as an end in and of
themselves.
Throughout this chapter I have examined the main points of Kant’s ethical
philosophy that are outline in the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Through
textual analysis I have been able to determine that the will, for Kant, is our ability to take
principles that we have constructed with our reason, and put them into action. To be able
to commit actions of moral worth, then, is to commit actions that are done from duty, as
opposed to inclination or incentive, and to be able to do that duty, one must respect the
27
Ibid., 45.
28
Ibid.

22
law, i.e. the categorical imperative. I’ve been able to determine what the will, in Kant’s
ethical philosophy, is, and what purpose it serves. From this point, I can now go on to
analyze Kant’s political philosophy.

23
Chapter Two: The Political Philosophy of Immanuel Kant
With Immanuel Kant’s ethical philosophy properly explained and analyzed, I can
now begin to explain the main ideas of his political philosophy in an effort to understand
if there is, or if there is not, any tension between these two parts of his philosophic works.
Upon reading Kant’s political writings, it becomes very clear that the ideas and terms
Kant uses when he crafts his theories will have to be analyzed and explained in a similar
fashion to the analysis of his ethical philosophy in chapter one. To properly explain
Kant’s political philosophy, I shall analyze the terms and ideas he uses and expresses in
his political writings. Specifically, I shall examine Kant’s ideas concerning the rights of
the state, the public right, and the private right. In this chapter, I shall analyze the text in
Kant’s book, The Metaphysics of Morals, so as to attain a better understanding of his
political philosophy.
Section One: A Brief History of Social Contract Theory
To be able to fully comprehend Kant’s political philosophy, I will first give a
brief overview of the history of social contract theory. My reasoning for this is that
Kant’s political philosophy can be considered a continuation of the ideas presented by the
major social contract theorists of the 17th
and 18th
centuries, and to understand how Kant
employs social contract theory within his own philosophy, I must first explain how the
ideas he presents could be considered a continuation of that philosophical tradition. With
that in mind, I shall briefly examine the works of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau so that social contract theory might be more fully understood regarding
its relation to Kant’s political philosophy.

24
If social contract theory is to be properly discussed in this section, then I shall
begin by analyzing and explaining the ideas presented by the first social contract theorist,
Thomas Hobbes. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) lived during a very violent and bleak
period in Europe’s history. In 1651, he wrote and published Leviathan, within which he
laid out the ideas and theories that would form the basis for social contract theory as it is
presently known. John Christman, a professor of political philosophy who examines the
works and ideas of the social contract theorists in his book, Social and Political
Philosophy, notes that within his lifetime, Hobbes was witnessed to “the wars of religion
in the sixteenth century and the Thirty Years’ War in the seventeenth century.”29
While it
cannot be said with absolute certainty, many historians and political philosophers have
postulated that as a result of witnessing constant warfare and political upheaval in his
lifetime, Hobbes’ political philosophy most likely reflected and reacted to those events.
Christman concludes in his book, noting that as a result to witnessing all of these
conflicts, “the idea that life without a strong central authority would result in a ‘war of all
against all’ was not difficult for him to imagine.”30
Hobbes begins his work on the social contract by first describing what he argues
to be the nature of mankind. Mankind, Hobbes argues, is, for the most part, equal in
strength, ability, and intelligence. At this point, Hobbes states that “from this equality of
ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men
desire the same thing, which never the less they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies;
29
Christman, Social and Political Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction, 28.
30
Ibid.

25
and in the way to their end, endeavor to destroy or subdue one another.”31
Man would
become enemies in their desire to complete their ends because, according to Hobbes,
people will work “principally for their own conservation.”32
It is from this set of propositions that Hobbes outlines his ideas concerning the
nature of man. If man, as Hobbes claims in Leviathan, have similar physical and
intellectual abilities, then they will desire similar ends, and if they desire similar ends,
then Hobbes concludes, as it has been noted, that people will become enemies and engage
in conflicts over the potential completion of those ends. From this, Hobbes postulates that
“during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in
that condition which is called war, and such a ware as is of every man, against every
man.”33
He comes to this conclusion by implementing his proposition concerning man’s
self-interested nature in his argument. If people desire similar ends, and their similar
natures and abilities will cause them to engage in conflicts with each other, then I can
conclude that they will engage in those conflicts by noting and using the proposition that
people are self-interested.
Social Contract theory, as noted by Christman, is built on the “general proposition
that state power is justified only if such power has been agreed to, by way of a contract of
some sort, by those living under that power.”34
To justify the existence of the state, social
contract thinkers will often give an explanation of the nature of man in an attempt to
31
Hobbes, Leviathan, 184.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid., 185.
34

26
strengthen their argument for why a state ought to exist and enforce the rule of law on its
citizens. This is done by postulating what a person might think that man would do if
given total freedom from the existence of a state. This mental construct of a stateless
society is known as the state of nature. Hobbes, as I have noted in my analysis, has
outlined his ideas regarding the nature of man in the Leviathan, by stating that man is
self-interested. He then notes, if it can be recalled, that people will become enemies with
each other when their self-interest and similar abilities, wants, and needs cause them to
engage in conflicts with each other, leading to them all living in a constant state of war.
Hobbes laments on this undesirable kind of existence, noting that in such a world there
could be
“no knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society;
and which is worst of all, continual fear, and the danger of violent death; and the life of
man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”35
It is from this point on that Hobbes begins to outline his justification for the
existence of the state. After noting Hobbes’ thoughts concerning his grim conception of
the state of nature, I can conclude, as Christman does, that “for Hobbes, then, any escape
from this horrific state would be justified for those involved, in that it would be in
keeping with reason in light of people’s fundamental motives.”36
To accomplish this,
people must be made to realize that they ought to work together to accomplish their ends,
rather than mistrust each other constantly. He concludes as much when he states that men
ought to be “willing when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for peace, and defense of
35
36

