Strangers in a New Land - 2014

American University School of International Service
Strangers in a
New Land
Analyzing Integration Through a Communications Lens
Jeffrey Wuerstlin
Fall 2014

American University – School of International Service Jeffrey Wuerstlin
Washington, DC
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Table of Contents:
Introduction 3
Literature Review 4
Turks in Germany 5
History & Introduction 5
Government Communication Tools & Integration Programs 7
Legal Framework for Immigration 9
Language Learning in School & Work 10
Civic Life & Community Outreach 11
Cooperation with Turkish Organizations 12
The Turkish Government & Its Diaspora 14
Community Communication Tools & Integration Efforts 14
Programs From & Within the Community 14
Cross-Cultural Communications 15
Political Communication & Activism 15
Overall Impact in Germany 16
Algerians in France 17
Language in School & Work 20
Programs From & Within the Community 22
Perceptions of Acceptance, Tolerance & Feeling French 23
Overall Impact in France 23
Mexicans in the United States 24

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The Obama Administration 27
Language Learning in School 27
The Mexican Government & Its Diaspora 29
Political Activism 30
Mexican Organizations 30
Language Patters 31
Notions of Identity 31
Overall Impact in the United States 32
Conclusions & Recommendations 32
Bibliography 35

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Introduction:
In a day and age when a student visa can serve as a cover for an agent of a terror
organization, national economies are inextricably linked to one another, and the development
and diffusion of mass communication technologies sees an almost daily increase, the question
of immigration and integration of diaspora groups presents a multilayered, multi-issue dilemma
for nation states. Each nation, depending on its own unique political history, geographical
location, and national agenda must establish a set of goals when considering its immigrant
populations and their effect on the national identity. More than that, these nations must then find
a way to implement tools and programs so as to achieve these goals.
In order to conduct an examination of the effects and realities of the communication tools
and trends in Germany, France, and the United States, this study will consider what is set forth
in an official capacity and what is occurring more organically from the members of the
community. Several aspects of life in these three nations will be evaluated through two scopes:
government and non-government.
Using the governmental scope, the following elements of life for an immigrant will be
evaluated:
 Immigration procedure and its legal parameters
o Allowances, limitations, expectations, and justification
 Education
o Nationally prescribed standards to be reached
 Civic participation
o Establishment and use of official channels of communication between State and
residents for various purposes
 Language and culture acquisition
o State expectations for immigrants and value added for maintenance of national
identity.
Through the non-governmental lens, the elements listed above will take on a new value for
their evaluation:
 Immigration policy
o Success or failure rates of language and culture training pre- and post-arrival
 Education
o Educational levels attained compared to citizen population
 Civic participation
o Non-official and informal channels of communication between members of
diaspora and greater community, to include the State
 Language and culture acquisition
o Use of national language versus native language as well as feeling of belonging

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By examining these elements through both scopes, the actual success of the
government tools and programs is rated. As well, a feeling for what is occurring at a more
organic level will develop as behaviors and trends grow and develop in response to and outside
any influence from the government institutions.
In addition to the elements identified, a consideration of the means of communication will
be made. It is important to understand how immigrants are accessing and utilizing the elements
above to integrate (adapt to the national identity) while simultaneously maintaining their own
cultural identity. Especially in light of generational differences in use or understanding of digital
communication tools, this underlining will enrich the discussion to follow and perhaps shed light
on true reasons for successes and failures as perceived by each group. Deepening the
scenarios to be analyzed is the undeniable element of culture. As will be discussed, it is entirely
possible that a few hundred miles separate two vastly different worlds. If one takes into account
all the cultures at play (native vs foreign, young vs old, conservative vs liberal, rich vs poor),
then a true discussion of integration and national identity as it concerns Diasporas can be had.
Literature Review:
Before the many elements of the questions at hand can even be asked, it is important to
know the concepts at play. Only by understanding what is happening beneath the observable
surface, can a full discussion of communication and integration be held. Moreover,
understanding that these concepts are acting simultaneously and on different levels of depth will
shape the analysis of integration and national identity.
At the most basic level, there is the difference in cultures. Hall (1976) sets the stage for
this discussion by breaking down the ever-seen yet never-noticed markers of various cultures in
an effort to explain why people behave as they do and why some people, when put together, will
not agree on any number of topics. For a start, Hall discusses the difference between “to do”
and “to be” cultures. He establishes that “to do” cultures are those wherein people identify
themselves based on their roles in the workplace. These cultures make heavy use of the verb
“to do” in everyday speech and often emphasize action as the best route to solving any
problem. Individuals from “to do” cultures are not bound to familial limitations; that is, a poor
man’s son doesn’t have to inherit his father’s trade and continue to be poor. Such a person
could, if desired, study or begin a trade that would bring in a higher level of income. Moreover,
social mobility is not only possible, but held fast as a laudable virtue.
Hall reconciles this self-interested and highly action-oriented culture type with the “to be”
cultures. As suggested, the most commonly used verb in cultures on this end of the spectrum is
“to be.” People on this end identify themselves by their familial relations. One might say that he
is the son of someone, rather than refer to his title afforded by his trade. Here too is an
underlying sense of loyalty to the family. A son could not simply leave the family trade to “better”
himself without seeming ungrateful or irreverent.
In 1887, Ferdinand Tönnies published his work on the dichotomy of the Gemeinschaft
and the Gesellschaft (“community” and “society”). The community-based life, Tönnies argues, is

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a life built on relationships with family. One born into this style of life know his or her place in the
ranking system based on internalized, wordless understandings of the power dynamics between
relationships. These power dynamics indicate who the father is, who the heir is, who the wife is,
and who the child is. Within these titles, people receive and uphold a certain set of duties and
responsibilities. These are rules of living that cannot be explained, but must be learned from
birth as one learns a native language. Secondly, Tönnies writes about the physical proximity
that the Gemeinschaft demands. Community “by blood, indicating primal unity of existence,
develops more specifically into community of place, which is expressed first of all as living in
close proximity to one another.”1
In a later chapter, Tönnies makes his theory on community
crystal clear with a third observation. He writes that “community life means the mutual
possession and enjoyment… of goods held in common.”2
Coupled with the power structures in
relationships and innate understanding of one’s place, this concept of mutual possession
signifies the fact that without these relationships and associations, one has nothing; no rank, no
support system, and no possessions. This point, as well as the other, relate directly to the “to
be” cultures that Hall describes.
In opposition to the Gemeinschaft, Tönnies’ theory of Gesellschaft founds the notion that
there are minimal power dynamics between people, but rather power spheres around people
and that humans interact by keeping these spheres present. Secondly, the physical proximity to
other humans is not a product of close familiar ties, but rather in spite of a lack of ties. Lastly,
Tönnies states that, when regarding possessions, “whatever anyone has and enjoys, he has
and enjoys to the exclusion of all others.”
Critically, one can see the Gemeinschaft theory as representative of the non-western
cultures that will be evaluated here. Even in the case of Latino Americans living in the United
States, there is much more propensity to tilt towards the characteristics of the “to be” cultures.
To balance that, the Gesellschaft theory is representative of the western cultures that will serve
as new homes to the immigrants in this analysis. Understanding the differences in the basic
mindsets of these two cultures types will assist greatly in discussing means of communication
and integration efforts.
The way in which people of certain cultural orientation interact with one another is not
just limited to metropolitan areas, rural villages, or personal interactions. Between 1967 and
1973, Dr. Geert Hofstede surveyed several nations in an effort to score them based on different
cultural dimensions. These dimensions illustrate how any of the surveyed nations handle or
perceive hierarchies in society (Power Distance), individualism versus collective associations
(Individualism), and competition versus cooperation (Masculinity).
The data from these surveys is very telling in the consideration of cultural orientation.
These three elements are particularly of interest to this analysis because they demonstrate on a
larger, more national scale the concepts presented by Tönnies and Hall. Power Distance, for
example, can be understood as the degree to which a nation respects the unquestionable
authority of those in power. A high score here would be indicative of a “to be” culture. Similarly,
low registers on the dimensions of Individualism and Masculinity would indicate that members of
that society rely on cooperation and do not look to themselves for achievement. Associating with
the group in this way also reflects notions found in the Gemeinschaft and “to be” cultures. High
1
Tönnies, Ferdinand, Jose Harris, and Margaret Hollis. "Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (Sociology)." In
Community and Civil Society, edited by Jose Harris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Kindle.
2 ibid

