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Behaviour in Competition 
A Guide to Competition Law
INTRODUCTION 4 
1. Statement 4 
2. Purpose 4 
3. Competition law 5 
3.1 EC Competition Law 5 
3.2 US Antitrust Law 5 
3.3 National competition laws 6 
4. Application of competition law 6 
5. Consequences of violations 6 
6. Responsibility of the employees 7 
AGREEMENTS AND COORDINATED POLICIES ELIMINATING 
OR RESTRICTING COMPETITION 8 
1. Horizontal agreements 8 
1.1 Prices and conditions of supply 9 
1.2 Market sharing 9 
1.3 Boycotts 10 
1.4 Joint ventures 10 
1.5 Trade associations 10 
2. Vertical agreements 11 
2.1 Resale prices 11 
2.2 Exclusivity 12 
2.3 Parallel trade 12 
2.4 Tying 13 
2.5 Competition clause 13 
2.6 Patent, trademark, copyright 14 
2.7 Improvements and new applications 14 
2.8 Supply agreements 15 
PROHIBITED ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION 16 
1. Discrimination/Different sales conditions 17 
2. Hindrance of competitors 17 
2.1 Imposing exclusive purchase commitments on customers 17 
2.2 Fidelity rebates 18 
2.3 Rebates with similar effects 18 
2.4 Unfair or predatory pricing 18 
3. English clause 18 
4. Refusal to sell 19 
INTRACORPORATE AGREEMENTS 19 
ANNEX 20 
III 
IV 
Table of contents 
I 
II
Introduction 
Statement 
The maintenance of high ethical standards in adhering to national and international 
laws is one of the fundamental Roche Corporate Principles . 
As a company with world-wide business activities, Roche is determined to adhere 
to the required laws and regulations in force in the various countries where it oper-ates 
as well as to implement high standards of integrity in business transactions. 
Such laws, regulations and standards include the EC Competition Law and the US 
Antitrust Law as well as the Rules of Conduct laid down in the Report on Extortion 
and Bribery in business transactions issued by the International Chamber of Com-merce 
(ICC). 
Competition law is intended to help preserve the competitive, free enterprise system 
that is the basis of the free market economy. It is the belief of the management that 
even in the absence of such laws the interest of the company, its shareholders and 
employees are best served by a policy of vigorous and fair competition. For these 
reasons, it is the policy of the company to comply strictly in all respects with compe-tition 
laws and to object to all forms of extortion and bribery, which – in addition to 
being often a crime – may also constitute acts of unfair competition. 
Roche is aware that sometimes it is difficult for the employees to understand the re-quirements 
of the competition laws of the various countries where Roche does busi-ness. 
In fact, in many cases the law itself is not entirely clear. Therefore, Roche encour-ages 
every employee to seek the counsel of the Roche legal department about any 
specific antitrust question that comes up. 
Behaviour in Competition is part of the Roche Compliance Program including this 
guide, antitrust audits and training on competition law. 
Purpose 
The purpose of the Behaviour in Competition guide is to explain the basic provisions 
of antitrust and competition laws, mainly of the US Antitrust Law and the EC Com-petition 
Law, in order to make the management and staff aware of the basic rules and 
how these laws affect their business behaviour in making commercial decisions. 
I 
1 
4 Behaviour in Competition 
Following these principles, fair and correct behaviour 
in competition shall be a must for every employee. 
2
I. Introduction 
5 
The guide cannot cover all facts and circumstances that the employee may encounter 
in his business activities. Accordingly, it is recommended and expected that in every 
case of doubt or if the employee has any question as to whether a particular course of 
action is appropriate or not, he should contact the Roche legal department for advice. 
Behaviour in Competition is designed to provide each employee with enough infor-mation 
‘I didn’t know it was illegal’ is no excuse for the 
competition authorities. 
Behaviour in Competition 
about the competition law to recognise situations that require legal advice 
and to obtain it. 
Competition law 
The best economic and social results are achieved in an environment of free compe-tition. 
Competition law prohibits unreasonable restraints on competition and acts 
of monopolisation. 
EC Competition Law 
The principal provisions of EC Competition Law are set forth in Articles 81 and 82 
EC (ex Articles 85 and 86 EC Treaty) – as stated in the Annex. More detailed regula-tions 
are fixed in various commission regulations and directives. 
