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MEMORANDUM
TO: Enjolie Dawson
FROM: Joni Schultz
DATE: Thursday, May 15, 2015
RE: Grange v. St. Holy Parochial School
FILE NO.: 062502
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ms. Grange filled out a job application at St. Holy Parochial School and was contacted by
the principal three days later. On August 5, 2014, Madison Grange signed a one year teaching
contract for the 2014-2015 school year and was hired by St. Holy Parochial School in Louisiana
to begin working as a Kindergarten teacher.
On October 31, 2014, Ms. Grange was informed by the Principal that she would be
terminated because she withheld information on her employment application. At her previous
place of employment, Ms. Grange was asked to resign from her position. Ms. Grange left that
information blank on her job application with St. Holy Parochial School. In consequence, Ms.
Grange was terminated for not being truthful on her employment application.
B. QUESTION PRESENTED
Under Louisiana law, does Ms. Grange have a valid claim for relief pursuant to cancellation
of her employment contract?

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C. BRIEF ANSWER
No. Ms. Grange does not have a valid claim against St. Holy Parochial School for
relief pursuant to cancellation of her employment contract.
D. APPLICABLE STATUTES
 La.Civil Code art. 1779 (2015).
 La.Civil Code art. 1819 (2015).
 La.Civ.Code art. 1949 (2015).
 La.Civ.Code art. 1948 (2015).
 La.Civ.Code art. 1950 (2015).
 La. Code Civ. Proc. Art. 966(C)(2) (2015).
 La.Civ.Code Ann. Art. 1832 (2015).
 La. R.S. 17:444(c)(1) (2015).
E. DISCUSSION
This memo addresses whether or not Madison Grange has a valid claim for relief for
the cancellation of her employment contract, whether Ms. Grange was dishonest when she
fraudulently misrepresented herself on her employment application with St. Holy Parochial School
pursuant to resigning from her position at her previous place of employment, and whether or not
St. Holy Parochial School has a duty to investigate the application before extending an offer for
employment.
At its core, fraud, as applied to contracts, can be defined as “the cause of an error bearing
on a material part of the contract, created or continued by artifice, with design to obtain some
unjust advantage to the one party, or to cause an inconvenience or loss to the other. Fraud, in the

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sense of a court of equity, properly includes all acts, omissions, and concealments which involve
a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, and are injurious to another,
or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.”1
The court will determine whether Ms. Grange’s conduct was fraudulent pursuant to
withholding material facts on the contract which lead to St. Holy Parochial School’s cancellation of
Ms. Grange’s employment contract.
I now turn to the following Louisiana cases wherein the applicants for teaching positions
had intentionally withheld information or lied on their applications. As a result, the contracts were
cancelled pursuant to breach of contract for all of the reasons fully set forth below.
WAS THE CONSENT OF THE CONTRACT VALID?
In all of these cases, it is obvious that the applicants for teaching positions had intentionally
withheld information or lied on their applications. As with Grange, in LaCross v. Cornerstone
Christian Academy, 896 So.2d 105 (LA. 2004), the third circuit held that "a teacher's answer on
an employment application that she did not drink alcohol, and her signature on the application
indicating that her answers were complete and correct, constituted induced error that vitiated the
school's consent to the employment contract. The summer after the teacher had executed the
contract, the school learned that she had gone out with co-workers and admitted drinking four to
five beers." Particularly in LaCross, the court states that LaCross lied, much like Grange
wherein Grange was not truthful on her application because Grange intentionally left the question
blank on her application that states, "Have you ever been reprimanded, disciplined, discharged, or
asked to resign from a prior position?” As with Grange, in LaCross, Cornerstone contends that it
1 “fraud.” Black’s Law Dictionary. 1910. http://thelawdictionary.org/fraud/ (11 May 2015).

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was under no obligation to honor the employment contract extended to Mrs. LaCross. Much like
Grange, Mrs. LaCross misled the school into believing that she had certain qualities and
characteristics that the school solicited. That is why an error concerning a cause exists and renders
the contract void ab initio because without Mrs. LaCross’s misrepresentations, Cornerstone would
have not offered an employment contract to Mrs. LaCross.
By extension, in Bischoff v. Brothers of The Sacred Heart, 416 So.2d 348 (La.App. 4 Cir.,
1982), the fourth circuit found that "there was a breach of a teaching contract when a teacher hired
at a Catholic school checked off "Practicing Catholic: Yes" and under "Marital Status" noted
"Married" when the applicant had been married in a Catholic church, divorced, and remarried. The
court found that the applicant had intentionally concealed his marital status because later
conversation with one of the school leaders revealed that he knew he would not have been hired
as a religion teacher if he had revealed his true status."
Simply put, in Bischoff the issue is whether Mr. Bischoff intended to deceive the school. As
with Bischoff, Grange withheld information because Grange felt that admitting she previously had
been asked to resign from a prior position would hurt her chances for employment.
As in Ostrolenk v. Louise S. McGehee School, 402 So.2d 237 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ denied,
404 So.2d 1259 (La. 1981) and in Bischoff, the fourth circuit held “that when the applicant
misstates or fails to state facts, on the application, in an attempt to mislead the school
administration, the contract of employment is invalid from its inception.” Put another way,
La.Civil Code art. 1779 states that “consent of the parties legally given is a requisite to the validity
of a contract.” Likewise, La.Civil Code art. 1819 states that “consent being the concurrence of
intention in two or more persons, with regard to a matter understood by all, reciprocally

