Y4 S3 - Postgraduate Dissertation - 'Crying Wolf - Lone Terrorists and the Application of...'

Crying Wolf: Lone Terrorists
and the Application of
Leaderless Resistance
Michael Futcher
21st September 2012
A dissertation presented in the University of Salford in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of MA Intelligence and Security Studies

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Table of Contents:
Declaration of Word Length ii
Abstract iii
1. Introduction 1
1.1 The problems of the case study approach 5
1.2 Going forward 9
2. Crying wolf: A definitional debate 10
2.1 The 'lone' in 'lone wolf' 14
2.2 'Lone wolf': An inappropriate term? 17
3. 'Leaderless resistance' and lone wolf theory 20
3.1 Leaderless resistance: A sign of weakness? 26
4. The contemporary trend of lone wolf terrorism 30
4.1 The inevitable defeat of leaderless resistance 32
5. Lone wolves and their habitats 34
5.1 The ideological foundation 36
5.2 The enabling environment 39
5.3 The psychology of lone wolves 44
6. Conclusion 48
Bibliography 52
Declaration of Word Length
The length of this dissertation is 12,752 words,
exclusive of the bibliography, abstract and footnotes.

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Abstract
This dissertation seeks to place lone wolf terrorism within its correct context
regarding the leaderless resistance approach advocated in many extremist circles.
This is done by emphasising that one can define 'lone wolf' in such a way that the
term can be used interchangeably with 'autonomous cell' without prejudicing its
meaning. It suggests that, whilst lone wolf terrorists are not a new phenomenon,
there is a conscious attempt by contemporary extremist movements to harness such
individuals in their ideological struggles. There is, therefore, a spike in the popularity
of lone wolf tactics sustained by the emphasis on leaderless resistance in extremist
discourse, rather than a growing trend. When lone wolf terrorism is placed in this
context, its vulnerabilities become much more illuminated. It allows one to recognise
that this phenomenon does not occur in a vacuum, and consequently that one can
endeavour to confront the 'habitats' in which lone wolves are bred. It argues that
leaderless resistance is destined to be discredited and fall from popularity within the
extremist milieus, with the essential caveat that there will always be rogue
individuals willing to act violently on their beliefs.

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1. Introduction
On the afternoon of 22nd July 2011, a car bomb exploded outside a government
building in Oslo, the capital city of Norway, killing eight and injuring 209. Less than
two hours later, as emergency responders treated those at the scene of the atrocity, a
man posing as a police officer began shooting at a youth camp on the island of Utøya,
killing 69 and injuring 33, before surrendering to armed police.1 The man, later
identified as right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik, had planned both attacks
alone and had executed them both with chilling efficiency. Perhaps more so than any
other attack in the post-9/11 period, Breivik's attacks implanted the danger of this so-
called 'lone wolf' terrorism in the public consciousness. US President Barack Obama
specifically invoked the Norway attacks when he spoke of lone wolves being 'the most
likely scenario that we have to guard against right now'.2 Indeed, with high-profile
attacks such as those in Norway, the Fort Hood shootings by Major Nidal Hasan in
November 2009 and, most recently, the attacks by Mohammed Merah in France in
March 2012, it could be strongly argued that lone wolf attacks are, at least in the
public perception, currently the most dangerous terrorist threat to Western
democracies.
This dissertation shall attempt to contribute to the growing literature
concerning lone wolf terrorism, yet offer a different slant to the majority of academic
studies into the phenomenon, if indeed the threat can be labelled as such. It is
encouraging that the emergence of academic literature addressing lone wolf terror
has corresponded with the growing popular concern with the matter, although the
1
BBC News, 'Timeline: How Norway's terror attacks unfolded', BBC Online, 17th April 2012. Available
at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14260297. Accessed on 15th August 2012.
2
CNN, 'Obama: Biggest terror fear is the lone wolf', 16th August 2011. Available at:
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/16/obama-biggest-terror-fear-is-the-lone-wolf/. Accessed on
15th August 2012.

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quantity of dedicated studies is still sparse. Previous high-profile lone wolf attacks
spawned literature which largely aimed to place such acts into a wider narrative of
the struggle between governments and extremist movements, in which the
perpetrators were painted as deeply immersed in the extremist cause. For example,
after the Oklahoma City bombing of 19th April 1995, in which Timothy McVeigh had
detonated a car bomb which killed 168 and injured hundreds more, much of the
academic material addressed the threat of the American militia movement to which
McVeigh was deemed to belong, rather than the solo nature of his act.3 Whilst there
is merit in this approach, and this dissertation shall address such lone wolf 'habitats'
in Chapter 5, it does not provide a comprehensive appraisal of the threat.
In contrast, the more recent academic texts on lone wolf terrorists strive to
present this more comprehensive analysis. Ramón Spaaij's 2012 work
Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism,4 an expansion on an earlier article published
in the academic journal Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,5 should be considered the
starting point for research into the topic, as it addresses all the major facets of lone
wolf terror with commendable academic rigour. George Michael's recent Lone Wolf
Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance6 is a similarly commendable work,
expanding on a subject he addressed ably in 2003's Confronting Right-Wing
Extremism and Terrorism in the USA.7 Indeed, the connection between lone wolf
terrorism and the theory of 'leaderless resistance' (discussed in Chapter 3) is perhaps
3
For a review of some of this literature, see Kaplan, Jeffrey, 'April 19', Terrorism and Political
Violence, Vol. 9(2), Summer 1997, pp135-142.
4
Spaaij, Ramón, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention
(New York: Springer, 2012).
5
Spaaij, Ramón, 'The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment', Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, Vol. 33(9), 2010, pp854-870.
6
Michael, George, Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt
University Press, 2012).
7
Michael, George, Confronting Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the USA (London:
Routledge, 2003).

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the most important thematic approach in academic studies, and it fits neatly into the
wider debate in contemporary terrorism studies regarding the networks (or lack
thereof) of terrorists, articulated most notably by Marc Sageman in his 2008 work
Leaderless Jihad.8 Other scholars address the problems of the boundaries of what
constitutes a 'lone wolf', the crux of the problem being whether a terrorist can be
considered alone if he has a tangible, or even merely ideological, support structure
(this is discussed in Chapter 2). To date, the most fully-realised piece of work on this
aspect has been Raffaello Pantucci's 'Typology of Lone Wolves', a 2011 paper on
Islamist lone wolves published by the International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation.9
George Michael has noted that academic study on lone wolf terrorism has
been split into those who identify it as part of a leaderless resistance trend, as
suggested above, and those who see it as the actions of anomalous individuals that
should be 'consigned to the field of abnormal psychology'.10 Whilst this dissertation
shall argue that lone wolves fit better within the concept of leaderless resistance,
acknowledgement should also be given to the psychology and radicalisation
processes of lone wolf terrorists, as discussed in Chapter 5. Although often seen as a
subset of the wider research into terrorist psychology and radicalisation, there are
dedicated studies, including an excellent 2011 article in the journal Counselling
8
Sageman, Marc, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia, PA:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
9
Pantucci, Raffaello, 'A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists',
Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence, International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation, March 2011. Available at:
http://icsr.info/publications/papers/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf.
Accessed on 14th August 2012.
10
Michael, Lone Wolf Terror, p2.

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Psychology Quarterly by Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley.11 The case study
by Kathleen Puckett, a criminal profiler who worked on the investigations into lone
wolves Theodore Kaczynski and Eric Rudolph, which was published in a book co-
written with Terry Turchie in 2007 named Hunting the American Terrorist,12 can
also be seen as part of this niche. These and many other texts shall be utilised in this
dissertation, although regrettably there is not enough time to pay tribute to all of the
high-quality scholarship which has addressed the problem of lone wolf terrorism.
As a side-note, an interesting aspect of studies into lone wolf terror concerns
the availability of material written by the perpetrators themselves. Breivik
infamously released an encyclopaedic 'compendium' of his beliefs, aims and planning
of his attacks13 (commonly referred to as his 'manifesto', though Breivik never uses
this term), whilst Kaczynski, commonly known as the 'Unabomber', had his
manifesto published by the New York Times and Washington Post whilst still a
fugitive, having promised to stop his attacks if this was done. Titled 'Industrial
Society and Its Future', it has since been picked up by a number of publishers.14 Most
studies of lone wolves cite such primary sources when attempting to dissect an
individual's motivations for committing a terrorist attack. Whilst there is no doubt
that these texts do provide insight into the minds of the perpetrators, a note of
caution should be struck. As Beau Seegmiller warns, any writings or interviews given
by a lone wolf post-attack presents them with a opportunity to evaluate their own
11
Moskalenko, Sophia & McCauley, Clark, 'The Psychology of Lone-Wolf Terrorism', Counselling
Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 24(2), June 2011, pp115-126.
12
Turchie, Terry D. & Puckett, Kathleen M., Hunting the American Terrorist: The FBI's War on
Homegrown Terror (New York: History Publishing Company, 2007).
13
Berwick, Andrew (Anders Behring Breivik), 2083: A European Declaration of Independence (2011).
Available at: http://info.publicintelligence.net/AndersBehringBreivikManifesto.pdf. Accessed on 15th
August 2012. Andrew Berwick is a pseudonym.
14
Perhaps the best version is a revised edition published in Kaczynski, Theodore J., Technological
Slavery: The Collected Writings of Theodore J. Kaczynski, a.k.a. "The Unabomber" (Port Townsend,
WA: Feral House, 2010), pp36-120.

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actions. Consequently, they may 'frame and present [their] actions as part of a
meaningful endeavor that may not have necessarily been the case in the actual
sequence of events'.15 In other words, personal motivations may have contributed to,
or even dominated, an individual's decision to commit an act of violence, but in
reflection, said individual may justify the act as a necessary part of a wider political
struggle. A cautionary tale in this regard is the case of John Allen Muhammad, the
so-called 'Washington sniper' who in 2002 (with the help of an accomplice) killed ten
people and injured another three. The motivations of Muhammad, a Muslim, were
intensely personal, yet later in prison he wrote 'an erratic screed about jihad'.16
Therefore, whilst they are often useful, such post-fact justifications should not be
taken at face value.
1.1 The problems of the case study approach
The majority of studies on lone wolf terrorism all try to analyse selected case
studies to reach conclusions about lone wolves, an approach which it is argued here
is insufficient to comprehensively address the phenomenon. Peculiarly, these same
studies often acknowledge the limitations of the case study approach. For example,
Puckett states that she knew she would 'have trouble making meaningful
generalizations' from the relatively small data pool of lone terrorists,17 whilst Spaaij
selects just five cases to attempt to represent the many varied faces of the
phenomenon, yet at the same time notes 'the absence of a single, standardized profile
15
Seegmiller, Beau, 'Radicalized Margins: Eric Rudolph and Religious Violence', Terrorism and
Political Violence, Vol. 19(4), 2007, p516.
16
Jenkins, Brian Michael, 'Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies: Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist
Terrorism in the United States Since 9/11', Occasional Paper, The RAND Corporation, 2011, p3.
Available at: http://timemilitary.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/rand_op343.pdf. Accessed on 14th
August 2012.
17
[Part 2] by Puckett, Kathleen M., in Turchie & Puckett, Hunting the American Terrorist, p242.