27
himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented
with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.”37
From this conclusion, Hobbes was able to explain the social contract theory. In order to
prevent a nightmarish war of all against all in which peoples’ mutual self-interested
natures would prevent them from being able to properly cooperate with one another,
people ought to get into groups and form civil societies, in which they will, as noted by
Hobbes, willingly, and mutually, consent to give up their complete and total freedom for
the security of not living in constant fear of their own neighbors.
To be able to ensure the fulfillment of the social contract, Hobbes then outlined
what he argued would make for an ideal government. He notes in the Leviathan that civil
society and governments are made possible by the mutually agreed upon bonds of the
social contract. What makes the social contract lasting, however, is the act of keeping
those bonds and promises fulfilled and intact. These bonds, however, cannot have “their
strength from their own nature, for nothing is more easily broken than a man’s word.”38
In other words, while a man ought to keep his word, his self-interested desire to survive
would cause him, according to Hobbes, to act in such a way that he would ensure his own
survival by breaking his word. From this proposition, that a man’s word alone is not
enough to enter into civil society with a social contract, Hobbes begins to argue for the
specific conditions which people, according to him, would agree too. Hobbes concludes
37
38
Ibid., 192.

28
that a social contract cannot be agreed upon by all the involved parties through their own
word alone, but rather, from “fear of some evil consequence upon the rupture.”39
To be able to ensure the security and stability promised by the social contract, a
mechanism of some kind must be constructed in order to prevent men from breaking the
conditions that bound them to the social contract in the first place. In attempting to
understand what kind of mechanism needs to be put into place within this civil society,
Christman notes during his analysis of Hobbes that, according to Hobbesian thought,
“only when an external power is constructed, one which all the rest of us hand over our
individual abilities to exact our will (our weapon, say), will there exist a mechanism to
enforce promises, contracts, laws, and, indeed, all the rest of morality and public law.”40
To be able to ensure the fulfillment of the promises made in the social contract, then, it is
necessary to implement a system of laws and punishments that make the people within
this civil society fearful of breaking that contract. Hobbes summarizes this conclusion
regarding the nature of the state in relation to its citizens and the social contract in the
following passage:
This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real uniting of them all, in one and
the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such
manner, as if every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right
of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition,
that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner.
This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a common-wealth. This
is the generation of the great Leviathan, or rather of that moral God, to which we
owe under the immortal God, our peace and defense. For by this authority, given
to him by every particular man in the common-wealth, he hath the use of so much
39
Ibid.
40

29
power and strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to form
the wills of them all.41
It can be concluded from this passage, then, that for Thomas Hobbes, the social contract
can be considered as a kind of metaphorical contract in which the governed consent to
give up their absolute freedom to the state, which then constructs a series of laws and
punishments so as to ensure the cooperation and obedience of the populace of that civil
society. This is all done, as I have noted in this brief analysis of Thomas Hobbes’ work,
to ensure the security and stability of the people who make up the state.
It is at this point that I can now begin to discuss, and analyze, the social contract
theory postulated by John Locke. John Locke (1632-1704) was a British philosopher
who, like Thomas Hobbes, attempted to formulate a reasonable justification for the
existence of the state. Locke, like Hobbes before him, makes his argument for the
justification of the state in his book, the Second Treatise of Government, by first
attempting to understand the nature of man, and how he would operate in the hypothetical
state of nature. It will become clear, however, that there are several major differences, as
well as similarities, between John Locke and Thomas Hobbes’ conceptions of the social
contract.
Locke, like Hobbes, begins the Second Treatise of Government by attempting to
explain and understand mankind’s nature, and how they would interact with each other in
the state of nature. He describes the state of nature as “a state of perfect freedom.”42
Somewhat similar to Hobbes’ initial conception of the state of nature, Locke continues to
explain what the state of nature might be like by arguing, like Hobbes, that people would
41
42
Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 8.

30
live under a kind of equality of rights and abilities that they might use as they see fit.
Locke says as much when he notes that the state of nature is, for those living under it,
also a “state of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one
having more than another, there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the
same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the
use of the same faculties.”43
It is at this point, however, that Locke begins to differ with Hobbes in his
conceptions of mankind’s nature, and how they tend to act. John Christman notes, in his
brief analysis of John Locke’s political and metaphysical philosophy that Locke argued,
throughout his life time, that humans were beings capable of reason, and as such, were
capable of coming to several conclusions regarding how they ought to act and treat
others. Regarding this facet of Locke’s philosophy, Christman explains these ideas in his
book, Social and Political Philosophy, noting that in his writings, Locke stated that
“because we are God’s handiwork (and He would not have created us unless we had the
capacity to follow norms that are necessary for our survival), we all have a natural
capacity for reason, which gives us direct access to the moral law (for Locke, the laws of
nature).”44
If humans are capable of reason, as Locke suggests, and that possession of
reason allows them to understand the moral laws of nature, then it can be concluded that
in a state of nature, people are more than capable of committing to actions with positive
moral worth. From this brief analysis of the early portion of Locke’s political writings, I
reasonably conclude, as Christman does, that if we have reason that allows us to perceive
43
Ibid.
44

