- Viktor Orban has been the Prime Minister of Hungary for 6 years and has consolidated control over the country's assets and media, putting them in his own or his allies' pockets. He claims to support common Hungarians but failed to get enough turnout for a referendum against EU immigration policies. - Orban is hollowing out Hungary's democratic institutions and challenging the EU, and the EU has been too lenient in response due to concerns about pushing Hungary closer to Russia or hurting the Hungarian people economically. However, this permissiveness only encourages more autocratic behavior from Orban and other leaders.

1. Opinion
He has built, at great expense, a narrow-
gauge railway between two villages that
figured in his childhood and where his
family now owns homes. Soccer-ob-
sessed, he also built a large sports sta-
dium near his weekend house. He ma-
nipulates news coverage in many ways,
including letting cronies snatch control
of national media outlets that fell on bad
times. When he created a government
program to encourage land acquisition
to assist farmers, one conspicuous
beneficiary was his wife.
For the past six years, Viktor Orban,
the prime minister of Hungary, has
vacuumed up his country’s assets,
putting them either in his pocket or the
pockets of people close to him. This is
no secret. His kleptocracy has been
well studied. But there is a tendency to
view it merely as sad and remote, a
familiar story of yet another autocrat in
a country struggling with a transition
to democracy.
The truth is darker. Mr. Orban is
hollowing out his country’s fragile
institutions and challenging core pre-
cepts of the European Union — with the
acquiescence of the European Union
itself, and the enabling of the United
States. Though he claims to speak for
the common masses of Hungary, as
opposed to its elites, just last weekend
he failed to rouse enough voters to take
part in a referendum that would have
renounced European Union immigra-
tion policies. He claimed victory be-
cause 98.2 percent of those who voted
were with him, but the rest of Europe
breathed relief that the low turnout had
nullified the referendum’s validity.
In fact, without the European Union,
his administration would be in deep
trouble. The union cofinances a large
share of all public investments; inside
the union, many of those investments
have come under suspicion of being
corruptly handled.
Nevertheless, European politicians
cite three arguments — all debatable —
to justify their leniency:1) By staying
“involved” with Hungary, the European
Union can influence things for the bet-
ter. 2) Average Hungarians would be the
first economic victims of a withdrawal
of support. 3) Taking a hard line with Mr.
Orban might prompt him to lead Hunga-
ry out of the 28-nation bloc into the
embrace of Russia’s president, Vladimir
V. Putin, starting a trend that could pull
along Poland and other neighbors.
This European Union policy of per-
missiveness can only encourage the
worst tendencies in Mr. Orban and
those like him — emulating Mr. Putin
and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of
Turkey. They, too, offer autocracy hid-
ing behind a democratic facade, laying
claim ever more unconvincingly to
democratic practices like majority rule
and the appearance of independent
institutions of governance.
By not taking Mr. Orban seriously,
the West is failing not only the people of
Hungary but the broader cause of
decent governance at a time of populist
discontent around the world. Mr. Orban
has the support of many of his own
people because, like Mr. Putin, he taps
into a fantasy of lost glory and presents
himself as the defender of Europe’s
Christian identity in the face of a Mus-
lim flood. Equally alarming is that Mr.
Orban’s truculence could become a
blueprint for the European Union’s
self-destruction: a government that
derides union governance while taking
its money to enrich an oligarchy and
entrench populist nationalism.
European Union funding for Hunga-
ry is enormous: an expected 25 billion
euros in the 2014 to 2020 funding cycle,
per capita more than any union country
other than Lithuania. Transparency
International describes a large percent-
age of Hungarian projects funded by
the European Union as corrupt.
Other European countries hope that
Mr. Orban’s undermining of democracy
will lead to pervasive discontent and
strong public opposition, but that is not
happening. The Hungarian population
has been quiescent except for infre-
quent street protests against, for exam-
ple, internet
taxes or Mr.
Orban’s vision of
educational
reform.
Uninhibited
and shameless,
Mr. Orban ap-
pears unmoved
by Western
criticism, dis-
missing it as
foreign “political correctness” while
state television explains it as a product
of Western conspiracies (by bankers in
league with journalists). Ironically, the
most muscular opposition to him comes
from a party, Jobbik, which is even
further to the right and which recently
accused him of trumpeting “so-called
achievements” through “double talk”
that conceals his real intentions.
In America, the democracy advocate
George Soros, who was born in Hunga-
ry and follows it closely, views Mr.