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of a lone wolf terrorist'.18 Herein lies the fatal weakness of the case study approach
when lone wolves are concerned. Acts which can be classified as examples of lone
wolf terrorism are incredibly diverse. Lone wolves can be found across many
countries, across a vast spectrum of ideological grievances and employing different
methods. Therefore, it is difficult to reach adequate conclusions when adopting a
case study approach, unless one is willing (and able) to apply dozens of case studies
encompassing this vast array of ideologies, cultures, methods and eras. Indeed, how
could one possibly accommodate such diverse cases as Merah (Islamist, spree/serial,
France), Breivik, (anti-Islamist, bomb/spree, Norway) and Hasan (Islamist, spree,
USA)? These all occurred within the last few years, for three different reasons and in
three different countries. This is before we have even considered older cases such as
McVeigh (anti-federalist, bomb, USA), Rudolph (anti-abortionist, serial bomber,
USA), Baruch Goldstein (ultraorthodox Jew, spree, Israel) and Kaczynski (anti-
technologist, serial bomber, USA).19 This is to say nothing of those individuals who
were not successful. No study could select appropriate cases from such a diverse
pool, and so any case study approach inevitably dilutes the conclusions of the work in
question.
Two previous master theses are instructive in this regard. Nathan Springer20
and Liesbeth van der Heide21 have both adopted a case study approach to try to gain
18
Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism, p13.
19
It is recognised that the ideologies of these terrorists are more complex than summarised here but,
for the sake of brevity in the above argument, it is hoped that one would acknowledge that such
concise generalisations are necessary.
20
Springer, Nathan R., 'Patterns of Radicalization: Identifying the Markers and Warning Signs of
Domestic Lone Wolf Terrorists in Our Midst', Master Thesis, US Naval Postgraduate School,
December 2009, pp1-87. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA514419&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.p. Accessed on 9th July 2012.
21
Van der Heide, Liesbeth, 'Individual Terrorism: Indicators of Lone Operators', Master Thesis,
University of Utrecht, August 2011, pp1-91. Available at: http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/student-

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insight into the lone wolf phenomenon, and their conclusions can be found freely on
the internet. Van der Heide's stated goal was to find a profile for 'lone operator'
terrorists that was time-independent, but concluded that there was no clear profile.22
It therefore stands to reason that case studies were an inappropriate method to try to
get to grips with this question. To her credit, van der Heide recognises that any
conclusions she might make would be 'largely conditional' on her selected case
studies, from which she cannot provide satisfactory generalisations about lone wolf
terrorism.23
This leads one to the second problem with adopting a case study approach. As
Matthijs Nijboer warns, 'there is always the risk that important factors have been left
out'.24 A scholar may, consciously or subconsciously, limit his or herself to cases
which conform to their own pre-formed opinions, omitting problematic cases which
may be too complex or contradictory. For example, McVeigh is often removed as a
case study as he had two accomplices and therefore, for many, fits uneasily into their
definitions of lone wolves. Indeed, some have gone so far as to suggest (albeit
plausibly) that he was part of a shadowy terrorist group, with McVeigh carrying out a
plot hatched by a wider extremist body,25 possibly as revenge for the execution of
white supremacist murderer Richard Wayne Snell scheduled for 19th April 1995.26
Others discount McVeigh as the substantial death toll of his act does not fit in with
theses/2011-0902-202354/MA%20Thesis%20Liesbeth%20van%20der%20Heide.pdf. Accessed on
14th August 2012.
22
Van der Heide, 'Individual Terrorism', p73.
23
Ibid., pp74-75.
24
Nijboer, Matthijs, 'A Review of Lone Wolf Terrorism: The Need for a Different Approach', Social
Cosmos, Vol. 3(1), 2012, p37. Available at:
http://socialcosmos.library.uu.nl/index.php/sc/article/viewFile/43/38. Accessed on 3rd July 2012.
25
Gumbel, Andrew & Charles, Roger G., Oklahoma City: What the Investigation Missed - and Why it
Still Matters (New York: William Morrow, 2012), pp19-21.
26
Ibid., p14.

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the accepted wisdom that the lethality of lone wolf attacks is modest.27 As this study
shall address in Chapter 2, there are many problems with the definition of lone wolf
terrorism. Some may permit the likes of McVeigh to be classified as lone wolves,
whereas others may find such a classification unacceptable. Studies which form
conclusions and recommendations with the former view in mind may find those
results are unusable to those with the latter view.
Springer's thesis is an example of the dangers of this approach. He adopts as
case studies the three 'most prolific' lone wolves from US history - McVeigh,
Kaczynski and Rudolph - to try to uncover a common 'chronological pattern of
radicalization' that can be used to identify future potential threats.28 However,
analysing just three cases is insufficient to identify common characteristics of dozens
of lone wolves. If Springer were to broaden his study by even a handful of cases, he
would find many who do not follow such patterns. Furthermore, choosing the 'most
prolific' cases is erroneous. Unsuccessful plots are just as instructive as successful
ones in understanding the phenomenon, particularly when it comes to radicalisation,
a process unconcerned with eventual success or failure. Regarding terrorism
research, Sageman warns that some 'compelling' cases can take attention away from
more comprehensive analysis.29 There is a danger that more famous cases might
overshadow their less successful counterparts, distorting research into the lone wolf
phenomenon. As stated earlier, Breivik's attacks in Norway have implanted the
danger of lone wolf terrorism in the public consciousness. But lessons about lone
wolves cannot be learned solely by studying Breivik, or McVeigh, or Kaczynski. There
27
For example, see Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism, p29.
28
Springer, 'Patterns of Radicalization', p79.
29
Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, p16.

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must be an acceptance that lone wolf terrorism is an incredibly diverse phenomenon,
and it cannot be truly understood by focusing on a few high-profile cases.
1.2 Going forward
With a case study approach therefore deemed to be inadequate, the problem
becomes: how does one begin to understand lone wolf terrorism? In the research for
this study, it has become increasingly clear that there is little academic consensus
regarding the phenomenon. This study does not presume that it can generate such a
consensus, but it will attempt to address some of the more contentious elements.
Chapter 2 shall address the problems of how to define lone wolves, and attempt to
provide a clearer picture of what exactly constitutes a 'lone wolf'. It will attempt to do
so by linking lone wolves to the theory of 'leaderless resistance' first espoused by
right-wing extremists in the USA but also adopted in various guises by other
movements, including radical Islamism. Chapter 2 will also address whether 'lone
wolf' is too romanticised a term, suggesting an image of an honourable, vigilant
guardian rather than a socially-inept, often psychologically-disturbed loner.
Chapter 3 will place lone wolves in their proper context within the theories of
leaderless resistance, providing an overarching narrative of 'lone wolf theory'.
Chapter 4 shall then address the contemporary trend of lone wolf terrorism, and
whether it is truly a new threat, as President Obama warns above. Chapter 5 shall
then address the matter of a lone wolf's 'habitat'. It is argued here that despite the
popular stereotype, no 'lone' wolf operates in a vacuum, and all have a support
structure of some sort, providing either material, emotional or ideological
sustenance. Chapter 6 concludes the study, drawing on the previous chapters to
emphasise how lone wolf terrorists, and their supporting habitats, fit into the concept

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of leaderless resistance. Much of the literature reviewed above propose general
counter-terrorism recommendations to help keep lone wolves at bay, and there is no
need to regurgitate such conclusions here. However, it should be acknowledged that
there are no definitive, foolproof responses that will make the problem of lone wolf
terrorism disappear. Measures can be taken to improve the odds for counter-
terrorism bodies, but lone wolves will always be a concern for security services.
Rather, this dissertation seeks to place lone wolf terrorism within its correct context
regarding the leaderless resistance approach advocated in many extremist circles.
2. Crying wolf: A definitional debate
That academia has yet to reach a consensus on the definition of a 'lone wolf'
should come as no surprise to anyone interested in terrorism and security studies.
Indeed, there is no widely accepted definition of terrorism itself, let alone lone wolf
terrorism. Marc Sageman notes that terrorism is 'a little like obscenity: people
believe they know it when they see it, but cannot define it'.30 However, there are a
number of common characteristics which can be found in most definitions, as noted
by George Michael. These include: the deliberate nature of the act; the violent nature
of the act, targeted at civilians; the intention to instil fear; the need for an audience;
and the intention for the act to achieve a political goal.31 Using Michael's common
criteria, one might suggest for this study a more succinct definition of an 'act of
terror' as: A deliberate, violent act targeted at civilians, which is intended to instil
fear in a wider audience with the intention of achieving a political goal.
30
31
Michael, George, 'Terrorism and Counterterrorism', in Logan, Keith Gregory & Ramsay, James D.
(eds.), Introduction to Homeland Security (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012), p316.

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Despite this basic definition, there are still numerous problems as to what
constitutes terrorism, particularly when one addresses lone wolf terrorism. Many
presumed lone wolf attacks are actually hate crimes, where an individual has
attacked another on the basis of his race or creed, but which lack one or more of the
above definitional elements. Such people are clearly engaging in politically (or
racially) motivated violence, but it is unclear whether they intended for their act to
play to a wider audience or simply lashed out as a cathartic release of their personal
prejudices. For example, in April 2000 Richard Baumhammers killed five people of
various races and creeds during a shooting spree in Pennsylvania. The targets of his
attack could be said to be chosen as a result of his neo-Nazi beliefs (including the fact
that he spared a white man), but the timeline of the attacks suggests an opportunistic
outlook, rather than a methodical, pre-planned attack designed to play for an
audience.32
There is also one other interesting area of contention: the similarities between
lone wolf terrorists and spree or serial killers. There are a number of shared traits,
such as the act of mass murder itself, the personalisation of one's motive for killing
and the internal psychological processes which compel one to act alone. (With
regards to lone wolf terrorists, the latter two are discussed in Chapter 5). If there is
one major difference, it is the political element which is absent, or less prominent, in
the motivation of common killers. Terrorists define their individual identity in social
terms, in which they see themselves in service to a higher cause than the self (see
Chapter 5.2). Criminals, on the other hand, are self-centred or have interests which
32
Martin, Gus, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues, second edition
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2006), pp17-18.

