Dissertation.SID_1559752

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Refugee Influx and Host State Fragility:
A Study in Perception & Reality in Sub Saharan Africa
Dissertation
M.A. International Relations
King’s College, London
Madeleine Hoyt Cashin
SID# 1559752
18 August 2016

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Table of Contents
1. Introduction p. 3
2. Literature Review p. 5
3. Methodology p. 9
4. Structure p. 11
I: Refugee terms and general trends in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) p. 12
II: Migration, xenophobia and economic marginalisation in SSA p. 14
III: Link between xenophobia and fragile States in SSA p. 18
IV: (Perceived and actual) economic impacts and contributions
of refugee presence: Comparative analysis of South Africa,
Kenya and Uganda p. 23
V: Relationship between sub-regional economic unions and
heightened stimulation of homogeneous societies: Comparative
analysis of South Africa, Kenya and Uganda p. 26
VI: Analysis of international and legal mechanisms in place
regarding refugees and their limitations in the face of practical
migrant marginalisation from rule of law: Comparative analysis
of South Africa, Kenya and Uganda p. 30
VII: Fractured responses: The chasm between perception and
reality: Comparative analysis of South Africa, Kenya and
South Africa p. 38
5. Conclusion: Suggestions for mitigating disconnect between
perception and reality, while encouraging synchronised policy
and practice in an era of mass displacement in Sub Saharan
Africa – drawing from South Africa, Kenya and Uganda p. 44
6. Bibliography p. 47
Word Count: 15,004

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INTRODUCTION
Drawing on qualitative research on the perceived threat of refugees and potential
links between refugee influx and fiscal insecurity within host countries, this dissertation
seeks to answer: Does the introduction of refugees into fragile democracies in Sub
Saharan Africa increase levels of xenophobia? Is this xenophobia misplaced or
appropriately coupled to a relationship between refugee influx and host country fiscal
insecurity? Is the resulting extent of linkage destabilising to the host country or
deleterious to the reception of service by refugees? Is international law proving relevant
to the practical life of these communities? Answers to these questions are impacted by
inter-related issues of encampment practices, policies and practices of structural
marginalization, as well as legal disjunctures between policy, rhetoric and action.
Scholarship of this link between refugee influxes, socioeconomic conditions and
xenophobia has been initiated by scholars such as Gomez and Christiansen (2010), who
maintain that “the dynamic between positive and negative factors is complex and varies
depending on several factors, including the political economy of hosting countries, urban-
rural interactions and the nature of host-refugee relations” (7). But these authors argue
that this field of study requires urgent expansion as the factors behind xenophobic
reception and policy response are increasingly important amidst trans-nationalised
immigration policies, social inequalities and security concerns. Fractured political
response, discordant alignment between international and local legal mechanisms, and
inadequate cross-border economic integration along sub-regional economic unions in Sub
Saharan Africa (SSA) have facilitated aggressive localised responses to social ills
associated with refugee presence, often in the form of scapegoating refugees and mixed
migrants out of xenophobic mistrust and socio-cultural judgments.
Multi-sectional challenges to manage migration whilst promoting State, human
and economic security are not particular to Africa. International, intra-regional and
internal migration presents difficulties to harmonise integration aspirations with domestic
immigration realities. Populist incentives, paired with demands from OECD countries,
incentivise increasingly securitised policy responses. This deep hue of state security in
immigration policies has neither prevented terrorism nor criminality – but has rather

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festered human rights abuses, labour exploitation, social stigmatisation, and criminal
enterprise along State borders (Achiume and Landau 2015).
The last twenty years have witnessed xenophobic resurgence across the world –
notably following 1990s decentralisation and democratisation processes in SSA, which
contradictorily spurred central determinations of belonging within State boundaries.
Xenophobia is commonly understood as systemic risk aversive behaviour that perverts
and perpetuates popular perceptions of insider-outsider divisions. Such behaviour
illuminates deeper socio-political questions of citizen legitimacy and narratives
surrounding access to social and public services. Though such processes have received
considerable political, academic and media attention in the United States and Europe, less
is known of the southern hemisphere in general and SSA in particular. In this climate,
refugee and mixed migrant influx portends exaggerated socio-political divides and
rhetorical edifices of otherness (Fourchard and Segatti 2015:6-7).
Attempting to assess whether the introduction of refugees into fragile democracies
in SSA increases levels of xenophobia, destabilises economies and cripples refugee
services, my dissertation is structured as follows: First, I broadly review scholarly
literature surrounding migration dynamics and socioeconomic drivers of xenophobia.
Then I explore migratory trends in SSA and the progressive xenophobic, economic
marginalisation of migrants. Then I explain why I am deepening my analysis through a
case study within this dissertation on South Africa, Kenya and Uganda, beginning with
an exploration of the links between xenophobia and fragile economies therein. As this
geopolitical relationship portends reverberating socioeconomic impacts, I then explore
(perceived and actual) economic impacts and contributions of refugees to local and
regional economies. This leads the analysis to the involvement of sub-regional economic
unions and their perceived stimulation of homogenous societies. Fractured
synchronisation between sub-regional economic unions couples negatively with
discordant legal systems, so I then focus on the marginalisation of migrants and refugees
from rule of law through international and legal mechanisms, and resultant crippling of
refugee services. The analysis concludes with a discussion of how Kenya, South Africa
and (to an extent) Uganda have regionalised refugee concerns and effectively localised
xenophobic discourse amidst times of economic downturn to distinctly different

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outcomes, suggesting potential adjustments in local policies to mitigate fiscal insecurity
and moderate cause of xenophobia. In the conclusion, I bring together my findings and
outline the implications for SSA in general and the three case studies (Kenya, South
Africa and Uganda) in particular.
LITERATURE REVIEW:
This dissertation topic emerged after extensive research on Sub Saharan African
(SSA) refugee trajectories and varying reception policies – and subsequent to the Brexit
decision on June 24, 2016 and recent European elections in Hungary, Austria, Sweden,
Poland, France, Germany and Greece, which together indicate heightened European
concerns about the impact of refugees on host countries (Aisch et al. 2016). Other
countries outside of Europe serving as asylum providers are suddenly of heightened
importance. The practice of scapegoating asylum seekers and refugees for economic
conditions and ranging social ills is a transnational phenomenon that has elicited
xenophobic fear, mistrust and demagoguery. Though Africa remains the continent most
rankled by economic and political fragility, its regional, sub-regional and local patterns of
xenophobia arguably extend to global trends in demagogic social and civic practices and
policies. Correspondingly, while the related research on the subject is transnational and
global in practice, it focuses largely on nation-states as opposed to regional
considerations – thereby arguably narrowing scope of interpretation of mass
displacement, which is in its essence transnational in nature and impact. Moreover,
research needs to be updated on on-going socioeconomic change, shifting reception and
continually expanding numbers.
Whether depicting contextual determinants of social capital or social unrest,
Fourchard and Segatti (2015) posit that scholars generally focus on ethnic variance as
historically constructed elements of groups and linked power dynamics with others. They
explain that the putative disparity therein is crucial to systematic processes of targeting
and legitimising or codifying modes of violent and socially aversive behaviour. This
difference links with spatial and historical dimensions of popular relations and official
rhetoric. Though increasing in number, fewer reports focus on the “mundane practices of
xenophobia and its related effects on citizenship in African Politics” (Lonsdale 2008;

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Smedt 2009; Misago et al. 2009; Landau 2011; Monson 2015). This gap in literature
conceptually supports Leviathan-centrality of violence in establishing authority, (re-)
classifying group identity and definition, and distinguishing the margins of citizenship
(Fourchard and Segatti 2015:8).
Literature around regional refugee crises focuses predominantly on the displaced,
while relative perspectives of the host populations living near theoretically transient
refugee settlements remain under-researched. Given the significant impact of refugee
settlements on regional and sub-regional economies, this dearth of research narrows
relative scope of understanding and policy application – particularly for receiving
countries with existing fragile economies and exclusionary cultural or territorial
tendencies (Kreibaum 2014:3). According to Adepoju (2008:3), sub-regional economic
unions “stimulated the homogenous societies which once existed in the sub-regions”
while fracturing along discordant sub-regional and national migration programmes and
policies. Along these lines, Maruping (2005) qualifies that while some “sub-regional
arrangements” have been in place since pre-independence, a number of African States
“have only recently rekindled their interest in economic integration” (129). Maruping
contends that this trend has been motivated by perceived success of integration efforts in
the Americas and across Europe.
A priori, potential risk areas surrounding refugee influx identified by existing
SSA literature include increased criminality, environmental degradation, overburdened
health care and school facilities, wage competition, unsafe drinking water, land and food
scarcity, and disease outbreaks. In a thematic paper supporting the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) project on Global
Factors Influencing the Risk of Conflict and Fragility, Hoeffler (2013) scrutinised why
such a significant portion of refugees settle in fragile States. Correspondingly, in a
Background Note to the World Development Report, Gomez and Christensen (2011)
focus on periods of mass displacement and their implications on developmental capacity
in neighbouring countries. Baez (2011) posits that additional human resources and
external funding harboured by refugee inflow potentially elevate host community welfare
and local economy through increased demand, (potentially) increased and improved