EC Competition Law applies to all companies doing business within the member 
states or which may affect trade between the member states of the European Eco-nomic 
Area (EEA) regardless of whether these companies are established in one of 
these countries or not. 
US Antitrust Law 
US Antitrust Law is set forth in four principal federal statutes: The Sherman Act, 
the Clayton Act, the Wilson Tariff Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
US Antitrust Law applies to all companies and individuals doing business in the 
United States or affecting US commerce. 
3 
3.1 
3.2
National competition laws 
There are national competition laws to be considered by doing business in the 
corresponding country. These national competition laws are generally similar 
to the EC Competition Law and/or US Antitrust Law. You should contact the Roche 
legal department with any questions regarding the applicability of local law. 
Application of competition law 
The EU Competition Law applies to restrictions of competition within the EEA, 
which directly or indirectly may affect trade between the member states of the EEA, 
regardless of where the restrictions of competition have taken place. 
The same applies with regard to the US Antitrust Law if there is an unreasonable 
restraint of trade affecting the US market. 
Other national competition or antitrust laws apply to restrictions of competition of 
a purely national dimension, also regardless of where the restrictions of competition 
have taken place. 
Because of the world-wide business activity of Roche, all employees, regardless of 
their place of business, have to comply with the EC Competition Law, the US 
Antitrust Law, and any other applicable local competition laws, where the intended 
business transaction affects these territories, and, as a result, follow the Behaviour in 
Competition guide. 
Consequences of violations 
Violations of the competition laws may result in extremely serious penalties. 
The European Commission imposes fines according to the severity and the duration 
of the violation. The highest fines are imposed for violations by horizontal agree-ments, 
i.e. agreements restricting competition between competitors. For such viola-tions 
the European Commission may impose a fine of 10% of the annual world-wide 
turnover. The fine may be increased for every year of the duration of the violation. 
3.3 
6 Behaviour in Competition 
Competition law has to be observed by all players in 
the market. 
4 
5
I. Introduction 
7 
Also violations in vertical agreements between the manufacturer and its distributors 
or customers may result in high fines. 
Violating the competition laws never pays off. 
Behaviour in Competition 
Furthermore, any agreement violating Article 81 (1) EC is automatically void. 
For a violation of US Antitrust Law, a company may be subject to very substantial 
fines in the amount of millions of USD. 
In addition, violations of competition law may also give rise to civil lawsuits which 
may result in substantial damage claims from customers and competitors. In the US, 
successful plaintiffs in antitrust lawsuits are entitled to triple their damages plus 
attorney fees. 
The violation of the US Antitrust Law and other national competition laws may also 
lead to criminal convictions of the involved employee. Individuals can be fined 
and/or given prison terms for criminal antitrust violations. 
Responsibility of the employees 
Compliance with the competition laws is the responsibility of every employee. 
Roche employees are forbidden to knowingly engage in practices that violate compe-tition 
laws. 
Each employee is responsible for acquiring a sufficient understanding of the compe-tition 
laws to recognise situations which may involve competition law issues. 
Where there is any question of whether a current business practice or a commercial 
decision might be in conflict with any competition law, each employee must consult 
the Roche legal department. 
Compliance with the competition laws is in the respon-sibility 
of every employee. 
In case of any doubt, the legal department must be 
consulted. 
6
Agreements and coordinated 
policies eliminating or restricting 
competition 
Article 81 (1) EC prohibits all agreements or understandings which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. 
The Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations or conspiracies that unreason-ably 
restrain trade. 
The form of agreement is of no importance. Not only written agreements are 
deemed to come within the scope of competition law but also verbal agreements or 
so-called co-ordinated policies, i.e. deliberate and intended collaboration between 
individual companies for the purpose of eliminating or restricting competition in a 
certain market. 
Restraints of competition are divided into two types: vertical and horizontal 
restraints. 
Horizontal restraints mean agreements or co-ordinated policies between companies 
acting on the same marketing stage, e.g. agreements with competing manufacturers. 
Vertical restraints mean agreements or co-ordinated policies restricting competition 
between companies acting on different marketing stages, e.g. agreements with dis-tributors 
and customers, licensees, suppliers or licensors which restrict the competi-tive 
freedom of the partners or third companies. 
Horizontal agreements 
Normally, agreements or co-ordinated policies between competitors which affect the 
terms on which they do business raise the most serious competition law concerns. 