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communicated, and resulting in each party from a free and deliberate exercise of the will, it follows
that there is no consent where it has been produced by error.”
Like the plaintiffs in Bischoff and LaCross, Ms. Grange induced school officials into
believing that she possessed principles she really lacked. La.Civ.Code art. 1949 states that “Error
vitiates consent [to a contract] only when it concerns a cause without which the obligation would
not have been incurred and that cause was known or should have been known to the other party.”
As with La.Civ.Code art. 1949, La.Civ.Code art. 1948 states “Consent may be vitiated by error,
fraud, or duress.” “When one party is in error and, thus, the error is unilateral, there is no meeting
of the minds.” See Scoggin v. Bagley, 368 So.2d 763 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1979). “A unilateral error
may invalidate a contract when an error exists as to a fact that was a cause for making the contract
and when the party who induced the error knew or should have known that it was the cause.” See
Nugent v. Stanley, 336 So.2d 1058 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1976). Specifically, La.Civ.Code art. 1950
states that “a party may obtain relief if s/he intended to contract with a certain person or a person
of a certain quality or character and the other party lacked the intended quality or character.”
Furthermore, “even when an obligation has multiple causes, error that bears on any one of them is
sufficient to make the obligation invalid.”
Much like Grange, in Board of Trustees, State Employees Group Benefits Program v.
Moncrieffe, 93-1393 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/07/94), Moncrieffe appealed a decision of the Louisiana
Civil Service Commission, which ordered the reinstatement of Moncrieffe (former employee),
whose employment had been terminated for cause. Moncrieffe was terminated for falsification of
his employment application and poor work performance. Id. Moncrieffe failed to disclose the fact
that he had prior state service and that he had been removed from a prior job for poor work
performance, which included falsification of work records. Id. The Commission reinstated

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Moncrieffe with back pay. Id. In reversing the Commission’s decision, the First Circuit Court of
Appeal held that the Board provided sufficient evidence that Moncrieffe lied on his employment
application and that the falsehood bore a substantial relation to his qualification for public work
involving reliability and trustworthiness. Id. The First Circuit Court of Appeal also rejected
Moncrieffe’s claim that the Board should be stopped on the basis of the length of time it took to
catch the lie, holding that inefficient personnel policies could not be used as a shield. Id. The First
Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the trial court, which ordered the reinstatement of
Moncrieffe, whose employment had been terminated for cause. Id. Along with Moncrieffe, in
Housing Authority of Morgan City v. Gibson, 598 So.2d at 550 states that “an employee’s prior
misconduct may later give rise to disciplinary action.”
Thus, based upon the above cases, it appears Ms. Grange’s consent to the contract is not
valid.
WAS IT THE SCHOOL’S DUTY TO PERFORM A BACKGROUND CHECK ON MS.
GRANGE?
As in, El-Amin v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 929 So.2d 838 (La.App., 2006), the trial court
found that "Plaintiff had not been forthcoming with his answer on the application for employme nt
regarding his status as a defendant in criminal proceedings and that the School Board did not have
a duty to investigate the application." The trial court found that Mr. El-Amin’s silence on the
pending felony charges resulted in error sufficient to vitiate consent. Id. In El-Amin, on the blank
space provided on the employment application Mr. El-Amin indicated to "Please contact: Richard
V. Burnes Attorney at Law (318) 442-4300" when one of the questions on the employment
application asked, "Have you ever been arrested for any crime, whether a felony or
misdemeanor? If yes, give details below including conviction or guilty pleas." Unlike El-
Amin, Grange intentionally omitted information on her employment contract wherein Grange had