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infrastructure, and arrival of international humanitarian resources. In a 2006 macro-level
study, Salehyan and Gleditsch underscore the significance of such external effects as
refugee networks and flows that can extend the breadth of extremist reach with negative
socioeconomic consequences in receiving countries. They clarify that this is particularly
possible if refugees are marginalised and congested in a region where they are
scapegoated for ranging social ills and unable to protect themselves given tenuous social
and legal situations. Correspondingly, Kirui and Mwaruvie (2012) emphasise State and
human security risk of the porous Somalian border and composition of the Dadaab
refugee camp in north-eastern Kenya (Kreibaum 2014:3-4).
Kreibaum (2014) analyses the repercussions from protracted refugee presence and
additional influxes in local Ugandan context. Noted as one of the first studies to
empirically examine the long-term impacts of displaced populations on local host
populations, she contributes an integral piece of work that weaves in political aims with
sustainable social and economic response. Along these lines, Jacobsen (1996, 2002)
identifies determinants behind national refugee policies and emphasises the potentiality
of explicitly legalised, economically active refugees. Jacobsen (2001) further articulates
three core impediments to local integration: (perceived or actual) environmental and
economic resource burdens, (perceived or actual) security threats, and (popular and
official) segregation of refugees coupled with popular resistance to integration (Kreibaum
2014:3-4).
Many scholars have endeavoured to understand the seemingly “selective
xenophobia” that manifests in systemic patterns of violence and discourse. A common
finding among the growing body of literature has been that these practices effectively
exclude perceived foreigners from socio-legal privileges and rights accorded to national
citizens (Neocosmos 2010; Idahosa and Vincent 2014:94-95).
Geschiere (2009) has found that while the world appears to shrink amidst
globalisation’s upturn in population and information spread, such effects can spark “a
return to local” in a paradoxical pattern of “flow and closure” (1; 425). He asserts that,
though historically situated, autochthonous and xenophobic practices and policies do not
entirely signify a return to traditional dynamics, but rather reflect temporally cognizant
attitudes towards access to economic, political and social capital. But with due respect to

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Geschiere, assessments of local belonging are never temporally isolated, but rather
relative to historically and culturally situated relations.
Though there is a growing body of literature on SSA on xenophobia, less is
known on how such practices alter definitions and perceptions of citizenship. While
existing literature has largely focused on civil ethno-political conflict, the sociology of
conflict refocuses this lens towards the modalities of motivations and disproportional
rationalities involved. Recent research has concentrated on more mundane modes of
political violence to illustrate how different strains therein contribute to contextual
insider-outsider boundaries (Higazi and Lar 2015; Fourchard and Segatti 2015:8). Ben
Rawlence contributes incredible depth to this line of inquiry with City of Thorns: Nine
Lives in the World’s Largest Refugee Camp (2016), which presents a socio-political
investigation of individuals in Dadaab to provide a human narrative paired with volatile
international ramifications.
Chambers (1986) argued that vulnerable cohorts within the host countries have
similar needs to incoming refugees, but lacked the safety net of encampment.1
This train
of thought directly and indirectly inspired several different empirical works. Whitaker
(2002) undertook a case study concerning Congolese, Rwandan and Burundian refugees
in Western Tanzania, and found an upturn in business and trade and general positive
reverberations from relief programmes on the one hand, and shifted social dynamics and
new-fangled diseases on the other. Significantly, Whitaker found that districts and
households that had already been better off often reaped more of a benefit from the new
dynamic, while others tended to become further marginalised. Similarly, Berry (2008)
elaborated on the benefits of increased trade opportunities and increased cheap labour
force of regional and sub-regional economies. Agblorti (2011) observed significant
structural changes in refugee-host communities in Ghana amidst wider transformation
from small agricultural settlements to urban settlements. Agblorti noted that though host
communities largely accepted economic and social integration of Liberians, they
withheld political and social inclusion (Kreibaum 2014:4-5).

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In Kenya, many nationals have taken to prefer services provided to destitute persons in camps
compared with those offered to the general population.

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This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways: Looking at South
Africa, Kenya and Uganda, these three significant hosts of large refugee populations
present themselves as important case studies for analysing the evolving nature of
xenophobic determinations amidst fragile socio-political conditions. With the on-going
conflict in Somalia and rapidly evolving conflicts in South Sudan and Burundi, resulting
displaced numbers and asylum trajectories within SSA and these three case studies
appear to be on the steady rise. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), in 2015, Kenya hosted the seventh largest refugee population at
553,900 refugees. In Uganda, crises in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi
and South Sudan led to an increase in the refugee population from “385,500 in 2014 to
477,200 in 2015. As a result, by end-2015, Uganda hosted the eighth largest refugee
population in the world” (UNHCR 2016:16). Though the amount of new applications for
asylum were relatively low in South Africa for 2015 (62,200), recent statistical
adjustments have shown that South Africa actually hosted the highest amount of asylum
seekers by the end of 2015 (UNHCR 2016:44). As these countries are going to be
increasingly central to the displaced population narrative in years to come, this study
hopes to draw conclusions from correspondent policies, practices and responses to
refugee influx over the last decade to suggest paths toward better synchronised,
constructive responses in the future.
METHODOLOGY
This post-structural political economy essay is structured as a secondary
qualitative analysis of socioeconomic bases behind and surrounding xenophobia in Sub
Saharan Africa (SSA). The analysis draws from academic journals, multinational reports,
governmental mandates and multi-media coverage to approach the above research
questions through a variegated, current lens. Though the work presented is predominantly
qualitative and analytical, it is not oblivious to African empirical data or studies on the
subject. While the study is by no means comprehensive in geographical, temporal or
topical terms, it broadly seeks to make academic sense of the xenophobic response across
informal and formal practice and policy in SSA in the last decade as well as to produce
conclusions on how to mitigate the present trajectory toward inhospitable refuge in a time

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of pandemic flight. Though I broadly acknowledge the pan-African scope of the issue,
this SSA study is focused primarily on South Africa, Kenya and Uganda. The comparison
between the three is justified on several levels: first because each State has experienced
massive fluctuations in refugee and migrant influx over the last ten years; second,
because each State has demonstrated markedly different socio-political responses in the
face of socioeconomic scarcity; and third, because these different responses and
conditions have presented different outcomes for conditions of political stability,
economic growth and perceived benefit among both the receiving and refugee
populations. The difference between Uganda and both South Africa and Kenya is
particularly interesting given the remarkably divergent pattern of socio-political and
cultural response and consequent fiscal and social conditions.
Before addressing the implications of xenophobic attitudes and practices, I begin
by briefly providing relevant trends, definitions, statistics, treaties, and covenants. The
latter particularly provide a rudimentary legal framework for preferable reception and
management of refugee populations. While it would be difficult to identify a State where
these codes are fully honoured or followed by host populations, they provide an
internationally mandated metric. The degree to which they are actually followed helps
justify the “Perception and Reality” part of my title.
In order to consider the origins and impact of xenophobia in the selected States,
this study focuses largely on the post-structural elements of identity reclassification and
how this has impacted formal and informal practices and policies towards refugees and
mixed migrants in Sub Saharan Africa. This social construction is by no means random,
so the analysis pairs with sociological grounding behind xenophobic aggression and
(historically situated) ethno-cultural proclivities that may make communities more prone
to such hostility.
Finally, while this paper presents both generalised framework and specific State
application, it is beyond its scope to focus significantly on countries of origin.
Additionally, it is beyond its breadth to provide the impact of displacement on individual
refugees and host country citizens living in proximity of camps and urban-refugee
clusters. Such an intimate depiction, though not taken here, would help to cement the
critical question of why these studies matter, both within each considered country and

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within the countries in which this dissertation is being written, the United Kingdom and
the United States of America. Such individual profiles remain an important part of the
literature yet to adequately emerge in the increasingly vital study of refugee influx and
fiscal insecurity and they would help to answer the second part of my question: how to
distinguish between the perception and the reality. In the meantime, that latter judgment
draws from my observations of inconsistencies in policy, practice and impact.
Certain authors and advisors have been markedly constitutive to the success of
this work. At King’s College, London, my advisor, Didier Bigo, and professors Mervyn
Frost, Leonie Ansems De Vries, and Richard Ned Lebow helped cultivate my argument
and understanding of broader international relations dynamics involved. Primary authors
presenting work central to my argument include: Adepoju (1996; 2002; 2005; 2007;
2008); Fourchard and Segatti (2015); Kreibaum (2014); Hoeffler (2013); Gomez and
Christiansen (2010); Maruping (2005); Rawlence (2016); and Landau and Misago
(2014). Additionally, studies undertaken by the International Labour Office (ILO),
International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and the Office of the UNCHR (2001);
the UNHCR (2016); and the Failed States Index (2016) were integral to my argument.
STRUCTURE
This dissertation is divided into seven sub-sections, as follows:
I: Refugee terms and trends in Sub Saharan Africa
II: Migration, xenophobia and economic marginalisation in SSA
III: The link between xenophobia and fragile States in SSA
IV: (Perceived and actual) economic impacts and contributions of refugee presence:
Comparative analysis between South Africa, Kenya and Uganda
V: Relationship between sub-regional economic unions and heightened stimulation of
homogenous societies: Comparative analysis between South Africa, Kenya and
Uganda
VI: Analysis of international and legal mechanisms in place and their limitations in
the face of practical migrant marginalisation from rule of law: Comparative analysis
between South Africa, Kenya and Uganda
VII: Fractured responses: The chasm between perception and reality: Comparative
analysis between South Africa, Kenya and Uganda