The following general principles should be considered in connection with any deal-ings 
with competitors: 
II 
1 
8 Behaviour in Competition
II. Agreements and coordinated policies eliminating or restricting competition 
9 
Prices and conditions of supply 
Every manufacturer is free to establish and change its own prices, and in doing so, 
it may take account of, in the absence of any co-ordination, the conduct of its com-petitors. 
However, it is a violation of competition law to agree or co-operate in any 
Do not fix any price-related conditions with competitors. 
Never discuss any aspects of pricing with competitors. 
Behaviour in Competition 
way with the competitors to fix or stabilise prices, particularly : 
It is prohibited to: 
• jointly determine selling or purchase prices 
• jointly determine price increases 
• jointly fix specific minimum or maximum 
prices or price ranges 
• jointly agree rebates, discounts and other 
conditions of supply 
It is generally prohibited to: 
• exchange price-related information with 
competitors unless it is merely historical 
(older than 12 months) 
In case of doubt, the Roche legal department should be consulted prior to any exchange 
of price-related information. 
Market sharing 
An agreement among competitors to share or allocate markets in any form is forbid-den. 
More specifically : 
It is prohibited to: 
• share or allocate markets between 
competitors in respect of specific 
territories, products, customers or 
sources of supply 
• fix production, buying and selling 
quotas between competitors 
Do not arrange any market sharing or allocation with 
competitors. 
1.1 
1.2 
✗ 
✗ 
✗
Boycotts 
The refusal by a group of competitors to deal with one or more customers or sup-pliers 
in order to hinder such customer or supplier to do business in a market is 
prohibited. 
Joint ventures 
Joint venture agreements between competitors may produce useful efficiencies but 
can also affect or restrain competition. Consequently, such agreements must not be 
entered into without legal advice. 
Trade associations 
Joining a trade association where competitors meet is not prohibited, however, any 
meetings or other activities that involve sharing of information among horizontal 
competitors can raise antitrust risk. Accordingly, Roche’s participation in such asso-ciations 
must be monitored carefully. 
10 Behaviour in Competition 
Do not exchange competitively sensitive information 
with competitors. 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
It is prohibited to: 
• mutually agree not to supply certain 
customers or not to purchase from 
certain suppliers 
• agree with competitors to make the supply 
or purchase of goods subject to certain 
conditions mutually agreed 
It is possible to: 
• have a competitor as supplier or customer 
at an arm’s length basis, provided that all 
other antitrust rules are observed 
Advice should be sought if you intend to: 
• enter into an agreement with a competitor 
on joint research and development 
• enter into an agreement with a competitor 
on joint manufacturing 
• enter into an agreement with a competitor 
on joint marketing 
It is prohibited to: 
• share information about prices, discounts, 
conditions of supply, profit margins, cost 
structures, calculation practices, distribu-tion 
practices, territories, customers, etc., 
during meetings of a trade association 
without having discussed it with counsel 
in advance 
It is possible to: 
• agree joint petitioning, government relation 
matters and similar topics within a trade 
association 
✗ 
✔ 
✗ 
✗ ✔
II. Agreements and coordinated policies eliminating or restricting competition 
11 
It is possible to: 
• give a non-binding price recommendation 
for resale prices of branded products, if no 
direct or indirect pressure is exercised to 
enforce such recommendation 
• mark all statements of resale prices as 
‘recommended resale prices’ 
Behaviour in Competition 
It is prohibited to: 
• fix or set the resale prices to distributors or 
dealers for any product 
• fix or set the resale prices in letters, offers 
and the like 
• state resale prices in order forms* 
• state resale prices in price lists, catalogues, 
displays, price labels, tags, packings, 
brochures, etc.* 
• require the distributor to adhere to the 
recommended resale prices 
• terminate the agreement with a distributor 
because of its refusal to adhere to the 
recommended resale prices* 
• coordinate the price policy with the dis-tributor 
according to the market situation 
• prohibit the distributor from granting any 
rebates or discounts 
• provide the distributor with formulas to 
calculate prices 
• state the profit margin of the distributor 
• prescribe maximum and minimum ranges 
for the resale prices 
✗ 
Do not impose any resale prices. 
2 
2.1 
Vertical agreements 
Vertical business partners include distributors, customers licensees, licensors and 
suppliers. 
