2. i
ABSTRACT
Border security is a politically strong but ambiguous concept. Terrorism and 9/11
have propelled border security straight into the heart of today’s security agenda. The
changing perception of borders, new pre-emptive approaches in border controls, and
increasing institutionalisation of Integrated Border Management (IBM) are important
drivers urging to revisit border security as an underdeveloped concept and explore its
principles and contradictions in the light of evolving border management practices.
This dissertation explores how well the IBM approach is equipped to meet the challenges
of border security. It looks into what constitutes ‘border security’ as part of the broader
security debate, and articulates its referent object(s) and threats to it. It critically explores
functions and institutions relevant to border controls, with particular reference to closer
integration, need for inter-agency and cross-border cooperation, and robust identification
management. Finally, it focuses on the IBM framework to explore to what extent its
institutionalisation helps to achieve border security objectives, especially preventing and
combating its threats.
In addition to the existing literature, this study relies on semi-structured interviews
with policy and technical experts, with solid experience in managing diverse aspects
of border controls. The analysis of their views and experience informs this research
and provide evidence to deductive conclusions, and answers to research questions.
Key findings in the study include fundamental changes in border controls, with
borders becoming ‘etherised’ and considerably expanded in spatial and temporal terms.
The main feature of today’s border controls is their intelligence-driven, risk-based and
technology-empowered qualities, with focus on pre-emption and moving borders away
from the physical borders. The concept of IBM is an important step in conceptualising
border controls and tackling border security threats. However, its further
institutionalization needs to be critically reviewed and enhanced to maintain its relevance
to border control realities.
3. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………..……………………………iii
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………..………..…………..…….iv
LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………...…………..………iv
GLOSSARY………………………………...………………..…………...………...v
1. INTRODUCTION………………………………………..…………...………...1
2. Chapter 1: KEY QUESTIONS, METHODS AND CONCEPTS……...……….7
3. Chapter 2: BORDER SECURITY REVISITED: WHAT BORDERS?
WHAT SECURITY............................................................................................16
The evolving concept of the state border: from the Westphalian
model to ‘etherised’ borders………………….. ………………...…16
Exploring ‘security’ in border security: threats and referent
objects………………………………………………………………20
Border controls in practice: spatial and temporal dimensions ….... .37
Conclusions……………………………………..…………………..45
4. Chapter 3: TRANSLATING BORDER CONTROL FUNCTIONS INTO
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS…………………...………………...…51
Border control functions………………………...……………...…...51
Security and Facilitation………………………...……………...…...53
Travel documents and identification management………...…...…...56
Institutional framework…………………………………...…... ……60
Inter-agency and cross-border cooperation……………...…………..62
Conclusions…………………...……………………………………..64
5. Chapter 4: INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT: EXPLORING
CONCEPTUAL STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE IBM
MODEL………………………………………………………………………....69
Overview of the IBM model……………………………………...……..69
Relevance of the IBM model to contemporary border controls…...……73
Conclusions……………………………………………..………………76
6. CONCLUSIONS………………………………………………….….………....79
Bibliography …………………………………………………………..….…………82
Appendix A……………………………………………………………...…………..87
Appendix B…………………………………………………………..….…………..89
4. iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This dissertation would have never been written without the help of many people in
many continents. I am very grateful to them all for their knowledge and support.
While listing them all would be a Herculean labour requiring a separate volume, I
should like to highlight at least some that were absolutely crucial to the success of this
project.
Professor Ann Fitz-Gerald was a kind and wise supervisor, encouraging me to explore
new boundary-testing areas, tolerating my (sometimes) aggressive iconoclastic
approaches, and gently pointing me in the right direction when things were about to
go astray. I am grateful to the whole Security Sector Management (SSM) faculty at
Cranfield University. The SSM programme granted me a generous bursary without
which I would have never been able to start my studies. The SSM professors who
delivered the courses added a lot to my understanding of Security Sector Management
dynamics from their respective angles. Dr Thomas O’Brien was most helpful with
providing constructive critique of my early mildly-megalomaniac research proposal,
adding some sanity to the whole affair. Lt.-Col. Thomas Hamilton-Baillie, the
academic coordinator for most of my time at the SSM programme, had the patience of
St Francis and did his best to accommodate my erratic schedules, last minute
consulting trips to Africa and other outrageous irregularities. This was a superb
academic and administrative team to work with and I am very much grateful to them
all.
Major contributors to this project were respondents to interviews, about a dozen of
policy and technical experts round the world. While their names cannot be disclosed
because of the anonymity clause in the interviewing methodology, they all did a
terrific job in sharing their thoughts and expertise in an open and most helpful
manner. While some of them were already happily retired, many were still very busy
in the office. They all devoted over an hour of their time for the interview, were not
discouraged by my clumsy interviewing techniques and kept saying thought-
provoking and relevant things.
I am also grateful to my former colleagues at the International Centre for Migration
Policy Development (ICMPD), International Organization for Migration (IOM) and
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) who have done a lot of thinking on
the evolving IBM framework from their respective perspectives. Working with them
closely, debating the finer points of IBM both as theory and as part of technical
cooperation assistance, has provided plenty of valuable insights for this dissertation.
There are many other people that contributed to the success of this research project
but are far too numerous to mention. I thank them all for their kind support.
5. iv
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Border security threats and referent objects……………………………….34
Figure 2: A border crossing cycle: the spatial dimension……………………………49
Figure 3: A border crossing cycle: the temporal dimension…………………………50
Figure 4: Five dimensions of holistic identification management (adapted
from ICAO, 2013)…………………………………………………………………...56
Figure 5: Components of intelligence-led border controls…………………….…….60
Figure 6: Conditions for inter-agency and cross-border cooperation……….….……64
Figure 7: Actors and stakeholders in border management…………….…….….……68
Figure 8: ‘Three pillars’ of IBM………………………………………..…….……...73
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Agencies ‘typically involved’ in border management, as per the EC
Guidelines (European Commission, 2010:28)……………………………………….87
Table 2: Border control institutional framework in Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
the UK and the US: a comparative perspective……………………………………...89
6. v
GLOSSARY
ABC Automated Border Controls
ABF Australian Border Force
ACBPS Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
AFP Australian Federal Police
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APHA Animal and Plant Health Agency (UK)
API Advance Passenger Information
APIS Advance Passenger Information System
APP Advance Passenger Processing system (Australia)
ASIO Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
BCP Border Crossing Point
BPR Behaviour Pattern Recognition
BS Border Security
Caricom Caribbean Community
CBP Customs and Border Protection (US)
CBSA Canada Border Services Agency
CFIA Canadian Food Inspection Agency
CIC Citizenship Immigration Canada
CMAL Central Movement Alert List
CSIS Canadian Security Intelligence Service
DAC (OECD) Development Assistance Committee
DAL Document Alert List
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration (US)
DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DHS Department of Homeland Security (US)
DIBP Department of Immigration and Border Protections (Australia)
DoA Department of Agriculture
DoD Department of Defence
DoH Department of Health
DoS Department of State (US)
EC European Commission
ePassport Electronic (Biometric) Passport
ESTA Electronic System for Travel Authorization (US)
EU European Union
EUR Euro
eVisa Electronic Visa
FCC Five Country Conference
FRONTEX European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at
the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
FTF Foreign Terrorist Fighter
HQ Headquarters
iAPI Interactive Advance Passenger Information
IATA International Air Transport Association
IBM Integrated Border Management
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICMPD International Centre for Migration Policy Development
ID Identification
7. vi
IGO International Governmental Organisation
Interpol International Criminal Police Organisation
IOM International Organization for Migration
MI5 Security Service (UK)
MI6 Secret Intelligence Service (UK)
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MRTD Machine-readable Travel Document
MRZ Machine-readable Zone
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Non-governmental Organisation
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command (Canada and the US)
NMCC National Maritime Coordination Centre (New Zealand)
NPM New Public Management
OBHS Office of Border Health Services (Canada)
ODIHR (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAL Person Alert List
PHAC Public Health Agency (Canada)
PKD (ICAO) Public Key Directory
PNR Passenger Name Record
POI Person of Interest
PSC Public Safety Canada
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SARPs (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SBC Schengen Borders Code
SC (UN) Security Council
SENTRI Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection
SLTD (INTERPOL’s) Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database
SSM Security Sector Management
SSR Security Sector Reform
TAG/MRTD Technical Advisory Group on Machine-readable Travel Documents
TRIP (ICAO) Traveller Identification Programme
TSA Transportation Security Administration (US)
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
US United States
UNCTED UN Counter-terrorism Executive Directorate
UNECE UN Economic Commission for Europe
UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime
USBP US Border Patrol
USD US dollar
WCO World Customs Organisation
8. - 1 -
INTRODUCTION
‘Few people would deny that security, whether individual, national, or international,
ranks prominently among problems facing humanity (Buzan, 1991:1). National
security is ‘particularly central’ because states have dominant power to shape other
security sectors, and they seem unable to coexist with each other in harmony’ (ibid).
Among other security sectors, border security (BS) is one of the very few able to
project the sense of ‘urgency and drama’ similar to that of national security, evoking
survival-threatening images of terrorism, serious crime, mass influx of foreigners, and
a complex and powerful government apparatus tasked with mitigating such threats.