31
and understand the moral laws of nature, then it can be understood that “the basis of
Locke’s political theory is that, independent of social conventions and civil obligations,
all human beings have certain natural moral rights that all other human beings are
obliged, and know by reason they are obliged, to respect.”45
This is, of course, very
different from the nasty, brutish, and short experience that Hobbes describes the state of
nature to be.
After Hobbes described the state of nature, he began to argue why it was not
suitable for people to live such an existence, so that he might justify the existence of the
state. Similar to this, Locke begins to explain what is, according to him, unfavorable
about the state of nature in his writings. As I explained earlier, Locke argues that while
humanity lives within a state of nature, they are nonetheless capable of using their reason
to perceive and understand the laws of nature. Among those laws, according to Locke, is
a person’s duty to “preserve himself…so by the like reason, when his own preservation
comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of
mankind.”46
We can, in other words, use our natural reason to understand that as
members of humanity, we have a moral obligation to preserve and protect ourselves, and
others, to the best of our ability.
People, of course, are not infallible. A person is just as capable of hurting himself,
or another, in the state of nature just as much as in a civil state. Locke describes what
people who find themselves in the state of nature ought to do in order to protect
45
Ibid.
46

32
themselves, or others, so that they might be able to follow their supposed moral duties in
the following passage:
Which being a trespasser against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it,
provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath
to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy
things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on anyone, who hath
transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter
him, and by his example others, from doing the like mischief. And in the case,
and upon this ground, every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be
executioner of the law of nature.47
If a person harms another while they both inhabit a state of nature, then, according to
Locke in the above passage, the person being harmed has the right to defend themselves,
and anyone else who might be harmed by those who would commit immoral acts. When
it is noted that a person has the right be the executioner of a person who has committed
immoral acts in the state of nature, then combined with the previous analysis of Locke’s
writings that suggest that people are capable of using their reason to judge what is right
and wrong when referencing the moral duties assigned to them by nature, then I can
determine that, according to John Locke, an individual person acts as both the judge and
executioner when living in the state of nature.
As I have explained in the above analysis of John Locke’s political writings, when
a person inhabits the state of nature, then they, and will use their reason to determine
what is morally right or wrong in regards to their obligations dictated by nature. From
this reasoning, it can be determined that while living in the state of nature, a person must,
and will, act as the judge, and in some cases, the executioner, when defending themselves
from the immoral actions of others. The problem with this arrangement is that people are
47
Ibid., 10.

33
self-interested. They will use their reason to determine what is right and wrong for them,
and thus, they will make decisions and commit actions that will best serve their interests.
It is from this observation of the nature of humanity that Locke determines that “it is
unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that self-love will make them
partial to themselves and their friends; and on the other side, that ill nature, passion, and
revenge will carry them too far in punishing others.”48
People are, Locke assumes, both fallible and self-interested, despite their ability to
use their reason to determine right and wrong. As a result of this fallible nature, Locke
determines that while humanity is capable of acting morally in a state of nature, they are
not necessarily capable of acting as proper judges and executioners on account of their
own self-interested nature. The problem with Locke’s version of the state of nature then,
is not that people are naturally violent or evil, as Hobbes believed them to be, but rather,
it is that while humanity inhabits the state of nature, they will lack, as Christman puts it,
“any superior common judge with the authority to settle disputes such as this.”49
For John
Locke, then, the answer to the potentially damaging disorder found in the state of nature,
that higher judge and superior authority, is civil government. Locke puts it best in the
Second Treatise of Government when he concludes that “civil government is the proper
remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature.”50
Like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke’s justification for the state rests upon that
social construct’s ability to ensure the safety and security of its citizens. People find
48
Ibid., 12.
49
50

34
themselves in a position of complete freedom in the state of nature. That complete
freedom over themselves leads, in the opinions of both Hobbes and Locke, to people
acting in ways that are not entirely ideal. To remedy the issues caused by the state of
nature, both Hobbes and Locke reason that people would give up some of their freedom
by consenting to be ruled over by a state that creates and enforces laws and institutions.
One of the main differences between Hobbes and Locker, however, is that while Hobbes
bases much of his argument for the justification of the state by focusing on its ability to
severely punish its citizens in order to deter any potential damage their lawbreaking could
cause, Locke instead focuses on how the state can actually aid its citizens in living free,
morally good lives.
Locke states in the Second Treatise of Government that “when he has acquired
that state, he is presumed to know how far that law is to be his guide, and how far he may
make use of his freedom, and so comes to have it.”51
It must be remembered that for
Hobbes, the state of nature is made unlivable because of man’s self-interested nature.
Locke, as it has been noted, argued in his political writings that the difficulties of the state
of nature were similar to how Hobbes envisioned it; made difficult by man’s self-
interested and fallible, albeit well-meaning judgements. Recall that earlier in the section,
I noted that according to Locke’s writings, people are capable of using their reason to
ascertain the moral duties they ought to adhere to, and that their ability to do so was part
of their natural abilities and capacities. It was from that postulation on the nature of
humanity that Locke determined that the state of nature is problematic not only because
man is self-interested, but also because there is no higher authority to judge his actions
51
Ibid., 33.

35
using the reason that all people have. That higher authority, according to Locke, is the
state, and if the state is acting as a kind of higher judge that keeps their self-interested
natures in check, then it can be concluded that, for John Locke, the state can ensure the
continued freedom of humanity by providing a structure that keeps people from harming
one another on account of their own self-interestedness, rather than suppressing their
freedom to ensure complete security and stability.
It is at this point in that I can conclude my brief analysis of the writings of the
social contract theorist by discussing and analyzing the political writings of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was a Genevan philosopher in the 18th
century who wrote on social contract theory after both Hobbes and Locke had made their
contributions to the subject. Rousseau, as I shall show in my analysis of his work, is quite
different from his counterparts. To understand both Rousseau’s social contract theory,
and how it relates and differs from that of his predecessors, I shall examine and analyze
one of his major works concerning political philosophy, On the Social Contract.
Similar to Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau outlines what he considers to be the
fundamental condition that people find themselves in by making postulations regarding
the fictitious state of nature. He outlines his premise concerning the state of mankind in
the opening lines of the Social Contract, stating that “Man is born free, and everywhere
he is in chains.”52
Man, according to Rousseau, is born free, but his subsequently put into
chains. It must be asked, then, what are these chains, and what is freedom? To understand
what Rousseau’s freedom is, and what the nature of these chains are, I will briefly
analyze the opening passages of the Social Contract.
52
Rousseau, On the Social Contract, 17.