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are unlikely to extend beyond a small personal group.33 This may be the key
difference between lone wolf terrorists and mere killers: the latter are inherently
selfish, whereas lone wolves often have a perverse sense of altruism. Even so, this is
not a clear demarcation line as spree killers may often allude to ideas which
transcend the self. For example, Seung-Hui Cho, who killed 32 and injured 17 during
a shooting spree at Virginia Tech in April 2007, ranted against rich 'brats' and
'snobs', positioning himself 'as a vehicle of class revenge'.34 To this end, he spoke of
dying as a martyr to 'inspire generations of the weak and the defenceless people'.35
Therefore, unlike Baumhammers, he intended for his act to resonate with an
audience, yet is still unlikely to be regarded as a terrorist as defined by Michael.
This suggests that the difference between lone killers and lone wolf terrorists
is one of degree, rather than of separation. Lone wolves have political aims, but
'political violence' is not a separate phenomenon - rather, it is one of many strands of
violence. When the line is blurred, it becomes difficult to differentiate between the
two. Indeed, this line may be blurred to such an extent that one commentator has
suggested that, in addition to 'going postal', a slang term used for those who commit
homicidal rampages, there is now a process of 'going jihad', where political and
personal grievances mix with deadly results.36 It is beyond the remit of this
dissertation to address this issue comprehensively, though it does serve as an
33
Mullins, Sam, 'Parallels Between Crime and Terrorism: A Social Psychological Perspective', Studies
in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 32(9), 2009, p821.
34
Kellner, Douglas, Guys and Guns Amok: Domestic Terrorism and School Shootings from the
Oklahoma City Bombing to the Virginia Tech Massacre (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2008),
p42.
35
Quoted in Ibid., p38.
36
Jenkins, Brian Michael, 'Going Jihad: The Fort Hood Slayings and Home-Grown Terrorism'.
Testimony presented before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,
19th November 2009, pp1-2. Available at:
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT336.pdf. Accessed on
19th July 2012.

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example of the problems of where to draw the line on what constitutes lone wolf
terrorism. It is an issue which is touched upon occasionally in terrorism literature,
but has yet to be grappled with in a dedicated study (although Leena Malkki and
Clark McCauley have lectured on the topic).37 Regrettably, this dissertation cannot
serve as that study as it focuses on the linkage between lone wolf terror and
leaderless resistance, but it remains an interesting and important avenue for further
research.
Indeed, the doctrine of leaderless resistance complicates the matter even
further. As we shall see in Chapter 3, under this doctrine political extremists are
encouraged to act on their own initiative. Lacking an organisational structure for
planning an elaborate attack, such individuals may simply choose to pick up a gun
and shoot some people who do not share their skin colour or political ideology. These
acts, though intended by the perpetrators to be part of a larger 'leaderless resistance'
movement, could easily be understood as a hate crime or a killing spree as much as
an act of terror.38 To complicate things further, some right-wing leaders have
suggested hate crimes may count as leaderless resistance by helping to 'foment a
revolutionary atmosphere'.39 There is also the problem of whether the attacks were
primarily personal or politically-motivated, which is often impossible to determine.
For example, Jessica Stern notes that Mir Aimal Kansi, who killed two CIA officials at
a set of traffic lights in January 1993, could have either been motivated by the USA's
support of Israel (as Kansi himself professed) or personal revenge. She could only
37
Centre for Police Research, 'Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism', Conference Programme,
Uppsala University, 24-26 September 2012. Available at:
http://www.polisforsk.uu.se/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=c6e0%2bS3k0bg%3d&tabid=3095&language=
sv-SE. Accessed on 4th September 2012.
38
Michael, Confronting Right-Wing Extremism, p173.
39

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speculate, despite interviewing him extensively.40 The process of designating whether
someone is a terrorist or a psychopath is therefore often inherently subjective,
relying on the individual judgement of the scholar or psychologist.
2.1 The 'lone' in 'lone wolf'
Easily the most misunderstood element of the definition of lone wolf terrorism
is the word 'lone'. Many studies define 'lone wolf' terrorism by relying on the crutch
of differentiating it from group or networked terrorism. Consequently, common
definitions are some variation of the one offered by Fred Burton and Scott Stewart: 'A
lone wolf is a person who acts on his or her own without orders from - or even
connections to - an organization.'41 The solo nature of the act therefore becomes its
'most pertinent characteristic',42 a view which this author believes to be erroneous.
Certainly, this approach is useful in understanding lone wolf terrorism, but not in
defining it. In this respect, the debate over whether this type of terrorism should be
known as 'lone wolf' or 'lone actor' terrorism43 is irrelevant.
At this point it is important to place lone wolf terrorism within its proper
context of what can broadly be termed 'leaderless resistance', whether espoused by
right-wing theorists such as Louis Beam or jihadist strategists like Abu Musab al-
Suri. The term 'lone wolf' in its terrorism context was first coined in the 1990s by the
40
Stern, Jessica, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill, new edition (New York:
HarperCollins, 2004), p181.
41
Burton, Fred & Stewart, Scott, 'The "Lone Wolf" Disconnect', STRATFOR Security Weekly, 30th
January 2008. Available at: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/lone_wolf_disconnect. Accessed on
31st May 2012.
42
Phillips, Peter J., 'Lone Wolf Terrorism', Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol.
17(1), 2011, p5. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1623573. Accessed on 31st May 2012.
43
Pantucci, Raffaello, 'What Have We Learned About Lone Wolves from Anders Behring Breivik?',
Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 5(5-6), December 2011, p41 n1. Available at:
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/what-we-have-learned. Accessed
on 31st May 2012.

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right-wing extremists Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis.44 This is a fact that many studies
acknowledge, but few realise the true importance of when it comes to defining lone
wolf terrorism. For Curtis and Metzger, 'lone wolf' was intended to be a romanticised
term for a decentralised cell of the sort advocated by Beam and others. This cell could
be comprised of a few people, or even a sole individual, as Beam acknowledges.45 The
phrase 'lone wolf' could therefore be used interchangeably with 'decentralised cell',
without prejudicing its meaning.
An individual employing leaderless resistance tactics could therefore be a lone
wolf, but so too could a small, tightly-knit cell. (Though perhaps, to avoid semantic
confusion, a cell should not be referred to as a 'lone wolf' but rather a cell of lone
wolves, or a 'lone wolf pack' of the sort outlined by Pantucci).46 For this reason,
McVeigh was a lone wolf, even though he didn't act completely alone, as he was part
of a very small cell and therefore acting in accordance with the far right's
understanding of the term.47 A number of terrorism studies have addressed
leaderless resistance when grappling with the lone wolf dilemma, failing to recognise
that they are one and the same. The overemphasis on the 'lone' in 'lone wolf' is to
blame for this confusion. Rather, instead of focusing on 'lone', we should focus on the
'wolf' in 'lone wolf', as this is a word which is a substitute term for 'cell'. Lone wolves
are, in essence, decentralised or autonomous 'lone cells'.
44
COT Institute for Safety, Security and Conflict Management, 'Lone-Wolf Terrorism', Case Study for
Work Package 3 Paper, 6th July 2007, p13. Available at:
http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Lone-Wolf%20Terrorism.pdf. Accessed on
14th May 2012.
45
Beam, Louis, 'Leaderless Resistance', The Seditionist, Issue 12, 1992, no page numbers. Available at:
http://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm. Accessed on 17th August 2012.
46
Pantucci, 'A Typology of Lone Wolves', pp24-29.
47
Jackson, Paul, 'Solo Actor Terrorism and the Mythology of the Lone Wolf', in Gable, Gerry &
Jackson, Paul, Lone Wolves: Myth or Reality? (Ilford: Searchlight, 2011), p80. Available at:
http://www.lonewolfproject.org.uk/resources/LW-complete-final.pdf. Accessed on 9th June 2012.

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Therefore, whilst the 'lone' element of lone wolf is useful in understanding the
phenomenon, it is not its defining element. Rather, the defining element of lone wolf
terrorism is its operational security. The ability to operate under the radar of security
services is the predominant driving force behind the adoption of leaderless resistance
by extremist movements (as discussed in Chapter 3), whether a cell or an individual.
Regardless of their wider support structures providing material or ideological
support, when it comes to the actual planning and execution of the terrorist attack,
'the direct influence [control] or support of others, even those sympathetic to the
cause, is absent'.48 The intention is to prevent security services from learning of the
plans, either by keeping it to oneself (if the lone wolf is an individual) or by keeping
the cell a tight-knit network of no more than a few people. In this sense, 'lone' does
not mean 'individual', but rather independent and autonomous, lacking a trail of
evidence to a wider network.
This has led to some confusion as to whether so-called 'grassroots operatives',
such as the Islamist bomber cells in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July
2005, could be classified as lone wolves. The answer is, of course, that they cannot.
Whilst they may appear to qualify in that they were tightly-knit cells whose plans
were not known outside of their own co-conspirators, they had ties, however small,
to a larger organisation. The members of both cells, as with later attackers such as
Faisal Shahzad and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, received training from more
established terror networks in the likes of Yemen and Afghanistan. By reaching out
to an established network, they had brought (or ran the risk of bringing) the
attention of security services. This compromised operational security (which, as we
have noted, is the defining characteristic of lone wolves), at which point they ceased
48
Spaaij, 'The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism', p856.

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to be lone wolves. Had the above-mentioned cells not sought out external help and
executed their acts regardless, they could conceivably still be classified as lone
wolves.
The case of Mohammed Merah may seem to be a problem in this respect.
However, whilst Merah did seek external training, he avoided the established
channels of contact and managed to stay under the radar, helped by his successful
deception of the French security services as to his reasons for visiting Afghanistan
and Pakistan.49 He therefore managed to preserve his operational security and left no
obvious evidence of any connections to an external network. Whilst seeking points of
contact with the wider al-Qaeda movement, Merah operated in such a way as not to
compromise his plans. He can therefore be seen as a sort of entrepreneurial lone
wolf, looking for others to provide him with a skill-set but always intending to strike
out on his own.
2.2 'Lone wolf': An inappropriate term?
Having recognised that the term 'lone wolf' was coined in its terrorism context
by the right-wing extremists Metzger and Curtis, it is pertinent to ask whether 'lone
wolf' is too romanticised a term. It is appealing to other political extremists, lauding
the achievements of these violent individuals, and perhaps encouraging copycats.
Though leaderless resistance is essentially an admission of weakness on the part of
extremist movements (as discussed in Chapter 3.1), the term 'lone wolf' allows
individuals to paint this weakness as part of a romantic struggle. As Roger Griffin
explains:
49
Lakhani, Suraj, 'Mohammed Merah - Lone Wolf or Al-Qa'ida Operative?', Royal United Services
Institute. Available at: http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4F6C9350E3EE5/. Accessed
on 11th May 2012.