The label ‘border security’ has become well established on today’s global security
agenda, confidently appearing in studies and scholarly papers, reports of government
agencies and the media as an important security sub-sector, being very much at the
heart of contemporary security dynamics. While border controls existed for centuries,
there seem to be two events in modern history that considerably increased attention to
border security and control issues. The first one was the end of the Cold War, which
shifted the focus of security thinking from military security during the decades of
bilateral nuclear confrontation to ‘new’ non-military threats such as numerous forms
of organised crime, societal tensions, intra-state conflicts and terrorism, all having
some trans-border dimension. The second major event to escalate the ‘weight’ of
border security and controls further was 9/11, which drew attention to the trans-border
dimension of the terrorist attacks in the USA, highlighting strong links between
terrorism, homeland security and border controls. It is fair to say that today border
security and border controls command the same sense of urgency and drama as other
well-established security concerns - such as military confrontation or terrorism -
making it a solid and legitimate element of contemporary international security
studies.
However, the fact that border security has firmly established itself on the security
agenda does not guarantee a coherent concept, developed theory or inclusive approach
in placing border controls within the broader security debate. The first issue is the lack
of an agreed and developed definition of what ‘border security’ is. Revealingly, an
ongoing debate in the USA keeps highlighting the fact that enormous public funds are
9. - 2 -
being spent on ‘border security,’ even without having a sensible definition of it, and
certainly no metrics how border security performance could be measured.1
Another issue is fragmentation. While the terms ‘border controls,’ ‘border security’
and ‘border management’ are used extensively by academia, practitioners and the
media, in many cases they are used in a narrow and fragmented sense. Typical
examples include focusing on immigration or customs or quarantine controls only;
addressing border security or border facilitation only; or focusing on ad hoc empirical
studies in specific countries only, without attempting to come to broader and more
universal conclusions.
Yet another issue is the institutionalisation and conceptual development of border-
specific security theory: while other security sectors and issues (e.g. military,
environmental, economic, societal or human security, securitisation, power-security
dilemma, arms control, etc.) have produced well-established sector-specific academic
literature, the scholarly knowledge on border security and border controls remains
much slimmer. In particular, the dominant simplistic and highly-empirical perception
of border security does not seem to take into account the ‘contradictions latent within
the concept itself, and/or inadequately aware of the fact that the logic of security
almost always involves high levels of interdependence among the actors trying to
make themselves secure’ (ibid:2).
It is fair to admit that border controls – and border management2
– are exceptionally
multi-faceted and multi-functional phenomena difficult to address in full due to their
complexity; hence a natural resistance to address it in a comprehensive manner, and
1
This argument has been raised by a number of American think tanks and congressmen, elaborated on
their websites and position papers. Olson and Wilson (2013) capture the main lines of the argument
about border security as an ambiguous and underdeveloped concept quite well. ‘It has never been clear
what precisely is meant by the term, but billions have nevertheless been spent on fences and
sophisticated technology, and the Border Patrol is now more than five times larger than it was two
decades ago. Has the border been secured? Hard to say since there is no agreement on the metrics for
measuring border security’ (ibid).
2
Respondent NAT5 argued quite convincingly that the term ‘border management’ was preferable to
‘border controls.’ The latter has negative connotations and focuses on the security and enforcement
side of overall border management, whereas ‘border manages’ includes all policies and functions
needed for well-run borders, including security and facilitation. While this argument has strong merits,
this dissertation uses the term ‘border controls’ to describe the whole of border systems and processes,
in the sense of ‘border management.’ This is mainly because in IBM literature ‘border controls’ have
become well institutionalised and used in the sense of overall ‘border management.’ Here the world
‘control’ is used in the sense that UN specialised agencies would have a “Document Control Unit,” a
division that manages all aspects of official publications.
10. - 3 -
attraction of focusing on its separate components instead of the whole. Perhaps the
only significant exception has been the IBM conceptual framework that attempts to
tackle border management and security issues in a holistic, inclusive and integrated
manner. The existing body of professional and academic knowledge on border
security seem to encourage moving from an ad hoc fragmented approach towards
articulating border controls theory and practice in a more inclusive and
comprehensive manner.
In addition to this complex background, an important driving force in rethinking
border controls has been the evolving concept of the border. Arguably, that the
traditional concept of the border – and the dynamics of crossing the border, rooted in
the classical geopolitical thought of the 1930s along the Westphalian lines and still
accepted by many as a valid model - has increasingly lost its relevance to the
contemporary border control realities. Drawing on works of critical post-structuralists
(Vaughan-Williams, 2012), this dissertation explores the new spatial and temporal
dynamics of border controls after 9/11, arguing that ‘border’ ‘controls’ have expanded
their spatial and temporal scope and have merged with the ‘perpetual’ homeland
security regime in the developed Western world. Another driving force changing the
nature of border controls has been rapid technological development that facilitates
real-time secure data sharing required for intelligence-driven risk-based border
controls.
The diversity of border security threats - and functions required for border controls -
poses particular challenges to setting up an institutional framework to tackle those
issues in practice. The traditional, if somewhat NPM-influenced approach, was setting
a number of single-purpose specialised national agencies to deal with each major
border control function. While this approach existed – and still exists – in many
countries, it poses questions about effective inter-agency and cross-border cooperation
and difficulties in achieving a ‘whole-of-government’ (or IBM) perspective. Since
9/11, there have been attempts in the developed Western world to move towards
holistic border management through integrating some of border control agencies into
a single institution, a tendency that is addressed in some detail in this dissertation.
The IBM doctrine has been often promoted as panacea for enhancing both security
and facilitation in border controls, and the concept has been institutionalised and
11. - 4 -
codified into a number of documents. While some IBM variations exist, the most
mature and inclusive framework is one developed for the EU border technical
assistance in the Western Balkans (Marenin, 2009: 18-19; European Commission,
2010). The focus of the ongoing debate – something that this dissertation critically
examines - is the inclusiveness of the IBM model: as the limits between border
controls and law enforcement, arguably, have been blurring, the IBM set of agencies
present ‘at the border’ appears to be increasingly insufficient, although no systematic
critique or alternative approaches have been produced so far.
While this brief introduction into border control problematics provides background
and justification for further research into border management in this dissertation, there
are two more good reasons that highlight border security as an important focus of
further security studies. These issues cannot be addressed in the dissertation as they
would make the scope far too broad. However, they do highlight further the
importance of border security on the contemporary international security agenda, and
call for follow-up studies.
The first issue central to the contemporary border control debate is its securitization,
as it relates to border security. It does not seem to have gained much strength and
institutionalization in the practitioner and policymaking world but has been acquiring
increasing momentum in critical security studies in Europe. In simplest terms,
securitization refers to a phenomenon when governments restrict the rights and
freedoms of individuals (which otherwise would contradict constitutional norms) and
get away with it invoking ‘security’ as a justification, thus highlighting a key Security
Sector Reform (SSR) problem: when government institutions stop providing security
to the individual and turn into a source of insecurity instead. Securitisation ‘refers
<…> to the process of presenting an issue in security terms, in other words as an
existential threat’ (Buzan and Hansen, 2009:214).3
Whether such restrictions enhance
3
Two classical Copenhagen school elaborations on securitisation that add clarity to the matter are
worth quoting in full. ‘The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations:
When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to
make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? If by means of
an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed
to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of
securitization’ (Buzan et al, 1998:25). And, ‘Security ‘frames the issue either as a special kind of
politics or as above politics’ and a spectrum can therefore be defined ranging public issues from the
non-politicised (‘the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public
debate and decision’), through politicised (‘the issue is part of public policy, requiring government
12. - 5 -
‘security’ in practice or just remain a consensus-manufacturing tool that strengthens
powers of government agencies at the expense of privacy and civil liberties, and
allows governments to handle issues ‘at an accelerated pace and in ways that may
violate normal social and legal rules,’ remains debatable. However, few areas
highlight securitization dilemmas as vividly as ‘border security’ and its overlap with
the broader homeland security and law enforcement agenda.
Secondly, border (in)security is no longer an exclusive concern of the developed
world but has shifted to failed, fragile and developing states, as part of IBM technical
cooperation and capacity-building efforts funded by the Western liberal democracies.
Many Western donors appear to realize increasingly that insecurity breeding in remote
fragile states is bound to spill over across the borders and threaten them sooner or
later. Hence the emerging element of self-interest in providing programming funding
for border security capacity building world-wide. In addition, looking from the
broader human security perspective, the perception of borders and their controls in the
developing world may differ significantly from the Western border control realities.
Questions increasingly emerge whether replicating the IBM model mechanically in
developing and fragile states delivers the intended security benefits or just presents
unintended human-security costs.
The dissertation structure is as follows:
Chapter 1 (KEY QUESTIONS, METHODS AND CONCEPTS) outlines the aim,
hypotheses and research questions that structure this dissertation. It goes on to
provide a literature review, since the existing scholarly knowledge define
methodology and need for any additional sources for data. The chapter also
outlines methodology, explaining optimal collection and analysis tools for
informing this research, and ends with articulating new critical theories that guide
the analysis in future chapters.
Chapter 2 (BORDER SECURITY REVISITED: WHAT BORDERS? WHAT
SECURITY?) is a boundary-testing exercise that critically examines two key
components of ‘border (in)security:’ the border and security, exploring the
decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance’) to
securitisation (in which case an issue is no longer debated as a political question but dealt with at an
accelerated pace and in ways that may violate normal legal and social rules)’ (Buzan and Hansen,
2009:214).