36
Rousseau does not formulate his social contract theory in quite the same way as
Hobbes and Locke. While he does attempt to argue for the legitimacy of the state by
juxtaposing the civil state with the state of nature, he formulates the state of nature
differently than his predecessors. Regarding Rousseau’s conceptions about the state of
nature, Christman postulates in his book that, according to Rousseau, “one must consider
human beings not in some fanciful hypothetical state, but as they really were, and as they
have developed through various stages of social organization.”53
Rousseau does this by
analyzing what he believes to be the social stages and networks that humans have put
themselves into overtime.
Specifically, Rousseau briefly analyzes the only social group that he considers to
be natural, rather than artificial: the family. He describes the family in the following
passage of his book, On the Social Contract:
The most ancient of all societies and the only natural one, is that of the family.
Even so children remain bound to their father only so long as they need him to
take care of them. As soon as the need ceases, the natural bond is dissolved. Once
the children are freed from the obedience they owed the father and their father is
freed from the care he owed his children, all return equally to independence. If
they continue to remain united this no longer takes place naturally but voluntarily,
and the family maintains itself only by means of convention.54
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke argued that children and their parents are tied together
by familial bonds until those children come of age, so in that regard, Rousseau is no
different from his predecessors. What is important about this passage, however, is that
once the natural bonds of family are broken by those children coming of age, they all
53
54
Rousseau, On the Social Contract, 18.

37
return to a state of independence. It is from this point on that Rousseau begins to outline
what freedom is.
Once a person, according to Rousseau, reaches an age of maturity, then they are
free from the natural bonds of family, and are returned to a state of independence. This
independence that man comes to possess upon maturity is, I believe, the key to
understanding Rousseau’s conception of freedom. Rousseau further explains and clarifies
both the nature of this independence, and the overall nature of man in the following
passage from the second chapter of the Social Contract:
This common liberty is one consequence of the nature of man. Its first law is to see to his
maintenance; its first concerns are those he owes himself; and, as soon as he reaches the
age of reason, since he alone is the judge of the proper means of taking care of himself,
he thereby becomes his own master.55
From this passage it can be concluded that, according to Rousseau, man has the ability to
use his reason to make decisions that affect his survival. Much like Hobbes and Locke,
Rousseau appears to argue that man has a duty to survive to the best of his abilities, and
that he must use his reason to accomplish this. Combining man’s duty to himself with his
reason, it can then be assumed that the independence that Rousseau speaks of is the
ability a person has to be the judge of their own personal affairs. People possess reason,
and upon reaching an age of maturity, they can act independently, and make use of that
reason. In other words, they are free to make their own decisions. Freedom, then, must be
a person’s ability to use their reason to make decisions regarding their own health and
stability.
55
Ibid.

38
I concluded in the above analysis of Rousseau’s writings that, for him, man’s
natural, ideal state is one of freedom, which for him is to be able to independently make
decisions concerning one’s life and affairs. Man has the freedom to make decisions, but
Rousseau states that man is also in chains. What are these chains, and how can man
regain his freedom? Presumably, these chains are the artificial bonds that tie people
together. Man’s freedom is tied with his independence, and if he is restricted by other
people, associations, and institutions, then he cannot be free. When taking into account
that, for Rousseau, the only natural bond that man is tied to is the family, and that bond
ends once a person has reached a mature age, it can be concluded that the chains that
keep men from being free are artificial bonds and associations that people enter into with
each other. Among these artificial bonds that keep man in chains are, of course,
governments. This begs the question, how can Rousseau, as a social contract theorist,
justify the existence of the state if it keeps people from being free?
In attempting to justify the state, Rousseau first notes what kinds of associations
cannot create a legitimate government. Recalling that Hobbes attempted to justify the
state by noting that the force that the sovereign can exert over citizens is what gives it
legitimacy, Rousseau separates himself from this part of the social contract condition by
arguing against governments formed on the basis of force. He argues against
governments founded around the rights of the strongest by noting that he “fails to see
what morality can result from its effects…to give into force is an act of necessity, not of
will.”56
For Rousseau, people possess reason that they can use to make decisions
regarding their own lives. They are able to use that reason to will actions into existence,
56
Ibid., 19.

39
and any association or institution that prevents them from exerting their will would
prevent them from being free. From this it can be concluded that for a government to be
legitimate, it must be organized in such a way that it does not interfere with the freedom
people naturally possess.
Rousseau argues for such a government when he suggests that people, in an effort
to live free lives, ought to “find a form of association which defends and protects with all
common forces the person and goods of each associate, and by means of which each one,
while uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before.”57
In other words, people could remain free if they create associations which keeps them
secure from anyone or anything that might harm them, but still allows them to act freely
and independently. Having already argued that a legitimate government cannot be
derived from force, Rousseau proposes an alternative. He begins to argue for a legitimate
form of government by stating that “since no man has a natural authority over his fellow
man, and since force does not give rise to any right, conventions therefore remain the
basis of all legitimate authority among men.”58
If legitimate government can only be
derived from conventions, as Rousseau argues, then it can be assumed that the only kind
of government that could be considered legitimate is one in which both the citizens of the
state consent to be governed, and that the institutions that make up that government
would be constructed in such a way that the wills of each individual would be respected,
while still keeping the state stable and secure.
57
Ibid., 24.
58
Ibid., 20.

