1. Queen's University School of Policy Studies 1
Decision-making and Negotiations:
comparisons with WTO
Robert Wolfe
“NAFTA and the Modern Tools of Global Trade Governance”
The Canada Institute and the Mexico Institute,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
Washington (DC)
March 13, 2006
2. Queen's University School of Policy Studies 2
Trade governance issues
How to make decisions on matters not specified in
the treaty (a generic contractual problem)
1. Self-executing endogenous modification (political
delegation?)
2. Dispute settlement (judicial delegation?)
3. New negotiations (consensus needed)
But do “decisions” emerge in new legal texts, or
organically, through practice?
3. Queen's University School of Policy Studies 3
Does WTO have lessons for NAFTA?
WTO a forum for all 149 Members
to understand the intentions of all other Members
(transparency)
to learn about complex new issues (new
consensual knowledge for the public and
officials)
where all Members have a voice (legitimation)
WTO challenge: squaring circle of formal
equality and practical inequality in capacity
of Members to participate.
4. Queen's University School of Policy Studies 4
Result: Multilayered decision process
Ministerial Conferences
Formal
General Council
Trade Negotiations Committee
Negotiating groups
Informal
Mini-ministerials
Senior officials
Coalitions
Bilaterals
Others
North America has a richer mix?
5. Queen's University School of Policy Studies 5
NAFTA additions to 270+ Canada-US bodies
Free Trade Commission
Dispute settlement process
Commission for Labor Cooperation
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
North American Commission for Environmental
Cooperation
Border Environment Cooperation Commission
North American Development Bank
Not to mention….
6. Queen's University School of Policy Studies 6
Annex 2001.2: Committees and Working Groups
(mostly a dead letter?)
1. Committee on Trade in Goods (Article 316)
2. Committee on Trade in Worn Clothing (Annex 300-B, Section 9.1)
3. Committee on Agricultural Trade (Article 706)
Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes Regarding Agricultural Goods (Article 707)
4. Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (Article 722)
5. Committee on Standards Related Measures (Article 913)
Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee (Article 913(5) )
Telecommunications Standards Subcommittee (Article 913(5) )
Automotive Standards Council (Article 913(5) )
Subcommittee on Labelling of Textile and Apparel Goods (Article 913(5) )
6. Committee on Small Business (Article 1021)
7. Financial Services Committee (Article 1412)
8. Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes (Article 2022(4) )
1. Working Group on Rules of Origin (Article 513)
Customs Subgroup (Article 513(6) )
2. Working Group on Agricultural Subsidies (Article 705(6) )
3. Bilateral Working Group (Mexico - United States) (Annex 703.2(A) (25) )
4. Bilateral Working Group (Canada - Mexico) (Annex 703.2(B) (13) )
5. Working Group on Trade and Competition (Article 1504)
6. Temporary Entry Working Group (Article 1605)
7. Queen's University School of Policy Studies 7
Security and Prosperity Partnership
Working Groups
Manufactured Goods & Sectoral and Regional Competitiveness
Movement of Goods
Energy
Environment
E-Commerce & Information Communications Technologies
Financial Services
Business Facilitation
Food and Agriculture
Transportation
Health
And then there’s Cross Border Crime
Forum, Smart Borders….
8. Queen's University School of Policy Studies 8
Puzzle: Why is NAFTA difficult to amend?
If all those groups don’t work…
No trade agreement is self-executing, so all formal
changes to any agreement require ratification
Domestic success usually requires a big package
(e.g. Single Undertaking in WTO)--any deal hard to
modify piecemeal
Limited amount of trade covered by most regional
deals a problem
9. Queen's University School of Policy Studies 9
Should NAFTA be amended?
Maybe it works well, and more not needed?
More fundamental? Decision process on trade
agreements shaped by
1. Modalities
2. Type of issues
3. Number of players
10. Queen's University School of Policy Studies 10
Effect of modalities
Rules and domestic policies inherently MFN, thus
multilateral
Reducing domestic subsidies cannot be done bilaterally
Dumping rules apply to all
Principal Supplier rule vs Formula approach
Request and Offer limits interest of large market Members in
market access negotiations with small market Members--original
motivation for the FTA, now gone
Request and Offer especially problematic for GATS, investment,
competition policy, trade rules
Implication: changes in ‘behind the border’ policies apply
to all trading partners, which limits scope of regional
deals among economies of disparate size
11. Queen's University School of Policy Studies 11
How complete is NAFTA, relative to WTO?
Belanger indicator: balance between political and
judicial modification
Example: NAFTA Article 712 is less “complete” than
the WTO SPS Agreement, but…
Disputes rare, even on PEI spuds
One mad cow closed Canada-US border. Resolved in
bureaucratic networks, though trade and OIE principles
relevant
Even in WTO, let alone NAFTA, dispute settlement
relatively insignificant…
12. Queen's University School of Policy Studies 12
Great Pyramid of WTO SPS order
4 Appellate Body reports on SPS matters (end 2004)
21 ‘matters’ raised in dispute settlement system
204 ‘specific trade concerns’ in SPS committee
[BSE, avian flu, aflatoxins]
Many clarification and elaboration issues in cttee
[regionalization, transparency, equivalence]
4100 ‘notifications’ to WTO
Tens of thousands of informal interactions among
officials, producers, consumers, standards bodies
13. Queen's University School of Policy Studies 13
Further research on governance
What sorts of “decisions” are taken at each level of
the pyramid? Why?
What if “decisions” emerge in new legal texts, or
organically, through practice?
To what extent must the lower levels be visible for officials
(and scholars!) to have confidence that the system works?
Does NAFTA still have critical mass?
“critical mass represents a negotiated level of participation
based on the share of world trade that interested Members
determine should be covered in order for those Members to be
willing to reduce rates in a given sector.”