13. - 6 -
meaning and relevance of the integrated concept, within the broader area of
international security studies thinking. It argues that the traditional concept of the
border – and the dynamics of crossing the border, rooted in the geopolitical
thought of the 1930s along the Westphalian lines has lost its relevance to the
contemporary border control realities. Drawing on a number of critical post-
structuralists, it argues that the spatial and temporal dynamics of border controls
after 9/11 have expanded, leading to ‘etherised’ borders merging with the
‘perpetual’ law enforcement regime. The chapter also explores ‘security’ in border
security, articulating its threats and referent objects. Finally, the chapter looks into
the spatial and temporal dimensions of border controls in practice.
Chapter 3 (TRANSLATING BORDER CONTROL FUNCTIONS INTO
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS), building on the previous critical
analysis of ‘border (in)security,’ presents a systematic overview of border control
functions, examining how they shape the institutional framework required for
border controls, and ensuring the facilitated flows of persons and goods across the
border while maintaining ‘border security.’ In addition, it addresses the Security v.
Facilitation dilemma central to the theory and practice of border controls. Another
central theme is the role of travel documents and passenger data, and how robust
identification management provides a foundation for intelligence-led and risk-
based controls of ‘etherised’ borders. Finally, the chapter looks into inter-agency
and cross-border cooperation issues in border management.
Chapter 4 (INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT: EXPLORING
CONCEPTUAL STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE IBM MODEL)
critically explores the IBM model, deconstructing it into three main pillars (intra-
agency, inter-agency and cross-border cooperation), and outlines its challenges to
border control needs. It critically explores the most institutionalised and mature
IBM model, published as EC Guidelines, and provides its critique in the light of
the findings in previous chapters.
The dissertation ends with CONCLUSIONS
14. - 7 -
Chapter 1: OUTLINING KEY QUESTIONS, METHODS AND CONCEPTS
This chapter covers four areas. It outlines the aim, hypotheses and research questions
that structure this dissertation. It goes on to provide a literature review, as the existing
scholarly and practitioner knowledge define methodology and additional sources for
data. Then the chapter outlines methodology, explaining optimal collection an
analysis tools for informing this research. The chapter ends with articulating new
critical theories that guide the analysis in future chapters.
The aim of this research is to examine how well the IBM approach is equipped to
meet the challenges of border security. In doing so, it explores what constitutes
‘border security’ as part of the broader security debate, and articulates its referent
object(s) and threats to it. In addition, it critically explores functions and institutions
relevant to border controls, with particular reference to closer integration that
promotes inter-agency and cross-border cooperation. Finally, the research focuses on
the IBM framework to explore to what extent its institutionalisation helps to achieve
border security objectives, especially preventing and combating its threats.
Importantly, this study does not attempt to produce a clear-cut definition of border
security or resolve its internal contradictions, which probably would be a futile
attempt by definition.4
Instead, it explores the scope, dilemmas and internal
contradictions – or, to put it differently, problems and opportunities - that they present
for attempts to apply them to real-world policy and practice issues.
The dissertation is structured around three hypotheses, which it critically explores in
the light of empirical evidence:
1. Border controls have transcended the ‘Westphalian model’ (with borders seen
as lines dividing nation states on the map) and present ‘etherised’ borders
blurred and expanded in spatial and temporal terms.
2. The main feature of today’s border controls is their being intelligence-driven,
risk-based and technology-empowered. Inspections at the ‘physical border’ do
have a role to play, but they have been increasingly becoming of auxiliary
nature.
4
After all, ‘the nature of security defies pursuit of an agreed general definition’ (Buzan, 1991: 16).
15. - 8 -
3. The IBM Guidelines, while an important step in conceptualising border
controls and tackling border security threats, needs to be critically reviewed
and enhanced to maintain its relevance to border control realities.
In addition to testing these hypotheses, this dissertation adopts an exploratory
approach, attempting to identify main issues, principles and components of the border
security and controls debate. It looks into the following research questions:
Where does the concept of ‘border security’ fit in the contemporary security
debate? What are its referent object(s) and typology of threats?
What are the current spatial and temporal boundaries of ‘border controls,’ as
based on empirical practice from the perspective of an individual crossing the
border?
Security and Facilitation: what is the relationship between the two, and to what
extent they are relevant to the contemporary border control agenda?
What are the main border control functions, and how do they shape the
institutional framework of border management?
What are the systemic components of the IBM model and to what extent it is
relevant to its self-articulated goals of providing border security and
facilitation in an effective and efficient manner?
Since the hypotheses and research questions are of multi-faceted and multi-
disciplinary nature, there is no single academic area that would provide sufficient
knowledge to inform the research. Instead, it looks into works from a range of
academic disciplines, including international security studies, public administration,
management studies and migration law. The literature overview below outlines the
main categories of academic knowledge used in this research:
A major group of books and scholarly papers that informed this dissertation deal
with the conceptual framework of security, exploring its dilemmas and
contradictions, and the evolution of security thinking, including the post-Cold war
broadening-and-deepening debate. These include primarily the authors of the
Copenhagen school (Buzan, 1991; Buzan and Hansen, 2009; Buzan et al, 1998)
and their attempts to establish a new security framework for analysis in the early
1990s, with particular interest in securitisation and societal security. While the end
16. - 9 -
of the Cold War was perhaps the strongest impulse that provided reason and
direction for their research, 9/11 – and the question whether it constitutes a ‘meta-
event’ (Buzan and Hansen, 2009) capable of replacing the Cold War and opening
a new page in security thinking – was addressed too, thus bringing their research
scope closer to the border security and ‘global war on terror’ nexus. While none of
their works focus specifically on ‘border security’ or ‘border controls,’ their
exploring security thinking in a systemic and systematic manner, and highlighting
its internal contradictions, provide a foundation (or a ‘conceptual lens,’ Buzan’s
favourite term) for analysing sub-sector-specific security dynamics such as border
security. Moving closer to border issues, the Copenhagen team have also produced
a volume focusing on identity and migration issues in the post-Cold-War
widening-and-deepening security debate, with particular focus on the
securitization of migration and asylum matters (Waever et al,1993). The migration
and (in)security nexus is explored further by Weiner (1995), Guild (2009), Theiler
(2010) and Heintz (2013), with particular focus on how security threats, even
legitimate, fuel security rhetoric that erodes the rights and fundamental freedoms
of individuals. This broad range of works includes ‘textbook’ attempts to codify
central themes and threats in contemporary security thinking in a systematic
manner. (Cavelty and Mauer (eds.), 2010). It contains a number of works
dedicated to terrorism and diverse forms of trans-border crime, contributing to
informing the analysis of those phenomena as border security threats in this
dissertation. Works on specific border security threats, such as terrorism
(Hoffman, 2006; Ganor, 2005; White, 2006; Willkinson, 2010), human trafficking
and smuggling (Rusev, 2013; Williams,2010), weapons and drugs trafficking
(Kellman, 2010; Shelley, 2006; Wirtz, 2010), illegal migration and asylum
seeking (Loescher, 1992, Weiner, 1994, Weiner, 1995) add academic knowledge
to border security dynamics.
The second, narrower, group includes books and articles on ‘border security’ and
border management, including some references to IBM. An early attempt to
establish a comprehensive perspective of issues related to border controls in the
SSR context was an agenda-setting volume Borders and Security Governance:
Managing Borders in a Globalized World (Caiparini and Marenin (eds.) 2006),
aimed at addressing both the effectiveness and accountability aspects of border
controls. As the book consists of conference papers, some fragmentation was
17. - 10 -
inevitable: while the editors’ introduction addresses broader conceptual issues,
other papers tend to focus on highly empirical cases, often without much obvious
link between them. Marenin (2010) revisits most of the issues, with particular
focus on IBM, both as a concept and institutionalisation attempts within the EU
and in the Balkans. Winterdyk and Sundberg (2010) offer another collection of
country-specific papers on border management practices. Most works in this
category are quite descriptive and highly factual, focusing either on a specific
policy area (Guiraudon, 2006; Koc-Menard, 2006; Marenin, 2006; Hills, 2006) or
a state (Heyman and Ackleson, 2010; Moran, 2010; Tascon, 2010; Haddal, 2010).
Nevertheless, they do provide empirical details about specific border management
issues or cases.
A work that stands out for the purposes of this dissertation is critical thinking
about borders, border controls and limits of sovereign power, articulated by
Vaughan-Williams, who claims that border theory is ‘a blindspot in international
relations theory,’ challenges the Westphalian model of borders, and articulates the
new vision of ‘etherised borders’ (2012:4, 6). While Vaughan-Williams book is
highly-inductive and particularly iconoclastic, some of the critical themes, in
varying degrees, also are raised by other authors (Marenin, 2010; Zaiotti, 2011;
Caparini and Marenin, 2006; Pluim and Hofman, 2015), often in a stronger
practical context of border management.