40
Mankind, according to Rousseau, ought to live freely, but should also enter into
civic associations with others in order to secure themselves. As he attempts to unite these
two ideals with the social contract, Rousseau makes a clear distinction between the roles
of the private and public individuals that are present within a civic society. Once private
individuals begin to enter into the social contract, Rousseau beings to make that
distinction between the public and private citizen in the following passage:
At once, in place of the individual person of each contracting party, this act of
association produces a moral and collective body composed of as many members
as there are voices in the assembly, which receives from this same act its unity, its
common self, its life and its will. This public person, formed thus by union of all
the others formerly took the name city, and at present takes the name republic or
body politic, which is called state by its members when it is passive, sovereign
when it is active, power when compared to others like itself. As to the associates,
they collectively take the name people; individually they are called citizens,
insofar as participants in the sovereign authority, and subjects, insofar as they are
subjected to the laws of the state.59
In the above passage, Rousseau notes that as individuals enter into a social contract, they
produce a collective that has its own interests, distinct from the individual interests that
would make up the newly formed civil society. The interests of this collective is
expressed through, what Rousseau calls, the general will.
To be more specific, the general will is the collective will that represents every
individual who consents to create a civil government. The general will is, in a sense, the
sovereign authority that rules over private individuals within a state. Rousseau states as
much when he notes that “only the general will can direct the forces of the state
according to the purpose for which it was instituted, which is the common good…it is
what these different interests have in common that forms the social bond, and, were there
59
Ibid., 24–25.

41
no point of agreement among all these interests, no society could exist.”60
Private
individuals exist within a state, and possess their own wills and interests, but these very
same private persons are now also, as it has been noted, public citizens and as such share
in the collective will that makes the state function.
Rousseau’s social contract, much like Hobbes and Locke’s, attempts to describe
and justify a state that is created by its citizens mutually consenting to its creation, and all
the laws and social institutions that will follow it. He does, however, differ slightly from
Hobbes and Locke when he begins to state the specific clauses and principles that would
make up this hypothetical contract. Specifically, he states that “since each person gives
himself whole and entire, the condition is equal for everyone; and since the condition is
equal for everyone, no one has an interest in making it burdensome for the others.”61
What Rousseau means by this is that when the social contract is being constructed, the
citizens that would be creating it would give their entire being and will into its creation.
So long as all those involved can agree to equally give their entire selves into the creation
of this contract, then everyone will be on equal ground, and be able to act freely and
independently without fear of harm from others in that state. The subsequent creation of
the state would then create what Rousseau calls the general will, which is the collective
will of the individuals who make up the newly formed state.
Each of the social contract theorists focuses on different elements of the contract
within their theories and ideas. Hobbes focuses on how those who enter into this contract
consenting to creating, and thus being put under, the rule of a metaphorical leviathan that
60
Ibid., 29.
61
Ibid., 24.

42
can, and will severely punish them if they disobey the parameters set by that contract.
Locke, as I have shown in my previous observations and analysis, argues that the social
contract can be used to create a higher authority, the state, so that peoples’ self-
interestedness might be kept in check, and thus, they might be free to use their reason to
live morally correct lives. Rousseau, however, differs from both of them, arguing that all
the social contract should do is ensure that people are free to act independently of others,
while also being able to make up the general will of the state, and keep it functioning.
Nothing else, it seems, is essential to the social contract, as Rousseau imagines it.
Rousseau concludes this argument, stating that “if, therefore, one eliminates from the
social compact whatever is not essential to it, one will find that it is reducible to the
following terms: each of us places his person and all his power in common under the
supreme direction of the general will, and as one we receive each member as an
indivisible part of the whole.”62
People, in Rousseau’s social contract, willingly submit
themselves to the collective, creating the general will of the state. In doing so, they ensure
that they are also able to live as free citizens with the ability to use their own reason and
will to make decisions.
In this section I analyzed the major ideas of the three social contract theorists.
After explaining that the social contract is used to justify the existence of the state, I was
able to compare and contrast the justifications that each social contract thinker used in his
writings. For Hobbes, the mutual consent by citizens to create a government that allows
for the punishing of those who violate the social contract legitimizes the state. Locke, on
the other hand, argues that the state is legitimized by citizens consenting to creating a
62
Ibid.

43
higher authority that can judge whether their actions are, according to the laws of that
society, right or wrong, so that they might be free to use their reason to live moral lives,
rather than to determine what is necessarily in their best interests. Finally, Rousseau
argued that the state can only be legitimate if it is created by citizens consenting to
completely, and totally, combine their wills into one legislative body, the general will,
which ensures that they are safe to live freely and independently. With the major ideas
and theories of these philosophers understood, I can now begin to explain Immanuel
Kant’s political philosophy, which, as I shall show, is closely tied and related to the
works of the social contract thinkers.
Section Two: Kant, Social Contract Theory, and the Formation of the State
Kant explains the basic principles of his political philosophy in The Metaphysics
of Morals by explaining the concept of the public right. The public right, Kant states, is
“the sum of the laws which need to be promulgated generally in order to bring about a
rightful condition.”63
When taken into account the fact that much of political philosophy
deals with creating and understanding the ideas concerning how and why people enter
into political societies, it can be concluded from this that Kant is arguing that during the
ideological process of forming a state, laws are created that ought to bring about what
Kant refers to as a rightful condition for those involved.
Building off of this opening statement, Kant further explains what the public right
is when making this argument. He notes in the text that the public right “is therefore a
system of laws for a people, that is, a multitude of human beings, or for a multitude of
peoples, which, because they affect one another, need a rightful condition under a will
63
Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 89.