Orban as seriously challenging Angela
Merkel for leadership of Europe when
he promotes “the principles of Hungar-
ian and Christian identity” and de-
nounces European Union refugee
settlement proposals.
ItisunsettlingtorememberthatMr.
Orban’sdisgustwith whathecalls
“Westernvalues,”hisdeterminationto
resurrectpre-1914 Hungarianborders,
and hisexplicitidentity-based national-
ismarisefromtheseedbed ofhistoric
grievance thatproduced bothworld
wars.
On the internet, Hungarian dissidents
describe a brand of cooperation be-
tween government and business that
approaches an art form. For example:
European Union funds intended to
assure the transparency of funded
projects are sidelined by invented
project-management companies into
investigations that go nowhere; mean-
while, Mr. Orban’s close associates
receive huge payments for useless
consulting work, or loans with which to
buy up steeply discounted assets like
exclusive real estate and vineyards.
Alongthe way,Mr.Orbanhascur-
tailed theconstitutionalcourt’sability to
serveasacheckonParliamentand,
accordingtoHumanRightsWatch,
diminishedthe protectionofminorities.
IfanOrbanassociate isaccused of
stealingfunds,thejudiciary proves
enfeebled.Afewheadlinessuggesting
governmentconcernquickly evaporate
intoinaction.
What can be done? Germany should
be urged to play a central role. German
companies figure heavily in Hungary’s
automotive industry, which contributes
10 percent of the country’s gross domes-
tic product and is the fastest-growing
sector of the national economy. Even as
he works to fracture the European
Union, Mr. Orban will pay attention if
Ms. Merkel demonstrates there are
consequences for bad behavior.
The union should go beyond periodic
slaps on the wrist by invigorating se-
vere economic sanctions and placing
Hungarian-bound funds in escrow
during compliance investigations.
The United States can work behind
the scenes, avoiding Mr. Orban’s para-
noia in imagining a Soros-inspired
cabal. It can support social media, and a
new American president should chal-
lenge Mr. Orban’s demonization of
Brussels.
Hungary has a vibrant humanistic
culture. Its universities, literature,
design, music and performing arts,
medical science and technology are
world class. You’ll find salons where the
conversation dissecting Mr. Orban’s
behavior is breathtakingly brilliant.
But the opposition is deflated; as in
Turkey, Russia and Venezuela, there is
an overriding resignation that the
country will not change, that the best
and brightest will continue to flee,
seeking a better future. Unless some-
thing fundamental changes, the resig-
nation one senses in Hungary will
continue because most Hungarians
believe Mr. Orban has won.
VLADIMIR SIMICEK/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE — GETTY IMAGES
Biting the E.U. that feeds him
Is Hungary’s
prime minister
creating a model
for demagogic
populism
throughout
Central Europe?
Kenneth Krushel
The cease-fire in Syria that the United
States and Russia tortuously negotiat-
ed has, like the one before it, fallen
apart.
The trouble began when an errant
American airstrike killed some 60
Syrian government soldiers. Then,
Russia resumed its disingenuous
grandstanding and the Syrian govern-
ment, with Russia’s support, went back
to indiscriminately bombing rebel-held
areas of Aleppo. On Monday, less than
a month after the agreement went into
effect, Secretary of State John Kerry
announced that the United States
would break off talks with Russia on
trying to revive it.
This failure, accompanied by images
of suffering in Aleppo, has inspired
renewed calls for a tougher American
policy in Syria from liberal hawks and
traditional conservatives alike. At the
vice-presidential debate on Tuesday,
both the Democrat, Senator Tim Kaine
of Virginia, and the Republican, Gov.
Mike Pence of Indiana, advocated for
more aggressive American action.
But the truth is that it is too late for
the United States to wade deeper into
the Syrian conflict without risking a
major war, or, at best, looking feckless
by failing to fully commit to con-
fronting Russia and President Bashar
al-Assad of Syria and then backing
down. The goal now should be reduc-
ing harm, saving lives and keeping
prospects for a political deal alive.
Cease-fire talks between the United
States and Russia, tormented though
they may be, remain the best way to
achieve this.
Although Russia has denied it, it is
clear that Moscow considers Mr. As-
sad’s survival crucial to protecting its
interests in Syria, which include com-
bating jihadism, preserving intelli-
gence and military assets, and as-
serting that Russia is a geopolitical
player in the Middle East. Russia has
unflinchingly protected the Assad
government both militarily and at the
United Nations Security Council.