A relatively small body of primary and secondary sources are devoted specifically
to IBM and its variations. These are prescriptive and normative works meant to
guide either practitioners or policy debate in search for more ‘holistic’ and
‘effective’ border management. IBM Guidelines (European Commission, 2010) is
the most mature and elaborate example of IBM institutionalization. Two other
volumes, written exclusively from the Customs perspective (OSCE and UNECE,
2012; McLinden et al, 2011), have similar purposes. However, being unrelated to
the EC but with strong institutional links to World Customs Organisation (WCO)
and the World Bank, they do not use the IBM term preferring ‘coordinated border
management’ instead. Finally, but importantly, the OECD DAC Handbook on SSR
(2007) includes a chapter on and some other references to IBM in the context of
the broader SSR framework.
18. - 11 -
Methodology. As institutions are central actors in border management, the
institutional approach in political science methodology is well placed to provide some
useful guiding principles. While the institutional approach has attracted numerous
criticisms for being methodologically simplistic, ‘hyperfactual,’ theory-deprived and
suffering from acute ‘reverence for the fact’ (Rhodes, 1995: 48-50), it nevertheless
provides a useful methodological toolbox, including some rusty but time-honoured
tools such as descriptive-inductive, formal-legal and historical comparative methods
(ibid., 43-47). As IBM and border management are essentially about institutions,
implemented by institutions and relying on policies and legislation produced by other
institutions, the unpretentious institutional approach, drawing on the ‘skills of the
historian and the lawyer’ (ibid., 56) provides some effective tools for organising
empirical data and analysing it against conceptual frameworks of the emerging
thinking about border security and border management.
The research was carried out using qualitative methodology involving research of
primary and secondary sources. Primary sources included mainly policy documents,
legislation, regulations and government reports – produced by international
organisations, states and their institutions – documenting policy and practice issues
related to border controls, border security and IBM. Another crucial primary source
was semi-structured interviews with border management practitioners who shared
their insights on diverse border management areas relevant to the research questions.
Secondary sources – that supported and informed the analysis of the primary sources -
were scholarly papers, articles and publications focusing on the evolving debate of
border security and diverse areas of border management and actors involved.
As the literature review demonstrated, while there is considerable literature on
international security studies, terrorism, trans-border crime and public management,
only very limited research is available on IBM in the context of border security. To
complement the scarcity of published information, interviews with experts and
practitioners was chosen as a key method of informing this research. Qualitative semi-
structured interviews were conducted with policy makers, policy implementers and
managers from national government institutions, corporations and international
organisations relevant to border security and management. Given the sensitive nature
of border security in government organisations, and in order to encourage the
19. - 12 -
respondents to speak frankly and openly, all the interviews were anonymous and the
identities of respondents, their countries or their organisation are not disclosed.5
Importantly, the interviews did not provide a definite set of questions to the
respondents, but rather outlined the main themes, a set of open-ended questions that
helped to structure the respondents’ views and knowledge of a range of border
matters.6
The information received from the respondents served as food for thought,
something that could be analysed in order to establish key issues, patterns and
common themes relevant to the dissertation research questions. The total of 11
persons interviewed in May – August 2015 were current/former officials of national
governments or private sector experts in New Zealand, the UK, Australia, France and
Canada, as well as the staff of international organizations.7
While preserving the
anonymity of the respondents, their codes and some background information are
below:
NAT1: Government official, background in military intelligence, border
controls and combating trans-border crime;
NAT2: Government official, background in immigration management and
passport office;
NAT3: Government official, background on foreign affairs and diplomacy,
with focus on passport office management;
NAT4: Private sector expert, background in broad range of border
management tools, including biometric passports, Advance Passenger
Information (API)/ Passenger Name Record (PNR) and Automated Border
Controls (ABCs);
NAT5: Government official, background in immigration management and
refugee affairs;
NAT6: Government official, background in internal affairs with focus on
identification management and travel document security;
NAT7: Private sector expert and manager, background in a broad range of
border management tools, including biometric passports, API/PNR and ABCs;
5
The records and transcripts of the interviews, however, have been archived and kept by the author.
6
For details of the interview framework see Appendix A.
7
Many, but not all, people interviewed were members of the working groups of the UN International
Organization of Civil Aviation (ICAO) Technical Advisory Group on Machine-Readable Travel
Documents (TAG/MRTD), which carries out a broad range of normative and assistance work related to
identification management, border controls, biometric technologies, passenger data exchange and IBM.
20. - 13 -
NAT8: Private sector expert and manager, background in a broad range of
border management tools, including biometric passports and API/PNR;
INT1: Official of an international organisation dealing with migration
management and technical cooperation assistance to developing states;
INT2: Official of an international organisation dealing with civil aviation
regulatory framework, travel document security and passenger data sharing;
INT3: Manager at an international organisation dealing with migration policy
development, border control capacity building and IBM-related research.
The records of interviews with the respondents were used as a primary source of
views on a number of research questions, as structured in the interview questionnaire.
Importantly, the respondents were not asked ‘quantitative-type’ questions that would
require ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers or specific factual information. Instead, these were broad
open-ended questions inviting the respondents to share their thoughts and experience
freely, while maintaining a structured format. The records of the interviews were
transcribed in order to make them ‘analysable.’ While such diverse feedback is not
structured enough for any quantitative analysis, it has provided valuable primary
sources that allowed to look for central themes, dominating patterns or, as well, some
unique points, made just by a single respondent, but nevertheless important for
supporting arguments in the thesis.
For primary sources and interviews, the geographic focus may need some explanation.
Most empirical evidence was drawn from the ‘Five Eyes’ countries that have
developed considerable trust and an effective intelligence-sharing mechanism –
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the USA. In particular, these states
cooperate closely on border control, law enforcement and biometric intelligence
sharing in the framework of the standing Five Country Conference (FCC) (see Gionet,
2011 or the FCC website8
) thus providing helpful lessons in inter-agency and cross-
border cooperation in border management. To a lesser extent, some data, information
and secondary sources were used from EU Member States, the EC, FRONTEX,9
and
the UN and its specialized agencies. The focus of this dissertation is on effective
border controls. While border security presents a range of other important problems,
8
https://www.fivecountryconference.org/
9
The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the
Member States of the European Union.
21. - 14 -
including good governance, accountability and parliamentary oversight, specific
security challenges posed by fragile or failed states, international assistance and
capacity building in border management, they cannot all be addressed in a single
project. As the emphasis of this dissertation has been on effective border controls, it
was sensible to focus on the practice of the developed Western liberal democracies
that have strong and mature administrative and operational capacity to manage their
borders.
Theory plays an important role in this research as it addresses the emerging new
thinking about borders and border security. This study revisits a long-standing debate
about the meaning and internal contradictions of security, as they relate to borders. In
exploring and articulating border security, it essentially asks the question ‘what <is>
to be made secure from what, by whom and how’ (Kerr, 2015:116). This boils
down to examining three aspects of security as far as borders are concerned:
The referent object(s) of border security, i.e. what is meant to be made
secure by border security?10
Threats to border security, i.e. what makes the referent object of border
security insecure, and where those threats emanate from, and who do they
threaten, and
‘Who and how’ realises border security in practice, which focuses on
practical responses to border threats, including policies, institutional
framework, sufficient operational and administrative capacity, inter-agency
and cross-border cooperation, and other important dimensions of border
management.
Another theory central to this research, and addressed in detail in Chapter 3, is the
changing temporal and spatial modalities of border controls (Vaughan-Williams,
2012). Innovative and boundary-testing, this theory is quite inductive, based on the
theoretical insights of French post-structuralist thought and national sovereignty
10
For the sake of structuring the debate, possible referent objects are considered on the scale ranging
from the state (the traditional neo-realist state-centric approach) to the individual (the main focus of an
all-inclusive human security framework), with numerous composite individuals (the society, specific
social and interest groups, groups the identity of which are defined by specific criteria of nationality,
religion, class, ideological views, etc.) in between. It also raises the question whether the referent object
of security could include intangible phenomena or values such as the rule of law, good governance and
similar.
22. - 15 -
debate with particular reference to border controls. While Vaughan-Williams does use
some empirical evidence in his highly-abstract work, he does it in a rather
circumstantial manner, more to illustrate his points then to test his theory against the
realities of border control practices. In this dissertation, the theory claims were
critically examined against the empirical evidence (e.g., interview responses, policies
and practices) from a practitioner’s perspective, to see if the facts support the theory
in a deductive manner. If empirical evidence supports claims that the Westphalian
model of borders is no longer quite relevant to border controls in the post-9/11 era,
this would provide further arguments for critically re-examining the IBM/SSR
doctrine that focuses on controls that take place at the physical border.
23. - 16 -
Chapter 2: BORDER SECURITY REVISITED: WHAT BORDERS? WHAT
SECURITY?
The evolving concept of the state border: from the Westphalian model to
‘etherised’ borders. The meaning of a state ‘border’ is not static: it is a conceptual
construct that evolved depending on the changing context and shifts in security
thinking. Borders are complicated and multi-dimensional phenomena. In O’Dowd’s
words, borders are ‘barriers, bridges, resources and symbols of identity’ (as cited in
Marenin, 2010:21). The meaning of borders has been undergoing semantic shifts,
often triggered by their internal contradictions, leading to paradox conclusions that
borders are ‘simultaneously becoming more and less important’ (ibid:26).11
A border concept that dominated the 20th
century was one of the Westphalian
international system that consisted of nation states with a clearly-defined territory in
which the state exercised its sovereignty.12
State borders were taken ‘to be territorial
markers of the limits of sovereign political authority and jurisdiction, and located at
the geographical outer edge of the polity’ (Waughan-Williams, 2012:1), an idea that
received considerable acceptance and institutionalisation.13
Following this approach,
borders are somewhat ‘symbolic’ but ‘real’ zero-wide lines on the map, delineating
the boundaries of sovereign nation states. The border is not an institution in its own
right but rather a physical/conceptual/perception gap created by the sovereign limits
of two states next to each other. The border does not exist as a supranational
institutional entity in its own right; instead, each sovereign state builds up institutional
presence required for border protection and control at its geographical limits. This
institutional presence, arguably, is strongest at the state’s edges where the institutions
and agencies are physically present, reinforcing the concept of the border.
