1. After Action Review
Training Division and AAR Committee
Structure Fire:
921 Green Star Dr.
Regency Apartments
Alarm #1927196
May 24, 2019
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For Questions Contact: Lt. Bryan Lynch

2. 921 Green Star Drive
After Action Review
Overview
 First Alarm Companies – E13, E4, E5, E11, T4, T9,
T19, BC1, BC2 and AMR 14.
 Working Alarm Companies – R17, S11, BC3, HM6.
 Second Alarm Companies – E3, E2, T8, FPE 101B,
MCOM.
 The building is an 11 story apartment complex that
houses mostly elderly residents.
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3. 921 Green Star Drive
After Action Review
Overview
 Initial Report From Dispatch – Fire on the carpet on
the 10th floor.
 Dispatch Update – Multiple calls for service as well
as an automatic fire alarm activation in the building.
 Initial Size-up –
 E13 observed smoke and flames from the 10th
floor and declared a “Working Fire” and
initiated the high rise procedure.
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4. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Overview
 E13 established their own water supply
and hooked up to the standpipe.
 E13 established the south stairwell as
the “Attack” stairwell and the north
stairwell as the “Evacuation” stairwell.
 E4 officer assumed Lobby Control.
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5. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Layout of Fire Apartment
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6. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review6
Video
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within the activity below.

7. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review7
Video Links
Please watch the video links
embedded within the activity below.

8. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Strengths
 “Working Fire” declared early in the incident (TacOp
300.01 Structure Fire Response III C 1).
 First arriving officer announced that the “High Rise
Procedure” would be followed early in the incident
(TacOp High-Rise Fires 300.09 I A).
 First due company (E13) clearly designated the Attack
stairwell and the Evacuation stairwell (TacOp 300.09
High Rise Fires H b iii).
 Fire was extinguished 15 minutes after arrival of the
first company.
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9. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Strengths
 The Incident Command System (TacOp 200.01 Command
Procedures) was established early and efficiently with the
establishment of groups and divisions.
 Groups included:
 Vent –T8/E1
 Salvage – E16
 Medical – Captain Lynch/AMR
 Divisions included:
 9th – E16 (later Salvage Group)
 10th – BC3 with S11/E4/E13/E5
 11th – Capt Vaughan with E11/E3/E2
 Charlie – 73 with T19/T8
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10. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Strengths
 Command requested a 3rd alarm early to address the
fatigue first and second alarm companies.
 Five rescues were made (four via aerial ladder);
four from the 10th and one from the 11th floor.
 10th floor – Alpha side, one apartment north of
the fire area (via interior stairwell) and three
from the Charlie side multiple apartments
away from the fire’s location.
 11th floor – Alpha side, one party two
apartments north of the fire on the floor above.
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11. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Strengths
 Shelter-in-place was effective for the fire
floor and floors below.
 All occupants who were informed to shelter-
in-place left on their own throughout the
incident. Only one occupant was assisted out
of the building by E4 and AMR because they
were non-ambulatory.
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12. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Strengths
 Command integrated DFM personnel, Human
Resources (Staging Officer), Medical Division
(Med Group sup) and PIO (Division 10) to
supplement operational efforts.
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13. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Strengths
 Medical group was established early utilizing
the CSFD Med Division and AMR (three in
staging at any given time) providing patient
care and transport, early notification of
hospitals, and transportation of displaced
residents to Cheyenne Mountain High School.
 Medical Group treated 12 people, with three
transported to the hospital.
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14. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Lessons Learned
 Although the High-Rise Procedure was declared, it was not completely followed.
 E13 established their own water supply using DE13 and FF13. This deviation
from the High-Rise Procedure and was done because of preplanning and
training by E13. Due to the building’s proximity to Station 13, it was
determined that E13 could establish a water supply, connect to standpipe, recon,
and establish a Fire Attack Group before the arrival of the next company.
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15. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Lessons Learned
 Although the High-Rise Procedure was declared, it was not completely followed. (continued)
 E13, E4, and T4 were Fire Attack One. E13 declared the south stairwell as the Attack stairwell
and ascended prior to all of the Fire Attack One crews joining together. This led to E4 and T4
ascending the north (Evacuation) stairwell rather than the Attack stairwell.
 This is not normal operating procedure during high-rise operations and should be avoided
because it delays the establishment of recon, fire attack, and rescue.
 If the first due company identifies a situation that requires deviation from our policies, the
first arriving officer must clearly communicate their actions to the other responding crews.
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16. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Lessons Learned
 Following TacOp 300.09 High-Rise Fires III H 1 b iii, E13 declared the
south stairwell as the Attack stairwell and the north stairwell as the
Evacuation stairwell.
 Companies assigned to Fire Attack One (E4 and T4) accessed the
fire floor via the north stairwell.
 The north stairwell was easier to locate.
 Companies who were unfamiliar with the building had a hard
time locating the south stairwell access.
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17. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Lessons Learned
 With the exception of the two person Recon Team, Fire Attack One
companies should congregate in the lobby and ascend to the fire
floor together to ensure continuity for hose lines and personnel.
 Prior to the establishment of Lobby Control, consider leaving one
person in the lobby to direct companies to the attack staircase.
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18. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Lessons Learned
 Command declared shelter-in-place procedures for the 8th floor
and below. Dispatch, however, initiated an emergency
evacuation call to the residents in the building advising them to
evacuate the structure. This led to confusion for both residents
and fire fighters.
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19. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Lessons Learned
 The Incident Commander assigned multiple radio “Incident Sets” without
requesting them from dispatch as required by TacOp Communication Procedures
100.01 II B 5 a.
 While an incident of this magnitude will require multiple Incident Sets, the
Incident Commander should always request them from Dispatch prior to
assigning companies, groups, or divisions to communicate on them.
 The Incident Commander will also require an individual at the Command
Post to monitor each channel to ensure critical information is relayed to and
from the Incident Commander effectively. MCOM was dispatched on the
second alarm and responded with entire crew from Station 22. They arrived
at 1216 hrs. and were released at 1318 hrs.
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20. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Lessons Learned
 Companies assigned to run the Rehab Unit did not have enough bottled water to
meet the needs of both fire fighters and civilians.
 Every apparatus carries bottled water and Clif-type bars which can and should
be utilized if needed by those assigned to run Rehab.
 On warmer days, Squads should carry an extra case of water.
 Additional resources can be ordered through Command or their designee.
 Command requested a second alarm from dispatch.
 Per TacOp 300.09 II B 2 d, a second alarm is automatically dispatched when
the fire is declared a “Working High-Rise Fire”.
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21. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Lessons Learned
 Three civilians were rescued via aerial ladder from the fire floor.
While the rescues were successful, removing civilians (especially
elderly civilians) via aerial ladder should be a last resort.
 Fire fighters should first consider sheltering-in-place to include
shutting doors and windows and evacuating residents to exterior
balconies prior to using aerial ladders to remove them.
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22. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Please Review
TacOp 100.01 Communication Procedures
TacOp 200.01 Command Procedures
TacOp 300.02 Fireground Strategy
TacOp 300.04 FDC Connections
TacOp 300.05 Truck Company Operations
TacOp 300.09 High-Rise Fires
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23. Training Division and AAR Committee
After Action Review
Please Review
What issues were faced during this incident that relate to the NIOSH 5 and how
could they have been mitigated?
The NIOSH 5 –
Improper Risk Assessment
Lack of Incident Command
Lack of Accountability
Inadequate Communications
Lack of SOPs or failure to follow established SOPs
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