44
uniting them.”64
From this it can be concluded that for human beings to exist in a rightful
condition, then they must, as Kant appears to argue, live under a system of laws, known
as the public right, that brings about that condition. If, however, the public right is used to
bring about this rightful condition that Kant speaks of, what is that rightful condition?
To begin to answer what the rightful condition that groups of people ought to live
under is, Kant begins to expand upon why the laws that make up the public right are
necessary. When asked why laws are created, a person might argue that they are created
in order to protect citizens from people who might harm them if given the chance. When
asked how they can be certain of this claim, that same person might argue that it can be
observed from experience that people are violent and will take advantage of others, and
from that it can be concluded that laws are made and enforced because experience
teaches us that people are violent by nature, and must be coerced by a system of laws and
punishments. Kant, however, would disagree with this argument.
Kant would disagree with this argument on account of the imagined persons’
main point concerning why laws are created and enforced. In the following passage of
The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant begins to expand upon his argument for the creation of
laws within a political state:
It is not experience from which we learn of human beings’ maxim of violence and
of their malevolent tendency to attack one another before external legislation
endowed with power appears. It is therefore not some fact that makes coercion
through public law necessary. On the contrary, however well-disposed and law
abiding men might be, it still lies a priori in the rational idea of such a condition
(one that is not rightful) that before a public lawful condition is established,
individual human beings, peoples, and states can never be secure against violence
64
Ibid.

45
from one another, since each has its own right to do what seems right and good to
it and not to be dependent upon another’s opinion about this.65
It cannot be argue, as this hypothetical person assumes, that people create laws based on
their experiences with violent and malevolent human beings. Kant argues, instead, that
human beings possess rationality, and from that rationality, they can craft maxims that
they use to govern and justify their actions, as demonstrated in his ethical philosophy. It
can be inferred from this that if human beings have the natural mental capacity to
perceive a priori ideas and truths, and that they can use those ideas to craft maxims and
other ethical principles, then it can be concluded that human beings have a natural
capacity to commit good actions. Therefore, it can be argued, from a Kantian perspective,
that if human beings have a natural capacity to commit morally good actions, then it can
be concluded that we do not craft the laws that make up the public right based on our
experiences with people who commit violent or malevolent acts.
If Kant argues, as he appears to argue after the above analysis, that laws are not
crafted from experiences with malevolent individuals, then why are laws crafted? In the
above passage, Kant states that with the absence of laws, people use their reason to form
ethical maxims. Most importantly, with the absence of any governing laws, Kant notes in
the previously cited passage that each individual has the right to do what they believe to
be right. From this I can imagine a scenario that might appear, which, upon recalling the
analysis of the social contract thinkers in the previous section, is very similar to John
Locke’s perception of the state of nature. Imagine a scenario in which two individuals
believe the other has wronged them in some way, and a dispute between the two erupts
over who shall be compensated or punished in regards to the incident that caused this
65
Ibid., 89–90.

46
imagined dispute. Each individual believes that they are in the right, and will do what
they have to do to protect their self-interests. Without a higher authority to settle the
dispute and determine who is right and wrong, the conflict will continue, and may lead to
actions that Kant might consider to be unethical, as the two individuals, in their quest to
protect their self-interests against the supposed wrongdoer, might end up committing
actions that do not respect the autonomy of the other individual involved in this incident.
From this it can be concluded that just as it was for John Locke, Kant cannot imagine an
ideal world devoid of laws and institutions, as the innate self-interestedness of mankind
might, and most likely will, cause them to commit immoral actions, which for Kant,
would be actions that violate the autonomy of others.
It is at this point that I can begin to show how Kant’s formulation of his political
philosophy derives from the works of the social contract thinkers. Up to this point, I have
described in the above passages Kant’s view of what the human experience would be like
without any rules or institutions. This is, of course, Kant’s version of the state of nature.
Recall from the previous section that the state of nature is a mentally constructed idea
that attempts to formulate how humanity would react in the absence of political societies.
The state of nature, as I have shown, was a hypothetical thought experiment crafted by
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in order to justify why
governments and laws ought to exist. Similar to Locke’s conceptions of the state of
nature, and by extension, the nature of humanity, Kant argues that while living in the
state of nature people are capable of committing good actions based on their knowledge
of a priori ideas. It is, however, still not an ideal state to live under. Kant reasons that
while the state of nature might not necessarily be a wholly terrible, unjust place to live in,

47
on account of humanity’s capability for understanding moral goodness, it would still,
however, “be a state devoid of justice, in which when rights are in dispute, there would
be no judge competent to render a verdict having rightful force.”66
In the state of nature, as Kant articulates it, individuals are each able to rule over
themselves independently of other persons, and thus, are able to formulate their own laws
and maxims for governing themselves. While Kant, like Locke before him, has argued in
the above passages that this is not necessarily a bad thing, on account of the fact that
people are able to naturally perceive a priori ideas that conform to morally good ethical
principles, it would still not be conducive to a just environment. The state of nature is not
a just environment, according to Kant, because there is no court where a judge might
decide who is guilty or innocent, and there is no state to create laws that can be used to
decide who has committed a wrong against another person. To avoid such an
environment, Kant argues in The Metaphysics of Morals that groups of individuals ought
to, and have, entered into political societies, known as states.
At this point in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant begins to define what the state
is, and how it ought to function. Taking inspiration from Rousseau, Kant defines the state
as “a union of a multitude of human beings under laws of right.”67
To be able to settle
disputes between individuals, groups are formed create these unions. States are founded
66
Ibid., 90.
67
Ibid., 90. This is very similar to Rousseau’s conceptions of the general will. Recall that, for Rousseau, the
general will is the collective will created by private individuals who freely enter into a civil society through
conventions. For both Kant and Rousseau, uniting under a collective will ensures both the security and the
freedom of all the individuals involved in the creation of the state. Kant, taking inspiration from this,
argues that legitimate states are created by multiple individuals consenting to be under the laws of right,
or for Rousseau, the general will.