11
Marenin (2010:26) elaborates that borders ‘matter less since the capacity of states to control the
mobility of people, goods, services and capital has been seriously eroded and control has drifted away
from states, or has to be shared with non-governmental agencies and groups (multinational
corporations, transnational NGOs, IGOs and transnational policy groupings and communities). At the
same time borders retain their ultimate status as one of the defining characteristics of states – namely
sovereignty over a limited piece of territory – and remain essential political building blocks of the
global system).’
12
This model, ‘characterised by strict territorial delimitations,’ replaced the Medieval pre-Westphalian
concept of statehood with multiple layers of sovereignty in overlapping jurisdictions (Waughan-
Williams 2012:1-2).
13
Viz. the principle of territorial integrity, articulated in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, or Max
Weber’s definition of the state as ‘a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the
legitimate use of force within a given territory’ (as cited in Waughan-Williams 2012:2).
24. - 17 -
The Westphalian concept of the border started being questioned around the 1980s.
Historically, the conceptual challenge emanated from a critical security studies
school, French post-structuralist thinking about security and borders, articulated
mainly by Etienne Balibar, but also by Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Derrida and Michel
Foucault, all of them sharing a ‘common interest in critically questioning both the
logic and practice of borders in a general sense’ and exploring ‘alternative border
imaginaries’ (ibid:8). The essence of this iconoclastic approach is ‘Balibar’s
seemingly paradoxical formulation that ‘borders are no longer at the border,’’ and the
‘notion that both the nature and location of borders have undergone some sort of
transformation requires a quantum leap in the way we think about bordering practices
and their effects’ (ibid:6). Balibar sums up that ‘borders […] are no longer at the
border, an institutionalised site that could be materialised on the ground and inscribed
on the map, where one sovereignty ends and another begins’ (as cited in ibid.). In a
similar vein, Walker questions the traditional ‘logic of inside/outside’ as far as borders
are concerned, and argues that the world has shifted from ‘the paradigm of securitised
territoriality’ of the Cold War to ‘a war on terrorism, and to forms of securitization,
enacted anywhere’ (as cited in ibid:7). Related is Agamben’s provocative view
reconceptualising ‘the limits of sovereign power: not as fixed territorial borders
located at the outer edge of the state but rather infused through bodies and diffused
through everyday life’ (as cited in ibid:9).
Marenin expands this argument further, bringing in a stronger practitioner’s
perspective:
‘For purposes of policy, it is a misconception to think of borders as
demarcated lines drawn on maps and on the soil and water between
internationally recognised states. Rather, borders are best understood as the
systematic processes and practices for controlling the mobility of people and
goods to protect states against the influx of unwanted people and goods and
the exit of wanted people and goods. Borders exist wherever controls over the
mobility of people, goods, services and capital in an out of states or regions
are exercised by state and regional agencies and authorised non-state actors.
Protected lines on the ground is only on element in the processes of border
control. Conversely, whenever control over transnational mobility is exercised
by a state or region, a border has to be crossed’ <…> Since borders are
everywhere, controls have to be everywhere. The notion that border controls
should focus exclusively on a physical border control line is outdated.
Delocalised borders require diverse methods of control and management.’
(Marenin, 1990:43).
25. - 18 -
As Waughan-Williams concludes this critical border control paradigm, ‘there are
many current bordering practices that challenge the commonsensical image of what
and where borders in global politics are supposed to be according to the model
geopolitical imaginary, and in many respects the concept of the border of the state
appears to be undergoing spatial and temporal shifts of seismic proportions’
(2012:15).
The perception of what the borders are is shaped by understanding how they are
controlled, including the spatial and temporal dimensions of border controls. In the
Westphalian model, from the spatial limits perspective, the movement of people
within the state is unhindered as far as borders are concerned: border controls are
exercised at the physical border, in a narrow and defined area, usually border
checkpoints on land or sea border or international airports. In temporal terms, it takes
a relatively short time at the border to complete exit and entry formalities. In contrast,
the model of ‘etherised borders,’ based on the argument that ‘borders are no longer
at the border,’ presents a completely different picture of border dynamics. In spatial
terms, most of such controls take place even before starting to move physically to the
border, and while some controls still do take place at the ‘old Westphalian’ physical
border, they also continue after the traveller has crossed the physical border. In
temporal terms, crossing the border is no longer a brief one-time event: here border
controls start weeks, months - or even years - before the traveller approaches the
physical border, and continue after having ‘crossed the border,’ and effectively
continue until the traveller returns home in his country of residence.
While the French school’s reasoning is highly inductive, their claims about ‘etherised
borders’ presumably could be demonstrated by analysing the empirical practice of
border controls. Waughan-Williams (2012) explored the limits of sovereign power
from a critical multi-disciplinary perspective, addressing the problems of border
controls and presenting a well-articulated summary of the challenging ideas about
borders by the post-structuralists. He tested his theory with three case studies focusing
on the (then) new UK’s border security doctrine, the out-of-EU activities of
FRONTEX and the indefinite detention of terrorist suspects at the US Naval Base in
Guantamo Bay. However, Waughan-Williams remains primarily a theoretician with a
limited grasp of border control practices. His case studies are essentially isolated
26. - 19 -
examples providing illustrations rather than offering a systematic look at what border
controls constitute in practice.
Building on those theoretical insights, this chapter explores the practicalities of
crossing the border from an international traveller’s perspective, to examine whether
it supports the argument of border controls becoming ‘etherised’ and moving away
from the physical ‘Westphalian’ borders.
For the sake of understanding border management, it is important to articulate the
anatomy of the border in the traditional sense. Rooted in the model where borders
were seen as dividing lines separating sovereign states, three types of border exist:
the ‘green’ border, i.e., land border that separates two states; the traditional
‘red line on the map’ in the Westphalian sense;
the ‘blue’ border, i.e. a sea or lake border that marks the physical
boundaries of a sovereign state but is not adjacent to another state;14
and
the air border which, while being less ‘physical’ than the previous two,
nevertheless is not less real. While being somewhat a mental construct, the
air border is essentially about a border control regime applied at
international airports handling flights from one state to another.
Another important distinction in the constitution of a border is the division between
the border itself (land, sea or air) and designated Border Crossing Points (BCPs).
Every sovereign state requires by law that people and goods cross the border at BCPs
following inspection procedures as prescribed by primary and secondary legislation;
any attempt to move people or goods outside the BCP channels is an offence
criminalized under the national law in every state. Therefore, while in physical terms
BCPs constitute only a microscopic part of the length of a nation’s borders, their
importance is substantial, since they are designated channels where official border
inspections take place, and circumventing them would constitute an offence in law. In
practical terms, for the purpose of border management, the border consist of two
binary components: BCPs, where legitimate crossing of people and goods take place,
and ‘the rest of the border’ that requires monitoring and intelligence-led and
14
A typical blue border includes the shore, territorial waters, the exclusive economic zone in which the
state claims some sovereign economic rights, which borders the neutral international waters.
27. - 20 -
technology-empowered surveillance to prevent and combat illicit crossings by people
and goods.
Exploring ‘security’ in border security: threats and referent objects. Probably the
simplest – yet most fundamental – definition of security is ‘the pursuit of freedom
from threat’ (Buzan, 1991:18). If the referent object of security is not threatened by
anything then, by definition, it is absolutely secure. While this may be a valid
conceptual point, in the real world hardly anything or anyone exists in complete
isolation from the potentially hostile environment to be completely free from threats.15
Presuming that absolute isolation and freedom from threats do not exist, the way to
increase one’s security is through mitigating security threats: decreasing one’s
vulnerabilities and building up capacity to deter and counter threats.16
As ‘border security’ was meant to be a foundation and point of departure for this
study, it was somewhat disappointing to discover how ambiguous and underdeveloped
it was. Secondary sources are of relatively little help as they tend to focus on the
factual and empirical instead of looking at the conceptual side of border security.
Typically, a volume with a grand agenda-setting title Border Security in the Al-Qaeda
Era does not pose a second to reflect on what border security is – it jumps straight
into (rather descriptive) national case studies of how borders are managed in specific
countries (Winterdyk and Sundberg, 2010). Few other works on different aspects of
security theory and practice provide any thoughts of what ‘border security’ is.
While coming up with a border security definition on the spot is not an easy task,
most interview respondents, after a (sometimes lengthy) pause, produced improvised
but rather coherent definitions, such as:
‘BS is the ability to manage people and vessels as they try to enter your
country, through the use of human interaction and technology’ (NAT7)
15
Even a most remote Pacific island state is likely to face some national security concerns from its
neighbours or global superpowers. Equally, a Trappist monk who spends his whole life in seclusion
and silent contemplation is not entirely isolated from the surrounding state and society, and faces some
threats, at least from the human security perspective.
