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Internet of Things Forensics
Jonathan T Rajewski
Director – Senator Patrick Leahy Center for Digital Investigation
Associate Professor – Champlain College
2
• We will cover a lot of devices today
• This will be a “learning lab”
Internet of Things Forensics
Overview
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Sqlitebrowser - http://sqlitebrowser.org/
Google Chrome – install the following apps
hrome://apps/
JSON Editor Online
XML Tree
PLEASE INSTALL THE FOLLOWING TOOLS
If you want to play along --
4
Speaker
Jonathan Rajewski
Professional	Certifications
EnCe,	CCE,	CISSP,	CFE
Professional	Associations
Board	Chair	- BTV	Ignite,	DFCB	– Digital	Forensic	Certified	Practitioner	
“Founder”,	CDFS	-Consortium	of	Digital	Forensic	Specialists,	ISFCE	–
International	Society	of	Forensic	Computer	Examiners,	ACFE	–Association	
of	Certified	Fraud	Examiners,	HTCC	– High	Tech	Crime	Consortium
Recent	Awards/Recognition	
2014	US	Ignite	Application	Summit	Best	Public	Safety	Application
2014	Honored	by	FBI	director	James	B.	Comey
2013	4	under	40	-Hilbert	College
2013	C.	Bader	BrouiletteAlumni	Leadership	Award	-Champlain	College
2012	Top	Digital	Forensic	Professor	–Digital	Forensics	-Princeton	Review	
2012	Best	300	Professors	in	the	United	States	- Princeton	Review	
2011	Digital	Forensic	Examiner	of	the	Year	- Forensic	4cast	Awards
@jtrajewski
5
"Behind this glass
is incredible talent
and this country in
general and the
FBI in particular
needs those
folks,"
-FBI Director
James Comey
Overview
6
A Special Thank You to our student research teams (Echo and Iot)
Christopher Antonovich
Jason Ehlers
Matthew Lantange
Mary Braden Murphy
Tyler Nettleton
Zachary Reichert
Emily Shelton
Kelsey Ward
LCDI Research Assistants
7
What is the Internet of Things?
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0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
Total	IOT	Devices
IoT Devices
2014 2015 2016 2020
Gartner (November 2015)
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3165317
9
Master Title
10
Internet of Things Forensics is Fun
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Data accessibility
Device
• Native	application
• App files	(json/sqlite/cache)
• Physical	extraction	- JTAG/Chip	off	etc.)
Network
• HTTP /	HTTPS	– Both	are	used	by	devices
• Protocol	Analysis	(BT/SDR	to	profile	which	
devices	are	available.)
Cloud
• Web	Interface/Subscriber	email account
• IDE/API
• Subpoena/Search Warrant/Court	Order
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A baby change table that’s connected to the internet
Hatch Baby
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WiFi SSIDs
Account Information
Biometric data
Forensic Artifacts
Hatch Baby
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WiFi SSIDs
com.hatchbaby/cache/volley/582429184758663336
Forensic Artifacts
Hatch Baby
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Account Information | Biometric
com.hatchbaby/shared_prefs/com.hatchbaby.HBPreferences.xml
Forensic Artifacts
Hatch Baby
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Account Information | Biometric
com.hatchbaby/databases/redhenbaby-db
Forensic Artifacts
Master Title
17
WinkHub
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WinkHub
Which products connect to the WinkHub?
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WinkHub
Forensic Artifacts
Account information
Devices connected/paired
Recent activity of devices
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User Account
com.quirky.android.wink.wink/shared_prefs/com.quirky.android.wink.wink_preferences.xml
Forensic Artifacts
WinkHub
21
Forensic Artifacts
WinkHub
As devices are provisioned with Wink, an entry is populated in PersistanceDB
com.quirky.android.wink.wink/databases/PersistanceDB
SQLite database
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data/data/com.quirky.android.wink.wink/shared_prefs/wink_preferences.xml
• Wifi SSID	and	Password	
• Base64	encoded
WinkHub
*This	has	been	patched	in	current	versions	of	Wink
Forensic Artifacts
23
Security sensors (contact sensors)
com.quirky.android.wink.wink/databases/PersistanceDB
Forensic Artifacts
WinkHub + Quirky GE Tripper
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Forensic Artifacts
WinkHub + Quirky GE Tripper
com.quirky.android.wink.wink/databases/PersistanceDB
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com.quirky.android.wink.wink/shared_prefs/winkdevices.xml
Forensic Artifacts
WinkHub + Quirky GE Tripper
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An internet connected egg tray
WinkHub + Egg Minder
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Forensic Artifacts
WinkHub + Egg Minder
com.quirky.android.wink.wink/databases/persistenceDB
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An internet connected lock
WinkHub + Kwikset Lock
29
Forensic Artifacts
WinkHub + Kwikset Lock
com.quirky.android.wink.wink/databases/persistenceDB
30
WinkHub + Kwikset Lock
Unlock with Phone
Unlock with Key or Keypad
These values updated when
unlocked with phone
Values not updated
31
WinkHub + Kwikset Lock
POP QUIZ – Which data represents an app unlock?