Indeed, Mr. Assad seems to enjoy
practically unlimited leverage over
Russia. Despite narrowly escaping
American pun-
ishment for using
chemical
weapons by
surrendering his
stockpile of
deadly nerve gas
and other poi-
sons in 2013, Mr.
Assad has felt
free to continue
using toxic com-
mercial chlorine
gas. Even though Russia moved to-
ward political compromise when it
provisionally withdrew from Syria in
March, Mr. Assad was not inclined to
give peace talks a serious chance. In
both cases, Russia fell back in line with
Mr. Assad’s defiant brutality.
There are probably limits to
Moscow’s deference to Mr. Assad’s
blood lust, but it is unclear what they
are. This is what makes an American
escalation in Syria so dangerous.
American supporters of interven-
tion, including the vice-presidential
candidates, often say that the United
States should create a no-fly zone in
Syria to protect civilians from Mr.
Assad and Russia’s bombs. But imag-
ine how this might work: An American
warplane enforcing a no-fly zone would
risk fire from a Russian-made antiair-
craft battery or fighter. (Just this week
Russia shipped new antiaircraft sys-
tems to Syria.)
This risk clearly worries advocates
for the use of force within the Obama
administration. They are said to favor
increased air support for the Syrian
rebels that would avoid direct con-
frontation with the Russians. But
small-scale, targeted bombing is un-
likely to change Syrian behavior, so to
be effective the strikes would have to
escalate. (Alternatively, ineffective
strikes could be ended, but this would
make the United States look incompe-
tent.) This would ultimately lead to a
violent response, which would compel
the United States to retaliate against
Russian and Syrian government
ground targets.
As conflict spiraled and casualties
increased, so would international
pressure for another costly, protracted
and thankless American-led ground
intervention to enforce peace, which
domestic opinion in the United States
would not support. While Russia’s real
appetite for a political solution in the
Syria conflict is unclear, it is wiser to
test unknown political limits than
unknown military ones.
Some of those advocating for more
intervention in Syria believe that as
the so-called indispensable power, the
United States has an ethical responsi-
bility to reduce the suffering caused by
Syrian and Russian bombing of
civilians. Another camp of interven-
tionists criticizes what it sees as Presi-
dent Obama’s weakness, heartlessness
and strategic myopia, and wants the
United States to stand up to Russia
and assert its intention to remain a
major geopolitical player in the region.
The United States does, in fact, have
a clear Syria policy: Roll back the
Islamic State by way of the air cam-
paign and American-supported Syrian
rebel forces, coordinating with Russia
to the extent possible; provide exten-
sive humanitarian support; and contin-
ue to press for a sustainable cease-fire
and a negotiated political transition
involving Mr. Assad’s eventual depar-
ture. It may be frustrating, but against
the alternatives, it is the only sensible
course of action.
Certainly, the Syrian government
and Russia have manipulated the
cease-fires, using them as cover for
continuing offensives. Nonetheless,
fragile though they have been, these
deals ratchet down the overall level of
violence and save lives.
The deal struck by Mr. Kerry and his
Russian counterpart, Sergey V. Lavrov,
for the United States and Russia to
coordinate counter-jihadist operations
and restrain opposition and govern-
ment military activity was intended to
produce a durable cease-fire, promote
more effective humanitarian opera-
tions and re-energize political talks.
Although it has fallen apart, the next
step, unsatisfying as it may be, is to try
again.
With the
cease-fire
collapsed,
American
intervention
might seem
tempting. It’s
still a bad idea.
How to avoid a Syrian quagmire
Steven Simon
Jonathan Stevenson
STEVEN SIMON, a professor at Amherst
College, was the National Security
Council’s senior director for the Middle
East and North Africa from 2011
through 2012. JONATHAN STEVENSON, a
senior fellow at the International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies and a fellow
at Cullman Center, was the council’s
director for political-military affairs for
the Middle East and North Africa from
2011 to 2013.
By any measure, António Guterres of Portugal is an excel-
lent choice to replace Ban Ki-moon of South Korea as the
next United Nations secretary general. He has experience,
energy and diplomatic finesse, all of which he’ll need to
lead the United Nations as it confronts regional wars,
rising tensions between Russia and the West, China’s
aggressive posture in Asia and the refugee crisis in the
Middle East and Europe.
