SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 15
Download to read offline
Henry Stern <stern@fsi.io>
Senior Distributed Systems Engineer
Farsight Security, Inc.
Registra)on	
  
Hos)ng	
  
Propaga)on	
  
Payload	
  
Delivery	
  
Blocking	
  
2014-­‐06-­‐20	
   ©2014	
  Farsight	
  Security	
  Inc.	
  	
   2	
  
2014-­‐06-­‐20	
   ©2014	
  Farsight	
  Security	
  Inc.	
  	
   3	
  
2014-­‐06-­‐20	
   ©2014	
  Farsight	
  Security	
  Inc.	
  	
   4	
  
2014-­‐06-­‐20	
   ©2014	
  Farsight	
  Security	
  Inc.	
  	
   5	
  
0.00%	
  
10.00%	
  
20.00%	
  
30.00%	
  
40.00%	
  
50.00%	
  
60.00%	
  
70.00%	
  
80.00%	
  
140501	
  
140502	
  
140503	
  
140504	
  
140505	
  
140506	
  
140507	
  
140508	
  
140509	
  
140510	
  
140511	
  
140512	
  
140513	
  
140514	
  
140515	
  
140516	
  
140517	
  
140518	
  
140519	
  
140520	
  
140521	
  
140522	
  
140523	
  
140524	
  
140525	
  
140526	
  
140527	
  
140528	
  
140529	
  
140530	
  
140531	
  
140601	
  
140602	
  
140603	
  
140604	
  
140605	
  
2014-­‐06-­‐20	
   ©2014	
  Farsight	
  Security	
  Inc.	
  	
   6	
  
Source:	
  Private	
  Spam	
  Trap	
  
2014-­‐06-­‐20	
   ©2014	
  Farsight	
  Security	
  Inc.	
  	
   7	
  
0.00%	
  
5.00%	
  
10.00%	
  
15.00%	
  
20.00%	
  
25.00%	
  
5m	
   10m	
   30m	
   1h	
   3h	
   12h	
   24h	
  
2014-­‐06-­‐20	
   ©2014	
  Farsight	
  Security	
  Inc.	
  	
   8	
  
0.00%	
  
5.00%	
  
10.00%	
  
15.00%	
  
20.00%	
  
25.00%	
  
30.00%	
  
35.00%	
  
40.00%	
  
45.00%	
  
50.00%	
  
5m	
   10m	
   30m	
   1h	
  
•  10% of spam messages use domain
names less than 10 minutes old.
•  Boosts spam catch rate on domain
names <5 minutes old by 20%.
2014-­‐06-­‐20	
   ©2014	
  Farsight	
  Security	
  Inc.	
  	
   9	
  
•  Snapshot in time from the zone’s
authoritative name server.
•  Only tells of new delegation points.
•  Not available for most CCTLDs.
•  Only available to public every 24 hours.
2014-­‐06-­‐20	
   ©2014	
  Farsight	
  Security	
  Inc.	
  	
   10	
  
•  Farsight DNSDB.
https://www.dnsdb.info/!
•  Historical database of 350 million known
domain names, 7 billion hostnames.
•  Detecting 50k new domain names per
day.
2014-­‐06-­‐20	
   ©2014	
  Farsight	
  Security	
  Inc.	
  	
   11	
  
•  Publishing a DNSBL, several DNS RPZs of
domain names first observed less than
24 hours ago.
domain.v1.bl.dns-nod.net
•  ZFA-like dumps from passive DNS.
– Resource records from authoritative name
servers for the zone.!
2014-­‐06-­‐20	
   ©2014	
  Farsight	
  Security	
  Inc.	
  	
   12	
  
•  All domains, even legitimate ones, will
be penalized by NOD's subscribers.
•  Up-front accountability would prevent
this junk at lower total cost.
•  The need and demand for NOD should
embarrass the whole DNS industry.
2014-­‐06-­‐20	
   ©2014	
  Farsight	
  Security	
  Inc.	
  	
   13	
  
•  Improve accountability for new domains.
–  Credit cards, whois, identity.
•  Offer ZFA, including deltas, for all TLD’s.
–  Even CCTLD’s.
•  Improve takedown procedures.
–  Consider APWG's API/process for this.
•  Consider putting new domains in "pause."
•  Limit NS changes to one per day.
–  Exceptions only by phone.
2014-­‐06-­‐20	
   ©2014	
  Farsight	
  Security	
  Inc.	
  	