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I. Refugee terms and trends in Sub Saharan Africa
People leave their country of origin for different reasons that span from endemic
decline in social or economic conditions to violent or environmental disasters.
Throughout these environmental, political or socioeconomic drivers, the fact remains that
most people prefer to stay in their country of origin provided they are able to do so in
dignity, safety and wellbeing. Subjective perceptions therein of socioeconomic and
political conditions vary across local and regional dynamics, but are categorically
characterised by the capacity to “survive above a local minimum standard of living.” As
such, forced displacement constitutes the direct fallout from the absence or breakdown of
sustainable community (ILO, IOM, OHCHR 2001:5).2
Displacement (and the time directly following) links with ranging developmental,
securitized, politicized and humanitarian challenges in local and neighbouring contexts.
The introduction of refugees and mixed migrants is not categorically negative. Reception
policies can encourage constructive contributions non-national individuals and
communities can make (Gomez and Christensen 2010:2).
Refugees are persons identified under the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of
Refugees as those who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political
opinion…[are] outside the country of his nationality, and…[are] unable to or, owing to
such fear…[are] unable to avail himself of the protection of that country” (UNHCR
2010).
As most States have signed the 1951 Convention and additional protocols, this is
currently the accepted international definition of refugees. Countless conditions ranging
from international regulation to familial connection influence migration decisions and
evaluations. Though other voluntary migrants leave in pursuit of better economic
opportunities and welfare, there is (in reality) a spectrum of motivations that range
between voluntary and forced migration, which obscures any theoretical distinction
therein (Hoeffler 2013:6).

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*Reference recent events in South Sudan.

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Given that the majority of refugees are hosted in countries sharing a maritime or land
border with the country of origin, developing States continue to disproportionally receive
refugees (Gomez and Christensen 2010:4-5; UNHCR 2016:18). By the end of 2015, Sub
Saharan Africa (SSA) hosted the largest number of refugees at 4.4 million displaced
persons – largely (80%) originating from the Central African Republic, Sudan, South
Sudan, Somalia, and Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNHCR 2016:14).
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) posits that given the
growing numbers of refugees in protracted displacement environments, finding socially
and economically sustainable solutions for extended development situations constitutes a
major developmental challenge to States affected by it (Gomez and Christensen 2010:5-
6). With on-going crises in South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Somalia and
Burundi, large masses of refugees continue to be displaced to Uganda, Kenya and South
Africa (among other countries) (UNHCR 2016:16).
One significant limitation to protection provisions for displaced individuals and
groups draws from the extent to which they are placed in fragile States (a concept to be
explained in more detail in Sub-Section III regarding the link between xenophobia and
fragile States in SSA). Sixteen of the twenty States in the most recent Failed States Index
are in Africa, and these States also present significant sources of refugee flows on the
continent (Failed States Index 2016).3
For example, over a million people have been
displaced across international and intra-regional borders by the protracted civil war in
Somalia (Wood 2013:17). While Somalia is unquestionably a “failed” state, ranking
114.0, at the top of the “Very High Alert” echelon for 2016, Kenya suffers its own issues
within the “failed state” criteria, placing it at 98.3 in the “Alert” bracket for 2016, thus
helping cripple the country’s reception of refugees over time (Failed States Index
2016:7).
While fragile States have a relatively low proportion of formal emigrants, the number
of refugees is disproportionally high. The scope of a State’s population demographics,
development levels and economy are integral to analysing impacts of hosting refugees
(socio-cultural and otherwise) (UNHCR 2016:18). Refugees and mixed migrants

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This list is consistently led by Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and
Somalia – and increasingly by Chad and South Sudan (Failed States Index 2016).

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generally (seek to) settle in neighbouring countries, which are often fragile themselves
(Hoeffler 2013:15).
Countries with fragile economic conditions that host refugees and asylum seekers for
protracted periods of time face immediate and extenuated environmental, political, social
and economic impacts. Local communities may come into competition with refugees and
mixed migrants for such scarce resources as water, food and medical services.
Additionally, the influx of refugees and mixed migrants can challenge programmatic
capacity demands for health services, education, and infrastructure – potentially
overwhelming transportation, sanitation and water resources (UNHCR 2004). Even in
situations where the refugee dynamic generates economic opportunities for the local
community and the displaced, there are both positive and negative reverberations
involved for both groups. The dynamic is complex and varies with such historically
situated factors as host-refugee dynamics, urban-rural relations, and receiving political
economy (Gomez and Christensen 2010:7).
The trans-national nature and particular characteristics of discrimination and
violence against refugees, migrants and other non-nationals is now commonly
acknowledged and enabled by “the restricted application of non-nationals in laws and
procedures of States.” Though there is broad State acknowledgement of the basic
entitlements and rights of unauthorised migrants in the UN 1990 International
Convention for the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families, there is not broad acceptance. The particular vulnerability of undocumented
mixed migrants draws from their general hesitancy or inability to seek protection from
authorities when faced with xenophobic hostility. Accordingly, governments in SSA may
tacitly abide varying forms and degrees of irregular entry given the subsequent (easily
exploitable) vulnerability of mixed irregular migrants (ILO, IOM and OHCHR 2001:5;
Castles and Davidson 2000).
II. Migration, xenophobia and economic marginalisation in SSA
International, intra-regional and internal migration in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA)
occurs within multitudinous political and socio-ethnic contexts. Erratic politics, endemic
poverty levels, and environmental and living insecurity combine with recurring

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conflagrations of international and intra-national formal and informal conflicts which fuel
pressures to emigrate across the continent (and present few reasons for expedient return
to home country). These migrations are disproportionally sub-regional in direction. The
configurations of migration trajectory and composition are changing in dramatic manners
– notably in diversified migration destination, increased unaccompanied female and child
migration, progressive commercial migration and emigration of skilled professional
workers from around the region. To some extent, “the formation of sub-regional
economic unions stimulated the kind of homogeneous societies which once existed in the
sub-regions” (Adepoju 2008:1).
SSA is historically a region where migration pressures are driven by interrelated
political, ecological, economic and demographic factors, undertaken by a spectrum of
migration configurations: internally displaced persons (IDP), refugees, skilled
professional emigrants, clandestine migrants, nomads, labour migrants, and so on.
Distinctive forms and patterns of migration characterise the component SSA sub-regions
– including clandestine migration, which has increased across the sub-regions amidst
intensified migration restrictions (Adepoju 2008:5).
With on-going intractable civil wars throughout Africa’s quadrants, refugee
conditions have become increasingly protracted in the last ten years. The average stay of
a refugee or IDP in a host country is 17 years (Jacobsen 2002). This evolving reality has
made the character of encampment debates, fluctuating levels of assistance and apparent
impact on surrounding communities increasingly contentious. This inflow and long-term
presence of mixed migrants and refugees often portends infrastructural, social and
economic strains – particularly in the case of fragile host democracies (Kreibaum 2014:1;
Kaiser 2006:598).4
Intraregional migration is integral to broader political, economic, and social
narratives across the African continent and its sub-regions. The UNHCR’s annual report,
Global Trends: World at War, recently affirmed that global rates of forced displacement

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According to UNHCR, Sub Saharan Africa now “hosts more than 26 percent of the world’s
refugee population” (2016)

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were the highest recorded in known history (2016:5).5
These transnational patterns
present costs and benefits, and require integrated regional, national and local responses.
The form these responses take in localised contexts has crucial implications for accruing
benefits and human rights protection across sending, host and migrant communities
(Achiume and Landau 2015).
The African Union (AU) has adopted a range of political and legal instruments to
regulate forced and voluntary continental migration. These frameworks are guided by the
concept of African economic integration laid out in the Treaty Establishing the African
Economic Community (Abuja Treaty) – which has been ratified by over 54 AU Member
States since it came into force in 1994 (Achiume and Landau 2015; African Union 2016).
The Abuja Treaty pledges member States to take individual, bilateral or regional action to
ensure “the necessary measures in order to achieve the progressively free movement of
persons, and to ensure the enjoyment of the right of residence and the right of
establishment by their nationals within [the African Economic] Community” (African
Union 2002).
The NGO Working Group on Migration and Xenophobia for the World
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance
asserted that stark economic inequalities couple with social and economic
marginalization to cultivate xenophobic and racist tensions. Primary targets of these
tensions are those viewed as foreigners or outsiders: non-nationals, displaced persons,
asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants (ILO, IOM and OHCHR 2001:10).
However, the very presence of large numbers of perceived outsiders does not
categorically provoke racist or xenophobic response. Cross-country surveys on public
opinion confirm that fear and distrust of foreigners is actually strongest where the
proportion of immigrants is lowest. Along these seemingly counter-intuitive yet highly
informative lines, xenophobia is generally less pronounced in areas where immigrants are
successfully integrated into local society (ILO, IOM and OHCHR 2001:10).
Restrictive immigration policies portend greater xenophobic and racist response
to refugees and migrants through narrow governmental interpretations of (required)

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According to the report, “by the end of the year [2015], 65.3 million individuals were forcibly
displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or human rights
violations. This is 5.8 million more than the previous year (59.5 million)” (UNHCR 2016:2).