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scores in Individualism and Masculinity with a low score in Power Distance would indicate a
culture’s tendency towards the Gesellschaft and “to do” cultures.
According to Hofstede’s survey, Germany scored high on Individualism (77/100) and
Masculinity (76/100) and very low on Power Distance (35/100). These scores show that
Germans typically emphasize individual accomplishments, perceive themselves as being in a
competitive society, and do not rely very much on hierarchies (those in power can be
questioned and should be accessible). Turkey’s scores of Individualism (37/100), Masculinity
(45/100), and Power Distance (66/100) are in direct opposition to Germany. Turks, from what is
found in this data, do not prefer to work as individuals and they give credence to unquestionable
authority figures. Similar comparisons can be made when looking at the scores of the United
States and Mexico and France and North Africa (Hofstede, 2014).
Rich and Ogawa (1998) designed an analytic tool to help researchers appreciate the
boundaries and barriers that prevent effective communication in intercultural and interracial
relations. Using circles to represent cultural environments in which different people live, the two
researchers modeled the experience of a cultural/racial minority living in an area populated by a
dominating culture. Overlapping circles demonstrate how even though an individual from one
culture may be living in another (an immigrant, for purposes here), there are limits as to the
individual’s integration to the new dominant culture.
Figure 1 from Rich and Ogawa (above) shows two cultural circles occupied by two
different individuals (A and B). C represents the immigrant from B’s culture that now lives in the
space dominated by A’s culture. The broken line within the dominant culture’s circle (A)
represents the elasticity of C’s situation in A’s circle. Depending on the environment (including
the “whim” of A), C may choose to stay closer to B or to venture further toward A. Figure 2
shows how socioeconomic levels also affect the boundaries of integration and communication
between the dominant and immigrant cultures. Assuming that X represents a top socioeconomic
tier and Z the lowest tier, the bounds of financial resources and social standing are now
demonstrated. This is an essential tool in mapping out interactions between Diaspora
populations and native people in an analysis of integration and communication tools.
Through all of these concepts and tools for analyzing the interactions between cultures,
and especially Diasporas living in a vastly different cultural region, the whole picture will begin to
come together. It is not, then, just the language that serves as a barrier to integration, nor is it
Figure 1 Figure 2

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only the differences in value systems, but rather it is the sum of all of these things, working on
all levels that will shape the experiences of these three diasporas and their host nations.
Turks in Germany
History & Introduction:
Beginning in the 1950s and lasting through the 1970s, the federal government of
Germany signed formal agreements with other European, Slavic, and North African nations in
order to recruit Gastarbeiter (guest workers). The reasons for these recruitment contracts found
themselves in the high demand for labor in the growing post-WWII German economy. By 1968,
Germany had signed worker agreements with Spain, Greece, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia,
Yugoslavia, and Turkey. After this round of recruitment had ended, family reunification became
(and remains) one of the largest roads to German residency. Today, the foreign population of
Germany consists mainly of the third and fourth generations of these initial guest workers (CLIP,
2010).
Today, Germany is home to the largest Turkish diaspora in the European Union
(Florindi, 2014). The ranks of the already more than 2.5 million Turks (Larkin, 2006) swell each
year with the addition of new arrivals. As recently as 2012, Turkish immigration accounted for
2.6% of all immigration cases into the Federal Republic (“Migrationsbericht: 2012,” 2014) and
while that is not as much as the percentages seen by EU-nation immigrants (which can be as
high as 4.2%), it is still a significant and competitive rate.
However, while many foreigners whose home country is now part of the European
Union, moving to and residing in Germany is not all that complicated. On the other side, life for
the children and grandchildren of those first Turkish immigrants is not so easy. Media, senate
debates, and real life experiences have made the case for Turks in Germany a relevant issue in
the conversation on integration and national identity. In 2010, Thilo Sarrazin, former executive of
Deutsche Bank, Berlin finance minister, and board member of the Deutsche Bundesbank
(German Central Bank), released a book entitled: Deutschland shafft sich ab (Germany does
away with itself). Sarrazin’s arguments considered the current state of the German economic
situation and posited that Turkish immigrants were not only unwilling to integrate into German

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society, but that they were wholly unable. Despite initial fiery reaction to the book’s thesis from
even the conservative political parties in Germany,3
Sarrazin’s views slowly gained popularity.4
Recent publications suggest that Sarrazin and his followers are not the only ones who
feel the undercurrent of tensions in Germany. A survey of the current situation shows that most
Turkish residents of Germany live in ethnic enclaves because they are cut off economically,
politically, and socially. They network with one another, they employ one another, and they keep
isolated from their German neighbors because they do not feel that they are part of German
society (Tol, 2005). While government officials admit that Germany has become an immigrant
nation (Jacoby, 2011), many Turkish “immigrants” that were actually born in Germany feel as
though they are caught between two nations: one that doesn’t want them and one that they do
not know (despite its emblem on their passports) (Popp, Gezer & Scheuermann, 2011).
Government Communication Tools & Integration Programs:
The Federal Ministry for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) is the governmental body
officially tasked with running communications, integration courses, and gathering data on the
state of Germany’s diaspora groups. In a statement from 2009, the Ministry defined its mission
as follows:
“Immigrants come to Germany for a variety of reasons. The aim of integration is to
enable them to have an equal stake in all areas of societal life whilst respecting cultural
diversity. For integration to be successful, the immigrants must be willing to take initiative
themselves to become familiar with the language and to identify with the norms and values of
the society of their adopted nation. It also requires willingness on the part of the indigenous
population to meet the immigrants with openness. This is the only way to ensure peaceful and
equitable cohabitation in the long-term.”
This definition of successful integration into German society seems to be in
acknowledgement of the tension that exist and the realities of discontent at the lack of action of
the government. In light of the clear need for guest worker programs in the 1950s-1970s and
Germany’s noted sensitivity to even the appearance of intolerance (Jacoby, 2011), the apparent
xenophobia and (infrequent) occurrences of race-based violence (Larkin, 2006; Tol, 2005) an
examination of current governmental communication practices and tools as they affect
integration of the Turkish diaspora in Germany is well in order.
Perhaps the most formal tool the German government can use to communicate its
expectations of its immigrants with regard to integration is use of legislation to define its national
identity. To this end, it is important to note that, according to Article 116 of the German
Constitution, a “German” is categorized not only as someone who has German citizenship, but
3 Days after the publication of the book, Sarrazin was thrown from the ranks of the center-left Social
Democratic Party. The Christian Democratic Union also made several attempts to put distance between
themselves and the author.
4 One study, conducted after the book’s publishing, by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, showed that 36%
of surveyed Germans felt the country was being “overrun by foreigners” and 58% said that Muslim
religious practices should be “significantly curbed.”

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also those who are ethnically German and live outside the Republic.5
If one then considers
Article 6 of the Federal Law on Expellees, members of the German Volk are outlined as those
who “have committed themselves in their homelands to Germaness,6
inasmuch as this
commitment is confirmed by certain facts such as descent, language, upbringing or culture.”
Although it may in part be responsible for creating divisions and labels (Tol, 2005), this
ethno-centric take on citizenship and, more importantly, national identity will lend itself to a
greater understanding of not only the current tensions between ethnic Germans and their
Turkish neighbors, but will also help sharpen the analysis of communication tools and trends as
they affect integration.
Legal Framework for Immigration
Coming to Germany legally as a Turkish national is a notoriously onerous task (Jacoby,
2011). As a non-EU member, Turkey is unable to help its citizens with the use of an EU Blue
Card to obtain temporary residency. However, following the provisions of the Residence Act, a
Turkish national may enter Germany and apply for residency in a number of ways. Sections 7,
8, and 9 outline how one without prior familial ties to Germany may secure a permanent
residence title. First, one must be able to secure a residence permit. These permits are highly
specific to the nature of a person’s reason to enter Germany.
Under this section, a residency permit is available to those who are: students attending a
German university, graduate students conducting field research for their program, researchers,
employees/trainees of a company, and entrepreneurs.7
After procuring a temporary residence
permit (which depends on the time allowed by the task associated with the type of permit), an
immigrant would have to apply for an extension permit. These cases serve as bridges between
a normal residence permit and a settlement permit, which requires at least 5 years of lawful
residency. As soon as an immigrant applies for the extension permit or the settlement permit, he
or she becomes subject to statutes requiring integration courses and a review of German
language skills as well as an awareness of German legal and social systems as well as “the
way of life in the federal territory” (German Residence Act, Section 9, Paragraphs 7-9).
Part 6 of the Residence Act provides for the immigration of family, dependents and the
ex officio residency of children born in Germany to parents holding valid residency permits.
These sections of the legislation may also render a person enacting them subject to integration
courses and evaluation of German language skills and knowledge of “German life.”
5 Article 116’s second paragraph actually provides instant citizenship upon application to ethnic Germans
who on the basis of certain grounds (political, religious) lost their citizenship between 1933 and 1945.
This statute is also extended to descendants of such persons who will, in effect, be “deemed never to
have been deprived of their citizenship.”
6 The wording here is difficult to translate completely accurately. The actual phrase used is “deutschten
Volkstum” which may also translate as “Germandom.”
7 Applications under this category must be approved by the Federal Employment Agency in addition to
the normal administrative offices associated with securing the permit. In the case of entrepreneurs, a
separate business plan (already funded) must be approved.

