1. Laurence E. Horton
MSc in Risk, Crisis and Disaster Management
Institute for Lifelong Learning
Civil Safety and Security Unit
University of Leicester
Intake September 2012
Dissertation
07 September 2014
PERCEPTIONS OF RISK ASSOCIATED WITH
INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL
Are lay decisions related to risk informed by expert
conceptions of reality?
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2. PERCEPTIONS OF RISK ASSOCIATED WITH
INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL
Are lay decisions related to risk informed by expert
conceptions of reality?
Laurence Horton
Abstract
This study has been carried out to establish to what degree risk perception and decision-
making of lay persons is informed by experts. International travel acted as a proxy from
which to further generalise. This study' primary objective was to examine the
effectiveness of expert communication of data related to travel risks by establishing
how strongly lay estimations of risk correlate with such data. This comparison
established how much experts inform public risk perception and acted as a metric to
compare against survey data regarding lay attitudes to expert informants. The
secondary objectives were to discover to what degree laymen engage with expert
advice and if they feel sufficiently informed in their decision-making. Together these
objectives allow an insight as to how functional the relationship between laymen and
experts is. Cross-referencing this data allowed further insight into whether people make
counter-rational decisions related to risk despite being informed by experts. This study
will show that despite perceiving travel as riskier than the actuality and generally
engaging with experts who would inform such pessimistic rationality, most people do
not use expert advice to inform decision-making. Previous studies have approached risk
perception of international travel by focusing on the ‘why' and 'what' of the decision
making process rather than the degree decision-making may deviate from rational
choices that experts advocate. As most risk perception research is highly quantitative
and questioned in terms of social validity, this research considers social contexts related
to lay perceptions and constructions of risk and how these change when in conflict with
expert conceptions of reality. This study' framework may allow for more general
insights into the relationship between laymen and experts regarding risks and decision-
making.
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3. Contents
1. Introduction - Modern mans informed and logical decision making process? ….4
2. Literature Review and Conceptual Framework - An informed society with
contempt for the informers………………………………………………………11
3. Research Methodology - Seeing science in the subjective decision making
Process…………………………………………………………………………...32
4. Results, findings and analysis - An illogical and dysfunctional relationship
with the logic of the scientific community…and our own………………………43
5. Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research - A need to
reconnect to quantitative truths and logic to educate and inform better
decision making………………………………………………………………….62
Appendices…………………………………………………………………………….70
Appendix 1 - Survey Invitation Email…………………………………………70
Appendix 2 - Informed Consent Form…………………………………………71
Appendix 3 - Online Survey (including raw data)……………………………..72
Appendix 4 - Presentation of Results…………………………………………..80
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………..110
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4. 1. Introduction
Modern mans informed and logical decision making process?
The purpose of this study is to establish to what degree risk perception and
decision making of lay persons is informed by experts and provide an insight into how
effective current risk communication strategies are in influencing behaviour. As most
risk perception research is highly quantitative and questioned in terms of social validity,
this research considers social contexts related lay perceptions and constructions of risk
and how these change when in conflict with expert conceptions of reality. It is the
responsibility of experts who expect our deference to not only provide the public with
information on day-to-day risks but also to ensure and maintain a healthy
communicative relationship with lay persons. This study will give some indication as to
whether modern society makes people less susceptible to risks due to expertly sourced
knowledge in the public domain, or whether people act autonomously regardless of the
availability of such knowledge. Validating if lay decisions related risk may be
disconnected from expert advice is important as more in depth studies can investigate
why this may be.
At every level in all societies, choices and decisions must be made. As all
actions have consequences, the uncertainty of those consequences is what may be
considered a risk. When choices are made, world-views further influence how
particular risks come to be (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012, Module 1, Unit 1: 5).
Risks commit people to live in an uncertain world where they cannot control or predict
accurately what may happen. Yet, people cannot leave all things as postmodernists
would have it to fate (Coote: 124). As such lay persons put trust in the experts who can
educate decision making amidst such uncertainty. Only quite recently has science
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5. earned its place over clergymen or cosmologists as the 'expert' opinions of the public
domain wherein an extraordinary optimism about science and technology has led to
almost universal deference to scientific experts (Durant, 1998: 70-71). Technological
and social advancement has given society the tools to make the world a better place and
also inform rationality, but events over the last fifty years or so have caused friction in
the relationship between lay people and experts. Amongst others; CFCs, nuclear power,
the UK BSE crisis, confusion over the MMR vaccine, uncertainty in the scientific
community about global warming, food and drink safety and military action without
public consensus have caused the public to question their relationships with those with
the power to both inform and make decisions at the international level. As such it can
be suggested that this relationship does not fulfil its fundamental and prescribed role.
Furthermore, lay persons are questioning whether technocratic and expert world-views
should inform decision making at an individual level. Risk affects everyone' lives and is
usually spoken of as a negative. Yet, understanding risk allows us to mitigate it. As
such, the more apparent it is, the more we can avoid it. Although, some risks are easily
identified like driving or smoking, others can become obscured due to conflicting or
complex arguments. Debates about nuclear power, transport and the environment are
just some examples where experts disagree about the effects of risks (Institute of
Lifelong Learning, 2012, Module 1, Unit 1: 5).
Some sociologists claim society is experiencing the 'decline of deference'
wherein lay persons are less inclined to place trust in traditional authority figures like
doctors, teachers, police officers, clergymen, politicians, judges and journalists.
Whether this is good or bad in terms of risk is a point of discourse, punctuated by the
notion of whether authority figures deserve our unquestioned respect. Problems
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6. materialise as "irrational" behaviour by politicians and bureaucrats, unaccountability
and declining public trust in scientific expertise (Hood and Jones, 1996: xi). Late
modern pluralism is permeating society as now society is "in a situation where no
single view of risk can claim authority or is wholly acceptable" (Turner, 1994: 148) and
it is becoming clear that "there is no expert on risk" (Beck, 1992: 29). Regardless of the
conflicting information from the experts and politicians that society may no longer trust
to keep them informed, people still make decisions. This further intensifies insecurity,
which for Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens embodies the transition from one form of
society to another (Franklin, 1998: 1-2) by moving from the first phase of modernity
through the risk society into the second phase or 'post-modernity'. Anthony Giddens
claims that to be living 'after tradition is essentially to be in a world where life is no
longer lived as fate' (Giddens, 1998: 26). Through experience, people are beginning to
realise they can no longer rely on experts to guide them in the choices they make and
are forced to make decisions in the light of conflicting information. People may simply
not trust politicians and experts because they do not know how to say that they don't
know (Franklin, 1998: 5). People expect politicians to answer questions and protect
them from risk, yet when they cannot, they find themselves resenting them (ibid.: 7).
The increasing reliance upon expert opinion by everyone in modern society is
paralleled by the growing ability of many people, reinforced by modern media, to
deconstruct political reassurance as scientific or technical 'fact' (Grove-White, 1998:
51).
Globalisation' effect on both perceptions and exposure to risk can be seen in the
increasing frequency of overseas travel, notably travel to developing countries which
pose increased health and safety risks to travellers. Risks people may be exposed to
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7. while abroad include violent crime, political, economic and societal unrest,
governmental stability and conflicts perhaps resulting in war and/or terrorism.
Furthermore risks such as not wearing safety belts in cars, driving in unserviceable
vehicles, taking part in activities in dangerous areas, risk of malaria and poor water
quality pose a considerable risk in developing countries This is by no means an
exhaustive list, but it does illuminate some of the many increased risks posed to people
whilst abroad.
The initial idea for this research began with an interest into why people chose to
live in countries which have poorer public safety records than those of their home
countries. Looking more closely at the topic highlighted the multitude of risks that
people may be exposed to when abroad on a more general level. Discovering how
people developed attitudes to these risks seemed a pragmatic way to investigate both
risk perception and risk communication. In choosing suitable research types, secondary
data and a survey were chosen as the most appropriate methods. These methods
allowed for collection of both quantitative and qualitative data as to improve the
validity of the research. The coupling of these approaches allowed for socially
constructed reality to be represented alongside positivist objectivity and provides a
basis for further research into rationality. Existing research lacks conceptualisation of
the relationship between how objective quantitative studies may inform ideas
concerned with social construction and vice versa. Risk perception, risk communication
and social learning have been identified as the appropriate theories to be explored to
expand the framework concepts to broaden applicability and generalisability. This
research has been carried out with all commonwealth nationals. The key objectives that
were identified to ensure concentrated study were:
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8. • To assess the difference between the lay perception of being exposed to a
significant risk during international travel and the statistical actuality of being
exposed to such risks.
• Establish if commonwealth nationals feel sufficiently informed by experts in
their decision-making.
• Establish the degree to which expert opinion influences lay decision making
related to risks and gain an insight into what factors may affect this.
This will be a comparative piece of research which will compare official
statistics on injury and death during international travel against data from an online
survey concerned with people's estimations of risk during international travel and
attitudes to public information provided by experts. The expert world-views and advice
which will be used to ascertain to what degree lay persons perception of travel risks
correlates with expertly disseminated statistics will be those of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Office of National Statistics (ONS). FCO and
ONS statistics were chosen as the source for comparative data as they are collected and
collated by the UK government and as such have a high degree of reliability.
Furthermore, this data and advice is both easily accessible to the public and provided to
other organisations to disseminate.
The publications used were ‘Travel Trends 2013' from the ONS which states
that in 2012/13 58.5 million UK residents travelled abroad (ONS, 2014a) and ‘British
Behaviour Abroad 2013' from the FCO which states that the FCO gave assistance to
more than 19,000 Brits in need in 2012/13 (FCO, 2013b). The FCO's Know Before You
Go campaign encourages British nationals to prepare for their foreign travel so they can
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9. avoid preventable problems. It targets several audiences and works with around 600
travel industry partners to communicate its messages (FCO, 2013b). This qualifies their
advice as sufficiently accessible to lay persons. From participants responses it can be
established if people seek or pay attention to such advice in regards to understanding
and mitigating risks during international travel. Analysis of these results will indicate
how accurate people's perceptions of the risks of international travel are and as such
establish how well public information about risk is communicated by experts. This data
is further compared against attitudinal perspectives from optional free text questions
within the survey to establish the reasoning behind the results. Depending on how well
people are informed, the qualitative data on attitudes may suggest why. Analysing data
on travel to show how much perception of risk and decision making is informed by
experts may show that there is a fundamental difference in world views between lay
persons and experts.
Establishing if lay perceptions of risk are informed by expert conceptions of
reality lays the foundation for asking why this may be the case. If the relationship
between powerful social informants and the general public can be proven to not only be
dysfunctional but increasingly so, claims of an increasingly globalised society which is
incapable of effectively utilising its means in a postmodern fashion shall be evidenced.
As such for all society' modernising and connectivity we are indeed susceptible to more
risks than ever before as we don't get the information we need and don't listen when we
do. Furthermore, our globalised world may be amplifying a less risk averse,
adventurous and autonomous post-modernist psychology. This research shows that the
rationality of the general public is not only increasingly disproving functionalist and
Marxist claims about society but also disregarding any individual logic that may be
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10. influenced by technocratic or expert advice. As such, people may be disregarding both
subjectively created logic through the lens of society and personal interpretation as well
as objectively informed logic from experts and scientists.
This study will show that although lay persons seek and trust advice form
experts they rarely utilise it. Although this may suggest that experts are ineffective in
their roles as social advisors, the findings of this study suggest it is quite likely the
choice to remain autonomous in their decision making that precludes lay persons from
making rational and informed choices. Until a risk communication model which
encourages reflexivity on behalf of both experts and lay persons evolves, the human
decision making process is still likely to remain irrational and result in adverse events.
How and to what scale information may be lost due to a dysfunctional relationship
between experts and lay people is of great relevance to society at large. Furthermore,
evaluating how much expert advice influences decision making or discovering if people
feel that they feel communicated to effectively, may illuminate how reflexive lay and
expert attitudes to risk may be. As an examination of human nature and the rationality
behind decisions related to risk, this research can act as a proxy for a more general
understanding of human decision making in multiple contexts.
To understand and draw from previous research a full literature review will
follow. This paper will go on to illustrate the methods used to collect the research data
alongside its challenges and restrictions. An analysis of this study's findings will then
assess both the degree to which risk perception and decision making of lay persons is
informed by experts and how much rationality influences this. This analysis will
support both the conclusions and suggestions for further research.
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11. 2. Literature review and conceptual framework
An informed society with contempt for the informers
This literature review will provide a comprehensive overview of the research
and theory that contributed to developing the research methodology of this study and
the conceptual framework for the analysis of its results. The appropriate theories
identified to be explored as to expand the framework concepts and to broaden
applicability and generalisability of this study are risk perception, risk communication
and social learning as well as political and social theoretical concepts related to the
nature of risk. These are all critical in establishing to what degree risk perception and
decision making of lay persons is informed by experts as this relationship, like risk, is a
multidimensional social construct. How and to what scale information may be is lost
due to a dysfunctional relationship between experts and lay people is of great relevance
to society at large as a functional form of this relationship would not only help people
effectively mitigate risk, it may also help reconcile differences between lay persons and
experts. Furthermore, evaluating how much expert advice influences decision making
or discovering if people feel that they are communicated to effectively, may illuminate
how reflexive lay and expert attitudes to risk may be.
Risk perception
Risk perception involves people's beliefs, attitudes, judgements and feelings, as
well as the wider social or cultural values that people adopt towards hazards and their
benefits (Pidgeon et al., 1992: 89). It is multidimensional and personalistic, with
particular risks or hazards meaning different things to different people and in different
contexts (Warner, 1992: 7). Until recently, most risk research has been very quantitative
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12. and carried out in a scientific and objective fashion. This research may be considered as
reliable as others may replicate the results yet its social validity is increasingly
questioned (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 3). Amongst others,
Slovic (1987) criticises how much quantified research illustrates the reality of decision-
makers using limited information and where judgements are often influenced by ‘trust'
or ‘intuition'. More recent social psychological approaches consider the social and
cultural contexts in which lay people perceive risk, and how they may change when in
conflict with expert conceptions of reality. Regardless of their methodological
differences, they can be generally placed into groups of risk perception, cognitive,
decision-making, psychometric and the more recent ‘mental models' approach (Institute
of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 3).
Psychological theorists believe risk is a real and objective entity, and as such
can be quantitatively analysed. Traditionally, psychologists have attempted to
comprehend risks by selecting a variable for an experiment or through collecting and
analysing data using social surveys. This research paradigm is known as risk perception
and often compares ‘perceived risks' against a calibrated `actual risk' within a particular
population sample (ibid.: 4). Earlier work in risk perception used mostly quantitative
approaches. However, more recently, qualitative approaches have been employed as the
significant use of quantitative approaches was questioned as the definition and
measurement of risk was considered problematic (ibid., Module 2, Unit 1: 5). Early
psychological empirical studies of risk perception, in particular those pioneered by the
Decision Research Group led by Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischoff and Sarah Liechtenstein
(1980) have been extensively replicated and extended (Pidgeon et al, 1992: 90).
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13. The classic method to test perception of risk was providing a sample group of
subjects with a situation involving decision-making. Under controlled conditions,
subjects would choose from a selection of options which would then be recorded and
analysed. From this work, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky established (Institute
of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 4-5) that, under certain predefined
conditions, there is a statistical likelihood that people will display certain preferences
which will often display logic very much unrelated to rational decision-making
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Breakwell (2007) claims there is a large amount of psychological research on
decision making about risk, specifically when choices are made about probabilities with
incomplete information (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012, Module 5, Unit 1: 8).
'Heuristic principles' often bias such decisions. The availability heuristic occurs when
‘‘people assume that the probability is greater if they can easily remember an instance
of the event '' (Breakwell, 2007: 80). This causes people to remember dramatic, unusual
or recent events more than frequent and normalised events regardless of their nature.
Some believe this phenomena causes the irrational degree to which we try to protect
ourselves against low frequency risks. The extent of human irrationality towards risk
shows how society wishes to control that which it cannot predict.
Another type of research associated with risk perception is psychometrics.
Psychometric studies collect and measure psychological variables related to a
phenomenon from individuals in a sample population. Such tests involve analysis of
data to show how a sample perceives certain risks. This approach also attempts to
consider qualitative characteristics of hazards. Early psychometric studies measured the
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14. degree to which people perceived how certain risks relate to fatalities. These studies
stemmed from increasing social and political pressures to investigate public perceptions
of risks as to better inform and re-educate the public (Institute of Lifelong Learning,
2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 30-31) if they disagree with expert conceptions of reality
(ibid.: 2-3).
One significant study involved educated non-experts making judgements about
fatality rates from several known hazards. The responses were compared against the
actual death rates (ibid.: 6). The study discovered subjects tended to overestimate death
rates for low frequency hazards while underestimating death rates for high frequency
hazards (Lichtenstein et al., 1978). This was significant as it enabled theorists to
measure irrationality towards significant risk issues (Institute of Lifelong Learning,
2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 6). Fischoff argues that such work demonstrates the degree of
rationality or confusion in relation to risk (Fischoff, 1990). However, risk perception
has been shown to be far more complex than this study alone suggested. Starr (1969)
discovered a difference between the way voluntary and involuntary risks of which
people are more fearful are perceived. He argued individual perception of a risk may be
affected by the degree that risk was considered to be self-imposed, in contrast to risks
imposed by uncontrollable outside forces. Involuntary risks were for Starr defined as
(Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 6) "imposed by the society in
which the individual lives" (Starr, 1969: 165).
Otway and von Winfeldt (1982) and Slovic et al. (1980) have attempted to
understand what Slovic has described as the ‘personality' of hazards (Slovic, 1992).
Otway and von Winfeldt argued, based on survey research, that there are several
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15. ‘negative hazard attributes' which may influence people's risk perception (Institute of
Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 31-32). These have been summarised by
Pidgeon et al. (1992) as:
1. Involuntary exposure to risk.
2. Lack of personal control over outcomes.
3. Uncertainty about probabilities or consequences of exposure.
4. Lack of personal experience with the risk (fear of the unknown).
5. Difficulty in imagining risk exposure.
6. Effects of exposure delayed in time.
7. Genetic effects of exposure (threatens future generations).
8. Infrequent but catastrophic accidents (‘kill size').
9. Benefits not highly visible.
10. Benefits go to others (inequity).
11. Accidents caused by human failure rather than natural causes (Royal Society, 1992:
101).
This study' significance is due to how it highlights the complexity of social
features which may affect risk perception. As such, the measurement of risk must be
sensitive to understanding how risks are perceived. This also suggests that what may
seem as an irrational view may actually be a logical construction of a perceived reality
(Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 7). These studies highlighted
the complexity of influences upon lay perceptions of risk. Furthermore, that risk
perception could be measured and the results replicated was important because different
studies could be compared to produce general conclusions about public perceptions of
risk (ibid.: 8). However, respondents were restricted to giving views only on the
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16. hazards mentioned causing relationships between other risks to remain unknown.
Nonetheless, this criticism could be addressed by good questionnaire design, the use of
pilot surveys and the addition of further axes of questioning (ibid.).
Psychometric approaches to risk perception have been increasingly criticised by
‘risk communication' theorists, who question the social context within which
communication takes place between ‘lay' and ‘expert' groups. They believe this affects
the way people develop their perceptions of risk. The bias towards empirical methods
within psychology also exists as some researchers wish to produce work which can be
evaluated in a purely scientific fashion (ibid.: 11-12). Furthermore, although
psychometric approaches are well grounded in an empirical sense they offer a limited
theoretical framework (Pidgeon et al., 1992: 124-125). Social scientists do not limit
themselves to purely quantitative analysis as 'there are serious difficulties in attempting
to view risk as a one-dimensional concept ... when...a particular risk or hazard means
different things to different people in different contexts' (Warner, 1992: 7). Social
science' wish to consider qualitative dimensions of risk led some theorists to adopt a
mental models approach (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 8).
The mental models approach may be viewed as being based on both the
psychometric and decision-making traditions, as well as theories of risk communication
(Bostrom et al., 1991). Criticisms of the psychometric approach were addressed to an
extent by the mental models approach which aims to improve effectiveness of risk
communication strategies by assisting people to make informed choices about risks.
Initially, a group of experts would be selected to establish what they thought about a
certain hazard through semi-structured and open-ended interviews. Prompted by
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17. photographs, the experts would be interviewed about a certain hazard. This would be
used to highlight the known risks from the hazard and the expert's conceptions of how
they viewed said hazard (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 9).
Lay perceptions of the risk would be analysed in the same way and mapped on to the
expert conceptions to identify any gaps and misconceptions in the lay people's beliefs.
Lay people would then be shown the expert influence diagrams and photographs to
prompt them to discover whether their beliefs about the hazard are incomplete or
misinformed (ibid.). Bostrom et al. (1991) argue this is useful to illustrate personal
psychological portrayals of certain risks for analysis. Bostrom argued this technique
could be useful in improving lay people's conceptions, by concentrating risk
communication work on risks where lay perceptions most need informing (Institute of
Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 10). There are several criticisms of this
approach including whether the interview techniques are sensitive enough to establish a
complete picture of how subjects view certain hazards. Furthermore, paying informants
to assist in a ‘study of a risk' is likely to suggest to subjects that they are being
questioned about a dangerous phenomenon (ibid.). More recent approaches to risk
perception such as cultural theory have been subjected to fewer empirical studies than
the approaches discussed above, but may offer broader and more valuable theoretical
insights into risk perception (Pidgeon et al., 1992: 124-125).
Most would agree that the physical consequences of hazards, such as deaths,
injuries and environmental harm, are objective facts (Pidgeon et al., 1992: 90).
However, within the behavioural sciences there are disagreements. Some psychologists
argue lay persons don’t view risks as a result of scientific rationality, but rather as a
socially construct which inherently involves a degree of subjectivity. Nonetheless,
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18. psychological views have been criticised by anthropologists as failing to take account
of the cultural dimensions of risk perception (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011,
Module 2, Unit 4: 8-10). Mary Douglas claims ‘the profession of psychologists which
has grown up to study risk perception takes the culturally innocent approach by treating
political dissension as intellectual disagreement' (Douglas, 1990: 9). The Royal Society
Study Group further support this view as '...one of the major challenges to orthodox
psychological approaches to risk perception over the past ten years has come from the
grid-group 'cultural theory' proposed by the anthropologist Mary Douglas and her
colleagues' (Royal Society, 1992: 112).
Although people try to make logical choices, rationality is limited by belief and
experience. As such cultural and psychological factors may affect perception of risk.
Research has shown people typically base risk perception on experiences and beliefs
unrelated to any mathematical model or scientifically reasoned understanding of the
situation (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012, Module 1, Unit 5: 5). As such, Douglas
and Wildavsky (1982) believe different societies and individuals interpret and measure
risks and hazards in different ways. Such social and individual perspectives suggest that
risk perception is not objective but subjective (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012,
Module 1, Unit 5: 5). Other authors support this view in claiming: "it is unrealistic to
presume that the fundamental processes of risk assessment are objective" (Reid, 1992:
151). Also that: "[a]ll judgements about hazards or risks are value-laden" (Shrader-
Frechette, 1991: 220). Paul Slovic (1992: 119) states that: "[t]here is no such thing as
‘real risk' or ‘objective risk'". As such it is suggested that both risk and risk perception
can be seen as being subjective in nature (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012, Module
1, Unit 5: 6).
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19. Risk communication
Governments and private industry are increasingly required to inform people
about the environmental, technological and health hazards to which they may be
exposed (Pidgeon et al., 1992: 118). Risk communication can be defined as the
techniques used by experts to inform lay people about such risks and influence
behaviour related to how people perceive risks and rationalise decision making
(Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 3: 3). Risk communication
theorists are concerned with the dialogue, or lack thereof, between expert and lay
persons (Irwin, 1989; Wynne, 1989). Risk communication research emerged from high
profile public policy problems which resulted from social conflicts over risks (Krimsky
and Plough, 1988). Much of the early work in risk communication had the objective of
resolving such conflicts (Borodzicz et al., 1993).
Risk perception research illustrates the plethora of ‘socially constructed' world-
views that contribute to such disputes. As risk communicators and lay persons may
ineffectively communicate with each other, both channels of communication may
become lost and as such make risk communication redundant. Consequently, it is
considered that in accommodating appropriate forms of communication between the
parties to such disputes, better mutual understanding may lead to conflict resolution.
However, achieving this effectively with persons who may have different perspectives
on the problem sets a more challenging task (Pidgeon et al., 1992: 119).
Current risk management practices assume science best explains and manages
the multiplying risks of the modern world - many ironically generated by science itself.
As such, it can be asked whether science is quite as rational and objective as its
advocates suggest since it is a human construction (Institute of Lifelong Learning,
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20. 2011, Module 2, Unit 3: 3). Furthermore, expert approaches, it is argued are based upon
a misconception of 'science' as within the scientific community subjective factors
(social, cultural and psychological) either do not, or minimally, influence the decision-
making process (ibid., Unit 1: 6-7).
The deficit model of risk communication assumes the public are passive and
ignorant. Yet, the public already holds opinions on a range of matters, and is far from
lacking in knowledge. However, such knowledge is unstructured and not subject to
‘methodical scepticism', fallibilism or peer review (ibid., Unit 3: 20). Risk
communication theorists claim lay people's perceptions of risk are influenced by
subjective factors not considered by science and are characterised as being constructed
within irrational and non-objective models of reality (Institute of Lifelong Learning,
2011, Module 2, Unit 1: 6). Some claim this is because experts count lost lives while
the public focuses on several other aspects, more specifically fairness and
controllability (Irwin, 1989; Wynne, 1989). Nevertheless, such knowledge can help tell
risk communicators how the public understands the world and help improve risk
communication.
One-way models of risk communication are highly criticised as by assuming an
altruistic communicator it devalues the perspectives and knowledge of the people at
risk, while ignoring the political aspects to many of the risk conflicts in society
(Pidgeon et al., 1992: 120). There are many publics within any society, each with
possibly different worldviews and frameworks for approaching risk problems. This
highlights the complexities of risk communication (ibid.: 121). Much of the currently
available advice on communicating risk information lacks direct empirical validation
either in terms of its effectiveness to meet goals or in its capacity to avoid unintended
consequences. The latter appears important as health and economic damage may result
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21. from poor risk communication, and sets a significant future research agenda for risk
communication researchers (ibid.: 122). Furthermore, miscommunication may be
causing confusion which in turn is rationalizing dangerous decision making.
Trust in regard to risk communication was first raised by Brian Wynne (1980,
1982) who argued that due to technological risks some of the differences between
expert and lay perceptions might be due to different perceptions of the relation between
risk outcomes and the trustworthiness of risk-management institutions (Pidgeon et al.,
1992: 123). As Lee (1986) points out, persuasive communication studies indicate the
reputation of communicators is relies highly upon the trust placed in them. As Wynne
(1992: 278) explains ‘the heart of risk perceptions and risk conflicts [is] not the issue of
technical risk magnitudes, but rather trust in institutions [...] trust [is an] essential
dimension of social life and institutional viability'. If we do not trust the source, we do
not trust the message (Pidgeon et al., 1992: 122). Laird (1989) illustrates that lack of
trust in risk management institutions may result from a more general loss of faith by the
public in institutions and an unwillingness to assign responsibility for important
decisions to institutions (Pidgeon et al., 1992: 123). In talking about trust in both
scientific and technological progress, Anthony Giddens differentiates between trust in
the time of ‘simple modernity', and trust in our present ‘reflexive modernity' (Giddens
in Lash et al., 1996: 44-83). According to Giddens in ‘simple modernity', trust was
willingly given to the modernist institutions of science and technology. However in
today's ‘reflexive modernity', trust is a matter of ‘deliberative choice' (Institute of
Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 6, Unit 9: 3).
The relationship between the British public and the UK' nuclear industry
provides a valuable test of Giddens' and Ulrich Beck' theories of ‘reflexive modernity'.
21