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refugee protection provisions, subsequent migrant reliance on clandestine routes of entry,
criminalisation and securitisation of illegal migrants, stigmatisation of legitimacy behind
refugee claims, and scapegoating of refugees and migrants as causes of ranging social ills
(ILO, IOM and OHCHR 2001:11).
This deliberate coupling of criminality and migration is particularly dangerous
because it tacitly condones xenophobic aggression. Media coverage and political
discourse connect migrants with transmission of commutable diseases, drugs and general
violent criminal tendencies that impose high-risk conditions upon local host populations.
The generalised categorization of irregular migrants as illegal is often rationalised along
terms of security and national identity, thereby obliquely marginalising migrants and
refugees from the protection and scope of the rule of law (ILO, IOM and OHCHR
2001:11).
The popular and official self-understanding of many States and societies remains
rooted in distinct historical and often mono-ethnic, mono-linguistic and mono-cultural
identities. Notional national identities thus stand in contradiction to the ramifications of
migrant and refugee influxes, whereby the populations of most societies and States
become increasingly diverse. Further, mono-ethnic and mono-cultural interpretations
inherently subordinate or disregard different ethnic or racial identities, traditions,
cultures, religious faiths, and national origins. The promotion of such narrowly conceived
identifications ignores (historical and changing) national realities and fuels exclusionary
xenophobic response to diversity and immigration (ILO, IOM and OHCHR 2001:11).
Different labels6
ascribed to socially aversive or violent behavioural patterns
reveal the multifaceted construction of social relationships, State institutions, and
citizenship (Fourchard and Segatti 2015:5). In Kenya and South Africa, official and
popular conceptions of “unregulated human mobility” abound with securitised
conceptions for human and economic stability, determined through “an individual’s
immutable geographic or cultural point of origin…[that] determine[s] insider or outsider

6
Patterns of violence against non-nationals in Sub Saharan Africa have ranged in codified
description and perception, along delineations of xenophobia, indigenous conflicts,
autochthonous conflicts, communal clashes, religious riots, ethnic cleansing, and so on

18
status.” Such stances are reinforced through local Malthusian fears7
legitimising urban
planners’ calculations of derailed social and political dynamics through uncontrolled
migrant mobility and “social mixing”. The right to territory is a crucial consideration
amidst such urban and rural calculations and presents a broad-based setting for
contentious political and social contestation (Landau and Misago 2009:102).
III. Link between xenophobia and fragile States in Sub Saharan Africa
For the purposes of this paper, I use a definition of fragility that facilitates practical
linkage between theoretical definition and empirical measures. The Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) broadly defines a fragile State as
follows: “A fragile state has weak capacity to carry out basic functions of governing a
population and its territory, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive and
reinforcing relations with society” (OECD 2011). A complementary definition elaborates
that fragility distinguishes States that are unable to provide economic opportunity and
security (Chauvet et al. 2010 & 2011). These conditions broadly condition the
fundamental roles of the fragile State to provide physical security and regulate private
economic activity (Hoeffler 2013:5).
It will prove relevant to consider this index of fragility in relation to South Africa,
Kenya and Uganda’s responses to refugees and the varying degrees of xenophobia that
arose because or despite it. The 2016 Fragile States Index ranks the countries from
“Warning” levels (South Africa) to “Alert” levels (Kenya and Uganda), with South
Africa among the eleven States that “Most Worsened” (globally) from 2015 to 2016
(Failed States Index 2016:6; 7; 11; 14).8
The Fund for Peace (2016) elaborates that while
South Africa has been “long heralded as an economic engine of Africa and certainly the
most developed nation on the continent, [it] is also demonstrating significantly worsening
trends in line with deepening political divisions and social unease, including protests and
civil disturbances” (18).

7
Malthusian fears (or the Malthusian check) are projections of deteriorated agricultural
conditions following exaggerated population growth (Landau and Misago 2009:102).
8
These rates follow recent rates refugee influx following on-going and worsening civil and
environmental crises in the region, social tension, demographic pressures, uneven economic
development, and economic decline (Failed States Index 2016:12).

19
Historically, times of economic depression negatively impact social cohesion and
spur resentment and xenophobic aggression towards outsiders (GMG 2009:1).9
Within
decidedly classed and cultural dimensions, Perbody (2009) elaborates that such
exclusionary practices trace back to nationalist narratives wherein visions of physical
bodies are partly distinguished through socio-territorial conceptions of who merits
inclusion (29).
Socio-cultural and economic inequalities are experienced by those accorded with
lesser levels of citizenship along legitimations of geo-political indigeneity, which flux
according to broader national and regional environments (Balaton-Chrimes 2015:4).
Engin Isin (2002) explains this social fluctuation along “logics of alterity”, underscoring
the mutable dynamic behind this practice of othering. Such exclusionary attitudes are not
discrete, but rather “deployed in degrees” against those perceived as outsiders, with the
qualification that “people can be Other at some points but not at others” (Balaton-
Chrimes 2015:8).
Related to this graduation, escalating migration pressures aggravate major domestic,
regional and international policy challenges, as States become more multi-ethnic, multi-
cultural, multi-lingual and multi-religious. These dilemmas challenge civil society and
government to accommodate and grow from this increased diversity whilst promoting
respect for human rights and peace (ILO, IOM and OHCHR 2001:I).
Migrants and refugees are particularly vulnerable to discrimination and
xenophobia. The extent of these phenomena is increasingly reflected in international,
intra-regional and local reports of discrimination and mistreatment of refugees, migrants
and other non-nationals. The progressively irregular and unauthorised nature of
international and intra-regional migration facilitates this exploitation and abuse.
Perceived outsiders still face high levels of discrimination following utilisation of legal
and authorised channels of migration (ILO, IOM and OHCHR 2001:I).
Such discriminatory processes operate in multi-tiered, mutually reinforcing
manners that are con-committed to governmental, political, multi-media, social, and
individual dynamics. According to the Global Migration Group’s (GMG) breakdown, at

9
Eric Hobsbawm (1996) argued that xenophobia was often the product of social transitions in the
form of “defence against the anxiety induced by the unknown” (24).

20
the population level, refugees and migrants are scapegoated for ranging social ills ranging
from unemployment rates and poor housing conditions to local and regional crime rates –
potentially instigating violent aggression towards migrants resulting in death. At the
workplace level, many States have “adopted labour market policies that encourage
employers not to hire foreigners and to lay off migrant workers first if necessary.” At the
trade union level, competition concerns have incentivised calls for restrictions on foreign
worker entry or for cancellation of migrant worker visas. At the government level, States
have sovereign discretion over admission policies, which hold extenuating implications
for economic return and human rights retention. At the multi-media level, the
dissemination of misinformation and mistrust surrounding asylum seekers, refugees and
migrants can warp national, racial and cultural stereotypes and contort popular
mentalities through tilting the scale of balanced representations concerning the
implications of refugee and mixed migrant influx (GMG 2009:1).
Throughout these levels, refugee influx invariably heralds increased societal
racial, ethnic and socio-cultural diversity to host States – along with the challenges that
come with accommodating individuals and collectives of different races, cultures,
languages and religions. This intersection requires economic, social, legal and political
mechanisms to safeguard “mutual respect and mediate relations across differences.”
Instead, according to a 2001 report undertaken by the International Labour Office (ILO),
International Office for Migration (IOM), and the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), xenophobic and racist policies and actions
often manifest in many societies that “have received substantial numbers of immigrants,
as workers or asylum seekers. In those countries the migrants have become the targets of
internal disputes about national identity. In [recent decades]…the emergence of new
nation states has often been accompanied by ethnic exclusion” (ILO IOM and OHCHR
2001:I).
Within this context, women and children are particularly vulnerable to general
and xenophobic abuse and exploitation. The double jeopardy of identifying as female and
foreign can hamper recourse to public authorities and legal remedies. The UN Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women underscored the warped role of authoritative
anti-immigration policies in branding trafficked women as culprits who merited sanction

21
rather than victims who deserved dignified response and protection (ILO, IOM and
OHCHR 2001:16-17).
The SSA situation surrounding women in general and migrant women in
particular can be markedly precarious given traditional exclusions from access to land
and credit. Such discriminatory practices range from the domestic to public sphere, and
collude to restrict vocational and social rights retention and actualisation. Traditional
gender roles and exclusionary practices in SSA have been challenged with the emergence
of migrant females as familial breadwinners. This changed dynamism in migration
decision-making impacts public policy orientation with particular socioeconomic, health
and education ramifications (Adepoju 2008: 3, 10, 27).
The hyper surveillance of women’s agency and bodies accompanies ethno-
nationalistic narratives and insider-outsider (re-)classifications. For example, in South
Africa, targeted violence against migrants and refugees is often legitimised through
protectionist blanket statements surrounding our women. This imagined duty to defend,
re-claim and protect South African women who portend to fall victim to foreign outsiders
assumes vacant agency on the part of the women and blanket criminality on the part of
the foreigner (Oketch 2015).
Challenges to accommodate diversified communities often come with distinct
increases in discrimination and violence against refugees and mixed migrants by
xenophobic and extremist individuals and groups. Though historically inadequate
research and documentation has confounded causal clarity between increased levels of
abuse and levels of reporting and exposure, there is sufficient anecdotal evidence to
demonstrate that human rights violations against refugees, mixed migrants and other non-
nationals are so widespread that they have become synonymous with contemporary
international migration (ILO, IOM and OHCHR 2001:I).
The extent of xenophobia and racial discrimination is further obscured through
official and unofficial reporting mechanisms in local and regional contexts. International
law defines racial discrimination as: “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference
based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect
of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on a equal footing, of