16
In the context of borders, freedom from threats is probably even less likely than in any other security
sectors. The state border does not exist in isolation by definition: the border is a construct where the
physical limits of two states meet, including any potential tensions caused by different ideology,
interests, cultures policies. While this ‘tension’ is probably most obvious to land borders that separate
two sovereign states, it also, by extension, equally applies to sea and air borders.
28. - 21 -
‘BS means that the border is well managed in such a way that any threatening
activity is quickly detected and dealt with, including the monitoring of the
border that prevents the movements across the border of people of goods that
are not authorised’ (NAT5)
‘BS is mechanisms that the state puts in place to exercise its sovereignty over
its territory, encompassing its full range of interventions across defence,
customs, immigration and the police’ (INT1)
‘BS is ability to balance risks and make good decisions about who enters your
country, to ensure the safety and prosperity of your country’ (NAT6)
‘BS is a fundamental function of the government: to keep the country safe, to
protect the frontier, and to allow in only legitimate travellers across the border’
(NAT8)
‘BS is compliance with legal norms and threat assessment that the country has
defined as acceptable for letting in visitors, goods and finances’ (NAT4)
‘BS is about making sure that you are able to identify who is coming to your
borders, even before they start moving to your borders’ (NAT2)
The replies of respondents, while quite diverse, highlight some common themes.
None of them referred to border security as a state or absolute condition in its own
right. All the definitions describe border security as ways and means, as management
and policy tools required to mitigate border threats. Following this logic, the
definition of good health would be having plenty of operation wards, doctors and
medications available, as well as a capable Department of Health ensuring that health
services are well regulated, regardless of whether one was actually healthy or ill. This
approach can be partly explained by the respondents’ practitioner angle – but also,
more likely, by the weakness of the border security concept where the empirical and
the fragmented naturally jump in to occupy conceptual vacuum left by the absence of
theory.
A ‘weakly conceptualised but politically powerful concept’ (Buzan, 1991:5) like
border security poses considerable concerns. Inadequately defined and articulated
border security becomes a ‘dangerously ambiguous symbol’ which, in Wolfers’s
words, ‘while appearing to offer guidance and a basis for broad consensus … may be
permitting everyone to label whatever policy he favours with an attractive and
29. - 22 -
possibly deceptive name’ (as cited in ibid:6) and open the door to political
manipulation and securitization, both on the domestic scene as well as in the
international development perspective.
The next logical question, then, is why border security is an underdeveloped concept.
Buzan’s reflections on the reasons of ‘persistent underdevelopment of thinking about
security’ after the end of the Cold War (1991:7-12) provide some arguments for
critical thinking why this may be the case with border security, including the
complexity of the issue, tensions between the realist and idealist perspectives, and its
strong empirical drag. The explanation that border security theory suffers because of
being too complex for analysis may carry some weight, considering its multi-faceted
nature, great diversity of actors and a number of internal contradictions discussed in
this paper. However, this hardly creates a unique challenge: while social sciences are
full of difficult central concepts, most of them have generated large academic
literature despite their complexity and internal contradictions. A more convincing
argument is that border security remains conceptually fragile because
‘for the practitioners of state policy, compelling reasons exist for maintaining
its symbolic ambiguity. The appeal to national security as a justification for
actions and policies which otherwise have to be explained is a political tool of
immense convenience for a large variety of sectional interests in all types of
state. Because of the leverage over domestic affairs which can be obtained by
invoking it, an undefined notion of national security offers scope for power-
maximizing strategies to political and military elites’ (Buzan, 1991:11).
While Buzan’s point was meant for security in general, with particular reference to
national security, it seems to be equally convincing when applied to border security.
In a political debate, one can invoke border security in order to justify one’s agenda,
in a similar way that the ‘global war on terror,’ another ambiguous and essentially
meaningless concept, has been often used.
Referent object of border security. In America, 9/11 triggered unprecedented surge
of academic (and quasi-academic) books on counter-terrorism and ‘global war on
terror.’ While few of them fail to mention that, as part of its counter-terrorism agenda,
the government had a ‘major goal: to protect America’s borders’ (for instance, White,
2006: 315, and many others of the same ilk), few elaborate what the ‘borders’ that
need to be ‘protected’ constitute in practice. The slim definition of the border,
30. - 23 -
presumably, would include border infrastructure (demarcation poles, fences, BCPs)
and core agencies performing surveillance along the border or inspection at
checkpoints. A fatter - and more inclusive definition - would expand the range of
stakeholders or include units of the agencies that may have no direct relevance to
border controls (such as HQs in the capital and administrative support units
elsewhere). However, the solemn tone of the authors - and the implied sense of drama
- suggest that, when talking about protecting the borders, they refer not just to the
physical border or its infrastructure, but something far grander and more important
that needs to be secured.
Predictably, none of the respondents suggested that the referent object of border
security was just the border itself. They had a view that it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to identify a single referent object of border security, because it was ‘a
combination of things’ (NAT2), encompassing the ‘political, social and economic life
of the country’ (NAT3).17
The state as a referent object of border security was
highlighted by many, implying close links between border security and national
security. Which is unsurprising as ‘states are the principal referent object of security
because they are both the framework of order and the highest source of governing
authority’ (Buzan, 1991:22). However, as some respondents put it, ‘border security is
about protecting your border and your country, its prosperity and the well-being of its
citizens,’ ensuring that ‘our citizens are safe and the country functions well’ (NAT6).
Given the complexity and multi-faceted nature of border security, one would conclude
that its referent object consists of a number of things on the scale ranging from the
state at the one extreme, and the individual at the other, including a range of
composite individuals in between, such as society or
ethnic/social/political/corporate/interest groups.18
In addition, the referent object may
17
Cf. Buzan (1991:26) ‘One soon discovers that security has many potential referent objects. These
objects of security multiply not only as the membership of the society of states increases, but also as
one moves down through the state to the level of individuals, and up beyond it to the level of the
international system as a whole. Since the security of any one referent object or level cannot be
achieved in isolation from the others, the security of each becomes, in part, a condition for the security
of all.’ And, ‘Although individuals, states and the international system all provide valuable starting
points for enquiry, none of them, in the end, provides an ultimate basic category of referent objects for
the concept of security. The same logic applies to sectors, where the full richness and meaning of
security is to be found in the interplay among them rather than the primacy of one’ (ibid, 368).
18
In the light of this argument, it is interesting to explore other well-meaning if somewhat arbitrary
attempts to articulate the referent object of security for the purposes of organised crime. The titles of
Williams’ two chapters that make a strong agenda-setting opening statement: ‘Threats to national
security: drug traffickers, insurgents and spoilers’ and ’Threats to human security: extortion,
31. - 24 -
also include some non-tangible entities, such as values, the rule of law, economic
well-being and societal harmony – all related to both the state and society – that
border security is meant to secure.
An important point for analysing the damaging potential of border security threats is
their dependence on vulnerabilities, with threats and vulnerabilities being two key
variables in the (in)security equation.
‘Threats to national security posed by transnational criminal organizations and
activities are not uniform. States that are strong, effective and legitimate tend
to be attractive markets for criminal organizations, but are able to limit the
impact of criminal organizations and criminal activities on the state’s ability to
function. In contrast, weak states that become home or trans-shipment states
for transnational criminal organizations are often seriously threatened by the
power of these organizations and the strategies they adopt to protect their
criminal activities’ (Williams, 2010:152).
The next fundamental question is: what are border security threats? Based on a
critical review and analysis of respondents’ replies and secondary sources, this sub-
section outlines a typology of border security threats. While it is inevitably arbitrarily
and the logic of inclusion and exclusion may be open to a debate, it groups isolated
threats into categories, depending on their nature, referent object and source. The
suggested typology falls into the following broad categories. Importantly, it lists the
categories in no particular order, while taking into account that the threats are ‘not
equal in terms of security concerns’ (Marenin, 2010:29) and their damaging potential
to the referent object may differ considerably.19
kidnapping, and human trafficking (2010:152-157) are a sobering reminder that the referent object of
border security with reference to (organized) trans-border crime threats cannot be oversimplified and
reduced to crimes against the state or the individual. Arguably, all the crimes listed in the both titles
threaten – and, if realised, damage – both the state and the individual as well as composite individuals
as argued above and demonstrated in Figure 1.
19
Marenin (1990:30) presents a different typology of border security threats, which, while being no
more convincing than any other, deserves including for the sake of completeness. He organises border
security threats into ‘five general categories which, though analytically distinguishable, merge at their
edges:
normal criminal acts which cross borders (e.g. car thefts on the one side of the border and
‘chop shops’ across the border):
technical violations (lack of proper papers, and irregular, illegal migrants looking for work);
transnational organised crime (various forms and types – smuggling cars, guns, drugs and
other commodities, human trafficking, the illegal transfer of arms and nuclear materials, or
the illegal transnational disposal of dangerous materials such as radioactive waste);
terrorist security threats;
32. - 25 -
1. Terrorism20 has been perhaps the most visible threat to border security,
particularly because of its high visibility since 9/11 due to the ‘global war on
terror.’21
While terrorist attacks rarely target border installations on purpose,22
in today’s increasingly-globalised word any preparation or execution of a
terrorist attack would involve crossing borders and, often, involve a range of
trans-border crimes, such as identity fraud, illegal migration, smuggling in
illegal goods or illicit funds, etc. In particular, links between terrorism and
border controls have been institutionalised in high-level UN documents.23
threats to the integrity of border management – corruption, abuse of power, violence against
other border guards.’