22. It is broadly considered that opposition to the nuclear industry originated in the
environmental movements of the 1970s. Nonetheless, Wynne believes the lack of
dissent before this decade should not be interpreted as acceptance of and support for the
industry (ibid.). Rather, it was feelings of helplessness and powerlessness when faced
with a pro-nuclear British political establishment that may have persuaded people that
there was little point in protesting (ibid.). Furthermore, according to Beck (1992: 37),
the ‘boomerang effect' of scientific and technological development, where supposedly
life-enriching innovations fail to improve the human condition, undermines the
legitimacy of institutions which promote scientific and technological development
(Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 6, Unit 9: 4). Flawed science may be
causing disinterest and disbelief in experts and in turn the social forces that promote
them within society. As such the decision making process of lay persons may not rely
upon expert opinion, suggesting expert constructions of reality conflict with those of
laymen.
Brian Wynne (1996) studied sheep farmers in Cumbria, England, who were
subjected to administrative restrictions due to radioactive contamination, allegedly
caused by the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986. The sheep farmers suffered
economical losses, and it emerged the source of radioactivity was in fact the Sellafield
nuclear reprocessing complex; thus, the experts responsible for the restrictions were
mistaken. This case illustrates how scientific interpretation controlled and intimidated
the farmers and furthermore how privileged scientific knowledge neglects and de-
legitimises specialist lay knowledge in presupposing ignorance or irrationality. It also
indicates the social basis of scientific knowledge and its public credibility (Institute of
Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 4: 18-22). Furthermore, the different world
22