22
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, social, cultural or any other field
of public life” (ILO, IOM and OHCHR 2001:I).
Though xenophobia and racism are particular phenomena, there is significant
overlap. Racism commonly distinguishes difference upon variance in such physical
characteristics as facial features or skin coloration. Xenophobia derives from severe
perceptions of the other being foreign to that State or community. This perception
manifests in “intense dislike or fear of strangers or people from other countries” that
often rationalises perceived difference along racial indicators to distinguish the other
from the common national or local identity. This attitudinal hostility is not specifically
racial as many of its SSA manifestations are against individuals and groups of common
ancestry (ILO, IOM and OHCHR 2001:2).
However, such examples of xenophobic hostility can prove symptomatic of
deeper racist, cultural or territorial proclivities within the host society.10
As fundamental
liberal democratic ideals do not align with discriminatory or racist disparities and
policies, many States denote such phenomena as imperfections of national identity, while
tacitly scapegoating the non-nationals, refugees and mixed migrants. Additionally, this
official denial of racism concurrently blocks basis for anti-discrimination and anti-racism
legislation (Van Dijk 1996; ILO, IOM and OHCHR 2001:8).
One common multi-media and political message worldwide is that the influx of
refugees and mixed migrants can cause xenophobia in a host community. Such purported
positive correlations between xenophobia or racism and the presence of migration or
immigrants verge on suggesting that refugees and mixed migrants generate racism or
xenophobia. This reasoning increases perceived risks of the perceived outsiders and
contributes to stigmatized conceptions that misconstrue proportionality and fact (EUMC
1999; ILO, IOM and OHCHR 2001:11).

10
Idahosa and Vincent (2014) argue that overt episodes and patterns of xenophobic violence in
South Africa are constitutive of a continuum that encompasses discursive and institutional
practices of constructing foreign bodies, which hamper service delivery and rights actualization
of South African nationals – which are re-articulated as substratum for scapegoating mixed
migrants and refugees (102).

23
IV. (Perceived & Actual) Economic Impacts and Contributions of Refugee Presence
Mixed migration and asylum-seeking influxes present both costs and benefits for
origin and destination countries. Where origin nation households benefit from
remittances, destination nations often cite challenges to social peace, increased cultural
differences, threats to national security, lower wages and unemployment. Cross-country
economic analyses have found that these purported challenges vary in strength and that
increased diversification in the workforce benefits the country overall (World Bank 2006;
Hoeffler 2013:7).
Following the 2008 xenophobic violence in South Africa, the deputy regional
representative for the UNHCR, Sergio Calle Norena concluded that, “no society is
xenophobic by nature, these attacks were caused by lack of development”. This violence
was judged systemic of and endemic to post-Apartheid culture and incurred against
foreign and internal migrants amidst conditions of severe poverty and fractured social
cohesion.11
Political and economic considerations typically triggered the aggressive
behaviour under the overhead of questionable accountability and legitimacy of local,
national and sub-regional governance (Khamango 2010).
Protracted and extensive refugee influxes can hold macro-economic impacts on
the receiving State economy.12
Some of these impacts link to increases in public
expenditures for maintenance and care of refugee populations, which may be
undercompensated. A governmental report on the impact of refugees on Malawi’s
national public expenditure during the 1990s found that substantial indirect and direct
expenditures associated with refugees impacted “the scale of the government’s capital
investment in the social and infrastructural sectors. Direct and indirect costs for refugee
influxes were estimated at US$9.4 million for 1988 and US$8.4 million for 1989” (GoM
et al. 1990). Consequently, a UNHCR emergency assistance program was constructed to
guarantee that development projects addressed the needs of nationals and displaced in

11
According to Tara Polzer, Forced Migration Studies Programme researcher at the University of
Witwatersrand, this “violence against foreign nationals typically occurs in locals with high (but
not the highest) levels of economic deprivation, and high levels of language diversity (including
many South African and foreign languages)” (Khamango 2010).
12
The UN Refugee Agency “defines a protracted refugee situation as one in which 25,000 or
more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five or more years in a given
asylum country” (UNHCR 2016:20).

24
refugee hosting areas (Zetter 1995). This program involved significant expansions of
water supply, road networks, clinics and hospitals, and reforestation plans to mitigate
“environmental degradation of the fuel wood reserves” (Gomez and Christensen 2010:7).
Refugee presence can significantly impact environmental, economic and social
conditions of surrounding host populations, depending on relative population proportions
and socioeconomic conditions of individual households and districts. Through opening
access to services provided by donors and international aid to host and refugee
populations, the general quality and availability of services often elevates along with
increased competition and price valuation in the market. The flip-side of this is that the
increased population may deteriorate availability and quality of existing services, thereby
degrading general welfare of surrounding communities and individuals – and grounding
xenophobic distrust and aggression. Sudden inflow or general influx of refugees thus
significantly impacts popular perceptions of outsiders through stakeholder considerations
of access to state services (Kreibaum 2014:2-3).
An impact evaluation of refugee camps in Dadaab, Kenya estimated that the total
indirect and direct economic benefits of the general camp operation for the local national
community approximated “US$82 million in 2009 and [were]…projected to reach
US$100 million in 2010” (Nordic Agency for Development and Ecology 2010:9). Some
of these funds were apportioned to infrastructural investments that benefited the local
national community. Additionally, the Dadaab camp has since impacted local national
community trading opportunities, reduced commodity prices, and increased purchasing
power in local markets for pastoral products (livestock and milk). These positive
indicators are weighed down by the exhaustion of building materials and firewood and
competition for grazing land. Though the impact evaluation found the impact of refugees
from the Dadaab camp on the local host community to be mixed, it supported the claim
that refugee presence held more positive than negative impacts in the host area (Gomez
and Christensen 2010:7-8).
One significant positive contribution that refugees can offer destination States is
diversified knowledge and skills that can be harnessed for the benefit of local individuals
and communities. This potentiality manifests in many ways, and is further fuelled by
refugee access to transnational resources through remittances and social networks (Crisp

25
et al. 2009; Jacobsen 2002; Gomez and Christensen 2010:9). For example, Ugandan host
communities and self-settled refugees appear to acknowledge the refugee contributions to
local district and regional economies. Though local conflicts arise between individual
hosts and refugees over behaviour, resources and land around settlements, there has not
been a sustained pattern of generalised or systemic hostility towards refugees in these
areas (Kaiser 2006:607).
Merle Kreibaum of the Development Economics Research Group undertook a
2014 study that harnessed information from three waves (2002, 2005, 2010) of household
surveys to look at potential benefits from protracted refugee and internally displaced
person (IDP) presence in Uganda. She found that Uganda’s policy framework coupled
positively with Uganda’s long experience of hosting refugee populations and providing
for IDPs in comportments that benefitted the general population. Though the generally
positive effect was overlain with times of socioeconomic crises involving market
competition between host populations and refugees, she found these effects to be
economically small. She additionally suggested that non-governmental organisations and
private agencies took certain strains off the State in terms of education concerns
(Kreibaum 2014:3).
Though generally positive, one warning indicator Kreibaum advanced was that
host populations surrounding refugee settlements tended to harbour “more negative views
on their present economic situation and could feel more alienated from their central
government” (Kreibaum 2014:3). She found that people generally felt worse off in zones
with higher proportions of refugees, particularly if they abutted settlements. Though
resentment likely colours these feelings, an accurate picture therein is difficult without
adequately disaggregated data for waves of refugee and receiving communities
(Kreibaum 2014:19). It is problematic to view impact evaluations of refugees on national
populations and economic indicators in the context of winners and losers amidst the
refugee and host populations (Gomez and Christensen 2010:10).
Xenophobic narrative in South Africa is impacted by (relatively recent) systemic
efforts to maintain (relatively recent) privileged welfare state access to South African
nationals. As this welfare state was historically erected against Black South Africans who
struggled for decades for equal access and rights, the inflow of mixed migrants and

26
refugees pose a threat as potential beneficiaries (Monson 2015). However, exclusionary
welfare efforts by no means totally encapsulate the xenophobic discourse in South Africa
The growing urbanisation of refugees further congests poorly serviced and
densely populated environments, and strains tensions over resources (UNHCR 2009;
Gomez and Christensen 2010:10). Rising SSA unemployment in urban areas compounds
urban sector failings to properly integrate the rapidly expanding workforce. This lack of
constructive acquiescence has been further exaggerated in the past few decades by
unyielding structural adjustment measures (Adepoju 2008:5).
V. Relationship between sub-regional economic unions and heightened stimulation
of homogeneous societies
International, intra-regional and internal migration circuits for internally displaced
persons, refugees, clandestine migrants and economic migrants in Sub Saharan Africa
(SSA), occur within a range of economic, political and socio-ethnic contexts. According
to Adepoju (2008), “The formation of sub-regional economic unions to some extent
stimulated the kind of homogeneous societies which once existed in the sub-regions. In
all cases, variance, economic unions are often dominated by the economies of a single
country to which all movements of persons have been directed” (3). To date, most States
lack both synchronised programmes and policies, and relevant data to guide such policies
(Adepoju 2002).
Most composite SSA States are members of at least one regional or sub-regional
arrangement that pursues economic integration, cooperation or coordination among
member States. The African regional economic blocs range in developmental stage and
implemental degree within their regional arrangements, thereby promoting a spectrum of
political and socioeconomic considerations around physical infrastructure, environment,
intra-regional trade and socioeconomic policy coordination. Some of the unions
additionally cover public interest issues of public governance, security and defence
(Maruping 2005:129).
SSA States have notably pursued regional economic integration on the basis of
South-South cooperation, which followed the rejection of the New International