With respect to agreements with such vertical business partners the following princi-ples 
should be considered: 
Resale prices 
The producer must not set the resale prices charged by the distributor. More specifi-cally 
: 
* May, under certain circumstances, be lawful in the US. Advice from the Roche legal department 
should be sought. 
✔
Exclusivity 
By entering into agreements to buy exclusively from one source or to supply exclu-sively 
to one customer (exclusive distribution, purchase, franchise or license agree-ments) 
certain principles must be considered: 
It is prohibited to: 
• prescribe not to passively supply customers 
from outside the territory* 
• forbid a distributor to accept a customer’s 
inquiry from outside the territory* 
• forbid a distributor to supply the products 
to other distribution channels upon 
corresponding orders* 
• refuse orders from distributors exporting 
the products with the argument of territory 
restrictions* 
* May be allowed in the US. Advice from the Roche legal department should be sought. 
The Roche legal department should be consulted prior to the establishment of an exclu-sive 
agreement. 
Parallel trade 
Parallel trade is the consequence of free trade within a market. 
* Territorial and customer restrictions may, under some circumstances, be permissible in the US. Advice 
from the Roche legal department should be sought. 
2.2 
2.3 
12 Behaviour in Competition 
It is possible to: 
• grant an exclusive distribution, purchase, 
franchise or license right in a certain 
territory 
• prohibit an active marketing policy outside 
the agreed territory. Therefore, outside the 
contract territory and in relation to the 
contract goods, the partner can be obliged 
to refrain from actively seeking customers, 
establishing any branch or maintaining any 
distribution depot 
It is prohibited to: 
• impose export bans* 
• prescribe to the partner not to export the 
product upon a customer’s inquiry from 
outside the territory* 
• refuse orders from partners exporting the 
products with the argument of territory 
restrictions* 
It is possible to: 
• prohibit an active marketing policy outside 
the agreed territory 
• inform the partner about any differences 
affecting the product’s acceptance in 
another country or other legal requirements 
in another country 
• limit the amount of products sold to a 
partner under capacity reasons 
✗ 
✗ 
✔ 
✔
II. Agreements and coordinated policies eliminating or restricting competition 
13 
Tying 
Tying clauses, which make the supply of a product subject to the acceptance of sup-plementary 
Behaviour in Competition 
obligations to buy other goods and/or services which, either by their 
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of the 
contract, generally should not be used, especially where Roche has a significant mar-ket 
share in the first product. 
The Roche legal department should be consulted prior to the establishment of any agree-ment 
if the employee intends to implement any arrangement where multiple assets must 
be purchased together. 
Competition clause 
Under certain circumstances, it may be possible to forbid a distributor or licensee 
to sell or manufacture competing products: 
The Roche legal department should be consulted prior to the establishment of any agree-ment 
if the employee intends to implement a competition clause. 
2.4 
2.5 
Where Roche has a significant market share 
in a product, it is prohibited to: 
• make the supply of the product 
conditional upon the obligation to buy 
other products of another nature 
• make the supply of the product subject to 
the obligation to enter into a service 
agreement for any kind of service 
It may be possible to: 
• require a customer to buy a full range of 
products including accessories 
• prescribe in license agreements to buy 
materials and special tools which are 
necessary for a technically satisfactory 
exploitation of the license 
It is prohibited to: 
• forbid the manufacturing and selling of 
competing products beyond the duration 
of the agreement 
It may be possible to: 
• forbid the manufacturing and selling of 
competing products during the term of the 
agreement 
✗ 
✗ 
✔ 
✔
Patent, trademark, copyright 
By licensing patents, copyrights, know-how or trademarks, the following has to be 
considered: 
It is prohibited to: 
• forbid the partner to contest the secrecy of 
the licensed know-how or the licensed 
trademarks and patents 
• forbid the partner to contest the validity of 
the licensed patent 
• fix the price which the licensee charges for 
its product 
• reach agreements with other patent owners 
regarding royalties to be charged for 
competing patents 
It may be prohibited to: 
• condition the grant of a license upon the 
licensee’s agreement to purchase certain 
goods or to license other patents 
• forbid the partner to use competing 
technologies (no non-competition clause 
permitted) 
The Roche legal department should be consulted prior to the establishment of any 
agreement by licensing patents, copyrights, know-how or trademarks, unless the market 
share is lower than 25%. 