23. views which are now recognised as underpinning different perceptions of risk means
presumptions and principles about risk are based upon very different conceptual
foundations (Krimsky and Golding, 1992; Wynne, 1996). When formal scientific
discourse is the only explanation the public is sufficiently pragmatic to listen to and
follow advice. However, as Wynne explains, we should not misinterpret such pragmatic
quiescence as a firm belief in science and scientists as dependence doesn't necessarily
require agreement (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 6, Unit 9: 5). In terms
of the relationship between lay persons and experts, Wynne' work has further
implications in how the experts undermined the farmers' history and identity. Whereas
in ‘late-modernity', people often define themselves through consumption patterns, in
traditional societies, people often define themselves in terms of their work.
Undermining this association risks destroying a person's identity (ibid., Module 2, Unit
3: 18). Identity is fundamental to a pluralistic post modern world. As such, the notion
that expert advice may neuter pluralism may affect how people engage with it.
Wynne' work critiques the distinction drawn between expert and lay decision
makers in much of the psychological and sociological work on risk. Wynne argues that
expert or scientific conceptions of science and truths are wrong as they are based upon
purely objective factors, and ignores social, cultural and psychological factors which
are very much subjective (ibid., Unit 1: 6). This suggests experts disregard subjectivity
in the decision making process and furthermore social truths, and as such believe the
general publics' perceptions are built upon irrational and subjective models of reality
(Bennett, 2012: 10). The relationship between expert and lay conceptions of risk is
complicated further by the theory of late modernity which suggests that an increasingly
sceptical or ‘reflexive' (Beck, 1992; 2009) society is challenging the traditional
23