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This is the age, not of mass assaults on the citadels of liberal decadence
led by paramilitary troops in coloured shirts and sporting sinister
emblems, but of leaderless resistance, the lone, uniformless warrior
priest... who remains inwardly loyal to the cause and retains his
anonymity in the midst of the pleasure-seeking crowd. The national
phoenix is grounded for the duration. The coming of the new order is
indefinitely postponed.50
Indeed, some lone wolves, such as Breivik, seem to relish this role as the 'lone
vanguard',51 and that would certainly have been the aim of Metzger and Curtis. It
might therefore be argued to be beneficial to dispense with 'the lupine metaphor'52,
or at least modify it. Certainly, counter-terrorism narratives could focus on the often-
amateurish nature of lone wolves, attacking the disconnect between the lone wolf
ideal and reality; 'stray mutts' rather than lone wolves.53 Often, lone wolf terrorists
operate alone because they have been rejected by a group or have a level of social
inadequacy that negates forming meaningful group ties (see Chapter 5). This hints at
a certain pathetic vulnerability, as Brian Michael Jenkins notes:
[their] behavior seems to more closely resemble that of stray dogs, who
may be found alone or in packs, estranged from but dependent on
society, streetwise but lacking social skills, barking defiantly, and
potentially dangerous but at the same time, suspicious, fearful,
skittish... They wander about in the shade of the... ideology, sniffing at
50
Griffin, Roger, 'Shattering Crystals: The Role of "Dream Time" in Extreme Right-Wing Political
Violence', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 15(1), Spring 2003, pp81-82.
51
Pantucci, 'What Have We Learned About Lone Wolves?', p33.
52
Stevens, Tim, 'The Myth of the Lone Wolf', The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation.
Available at: http://www.icsr.info/blog-item.php?id=247. Accessed on 14th May 2012.
53
Stewart, Scott, 'Cutting Through the Lone-Wolf Hype', STRATFOR Security Weekly, 22nd
September 2011. Available at: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110921-cutting-through-lone-wolf-
hype. Accessed on 31st May 2012.

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the edges of violence before making a move. Most are arrested before
they get that far.54
The contrast to Griffin's text could hardly be more marked. Contemporarily,
'lone wolf' is associated with operating autonomously and under the radar. Using
Jenkins' approach, we can manipulate the term to enhance the negative connotations
of being lost, or exiled from a group. Rather than dispensing with the lupine
metaphor, it should perhaps be embraced and corrupted. 'Stray terrorism' is much
less appealing than lone wolf terrorism. However, it is perhaps futile to suggest this
as a possible remedy, as the term has become embedded in the popular collective
consciousness. There will never be an eradication of the phrase in relation to
terrorism; even if it were possible to purge it from respectable media, it would linger
in extremist discourse, inspiring yet more individuals to violence.
Overall, it has become clear in this chapter that the definitional debate
regarding lone wolf terrorism is rather complex. Nevertheless, some general
observations can be made, which will serve us well in subsequent chapters. As Stern's
encounter with Kansi reminds us, any judgement on classifying lone wolves is
inherently subjective, or rather inherently speculative. As Ramón Spaaij notes, there
will always be 'some degree of arbitrariness' when addressing lone wolves, and
perhaps terrorism in general.55 This should be (reluctantly) accepted as a necessary
by-product of studying such a diverse and interesting topic, which is constantly
evolving in response to the contemporary security environment. Most importantly,
for the purposes of this dissertation, the term 'lone wolf' must be seen in its original
54
Jenkins, 'Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies', pp21-22.
55

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context as a replacement term for decentralised cells or individuals in leaderless
resistance theory. It is to this theoretical background that one shall now turn.
3. 'Leaderless resistance' and lone wolf theory
It is necessary to discuss leaderless resistance theory, in order to both provide
context to the links to lone wolf terrorism discussed in Chapter 2, and to provide an
overarching theme for this dissertation. 'Leaderless resistance', as theorised by Louis
Beam, is essentially the right-wing appropriation of a concept which has existed in
one form or another since the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, Beam openly cites
Colonel Ulius Louis Amoss, who sought to use the theory to counter a potential
communist invasion of the USA in the early 1960s, as his source.56 Broadly speaking,
leaderless resistance can be placed into the wider discourse regarding 'netwar', an
observation noted by other terrorism scholars.57 Netwar, as defined by John Arquilla
and David Ronfeldt, involves actors who:
generally consist of dispersed, often small groups who agree to
communicate, coordinate, and act in an internetted manner, often
without a precise central leadership or headquarters. Decisionmaking
may be deliberately decentralized and dispersed.58
These actors may be groups, organisations or, most significantly for our purposes,
individuals.59 This is akin to Beam's outlining of the leaderless resistance concept:
56
Kaplan, Jeffrey, '"Leaderless Resistance"', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9(3), Autumn
1997, p87.
57
Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism, new edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p39.
58
Arquilla, John & Ronfeldt, David, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
1996), p5. Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR789.html. Accessed on
9th August 2012.
59
Ibid., p9.

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Utilizing the Leaderless Resistance concept, all individuals and groups
operate independently of each other, and never report to a central
headquarters or single leader for direction or instruction, as would
those who belong to a typical pyramid organization.60
The interconnectivity of these leaderless groups or cells (which, as we
discussed in Chapter 2, can be termed 'lone wolves') is a feature which is difficult to
translate from theory into reality, a more complicated endeavour than Arquilla and
Ronfeldt's definition might suggest. Often when leaderless resistance theory is
applied to the real world, problems of co-ordination become a significant
disadvantage. As Marc Sageman has noted, 'the followers are in command'61 and a
terrorist organisation cannot direct lone wolves as it can its operatives in a more
traditional hierarchical network. For example, Gilbert Ramsay has argued that al-
Qaeda seeks, on a strategic level, to commit mass casualty attacks against the West
rather than symbolic attacks directed at particular groups.62 Despite this, it is more
common in contemporary extremist discourse to 'emphasise religious and spiritual
justifications' for global jihad in order to appeal to and radicalise individuals, to the
extent that strategically-important targets are discarded in favour of more symbolic
ones.63
Consequently, the likes of Mohammed Merah would attack Jewish
schoolchildren and Muslim soldiers serving in Western armies, intending to 'send a
message' rather than commit large-scale murder. Al-Qaeda, with its more perceptive
60
Beam, 'Leaderless Resistance', n.p.
61
62
Ramsay, Gilbert, 'Targeting, Rhetoric and the Failure of Grassroots Jihad', Journal of Terrorism
Research, Vol. 3(1), Summer 2012, p28. Available at: http://ojs.st-
andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/415. Accessed on 31st August 2012.
63
Ibid., p34.

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understanding of strategic jihad, would surely have preferred the latter, but had no
way of directing Merah to do so. Such problems have led leaderless resistance
campaigns to be correctly described by one journalist as 'more like spontaneous
combustion than someone... lighting a match'.64 Leaderless resistance ensures
beleaguered organisations still have rather dangerous teeth, but robs them of the
freedom to choose when and who to bite.
Nevertheless, despite this disadvantage, leaderless resistance theory fits neatly
into the larger discourse regarding netwar. This is a useful framework as it allows us
to observe that it is not a concept limited solely to far-right movements as Beam
wished, but one whose principles have been adopted by a number of extremist
movements. For example, a spokesman for the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), a
radical environmentalist group, described its composition as a 'series of cells across
the country with no chain of command and no membership roll'.65 Perhaps most
significantly in the contemporary security environment, it is a concept which has
been adopted by the radical Islamist movement. Abu Musab al-Suri, loosely
described by one biographer as the 'jihadi equivalent' to Beam,66 explained his ideas
in 2004's The Global Islamic Resistance Call thus:
We should advise him [the jihadist] to pursue his everyday life in a
natural way, and to pursue jihad and Resistance in secrecy and alone,
64
Gibbs, Nancy, 'The Fort Hood Killer: Terrified... or Terrorist?', Time Magazine, 11th November
2009. Available at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1938698,00.html. Accessed
on 29th July 2012.
65
Quoted in Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p38.
66
Lia, Brynjar, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri
(London: C. Hurst & Co., 2007), p6 n8.

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or with a small cell of trustworthy people, who form an independent
unit for Resistance and for the individual jihad.67
Of course, with the absence of an organisational structure, there is a need to
replace this with a suitable alternative to provide some degree of cohesion. All the
above movements suggest a shared ideology as the correct replacement. Arquilla and
Ronfeldt point out that by emphasising a set of shared principles to which all
members subscribe, one can develop 'a central ideational and operational coherence
that allows for tactical decentralization', as every member already has a general sense
of what they must do.68 Consequently, al-Suri notes that, with the lack of
'organizational bonds of any kind', the only bonds are those of a 'program of beliefs, a
system of action, a common name, and a common goal'.69 An activist for a second
environmentalist group, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), proclaims that members
act 'in accordance with our own conscience',70 whilst Beam adopts a similar line,
suggesting that each individual makes 'a private decision in the quietness of his heart
to resist... by any means necessary'.71 Therefore, leaderless resistance relies on a
shared ideology to link together individual acts of terror into a wider terrorist
campaign narrative on behalf of the movement.
However, there are problems with relying on such an elusive and subjective
concept as ideology. Paul Joosse argues that the adoption of leaderless resistance
67
Al-Suri, Abu Musab, 'The Military Theory of the Global Islamic Resistance Call', Chapter 8, Section
4 of 'The Global Islamic Resistance Call' (2004), in Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, p393.
68
Arquilla, John & Ronfeldt, David, 'The Advent of Netwar (Revisited)', in Arquilla, John & Ronfeldt,
David (eds.), Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), p9. Available at:
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/MR1382.ch1.pdf.
Accessed on 9th August 2012.
69
Al-Suri, 'The Military Theory of the Global Islamic Resistance Call', p422.
70
Quoted in COT, 'Lone-Wolf Terrorism', p53.
71