20
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to outline what terrorism is, it is worth noting that a single
universally-agreed definition does not exist yet. The main reason appears to be a simple truism that
‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’ Difficulties with defining the concept, including
exploration of a broad range of definitions available, and suggestions for a working definition that
would reconcile some differences, are outlined in detail by Ganor (2005:1-46). For the purposes of this
paper, the working definition of terrorism is ‘as special form of violence’ being ‘a deliberate attempt by
a group or a government regime to create a climate of extreme fear to intimidate a target social group
or government or commercial organization with the aim of forcing it to change its behaviour’
(Wilkinson, 2010:129).
21
Some respondents noted that, while the threat of terrorism may be overblown because of ideological
and political reasons, it is nevertheless remains the main threat to national security (and border
security) of the nations of the Western liberal democracies.
22
Except few cases where the border infrastructure and its users were the target of a calculated attack,
such as the 2011 Moscow Sheremetyevo airport attack.
23
The UN SC resolution 1373 (2001) created formal obligations to all member states to join efforts in
preventing and combating terrorism. In particular, it created an obligation to ‘prevent the movement of
terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and
travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of
identity papers and travel documents.’ It also called upon all states to ‘find ways of intensifying and
accelerating the exchange of operational information, especially regarding actions or movements of
terrorist persons or networks’ and ‘forged or falsified travel documents.’ Those obligations and
ongoing counter-terrorist capacity-building efforts have been reinforced by resolution 1624 (2005)
which called further upon all states to ‘cooperate, inter alia, to strengthen the security of their
international borders, including by combating fraudulent travel documents and, to the extent available,
by enhancing terrorist screening and passenger security procedures with a view to preventing those
guilty of [incitement to commit a terrorist act] from entering their territory.’ In addition to SC
resolutions, the UN General Assembly has furthered and institutionalised the development dimension
of global counter-terrorism efforts. The action plan of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
provides for ‘measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism,’ calls for ‘the
timely and full realization of the development goals and objectives agreed at the major United Nations
conferences and summits, including the Millennium Development Goals’ and reaffirms the
‘commitment to eradicate poverty and promote sustained economic growth, sustainable development
and global prosperity for all.’ The Strategy also reconfirms the relevant provisions of resolution 1373
(2001) on international development and technical assistance, including stepping up ‘national efforts
and bilateral, subregional, regional and international cooperation, as appropriate, to improve border and
customs controls in order to prevent and detect the movement of terrorists <…> while recognizing that
States may require assistance to that effect’ and stepping up ‘efforts and cooperation at every level, as
appropriate, to improve the security of manufacturing and issuing identity and travel documents and to
prevent and detect their alteration or fraudulent use, while recognizing that States may require
assistance in doing so. Most recently – and, arguably, most importantly - resolution 2178 (2014)
provided further momentum to preventing terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs),
crossing the borders. In particular, it has highlighted the need to provide assistance to States for
33. - 26 -
Another aspect that adds to the high profile of terrorism on the national and
border security agenda is its dual nature, terrorism being both a crime and an
act of war.24
While terrorists’ intention is primarily to cause damage to the
state and attract publicity to their cause or both, they do so through symbolic
targets including damaging individuals who are often the direct targets of
terrorist attacks (Wilkinson, 2010:129). By extension, terrorism also causes
damage to the society and its values through eroding the rule of law,
generating societal tensions and anxiety, which are meant to be instruments to
change the behaviour of the state. In addition, terrorism has close documented
links with - and often reinforces - a broad range of forms of trans-border crime
(see below) for revenue generation, thus creating synergies with other border
security threats.
2. Trans-border crime (often organised, but not necessarily) is a broad umbrella
of various crimes linked by their trans-border dimension. Drawing on the
respondents’ feedback and secondary sources, and given their weight on the
border insecurity agenda, it is worth addressing each of them in some detail:
Illegal (economic) migration, probably the most common border security
issue, where individuals attempt, and often succeed, in crossing the border
illegally, without being authorised or entitled to. It also is a well-
established and well-institutionalised area of the ‘migration-security
nexus’ (Huysmans and Squire, 2010:170-172).25
A related variety of
illegal migration is when the person enters the country legally, but
misrepresents his intentions (e.g., claims to be a temporary visitor while
engaging in illegal employment and overstaying one’s entry permit). The
strengthening their capacity to apply risk-based and intelligence-led tools in border controls, with
particular focus on universal implementation and use of API.
24
Seeing terrorism as a crime is relatively straightforward: as most aspects of terrorism are criminalised
globally, and have close links with other forms of trans-border crime, few would argue it is not a crime.
Terrorism as an act of war is probably less obvious, although there are arguments in favour that go far
beyond the rhetoric about the ‘war on terror.’ Following 9/11, it was the first and only time when
NATO invoked Article 5 provisions guaranteeing a member military support of all members in case of
attack. Moving to more recent history, responses to terrorism have included large-scale military
campaigns such as US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Wilkinson, 2010:135-136), and the ongoing
war against the Islamic State.
2525
‘Many of the leading works introducing migration into the area of Security Studies have done so by
defining migration as a central dimension of a rounded security agenda. Thus, it has been argued that
migration needs to be factored into the calculations of national security strategy, and that national
security needs to be factored into the calculations of migration policy’ (Huysmans and Squire,
2010:170).
34. - 27 -
effect is essentially the same: the presence of an unauthorised foreigner,
who has broken immigration and employment laws, and is subject to
removal if apprehended. 26
The damaging potential of illegal migration
increases considerably with mass flows of illegal migration.
Human smuggling, an organised form of illegal migration where migrants
are assisted by private sector ‘facilitators’ who organise their travel and
illicit crossing the border.27
While being illegal, human smuggling
essentially is a client-and-service-provider contract between two
consenting parties. While most human smuggling uses clandestine routes,
they may supply clients with forged travel documents for crossing the
border through official BCPs. Well-publicised examples include
Australia-bound ‘boat people’ (Tascon, 2010), assisted illegal border
crossings from Mexico to the US, or large numbers of smuggled migrants
from North Africa to Southern EU Members.
Human trafficking, usually of women and children, predominantly for
financial or sexual exploitation. Despite some superficial similarities with
human smuggling, human trafficking has an important difference: it
involves deception or coercion, often both. It is far more damaging to the
victims and is considered a graver offence than human smuggling in
almost every jurisdiction.
Smuggling illegal or prohibited goods: illicit drugs, child pornography,
conventional weapons, chemical weapons, bacteriological agents, nuclear
proliferation (including bomb-grade material or inferior radioactive
material suitable for using in a ’dirty bomb’). In other words, ‘global flows
of dangerous commodities’ across national borders (Williams,
2010:150).28
This threat, particularly involving chemical, biological or
26
It is debatable whether illegal migrants are ‘criminals’ in the strict sense of the word. While they
have broken national laws, critical and post-colonialist school academics and leftist NGOs would rather
see them as victims of unequal development, colonial-era exploitation and similar structural causes.
From the receiving state’s and society’s perspective though, illegal migrants erode the rule of law and
weaken the state through breaking national legislation, bringing economic costs through stealing jobs
they are not entitled to, and (allegedly) abusing the national social security system.
27
‘One dimension of this is human smuggling – which circumvents immigration controls and is a crime
against the state. Another is human trafficking for purposes of forced labour or commercial sex.’
(Williams, 2010:151).
28
A possible typology of threat-producing commodities within the sub-sector includes ‘prohibited
(illegal drugs), regulated (endangered species and cultural property), counterfeit (cigarettes and
pharmaceuticals), or stolen (cars, art, nuclear and radioactive materials)’ (ibid:150-151).
35. - 28 -
nuclear materials, seems to be particularly closely linked to the threat of
terrorism, as those weapons can be used for terrorist attacks (Wirtz,
2010:147).
Smuggling of goods that are legal but moved across the border
avoiding paying import dues and taxes as required by law (obvious
examples include high-tax high-demand goods such as alcohol, tobacco,
cars or petrol). While, generally, none of those commodities are illegal per
se, it is the modus operandi of moving them across the border evading
dues and taxes that makes it illegal and a form of crime.
Money laundering: making funds of illegal origin look legitimate, which
is a considerable priority for most crime actors. As Williams elaborates,
‘the illegal proceeds of crime can be moved across borders as part of the
money laundering cycle, in which funds derived from criminal activity are
made to appear as legitimate’ (2010:151). Money laundering does not
necessarily include, but often does, cash taken across an international
border. Since official inter-bank trans-border transfers maintain records
and the data can be analysed by criminal intelligence and border control
agencies, a common modus operandi is taking large amounts of cash
across the borders.29
Identification fraud and use of fraudulent travel documents.30
While
identity and travel document fraud are issues high on the border security
agenda, they are primarily used as means for committing other trans-
border crimes, instead of being a crime for its own sake. To put it more
poetically, identity fraud is a golden thread that runs through the multi-
coloured fabric of trans-border crime.
