1. NO: A1/2001/0441
Neutral Citation Number: [2001] EWCA Civ 711
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2
Monday, 14th May 2001
B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE LONGMORE
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CARLA BENNETT
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LONDON BOROUGH OF SOUTHWARK
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2. Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited
180 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2HD
Telephone No: 0171-421 4040 Fax No: 0171-831 8838
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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MR JOE SYKES (instructed by Philip Glah & Co, 259/260 Temple Chambers, Temple Avenue,
London EC4Y 0HP) appeared on behalf of the Applicant
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J U D G M E N T

3. LORD JUSTICE LONGMORE: This is a most unfortunate case originated by a claimant in the
Employment Tribunal; the applicant which was dismissed in the mid-1990s and began
proceedings for racial discrimination and/or unfair dismissal.
The first tribunal after ten days hearing disqualified themselves because they considered
that the representative of the applicant had accused the tribunal of racial bias. The matter
was left in the air. There was then an application by the respondents to a second
employment tribunal for an order striking the case out on account of the vexatious nature of
the conduct of the appellant's representative. That application succeeded.
The matter then went to the Employment Appeal Tribunal which held that the first tribunal
was wrong to have disqualified themselves and to stop the hearing after ten days, that there
was therefore no ground for the invocation of the services of a second employment tribunal
but that they themselves, the Employment Appeal Tribunal, having all the powers of an
employment appeal tribunal, would decide whether the case should be struck out, and they
did decide that the case should be struck out, thereby effectively agreeing with the decision
of the second tribunal.
Although this is a second-tier appeal, it seems to me it is right to grant permission to appeal.
It is in my judgment arguable first that questions of principle as to the correct approach to
both the employment tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal are in issue where a
question is raised as to the possible bias of the tribunal, and, secondly, it is arguable that the
consequences of allowing the appeal from the discontinuance order of the first employment
tribunal were not fully or accurately addressed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal.
It is a most unfortunate fact that the applicant was dismissed many years ago, as she was,
but the other unfortunate fact is that no hearing has yet been brought to a conclusion.
Therefore, it seems to me that it would be right to grant permission to appeal in what I
repeat is a very unfortunate case.
(Application to appeal allowed)
SMITH BERNAL