24. structures of authority (scientists, politicians, doctors, engineers, legal officials) and
their explanations for patterns and truths in the world around us (Bennett, 2012: 1). A
paradox lies at the centre of late modernity, as the more science and objective,
quantitative logic develops, the more it is questioned (ibid.). This infers that individuals
may be purposefully making decisions which counter positivist and scientific rationale,
as the more science affects our lives the less we accept its authority (Beck, 2009).
Consequently, decisions made by lay people to disregard what scientists or ‘experts'
would regard as quantified fact may result in increased exposure to risk and adverse
events. Ulrich Beck claims the solution to this problem is for science to engage with
society's increasing reflexivity (Beck, 1992).
Lay person' difficulty in understanding information communicated by experts is
compounded by public questioning of political and expert assertions which some
experts attribute to irrational folk world views based on a mistrust of expertise and
progress (Wynne, 1992). Nonetheless, governments may be complicit in
misrepresenting risks through poor communication of the relative scale of risks to
achieve political and economic gains. This notion suggests that mistrust in experts may
not be as unintuitive as is likely assumed. The one-way nature of this relationship is
evidence that poor risk communication by expert may be disguising poor lay decision
making. Another aspect of the debate is that experts must consider that "numerical
information is capable of seriously misleading those who use it" (Funtowicz and
Ravetz, 1990: 10). This may cause problems for people who have difficulties
understanding expressions of probability related to evaluation of hazards. This is further
complicated by the abstract language that such information is often presented with
(Covello, 1991; Covello et al., 1986; Slovic and Fischoff, 1983). Furthermore, experts
24

25. themselves can also make mistakes when dealing with probability estimates.
Gigerenzer (2002) reports research showing that senior doctors made such mistakes
when interpreting the results of diagnostic tests to advise patients on their chances of
having an illness and a successful treatment. He argues that confusions arise where data
is presented as percentages and probabilities (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012,
Module 1, Unit 5: 11). People find it difficult to either comprehend or believe
probability. This apparent irrationality of popular risk perception suggests people have a
problem of cognition or trust in official and / or scientific data sources (ibid., Module 2,
Unit 1: 4). Toft and Reynolds highlight that society should not ignore the fact that
‘where people decide that a particular activity is safe, they continue to engage in it
regardless of expert advice or the evidence' (Toft and Reynolds, 2005: 3).
Wynne's concept of social learning states that, informed decision-making on
technological and/or scientific questions requires both transparency and candidness in
all intellectual and ideological transactions between parties (Wynne, 1992 in Institute of
Lifelong Learning, Module 4, Unit 1: 11-12). Social learning advocates reflexivity to
allow experts to accommodate society' irrational reactions to risks. As if subjective
rationalities are not recognised by experts it is unlikely they will aggregate to form a
mutually beneficial discourse, further perpetuating the unbalanced narrative on risk and
continuing to undermine both lay and expert opinion.
World-views and conceptions of reality
World-views are the ways people interpret the world. The influence between
individual and collective world-views is significant in examining the influences of
culture and power upon risk perception. A specific world-view prescribes a complex
25

26. and dynamic set of beliefs, values, assumptions, opinions, attitudes and motivations
which form our (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012, Module 1, Unit 3: 10) perceptual
biases about the world. Shared world-views are important for integration and stability
in society yet, different world-views may be so irreconcilable that clashes and conflicts
occur.
The functionalist world-view is objective and consistent with beliefs that the
structures of society, politics, business and organisations have predetermined functions
necessary to maintain social order. Furthermore, some functionalists believe society
exists to support and serve capitalist interests. Interpretative world-views cross a desire
for order with assumptions that aspects of society, politics, business and organisations
are not pre-determined but socially constructed. Interpretivist also admit that multiple
interests, rationalities and even realities are recognised as legitimate. For example, non-
expert perceptions of risk, which may be marginalised or considered insignificant in a
functionalist world-view, would be highly relevant from an interpretative perspective
(Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 1, Unit 3: 11). The debates about the
way functionalist and interpretative world-views and modernist and postmodernist
perspectives are compared are closely linked (Carter and Jackson, 1991; Waring, 1993).
The new ‘Realpolitik' in social analysis, which Beck advocates, stresses continuity
between world-view types and seeks to accommodate different perspectives (Waring,
1993, 1996 in Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 1, Unit 3: 12).
Every day people make many decisions related to risk believing they are
appropriate. Nonetheless, powerful socio-psychological processes can affect both
individuals and groups. If unrecognised and poorly managed, these influences can
increase the likelihood of inappropriate decisions being made (Toft and Reynolds,
26

27. 2005: 9). The problem to be addressed in this research is whether, as Ulrich Beck
suggests, that in the Risk Society, humans are in touch with and aware of the risks in
the modern world.
Risk society and late modernity suggest the world is changing at an increasing
rate. Furthermore, Beck (1992) claims risks will become more prevalent due to
globalisation, industrialization and modernisation which increase exposure to risk. Beck
highlights how the perceptions of risks are inclined to being ‘magnified, dramatized or
minimized' by key ideological institutions, primarily the media and states (Beck, 1992,
cited in Waddington and McSeveny 2011: 45). Furthermore, late modern societies are
reflexive societies wherein the centres of power and things that once made us feel
secure like science, technology, medicine , the state, judiciary, the law and
bureaucracy; unsettle us and as such are challenged (Bennett: 12-13). Although greatly
aided by hyper-connectivity, globalisation and information technology humans have
begun to question the validity of scientific expertise.
New types of incalculability are emerging through what Giddens and Beck call
manufactured uncertainty. Here the production of risks from scientific and political
efforts to control or minimize them (Beck, 1998: 12) are turning society into a
laboratory where nobody is in charge (ibid: 9). The new discoveries and technologies of
science create unprecedented risks at an ever increasing rate. Furthermore, these new
risks are a product of a community of experts being given the green light by politicians.
In the case of risk conflicts, politicians can no longer rely on scientific experts as there
are always competing and conflicting viewpoints from a many individuals and groups
who define risks very differently. Nonetheless, producing conflicting knowledge on risk
27

