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Putting Cyber Attackers
on the Defensive
July 16, 2019
Rami Mizrahi
Yishai Gerstle
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
Featuring…
2
THE
ATTACKER
Yishai Gerstle
Security Researcher
THE
DEFENDER
Rami Mizrahi
VP, Software
Engineering -
Deception
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
Agenda
▪ Attacks & Attackers
▪ The Demo arsenals
▪ Attack Demos
▪ In details: tools & deployment
▪ Wrap-up
3
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
Attacks & Attackers
▪ Attacks are becoming more & more
advanced
▪ Methods of attacks are shared between
attackers and online
▪ Recon phase is a key part of any attack
– both before and during.
▪ We’ll start our attack demos from the
Moment of Boom
4
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
Attackers Arsenal
5
Attacker Type SKIDDIE –
Script Kiddie
Advanced attacker
OS of choice Kali Ubuntu
Enumeration
methods
Credentials
collection
Data validation ARP table, DNS Server
Framework Metasploit
Lateral movement
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
Defenders Arsenal
▪ Using Fidelis Deception
▪ Focusing on two concepts as part of a Terrain
based Cyber Defense
▪ Know your Terrain - Understanding your
network
▪ Asset, subnets, domains and their
connectivity
▪ Alter your Terrain - Using Deception to fool
& catch attackers
▪ Decoys, Breadcrumbs, Network
deception, Data deception
6
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
SKIDDIE Attack Demo- Wall Port
▪ Weapon of choice: Kali machine
▪ Nmap scan – port scanning
▪ Responder – poison multicast requests
7
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
SKIDDIE Attack Demo – Infected Asset
▪ Shell on infected asset:
▪ Metasploit commands automation using script
▪ Collect data, crack credentials
▪ Next hops: SSH, FTP, Shared
▪ File upload to ftp or shared
8
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
▪ Noisy alerts – in Deception and probably in other tools
▪ All activities monitored by deception
▪ Credentials usage is monitored
▪ Files uploaded are sent to Sandbox analysis
9
SKIDDIE Deception Activity
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
Advanced Attacker – Demo – Wall Port
▪ Weapon of Choice: Ubuntu
▪ Wall Port:
▪ Responder – passive analysis
10
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
Advanced Attacker – Demo – Infected Asset
▪ Shell on infected machine:
▪ Credentials collect
▪ Bloodhound view
▪ Validate against – ARP table, DNS server, pcap file
▪ Access next hop – RDP, SSH
▪ Non monitored networks – camera, scanner
11
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
▪ Fewer alerts
▪ Access to unmonitored systems
▪ Improve the Decoy validity with:
▪ ARP poisoning
▪ Breadcrumbs
▪ AD Deception
12
Advanced Attacker – Deception Activity
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
Defenders in Details
▪ Deception Elements in detail:
▪ Decoys
▪ Breadcrumbs
▪ Network Deception
▪ Data Deception
▪ Active Directory Deception
13
© Fidelis Cybersecurity14
Attacker Type SKIDDIE – Script
Kiddie
Advanced attacker
OS of choice Kali Ubuntu
Enumeration methods
Credentials collection
Data validation ARP table, DNS Server
Framework Metasploit
Lateral movement
Attackers Arsenal
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
Wrap-up
▪ We reviewed two types of attackers – the
noisy script kiddies and the stealthy
advanced attackers.
▪ Attackers are always looking for ways to
get into your network
▪ To protect your network, you must first
understand what you have in it - know your
terrain
▪ Using Deception helps you prepare your
network for an attack and catch
15
Questions?
fidelissecurity.com/event/
black-hat-pass/
LEARN MORE

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Putting Cyber Attackers on the Defensive

  • 1. Putting Cyber Attackers on the Defensive July 16, 2019 Rami Mizrahi Yishai Gerstle
  • 2. © Fidelis Cybersecurity Featuring… 2 THE ATTACKER Yishai Gerstle Security Researcher THE DEFENDER Rami Mizrahi VP, Software Engineering - Deception
  • 3. © Fidelis Cybersecurity Agenda ▪ Attacks & Attackers ▪ The Demo arsenals ▪ Attack Demos ▪ In details: tools & deployment ▪ Wrap-up 3
  • 4. © Fidelis Cybersecurity Attacks & Attackers ▪ Attacks are becoming more & more advanced ▪ Methods of attacks are shared between attackers and online ▪ Recon phase is a key part of any attack – both before and during. ▪ We’ll start our attack demos from the Moment of Boom 4
  • 5. © Fidelis Cybersecurity Attackers Arsenal 5 Attacker Type SKIDDIE – Script Kiddie Advanced attacker OS of choice Kali Ubuntu Enumeration methods Credentials collection Data validation ARP table, DNS Server Framework Metasploit Lateral movement
  • 6. © Fidelis Cybersecurity Defenders Arsenal ▪ Using Fidelis Deception ▪ Focusing on two concepts as part of a Terrain based Cyber Defense ▪ Know your Terrain - Understanding your network ▪ Asset, subnets, domains and their connectivity ▪ Alter your Terrain - Using Deception to fool & catch attackers ▪ Decoys, Breadcrumbs, Network deception, Data deception 6
  • 7. © Fidelis Cybersecurity SKIDDIE Attack Demo- Wall Port ▪ Weapon of choice: Kali machine ▪ Nmap scan – port scanning ▪ Responder – poison multicast requests 7
  • 8. © Fidelis Cybersecurity SKIDDIE Attack Demo – Infected Asset ▪ Shell on infected asset: ▪ Metasploit commands automation using script ▪ Collect data, crack credentials ▪ Next hops: SSH, FTP, Shared ▪ File upload to ftp or shared 8
  • 9. © Fidelis Cybersecurity ▪ Noisy alerts – in Deception and probably in other tools ▪ All activities monitored by deception ▪ Credentials usage is monitored ▪ Files uploaded are sent to Sandbox analysis 9 SKIDDIE Deception Activity
  • 10. © Fidelis Cybersecurity Advanced Attacker – Demo – Wall Port ▪ Weapon of Choice: Ubuntu ▪ Wall Port: ▪ Responder – passive analysis 10
  • 11. © Fidelis Cybersecurity Advanced Attacker – Demo – Infected Asset ▪ Shell on infected machine: ▪ Credentials collect ▪ Bloodhound view ▪ Validate against – ARP table, DNS server, pcap file ▪ Access next hop – RDP, SSH ▪ Non monitored networks – camera, scanner 11
  • 12. © Fidelis Cybersecurity ▪ Fewer alerts ▪ Access to unmonitored systems ▪ Improve the Decoy validity with: ▪ ARP poisoning ▪ Breadcrumbs ▪ AD Deception 12 Advanced Attacker – Deception Activity
  • 13. © Fidelis Cybersecurity Defenders in Details ▪ Deception Elements in detail: ▪ Decoys ▪ Breadcrumbs ▪ Network Deception ▪ Data Deception ▪ Active Directory Deception 13
  • 14. © Fidelis Cybersecurity14 Attacker Type SKIDDIE – Script Kiddie Advanced attacker OS of choice Kali Ubuntu Enumeration methods Credentials collection Data validation ARP table, DNS Server Framework Metasploit Lateral movement Attackers Arsenal
  • 15. © Fidelis Cybersecurity Wrap-up ▪ We reviewed two types of attackers – the noisy script kiddies and the stealthy advanced attackers. ▪ Attackers are always looking for ways to get into your network ▪ To protect your network, you must first understand what you have in it - know your terrain ▪ Using Deception helps you prepare your network for an attack and catch 15