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previously been asked to resign from a prior position. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article
966(C)(2) provides that “the mover bears the initial burden of proof. If the mover meets the initial
burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that he will be able to satisfy the
evidentiary burden at trial.” See Champagnev. Ward, 893 So.2d 773. La.Civ.Code Ann. Art. 1832
states that “a false representation of a material fact by a teacher, with knowledge of its falsity, with
intent to induce the school authorities to enter into a contract of employment to teach, constitutes
fraud sufficient to entitle the school authorities to avoid the contract and that in all cases, however,
when the information which would have destroyed the error, has been withheld by the other party
to the contract, it comes under the head of fraud, and invalidates the contract.”
Along with El-Amin, in Ostrolenk v. Louise S. McGehee School, 402 So.2d 237 (La.App. 4
Cir.) the fourth circuit held that "a teacher's omission on her employment application of her
termination at another private school during the previous year established that error existed as to
the principal cause of the contract which rendered the contract null from its beginning." Judge
Samuel, in Ostrolenk, further cited 78 C.J.S. “Schools and School Districts,” Sec. 187, p. 1043-
44, as follows:
“A false representation of a material fact by the teacher, with knowledge of its
falsity, with intent to induce the school authorities to enter into a contract of
employment to teach, constitutes fraud sufficient to entitle the school authorities to
avoid the contract.”
In a nutshell, in El-Amin the court ruled in Mr. El-Amin's favor. By contrast,
in LaCross and Bischoff the court ruled in favor of the school.
Furthermore, in Wright v. Caldwell Parish School Board, 98-1225 (La. 03/02/99); 733
So.2d 1174; 1999 La. LEXIS 1002, the Supreme Court of Louisiana granted Caldwell Parish
School Board’s writ of certiorari from the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, Parish of Caldwell
(Louisiana), to determine if Caldwell Parish School Board’s failure to notify Wright of non-

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renewal of her initial employment contract, at least 120 days before that contract’s termination
date, required Caldwell Parish School Board to offer Wright a new contract. After Caldwell Parish
School Board’s tie vote regarding whether plaintiff’s contract of employment as assistant principal
should be renewed, Caldwell Parish School Board’s President declared Wright unemployed. Id.
Wright filed a petition of mandamus with the trial court asking to compel Caldwell Parish School
Board to offer her a new contract based on their alleged noncompliance with the Teacher Tenure
Law. Id. The trial court declined to issue the writ and the appeals court reversed that decision,
finding that Caldwell Parish School Board had a mandatory duty to negotiate and offer Wright a
new contract because Caldwell Parish School Board did not notify Wright of termination of
employment under Wright’s contract 120 days or more prior to the contract’s termination. Id. The
Supreme Court of Louisiana granted a writ to consider the correctness of that ruling and reversed
the holding that Caldwell Parish School Board was not statutorily required to offer Wright a new
contract based on its failure to give 120 days’ notice. Id. The Supreme Court of Louisiana
remanded the case to the appeals court to consider other errors raised by Wright. Id. The Supreme
Court of Louisiana reversed the judgment in favor of Wright and determined that the failure of
Caldwell Parish School Board to give Wright 120 days notice that Wright’s initial contract would
not be renewed did not obligate the Caldwell Parish School Board to negotiate and offer Wright a
subsequent contract. Id. The Supreme Court of Louisiana remanded the case to the appeals court
to determine the remainder of the issues raised by Wright. Id.
Because Grange is a recent college graduate, Grange’s contract does not plunge into the
contract terms under The Teacher Tenure Law wherein Grange was a teacher who was recently
hired by St. Holy Parochial School as a Kindergarten teacher. Thus, Grange did not have tenure
at the time of her termination. Pursuant to La. R.S. 17:444(c)(1), “a clear reading which relates

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only to ‘subsequent contracts,’ allows the parties to enter into ‘subsequent contracts’ and
immediately thereafter provides that not less than 120 days prior to the termination of ‘such
contract,’ the superintendent must notify the employee of termination under ‘such contract.’ Thus,
it only requires a school board to give the employee 120 days notice prior to the end of the
subsequent contract, not the initial contract. As argued by the Board, requiring the Board to give
the employee 120 days notice during initial contract would not give the Board enough time to
properly evaluate the employee.”
Therefore, according to Louisiana law, St. Holy Parochial School did have a duty to
investigate Ms. Grange’s background prior to extending an offer of employment with the school.
In our case, Ms. Grange’s intent was to fraudulently misrepresent to St. Holy Parochial School
because she was dishonest on her employment application. Based on the issues and cases indicated
above, St. Holy Parochial School is not time barred on its investigation of Ms. Grange pursuant to
equitable estoppel.
F. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons given above, Ms. Grange is not very likely to have a valid
claim for relief because she "intentionally" left that information blank on her job application. This
was an obvious attempt to fraudulently mislead. Therefore, St. Holy Parochial School terminated
Ms. Grange based on material breach for Ms. Grange’s failure to abide by standards of conduct
and behavior reasonably expected in schools of similar quality and reputation clause noted in the
early termination section of the one year contract of employment which Ms. Grange signed
on August 5, 2014, attesting to fraudulent misrepresentation and perjury.

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Thus, viewing all the evidence both direct and circumstantial in the light most favorable to
the state, any rational trier of fact would conclude beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion
of any reasonable hypothesis that Ms. Grange’s bad faith caused contractual error and the contract
of employment was invalid from its inception. Because, it was Ms. Grange’s intent to fraudulently
misrepresent her valid claim on the contract, the court is not likely to find that St. Holy Parochial
School has a duty to investigate the application before extending an offer for employment.