   14	
  
https://www.farsightsecurity.com/
https://www.dnsdb.info/
2014-­‐06-­‐20	
   ©2014	
  Farsight	
  Security	
  Inc.	
  	
   15	
  

More Related Content

Similar to presentation-passive-dns-mitigate-abuse-23jun14-en

Webinar: Insights from Cyren's 2016 cyberthreat report
Webinar: Insights from Cyren's 2016 cyberthreat reportWebinar: Insights from Cyren's 2016 cyberthreat report
Webinar: Insights from Cyren's 2016 cyberthreat reportCyren, Inc
 
DDoS Mitigation using BGP Flowspec
DDoS Mitigation using BGP Flowspec DDoS Mitigation using BGP Flowspec
DDoS Mitigation using BGP Flowspec APNIC
 
IPv6 Security - Myths and Reality
IPv6 Security - Myths and RealityIPv6 Security - Myths and Reality
IPv6 Security - Myths and RealitySwiss IPv6 Council
 
Mobile Penetration Testing: Episode II - Attack of the Code
Mobile Penetration Testing: Episode II - Attack of the CodeMobile Penetration Testing: Episode II - Attack of the Code
Mobile Penetration Testing: Episode II - Attack of the CodeNowSecure
 
Jeroen Wijdogen (Akamai) | TU - Hacks & Attacks
Jeroen Wijdogen (Akamai) | TU - Hacks & AttacksJeroen Wijdogen (Akamai) | TU - Hacks & Attacks
Jeroen Wijdogen (Akamai) | TU - Hacks & AttacksMedia Perspectives
 
第1回福岡SoftLayer勉強会
第1回福岡SoftLayer勉強会第1回福岡SoftLayer勉強会
第1回福岡SoftLayer勉強会Shin Sakamoto
 
Thriving in the Shark Tank: How Vebalizeit Load Tested with SOASTA
Thriving in the Shark Tank: How Vebalizeit Load Tested with SOASTAThriving in the Shark Tank: How Vebalizeit Load Tested with SOASTA
Thriving in the Shark Tank: How Vebalizeit Load Tested with SOASTASOASTA
 
Save Your Network – Protecting Manufacturing Data from Deadly Breaches
Save Your Network – Protecting Manufacturing Data from Deadly BreachesSave Your Network – Protecting Manufacturing Data from Deadly Breaches
Save Your Network – Protecting Manufacturing Data from Deadly BreachesLancope, Inc.
 
PLNOG 13: James Kretchmar: How Akamai scales to serve the largest events on t...
PLNOG 13: James Kretchmar: How Akamai scales to serve the largest events on t...PLNOG 13: James Kretchmar: How Akamai scales to serve the largest events on t...
PLNOG 13: James Kretchmar: How Akamai scales to serve the largest events on t...PROIDEA
 
Introduction to RPKI
Introduction to RPKIIntroduction to RPKI
Introduction to RPKIAPNIC
 
Cisco IPv6 Deployment Statics, by Shishio Tsuchiya [APRICOT 2015]
Cisco IPv6 Deployment Statics, by Shishio Tsuchiya [APRICOT 2015]Cisco IPv6 Deployment Statics, by Shishio Tsuchiya [APRICOT 2015]
Cisco IPv6 Deployment Statics, by Shishio Tsuchiya [APRICOT 2015]APNIC
 
Reverse Engineering Malware: A look inside Operation Tovar
Reverse Engineering Malware: A look inside Operation TovarReverse Engineering Malware: A look inside Operation Tovar
Reverse Engineering Malware: A look inside Operation TovarLancope, Inc.
 