Improvements and new applications 
In patent licensing and know-how licensing agreements either party should generally 
be free to compete with its own developed products, improvements or new 
applications of the technology in question in so far as these are severable from the 
licensee’s initial know-how. 
2.6 
2.7 
It is prohibited to: 
• restrict either party from competing with 
the other party in respect of research and 
development, manufacture, use or sale of 
any own developed product, improvement 
and new application of the technology in 
question 
14 Behaviour in Competition 
✗ 
✗ 
✗
II. Agreements and coordinated policies eliminating or restricting competition 
15 
Supply agreements 
Obligations in supply agreements usually do not affect free competition unless the 
supplier is required to deliver the products exclusively to the buyer. 
Generally, requirements and arrangements referring to quality, specifications, quality 
control, raw materials, packing materials, quantities, terms of delivery, etc., may be 
made. 
However, if either the buyer or the seller has significant market share, entering into 
a long-term exclusive supply agreement may cause competition concerns. 
If the supplier uses technical auxiliaries and/or know-how of the buyer for the pro-duction, 
it is possible to oblige the supplier not to use such know-how or technical 
Behaviour in Competition 
means for other purposes than for supply of the buyer. 
However, it has to be stated that such obligation generally should be used only if the 
supplier was not capable of producing the corresponding products without the 
know-how and the auxiliaries of the buyer. 
That means that the exclusivity must not be agreed if the supplier is already in pos-session 
of the necessary auxiliaries and know-how or if the company only provides 
specification such as dimension, tolerance, weight, quality of the product, etc. 
In addition, it has to be considered that the buyer and the supplier have to be free to 
compete with their own developed products, improvements or new applications of 
the technology in question in so far as these are severable from the know-how of the 
supplied product. 
The Roche legal department should be consulted prior to entering into any exclusvie 
supply agreement. 
2.8
Prohibited abuse of dominant 
position 
Article 82 EC prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. 
The Sherman Act prohibits monopolisation, attempts to monopolise and conspira-cies 
to monopolise. 
Therefore, companies dominating a market have – besides the rules mentioned 
before – to pay special attention to some additional principles. 
Several factors are used to determine whether a company has a dominant position. 
However, the market share of the product involved is the main factor. To determine 
the market share, the relevant product market and the relevant geographical market 
have to be identified. It is not necessary to have a dominant position in an entire 
industry – it is enough to be dominant in a particular segment of that industry. 
As a rule, products belong to the same product market if they are ‘reasonably inter-changeable’. 
Furthermore, it is not necessary to have a dominant position throughout the entire 
European Union. The geographical market is defined as the area where there are the 
same or comparable conditions of competition. Such market, for example, may 
cover every single country of the European Union and even parts of such countries. 
Any market share exceeding 50% is in itself evidence of a likely dominant position. 
In certain circumstances, a company with a smaller market share may have a domi-nant 
position. For example, if there is a significant gap between the market share of 
the dominant company and the market shares of its competitors, that may be con-sidered 
as a confirmation of a dominant position. 
As a consequence, there may be a dominant position even with market shares around 
30% in one single European country. Even though there is no precise rule for deter-mining 
when a company has a dominant position, if the company’s share exceeds 
30%, it is prudent to take into account the principles set forth below. 
Under these circumstances, the prohibition of discrimination in particular has to be 
considered, i.e. the different treatment of distributors, licensees and customers is not 
allowed without justifying reasons under EC Competition Law. The company which 
dominates the market may not be discriminatory in its treatment of distributors, 
licensees and customers under comparable conditions unless there are reasons war- 
III 
16 Behaviour in Competition 
The larger the market share, the more careful a 
company must be in certain practices.
III. Prohibited abuse of dominant position 
17 
Behaviour in Competition 
ranting such conduct. The restrictions on the conduct of monopolists is less clear 
under US Antitrust Law. 
However, quantity rebates, function rebates or price reductions for services which 
are not performed by other distributors, licensees or customers, for example, justify 
different treatment. 
Discrimination/Different sales conditions 
A company with a dominant position must not discriminate in its sales conditions 
when dealing with similar customers under comparable circumstances. 
✗ 
Note: US law – Robinson-Patman Act – governing price discrimination is quite complex. Any rebate/discount 
programs should be reviewed carefully with US counsel. 