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Language Learning in School & Work
The variance to and theories of German language acquisition by immigrants has seen as
much change since its inception with the guest worker programs as any aspect of the debate. In
the 1960s and 1970s, the German language was taught to immigrant workers as a survivalist
course (Grünghage-Monetti, 2010). It was only in the late 1980s that the German government
began to finance and develop studies on the language attributes of its diaspora populations as a
part of its integration program. Today, the language courses offered can be as varied as the
reasons that one might immigrate to Germany. To this end, the government does offer career
and professional language courses through which a person’s aptitude and command of the
language can be measured as a part of determining his or her future in Germany.8
While this measurable side of the argument presents as fairly straight-forward, the side
of the debate that brings up multilingualism is a more subjective, and therefore revealing,
marker of the overall success of immigrant integration. The three main schools of thought found
in most qualitative studies that research immigrants’ use of German and their native language
are that multilingualism is neither useful nor useless to integration. Socially speaking, the use of
another language besides German in school or the workplace is either accepted, ignored, or
sanctioned (Meyer, 2008). In cases where a second language is accepted/sanctioned, the
government has reasoned that, so long as German language competency exists (Grünghage-
Monetti, 2010), residents with migration backgrounds and fluency in another language can
actually help with the integration of other immigrants. While professional and trade-based
networks for integration do indeed exists,9
stabile statistics on their success are lacking. Most
often, success stories are anecdotal.
Meyer (2008), in his study on use of a native language by an immigrant in a professional
setting, notes that there are three professional disciplines where fluency of a language other
than German is actually in demand: Social work, medical work (in a nursing capacity), and
business (related to sales). However true that demand for multilingualism may be, Esser’s
(2006) research shows that multilingual abilities of immigrants do not seem to be a determinant
in the wage or salary of any such immigrants. This runs contrary to common conception in
today’s workplace and seems out of synch with Germany’s own acknowledgement that these
abilities are a resource to its integration goals.
Practical contradictions aside, the rhetoric for acknowledging the use of a mother
language in addition to German can also be found at the school level. According to BAMF,
recent Culture Ministry conferences have indicated that competence in a second language
leads to a deeper competency in German (Seiler, 2008). While the exact explanation for these
findings may be too pedagogical or scientific for this analysis, the report claims that the ability to
command two languages equally well should also be considered when framing Germany’s
integration of immigrants from kindergarten through their high school graduations.
8 It is important to remember that, according to the Residence Act, integration and language courses must
be completed and the course-taker must be found satisfactory before long-term residency permits are
granted.
9 The North German Network for Professional Integration of Migrants (NOBI) is one such network that
receives federal funding and serves as a resource for data on this growing field of study.

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Citing active EU-wide programs, recommendations number 101 through 103 of this
report suggest that, starting at the kindergarten level, children should be taught in two
languages throughout the day. For children of immigrants, this would mean having some
classes and activities taught in German while others would be taught in the language they hear
at home. For German children, bilingualism would be encouraged from an early age. This would
create a cultural sympathy between these two groups. This resolves not only a fear of
immigrants not being able to communicate in German, but also addresses the long-term
concerns of social isolation and consequent rise of tensions and mistrust which often describe
the situation in Germany today (Larkin, 2006). Such a program, if it exists today, is not federally
endorsed, funded, or mandated.
Civic Life & Community Outreach
Governmental communication tools and practices are not very visible in the realm of
civic life with regard to integration efforts after the issuance of a residency visa. Upon arrival in
Germany, there is bureaucratic support to help the visa-holder (and dependents) adjust to life in
the Federal Republic. These efforts are manifested in the integration and language courses,
which have already been discussed. While teaching a new immigrant the aspects of life in
Germany (emergency services, customs to observe when in public, and certain legal situations
such as driving) is undoubtedly an important key to successful integration, the efforts often stop
after the course completion. Moreover, while these courses are installed to help ease the
transition for new immigrants, Turkish children who are born in Germany are given residency
and may not have the same chance of benefiting from these institutions.10
In the absence of federal agencies and practices, one finds that municipal powers have
come forward. The city of Frankfurt am Main, for example, founded the Office for Multicultural
Affairs (AmkA) in 1989 which works not only to advance the national integration agenda, but
also to promote “tolerance and understanding between residents” of the city. With an aim to
incorporate all residents of the city in all aspects of civic life, the office pledges to act as a
mediator in regards to any and all conflicts. Although this office follows federal guidelines, has
formed its own framework which includes all residents in society regardless of religious, ethnic,
or linguistic background (CLIP, 2010).
Perhaps Frankfurt’s most notable effort to relieve tension and further the integration of
Turkish residents can be found in the manifestation of the project entitled “Police and Migrants
Engage in Dialogue.” Over several months, police officials in Frankfurt met with representatives
of the immigrant communities in workshops to exchange information and actively work to reduce
tensions.11
The project’s aim was not only to allow the German police an opportunity to earn an
understanding of cultural cues of their neighbors, but also to explain to the immigrants aspects
of civil life such as the role of the police and in light of Germany’s democratic structure and laws
(CLIP, 2010).
10 As discussed above, there are more Turkish nationals residing in Germany than Turkish nationals who
immigrate to Germany.
11 Lessons learned from these town-hall style meetings from the police are now shared with recruits at the
training academy.

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The city of Frankfurt has done more than just sponsor conversations between itself and
its immigrant residents, however. Several projects and efforts have been launched and funded
(some with federal funding) in order to strengthen the community relationships within the city
limits. Networking associations have been established for immigrants according to trade,
gender, and religion. Additionally, regular events such as exposés are held so that ethnic
German residents of Frankfurt can be exposed to the Turkish culture in a neutral setting (CLIP,
2010).
Stuttgart has also come up with peaceful, multicultural solutions to integrate Turkish
immigrants into its city. In 1999, the DTF (German-Turkish Forum) was established to help ease
the integration process. The forum now benefits from the collective experience of its more than
200 members of new immigrants and German-born Turks as well as its 100,000 Euro budget,
which is sponsored by Stuttgart’s Office of Culture (Knabe, 2009). Although it has no direct ties
to the education system, the forum’s mentoring programs seem to have a positive effect on
Turkish children. According to a spokeswoman for the forums:
“Teachers report to us that Turkish children, who were once quiet, suddenly participate
because they have recovered and the German students are very interested and see Turkey and
their schoolmates with new eyes.”12
Cooperation with Turkish Organizations
While it has become clear through the evidence in the previous section that long-term,
post-arrival initiatives to integrate Germany’s immigrant communities are so far often better
served by the direction and execution of municipal and local leaders, this does not mean that
the federal government has not acknowledged the potential for success in partnering with
migrant organizations. In fact, BAMF has also taken to cooperation with Turkish organizations
through direct networking, project development, and funding. Due perhaps to the polarity of the
debate regarding Germany’s immigrant population, the actual evaluation of the relative success
and failure of these federal-to-local partnerships is an entirely new field (Weiss and Thränhardt,
2005). Despite such cooperation being a new and untested tool for integration, there are some
early indicators for what lends to successful projects and as well some analytical comment on
the scope and scale of this new tool.
For a partnership between the federal offices and the community-based organizations to
even have a chance of success and sustainability, the first obstacle to clear is funding. Because
factors such as location, trade, language ability, age, religion, and gender may all be defined by
any given immigrant organization (either by majority of membership or by the organization’s
defined mission), the number of permutations is effectively limitless. Organizations can be
centered on German-speaking Turkish IT professionals within a certain age range who live in
Berlin or may be designed to support single Turkish mothers who have no real professional
training or trade craft. Hunger and Metzger (2011) identify this as the first of major factors to
12 Ağabey-Abla as quoted in Knabe, 2009. Original quote: “Die Lehrer berichten uns, dass türkische
Kinder, die sonst sehr still sind, auf einmal mitmachen, weil sie sich wiederfinden“, freut sich Arpad, „und
auch die deutschstämmigen Schülern sind sehr interessiert und sehen die Türkei und ihre
Schulkameraden mit ganz anderen Augen.“

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consider in their analysis of cooperation with immigrant organizations. The result of having such
a myriad groups with well-intentioned mission statements is that financially supporting all of
them is not viable. Often, projects are labelled as “pilot projects” or “models” and are given a
certain deadline on which federal funding will cease. Hopefully the organization has grown
enough to support itself through other means. This is often not the case.
The second major issue with Germany’s approach to these partnerships has to do with
motivation. Through profiling a dozen cases, the 2011 study found that projects that presented a
“top-down mobilization” in which the government dictated goals and procedures failed simply
because of the perception of official control. This feeling, then, resulted in a loss of motivation
from those involved in the project. On the other hand, cases that displayed a more visible
“bottom-up mobilization” proved to last longer and yield more stability. This can be attributed to
the perception of respect and ownership of a project. The study also found that the differences
between the two directions of mobilization are greatly influenced by the degree of hierarchy
embedded within the project.
Finally, the analysis’ third major finding can be best described as being comprised of
three smaller elements: communication, trust, and participation. Participation, according to
Hunger and Metzger, is both the reason for and result of trust and communication. In cases that
saw success, the researchers noted that communication was strengthened during working
hours because of communication outside of working hours. According to an anonymous project
leader:
“What I have learned is to take part in activities, otherwise it will quickly seem like a lack
of interest. It is not enough to only advise a little bit here and there, but rather to actually take
part.”13
Participation in events, within and outside the scope of the project, helped to build trust
between the partners. This, as attested to by several workers of successful projects, lent itself
immensely to intercultural relations understanding and better communication during working
hours.
Although state-sponsored partnerships are relatively new in Germany, there are marked
successes for such cooperation in other EU nations. In the Netherlands, for example, active
partnerships exists between Dutch and Turkish organizations of all sorts (Tol, 2005). Where
there is a Turkish political group in Holland, there is a Dutch political group acting as partner.
The same can be said for civic groups and trade unions. The dual benefit to this structure is that
the Dutch organizations play a quasi-mentoring roll while also allowing themselves to be
informed by their Turkish neighbors.14
13 Original quote in German: “Was ich gelernt habe, ist teilzunehmen an Veranstaltungen, sonst wirkt es
sehr schnell als nicht-interessiert. Es reicht nicht nur, hier ein bisschen zu beraten, sondern auch wirklich
teilzunehmen“ (Zitat eines Interviewpartners aus eines etablierten Trägers)
14 Tol also places a heavy emphasis on the legal system that allows more active and direct immigrant
(non-citizen) participation in civil and political circles in the Netherlands.