Against these challenges, the secretary general post has
only limited power, and its diplomatic influence is even
more attenuated with stateless terrorist groups and insur-
gencies that cross international borders. A good part of Mr.
Guterres’s work will be to figure out how the United Na-
tions, a 193-member body, can navigate a world in which
terrorism and war are melded and now are driven by
multiple forces.
After leading Portugal as prime minister, Mr. Guterres
served as the United Nations high commissioner for
refugees for a decade until 2015, dealing with the displace-
ment of millions fleeing wars in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq
and elsewhere by providing food and shelter and finding
them refuge in other countries. Mr. Guterres was effective
at pressing Western nations to do more to help and at
hammering out agreements in difficult circumstances. As
the refugee crisis has worsened, it has generated a nation-
alistic backlash in Europe and the United States. Mr.
Guterres’s understanding of the problem and his passion-
ate advocacy for just and compassionate solutions could
persuade governments to keep accepting refugees, rather
than shut them out.
Wars in the Middle East and elsewhere have eroded
confidence in the United Nations’ ability to be a force for
peace, its core mission. Mr. Guterres has spoken of in-
tensifying diplomatic efforts to reach peace agreements in
Syria, Libya and Yemen. He will need to do that while also
seeking to mitigate the dangerous rivalry between Iran
and Saudi Arabia, overseeing implementation of the Iran
nuclear deal, enforcing nuclear sanctions against North
Korea and feeding millions of people at risk of starvation.
Mr. Guterres, a forceful personality and an effective
political communicator, may become, as Matthew Rycroft,
the British ambassador to the United Nations, said, the
kind of secretary general “who will provide a convening
power and a moral authority at a time when the world is
divided on issues, above all like Syria.” If Security Council
members permit Mr. Guterres to do that, he may yet re-
store the mission and reputation of an international insti-
tution that is still trying to find its role in a perilous and
complicated world.
António
Guterres of
Portugal
should make
an effective
United Na-
tions secre-
tary general,
when his
nomination is
approved by
the General
Assembly.
A GOOD CHOICE FOR U.N. CHIEF
The State Department quietly notified Congress last
month that it had decided, after considerable deliberation,
to certify that Mexico had made enough progress in up-
holding human rights to justify receiving its full security
aid package of about $155 million.
That reversed last year’s decision to withhold a small
portion of that assistance that Congress had made contin-
gent on demonstrable progress on protecting human
rights. The department’s justification, which has only
recently come to light, is far from persuasive.
While Mexico has announced a series of initiatives to
curb the use of torture, and it promised to more dutifully
investigate forced disappearances, its commitments can-
not be trusted, not least because of the stunning mishan-
dling of the investigation into the suspected massacre of 43
university students two years ago.
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, who sought the aid
conditions, said Mexico had not made sufficient progress
in ending torture, disappearances and extrajudicial
killings. “Instead, we have seen a pattern of failing to
investigate, destroying evidence, threatening witnesses
and covering up for corrupt and abusive soldiers and
police,” he told The Times. “It is not only the cases on the
front pages of the newspapers; it is thousands of nameless
Mexicans who are victims of the officials whose job is to
protect them.”
Emblematic of the shortcomings of Mexico’s justice
system is the government’s failure to offer a credible ac-
count of what happened to the students from Ayotzinapa
after they vanished on the night of Sept. 26, 2014. In April,
an exhaustively documented report by a panel of interna-
tional experts charged that Mexican officials had mis-
placed, disregarded and fabricated evidence, raising the
possibility of a cover-up. The government’s account held
that the students, who were traveling in buses, were killed
by drug cartel members after local police officials had
pulled them over.
Last month, the attorney general’s office announced the
resignation of the former chief criminal investigator,
Tomas Zerón de Lucio. Hours after Mr. Zerón’s resignation,
President Enrique Peña Nieto appointed him to a plum
post on the National Security Council, a move that appears
to shield Mr. Zerón, for the time being, from accountability.
Mexico
promised to
diligently in-
vestigate the
disappear-
ance of 43
students, but
it has become
clear officials
are more in-
terested in
damage con-
trol than the
truth.
2 YEARS AFTER STUDENTS VANISHED
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KENNETH KRUSHEL, an adjunct professor
at the New School’s Media Manage-
ment Program in New York, has been
an executive at entertainment and
telecommunications companies and a
media industry investment analyst.
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