The Roche legal department should be consulted. 
Hindrance of competitors 
Imposing exclusive purchase commitments on customers 
Furthermore, market-dominant companies are not permitted to substantially 
restrict the access of competitors to customers or dealers by exclusive purchase 
obligations or fidelity rebates or rebates and bonuses having a similar effect (e.g. 
‘target’ rebates). 
1 
2 
2.1 
It is prohibited to: 
• grant different sales conditions (prices, 
rebates) to distributors or customers 
meeting the same requirements 
It may be possible to: 
• grant different sales conditions (rebates) to 
distributors providing special services that 
are not met by other distributors 
• grant different sales conditions to distribu-tors 
of another stage in the distribution 
channel (wholesalers – retailers) as such 
distributors are providing different services 
Do not discriminate between your customers. 
Do not abuse your market power. 
✔
Fidelity rebates 
Fidelity rebates mean rebates which are granted to buyers on the condition that they 
obtain their supplies exclusively from the dominant supplier. 
It is prohibited to: 
• grant fidelity and target rebates by a 
company dominating the market 
Note: US law – Robinson-Patman Act – governing price discrimination is quite complex. Any rebate/discount 
programs should be reviewed carefully with US counsel. 
Rebates with similar effects 
Aggregated sales rebates which develop a so-called suction effect in favour of the 
company dominating the market and target rebates which individually are related 
to the sales volume of a specific customer are generally forbidden. 
It is prohibited to: 
• grant aggregated rebates on the overall 
turnover reached with the supply of goods 
belonging to separate markets 
• grant target rebates 
Note: US law – Robinson-Patman Act – governing price discrimination is quite complex. Any rebate/discount 
programs should be reviewed carefully with US counsel. 
Unfair or predatory pricing 
Prices that are lower than ‘average variable cost’ or above ‘variable cost’, but consid-erably 
lower than ‘average total cost’ with the aim of eliminating a competitor, must 
not be charged. 
English clause 
It is not allowed to stipulate an English clause specifying that the party bound by 
contract to the company dominating the market has the possibility of purchasing 
from a competitor – provided it has in advance informed the company dominating 
the market of the competitor, quantities and prices agreed upon. 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
3 
18 Behaviour in Competition 
It may be possible to: 
• grant quantity rebates 
• grant turnover rebates based on the prior 
information about quantities of one 
product to be ordered 
It is prohibited to: 
• grant prices below cost (dumping prices) 
✗ 
✗ 
✔ 
✗
III. Prohibited abuse of dominant position / IV. Intracorporate agreements 
19 
Behaviour in Competition 
It is prohibited to: 
• agree an English clause obliging the cus-tomer 
to disclose names and prices of 
competitors 
Refusal to sell 
A refusal to sell to distributors or customers may constitute an abuse of a dominant 
position. The following principles have to be considered: 
* US law may provide more flexibility in this area. If such an issue occurs it should be reviewed carefully 
with US counsel. 
4 
It is prohibited to*: 
• refuse to sell to a customer which meets the 
same requirements as other customers 
which are supplied 
• reduce supplies to comparable customers 
in different ways without objective 
justification 
It is possible to*: 
• refuse to sell to existing or new customers 
under a good business reason 
• refuse to sell to a new customer because of 
insufficient capacity 
Intracorporate agreements 
Agreements between affiliated companies do not in principle fall within the scope 
of competition law. Therefore, the above mentioned rules of competition are not 
applicable with respect to the relation of the parent company to its affiliates or 
between sister companies. 
However, it has to be considered that all information given by the parent company 
to its affiliates in order to be provided to customers, such as advertising material, 
brochures, price lists, internal calculating documents, marketing plans, etc., have to 
meet the requirements of competition law. 