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The Turkish Government & Its Diaspora
The federal support lent to Turkish immigrants and their integration is not limited to the
host nation. Recently, the Turkish government has taken great steps to increase the successful
integration of Turks in Germany while simultaneously reaffirming their cultural ties to Turkey.
As recently as 2010, legislation from the Turkish government has been enacted to form
several offices to support the Turkish diaspora in areas such as furthering Turkish economic
potential as a benefit to Germany and its immigrants, supporting Turkish students,
strengthening Turkish integration in Germany, and promoting positive communication between
Turkey and members of its diaspora (Aydin, 2014).
Under the leadership of Turkey’s new president, these offices aim not only to further the
integration and deepen the relationship between the two nations, but to assert that becoming
more German does not mean becoming less Turkish.15
Community Communication Tools & Integration Efforts:
Despite lack of depth and long-term scopes of federally designed programs and
communication efforts and besides the more well-structured municipally developed projects,
there is a parallel world in Germany inhabited by members of its Turkish diaspora. Due to the
reasons outlined previously (unwillingness of Germany to accept that it is an “immigration
nation,” feelings of distrust between Turks and Germans, etc.), Turks have developed a sort of
shadow society in which almost all aspects of life present in a German’s world are available in
the Turkish language and custom.
The initial evidence to this idea is seen in the physical separation of Germans and Turks
within the city plan (Popp, Gezer & Scheuermann, 2011). Tol (2005) writes about how Turks
have developed social, religious, and economic enclaves which serve not only to provide the
Turks with social and economic support, but also keep Germans out as a result of their degree
of entrenchment. This indicates that not only have the Turks been kept on the social, political,
educational, and economic peripheries (Florindi, 2014; Larkin, 2006), but that they are deeply
aware of their situation and the factors surrounding it (Tol, 2005; Ferguson, 2012).
Programs From & Within the Community
As discussed earlier, there is a vast number and variety of Turkish organizations whose
aim is to support its members across a multitude of issues, identifying attributes, and interests.
Even as the BAMF attempts to seek out partnerships with a sliver of these groups and establish
15 For some time there has been an argument that Turks in Germany should be eligible for dual
citizenship. This has drawn a lot of criticism from Germans both in the official dialogue as well as public
opinion.

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a framework for best practices through analysis, the existence and depth of the rest of such
organizations must be acknowledged. Pries (2013) defines these organizations as
“Migrantenselbstorganisationen” (migrant self-organizations or MSOs) in his work and
establishes that while the exact number of these groups is unknown, it is somewhere in the area
of 16,000. More important to note is that there exists a main dichotomy among these many
thousands of organizations. Some, it seems, build an integration aspect into their operational
framework while others encourage isolation along ethnic lines. Further research into these
areas of interest are stunted by the sheer lack of breakthrough research.16
Clearly, then, the best indications of successful cross-cultural communication and
integration must be marked by the work done in tandem with BAMF and other umbrella
organizations. As of now, the community-based tools are either not as sharp as they can be or
not as known (which limits anyone’s ability to measure their successes).
Cross-Cultural Communications
If there is one thing that deserves highlight in an analysis of communication-based
integration tools, it is the opening of a language center in Neukölln, Berlin that teaches the
Turkish language to German students. This example is incredibly small in the grand scheme of
the integration issue in Germany, but its main point may be an indicator of a slow change in
public opinion. Both the students and teachers involved in the center state definitely that it has
become every German’s responsibility to integrate themselves with their Turkish neighbors – a
process being called reverse integration (Ferguson, 2012). The participants of the project hope
that Turkish language and culture instruction will eventually be written in to the curriculums of
the nation’s schools (to the earliest age possible). This is certainly a new and novel solution for
the integration debate and will no doubt have a lasting effect on the notion of German national
identity in the coming years.
Political Communication & Activism
Perhaps it is in response to the sheer number of Turkish MSOs or perhaps simply the
sheer size of the Turkish migrant population in Germany, but there has been a marked rise in
the political power of Turks in Germany over the past few years and months. After what to some
is a lifetime of waiting, German politicians have begun to address the Turkish diaspora in
discourse and legislation. The years 2001 and 2005 mark political gains for Turks with the
introduction of legislation that promote the recruitment of highly skilled Turkish labor and begin
16 The bibliography in Pries’ work is telling of this problem. The oldest references used date from the
1960s. The newest come from the early to late 2000s. This 40-50 gap in literature is filled with anecdotal
references and gross generalities on the nature of this field of study.

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to ease the bureaucratic barriers associated with obtaining residency and citizenship (Jacoby,
2011).17
More recently, the latest Turkish election for prime minister allowed Turkish nationals
living abroad to vote. For the over 2.5 million Turks living in Germany, 1.4 million were eligible to
cast a ballot (Torry and Peker, 2014). Couple this renewed sense of political power with the
appointment of Germany’s first ever minister of Turkish descent at the end of 201318
and it is not
difficult to imagine the formation of new MSOs devoted to political activism.
Overall Impact of Integration Programs & Communication Tools in Germany:
It is clear to see that, from an analytical viewpoint, the conversation in Germany
regarding integration programs and communication practices is very one-sided. More than the
entire discourse being new as a formalized topic and area of development, there is also a
tendency for literature to come overwhelmingly from the official, state-sponsored side of the
debate, leaving any major trends and developments on the community level grossly
unacknowledged.
Even at the state level, there seems to be some confused dialogue regarding the desire
to integrate Turkish migrants with respect to its effect on the notion of German national identity.
Clearly, the desire to attract highly skilled labor has always been a factor in immigration to
Germany. This is evidenced through the arrival of Turks as guest workers back in the 1960s.
Although this political and economic point has now been brought into the modern debate
(Jacoby, 2011), the existence of Turkish nationals who have lived their entire lives in Germany
without receiving citizenship brings a major dilemma to the idea of German identity. On the one
hand, Germany is beginning to acknowledge itself as an immigrant nation (Popp, Gezer &
Scheuermann, 2011) while on the other it continues to foster an ethno-centric notion of being
German. At the state level, the first inklings of departure from this ideological standpoint can be
seen in the funding of, and partnerships with, Turkish migrant organizations. Still, however, the
main point of these projects is to use the communication between organizations as a method to
bring the Turks into the fold, so to speak.
At the community level, there is also evidence of resistance to integration and isolation.
This decided isolation is perhaps not the goal of the Turkish MSOs, but rather the very reason
for their existence. After half a century of living on the peripheries of German society,
networking among Turks in Germany is a necessary means to survival (Popp, Gezer &
Scheuermann, 2011; Larkin, 2006; Tol, 2005; Florindi, 2014).
There is, however, rather encouraging evidence of a breakdown of isolation and a new
notion of integration. Through the reverse integration of Germans (Ferguson, 2012) and the
17 While these public acknowledgements are important, most of the studied found for this analysis still
belabor the point that visa applications and the process to gain German citizenship is still notoriously
difficult. The effects and advancement of these political ideas must be watched to determine their true
meaning for Turkish migrants in Germany.
18 Aydan Özoğuz was appointed the State Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Integration. This is a
position that serves within the federal cabinet.