Virtual SAN: It’s a SAN, it’s Virtual, but what is it really?
Virtual SAN: It’s a SAN, it’s Virtual, but what is it really?Virtual SAN: It’s a SAN, it’s Virtual, but what is it really?
Virtual SAN: It’s a SAN, it’s Virtual, but what is it really?DataCore Software
 
DNS как линия защиты/DNS as a Defense Vector
DNS как линия защиты/DNS as a Defense VectorDNS как линия защиты/DNS as a Defense Vector
DNS как линия защиты/DNS as a Defense VectorPositive Hack Days
 
Securing your Rails application
Securing your Rails applicationSecuring your Rails application
Securing your Rails applicationclucasKrof
 
Decreasing Incident Response Time
Decreasing Incident Response TimeDecreasing Incident Response Time
Decreasing Incident Response TimeBoni Bruno
 

Similar to presentation-passive-dns-mitigate-abuse-23jun14-en (20)

Webinar: Insights from Cyren's 2016 cyberthreat report
Webinar: Insights from Cyren's 2016 cyberthreat reportWebinar: Insights from Cyren's 2016 cyberthreat report
Webinar: Insights from Cyren's 2016 cyberthreat report
 
DDoS Mitigation using BGP Flowspec
DDoS Mitigation using BGP Flowspec DDoS Mitigation using BGP Flowspec
DDoS Mitigation using BGP Flowspec
 
IPv6 Security - Myths and Reality
IPv6 Security - Myths and RealityIPv6 Security - Myths and Reality
IPv6 Security - Myths and Reality
 
Mobile Penetration Testing: Episode II - Attack of the Code
Mobile Penetration Testing: Episode II - Attack of the CodeMobile Penetration Testing: Episode II - Attack of the Code
Mobile Penetration Testing: Episode II - Attack of the Code
 
Tracing your security telemetry with Apache Metron
Tracing your security telemetry with Apache MetronTracing your security telemetry with Apache Metron
Tracing your security telemetry with Apache Metron
 
Breaking the Status Quo
Breaking the Status QuoBreaking the Status Quo
Breaking the Status Quo
 
Jeroen Wijdogen (Akamai) | TU - Hacks & Attacks
Jeroen Wijdogen (Akamai) | TU - Hacks & AttacksJeroen Wijdogen (Akamai) | TU - Hacks & Attacks
Jeroen Wijdogen (Akamai) | TU - Hacks & Attacks
 
第1回福岡SoftLayer勉強会
第1回福岡SoftLayer勉強会第1回福岡SoftLayer勉強会
第1回福岡SoftLayer勉強会
 
Thriving in the Shark Tank: How Vebalizeit Load Tested with SOASTA
Thriving in the Shark Tank: How Vebalizeit Load Tested with SOASTAThriving in the Shark Tank: How Vebalizeit Load Tested with SOASTA
Thriving in the Shark Tank: How Vebalizeit Load Tested with SOASTA
 
Save Your Network – Protecting Manufacturing Data from Deadly Breaches
Save Your Network – Protecting Manufacturing Data from Deadly BreachesSave Your Network – Protecting Manufacturing Data from Deadly Breaches
Save Your Network – Protecting Manufacturing Data from Deadly Breaches
 
PLNOG 13: James Kretchmar: How Akamai scales to serve the largest events on t...
PLNOG 13: James Kretchmar: How Akamai scales to serve the largest events on t...PLNOG 13: James Kretchmar: How Akamai scales to serve the largest events on t...
PLNOG 13: James Kretchmar: How Akamai scales to serve the largest events on t...
 
Introduction to RPKI
Introduction to RPKIIntroduction to RPKI
Introduction to RPKI
 
Streaming with Varnish
Streaming with VarnishStreaming with Varnish
Streaming with Varnish
 
Cisco IPv6 Deployment Statics, by Shishio Tsuchiya [APRICOT 2015]
Cisco IPv6 Deployment Statics, by Shishio Tsuchiya [APRICOT 2015]Cisco IPv6 Deployment Statics, by Shishio Tsuchiya [APRICOT 2015]
Cisco IPv6 Deployment Statics, by Shishio Tsuchiya [APRICOT 2015]
 
Reverse Engineering Malware: A look inside Operation Tovar
Reverse Engineering Malware: A look inside Operation TovarReverse Engineering Malware: A look inside Operation Tovar
Reverse Engineering Malware: A look inside Operation Tovar
 
Virtual SAN: It’s a SAN, it’s Virtual, but what is it really?
Virtual SAN: It’s a SAN, it’s Virtual, but what is it really?Virtual SAN: It’s a SAN, it’s Virtual, but what is it really?
Virtual SAN: It’s a SAN, it’s Virtual, but what is it really?
 