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allows individuals to commit actions in accordance with their own personalised
ideology rather than the wishes of the movement's leadership,72 an argument which
is in line with the one articulated by Ramsay above. Whilst this is acceptable for the
radical environmental movement which seeks little more than increasing the number
of 'direct actions' in order to halt the degradation of nature,73 Joosse argues such
ideological diversity dilutes the aims of other movements such as the far-right who
seek to co-ordinate lone wolves under one banner to achieve lasting political change.
Such revolutionary change cannot be achieved if ideological purity is compromised.74
Indeed, the need for ideological harmony throughout the movement has been
accepted wisdom for the far-right ever since it was demanded as an essential
condition for victory by Adolf Hitler in Mein Kampf.75
To counter these problems, the theorists each propose a 'political arm' of the
organisation to guide the terrorist 'lone wolf' arm. Beam suggests that 'organs of
information' and propaganda allow the lone wolves to stay informed and act
accordingly.76 Another far-right activist, the Odinist David Lane, notes that this
political arm must be 'scrupulously legal' and 'rigidly separated' from the lone wolf
cells, as it will face intense scrutiny from security services.77 In the jihadist sphere, al-
Suri notes that his brand of Islamist resistance requires investment in 'a variety of
nonfighting fields - proselytizing, media, education, and defining elements of our
72
Joosse, Paul, 'Leaderless Resistance and Ideological Inclusion: The Case of the Earth Liberation
Front', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19(3), 2007, p363.
73
Ibid., p356.
74
Ibid., pp353-354.
75
76
77
Quoted in Kaplan, '"Leaderless Resistance"', p89.

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religion'.78 Similar to Lane, he also stresses that propagandising 'contradict[s] [the
principles of] secrecy' and consequently can never be combined with terrorist
operations.79 The American anti-abortion movement provides one example of how
such a political arm can direct its cells whilst remaining superficially legal. Anti-
abortion websites often list the names and addresses of abortion doctors, and suggest
some kind of retribution (whether divine or human) against them, whilst avoiding
explicit incitement to violence. Lone wolves can then take their cues from this
information.80 Similarly. a significant school of thought suggests that the
contemporary incarnation of al-Qaeda is that of a 'global social movement' nurtured
around a common jihadist ideology.81 In this respect, al-Qaeda becomes a 'strategic
communicator' for the wider movement.82 By elaborating on the need for a political
arm, the leaderless resistance theorists hope to mitigate the need for management of
cells by providing a strategic narrative into which all willing lone wolves can frame
their actions.
Indeed, it is with this in mind that it has been suggested that leaderless
resistance is not actually 'leaderless'. Orla Lynch and Christopher Ryder note the
semantic distinction between leadership and management, with the former being
concerned with inspiring individuals and 'setting [a] strategic vision' and the latter
78
Al-Suri, Abu Musab, 'Call to Global Islamic Resistance' [condensed translation] (2004), in Lacey,
Jim (ed.), A Terrorist's Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri's Islamic Jihad
Manifesto (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), p7.
79
Al-Suri, Abu Musab, 'Theory on the Organization and System of Action in the Global Islamic
Resistance Units', Chapter 8, Section 5 of 'The Global Islamic Resistance Call' (2004), in Lia, Architect
of Global Jihad, p454.
80
81
Bartolo, Romain, 'Decentralised Leadership in Contemporary Jihadism: Towards a Global Social
Movement', Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol. 2(1), June 2011, p46. Available at: http://ojs.st-
andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/173. Accessed on 8th June 2012.
82
Michael, 'Terrorism and Counterterrorism', p331.

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about achieving said vision 'through day-to-day activities'.83 Of course, 'managerless
resistance' has less of a ring to it than leaderless resistance, but it is perhaps closer to
the actual nature of the concept. By including a political arm, leaderless resistance
theory is, somewhat paradoxically, providing a leader that inspires and contributes
strategic direction. Rather, the lone wolf cells lack a hierarchical manager, and
provide self-management on a day-to-day basis.
3.1 Leaderless resistance: A sign of weakness?
A common theme in studies of lone wolf terrorism is that leaderless resistance
is a strategy born out of organisational weakness. Jeffrey Kaplan in particular is an
adherent of this view, labelling the concept as 'more a mark of despair than a
revolutionary strategy',84 whilst Simson Garfinkel argues its adoption is an
'admission of failure' and 'a last-ditch effort to keep a struggle alive in the face of an
overwhelming opposition'.85 Such arguments suggest that the primary reason for the
adoption of leaderless resistance is the success of counter-terrorism bodies in
breaking up and prosecuting more conventional extremist and terrorist
organisations. For example, Bruce Hoffman argues that leaderless resistance was
adopted by the far-right in order to 'avoid the mistakes of the past' made by groups
such as the Order, which was undermined by arrests and informants.86 The far-right
leaders would therefore be more inclined to endorse a concept in which they had
83
Lynch, Orla & Ryder, Christopher, 'Deadliness, Organisational Change and Suicide Attacks:
Understanding the Assumptions Inherent in the Use of the Term "New Terrorism"', Critical Studies
on Terrorism, Vol. 5(2), August 2012, p268.
84
Kaplan, '"Leaderless Resistance"', p80.
85
Garfinkel, Simson L., 'Leaderless Resistance Today', First Monday, Vol. 8(3), March 2003, no page
numbers. Available at:
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1040/961. Accessed on
31st May 2012.
86
Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p115.

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deniability and were shielded from prosecution.87 Indeed, the emphasis on the
benefits of organisational security provided by leaderless resistance supports this
claim.
A similar theme can be found with regards to the contemporary global
Islamist movement. As Rodger Bates notes, 'the growing effectiveness of
counterterrorism techniques' has made al-Qaeda successes on the scale of 9/11 much
harder to achieve.88 Al-Qaeda must therefore shift to encouraging less complex
individual attacks in order to stay relevant during a period of 'limited possibilities' for
central planning of terrorist spectaculars.89
Interestingly, this weakness is admitted by the prominent lone wolf theorists
discussed earlier in this chapter. Beam's article has a surprising aura of despair,
lamenting the 'ever increasing persecution and oppression' by the authorities in a
country where '[t]hose who love liberty, and believe in freedom enough to fight for it,
are rare'. He concedes that leaderless resistance is a 'child of necessity', the only
feasible option for the far-right movement.90 As with Beam, al-Suri chides the
contemporary malaise of his movement, noting that there are only a small number of
jihadists resisting the enemy. This is not only because of the 'viciousness' of the
American-led War on Terror, but also the 'decadence and the individual acceptance
87
Chermak, Steven M., Freilich, Joshua D. & Simone Jr., Joseph, 'Surveying American State Police
Agencies About Lone Wolves, Far-Right Criminality, and Far-Right and Islamic Jihadist Criminal
Collaboration', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33(11), 2010, p1022.
88
Bates, Rodger A., 'Dancing with Wolves: Today's Lone Wolf Terrorists', The Journal of Public and
Professional Sociology, Vol. 4(1), April 2012, p4. Available at:
http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=jpps. Accessed on
9th August 2012.
89
Centre for Terror Analysis, 'The Threat from Solo Terrorism and Lone Wolf Terrorism', Danish
Security and Intelligence Service, 5th April 2011, p5. Available at:
https://www.pet.dk/~/media/Engelsk/the_threat_from_solo_terrorism_and_lone_wolf_terrorism
_-_engelsk_version_pdf.ashx. Accessed on 9th August 2012.
90

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of colonialism and defeat within the ummah [the global Muslim community]'.91 With
surrender unacceptable, 'the sole method for confrontation that presents itself in
light of this situation is war by secret bands of disconnected cells'.92 Both Beam and
al-Suri therefore candidly admit the weakness of their movements, and propose
leaderless resistance in response to this.
That the rise of lone wolves and leaderless resistance is due to successful
counter-terrorism is an important observation. It may provide a morale boost for
democratic societies disheartened by the rise in lone wolf violence, as it is evidence
that counter-terrorist efforts have been effective. However, it should be pointed out
that weakness is not defeat. Both Beam and al-Suri remain convinced of the
righteousness of their causes. Beam hopes that 'America can still produce the brave
sons and daughters necessary' for the struggle, and that '[i]t's not over till the last
freedom fighter is buried or imprisoned', or the enemy is defeated.93 Al-Suri
reassures his followers that jihadism is not 'threatened with extinction, because God
proclaimed for his ummah longevity, triumph, and victory'. Rather, they are
threatened with a generation of hardship, humiliation and destitution due to their
own inaction.94 Interestingly, Paul Jackson argues that lone wolves are actually an
'optimistic concept', providing passionate and restless individuals with an
opportunity to act whilst the movement awaits its inevitable righteous victory.95
Therefore, leaderless resistance is not always seen as an admission of failure, but a
strategy of endurance whilst the movement regroups and overcomes its weakness.
Long-term victory is still expected, but postponed indefinitely.
91
Al-Suri, 'Call to Global Islamic Resistance', p5.
92
Ibid., p28.
93
94
Al-Suri, 'Call to Global Islamic Resistance', p5.
95
Jackson, 'Solo Actor Terrorism', p83.

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However, some commentators argue that leaderless resistance is no longer a
sign of weakness. Sageman, for example, argues that its adoption was only an
'admission of failure' before the advent of the Internet.96 Whilst acknowledging that
the post-9/11 War on Terror has led to the degradation of the core al-Qaeda
organisation and compelled it to morph into a movement of 'leaderless jihad',97
Sageman argues that the information revolution ensures this is not a weakness.
Rather, it is more akin to 'a Darwinian evolution by natural selection', in which the
al-Qaeda movement adapted to its 'hostile physical environment' by finding
sanctuary online, improving its potency rather than fleeing its enemies.98 This
allowed it to flourish as a 'bottom-up' movement in an environment where the
security services were used to preying (to continue the Darwinian metaphor) on 'top-
down' organisations.99 However, whilst the role of the Internet may be incredibly
important in enhancing the potency and global reach of lone wolf terrorism, it is not
necessarily a driver of the phenomenon. As the presence of the lone wolf theorists
above demonstrates, and as Chapter 4 shall elaborate, al-Qaeda (and, by extension,
other terrorist movements) cannot be seen as 'a merely spontaneous evolution. It has
had its intelligent design too'.100 Sageman's approach leaves no room for such
nuance, as it focuses on the former to the exclusion of the latter.
Overall, therefore, one can see that leaderless resistance is a concept not
limited to one ideology. Most importantly, though its adoption often signals
weakness on the part of the terrorist movement that employs it, weakness is not
96
97
Ibid., p149.
98
Ibid., p121.
99
Ibid., p143.
100
Cruickshank, Paul & Ali, Mohannad Hage, 'Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda',
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 30(1), 2007, p2.