27
Economic Order (NIEO) proposal in the 1970s-1990s. In order to translate integration
aspirations into reality, States in the area have to function with a pragmatic
multilateralism that acknowledges regional agenda within local context (Maruping
2005:129-130).
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the South African
Development Community (SADC) are two crucial sub-regional organizations that play
significant roles in managing intra-regional mixed migration within socio-ethnic,
economic and political contexts. Despite wavering political support, overlapping
membership, border disputes, and poor transportation networks, these sub-regional
arrangements are central to the region’s integration into the global economy (Adepoju
2002).
This trans-topical merger at the crux of regional economic integration sprouts from
fundamental coordination between (and within) member States. Increasingly, regional
integration efforts have emphasised socioeconomic concerns as mutually beneficial lens
through which to harmonise economic policies and derive monetary unions. Other
important derivatives of integration include the diversification and expansion of market
size, promotion of intra-regional trade, and the free movement of factors of production -
thereby strengthening member States’ bargaining positions and cultivating political
stability and socioeconomic progress. The small size and fragmented nature of SSA State
economies necessitates competitive, multilateral engagement from regionalised
standpoints in effective negotiations for international market access, and against
marginalisation in the global arena (Maruping 2005:132).
Population-wide conditions of socioeconomic insecurity are aggravated by urban-
rural disparities, low-grade social services, and poor popular participation.13
While the
infrastructural amenities further strain with growing congestion of mixed migrants and
refugees in urban areas, social policies’ formulation and implantation often misalign with
national and international migration frameworks and development agendas. The
interrelations between social policy and migration splinter through popular responses and
relative capacities for sustainable development (Adepoju 2008:3-4).

13
These factors are further obscured by unreliable data available to trace patterns in social
indicators.

28
SSA social policy framework is framed around health, education and employment,
and measured by levels of human and social development indicated by life expectancy,
education, and income of the population. Regarding health, mixed migrants’ vulnerable
situation and restricted access to health services dramatically escalates their susceptibility
to health risks. Migrants generally face steeper challenges than other social groups to
accessing social services (and actualising their rights) due to contextual cultural dynamics
and discriminatory/restrictive policies and programmes in host States and societies.
Refugees and mixed migrants are not considered to be legitimate citizens, and so are
denied access to social and legal services and may be expelled when political and
economic conditions deteriorate. As intimated before, this legal and social vulnerability is
more pronounced for migrant and refugee females and often entails exclusion from credit
and land tenure policies (Adepoju 2008:3).
The strain placed upon development processes by spiralling population growth
roots back to patterns of internal, intra-regional and international SSA migration. Patterns
of intra-regional and international migration and asylum-seeking trajectories are coloured
through negative couplings between unemployment and labour force growth, and
persistent economic decline, erratic politics, environmental degradation and pervasive
poverty. Contradictory fiscal policies retrench workers in the public service, whilst
insufficiently (and unproductively) absorbing the bourgeoning young labour force into
the market (Adepoju 2008:5).
Poor education and health systems perpetuate pervasive poverty in the region,
forestalling economic growth and rates of human development (ILO, 2007). Structural
adjustment measures have exacerbated these poor conditions through removing subsidies
and inadvertently diminishing general welfare of families by further hampering access to
food, health, education and social services (Adepoju 1996).14
Amidst poor social and economic conditions, the family remains the primary
socialising agent in SSA society (Adepoju 2008:6). Though SSA societies are historically
hospitable to outsiders, this is increasingly not the case. Political leaders have
increasingly utilised region and ethnicity to reclassify refugees and migrants (and long-

14
Such cost-recovery strategies most notably impact the poor, partly through requiring families
to pay full price for education and health services (Adepoju 2008:6).

29
standing residents, as was the case in Cote d’Ivoire). This strategic identity
reclassification often aligns with periods of economic recession and often entails a highly
stigmatising strain that suggests criminal intention or conduit potential for such
commutable diseases as HIV/AIDS15
(Adepoju 2003). In South Africa, politicians and
press fanned public discontent surrounding mixed migrants and refugees through
portrayals of immigrants as culprits of labour exploitation, drug abuse and crime –
determinedly wedging a wall between nationals and non-nationals, and aggravating calls
for nationalist supremacy and non-national expulsion (Adepoju 2008:7).
By degree, the construction of sub-regional economic unions stimulated the strain
of homogeneous societies conceived by these mono-ethnic nationalist visions. These
unions are often dictated by the economies of a single country to which migratory
trajectories have been directed: Congo in CEPGL, Nigeria in ECOWAS, Cote D’Ivoire in
CEAO, Gabon in UDEAC, and RSA and Botswana in SADC. The prosperity of these
resource-rich but labour-short countries to a large extent was built upon migrant labour,
yet continues to place primacy upon notional national mono-ethnic identities (Adepoju
2008:11).16
The AU has adopted a range of political and legal mechanisms to regulate forced
and voluntary intra-regional and international migration. These frameworks are guided by
the conception of African economic integration inscribed in the Treaty Establishing the
African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty) (Achiume and Landau 2015). Ratified by
over 54 AU member States and implemented in 1994, the Abuja Treaty obligates member
States on individual, bilateral and regional bases to take “the necessary measures, in order
to achieve progressively the free movement of persons, and to ensure the enjoyment of
residence and the right of establishment by their nationals within [the African Economic]
Community” (African Union 2002; African Union 2016).
The 1994 Abuja Treaty laid out expected building blocks for the African
Economic Community, and notably underscored the free movement of persons within
ECOWAS and adoption of an ECOWAS passport as a symbol of intraregional
(borderless) solidarity (Adepoju 2007). In the SADC, the 1997 protocol on Free

15
This was the case in Botswana and South Africa.
16
This was the case with regard to forestry and oil fields in Gabon and mines and agriculture in
South Africa (Adepoju 2008:1).

30
Movement of Persons was repeatedly revised to integrate a range of objections from
member States – particularly South Africa. The amended protocol on the Facilitation of
Movement of Persons reduced visa-free entry periods and enabled member States to
reserve authority on bilateral agreements on conditions restricting immigrant entry with
other States (Oucho and Crush 2001; Adepoju 2008:11).
The multi-dimensional nature of AU policy on migration, intra-regional labour
regulations and asylum procedures, impacts relative access to social services and
official/casual exclusionary practices (Mkandawire 2001; Adepoju 2008:11). Given
significant barriers to accessing social and legal services and to actualising fundamental
rights, mixed migrants and refugees are unaware of (and have not been informed of) their
rights, are hesitant to claim them given how they are scapegoated for ranging social ills
amidst socioeconomic deterioration – or are simply unaccustomed to the social services
available (Adepoju 2008:12-13). By 2016, only 48 countries have ratified the
International Convention on Protection of the Rights of Migrants and Members of their
Families, and only 38 have actually signed the convention. Of these, 25 SSA countries
(mostly migrant sending countries in West Africa) have ratified the convention (United
Nations 2016).
Sub-regional economic unions that provided for the establishment of rights and
free flow of skilled labour in member countries could further facilitate intra-regional
labour kinesis and self-reliant regional development. Intra-regional and national
socioeconomic recovery in SSA depends significantly on developing resolutions to
enduring economic and social malaise, and the mobilisation of resources to mitigate
impact of and response to mixed migration and asylum-seeking influxes (Adepoju
2008:14).
VI. Analysis of international and legal mechanisms in place and their limitations in
the face of practical marginalisation of mixed migrants from rule of law
With increasingly protracted and intractable civil wars, the situation of refugees
worldwide necessitates stable, integrated solutions for refugees and host populations.
Protracted refugee situations have increased dramatically in the last ten years, with
refugees living in tenuous, prolonged uncertainty for an average of 17 years (Jacobsen

31
2002). Refugee policies had an emergency aid connotation for a long time that oriented
service delivery towards encampment and quick repatriation. This shifted in 2005 when
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) switched general policy
towards local integration following analysis of the evolved refugee situations around the
world (UNHCR 2005). In a background note to the 2011 World Development Report, the
World Bank Group also noted the particular development challenge that refugees posed
for neighbouring countries (Puerto Gomez and Christiansen 2010).
Though increasingly porous, State borders continue to embody regional and local
tensions between nationalist protectionism and capitalistic expansionism. Immigration
legislation establishes the substratum of sovereign State reception and integration
management and mitigation. These span preventative border controls and intra-territorial
management, and are often suffused with a range of “legitimising narratives” (Idahosa
and Vincent 2014:96). In South Africa, for example, the African National Congress’
policy of Peace and Stability directs efforts at the Home Affairs’ directive to manage
public identity and immigration. This navigation of “territorial integrity and internal
security” arguably enabled practical and political xenophobia – despite the central policy
reference (in that same document) of internationalism in South Africa’s relationship with
the rest of the continent and world (Oketch 2015).
Similarly, Kenyan immigration laws have solidified the above tensions through
recent labour restrictions and classifications of identity cards in Northern Kenya (Oketch
2015). According to Rawlence (2016), Kenyan police routinely destroy refugee alien
certificates so as to effectively cripple legal mobility and documentation as part of a
broader effort to contain all refugees to regionalised settlements. He underscores that “the
transformation from legitimate, protected refugee, to undocumented immigrant at risk of
instant deportation was often just as fast as that” (226). Manby (2016), of the Migration
Policy Institute, explains that individuals without identity documents are then unable to
use regular (legal) channels to cross international borders, and arguably, “as requirements
to show identification multiply, a person without a recognised nationality is increasingly
unable to function in the modern world” (1). The UNHCR has located the highest amount
of undocumented individuals in Sub Saharan Africa, and has stressed that such people are
predominantly among the more marginalised ethnic groups and migrant communities.