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evolving understanding of what makes for successful cross-cultural partnerships (Hunger and
Metzger, 2011; Knabe, 2009; CLIP, 2010), one might suggest that the question of the
integration of Germany’s Turks is not a matter of the migrants’ willingness or ability to become
German (especially in light of the current ethnic definition), but rather a question of the level of
cultural empathy and level of respect afforded to each side from each side.
Without a doubt, the best examples of successful employment of communication for the
integration of Turks have been those in which basic, roundtable meetings are held and active
participation in cross-cultural and inter-cultural events have taken place. Whether or not these
practices will become the new norm (at either the state or local level) in a larger sense remains
to be seen.
Algerians in France
Similar to its neighbor Germany, France’s history of active recruitment of immigrants for
labor finds cause in rebuilding its national economy in the aftermath of the Second World War.
Unlike Germany, however, France’s relationship with Algeria and its roller-coaster relationship
with its Algerian diaspora reaches back over 180 years, beginning with France’s colonization of
Algeria. Even before the triggering events of WWI, the immigration of Algerians to France was
not a new phenomenon (Schneider, 2008). In fact, French use of colonial subjects from Algeria
and other North African nations for laborers and soldiers during war-time is a well-documented
institution.
Yet despite almost a century’s long mutual cultural exposure between the Algerians and
the French, formal efforts to address the challenges and to regulate the legal procedures for
immigration to France did not become institutionalized until the 1940s with the formation of the
National Immigration Office (ONI) (Kofman, Rogoz and Lévy, 2010). Even at this point in the
French narrative of immigration, the ONI was established to recruit and place immigrants in
certain roles within the French economy. However, due to the demand for labor in France
following the war, private sector firms often went directly to the sources themselves, recruiting
workers from the French colonies through their own means and completing the paperwork later.
While the workers technically hailed from another nation, the colonial relationship between
France and these North African nations lent itself to the quasi-validity of this recruitment
method.19
19 In fact, this practice of immigration during this time period was termed “immigration interne”
(immigration from within).

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From the 1950s through the 1970s, France maintained a fairly open policy toward
immigration from North Africa. It is during this period of time, however, that the first recurring
theme of French integration can be seen. In addition to efforts to rebuild the national economy,
France’s open immigration policy was based on its confidence in its ability to integrate new
comers based on its strong republican traditions (Kofman, Rogoz and Lévy, 2010; Escafré-
Dublet, 2007; Algan, Landais and Senik, 2010). Faith in the republic and the liberal orientation
of policies regarding integration is an indispensable element in the analysis of French
integration efforts.
Of particular import to France’s immigration and integration efforts are the years 1947
and 1962. In 1947, Algerians were awarded quasi-citizenship under the label “French Muslim,”
which, in addition to being counter to French liberalism, seems to imply a limited entitlement to
enjoyment of French citizenship and rights in the Republic. In 1962, Algeria won its
independence from France. Immediately after peace was established, thousands of Algerians
fled to France.
In the years and presidential terms following the acknowledgement of Algeria’s
sovereignty, the conversation regarding integration of Algerians into French society has taken
many twists and turns. As this analysis follows the legal and informal tools of communication
and integration, special attention must be paid to the reoccurring themes of French liberalism,
republicanism, and its historical context in relation to Algerians.
Similar to the case in Germany, the clearest method that the French State has to
communicate its goals as to successful integration of the Algerian diaspora is through use of
legislation. Unlike the Germans, however, the long-term, historical context surrounding the
debate, as well as the notion of the Republic, are the driving factors in defining French national
society.
As discussed above, the ONI was the first office tasked with the coordination of
immigration to France. Since its establishment, a multitude of offices have been charged with
the task of monitoring, integrating, and policing Algerian immigrants in France. Among these
offices are: SSAE (le Service social d’aide aux emigrants), ANAEM (Agence natonale de
l’accueil des étrangers et des migrations) which was formerly the Office des Migrations
Internationales, ASCÉ (l’Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l’égalité des chances),
DIV (Délégation interministérielle à la ville), FAS (Fonds d’action Sociale), SAINA (Services des
Affaires Indigenes Nord-Africaines), ANLCI (l’Agence nationale de lutte contre l’illettrisme), and
L’OFPRA (Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides).20
As can be seen with the
legislation regulating legal immigration to France, the reason behind this plurality and ever-
changing legal landscape can be attributed to the nature of the French political system by which
the ruling regime can exercise vast authority and dictate the direction of national policy
(Guiraudon, 2002).
20 Many of these offices work in conjunction with one another or have themselves been projects of one
ministry office that has since been established in its own right.

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In terms of a definable sense of the French national identity in relation to the French
regard for immigrants, perhaps the best tool available is the overwhelming rhetoric in support of
a national, secular society (Mulholland, 2013; Kofman, Rogoz and Lévy, 2010; Escafré-Dublet,
2007; Algan, Landais and Senik, 2010). It is under this ideology that French identity, and indeed
immigration policy, demand acknowledgement, understanding, and respect of French
egalitarianism.21
It would appear, then, that being French has more to do with the ability to
function in the French political realm than with attributes of race or ethnicity (Ramdani, 2012).
Although a description of the historical context could arguably find a place in the opening
of the analysis of Algerians in France, a synopsis of the change in legal structures for obtaining
residency and citizenship in France here serves to exemplify the formation of today’s
complicated situation. As suggested with the vast array of offices tasked with managing the
varied aspects of immigration and immigrant life in France, the legal framework for immigration
that has both affected and been a result of public discourse could be best defined as polar.
In response to the oil crisis in 1974, and after following an almost 20-year period of
relatively open immigration policy into France, French officials decided to close the borders to
immigrants and effectively end the period of open immigration. Although this action was widely
seen across Europe, France was the first to institute a policy of random work-site checks that
punished employers who used illegal labor (Hamilton, Simon and Veniard, 2004). In spite of the
battle to stem the flow of illegal immigration, there were no marked efforts to deport the Algerian
diaspora already in France. This, in turn, halted the free movement between Algeria and France
granted by the peace treaty in 1962 and allowed Algerians, in the eye of the State, the chance
to assimilate and become “regularized” (Kofman, Rogoz and Lévy, 2010). However, 1974
marked a shift in Algerian immigration from a labor-based focus to a family reunification focus,
which dominated immigration (Murphy, 2006).
In order to further slow the flow of new immigrants, France proposed a new set of laws
from the late 1980s to the early 1990s that restricted immigrant rights. These efforts were aimed
to discourage long-term settlement. Purposed in 1986, the first Pasqua Law actively tried to stop
integration and immigration by increasing the waiting time the spouse of a French national
would have to endure before filing for a residency visa. The next installment of the Pasqua Law
aimed to restrict (or completely end) social benefits such as healthcare or the possibility to
appeal denied visa applications filed under asylum. This version was also later amended to
require that would-be residents provide satisfactory proof that they would not rely on social
welfare and could pay their own way in and out of the country (Kofman, Rogoz and Lévy, 2010).
Other aspects of the Pasqua Law include the prohibition of foreigners graduating from French
universities to accept job offers in France, which led to a noticeable decline in human capital
(Guiraudon, 2002).
21 Current federal laws (established in 1973) even prohibit publication of a person’s race or ethnicity in
media and other types of public documentation.

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The year 1998 saw a loosening of the Pasqua Law with the passing of the Guigou Law,
which allowed all people born in French territory to apply for naturalization (Kofman, Rogoz and
Lévy, 2010). Additionally, the 1998 Law reversed the tightening of control on student and skilled
labor immigration and gave special classification to scientists and scholars (Guiraudon, 2002).
In 2006, the legal framework changed yet again to redefine French immigration and
integration goals. This time around, officials focused on recruitment of skilled labor,22
facilitation
of student immigration,23
limiting access to residence and citizenship, and tightening the
regulations on family reunification (Kofman, Rogoz and Lévy, 2010; Murphy, 2006).
With a hefty proportion of the law focused on regulating family reunification (still the most
common reason for visa applications), the statutes become almost as burdensome to grasp as
they are to satisfy. In order to successfully meet the criteria for family reunification under current
law, a sponsor may only apply after 18 months of legal residency (an increase from 12), show a
basic respect for Republican principles, be able to provide for the family without the social aide,
and be able to secure housing that is adequate for the size of the family. Additionally, the family
members in question must also show a basic respect for the way of life in France (Murphy,
2006). If the family reunification clauses are enacted in situations that involve a French national
applying for a 10-year residence permit for his or her non-French spouse, the spouse must wait
three years (an increase from two). Attaining citizenship for the non-French spouse, under
current legal framework, requires conjugal marriage for five years (and increase from four)
(Murphy, 2006). The 2007 modification to this law saw the addition of compulsory French
language testing for all foreigners ages 16-64 (Kofman, Rogoz and Lévy, 2010).
The legal entry to France is overwhelmingly complicated and designed to discourage
long-term residency. It is defined by the burden of proof resting on the immigrant that the origin
culture has been abandoned and that assimilation to the so-called egalitarian way of life is
understood and upheld. Simultaneously, there is an undercurrent felt in the legislation which
signals the French government’s distrust in the ability of its Algerian diaspora to conform
(extreme restrictions on family reunification, visas given only in light of a return ticket to an origin
nation). It seems, then, that France has done all it can through immigration policy to distance
itself from its former colonial subject.
Language Learning in School & Work
Given France’s official policies and views on immigration, it is not all-together surprising
to find an astounding lack of research and government programming devoted to language
acquisition in school and the workplace. As noted above, would-be immigrants are expected to
demonstrate a command of the French language prior to arrival and after arrival when applying
for long-term residency. The most that can be said about federally supported efforts to assist in
language acquisition can be found in the legislation of 2006 wherein courses on French
22 Skilled labor recruitment under this law is permissible only in cases where the country of origin has
signed a “co-development” agreement with France or if the laborer agrees to return to the origin country
after six years.
23 This mostly focused on students to who could prove their intent to leave after their degree programs
ended.