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defeat. There is often a candid acknowledgement that the movement cannot achieve
victory in the contemporary security environment, but there is also an assurance that
such a day will come. This inspires lone wolves such as McVeigh and Breivik to inflict
heavy costs on the societies that have the misfortune to encounter them. Whilst the
movements that created these lone wolves are in a period of weakness, there is often
nothing more dangerous than a wounded animal, cornered and desperate.
4. The contemporary trend of lone wolf terrorism
As discussed in the introduction, high-profile attacks by the likes of Breivik,
Hasan and Merah have ensured that lone wolves are, at least in the public
perception, currently the most dangerous terrorist threat to Western democracies.
However, lone wolf terrorism is not in itself a new phenomenon, and elements can be
found in nineteenth-century anarchism. Indeed, the common stereotype of
anarchism at the time was of 'the lone, crazed anarchist sitting in a run-down
apartment putting together a bomb'.101 Prominent anarchist leaders like Peter
Kropotkin would extol the virtues of 'lonely sentinels' who carried out 'acts of illegal
protest, of revolt, of vengeance'.102 Interestingly, Kropotkin also paints such sentinels
as the passionately restless actions of those individuals who could not bear to wait for
the masses to prepare for revolution.103 This can be seen in line with the argument
outlined by Paul Jackson in the previous chapter that the lone wolf concept provides
restless individuals an opportunity to act whilst awaiting inevitable victory.
101
Thorup, Mikkel, 'The Anarchist and the Partisan - Two Types of Terror in the History of Irregular
Warfare', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 20(3), 2008, p339.
102
Quoted in Jensen, Richard Bach, 'Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite: Anarchist Terrorism in
Nineteenth Century Europe', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16(1), Spring 2004, p124.
103
Fleming, Marie, 'Propaganda by the Deed: Terrorism and Anarchist Theory in Late Nineteenth-
Century Europe', Terrorism, Vol. 4(1-4), 1980, p7.

@00086304 31
Most notably, anarchists were ideologically-bound to accept the legitimacy of
'individual terror', due to the movement's emphasis on the historical achievements of
individual heroes.104 This can be compared to the attempts by contemporary Islamist
thinkers to reframe the concept of individual jihad 'from a religious revivalist concept
to a tactical tool of terrorism'.105 Due to their organisational weakness (as discussed
in Chapter 3.1), these movements emphasise the benefits of lone wolf terrorism, such
as organisational security. They therefore seek to mobilise lone wolves in their
movements, proclaiming individual actions as being struck on behalf of the cause.
There is certainly evidence of extremist movements operating with this intent. As
was discussed extensively in Chapter 3, theorists like Louis Beam and Abu Musab al-
Suri have sought to appropriate lone wolves as the key element of a leaderless
resistance strategy for their beleaguered movements. Furthermore, al-Qaeda has
often sought to lionise Islamist lone wolves as role models for jihad, as spokesman
Adam Gadahn did after Nidal Hasan's Fort Hood attack in 2009.106 One can
therefore see a conscious attempt by extremists to utilise lone wolves in their
ideological struggles.
However, there is no objective upwards trend in lone wolf terrorist violence.
One study found that between 1968 and 2007, lone wolves accounted for only 1.28
percent of all terrorist incidents in Western countries,107 which has been interpreted
as suggesting that they are 'black swan occurrences' of negligible concern.108 Whilst,
104
Iviansky, Ze'ev, 'Individual Terror: Concept and Typology', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.
12(1), January 1977, p44.
105
Bates, 'Dancing with Wolves', p4.
106
Pantucci, 'A Typology of Lone Wolves', pp6-7.
107
COT, 'Lone-Wolf Terrorism', pp16-17.
108
Bakker, Edwin & de Graaf, Beatrice, 'Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism: Some CT Approaches
Addressed', Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 5(5-6), December 2011, p45. Available at:

@00086304 32
historically-speaking, lone wolf terrorism is a minority endeavour lacking a clear
trend, Ramón Spaaij has pointed out that there are significant spikes in activity in
certain periods.109 Jeremy and David Carter identify one such spike as the 2009-
2010 period, when a number of high-profile lone wolf attacks spanning numerous
ideologies took place in the United States, including Hasan's Fort Hood attack, the
murder of abortion doctor George Tiller, the shooting at an army recruiting office in
Little Rock, Arkansas and the shooting at a Holocaust museum in Washington by
white supremacist James von Brunn.110 Carter and Carter also cite the foiled attacks
by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and Faisal Shahzad as examples during this period
but, as was discussed in Chapter 2.1, they are not lone wolves within our definition of
the term as they compromised operational security by relying on traceable outside
networks. It might therefore be suggested that the West may currently be undergoing
such a spike in lone wolf activity, perhaps a generational spike which is artificially
sustained by the increasing emphasis placed on leaderless resistance in extremist
discourse.
4.1 The inevitable defeat of leaderless resistance
Such is the potential length of this spike that some scholars have attempted to
frame it as a new 'wave' of terrorism. Jeffrey Simon, for example, has suggested that
the internet has revolutionised how terrorism is conducted, allowing lone operators
to become 'significant players' rather than the black swans of previous generations.111
Because of this information revolution, lone wolves will become 'a permanent [and
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/preventing-lone-wolf. Accessed on
31st May 2012.
109
110
Carter, Jeremy G. & Carter, David L., 'Law Enforcement Intelligence: Implications for Self-
Radicalized Terrorism', Police Practice and Research, Vol. 13(2), April 2012, p139.
111
Simon, Jeffrey D., 'Technological and Lone Operator Terrorism: Prospects for a Fifth Wave of
Global Terrorism', in Rosenfeld, Jean E. (ed.), Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy: The Four Waves
Theory and Political Violence (London: Routledge, 2011), p48.

@00086304 33
prominent] fixture in the world of terrorism'.112 This suggestion that lone wolf
terrorism cannot be extinguished is disconcerting, but it is also partly erroneous. It is
correct that lone wolf terror cannot be eradicated, as there will always be violent
individuals willing to act on their beliefs. However, viewing lone wolf terrorism as an
evolutionary phenomenon does not tell the whole story; as discussed in Chapter 3.1,
there has been intelligent design too.113
The reason lone wolf terrorism is undergoing a spike in activity is partly
because of the championing of the concept of leaderless resistance by a number of
extremist movements. This concept may become discredited in time, leading to its
fall from favour or abandonment. As Simson Garfinkel argues, 'ideologies require a
constant stream of new violent actions' in order to maintain interest and
credibility.114 Whether due to the failure of plots, frustration at the lack of progress,
or successful counter-narratives aimed at defusing tension and discouraging
political violence in fringe communities, lone wolf terror will eventually cease to be
seen as a viable option for revolution, a conclusion that the anarchist movement
reached in the early twentieth century.115 Far from being undefeatable, lone wolf
terror on a strategic scale is inherently fragile and condemned to being defeated and
discredited. As discussed in Chapter 3.1, leaderless resistance is seen as a holding
measure whilst the movement awaits its righteous victory. When this victory does
not arrive, followers become disenchanted with the strategy. Certainly, some
individuals will continue to engage in acts of lone wolf terrorism, which should
112
Simon, 'Technological and Lone Operator Terrorism', p61.
113
Cruickshank & Ali, 'Architect of the New Al Qaeda', p2.
114
Garfinkel, 'Leaderless Resistance Today', n.p.
115
Novak, Derry, 'Anarchism and Individual Terrorism', Canadian Journal of Economics and
Political Science, Vol. 20(2), May 1954, p176.

@00086304 34
certainly be guarded against, but the idea itself will fall out of favour within the
extremist milieus.
Overall, the contemporary concern with lone wolf terrorism is not the result of
an objective upwards trend, as there have always been prominent acts of individual
terror, whether political assassination, serial bombing or spree killing. Rather, the
contemporary trend is one of extremist movements seeking to harness the potential
of lone wolves in line with leaderless resistance theory. This has led to a spike in lone
wolf activity advocated by extremist movements, rather than a growing trend. It
requires greater attention from security services for the duration of this spike, but it
is erroneous to treat it as a revolutionary and inexhaustible phenomenon, regardless
of the equalising potential of the internet. Beam's ideas will eventually fall from
favour, as will al-Suri's. There is signs that this may already be happening in the
American far-right movement, with writers such as Steven Barry heavily criticising
the strategy.116 This may take a generation or more, but security services will
eventually grapple with other threats which are unforeseeable today, and lone wolf
terrorism will continue to be a persistent thorn perpetrated by individuals rather
than an explicit strategy endorsed by extremist movements.
5. Lone wolves and their habitats
Having addressed the contemporary application of lone wolf terrorism and
linked it to leaderless resistance theory, this study shall now address the lone wolves'
habitats. After all, it would be futile if one were to link the lone wolf phenomenon to
its wider theoretical advocates if there was no evidence that the lone terrorist
116
Michael, Lone Wolf Terror, pp47-48.

@00086304 35
perpetrators were influenced by such ideas. There is strong evidence that many lone
wolves are indeed influenced by the ideas circulating in extremist circles.
Lone wolf terrorists do not commit their violent acts out of the blue, although
such attacks may appear as such to a security establishment that had not anticipated
them. Indeed, there is wide academic consensus that, despite carrying out the attacks
independently, lone wolves do not arise out of a vacuum.117 As Terry Turchie has
noted in a slightly different context, '[e]very Lone Wolf, no matter how isolated he is
at the outset of his mission, originates in a pack'.118 Indeed, the broader non-
terroristic connotations of the term 'lone wolf' is of a canine who has been exiled
from or abandoned by its pack. This perhaps examples the usefulness of the lupine
metaphor in understanding this peculiar form of terrorism, as lone wolf terrorists are
removed from their support structures in a similar way to lone wolves in the natural
world are removed from their packs.
Beatrice de Graaf and Eelco Kessels identify three layers of how lone wolves
radicalise in their habitats, and these serve as a useful framework for this chapter.
The first is the extremist ideologies which serve as the foundation for their
radicalisation. Insufficient on its own to induce violent action, a second necessary
layer is an enabling environment which inspires and sustains the potential lone wolf
- an intensification of their ideology. The third layer is psychological - the presence of
117
Bakker, Edwin & de Graaf, Beatrice, 'Lone Wolves: How to Prevent This Phenomenon?',
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, Expert Meeting Paper, November 2010, p4.
Available at: http://icct.nl/userfiles/file/ICCT%20EM%20Lone%20Wolves%20Paper.pdf. Accessed
on 12th June 2012.
118
[Part 1] by Turchie, Terry D., in Turchie & Puckett, Hunting the American Terrorist, p109.