28. is the purpose of scientific investigation. Secondly, experts can only supply more or less
uncertain factual information about probabilities, but never answer the question: which
risk is acceptable and which is not. Thirdly, if politicians just implement scientific
advice, they become caught in the mistakes, modes and uncertainties of scientific
knowledge (ibid.: 13-14).
Postmodernism
A dictionary definition of ‘modernism' is ‘to subordinate tradition to harmony
with modern thought' (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1982), whereas ‘postmodernism, is
‘a style of thought that rejects the dogma and practices of any from of modernism'
(Collins Concise English Dictionary, 1992). Lash (1990: 261-3) believes this society, is
characterised by struggle for change and individual groups attempting to achieve
autonomy. It defines a complex society where all processes are not as monolithic and
deferential to the established knowledge and power structures but more pluralistic in
their construction and execution (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012, Module 5, Unit
5: 7). In a truly postmodern society, although potential disharmony must be allowed for,
different conceptions of reality must be reconciled as to minimise conflict (ibid.: 15).
Although many believe we exist in a ‘post-modern' society (Beck, 1992; Giddens,
1991), others argue that failure to effectively manage risks shows our inability to
become modern let alone post modern (Latour, 1991). Bruno Latour counters Beck in
claiming postmodernism is still elusive, and suggests we are currently unable to control
risk to a degree that can be called post-modern.
Postmodern cultures are claimed to be less deferential towards all types of
experts as they are considered part of the problem rather than the solution (Durant,
28

29. 1998: 72). The relationship between politicians, policy makers and lay people has
always been tumultuous and volatile and one may hypothesise that the way technocrats,
experts at large and the scientific community are regarded by lay people may be
increasingly less deferential. The notion that we may be becoming a postmodernist
society where expert opinions of the scientific community are increasingly rejected by
society is further supported by the increasing criticism of the relationship between
science and capitalism which produces no universal good (McNeill and Chapman,
2005: 185) as "the knowledge is spreading that the sources of wealth are ‘polluted' by
growing ‘hazardous side effects" (Beck, 1992: 20). Together, Beck, Latour and
Giddens, in different ways, attempt to explain that we do not live in a postmodern
society without control. Nonetheless, if as Beck suggests, society is postmodern and we
are more in control of risks, we shall simultaneously be less deferential towards the
power structures of old. This suggests lay persons are inherently able to mitigate risk as
they no longer require advice to inform decisions on risk and assumes we have become
exceptionally logical individuals who can determine what is best for ourselves without
having to consult experts. It seems illogical to assume such a notion, as to forego
scientific truth in the name of postmodern autonomy can only serve to perpetuate
misinformed decision making and the institutionalization of irrationality within the lay
populous.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, science replaced religion as the
major source of knowledge in western societies as (McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 172)
‘empirical, rational science usurped...the tradition of religion' (Woodward and Watt,
2000). Furthermore, "Up until the Scientific Revolution ... we apparently had no need
29

30. for a concept like ‘accident'. Religion and superstition supplied adequate explanatory
models...No longer do we see accidents as meaningless, uncontrollable events...
accidents are evidence that a particular risk was not managed well enough" (Dekker,
2012). Although scientific accuracy is now commonplace and facts and figures
dominate the structure of society, have experts and scientists been deified only to be
dethroned by a post modernist apathy to technocracy and expert opinion due to an
increasing unease or disappointment with both experts and the establishment .
Marxism claims that politics, hierarchy, economics and the vested interests
therein may control and cause conflict with the general public. Positivists too suggest
that people are controlled by social forces (McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 15). As such
these social forces and the positivist scientific community see ‘society' as more
important than the ‘individual'. In the classic Marxist sense, society may not wish to be
controlled and as such may develop both disregard and contempt for social forces. Not
entirely unlike Marxism, functionalism is concerned with how individuals need to be
socialized into a set of values which shapes society and creates social order. In a
postmodern sense, there may be some conflict with acceptance of such truths at the
individual level (ibid.). Both expert and lay persons constitute society, but since experts
have the ability in a functionalist sense to shape society, the question is raised,
especially in an increasingly postmodernist society, as to whether people accept this
authority.
Berger and Luckman (1984) argue reality is socially constructed and ‘inter-
subjective' as it exists in the shared social consciousness as a construction of shared
30

31. meanings and interpretation. As such man is a conscious, active, purposeful social
being rather than being controlled by external influences (McNeill and Chapman, 2005:
21). This perspective suggests all risks are to an extent subjective in nature, as
suggested by Pidgeon et al (1992), and hence for human beings perception is all. As
this research is concerned with risk perception, social construction is of great
importance in determining an accurate interpretation of human rationality.
31

32. 3. Research Methodology
Seeing science in the subjective decision making process
This research has taken a primarily positivist approach through comparative
analysis of quantitative data sets to assess results and reach a conclusion. Nonetheless,
it also includes phenomenological approaches as to increase the validity of the research
through triangulation of data sources to allow methodological pluralism. The coupling
of these two approaches allow for the subjectivity of social constructed reality to be
represented alongside positivist objectivity. As the research is concerned with risk
perception, social construction is of great importance in determining an accurate
interpretation of human rationality. Social construction is a theory that believes peoples
actions are results of the interpretation of social reality, but are also limited by structural
factors beyond their control (McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 5). From a non positivistic
outlook, reality is socially constructed and as such, in so far as human rationality is
concerned a deeper truth can be uncovered through phenomenological approaches
rather than just positivism. Acknowledging this in developing the methodology has
allowed for a clear line to be drawn between that which the question aims to confirm
and the indisputable nature of human rationality and decision making being a subjective
process. As the research was conducted upon people who have already made choices
despite processing the rationality of those risks, they have controlled the external
factors and can be considered examples of pure social construction. Although this
research is using the hypothetico deductive model to extrapolate its findings and is
primarily descriptive and analytical in nature, it will be explanatory in some respects.
32

33. There are many approaches to data collection in both ‘quantitative and
qualitative' (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 3, Unit 5: 9) research.
Anthony Giddens encourages multiple methods, as quantitative methods are seen as
suited to exploring the influence of the social structure whilst qualitative methods are
aimed to uncover how people interpret social structure (McNeill and Chapman, 2005:
6). Furthermore, interpretivist sociologists argue secondary data alone reduces the
probability of uncovering the real meanings of actions or behaviours of social actors'
(McNeil and Chapman, 2005: 58). For this project both qualitative and quantitative
data have been used to enhance research validity through triangulation. Triangulation
refers to the use of multiple methods to cross-check and verify the reliability of a
particular research tool and the validity of the data collected. (McNeill and Chapman,
2005: 23). Quantitative secondary Data from the UK ONS and FCO will be contrasted
against both quantitative and qualitative primary data from online surveys.
The ONS statistics present the actuality of risk exposure whilst travelling. The
closed questions from the survey provide the comparative data to be compared against
the ONS statistics and highlight how people's perception of risk differs from the
statistical evidence. The ONS data is compared against participant's perceptions to
establish if there is any correlation. Open text boxes in the survey have provided
opinions to compare the subjectivity of participants and assess general qualitative
attitudes towards both risk and the bearing of expert opinion upon the decision making
of lay persons. In establishing the degree and nature of both the perceived and
quantifiable risks of international travel it is possible to show how informed people are.
33

34. To achieve the broader objective of determining how much of a difference there
is between statistical estimations of exposure to risk and human perception of risk
during international travel, the study has undertaken two pieces of research, one
quantitative and one qualitative. They are as follows:
• Quantitative > What is the number of serious incidents occurring to UK citizens
travelling or living abroad and what does that statistically represent when compared
to the overall number of UK citizens travelling or living overseas. This data will
then be compared against data collected from an online survey concerned with
perceptions of risk during international travel. The key data for comparison will be
the extent to which the participants feel they may be exposed to significant risk
while travelling abroad.
• Qualitative > The perceptions and opinions of UK citizens regarding the risk of
travelling abroad to establish a descriptive insight (to what degree do we perceive
the risks associated with international travel?) with further open questions leading
maybe to an explanatory insight (why do we do it?).
The chosen methods relate well to the research problem. As human perception
of risk is a very subjective social construction, the balance between phenomenological
and positivist approaches to both generating and triangulating results of the research
will increase the validity of the findings. The research has followed the principle of
falsification by looking for evidence to prove the hypothesis is wrong rather than right
(Popper, 1934). This helped to reduce 'confirmation bias' which may have sought
information to confirm a hypothesis. To compile information specific to UK nationals
34