Bringing in goods that threaten public health, animal and plant
security, violations of quarantine regulations, sometimes by ignorance.
Such threats seem to be emanating not so much as a calculated crime but
as non-intentional consequences, a side-effect of globalisation and
increasing movement of people and goods. However, such threats may
29
As part of the global anti-money laundering regime, most countries would require any amount of
cash (and comparable ‘financial instruments’) exceeding USD 10,000 (or sometimes EUR 10,000) to
be declared at the border to the controlling agency, usually the Customs.
30
Highlighted by respondent NAT6 as a major border security threat.
36. - 29 -
also be intentional, ranging from recklessness to intentional attempts to
circumvent health and quarantine regulations for personal gain.
3. Refugees and asylum seekers. Within the broader agenda of forced
migration, asylum seekers occupy a unique position provided by the 1951
Refugee Convention that creates an obligation for contracting states to offer
protection to individuals fleeing a ‘well-founded fear of persecution.’31
This
leads to a paradox situation where genuine asylum seekers meeting the
Convention definition are deemed to have entered the country legally for
protection purposes, even if they had not. However, even legitimate asylum
seekers may be a security threat and economic burden if the numbers are high
or the state is weak or in a particularly exposed location, as demonstrated by
current ex-IS asylum seekers’ flows to Hungary and Austria.32
Such threats,
inevitably, are quite subjective and have close links with the securitisation
dilemma:
‘the effects that the political framing of migration as a threat has on
public perception and opinion formation. Over recent years, public
opinion regarding migration in many countries within the global North
has become hostile toward ‘asylum seekers’ and ‘illegal migrants.’ An
analysis of the discrepancy between perceptions of migration and the
objective threat that migration poses, and an analysis of interrelation of
threat perceptions of migration in the political elite and the wider
public is of political interest in this regard ’ (Huysmans and Squire,
2010:172-173).
4. Non-intentional border security threats. While terrorism and trans-border
crime take many shapes, they share an important common denominator:
malicious intent that the perpetrators have and, their capabilities permitting,
realise in order to achieve their objective, usually by causing damage that
attracts attention to their cause, or obtaining economic gains using illegal ways
and means. Most interview respondents omitted mentioning non-intentional
threats in their responses, although three have stressed the importance of
border security threats that do not emanate from a particular actor but occur
31
The international refugee protection regime is well explained in Gil Loescher’s works, including his
classic that explores refugee dynamics from the security perspective (1992).
32
As highlighted by respondent NAT8, also suggesting that the realistic burden and threats posed by
refugees prevented small, weak or disadvantagely-positioned states to accept their obligations under the
1951 Geneva Convention and Addition Protocol in the first place.
37. - 30 -
‘when things go wrong’ and have the potential of spilling over the borders
with great ease. Examples would include communicable diseases, such as
Ebola virus, SARS or avian flu epidemics, or, on a less dramatic scale,
international travellers with communicable diseases such as tuberculosis or
yellow fever, that may endanger public health in the country of destination.
5. Security threats to the individual emanating from the state. Contradictions
between the security of the state and individual security have been well argued
elsewhere (see Buzan, 1991: 35-55). ‘The state is a major source of both
threats to and security for individuals’ (ibid:35). The state as a source of the
individual’s security need not be discussed here: it has been well articulated in
The Leviathan and centuries of post-Hobbesian thought that laid foundations
to realist and neo-realist security thinking. This section concerns itself with the
question when and how does the state become a source of insecurity for the
individual in the context of borders, which offers two interpretations.
5.1 The first obvious response is that the state would compromise the security of
the individual when there were no safeguards to prevent its abuse of power:
this would allow border control agencies – and their officials - to exercise their
considerable powers in an unaccountable and arbitrary manner. This is very
much in line with the central SSR belief33
that state security institutions easily
deteriorate from the provider of security to a major source of insecurity to the
individual, unless adequate monitoring and redress mechanisms, such as
executive control and parliamentary oversight, have been established. ‘The
border control system and border police need to be subject to democratic
oversight and governance, as do all security agencies which have the right to
use force to control people’ (Marenin, 2010:27). This is a valid concern: while
border control officials have exceptional powers, comparable to – and often
surpassing - those of the military, the police, intelligence security agencies and
similar, it has generated surprisingly few SSR studies and guidance materials
(the only significant, if dated, exception being Caparini and Marenin, 2006).
5.2 The second aspect of the state being a threat to individual security is more
controversial and less SSR-aligned. An important SSR tenet is that security
33
Inherited, presumably, from civil-military relations.
38. - 31 -
institutions tend pose a threat to the individual when ‘things go wrong,’ i.e.
when control and oversight mechanisms fail, or had never been established in
the first place. Following this logic, as long as effective control and oversight
have been established, security agencies (including border security ones)
would do what they were meant to do: provide security to the individual. Not
necessarily, as a closer look suggests. Anyone unfortunate and foolish enough
to be caught smuggling large amounts of drugs across the border would be
arrested, tried, sentenced, and in some jurisdictions executed, by the state.
Such behaviour of the state would be perfectly legal and legitimate, however,
the consequences to the individual would be nevertheless disastrous: one
would lose one’s freedom, status, money and, in some cases, life. This
hypothetical border control example is a reminder that good governance and
the rule of law need not fail for the state to become a threat to the individual.
‘The security of individuals is locked into an unbreakable paradox in which it
is partly dependent on, and partly threatened by, the state’ (Buzan, 1991:363-
364). Even when the state functions with model SSR-aligned executive control
and parliamentary oversight, it still remains a threat to the individual, and the
border security sub-sector is no exception.34
6 Corruption. Secondary sources rarely highlight border integrity issues such as
corruption as a threat in its own right. However, it has been raised in threat
considerations by authors with an SSR background (e.g., Pluim and Hoffmann,
2015:8). ‘Corruption of border guards, which is known to happen, undermines the
integrity and existence of border controls and needs to be taken seriously as a
34
The state as a source of threat to the individual, in the context of border security and border controls,
highlights another unique feature of this security sector. While most international travellers cross the
border relatively uneventfully, those unfortunate enough to raise suspicion of border control agencies,
identified as high-risk individuals or POIs, and selected for a secondary inspection, would tell a
different story. Based, for example, on the border control realities of some developed English-speaking
countries (while not getting into technical empirical details), as part of border controls, the suspect
person, his luggage, records and computer, and unaccompanied goods can be searched without a court
warrant at the discretion of border control officials. One has no right to silence and is obliged by law to
give the examining officer any information in one’s possession that the officer requests. The suspect
individual can be detained under ‘reasonable’ suspicion by border control officers for a certain time,
without any charges laid, for the purpose of ‘examination.’ The suspected individual is not allowed to
use any communication devices during the ‘examination.’ Refusal to comply with any of the above
constitutes an offence punishable by imprisonment or a fine. Anywhere else – including in streets, flats,
shops, football matches, peaceful demonstrations, squares, parks, churches or tube stations - in Western
liberal democracies such practices would be seen as Orwellian, unthinkable, outrageous and
unconstitutional infringement upon human rights and fundamental freedoms, eroding most things that
good governance and the rule of law stand for. However, in the same developed liberal democracies,
such practices as part of border controls are seen as a perfectly normal, if somewhat unpleasant, thing.
39. - 32 -
problem in the planning, implementation and management of border controls.
Corruption weakens and can destroy the most carefully designed plans and
policies of IBM’ (Marenin, 2010:32). While few respondents mentioned
corruption among threats on their initiative, they all agreed, when asked about
border integrity issues, that corruption was a serious – perhaps even a major –
border security threat. Corruption has the potential of eroding the effectiveness of
border controls and creates enormous vulnerability that can be exploited by ‘other’
threats. Also, border controls seem to present another specific integrity challenge.
Most other security sectors (the police, military, corrections, intelligence services)
have a clearer focus, a relatively clear scope of what they do and how, which
allows to identify main integrity challenges and design anti-corruption measures.
In contrast, IBM consists of highly-complex interaction in intra-agency, inter-
agency and cross-border levels that involves a broad range of actors. Designing
counter-corruption measures – or even identifying integrity issues – in such
complex dynamic requires a far more bespoke approach that involves close
monitoring and analysis, instead of using a time-proven anti-corruption toolbox
that worked in the past for other security sectors.35
7 Military threats occupy an ambiguous, if somewhat marginal, role among border
security threats. A military attack and invasion would, naturally, violate the state’s
physical borders and territorial integrity, thus, by definition, becoming a border
security issue. However, in the broader border security debate by academia,
practitioners and the media, military threats do not feature much. Similarly, out of
all the respondents, less than half of them mentioned military threats among
possible border security threats, and even they referred to them not so much in the
sense of the defence of the state but preserving the integrity of its territory and
borders (such as peace-time monitoring and surveillance of the land, sea and air
border that is, in many states, carried out by the armed forces). However, while
military threats may not fit into border insecurity as obviously as others, they
clearly have a role to play in more complex security dynamics. A hypothetical –
but quite realistic – example would be FTFs from the US, Canada or EU Members
35
IBM-specific integrity issues also have been implied by Marenin: ‘Abuse and corruption among
border controllers can occur anywhere that control activities are dome. Accountability and oversight,
hence, will required different mechanisms with different rules for transparency, disclosure and external
oversight than of an increasingly large and diverse number of agents and agencies.’ (2010:33).