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language and culture are offered on a remedial basis for those who fail to display a command of
the language and understanding of the culture (Murphy, 2006).
The most visible effort to assimilate Algerian children in France’s schools right now has
more to do with the official ban on headscarves and the display or donning of religious dress on
school grounds (Zappi, 2003; Mulholland, 2013). This ban is enforced under the same principle
that outlaws media reporting on ethnicity and race and circles back to the grand rhetoric of
France’s egalitarian society.
To consider France’s role in civic life and its efforts to affect the community-level
integration is to again find a federally-supported barrier to integration and a breakdown of cross-
communication. Even municipal authorities find their justification in federal statutes. Mayors, for
example, are given the authority to investigate claims to residency and citizenship as it relates
to nuptials between a French national and a foreigner. The mayoral power in such cases is so
great that, under the mayor’s discretion, a couple may be referred to the courts for investigation
in an effort halt the union (Zappi, 2003).24
Mayoral powers, and indeed responsibilities, also
extend so far as to acting as the federal government’s enforcer of certain clauses of immigration
law. As has already been discussed, immigrants and would-be settlers must prove their ability to
provide appropriate housing and funding for themselves and any family members. Discretion on
these points of judgment again falls to the office of the mayor (Kofman, Rogoz and Lévy, 2010).
Interactions between French police officers and Algerians have as much history as the
relationship between France and Algeria itself. Following WWII, for example, a special patrol
division was created specifically to police the nation’s Algerian population (Schneider, 2008).
While offenses committed by members of the Algerian diaspora are not markedly more violent
than the rest of the population, instances of use of force on behalf of the police are more
common. In the French collective memory, perhaps more specifically the French-Algerian
collective memory, two famous events serve to define the combatant nature of the police-
Algerian relationship. In 1961, for example, Parisian police were ordered to attack some 30,000
protesting Algerians taking part in an illegal demonstration.25
Only as recently as 2012 did
officials take responsibility for the deaths of some 200 pro-independence Algerians (Ramdani,
2012).
More recently, the lives of two school-aged boys were lost in late 2005 after they were
chased by police into an electric power sub-station. Although the boys’ did flee after being
ordered to halt, their reasons for running, according to other members of the group who were
apprehended, were based on their understanding that once in police custody, they would not be
released for several hours (Schneider, 2008). As subjective as this all appears, transcripts of the
conversation between the pursuing officers and dispatch chillingly confirm the boys’ perception
24 By and large, this section of French code comes under fire for being designed to stop “mixed”
marriages.
25 The French government did not release any admission of wrong-doing in the aftermath of this attack. In
fact, only in 1998 was there an official acknowledgement of some 40 Algerian deaths as a result of this
sanctioned action.

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of police brutality and disregard. The following conversation took place between an officer who
had witnessed the boys enter the sub-station and a commanding officer:
I think they are about to enter the EDF [the name of the power company] site; we need
reinforcements to surround the neighborhood, or they are going to get out.
Yes, message received.
On second thought, if they entered the EDF site, their skin is worth nothing now.26
While this transcript cannot prove anything beyond this officer’s failure to take action in
the course of saving a life, it does lend credibility to the widely-held perception of the war-like
posturing of French police in Algerian neighborhoods (Schneider, 2008; Randami, 2012;
Villanueva, 2013).
Much like the government side of this analysis of France’s integration of Algerians,
conversation regarding community-based efforts to further integration are one-sided and lacking
in academic understanding. As often as new programs and partnerships among Algerians and
French have been formed, regime change, coupled with increasingly stringent legislation, has
rendered them powerless.
What has been well-documented, however, is the spatial segregation and parallel
society found in the banlieue27
of France’s metropolitan areas. These communities, much like
their Turkish-German counterparts, serve to support the community members’ needs where the
government cannot or has not. In the vein of this analysis though, one will see again how
legislation and policy curb any community-level integration and cross-cultural efforts.
Programs From & Within the Community
By and large, the majority of notation on immigrant-driven organizations in France are
set in the scope of protest and carry a spirit of counter-culture. In the 1970s, and in protest to
both the perceived French exploitation of its former colonial subjects and poor living conditions
for immigrants, members of the Algerian diaspora organized a theater festival in which skits
were designed to satire the government and convey the poor living conditions (Escafré-Dublet,
2007). The 1980s actually saw a period of encouragement of cultural expression through the
artistic mediums of radio, stage, and artist associations that lasted through the early 1990s.
However, as the 2000s began to bloom, regime change and policy shift once again
sharply altered the landscape for these community organizations. In order to fund the mandated
26 Translated quote from Schneider, 2008.
27 This term refers to poor, suburban areas consisting mostly of immigrant residents.

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language testing and French cultural instruction for immigrants, the State drastically cut money
intended for government-community partnerships (Zappi, 2003).28
To this day, it would be
understandably difficult for a non-French culture-oriented organization to receive funding or
support from the government as French law prohibits anything that could be seen as lobbying or
partnerships with special interest groups.
If there is a strong number of partnerships or stabile immigrant-based organizations
operating today, lack of awareness on an academic and practical level hinder a meaningful
discussion of their success or failures (and factors thereof) in integrating French-Algerians.
Perceptions of Acceptance, Tolerance & Feeling French
Day-to-day experiences of Algerian immigrants in France (once removed from discourse
of human rights and the liberal ideology of a secular society) do tend to shed a more positive
light on the realities of intercultural relations between Algerian and French residents. Recent
data collected from surveys conducted among Arab communities in European metropolitan
areas showed that, generally, Arab Muslims do not believe that most non-Muslims are hostile to
them. Additionally, most of the survey participants could not recall a negative encounter with
someone that could have been attributed to their race or ethnicity (Adida, Laitin and Valfort,
2010). It is important to note that, not only are these trends encouraging in the face of
governmental suppression of culture, the surveys were conducted only a short time after the
bombings in Spain and the UK. At least on the ground-level then, there seems to be some
indication of tolerance and acceptance between Algerians and the French.
Perhaps the most important finding in the frankly scarce amount of academic analysis of
perceptions of belonging is a trend showing that as generations of Algerian immigrants continue
to dwell in France, younger Algerians become integrated faster (Algan, Landais and Senik,
2010). This is most likely a result of the diaspora’s need to adopt at least a certain amount of
French culture to function.
Overall Impact of Integration Programs & Communication Tools in France:
The evaluation of France’s integration programs and communication tools in relation to
its Algerian diaspora is not a task that will be done full justice without a complete historical
explanation of the colonial relationship between France and Algeria. Unlike other cases in this
study, it could be argued that France began its efforts to assimilate Algerians as a colonial
power. After two world wars and a war for Algerian independence, the legal pathways to
residency and citizenship have been manipulated and altered to suite the liking of the dominant
culture.
28 By the mid-2000s, many hundreds of organizations whose purpose was to acknowledge the cultural
diversity in French society had been disbanded due to lack of support and funding.

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There are points, however, that do deserve note from the discussion found here. Firstly,
while the notion of an egalitarian society in which race, gender, religion, and ethnicity should not
be considered in the political realm has been the cultural norm in France since its revolution, the
transfer of this ideal to education and the workplace is relatively new and seems to be imposed
ad hoc as immigrants become involved in more aspects of life in France.
Secondly, the notion of egalitarianism in the French liberal sense functions only by
suppressing attributes that define the different cultures in French society instead of holding up
those diversities as equal. This means that, if French culture is defined as the ignorance of
cultural attributes, then it in itself should also be ignored.
Thirdly, the French government places the overwhelming burden of assimilation on the
immigrant. While other cases present language and culture training at the outset, the French
case refers to instruction more as a remedial measure for those who have not met certain
standards.
Overall, the case for integration of Algerians into French society is doubtful to be a
success story any time soon. The attitude of the French State and its relentless use of
legislation to block entry and suppress cultural expression is evidence of its refusal to facilitate,
or even take part in, a cross-cultural communications and, therefore, more effective dialogue
regarding integration.
Mexicans in the United States
Due to proximity and a history of debates, skirmishes, and wars over territorial
boundaries, the United States and Mexico have long history filled both with agreements and
conflicts. There has also been a long history of professional, academic, and personal border
crossings among the citizens of these two nations which can still be seen today.
Mexicans have represented the largest percentage of immigrants to the United States
consistently over the past five decades (Stoney and Batalova, 2013). In fact, as of 2007, a third
of the entire US foreign-born population consisted of Mexican immigrants with 95% of all
Mexican emigrants arriving in the US (Laglagaron, 2010). However, because of the US practice
of jus soli, there is also an element here to consider that is absent in other cases: US-born
Mexicans as US citizens. As recently as 2012, a full 48% of adult Hispanics in the US were born
in the United States (Taylor, Lopez, Martínez and Velasco, 2013). This factor, perhaps more
than anything creates a very heterogeneous Mexican diaspora in the United States. The fact
that the Mexican diaspora consists of naturalized citizens, third and fourth generation citizens,