48
on constitutions that outline the central laws and governmental structures used for the
sake of governance. Kant outlines the ideal form of a state in the following passage:
Every state contains three authorities within it, that is, the general united will
consists of three persons: the sovereign authority in the person of the legislator;
the executive authority in the person of the ruler (in conformity to the law); and
the judicial authority (to award to each what is his in accordance with the law) in
the person of the judge.68
With this kind of governmental structure forming the core of the state, it would then be
possible to properly solve the dilemma that might prove troublesome for individuals in
the state of nature. If two individuals within a state enter into a dispute in which both
believes the other has wronged the other, the two individuals would enter a court. Within
that court, a judge would hear both of their cases, and determine which individual was in
the wrong by analyzing the laws that the legislature has passed. After analyzing the case
within the grounds of the laws that govern the state, the judge can then make a decision in
regards to who is guilty or innocent of wronging the other individual in question. That
ruling is then enforced with the power of the executive authority, which makes
individuals within the state conform to the law. It can be concluded from this example
that when Kant’s ideal state structure of three governing bodies, or authorities, are
present, then the dilemma posed by an unjust state of nature is resolved.
The structure of state governments, however, is not the only factor Kant considers
when developing his political philosophy. As noted earlier in this section, Kant argues
that states are, similar to Rousseau’s conception of citizens uniting to create the general
will, a union of people who choose to be governed under what he calls the laws of right.
Kant explains what the laws of right are when he defines what he argues to be the state.
68
Ibid., 90–91.

49
After defining the state, Kant notes that “insofar as these are a priori necessary as laws,
that is, insofar as they follow of themselves from concepts of external right as such (are
not statutory), its form is the form of a state, as such, that is, of the state in idea, as it
ought to be in accordance with pure principles of right.”69
What Kant means to say in this
passage is that states are built upon ideas, and those ideas, in an ideal state, ought to be
crafted from pure principles of right.
As noted in the first chapter, Kant argues that people are able to form maxims by
using their reason to comprehend a priori ideas. These ideas, once properly analyzed with
our reason, become ethical principles that we use to commit morally good acts. With that
in mind, it is possible to understand what Kant means when he says that states are crafted
from pure principles of right. What made the state of nature, for both Kant and Locke,
unideal was the lack of any judge or set rules that could be used to mend conflicts that
might arise between individuals, though they might both be committing morally sound
actions. Keeping in mind the analysis of Kant’s categorical imperative in chapter one, it
could be argued that after forming into groups, these multiple individuals might come to
the mutual conclusion that living under a state might be more just than living in a state of
nature.
In order to do this, the individuals that will make up the state must give some of
the freedom they possessed under the state of nature, in order to be able to form a state.
Kant notes that when one considers the rights that citizens ought to possess under a state,
“the attributes of a citizen, inseparable from his essence (as a citizen), are: lawful
freedom, the attribute of obeying no other law than that to which he has given his
69
Ibid., 90.

50
consent.”70
If we remember that the final formulation of the categorical imperative argues
that if groups of people respect each other’s autonomy by treating each other as ends
rather than as means, then a hypothetical kingdom of ends could form. It should also be
recalled that Rousseau had previously argued when formulating his social contract theory
that a legitimate state can only form when its prospective citizens come together and
create the general will, which is the combined will of the citizenry of a state, created with
the assurance that each of their fellows will respect each other’s rights to act freely and
independently. In other words, similar to Rousseau’s formulation of the general will,
Kant argues that a legitimate state can only come from citizens who respect the personal
autonomy of others.
From this brief analysis of Kant’s ethical philosophy, I have been able to explain
that in his political philosophy the argument is made that in order to create a state, the
group of people engaged in its creation ought to create laws that the entire group can
consent to being governed by. People, according to Kant, possess the faculty of reason, in
which they can determine a priori ideas. Since these a priori ideas help people formulate
ethical principles such as the categorical imperative, it can be concluded that the
individuals involved in the creation of the state would use their reason to create laws
worthy of consent, and those laws ought to make it possible for individuals to be treated
as ends in and of themselves while they reside within the state. It is at this point that I can
now determine what rights and responsibilities Kant believes the state possesses.
70
Ibid., 91.

51
Chapter Three: The Duties of the State Mixed With Tension
In the previous chapter, I was able to analyze both Immanuel Kant’s social
contract theory, as well as the philosophical foundations that he constructed it around.
With all of that properly explained, I can now begin to explain Kant’s views regarding
the specific duties that a state possesses. Specifically, I shall analyze Kant’s postulations
regarding the state’s right, and duty, to punish law-breaking citizens. Recall that the basis
for my thesis regarding the tension in Kant’s philosophy is that he argues that individuals
ought to respect their own autonomy while also obeying the state. To further understand
the possible existence of this tension, I must begin to analyze the specific duties and
responsibilities that a state possesses in relation to the citizens’ duty to obey it. In an
effort to understand Kantian punishment, I shall explain and briefly analyze the link
between Kant’s views, and the views expressed by Thomas Hobbes in the Leviathan.
After linking Kant’s ideas regarding punishment to his political foundations, I can then
begin to link these views to his ethical philosophy, and show how, for Kant, punishment
might be regarded necessary according to the categorical imperative. Finally, after
linking Kant’s conceptions of the responsibilities of the state and its citizens with his
ethical philosophy, I will be able to argue whether or not a tension exists between his
ethical and political philosophies.
Section One: Kant, Hobbes, and Punishment
To understand Kant’s views regarding punishment, one must first understand that
the foundations for his ideas concerning this subject are found within Thomas Hobbes’
Leviathan. Recall that in chapter two, I analyzed Hobbes’ social contract theory in an
effort to understand how his works and ideas might have served as a foundation for