DNS как линия защиты/DNS as a Defense Vector
DNS как линия защиты/DNS as a Defense VectorDNS как линия защиты/DNS as a Defense Vector
DNS как линия защиты/DNS as a Defense Vector
 
Introduction to RTI DDS
Introduction to RTI DDSIntroduction to RTI DDS
Introduction to RTI DDS
 
Securing your Rails application
Securing your Rails applicationSecuring your Rails application
Securing your Rails application
 
Decreasing Incident Response Time
Decreasing Incident Response TimeDecreasing Incident Response Time
Decreasing Incident Response Time
 

presentation-passive-dns-mitigate-abuse-23jun14-en

  • 1. Henry Stern <stern@fsi.io> Senior Distributed Systems Engineer Farsight Security, Inc.
  • 2. Registra)on   Hos)ng   Propaga)on   Payload   Delivery   Blocking   2014-­‐06-­‐20   ©2014  Farsight  Security  Inc.     2  
  • 3. 2014-­‐06-­‐20   ©2014  Farsight  Security  Inc.     3  
  • 4. 2014-­‐06-­‐20   ©2014  Farsight  Security  Inc.     4  
  • 5. 2014-­‐06-­‐20   ©2014  Farsight  Security  Inc.     5  
  • 6. 0.00%   10.00%   20.00%   30.00%   40.00%   50.00%   60.00%   70.00%   80.00%   140501   140502   140503   140504   140505   140506   140507   140508   140509   140510   140511   140512   140513   140514   140515   140516   140517   140518   140519   140520   140521   140522   140523   140524   140525   140526   140527   140528   140529   140530   140531   140601   140602   140603   140604   140605   2014-­‐06-­‐20   ©2014  Farsight  Security  Inc.     6   Source:  Private  Spam  Trap  
  • 7. 2014-­‐06-­‐20   ©2014  Farsight  Security  Inc.     7   0.00%   5.00%   10.00%   15.00%   20.00%   25.00%   5m   10m   30m   1h   3h   12h   24h  
  • 8. 2014-­‐06-­‐20   ©2014  Farsight  Security  Inc.     8   0.00%   5.00%   10.00%   15.00%   20.00%   25.00%   30.00%   35.00%   40.00%   45.00%   50.00%   5m   10m   30m   1h  
  • 9. •  10% of spam messages use domain names less than 10 minutes old. •  Boosts spam catch rate on domain names <5 minutes old by 20%. 2014-­‐06-­‐20   ©2014  Farsight  Security  Inc.     9  
  • 10. •  Snapshot in time from the zone’s authoritative name server. •  Only tells of new delegation points. •  Not available for most CCTLDs. •  Only available to public every 24 hours. 2014-­‐06-­‐20   ©2014  Farsight  Security  Inc.     10  
  • 11. •  Farsight DNSDB. https://www.dnsdb.info/! •  Historical database of 350 million known domain names, 7 billion hostnames. •  Detecting 50k new domain names per day. 2014-­‐06-­‐20   ©2014  Farsight  Security  Inc.     11  
  • 12. •  Publishing a DNSBL, several DNS RPZs of domain names first observed less than 24 hours ago. domain.v1.bl.dns-nod.net •  ZFA-like dumps from passive DNS. – Resource records from authoritative name servers for the zone.! 2014-­‐06-­‐20   ©2014  Farsight  Security  Inc.     12  
  • 13. •  All domains, even legitimate ones, will be penalized by NOD's subscribers. •  Up-front accountability would prevent this junk at lower total cost. •  The need and demand for NOD should embarrass the whole DNS industry. 2014-­‐06-­‐20   ©2014  Farsight  Security  Inc.     13  
  • 14. •  Improve accountability for new domains. –  Credit cards, whois, identity. •  Offer ZFA, including deltas, for all TLD’s. –  Even CCTLD’s. •  Improve takedown procedures. –  Consider APWG's API/process for this. •  Consider putting new domains in "pause." •  Limit NS changes to one per day. –  Exceptions only by phone. 2014-­‐06-­‐20   ©2014  Farsight  Security  Inc.     14