32
These communities are at risk of statelessness, Manby (2016) contends, not only as the
result of discriminatory practices and ineffective administrative arrangements, but also
through ethno-territorial laws, which restrict localised transmissions of rights.
Such xenophobic legal proclivities are not new in Kenya or South Africa. The
May 2008 xenophobic violence in South Africa underscored inherent political incapacity
to protect and provide for the State’s range of residents. This inability sparks questions
concerning actual control on street and district levels, and what that ostensibly suggests
more broadly of contemporary SSA societies and States. Protection concerns orient back
to colonially engendered notions of territory and associated economic and political
privileges that have facilitated exclusionary “discourses of indigeneity”. Contradictory
conceptions between political and socioeconomic (national or universal) rights entangle
with conditions surrounding ethno-territorial origin and (current) geo-political habitus.
Whether conditions ensue under national boundaries or around naturalised frontiers,
resultant xenophobic conflict varies along perspectives of access to institutional and
social policies amidst extensive displacement and economic disenfranchisement (Landau
and Misago 2009:100).
Along this vein, the Ugandan government advocated local refugee integration and
merged public services for host and displaced populations with its Refugee Act of
2009/10, through a vision of refugee economic self-reliance and mutual socioeconomic
advantage. The Refugee Act denoted social and economic integration, but notably
excluded legal integration (Fielden 2008). This led to two associated but particular
challenges for Uganda and the international community to resolve: providing long-term
development support and emergency aid whilst concurrently transitioning from one to the
other. Basic health, education and social service delivery proved at risk given sensitive
economic dynamics and tight public budgetary constraints (Kreibaum 2014:1-2).
Traditionally, Uganda preferred settlement to encampment strategies to host
refugees. The government adopted the so-termed Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) in 1999 to
transition “refugee support from relief to development.” Though initially planned for
displaced Sudanese in the West Nile region, it extended across the whole country and
provided incoming refugees with allotments of “non-food items, a plot of land as well as
seeds and food rations for two to four seasons until they are supposed to be self-reliant,

33
i.e., economically independent from food aid.” In 2004, the Development Assistance for
Refugee-Hosting Areas (DAR) programme supplanted the SRS (Clark 2008). Next came
the 2006/09 Refugee Act which became a standard for Africa in its affirmation of
refugees’ rights to free movement, labour and residence around the country – as opposed
to distinct areas. Though this enhanced national agency of refugees, Kaiser (2006)
explains that it was constrained by the stipulation that to receive further UNHCR
assistance, refugees needed to reside in settlements that were generally in marginal,
remote areas with problematic market access. While State and international actors often
neglected self-settled refugees in urban sectors, the Refugee Act did attempt to integrate
displaced persons into local districts through removing inefficient parallel health and
education systems.17
Dryden-Peterson and Hovil (2004) contend that notwithstanding perceived popular
injustice from local host populations debating potential competition with refugees over
scarce resources and watching World Food Programme (WFP) trucks enter settlement
structures, the host population did benefit in local and national ways from refugee
integration. Though faced with widespread disjunctures between refugee assistance
structures and district development structures, in Uganda’s Kibanda district, nearly half
of the assistance was provided by UNHCR to the Kiryandongo area around the refugee
settlement so as to mitigate possible resentment at refugee influx by the local population.
The UNHCR supported the Ugandan government commitment to including the national
population on budgeting and service provision considerations in the general effort of
mitigating xenophobic response and conflict. Though contradictory views persist among
the local population who maintain that refugees strain existing and scarce resources, aid
and government agencies counter that the elevated quality of health and education
services and infrastructures in rural Uganda would likely not exist were it not for the
refugee influx (IOM 2013; Kreibaum 2014:7)
The main source of contention between host and refugee populations in SSA seems to
be resources – most particularly land. When refugees began to come in the 1960s and
1990s, populations were relatively small so providing the displaced with means for

17
Oftentimes, surrounding populations benefited from the superior quality of the integrated
service provision, which was generally better than (past) local equivalents (Kreibaum 2014:6).

34
agricultural development and settlement was popularly seen as constructive cultivation of
underutilised land (Jacobsen 2001). Since then, both receiving and refugee populations
have grown significantly and land has become an increasingly scarce commodity
(Kreibaum 2014:7), supporting Engin Isin’s “logics of alterity” (Isin 2002).
Uganda and Tanzania are remarkably divergent in political policies and reforms on
refugee status and rights. Both countries have long histories of hosting refugees and
providing for internally displaced persons. Though Tanzania originally advocated
integration and economic self-reliance for Burundian refugees in 1972, the 1993/4 influx
overlaid State economic and infrastructural capacity and led to official restriction of
refugee movement to a 4 km radius around the camp. Uganda countered this restrictive
response through attempting to enhance refugee rights and capacities to work and settle
around the country. Kreibaum asserts that this divergence means that, “the impact of
refugees in Uganda is likely to be more pronounced and lasting than the short-term,
isolated shock in Tanzania” (2014:5).
The difficulties of regulating migration whilst promoting State, human and economic
security are not particular to SSA. The challenge of “balancing domestic immigration
realities with integration aspirations” is a transnational phenomenon, but also presents the
AU and its SSA member States with particular operational and cultural considerations
and complications. As with other regions in the world, policy responses deeply coloured
by State security concerns have neither effectively prevented terrorism nor criminality,
but have instead festered organised crime along border regions and human rights abuses
throughout State boundaries. Along with general labour exploitation and social
stigmatisation, such securitised policies additionally hamper cross-border trade in Sub
Saharan Africa (Achiume and Landau 2015).
The AU has adopted policies that provide a normative framework for promoting the
intra-regional and international flow of people in Africa – and for the essential
protections due to the migrants and refugees outside of their respective States. Though
AU migration policies are flexible to the spectrum of circumstances within and across the
sub-regions, they arguably provide inadequate concrete frameworks for protecting the
rights of mixed migrants and refugees. One example of this is the conflict “between
aspirational goals of portable rights within the context of regional integration and the

35
socioeconomic and political realities of AU member States.” This is applies to the AU’s
vision of social integration – and the dearth of both empirically based guidance for
achieving this integration in complicated domestic contexts, and of monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms. There are few incentivising mechanisms to encourage adoption
of progressive political and economic policies that facilitate safe migration, reception and
integration. Narrow interventions (such as civic education) have not effectively countered
xenophobia, and have often (inadvertently) regionalised forms of response through lack
of synchronised, expansive attention to fundamental dignity and portable rights of
migrants and refugees. Progressive reforms to immigration policy, service delivery and
infrastructural development are threatened by securitised agendas in SSA and across AU
member States. Contemporary political climate in Sub Saharan Africa calls for advocates
for migrants and refugees to complement campaigns for immigration reform with
context-specific considerations concerning conflict resolution, labour, urbanisation, local
government, policing and rule of law (Achiume and Landau 2015).
The AU’s approach to internal, intra-regional and international migration is laid out
in two policy documents: the 2006 African Common Position on Migration and
Development (African Common Position), and the 2006 Migration Policy Framework for
Africa. Achiume and Landau (2015) explain that these documents frame aspirational
guidelines governing how member States should regulate migrant access and what basic
rights the immigrants are due within State boundaries. Though AU member States are not
bound by either policy document, they do still highlight AU member States’ compulsions
“to comply with legally binding migration-specific regional and international law.” This
extends to the two AU treaties governing involuntary migration: the Organisation of
African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa, and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally
Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) (Achiume and Landau 2015).
Of the two central AU policy documents, the Migration Policy Framework is
more comprehensive. It addresses nine thematic migration concerns: inter-State
cooperation and partnerships, migration and development, migration data, internal
migration, human rights, forced displacement, irregular migration, border management,
and labour migration. It further lays out policy recommendations for AU member States