52
Kant’s political philosophy. While analyzing Hobbes’ social contract theory, it became
clear that, for Hobbes, a civil government is formed and maintained by its citizens so that
each might be protected from both internal and external threats to their individual well-
being.
The individual security of each member of this new political society is insured by
the creation of a new civil government. This new government, however, if founded on a
contract in which every citizen consents to live under the rules and institutions created
and enforced by that new government. Each person gives their word to obey and submit
to this new government, and, for Hobbes, each citizen is now bound by that promise to do
so. Recall, however, that Hobbes does not have a particularly positive view of human
nature. Remember that, for Hobbes, the state of nature is made dangerous by man’s own
self-interest. He does not put any faith into the promises individuals make to each other,
stating that “nothing is more easily broken then a man’s word.”71
People can promise to
adhere to the laws created by the civil government that they created, but for Hobbes, their
self-interest will always come first.
Thomas Hobbes argues that even after a civil government is formed within a
social contract, it does not necessarily guarantee the obedience and compliance of all
those involved, on account of their self-interested natures. For Hobbes, the only way to
ensure that people keep to the bonds of the contracts that they agreed to is not by relying
on their own ability to do so, but to rely on the “fear of some evil consequence upon the
rupture.”72
In chapter two, I explained that, in Hobbesian philosophy, people will ensure
71
72
Ibid.

53
the security and stability of their political society by agreeing to the creation of a
sovereign power within this new state. Hobbes expounds upon the concept of the
sovereign, and its duties, in the Leviathan when he explains that “because the major part
hath by consenting voices declared a Sovereign, he that hath dissented must now consent
with the rest, that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be
destroyed by the rest.”73
In other words, by consenting to creating a civil government that
has the ability to create laws, the citizens that inhabit this new state are now obligated to
obey those laws, or be punished, and for Hobbes, that fear of punishment keeps the state
intact and secure.
Earlier in the paper, I noted that Kant takes inspiration from each of the social
contract theorists, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. In chapter two, I was able to connect
Kant’s conception of the state of nature with Locke, as well as his conception of wills
coming together to form a state with the ideas of Rousseau. It is at this point that I can
make it clear that Kant takes some inspiration from Hobbes in regards to his conceptions
of punishment, and the state’s role in carrying it out.
Kant, as I have noted, argues that an ideal state is created through a social
contract, in which every member of a newly founded civil society agrees and consents to
giving up the freedom they had within the state of nature. After consenting to live under
the rules and institutions of the state, the citizenry can, according to Kant, be free and
secure to commit actions with their own autonomous wills without having to worry about
others imposing their wills upon them. Kant describes this social contract in the following
passage of the Metaphysics of Morals:
73
Ibid., 231.

54
The act by which a people forms itself into a state is the original contract.
Properly speaking, the original contract is only the idea of this act, in terms of
which alone we can think of the legitimacy of a state. In accordance with the
original contract, everyone within a people gives up his external freedom in order
to take it up again immediately as a member of a commonwealth, that is, of a
people considered as a state. And one cannot say: the human being in a state has
sacrificed a part of his innate outer freedom for the sake of an end, but rather, he
has relinquished entirely his wild lawless freedom in order to find his freedom as
such undiminished, in a dependence upon laws, that is, in a rightful condition,
since this dependence arises from his own lawgiving will.74
Kant concludes his discussion regarding the creation of the state by noting, as I have
already noted in chapter two, that the state, upon its creation, is divided into three
authorities: the legislative authority, the executive authority, and the judicial authority.
These three authorities can, as noted earlier, create, enforce, and implement laws
respectively.
After Kant outlines and explains the creation of the state through the social
contract, he then begins to explain the rights and duties that the state now possesses.
Among these rights and duties is the state’s right to punish its citizens. Kant defines the
state’s right to punish its citizens in the following excerpt: “The right to punish is the
right a ruler has against a subject to inflict pain upon him because of his having
committed a crime.”75
Like Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant argues that upon the
creation of a state, its citizens consent to live under the laws created by the legislative
body. Breaking these laws would be, for both men, a breach of the social contract, and
warrants punishment by the executive authority.
In this section, I have shown that Kant derives some of his political philosophy,
specifically ideas regarding punishment, to Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes argues that upon the
74
Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 92–93.
75
Ibid., 104.

55
creation of the state, it must enforce the will of the sovereign by creating laws that the
citizenry must follow, or be punished for failing to keep their promises to adhere to the
social contract. Similarly, Kant argues that upon the creation of the state, the legislative
authority will make laws that are enforced by the executive authority, and failing to
follow these laws warrants punishments by that executive authority. Both of these
conceptions of punishment ensure that the social contract is followed, and the security of
the state is ensured. As I shall argue in the next section, however, while Kant’s
conception of how punishment occurs is similar to Hobbes’ conception of punishment,
his reasons for the state having the right to punish its citizenry is entirely different.
Section Two: Punishment and the Categorical Imperative
For both Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant, punishment is something that the
state has a right to do when citizens break the law. Both men argue that the social
contract, once it is agreed upon by all of those involved, binds its citizens to the laws that
will be created by that new civil government, and the failure to fulfill one’s promise to
obey those laws warrants punishment. It is at this point, however, that the similarities
between Kant and Hobbes end.
Kant’s reasons for arguing that the state has the right to punish law breakers is
entirely different from the reasons purposed by Hobbes. Hobbes, as I have noted, justified
the state’s right to punish by arguing that the fear of punishment would keep the citizenry
obedient, thus ensuring the security and stability of the state. Immanuel Kant, however,
does not argue that the state ought to punish law breakers for the sake of the state’s
stability. Instead, Kant’s justification for punishment is rooted in his ethical philosophy.

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