35. and gain a representative sample, specific data is required so an analysis may be made
and conclusions drawn. As this information has not been compiled before, this research
may provide a basis on which others can develop further.
Secondary Data
To establish the number of incidents injury or death occurring overseas,
secondary data from the ONS and the FCO was reviewed and collated. ONS statistics
are collected and collated by the UK government and as such have a high degree of
reliability. Furthermore, they are available to the public and are easily accessible. As
this research is attempting to compare lay perceptions against those of experts, the ONS
statistics are an excellent basis for comparison as they represent expert advice which
may be communicated to the British public both at home and abroad. Official statistics
are seen to have positivist characteristics as they are considered to have been collected
in a reliable and objective fashion, and as such are seen to deal in 'fact'. (McNeill and
Chapman, 2005: 137). Some consider official statistics to be social constructions which
are not simply facts but the end process of a series of relationships between social
actors who are engaged in a constant process of interpretation and negotiation (McNeill
and Chapman, 2005: 138). As such the content of official statistics are often defined by
civil servants and the priorities of politicians (McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 141).
McDonald (2001) argues documents are 'socially produced' by organisations or
individuals for reasons other than sociological research. 'Social production' refers to the
view that although documents are often presented as objective statements of social fact,
they actually reflect the values and norms of the society or social group in which they
are produced. As such secondary data can give tremendous insight into the organisation
of societies and cultures at particular points in time (McNeill and Chapman, 2005:
147). One of the benefits of secondary data is that is generally unobtrusive as it rarely
35

36. directly intrudes in peoples lives (McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 169). Nonetheless,
statistics are snapshots and it is important to be sceptical and consider other factors.
This approach will serve to establish a deeper truth from secondary data by looking at
where it comes from and for what purposes it has been generated.
All data sets have been individually reviewed to compare the total number of
incidents with the assessed demographic to check statistical validity. This has been
done to find unidentified trends or anomalies, and get a deeper understanding from the
secondary data by looking at where the statistics come from. Having established that
the data was comparable the data was compiled into one complete data set. These
provide another source of data for later analysis. The FCO report ‘British Behaviour
Abroad 2013' (FCO, 2013a) was used to establish the total number of cases reported
and catalogued by the FCO which could be considered a significant risk whilst the
‘Commentary: UK Residents visits abroad' (ONS, 2013a) section from the ONS report
‘Travel Trends 2013' (ONS, 2013b) was used to establish the total number of visits
abroad made by UK nationals. Travel Trends is an annual ONS publication which
presents some of the key trends in overseas travel and tourism drawn from the
International Passenger Survey (IPS). The IPS is a continuous survey carried out by the
Office for National Statistics (ONS), whose results are used by a number of
government departments and organisations. The results are based on face-to-face
interviews with a random sample of passengers. Approximately 95 per cent of
passengers entering and leaving the UK have a chance of being sampled on the survey.
The estimates contained in 'Travel trends' are based on approximately 300,000
interviews a year, which represents approximately 0.2 per cent of travellers. They are
subject to sampling errors that result because not every traveller to or from the UK is
36

37. interviewed on the survey. Robustness of estimates ranges from a 95% confidence
interval of +/- 1.1 per cent of the estimate for total visits abroad by UK residents (ONS,
2014b).
Primary Research
Primary research was conducted through a self completion online survey which
can be found complete with the raw data in Appendix 5 of this study. Surveys are a
significant research method as they tend to gain a large amount data and information
and response rates tend to be high. They are also high on reliability, as findings are
easily replicated. Surveys also involve minimal interaction with the researcher and
therefore there is seen to be less opportunity for subjective bias. The quantifiable nature
of questionnaires is seen as attractive because statistical data can be comparatively
analysed and correlated (McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 44). Positivist sociologists
advocate social surveys as they are carried out under controlled conditions and are
organised by logical and systematic designs. The survey style of research imposes a
structure on that which is being researched, rather than allowing the structure to emerge
from the data as it is collected (McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 22). Furthermore, having
both fixed choice and less structured questions can lead to more accurate results as
respondents can seek to clarify answers by adding further depth (McNeill and
Chapman, 2005: 37). Including text boxes for open opinions to be expressed allows
participants to describe their perceptions about the risk associated with travel within
their answers. This ensures that the same questions are asked, but allows for some
different responses. Including these text boxes was critical to the choice of method as
having a questionnaire with only closed questions would limit expansion of opinions
which may clarify answers (ibid.).
37

38. The survey was carried out in the Summer of 2014. Initially Shanghai was
chosen as the city within which to perform the research as the author resides there,
making access to a chosen sample and collection of data simpler. Furthermore, there is
broad range of UK companies and organisations that operate there. Upon further
investigation and consideration, as to enhance the validity of the survey the sample was
broadened to include UK nationals who did not only reside in Shanghai. as it would be
more representative. The objective of choosing the sample was to enable a practical
means for the data to be collected whilst ensuring the selected sample provided an
unbiased and balanced representation of the population. As such surveys were
forwarded alongside an invitation email (Appendix 1) to individuals known to the
author, but also to random participants to ensure the data collected is unbiased and
represents a broad enough sample to inform a comprehensive analysis. 50 survey
invitation emails were dispatched with the hope of achieving a 40% to 50 % response
rate of 20 to 25 completed surveys. The survey was designed on and accessed online by
participants through Bristol Online Surveys (BOS). Having completed the literature
review and identified the main aims and concepts necessary to ensure a strong piece of
research both in its content and structure, the concepts were operationalised into
questions. Converting the hypothesis and concepts into question form became simple
once the indicators for questions were identified.
The wording of the questions, especially the closed questions, was clear,
precise and unambiguous. Furthermore emotion, jargon and vague terms were all
avoided (McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 38) whilst designing the survey. The survey was
designed to be completed in less than 10 minutes and structured in a logical fashion. As
values, attitudes and opinion of researchers should not influence a respondents answers
38

39. (McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 62) the phrasing and sequence of the questions was very
neutral and any values or attitudes were not imparted during their design. As such the
respondents were not ‘led' to answer any questions in a particular way. At all stages
during the research the personal opinions and biases of the researcher were prevented
from being introduced into the survey.
The survey begins with simple and welcoming introductory questions to
encourage participants to continue as it has been shown correctly ordering questions
increases response rates (Moser and Kalton, 1971: 346). Most questions will be
'perception' and ‘attitude' questions and were designed to review existing attitudes and
previous behaviours rather than anticipated future attitudes or behaviours as
‘individuals are generally not good at predicting future behaviours' (Moser and Kalton,
1971: 326). Nonetheless, some questions did ask about possible future decisions and
actions to gauge whether attitudes remained consistent in a chronological sense.
This survey contained mostly closed questions as they are easier to process;
enhance comparability and may clarify the meaning of a question for the respondent.
Furthermore, they decrease bias and increase accuracy of any data collected. The
purpose of these questions is to have a quantifiable data set concerned with how people
perceive risk and interpret expert opinions which can then be compared against the
secondary data. To collect adequately comparable data, the survey mostly used the
Likert scale (Likert, 1932: 140) for ordering the closed questions. However,
disadvantages of closed questions include spontaneity in respondents' answers,
therefore loss in richness of data (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 3, Unit
6: 28). As closed questions can be irritating for respondents, every five closed questions
39

40. were followed by an open ‘comment' question to partition the survey. They questions
allowed for a more interpretivist approach, to contrast against the positivist
methodology used for closed question and secondary data analysis and further increase
validity. The open questions allowed participants to elaborate on the content of the
survey and their experience. The purpose of the comments is to provide deeper
understanding of participant's attitudes to the risks of travel and allow the student some
insight into why they travel despite the innate risks. The comments in the survey
generated more qualitative answers which were analysed using the Glasser and Strauss
(1957) ‘Coding Paradigm'. As the data was collected to be compared against existing
data, it was 'coded down'. Primary coding was open to identify key analytical
categories, followed by axial and selective coding stages which became part of the
analysis not simply to allow for categorisation but to identify key themes in the data.
Before the survey was launched a brief pilot test took place to ensure whether
the questions were suitable for a broad sample. This has increased validity and
reliability. Furthermore, this testing established how the questions needed to be changed
so they were easy to understand. The content and the language of the questions were
reassessed and slightly revised due to the feedback. Having verified the survey and
interview schedule through pilot tests, few other resources other than time were needed
to proceed. The project followed a strict timetable. Having completed the literature
review to frame the research and ensure clear aims and objectives, the design of the
research tools commenced. This was followed by the compilation of secondary data
sources to generate one set of data for comparison in the analytical stage. Next, having
established an adequate sample selection for the survey and interviews, the collection of
primary data began during which the second and third sets of data would be compiled
40

41. for analysis. After the coding stages, the computer analysis was undertaken in order for
final analysis to take place, allowing for the conclusions to be drawn. In seeing that all
aspects of quality control and all the above stages were met, the feasibility and quality
of the planning of this project was ensured.
The open ‘comment' sections of the survey generated large amounts of data
which required significant time to organise and analyse. This process commenced upon
the closing of the survey through identifying themes, similarities, differences and
problems within the comments. Comparative analysis of this data helped to establish if
participants have discussed similar issues, themes and opinions. Once analysed through
Microsoft Access, the data was cross-referenced in order to develop a means for
presentation using tables, chart and graphs. Once coded, the survey data was cross-
referenced and analysed using the Bristol Online Surveys analysis tools. Following this,
having compiled the qualitative data each statement was individually analysed by the
author to help codify, review and develop theory.
Problems
There were not many problems whilst implementing the research. Gaining
access to participants was not hindered by ‘gatekeepers' (Institute of Lifelong Learning,
2011 Module 3, Unit 2: 17) as social and professional networks were utilised in place of
organisational networks. One limitation of the research was the significant amount of
research needed in the subject and the constraint of time which denied deeper study and
increased accuracy of results, perhaps through the use of focus groups. Nonetheless, the
survey has provided a rich source of both quantitative and qualitative data.
41