36
and their component Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Though it doesn’t
articulate social cohesion to be one of the core migration concerns, the Migration Policy
Framework prioritises migrant integration into host communities and broad humanitarian
principles of migration in AU member States’ regulatory and practical agendas and
practices (African Union Executive Council 2006, Article 41-42; Achiume and Landau
2015).
The African Common Position and the Migration Policy Framework both “locate
humanitarian principles of migration in international human rights law” (Achiume and
Landau 2015). For example, the Migration Policy Framework promotes member State
adoption of inter- and intra-State policies to protect human rights of migrants, whilst
“harmonising national legislation with international convention” in the general effort to
integrate migrants into host societies with dignity and due protection and “foster mutual
acceptance” (African Union Executive Council 2006, Article 25; Achiume and Landau
2015).
AU migration policy frameworks invoke broad ambitions for internal, intra-
regional and international solidarity across the continent and within its sub-regions
through positively linking migration and integration to development. The flexible
frameworks recognise the variance across the sub-regions and assign significant agency
to AU member States and RECs to adopt policies that align with the progressive AU
vision. Though appropriately ambitious, the frameworks have fundamental limitations.
As neither the Migration Policy Framework nor the African Common Position entail
dedicated institutional instruments for monitoring and guiding AU member State
compliance, the member States can’t be held completely responsible within the
parameters of the frameworks – and even the member States that are committed to
implementing the articulated guidelines must endeavour to do so without support and
guidance from the AU (Achiume and Landau 2015).
Though the Migration Policy Framework and the African Common Position
underscore the primacy of the human rights framework to effective migrant social
integration and promotion of wellbeing of refugee and host communities, the policies
offer insufficient evidence-based guidelines for concrete policy solutions that could
succour member State capacity to adopt a human rights lens across appropriate policy

37
response. Tension between aspirational human rights and civic education efforts to
stimulate social cohesion run into practical implementation obstructions because of
political and socioeconomic drivers of xenophobic discrimination and aggression
This tension is not particular to AU sub-regional migration policy concerns and
international policy and human rights mechanisms’ ineffectual connection of human
rights and concrete policy mechanisms. The AU Migration Policy Framework has
explicitly acknowledged potential political opposition to policies that promote migrant
access to services, territory and markets – and even that such push-back is likely to
increase in coming years. Efforts to facilitate information exchange and trade programs
across the continent have faced serial politics of closure regarding migration concerns.
The framework further notes the perceived conflict between national security and migrant
rights, and the need for inter- and intra-state balanced consideration and synchronicity
with international norms and standards. Ascendant securitised agendas suggest, however,
that the AU needs to “more firmly reinforce member states’ commitments to the welfare
of migrants” through explicitly articulating the synergies between national security,
social cohesion and migrant welfare (Achiume and Landau 2015).
The cocktail of securitisation and decentralisation further necessitates efforts to
reform immigration policy. Given the increasingly horizontal and localised deliberations
of migrant rights with local and neighbouring authorities, there is potential for
constructive local response amidst increasingly restrictive national policies. This
potentiality draws from linking potential to work outside starkly politicised discussions of
international migration through promoting localised policies that facilitate access to
security and services for migrants and refugees without making them focal points of
contentious political debate. Current research in southern Africa, for example, denotes
benefits from bureaucratic negotiations over rights claims for immigrant access to health
services. Correspondingly, the research indicates that appealing to local officials’
penchant for boosting tax revenues can enable access to employment and housing for
migrants and refugees more effectively than appeals to inclusive development or rights
claims (Achiume and Landau 2015).

38
In sum, growing influxes of mixed migrants and asylum-seekers into fragile and
fractured political economies across SSA require comprehensive immigration policies
that acknowledge broader issues around regional and sub-regional governance and
monitoring, cross-sectoral and international policy harmonisation and incentive structures
for AU member State compliance with general migration, labour and refugee policy
VII. Fractured responses: the chasm between perception and reality
In the 1980s, Archbishop Desmond Tutu would make speeches wherein he would
chuckle deprecatingly of the Apartheid development of referring to Black South Africans
as foreign natives, given the socio-linguistic claim that they were not actually South
Africans but rather Transkeians or Bophutatswanans. This contradiction in terms and
basic logic adhered to warped reasoning regarding grounds for state citizenship that
equated citizenship conceptions with indigeneity whilst drawing pronounced distinctions
between existing, transient and new populations. This identity reclassification
demonstrates continuity of xenophobic response and State complicity in manufactured,
endemic socio-cultural renderings (Neocosmos 2010: ix).
Xenophobia undermines human rights observance, good governance, peaceable
coexistence and social cohesion through deliberately drawn distinctions of otherness (or,
rather, through othering) (Crush and Pendleton 2004:1). Peter Geschiere (2009) found
such autochthonous tendencies to be particularly marked in Africa with the primacy
placed upon attachments to soil and origins. He explains that regionalised exclusive and
territorial proclivities often escalate to violence – which is often legitimated through local
conceptions of what is considered to be right at citizen and local governmental levels
(Balaton-Chrimes 2015:4-5). Increasingly, discussions “local beneficiation” underlying
economic development policies in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) focus on circumstances
where local property development or infrastructure projects portend to benefit locals over
others – thereby opening the floor for intractable definitions of who exactly is local
within relative socio-political considerations. These policies often fuel autochthonous and
xenophobic tendencies (Bolay 2014; Fourchard and Segatti 2015:7).

39
Since democratisation, Uganda’s political system has stressed decentralisation
and delegated public policy decision-making to the district level (the so-termed LC5
level). As a result, refugee dynamics are largely regionalised and negotiations regarding
service provision are markedly district-specific (Kaiser 2006:601; Kreibaum 2014:13).
These district-specific provisions and dynamics appear to have harmonised legal and
political aspirations with human and State security concerns. Kaiser (2006) explains that
though the local host communities and refugee populations have not always been entirely
peaceable, there has not been a systematic pattern of hostility towards the refugees (607).
A survey undertaken by the 2004 Southern African Migration Project found that
citizens across the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region inflated
numbers of non-nationals in their countries to support the claim that migrants and
refugees within the region were a problem rather than an opportunity – and to broadly
scapegoat the non-nationals for ranging social ills (Crush and Pendleton 2004:1).18
Widespread xenophobic intolerance appears to be a progressive bi-product of the ANC’s
nation-building efforts to transcend past divides and to harmonise national, regional and
local social cohesion. South Africa’s reconceived parameters for citizenship are
rationalised through construction of a new other – the alien. Xenophobic discontent and
aggression has intensified since 1994, escalated to violent degree in 2008, and resurged in
2015. Violent aggression against non-nationals, mixed migrants and refugees has become
increasingly common with engorged demagogic divisions based on suspicion and
hostility (Crush and Pendleton 2004:4).
These sentiments are historically situated. The Apartheid era saturated individual
and district habitual security concerns with volatile vertical (state versus citizens) and
horizontal (citizens versus citizens) threats of ethno-territorial violence (Hamber 1999).
The peaceful political transition from Apartheid did not effectively cull these threats as
on-going economic and social insecurity and exploitive policing tactics have effectively
perpetuated culturally situated and coercive means of dominance in local political and

18
The intensity of these unfounded feelings varied between States, but the survey found the
“harshest sentiments” expressed in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa – whereas, the citizens
of Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Swaziland were more comfortable with the presence of non-
nationals (Crush and Pendleton 2004:1).

40
socio-ethnic dynamics in South Africa’s districts and towns.19
The culture of impunity in
South Africa is palpable around legitimation behind and reaction to xenophobic violence,
thereby perpetrating popular perceptions of ostensible control and insider-outsider rights
differentiations (Landau and Misago 2009:103-104).
Such cultural and institutional legacies engrain “technologies of alienage” that
fester and reinforce marginalisation through ethno-nationalistic and territorial
conceptions of rights. This pattern cultivates aggressive “nativist revivalism” – as seen in
Kenya and South Africa. The xenophobic violence in South Africa derives largely from
localised, decentralised politics in micro efforts to appropriate local authority over
economic and political means. These disjointed, localised xenophobic aggressions were
originally fuelled by poor economic conditions and enabled by absence of strong central
leadership.20
In this context, self-appointed parallel leadership operated with little push
back from local government arrangements, and further marginalised migrants and
refugees as scapegoats for social ills brought about by historically fractured political and
economic systems (Landau and Misago 2009:104-105).
Though South Africa is commonly highlighted for xenophobic aggression
towards migrants and refugees, the Uhuru Kenyatta administration in Kenya has reacted
with extreme measures to an equally violent wave of Al Shabaab gun attacks, bombings
and kidnappings in Garissa, Dadaab, Nairobi and Eastleigh in a manner that determinedly
disseminates xenophobic anti-Islam and anti-Somali sentimentalities (Oketch 2015).21
Both sides claim the title of victim, with fatalities wracking up entire refugee populations
at risk in the balance.
Historically, Kenyan politics have been dominated by local level dynamics. In its
annual report on Kenya, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) maintains that,
“Kenya is one of the most unequal countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which is reflected in

19
According to Schutte (2000), the socio-political transformation following Apartheid shifted
racialised social and political capital but didn’t alter the entrenched exclusionary practices and
primacy of indigeneity in South Africa (207).
20
This notably juxtaposes with Ugandan Big Man politics, which though markedly less
democratic in make up, have more effectively harmonized socio-legal and economic aspirations
with localized migration integration realities.
21
So doing, the Kenyan government has arguably hindered national capacity to cohesively
respond to the stability and security threat.

Dissertation.SID_1559752

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