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short- and long-term visa holders, and undocumented immigrants creates an atmosphere that is
wholly non-existent in the cases for Germany and France.
The very unique relationship that exists between Mexico and the United States, as well
as the legal circumstances and traditions practiced by these two nations presents a very
interesting and multi-layered case for the question of communication and integration.
A self-styled nation of immigrants, the United States is a very unique case for
governmental efforts on the topic of immigration and integration. Looking over its history as a
sovereign nation, it is very easy to discuss the waves of immigrants that comprised the “new
arrivals” during each time period. While formal regulations and efforts exits, the United States
has historically made significant use of its “older” immigrants to integrate the “new” (Fix,
Zimmerman and Passel, 2001; Jiménez, 2011). However, it is exactly this mismatch between
the formalized codes designed to regulate immigration and the laissez-faire mechanics of
integration that draw attention from most scholars and policy analysts. Especially in a nation
without an official national language, the debate concerning how involved the government
should be in integrating its immigrant populations provides a myriad views.
Whereas the case studies for Germany and France provide clear cultural, linguistic, and
sometimes even ethnic references for measuring the success of their integration tools, the
United States is forced to define its progress by other means. Often, the standards used
include: income, educational levels, residential patterns,29
language use, political activity,
residency status, and intermarriage30
(Jiménez, 2011). These markers prove surprisingly
resilient in displaying data in support of the qualitative discourse of the American integration
model.
There is also a striking difference between the American case and those of the
European Union regarding the notion of a national identity. While it is true that the majority of
Americans are descendants of white Europeans (Walsh, 2013), there is a fair amount of valid
theory which posits that American culture as a whole is more synergistic than just the attributes
of the dominant culture (Weaver and Mendelson, 2008). This idea, prominent in literature about
the “American culture,” will help focus the analysis of governmental efforts to shape the realities
of life in the United States for members of the Mexican diaspora.
29 In the introductions of many scholarly and policy papers on the subject of modern immigration to the
United States, there is a discussion of spatial relationships between new immigrants and the rest of
society. This can be likened to the parallel societies discussed in the analysis of Germany.
30 This standard is not mentioned in literature regarding immigrant integration in the case studies for
Germany and France. The reasoning for use of this measurement is based in the idea that intermarriage
can occur only when boundaries between different ethnic groups are highly permeable.

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26
Discussions of legal framework for immigration throughout this analysis start with the
position that immigration is an especially time-consuming and onerous task. While large
bureaucratic organizations may be one significant factor behind long waits to receive an entry
visa to the United States, it is much more obvious that the sheer competition to gain entry is a
much more substantial element. Every year, the United States, in accordance with the
Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), sets the worldwide limit on the acceptance of
permanent immigrants to 675,000 (USCIS, 2014). The only exception to this limit is the
issuance of visas to immediate family members of a US citizen or a lawful permanent resident
(LPR).31
Significant to the conversation here is that Mexicans are the most likely of all immigrant
groups to enter the US as immediate family members of current residents and become LPRs
(Stoney and Batalova, 2013)
Permanent employment-based visas are limited to 140,000 each year are divided
between five categories that include professions requiring advanced degrees, highly skilled
labor, government and religious workers, and persons who will invest at least $500,000 in an
enterprise which employs at least 10 full-time US workers.
Unlike its EU counterparts, the United States is able to set its own ceiling for immigrants
admitted due to their refugee status and petitions for asylum. Both the executive and legislative
branches of the US federal government have a hand in determining how many individuals to
admit under these circumstances. For the fiscal year of 2013, this limit was set to 70,000 and
was further broken down between Africa, East Asia, Europe and Central Asia, Latin
America/Caribbean, and the Near East/South Asia (USCIS, 2014).
Most interestingly in the US case and as a testament to its unique notion of its national
identity, the Immigration Act of 1990 provides for the issuance of 55,000 visas to random
immigrants whose origin countries have low immigration rates to the US. This Diversity Visa
lottery does have some semblance of ground rules for validity (a recipient must have at least
two years of experience in a trade or skill as well as the equivalent of a high school education),
it was designed as a dedicated channel for those who may not have a viable way to gain US
residency. While Germany and (especially) France are ever involved in debates aimed at
refining and often limiting visas, the United States has developed a piece of legislation that
actively encourages immigration of those who may be seen by nations as undesirable.
Lastly, while the US does not lack the traditional elements of language testing and
instruction on national history and civic life, it places them on the back end of the immigration
process; application for citizenship. Although this allows resident immigrants an extensive
timeframe to become integrated and familiar with life in the United States, its actual side effects
have silently, yet greatly, impacted the narrative of the integration of the Mexican diaspora in the
United States.
31 Eligible family members under this definition of “immediate” are spouses, unmarried minor children, and
parents. Preferential visas for other family members may be issued to siblings and married children.
However, the limit on preferential visas correlates negatively to the number of immediate family visas
granted.

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27
The Obama Administration
Immigration has been a central issue of the Obama administration since even before
President Obama took office. In May 2011, the White House issued a report outlining steps to
reform the current immigration and integration models. While about half of the report outlines
the need for increased border security against illegal aliens as well as current steps being taken
to refine police methods to arresting non-US national criminals, there are a few points that merit
mention.
First, the report describes a revamped website for those applying for visas which allows
a real-time update as an application is reviewed. This new tool not only provides clearer
information for applicants, but is also now available in Spanish. Furthermore, the United States
Citizenship and Immigrant Services (USCIS) office has launched what it is calling the
“Citizenship Resource Center” which centralizes information for immigrants regarding the
naturalization process.
Second, the Obama administration has taken measures to reduce barriers to
immigration for families and individuals who have served with or supported the US Armed
Forces as well as highly skilled immigrants and refugees.
Third, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has been supported in its efforts to improve the
immigration courts. Not only have more immigration judges and support staff been hired to
handle the volume of case work, but more comprehensive training is now being provided to
case workers.
Even as these improvements speak to the liberal model of immigration in the US, they
only represented some of what the president hoped to accomplish. Recently, President Obama
made another move to overhaul the immigration system by introducing programs that will make
around four million unauthorized immigrants eligible for legal status (Shear, 2014). These
measures will doubtless continue the conversation regarding government’s role in immigration
and integration in presidential elections to come.
Language Learning in School
Although much of the recent literature and statistical papers focus on Mexican
immigration to the US starting in the 1970s and the 1980s, the idea of bilingual education had
been brought up well before then. At the close of the 1960s, studies began to show that
Mexican American children were not preforming as well as their non-Hispanic counterparts –
moreover, it was being posited that the academic needs of the children were not being well met
in an English-only environment (Ainsworth, 1969). From this point on, linguistic trends started to
show themselves to researchers. Namely, Mexican Americans (whether by birth or by
naturalization) are not only lacking in English skills, but also in Spanish (Ainsworth, 1969;
Stoney and Batalova, 2013; Gonzalez-Barrera and Lopez, 2013). While this may be attributable
to the fact that the “hyphenated” identity of the Mexican American created a space in which
aspects of both English and Spanish were incorporated into everyday speech, some have gone
on to say that the dialect of this diaspora could and should be treated as a unique language
(Barrón and San Román, 2003). Further studies have gone on to document that, when

Washington, DC
28
instructed in their native language, Mexican American children have a chance at academic
achievement than when instructed only in English (Zubrzycki, 2011; Aguayo, Herman, Ojeda
and Flores, 2011).
Despite these findings, there is an overwhelming conviction among Americans that part
of being American and functioning in the culture means being able to speak English proficiently
(Jiménez, 2011). This national attitude has also gained ground among the Mexican diaspora
where almost 90% believe that learning English is a key to being successful (Taylor, Lopez,
Martínez and Velasco, 2012). The dominance of the English language in rhetoric was codified in
California in the early 1990s by the passing of Propositions 187, 209, and 227 which heavily
restricted the use of the Spanish language in California. Proposition 227 placed an especially
difficult set of circumstances on school children by severely limiting the use of Spanish as a
language of instruction and made the acquisition of English a necessity (Martínez, Pérez and
Fernández, 2013).
Although intended as a tool to encourage mastery of the English language and better
integrate the younger generation, the Proposition had unanticipated side-effects. Instead of
merely codifying English proficiency, the law was often criticized as a means to deny the culture
of Mexican and other Hispanic children (Aguayo, Herman, Ojeda and Flores, 2011). This in turn
led families and children to feel as if their culture and identity were irrelevant in US society
(Martínez, Pérez and Fernández, 2013).
As can be expected of a nation which uses its own society as the machine to integrate
its immigrant populations, most efforts are not federally supported. Objectively, the largest
nation-wide effort to integrate members of the immigrant community would be the public school
system. However, as this system is regulated largely on a state-to-state basis, there is not a lot
to say about a cohesive integration program, tool, or effort. As an institution, however, the public
school system does seem to have its merits as a means of integration among Mexican
Americans.32
Officially, there are some federal guidelines and programs regarding civic life within the
United States. In as much as the demonstration of English proficiency and knowledge of US
history and government are required as part of the naturalization tests, there are programs
designed to help residents study and prepare. One such program from the International Institute
of St. Louis receives its funding from the federal government and operates by conducting phone
interviews with citizenship applicants in order to prepare them for the naturalization interviews
and tests (USCIS, 2014). Although this program is small in scale and certainly cannot be
considered representative of the entire federal effort, it is part of a greater scheme of integration
32 For the sake of organization, more in-depth results on Mexican integration will be saved for the
community-based section of this analysis.