42. Ethical Issues
Ethics or moral principles must guide research (McNeill and Chapman, 2005:
12) as researchers have responsibilities and obligations to uphold the rights and safety
of participants. Ensuring the trust of participants was paramount to ensure truth and
detail. As such all participants completed informed consent form, to confirm they knew
the purpose of the research. This form can be found in Appendix 2 of this study. No
information was kept from any participant and all participants knew the survey was part
of a research program. In recognition of the Data Protection Act 1998, the details
concerning the ownership, storage, confidentiality and anonymity of the data were
explained to the participants. All information collected in the survey and during
interviews will remain confidential, as will the identities of all interviewees.
42

43. 4. Results, analysis and findings
An illogical and dysfunctional relationship with the logic of the
scientific community…and our own.
The tables and graphs shown in Appendix 4 represent the data gathered from the
online survey and are related to the aims outlined in the introduction. Although all the
data gathered from the survey is presented here, during the analysis phase it was
considered that some of the questions could not add a significant degree of inference to
the study. The findings from the data sets considered relevant and significant will be
analysed and further cross-referenced as to build upon each one in succession and
emphasise their relationship in achieving the aims of the study. This approach has
assisted in both creating separation between the different sections of the survey whilst
highlighting the interrelated nature of the study' aims articulated in the introduction.
The primary aim was to compare how strongly lay persons estimations of risks related
to travel abroad correlates with UK government data related to travel risks. The
findings from this comparison are then cross-referenced against survey data regarding
lay attitudes to expert social informants as to establish to what degree lay persons
engage with expert opinion and if they feel sufficiently informed in their decision-
making. This approach facilitates an analysis which will establish how functional the
relationship between lay persons and experts is. The necessary data to achieve such
aims was gathered successfully. There were a total of 25 completed surveys. This
represented a return rate of exactly 50% of the 50 emails dispatched. This was as
expected. A slightly higher response rate would have been desirable as to increase both
representativeness and validity but the 25 responses matched the goal set out in the
43

44. proposal for this study. The survey was completed by a wide cross-sectional
demographic including a broad age range and a variety of social economic
backgrounds. This is evidence that the methodology employed a strategy which allows
for broader generalisations due to broad representativeness of the UK public amongst
the respondents.
The survey was structured so that during analysis once inferences were made
from the first set of questions related to risk perception, the following questions
included for more comparative purposes could allow for clear and linear analysis. In
this sense the perception questions are followed by questions related to cognition and
rationality which in turn are followed by questions related to experts and risk
communication. This was intended as to facilitate a logical and structured analytical
framework. This structure has allowed for a gradual layering of both analysis and
theory through which the aims of the study can be achieved in a structured and
comprehensive fashion.
44

45. The survey began with questions which although essential to both establish the
demographic base of the respondents and to ease respondents comfortably into the
survey, they have little to no applicability in serving to achieve the aims of this study.
The first key question which related to the aims of this study was question 5, which
asked whether people felt they were always adequately insured for travel. Table and
figure 4 show that 64 % of respondents answered ‘yes' to this question and 36%
answered ‘no'. These responses indicate that almost two-thirds of people like to feel
prepared for travel risks. When considering these responses in regard to more general
risks, it can be inferred that people like to feel prepared for risks in general. That lay
people choose to have adequate travel insurance whilst abroad may be indicative of
general attitudes to risks and an underlying desire of most people to feel safe. This is a
rational way to behave. When considering risks, most people will take steps to avoid
risk. Furthermore, such behaviour is consistent with social norms in regard to personal
safety. The responses to the optional text based question related to question 5, suggest
that people are aware of the need to be prepared for the risks that travelling abroad
necessitates. Answers included an admission to feeling uneasy about having travelled
without insurance in the past and having good medical insurance which covered the
individual without a separate travel insurance policy. The qualitative answers to this
question all suggested that people value travel insurance. This is qualitative evidence
of a general predisposition by lay persons of the awareness of risks. This data shows
that individual decision making related to avoiding and mitigating risk exhibits a
logical perception of risk.
Table and figure 5 show the responses to Question 7 which asks to what extent
people try to avoid risks. Figure 6 gives a better impression of the distribution of
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46. responses and shows that responses sharply drop off in the less risk averse area of the
chart. This highlights that people believe that they are generally quite risk averse.
Furthermore, the responses to question 14, shown in figure 12 which asks whether
people think they make good decisions, show that people overwhelmingly trust
themselves to make good decisions most of the time. These results suggest that most
lay persons believe they are both rational and risk averse. Furthermore, these responses
show people have trust in informing themselves to reach informed and balanced
conclusions on possible risks. The data and analysis on the questions discussed above
shows that lay persons are aware of the risks that travelling abroad presents and that on
the whole they perceive themselves to be rational and risk averse. These observations
show us that lay persons can take steps to mitigate risks as they are aware of where the
risks may be and how to protect against or mitigate their effects. This is evidence of
Ulrich Becks Risk Society in action as lay persons are taking responsibility for the risks
which surround them in a postmodern fashion through both awareness and action to
mitigate personal risk. This responsibility is representative of a society that is rational in
its choices.
The responses to questions 8 and 9 which asked people how safe they feel on a
day to day basis or whilst on holiday are shown in figures 7 and 8 respectively. The
responses to these two questions show that people feel marginally safer on a day to day
basis than they do when travelling abroad. These responses are evidence of logic and
rationality at work. Lay persons perception of the risks which exist abroad compared to
those of their home are marginally heightened. The factors which contribute to this can
be many. One factor may be the exposure to the unknown and what they perceive as
low frequency risks. Although as suggested by the name, ‘low frequency' risks happen
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47. infrequently, many people do engage in activities which are associated with them whilst
travelling. Air travel, visiting new places, exposure to poverty and tropical diseases are
to name but a few of the types of risk people are exposed to when travelling abroad.
Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) believe that the ‘availability heuristic' contributes to
this irrational response to such risks as it is the low frequency, high impact nature of
certain types of risks associated with travel which cause an irrational predisposition to
feel anxious about travelling. The low frequency nature of these risks compounded by
the relatively short amount of time most people spend whilst on holiday makes such
opinions irrational as the risks we are exposed to on a day to day basis are far more
likely to cause people harm than those that may be encountered whilst travelling
abroad.
Question 10 asked people to express as a percentage, how likely they thought it
would be that they may be exposed to a significant risk whilst travelling abroad. The
primary purpose of the responses to this question was to establish people's perceived
likelihood of being exposed to significant risks whilst abroad. This question generates a
statistic similar to those used in risk perception research through comparing ‘perceived
risks' against a calibrated `actual risk' related to a certain population sample. The results
from this comparison will also act as a metric that establishes the degree to which the
perceptions of lay persons deviate from the statistical actuality. Asking the participants
to express how likely they thought it was that they would be exposed to a significant
risk while travelling abroad as a percentage was the best way to get an accurate
representation of their perception of the risk as it could be easily compared against
statistics generated from the FCO and ONS data. For the purpose of this study, the
mean average was chosen over the median and mode. The median and mode averages
in this case would represent an unbalanced central tendency which would not have been
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48. representative of the broad range of responses to this question. Had the responses been
distributed closer to one another perhaps they may have been utilised to generate the
comparative average for this data. The percentage that was generated as the mean
average from all the respondents answers was that they believed it was a 34.8
(34.78260869565217) percent chance that they would be exposed to significant risk
while abroad. This roughly equates to a one in three chance. The raw data for this
comparative statistic can be found in figure 9. To compile a percentage which
represented the actuality of significant travel related risks for comparison, data on
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) assistance for serious types of cases and
Office of National Statistics (ONS) data for the total number of visits made abroad by
UK residents was used. The statistics for the number of serious incidents reported to the
FCO were acquired from the British Behaviour Abroad Report 2013 and the ONS data
on the number of visits abroad made by UK residents was taken from the Travel Trends
report 2013. From these statistics the incidents which qualified for inclusion as they
represented a significant risk within the usable statistics were total deaths,
hospitalisation, rape, sexual assault and total assistance. The categories of arrests and
detentions were not included as arrest tends to be due to personal premeditated
misbehaviour rather than risks unintentionally encountered. The category of passport
lost/stolen was also not included as if the loss or theft of a passport had resulted an
individual coming to personal harm the incident would have been recorded as such.
This comparative question is essential for comparing the responses to certain other
questions as it acts as a metric against which to compare people's perception of the
likelihood of travel risks against the actuality of such risks. To generate a percentage to
be used as a comparative statistic, the total number of overseas visits by UK nationals
in the year 2012/13 (58.5 million) was divided into 100 then multiplied by the total
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49. number of incidents considered to be a significant risk in the year 2012/13 (13,809).
The figure which emerged from this calculation was a 0.0236 (0.023605) percent
chance of being exposed to a significant risk. This result represented a less than one in
four-thousand chance of exposure to a significant risk whilst travelling abroad.
This clearly shows that lay perceptions of the likelihood of being exposed to a
significant risk represent a very high estimation against the actuality. This is evidence
of both an inflated and over-exaggerated perception of risk. Although the statistics and
its related advice tell people the risks are reasonably low, the public perception of them
is statistically very high in comparison. This comparison is evidence that although we
live in a hyper connected globalised world, important public information is not being
communicated effectively to lay people by experts. This shows us that we cannot be
living in the postmodernist world Ulrich Beck believes is emerging as despite the
means at the disposal of both experts and lay persons, risks is not being effectively
controlled. Bruno Latours perspective that it is that we cannot control these risks which
keeps us from becoming a postmodern society is supported by these figures.
Questions 11 and 12 which ask whether people have ever experienced any
anxiety related to their destination prior to or whilst travelling abroad. Figures 10 and
11 show that people are 20% more likely to be anxious prior to a trip. This increased
level of anxiety is likely related to the knowledge of irrational decision making which
causes people to maybe ask themselves ‘have I made the right choice ?' or ‘will I be
safe?'. The open text section of the question concerned with anxiety prior to a trip
shows the reasons for this anxiety are related to fear of flying, fear of the unknown,
feeling uninformed about destinations, driving in another country, social unrest,
49