@00086304 36
mental illness or personal circumstances which make an individual susceptible to
violent radicalisation.119
5.1 The ideological foundation
The first of these, the ideological outlook of the individual, serves as the
foundation for their future radicalisation. As Ramón Spaaij notes, this 'exposure to
ideologies justifying terrorism is a key ingredient in the mix' that leads to the violent
commitment.120 Most lone wolves have in their history some involvement with
radical groups, or at least a notable interest in radical politics. Timothy McVeigh had
been associated with the Christian Patriot and militia movements in the USA, but
was not warmly welcomed in either.121 David Copeland, the right-wing nail-bomber
who killed three and injured over a hundred more in London in April 1999, was a
member of the British National Party (BNP), before leaving dissatisfied to join the
more extreme National Socialist Movement.122 In the aftermath of his attacks,
Anders Behring Breivik's past was the source of much speculation regarding his links
to extremist groups. It appears he was deeply invested in activities organised by the
far-right Norwegian Defence League (NDL) and its English counterpart, the English
Defence League (EDL), before being kicked out of the NDL for being 'too extreme'.123
Therefore, it seems that a recurring theme among lone wolves is their
rejection by radical groups or, as in Copeland's case, their voluntary withdrawal of
119
De Graaf, Beatrice & Kessels, Eelco, 'Lone Wolves and Their Enabling Environment', ICCT
Commentary, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, 29th July 2011. Available at:
http://icct.nl/vervolg.php?h_id=6&s_id=43#BGEK. Accessed on 31st May 2012.
120
121
Michael, Confronting Right-Wing Extremism, p107.
122
McLagan, Graeme & Lowles, Nick, Mr. Evil: The Secret Life of Racist Bomber and Killer David
Copeland (London: John Blake Publishing, 2000), pp216-219.
123
Ravndal, Jacob Aasland, 'A Pre-Trial Profile of Anders Behring Breivik', CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5(3),
March 2012, p9. Available at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/CTCSentinel-
Vol5Iss37.pdf. Accessed on 31st May 2012.

@00086304 37
membership due to frustration at the refusal to support violence. As discussed in
Chapter 1.1, the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism is too diverse to make general
conclusions based on case studies, but one might tentatively suggest that a
government liaison with such groups might help identify potential lone wolves who
are considered too extreme even for the extremists. Indeed, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) has emphasised in a 2009 memorandum the identification of
those 'who have voluntarily left a[n] [extremist] group due to their perception of the
group's inactivity, or those forced from the group for being too extreme and or
violent'.124 Of course, there would be some groups resolutely unwilling to help the
government. For example, one could not see the anti-federalist far-right militias in
the United States liaising with the FBI that they despise to identify such individuals,
no matter how dangerous they may be. Nevertheless, there is potential in this
approach, especially with regards to groups which do not advocate violence.
This autonomous behaviour, pushing beyond the boundaries of the extremist
groups with which they associated, suggests the mind of a lone wolf is one which is
unburdened by the social pressures which neuter the violent tendencies of most
radicals. As Spaaij notes, there is an almost autodidactic characteristic in a lone wolf
terrorist, in which an appetite for self-study allows them to personalise their
ideology.125 In what Kathleen Puckett describes as the 'essential finding' of her
study,126 she notes that, like other extremists, lone wolves retain a paranoid
personality that makes connections and sees conspiracies everywhere. However, due
to their rejection, voluntary withdrawal or social inadequacy, they are unable to
124
Fields, Gary & Perez, Evan, 'FBI Seeks to Target Lone Extremists', The Wall Street Journal, 15th
June 2009. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124501849215613523.html. Accessed on
15th June 2012.
125
126
[Part 2] by Puckett, in Turchie & Puckett, Hunting the American Terrorist, p272.

@00086304 38
share this with others. Despite their inability, they still need to make a connection,
and so ideology becomes the substitute, the one thing that cannot reject them.
Undiluted by group interaction (and the moderating voices that come with it), their
cherished ideology becomes more personalised, further alienating them from the
extremist milieu. Ideology becomes dominant and the individual the only 'true
believer'. He is in his own mind the only one devoted to it, to the point of engaging in
terrorist violence in pursuit of its goals.127
Therefore, ideology is a potent force in the radicalisation of a lone wolf
terrorist. As Puckett's findings suggest, it can come to dominate an individual's
mindset and legitimise - perhaps even necessitate - the application of violence.
However, it remains merely a foundation for our analysis. Terrorism is, by definition,
carried out by those with extremist ideologies, but the majority of extremists are not
terrorists.128 This suggests that an extremist ideology is, in isolation, insufficient to
drive one to commit acts of terror. Indeed, the lone wolf anti-abortionist terrorist
Eric Rudolph, in noting that his actions were 'wholly consistent' with his ideology,
queried why 'the majority of so-called pro-lifers don't act in a similar manner'.129 The
answer is, of course, that they lack the psychological makeup that make an individual
susceptible to violent radicalisation. Puckett's findings suggest the need for a mind
plagued with social inadequacy, rejection or strong-willed independence (to be
discussed in Chapter 5.3). Indeed, we should be thankful that the majority who adopt
such radical views do not act on them as violently as Rudolph did. Furthermore, an
individual needs to already be committed in order to become more deeply
127
[Part 2] by Puckett, in Turchie & Puckett, Hunting the American Terrorist, pp268-271.
128
129
Quoted in Vollers, Maryanne, Lone Wolf: Eric Rudolph and the Legacy of American Terror (New
York: HarperCollins, 2007), p303.

@00086304 39
radicalised. Enabling environments therefore perform the important function of
making available these ideas in the first place. Ideology is therefore a foundation for
lone wolf radicalisation, but by itself is not sufficient to explain it.
5.2 The enabling environment
No act of lone wolf terrorism emerges from a vacuum. As Mark
Juergensmeyer points out, even solo actions have 'networks of support and
ideologies of validation behind them, whether or not these networks and ideologies
are immediately apparent'.130 As stated above, lone wolves often have prior
connection to extremist groups in which they developed their ideology. But providing
access to ideological material is not the most important function of enabling
environments. As Marc Sageman argues, ideological propaganda 'merely reinforce[s]
already made-up minds';131 it is unlikely that a person would invest his or her time
indulging in extremist material unless they already found such material appealing.
Rather, it is the discussion of these ideas which allows for more intensive
radicalisation.132 Extremist movements provide forums for such discussion, and
permit the dissemination of new ideas. Of course, for our purposes the most
important idea spread within various extremist movements is the theory of leaderless
resistance.
Indeed, the need for a political arm in leaderless resistance theory, as outlined
by Louis Beam and Abu Musab al-Suri in Chapter 3, suggests that lone wolf theorists
are aware that their target audience does not exist in a vacuum and will listen to
130
Juergensmeyer, Mark, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, third
edition (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), p11.
131
132
Ibid., p116.

@00086304 40
outside direction. Indeed, if potential lone wolves did not engage with the wider
extremist community, there would be no point in the likes of Beam and al-Suri
proclaiming the virtues of leaderless resistance, as there would be no audience
willing to act on it. The presence of an enabling environment provides the
articulation of a narrative which allows individuals to see their lone wolf actions as
one part of a community-wide struggle: a broader campaign of leaderless resistance.
Fiction is often useful in this regard. The Turner Diaries, an infamous far-right novel
written by William Pierce in 1978, has been described as 'a blueprint for committing
violent acts', describing how terrorism can overthrow the established political system
and replace it with a new order. Such material augments factual theory by the likes of
Beam.133 Indeed, The Turner Diaries has been said to have directly inspired a
number of far-right lone wolves, including McVeigh and Copeland.134 McVeigh even
seemed to agree with the popular consensus that the book was his 'Bible'.135
Such an environment of both factual and fictional material provides not only
the narrative, but also justifications for violence and recommended tactics.136
Furthermore, it also provides suitable targets. For example, McVeigh attacked a
government building in Oklahoma City, much as his literary hero Earl Turner had
done in Pierce's novel.137 Chapter 3 noted how anti-abortion websites may unsubtly
list the names and addresses of abortion doctors, but the influence of an enabling
environment on a lone wolf's choice of target may be more indirect. For example,
Theodore Kaczynski sent a bomb which killed an advertising executive who had
133
Jackson, 'Solo Actor Terrorism', p83.
134
Michael, George, 'Blueprints and Fantasies: A Review and Analysis of Extremist Fiction', Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33(2), 2010, p153.
135
Michel, Lou & Herbeck, Dan, American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh & the Oklahoma City
Bombing (New York: Regan Books, 2001), p304.
136
Bates, 'Dancing with Wolves', p5.
137
Michael, 'Blueprints and Fantasies', p154.

@00086304 41
spearheaded the oil company Exxon's public relations campaign after the Exxon
Valdez oil spill of March 1989. Despite his predominantly anti-technologist views,
the Unabomber is widely believed to have been motivated by reading radical
environmentalist material for this particular attack.138
These enabling environments also provide lone wolf terrorists with a sense of
validation. Thoroughly committed to their ideology, they see in the extremist
community an ideal which they wish to transfer to the wider society. The extremist
community espouses values which the lone wolves view as righteous, and therefore
seek to impose upon others. Because of this, some lone wolves often see themselves
as the true saviour of their community, group or nation, saving it from decadence or
destruction. The ideology becomes more important than the individual identity, and
the lone wolf begins to define himself through his commitment to his cause. McVeigh
appears to have formulated a fantasy of the 'ultimate warrior' with himself in the
starring role as the first hero of the second American Revolution, an act he hoped
would come about as a result of his bomb in Oklahoma City.139 Similarly, Breivik,
despite his narcissistic personality, saw himself as in service to a higher cause - the
preservation of European identity. He therefore targeted the Norwegian Labour
Party in both a government building in Oslo and a Labour Party-run youth camp on
Utøya as he saw this party as responsible for encouraging multiculturalism and mass
Muslim immigration into Norway.140
138
Taylor, Bron, 'Religion, Violence and Radical Environmentalism: From Earth First! to the
Unabomber to the Earth Liberation Front', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 10(4), Winter 1998,
p28.
139
Meloy, J. Reid, 'Indirect Personality Assessment of the Violent True Believer', Journal of
Personality Assessment, Vol. 82(2), 2004, p142.
140
Stewart, Scott, 'Norway: Lessons from a Successful Lone Wolf Attacker', STRATFOR Security
Weekly, 28th July 2011. Available at: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110727-norway-lessons-
successful-lone-wolf-attacker. Accessed on 31st May 2012.