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29
programs in 27 US states which, collectively, receive almost $8 million each year in federal
funding.
Other efforts aimed at integration and improvement of community-based
communications are more likely to be sponsored by municipal authorities. This is not unlike the
case in Germany and, almost as if in response to German municipal police efforts, institutions
such as the New York Police Department (NYPD) have started to hold town-hall style meetings
with immigrant populations. Most notably, a series of conversations was held between 2003 and
2005 among NYPD officials and community leaders in an effort to increase cultural awareness
on both sides of the table. The NYPD wanted to learn about the cultural nuances of those they
were sworn to protect and also wanted to teach members of the diaspora the basic function of
civil services; including their rights when dealing with police (Khashu, Busch and Latif, 2005).33
The Mexican Government & Its Diaspora
Although international agreements that affect immigration are not unheard of (such as
Germany’s agreement with Turkey and France’s ad hoc agreements with emigrant nations) and
despite similar efforts from origin nations to support their emigrants (such as Turkey’s religious,
political, and economic organizations that engage both Turks abroad and at home), the Mexican
government should be noted as being among the first to launch a comprehensive and target-
nation specific approach to empowering and integrating its diaspora. In addition to the tradition
supports of consular services found at Mexican embassies, the Mexican federal government
uses its Institute of Mexicans Abroad (Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior or IME) to help
immigrants in the United States transition and adjust to life in a new country (Laglagaron, 2010).
Armed with the credo that a better integrated immigrant is beneficial to both the origin and
destination nations, the IME operates five main projects designed to ease the transition to the
United States and to ensure that educational, political, social, and health needs are met among
members of the US-based diaspora.
This comprehensive development of cross-border politics is not only new for the field of
immigration and integration studies, but for the Mexican government as well. In the later part of
the last century, relations between Mexico and its diaspora ran thin. Many researchers
interested in the US-Mexico dynamic noted the sense of mutual animosity between Mexicans on
both sides of the border (Shain, 1999). Indeed, much of the official policy stemming from the
Mexican government had to do with repatriation of Mexican nationals and scholarships for
Mexican Americans to study in Mexico (Laglagaron, 2010).
Keeping in mind the differences between cultures of association and cultures of action,34
it is easy to understand the feelings of betrayal experienced by the Mexican government.
However, it is most likely this same culture of association that can explain the development of
33 This effort was given an extreme amount of preparation that included study of failed dialogues among
American police forces and immigrants as well as efforts to build trust between the two sides. Although
the analysis here concerns Mexicans, this project was a sweeping success among Arab communities as
well.
34 Refer back to the literary review portion of this paper to find an explanation of Tönnies’ theory of
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.

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30
Mexico’s current policies. Starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Mexico began to see its
diaspora as needing help in the US (Shain, 1999; Laglagaron, 2010) beginning the movement to
form a supportive relationship.
As has been mentioned several times already, the US maintains a largely laissez-faire
system for integrating its immigrants. After visas are issued and during the naturalization
process, Mexican residents of the US are by and large free to become familiar with life in the
States. In many instances (such as school), learning the dominant, English-speaking culture is a
means of necessity for new immigrants. However, there are some trends to be found in the
Mexican immigrant community which serve to show the effectiveness of the noninterventionist
model of the US.
Political Activism
Although non-citizen residents are restricted from voting in municipal, state, and federal
elections in the United States, there is ample opportunity to become involved in community and
cross-border politics. Perhaps the most significant political outlet in terms of prestige is centered
in the support systems created by the IME. After Mexican nationals make the move to the
United States, they are eligible to vote for representatives on the IME Advisory Council (Consejo
Consultivo del IME) which is meant to be a representative voice for Mexicans abroad
(Laglagaron, 2010). The first council, which included 10 representatives from the US, lived up to
its task by issuing 225 recommendations to the Mexican federal government over its two-year
term (Laglagaron, 2010). This collective of individuals from both sides of the border is an
incredible way to encourage political activity among the US-based diaspora.
Smaller scale political activity has also been marked as a means of more meaningful
integration. Often, US-based Mexicans participate in hometown associations which, like other
political and social enterprises, collect funds from members, elect boards, and enact community
rules (Jiménez, 2011).
Mexican Organizations
Through exercising other basic rights guaranteed under the US Constitution, members
of the Mexican diaspora have been able to assemble and form organizations that include and
address almost all aspects of life in the United States. Beginning in 1929, the League of United
Latin American Citizens (LULAC) formed as the first ethnic organization to differentiate Mexican

Washington, DC
31
Americans from Mexican immigrants – a point that served to underline the hyphenated identity
of its members (Shain, 1999).
Combining traditional Mexican social culture with American political culture, LULAC was
the first of many now national organizations striving to further the integration of the Mexican
diaspora into American social, political, educational, and professional realms.35
Organizations
such as the Hispanic Association on Corporate Responsibility (HACR), The American GI Forum
of the United States (AGIF), the Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute, the Congressional
Hispanic Leadership Institute (CHLI), the Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities
(HACU), the National Association of Hispanic Publications (NAHP), the National Council of La
Raza (NCLR), the National Society of Hispanic MBAs (NSHMBA), the United States Hispanic
Chamber of Commerce (USHCC), and the United States Hispanic Leadership Institute (USHLI)
all work together through active partnerships with one another as well as with other
professional, academic, and political organizations to increase the parity of Mexicans in the
United States (HACR, 2014).36
Language Patterns
Although the Mexicans, along with other Hispanic groups, demonstrate the highest
percentage of Limited English Proficiency (LEP) among first generation US immigrants,
research suggests that proficiency and fluency set in over time (Jiménez, 2011). Currently,
about 66% of first generation Mexican immigrants report English proficiency compared to 89%
of US-born Mexicans (Gonzalez-Barrera and Lopez, 2013). English proficiency and fluency rise
sharply in later generations (Fix, Zimmerman and Passel, 2001) while proficiency and fluency in
Spanish decline slightly (Marquez, 2008). This tilt in proficiency today means that 38% of US
Hispanics speak predominately Spanish while another 38% speak both English and Spanish
equally. The remaining 24% speak mostly English (Taylor, Lopez, Martínez and Velasco, 2013).
Although the trends are very suggestive of the effectiveness of the community-based
integration model with regard to language acquisition, it should be noted that (as with most of
these measurements of integration) the Mexican diaspora is slower to show change and often
shows less of it (Gonzalez-Barrera and Lopez, 2013; Fix, Zimmerman and Passel, 2001;
Marquez, 2008; Marquez, 2008; Jiménez, 2011).
Notions of Identity
Notions of identity also saw a change from first generation immigrants on. While 66% of
first generation immigrants used the term “Mexican” to describe themselves, only 39% of the
35 It should be noted that many of the organizations today are inclusive of all Hispanic and Latino
identities.
36 Many of these national organizations had a hand in creating their peer-organizations and often serve
on one another’s board of directors.

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32
second generation and 32% of the third generation did. Inversely, 3% of first generation
immigrants identify as “American” while 35% of the second generation and 45% of the third
generation do (DeSilver, 2013).
However, there may be some discrepancy between national averages and local
perceptions of feeling American. In the Los Angeles area, for example, residential patterns
continue to yield high rates of racial segregation where only about 10% of Mexicans consider
themselves “American” (Marquez, 2008).
To obfuscate the conversation further, over 80% of Mexican LPRs currently eligible to
naturalize and obtain American citizenship have not (Jiménez, 2010). As a measure of
integration, citizenship is an undeniable yardstick. Why such a vast number of eligible Mexicans
have not become fully integrated in the eyes of the US Constitution is a mystery.
Overall Impact of Integration Programs and Communication Tools in the United States:
The dual mechanism of regulated competitive visas and the largely noninterference
policy of the US government after entry, although in contrast to its EU counterparts, seems
mostly to be a success (Fix, Zimmerman and Passel, 2001). While statistics for Mexicans in
regard to economics, political activity, education, and English language acquisition do tend to
lag behind other immigrant groups, they follow the same general pattern seen throughout US
immigration history.
Although the US government is starting to change the defining regulations for visa and
naturalization applications, it has yet to really enter the realm of focused communication and
integration policy. Most likely, the laissez-faire societal model will continue to be the means
through which the national identity is debated and formed and the Mexican diaspora is
integrated into the “nation of immigrants.”
Conclusions & Recommendations
Keeping many of the core concepts of this analysis’ literature review in mind, there is
much to be said about the implementation of official and non-official tools of communication and
integration efforts with regard to a diaspora. Through these three nations, one can distinctly see
the characteristics of culture and identity that were shaped by historical experience. Both of the
EU nations, for example, have codified the value of belonging by either proof of bloodlines or by

Strangers in a New Land - 2014

Strangers in a New Land - 2014

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