desired_locked_changed_at:1463421866, 5/16/2016,	2:04:26	PM
locked:true,
locked_changed_at:1463421866, 5/16/2016,	2:04:26	PM
desired_locked_updated_at:1463421866, 5/16/2016,	2:04:26	PM
locked_updated_at:1463421866, 5/16/2016,	2:04:26	PM
connection_updated_at:1463421866 5/16/2016,	2:04:26	PM
desired_locked_changed_at:1463421866, 5/16/2016,	2:04:26	PM
locked:false,
locked_changed_at:1463422892, 5/16/2016,	2:21:32	PM
desired_locked_updated_at:1463421866, 5/16/2016,	2:04:26	PM
locked_updated_at:1463422892, 5/16/2016,	2:21:32	PM
connection_updated_at:1463422892 5/16/2016,	2:21:32	PM
App	Unlock	@	2:04
Manual	Key	Unlock	@	2:21
32
WinkHub - Phillips Hue Light Bulbs
33
WinkHub - Phillips Hue Light Bulbs
com.quirky.android.wink.winkdatabasespersistenceDB
Forensic Artifacts
34
WinkHub - Phillips Hue Light Bulbs
Forensic Artifacts
35
Make all lights red.
Light 1 in persistence DB has the
following x and y values
Using the CIE 1931 color graph to
plot these values, the resulting color
is in the red area of the graph and
thus matches with the user action of
changing lamp 1 to red.
36
37
Zoomed in on the CIE 1931 graph, there is a
curved black line that represents these
values on the color spectrum.
The “color_temperature” value in the data
represents the Kelvin number [2000 .. 6500]
38
She doesn’t record your voice until you say her name
Alexa is always listening…
Amazon Echo
39
Account information
Timestamps of what Alexa heard during the period activated
The actual text of what Alexa heard
The given response
The URL of the file location on Amazon server
The actual audio of the last played response (via the app)
Forensic Artifacts
Amazon Echo
40
Account information
com.amazon.dee.app/cache/org.chromium.android_webview
Step 1 - Decompress the gziped files
Step 2 - search for the following:
{"accounts":[{"email": -This will give you the base account as well as the
Amazon customer ID
customerEmail":” - This will give you the Amazon Prime Music email
account and customer ID
Forensic Artifacts
Amazon Echo
41
Account Information
com.amazon.dee.app/cache/org.chromium.android_webview
Forensic Artifacts
Amazon Echo
42
Interactions with Alexa
com.amazon.dee.app/cache/org.chromium.android_webview
§ Step 1 - Decompress the gziped files
§ Step 2 – Find your favorite Json viewer and/or forensic tool J
§ Step 3 – Search for the following:
▫ Alexa heard: or playbackAudioAction -This will show you the location of “cards” that contain text Alexa heard from the user
▫ primaryActions – This is what Alexa did with the query (backend)
▫ "descriptiveText": or "title": - This will show you the response from Alexa – what was said out
loud or played.
▫ ,"cardType": - This is present in all “cards”, will yield more results
Forensic Artifacts
Amazon Echo
43
Interactions with Alexa
com.amazon.dee.app/cache/org.chromium.android_webview
Forensic Artifacts
Amazon Echo
Alexa	heard:	or playbackAudioAction -This	will	show	you	the	location	of	
“cards”	that	contain	text	Alexa	heard	from	the	user
primaryActions – This	is	what	Alexa	did	with	the	query	(backend)	
"descriptiveText":	or "title":	- This	will	show	you	the	response	from	Alexa	
– what	was	said	out
loud	or	played.
,"cardType": - This	is	present	in	all	“cards”,	will	yield	more	results
44
Samsung SmartCam
Wi-Fi or Hardwire
Motion/Voice/Night Vision
45
Samsung SmartCam
46
Samsung SmartCam
47
Username and password in plaintext
• Username and password
• The SSID that the phone was connected to can also be seen
• The log no longer exists after an the version 2.71 update
Samsung SmartCam
48
Forensic Artifacts
Samsung SmartCam
/data/data/com.techwin.shc/files/
Videos are saved in this location
Folders named in epoch time
corresponding to when user began
recording
Folders created when user saves a video
(live record) (you hit I want to record)
49
SD Card – User initiated action – Insert MicroSD and enable it in the App
Where is the data?
Samsung SmartCam
Pictures and videos saved here
50
IOT Hub
Samsung Smartthings
51
Camera, Thermostat, Fire/CO Alarm
Nest
52
Forensic Artifacts
When Nest sensed a presence
Video
Nest
53
Forensic Artifacts
Nest Account Information
Com.nest.android/cache/cache/
Nest
53
54
Forensic Artifacts
Com.nest.android/cache/cache/
image_manager_disk_cache
Use ffmpeg to convert the files
Nest
54
55
Forensic Artifacts
Ffmpeg
ffmpeg -f h264 -i VIDEOFILE -vcodec copy OUTPUT.mp4
ffmpeg -f h264 -i VIDEOFILE -vcodec copy OUTPUT.mp4
Nest
55
56
Forensic Artifacts
Nest Protect
Com.nest.android/cache/cache/
Nest
56
57
57
Forensic Artifacts
Nest Protect
Com.nest.android/cache/cache/
Nest
58
We just found this on our air-gapped
network
Hands-on Scenario
Can	you	use	data	from	the	IOT	
devices	installed	at	this	facility	
to	determine	what	happened?
59
Amazon Echo
Samsung Camera - SamsungSmartCam_SDCard.Ex01
Samsung Smartthings
Wink
Email me your answer
Data for you to review
Hands-on Scenario
60
Thank You
Jonathan Rajewski | Director | Senator Patrick Leahy Center for Digital Investigation
@jtrajewski | rajewski@champlain.edu | jtrajewski@gmail.com

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Enfuse_2016_Internet_of Things_Rajewski