50. inability to communicate effectively in an emergency and airport security. The
qualitative answers given in the question related to anxiety felt whilst abroad showed
reasons for such anxiety is related to unfamiliarity with transport networks, unavoidable
risks whilst being in certain situations, lack of security, stolen belongings and unsafe
districts and regions. The availability heuristic is affects how individuals perceive risk
as well as mitigating it through choice. As Breakwell claims, this irrational fear of low
frequency risks as opposed to normalised risks is evidence of individuals emphasising
the likelihood of experiencing a high impact, low frequency event. This notion may
apply to familiar or low consequence risks due to disconnection from scientific advice.
This is counter to the fear which some believe is institutionalised within society and
causes the irrational degree to which we try to protect ourselves against low frequency
risks.
These qualitative responses constitute the risks which may significantly impact
upon an individual's perception of risk within a given scenario as well as suggesting the
forces which may inform such perspectives. Communication, information and
infrastructure feature heavily in the qualitative reasons as to why people feel anxious
about travelling abroad. There are many factors which influence our perceptions of
risks which in turn affect decision making. One of the most significant is how
information and statistics collected by governments and bodies responsible for public
information is presented to the general public. This shows that how information is
absorbed and utilised by its target audience can significantly affect people's lives.
Influences on risk perception and decision making
The next section of analysis will begin to show what contributes to building our
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51. perceptions of risk of travelling abroad and informs our decision making, such as our
own experience and knowledge, friends and expert opinion. When compared against
the responses to the questions related to trust in advice given by friends and
acquaintances (table 14 and figures 15/16) and government advice and statistics (table
16 and figure 17), the responses to question 15 which asks to what degree peoples
experience and knowledge of international travel influences where they decide to visit
shows that peoples own knowledge is far more important than consulting the advice of
experts or friends. The responses to question 18 which asked if people trust advice
given by friends and acquaintances in relation to planned travel show more often than
not people trust advice and information given by friends and acquaintances as opposed
to government or expert advice. Although the data shows that peoples own knowledge
and experience supersedes the advice of both friends and experts, the data related to
whether people trust expert advice (Figure 19) shows 80 percent of people do trust such
information and indicates that people do place value on the advice of experts.
Despite this level of trust in experts, the data suggests that people prefer to trust
their instinct to volunteer to accept risks rather than being told of statistical likelihoods
and accepting other peoples conceptions of reality, especially those of experts. This
finding highlights the postmodernist claim that lay persons and groups are becoming
less deferential to experts. This study does not have the aim of establishing whether
society is postmodern or not but this finding supports Becks claim that individuals and
groups seek autonomy in developing their own perceptions of risk which to a large
degree are less affected by expert conceptions of reality.
That lay persons prefer to make decisions based on their own personally
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52. constructed perceptions of risk supports the work of Slovic et al. (1980) and Otway and
Van Winfeldt (1982) into the personality of hazards which established several
‘negative hazard attributes' which influence peoples perception of risk. Amongst others
these included involuntary exposure to risk, lack of personal control over outcomes,
uncertainty about consequences and lack of personal experience with particular risks.
The data has shown that for rational reasons or not, these factors do also impact upon
how lay people allow themselves to be informed on risk. People would rather
subscribe to their own perceptions of risk which are informed by their own experience
over those of others as they feel they may have more control over the outcomes.
Figure 17 shows the responses to Question 20 which asks if people use the
internet for mostly information or communication. Although 72% of respondents
answered that they use the internet for both communication and information equally,
24% of the remainder use the internet mostly for information. This indicates that a
majority use the internet as a means to gather information. This is evidence of peoples
desire to be informed in their decision making. Nonetheless, this does not correlate with
the data which shows that people over-amplify risks and perceive their likelihood as
being far more likely than the actuality. People wish to be informed, but either do not
engage with the correct sources of information or simply do not digest that which they
have actively sought to inform both their perception of risk and decision making. This
paradox suggests many problems within the relationship between lay persons and
experts.
Question 17 which provided respondents with an opportunity to give qualitative
answers concerned with what factors affect where people decide to travel
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53. overwhelmingly shows that when choosing a destination to visit the interest in that
places culture as well as sightseeing and cost figure very dominantly in making these
decisions. Nonetheless, those who do mention safety and security place a great degree
of emphasis upon it. These responses also stipulate the importance of transport and
communication infrastructure in deciding where to visit. These responses highlight that
those individuals with more risk averse attitudes do have a more rational conception of
the types and degree of risk inherent in travelling abroad. This concern and specificity
in regard to risk indicates such persons may have a more engaged and rational
relationship with experts and the advice they provide.
Opinions on Government and expert advice
That people use the internet primarily for information correlates with the
question which asks whether people actively seek expert and/or government advice in
relation to planned travel (question 21). The responses to this question shows people
overwhelmingly ‘may' seek advice from experts. This establishes that people wish to be
informed and are generally seeking information from experts. This finding is important
in assessing the degree of functionality within the relationship between experts and lay
persons as people clearly want expert advice. This finding can be compared against the
following set of questions and their responses which illuminate to what degree this
information is trusted and how often and to what degree it factors into the decision
making of lay persons.
The results to Question 22 which relates to trust in expert and/or government
advice related to planned travel are shown in figure 19 which shows 80 % of people
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54. trust government advice. The responses to this question do not support Brian Wynne's
assumption that there is an inherent lack of mistrust in experts by lay persons.
Nonetheless, figure 20 which shows the distribution of the answers to question 23
concerned with how much the opinions of experts inform people's decision making
highlights that although people trust these sources of information and the opinions of
experts they may not use them to inform their decision making to such a high degree.
This result allows for the suggestion that the nature of the relationship between lay
persons and experts may be becoming inherently and increasingly dysfunctional in that
it is not so much a matter of trust in experts, rather a choice to be less deferential to
experts and be more autonomous in their decision making. This is evidence that people
value their own world views over expert conceptions of reality and that perceptions of
risk are quite likely informed by the perspectives that individuals or groups have on risk
rather than positivist conceptions of reality that functionalism assumes gives order to
society. This is further emphasised by question 24 which asks whether people think
those responsible for informing the public on risk communicate this information
effectively. Figure 22 shows that there is not an overwhelmingly positive or negative
answer to this question. This suggests people are undecided on whether social
informants fulfil their role as effective communicators of risk and are perhaps impartial
as to whether they perform effectively as people are more inclined to act in an
autonomous fashion which relies more upon personal experience or their own
constructions of reality
Question 25 asked whether people feel experts and government bodies fulfil
their roles in informing the public about day to day risks. Figure 23 shows the
responses suggest people believe experts and social informants do not fulfil their roles
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55. as completely as they might be able to. The opinion that experts and government
bodies may not be effectively informing the public on day to day risks allows for risk
communication to be discussed. We have established above that people generally trust
expert informants which should allow for effective risk communication and a reciprocal
relationship between lay persons and experts in regard to effective social learning.
However as the responses to question 24 point out a higher proportion of people believe
this information could be communicated more effectively. The lay belief that public
information is being delivered poorly or even being mis-communicated can lead to a
perspective which rationalises dangerous decisions.
Question 26 gave respondents the option to make qualitative statements about
the issues raised in questions 20 to 25. They have provided an insight into lay opinions
regarding expert advice and risk communication. One respondent expressed an
attitudinal opinion which helps draw together all the aims of this study. The response
was ‘I believe they (experts) do provide good information, however I believe you will
only get the information if you look for it. Which is something I have never done'.
Although only expressed as a belief, this perspective seems somewhat contradictory in
that how can a person have a opinion upon something with which you have never
engaged. It has already been established through other data that most people do seek
expert advice yet believe the information could be better disseminated. However this
respondent, although not having sought expert advice believes they provide good
information. This response further supports the notion that persons who may be
autonomous in their approach to making decisions on risk may have irrational attitude
towards expert advice which could result in dangerous and uninformed decision
making.
55