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Noting the inability of many lone wolves to fit into society, Ami Pedahzur and
Arie Perliger have speculated that the individuals may see their attacks as a form of
social rehabilitation. By harming one's enemies and restoring the society to its 'true'
state (according to their ideology), they hope to earn the appreciation and affection
of the community which has spurned them.141 Enabling environments are therefore
dangerous not just because they actively encourage lone wolves to commit violence,
and provide them with a leaderless resistance framework in which to do it, but also
because they provide them with an ideological ideal for which they are prepared to
commit mass murder to attain.
It is also perhaps worth briefly noting that an enabling environment does not
necessarily have to be extremist. Lone wolves do not exist in a vacuum, but nor do
they exist in an exclusively extremist vacuum. For example, during his trial Breivik
argued his own negative views on multiculturalism are similar to those of 'the three
most powerful [mainstream] politicians in Europe': British Prime Minister David
Cameron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and then-French President Nicolas
Sarkozy,142 who had 'all admitted multiculturalism does not work'.143 Therefore, it
needs to be acknowledged that lone wolves may be influenced by the politics of the
wider society, rather than just the minority ideologies espoused in the extremist
fringes. It must be emphasised here that whilst extremists are on the fringes of
society, they are not absent from society. Jeffrey Stevenson Murer notes that, in
141
Pedahzur, Ami & Perliger, Arie, Jewish Terrorism in Israel (New York: Columbia University Press,
2011), p158.
142
Kundnani, Arun, 'The Anti-Islamist: Anders Behring Breivik's Manifesto', ICCT Commentary,
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, 23rd April 2012. Available at:
http://icct.nl/vervolg.php?h_id=6#AK. Accessed on 12th June 2012.
143
Siddique, Haroon & Pidd, Helen, 'Anders Behring Breivik gives evidence - Tuesday 17 April', The
Guardian News Blog, 17th April 2012. Available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/17/anders-behring-breivik-live-updates. Accessed on
31st August 2012.

@00086304 43
liberal Western societies, political extremists commit a form of 'ideocide', espousing
views which are so offensive to their fellow citizens that they are shunned by society.
This prevents them from being engaged in rational debate which may dilute their
extremist and violent ideas, and transforms the inevitable conflict between the
political majority and minority into a 'zero-sum game' in which the latter feels
compelled to commit violent acts to preserve its virtue.144
There is therefore a duty of care on the part of all society to ensure that
extremist ideas are not shunned and ignored, but confronted and discredited. As one
potential course, Raffaello Pantucci recommends that the mainstream political
parties should assume greater responsibility in countering extremist language when
it emerges through democratic debate.145 The exemplary actions of Norwegian
society in response to the actions of Breivik serve as a role model for such counter-
narratives in future, as it processed his criminal prosecution through established
channels and refused to engage in knee-jerk responses.146 Indeed, the tragedies in
Oslo and on Utøya led to a reaffirmation of Norwegian democratic values which
brought worldwide praise.147 Furthermore, the decision to try Breivik as sane rather
than insane showed that Norway was prepared to confront the reality of his crimes. A
diagnosis of insanity would have allowed both the far-right and the wider society to
paint him as 'a loner, a violent psychopath and a freakish aberration', rather than the
144
Murer, Jeffrey Stevenson, 'Security, Identity, and the Discourse of Conflation in Far-Right
Violence,' Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol. 2(2), November 2011, p18. Available at: http://ojs.st-
andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/188. Accessed on 8th June 2012.
145
146
Fisher, Max, 'What America Can Learn from Norway's Anders Breivik Trial', The Atlantic, 18th
April 2012. Available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/what-america-
can-learn-from-norways-anders-breivik-trial/256066/. Accessed on 9th July 2012.
147
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, 'Norway's Trial, and a Democratic Lesson', Open Democracy, 24th April
2012. Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hylland-eriksen/norways-trial-and-
democratic-lesson. Accessed on 9th July 2012.

@00086304 44
product of extremist discourse.148 Such action would have discouraged the society
from confronting and discrediting the ideas and environment that spawned him.
There is also a need for governments to operate with restraint, guarding
against the ''cowboy' style [law] enforcement' which places the state at odds with
many political fringe movements.149 One need only remember the law enforcement
fiascos at Waco and Ruby Ridge in the USA, against which a new generation of
uncompromising armed civilian militias developed.150 Indeed, the two events were
key motivations for McVeigh to press ahead with the Oklahoma City bombing.151 It is
beyond the remit of this dissertation to propose counter-terrorism
recommendations, but a call for restraint has self-evident merit. Breivik may have
shown the damage that a lone wolf can do, but Norway showed how a democratic
society must respond. Counter-narratives offer the best way of disrupting the
enabling environments of lone wolves, both in discrediting the ideas of those who
have committed violent acts and in discouraging others from following their lead.
5.3 The psychology of lone wolves
The third and final layer of the framework provided by de Graaf and Kessels is
the psychological element. This contends that there must be the presence of a mental
illness or peculiar set of personal circumstances which make an individual
susceptible to violent radicalisation where others would not. As suggested in Chapter
148
Fekete, Liz, 'The Muslim Conspiracy Theory and the Oslo Massacre', Race & Class, Vol. 53(3),
January-March 2012, p31.
149
Anthony, Dick & Robbins, Thomas, 'Religious Totalism, Violence and Exemplary Dualism: Beyond
the Extrinsic Model', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 7(3), 1995, pp38-39.
150
Durham, Martin, 'Preparing for Armageddon: Citizen Militias, the Patriot Movement and the
Oklahoma City Bombing', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 8(1), Spring 1996, p68.
151
Wilkinson, Paul, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, third edition
(London: Routledge, 2011), p118.

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5.1, the fact of the matter remains that there are many people populating extremist
milieus, but only a few engage in lone wolf terrorism. It therefore stands to reason
that there is a psychological element that differentiates these few from the masses
who do not act on their beliefs.
An attempt to find such a psychological element is complicated by the fact that
it is difficult to determine whether the decision to commit acts of terrorism and
political violence is a sign of psychological disturbance. Sageman notes that the
contemporary academic consensus is that there is no set 'terrorist personality', and
notes the failure to find one in the past forty years of terrorism research.152 Lorenzo
Vidino also makes the important observation that even if a terrorist suffers from
mental illness, their targets are not random but often chosen for their political
symbolism or association.153 This suggests that the political motivation is not
completely consumed by a psychological disturbance; lone wolves therefore retain at
least some rational cognitive ability. Nevertheless, there is some quantitative
evidence to show that the rate of psychological disturbance is higher amongst lone
wolves than group-based terrorists,154 and so a discussion of the psychology of lone
wolves is important.
Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley argue that something must occur in a
lone wolf's background that 'make[s] the political personal'.155 There is a combination
of support for extremist ideas cultivated by the enabling environments discussed in
152
153
Vidino, Lorenzo, 'Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional
Phenomenon?', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 32(1), 2009, p10.
154
Hewitt, Christopher, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda (New
York: Routledge, 2003), p80.
155
Moskalenko & McCauley, 'The Psychology of Lone-Wolf Terrorism', p125.

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Chapter 5.2 with a personal event or experience which moves the individual beyond
mere sympathy towards an obligation to act.156 For example, the anti-Islamist Breivik
related several instances of when he had been attacked by Muslims, although the
truth of this cannot be determined.157 Kaczynski spoke of a technological society
'inexorably imposing on me',158 whilst Rudolph spoke of his personal confrontation
with 'the horror of abortion', experiencing 'the sense of hollowness... I felt dirty and
wanted to wash the... indifference off me with a Brillo pad'.159 Moskalenko and
McCauley note that empathy and 'positive identification' with others is a common
trait in human psychology, most commonly manifested in affection towards family
and friends, celebrities, sports teams, fictional characters and pets.160 Lone wolf
terrorists redirect this empathy towards the extremist ideology they have been
exposed to by their enabling environments, to such a degree of intensity that they are
willing to sacrifice their lives or liberty.161
This intense personalisation of one's political views is made possible by the
autodidactic and individualistic psychological makeup of the lone wolf in question, as
discussed in Chapter 5.1. Puckett points out that lone wolves tend to be rather
intelligent, or at least independently-minded. She deduces that their 'locus of control'
is more likely to be internal rather than external; they are 'able to look to [their] own
ideas as authority for [their] actions' rather than relying on a group. This allows them
to appropriate the extremist ideas to which they have been exposed and mould them
156
157
158
COT, 'Lone-Wolf Terrorism', p29.
159
Quoted in Vollers, Lone Wolf, p302.
160
161
Ibid., p124.

@00086304 47
to their own personal circumstances.162 Matthijs Nijboer notes how such a conclusion
has also been reached by marketing research, where 'lone wolves' in a non-terroristic
context are highly committed individuals who attach little importance to social
interactions and do not trust others to complete the task at hand.163 The fact that
similar traits can also be found in marketing research supports our argument that
lone wolves are not necessarily psychologically disturbed, but rather follow rational,
though extremely uncommon, psychological processes.
Overall, therefore, one can see how the three layers of radicalisation outlined
by de Graaf and Kessels provide an explanation for how lone wolf habitats develop
and set an individual on the road to political violence. In reverse order, there is often
a psychological element which makes an individual vulnerable to violent
radicalisation. This is often a potent mix of the political with the personal, made
possible by the lone wolf's individualistic nature. A lone wolf is then exposed to an
extremist environment which enables him to frame his grievances within a wider
cause. The individual may also be exposed to the theory of leaderless resistance at
this stage. Finally, the lure of extremist ideology becomes dominant, supplanting
social needs and allowing an individual to see himself as the only 'true believer'. This
compels him to become a lone wolf terrorist and act in pursuance of his ideology.
One can therefore find little fault in Spaaij's assertion that 'violent radicalization
takes place at the intersection of an enabling environment and individual
trajectories'.164 Individual circumstances and the lure of the extremist milieu
conspire to create a habitat which breeds lone wolf terrorists.
162
[Part 2] by Puckett, in Turchie & Puckett, Hunting the American Terrorist, p265.
163
Nijboer, 'A Review of Lone Wolf Terrorism', p37.
164

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