IV 
✗ 
✗ ✔
Annex 
20 Behaviour in Competition 
TREATY OF AMSTERDAM 
AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTAB-LISHING 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS 
Amsterdam, 2 October 1997 
Article 81 (ex Article 85) 
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competi-tion 
within the common market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be 
automatically void. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 1may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
– any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; 
– any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings; 
– any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share 
of the resulting benefit, and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in 
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Annex 
21 
Behaviour in Competition 
Article 82 (ex Article 86) 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the com-mon 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with 
the common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice 
of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties 
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
© July 1999 
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd 
Corporate Law 
Basel, Switzerland 
7000320

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Beincomp e

  • 1. Behaviour in Competition A Guide to Competition Law
  • 2. INTRODUCTION 4 1. Statement 4 2. Purpose 4 3. Competition law 5 3.1 EC Competition Law 5 3.2 US Antitrust Law 5 3.3 National competition laws 6 4. Application of competition law 6 5. Consequences of violations 6 6. Responsibility of the employees 7 AGREEMENTS AND COORDINATED POLICIES ELIMINATING OR RESTRICTING COMPETITION 8 1. Horizontal agreements 8 1.1 Prices and conditions of supply 9 1.2 Market sharing 9 1.3 Boycotts 10 1.4 Joint ventures 10 1.5 Trade associations 10 2. Vertical agreements 11 2.1 Resale prices 11 2.2 Exclusivity 12 2.3 Parallel trade 12 2.4 Tying 13 2.5 Competition clause 13 2.6 Patent, trademark, copyright 14 2.7 Improvements and new applications 14 2.8 Supply agreements 15 PROHIBITED ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION 16 1. Discrimination/Different sales conditions 17 2. Hindrance of competitors 17 2.1 Imposing exclusive purchase commitments on customers 17 2.2 Fidelity rebates 18 2.3 Rebates with similar effects 18 2.4 Unfair or predatory pricing 18 3. English clause 18 4. Refusal to sell 19 INTRACORPORATE AGREEMENTS 19 ANNEX 20 III IV Table of contents I II
  • 3. Introduction Statement The maintenance of high ethical standards in adhering to national and international laws is one of the fundamental Roche Corporate Principles . As a company with world-wide business activities, Roche is determined to adhere to the required laws and regulations in force in the various countries where it oper-ates as well as to implement high standards of integrity in business transactions. Such laws, regulations and standards include the EC Competition Law and the US Antitrust Law as well as the Rules of Conduct laid down in the Report on Extortion and Bribery in business transactions issued by the International Chamber of Com-merce (ICC). Competition law is intended to help preserve the competitive, free enterprise system that is the basis of the free market economy. It is the belief of the management that even in the absence of such laws the interest of the company, its shareholders and employees are best served by a policy of vigorous and fair competition. For these reasons, it is the policy of the company to comply strictly in all respects with compe-tition laws and to object to all forms of extortion and bribery, which – in addition to being often a crime – may also constitute acts of unfair competition. Roche is aware that sometimes it is difficult for the employees to understand the re-quirements of the competition laws of the various countries where Roche does busi-ness. In fact, in many cases the law itself is not entirely clear. Therefore, Roche encour-ages every employee to seek the counsel of the Roche legal department about any specific antitrust question that comes up. Behaviour in Competition is part of the Roche Compliance Program including this guide, antitrust audits and training on competition law. Purpose The purpose of the Behaviour in Competition guide is to explain the basic provisions of antitrust and competition laws, mainly of the US Antitrust Law and the EC Com-petition Law, in order to make the management and staff aware of the basic rules and how these laws affect their business behaviour in making commercial decisions. I 1 4 Behaviour in Competition Following these principles, fair and correct behaviour in competition shall be a must for every employee. 2
  • 4. I. Introduction 5 The guide cannot cover all facts and circumstances that the employee may encounter in his business activities. Accordingly, it is recommended and expected that in every case of doubt or if the employee has any question as to whether a particular course of action is appropriate or not, he should contact the Roche legal department for advice. Behaviour in Competition is designed to provide each employee with enough infor-mation ‘I didn’t know it was illegal’ is no excuse for the competition authorities. Behaviour in Competition about the competition law to recognise situations that require legal advice and to obtain it. Competition law The best economic and social results are achieved in an environment of free compe-tition. Competition law prohibits unreasonable restraints on competition and acts of monopolisation. EC Competition Law The principal provisions of EC Competition Law are set forth in Articles 81 and 82 EC (ex Articles 85 and 86 EC Treaty) – as stated in the Annex. More detailed regula-tions are fixed in various commission regulations and directives. EC Competition Law applies to all companies doing business within the member states or which may affect trade between the member states of the European Eco-nomic Area (EEA) regardless of whether these companies are established in one of these countries or not. US Antitrust Law US Antitrust Law is set forth in four principal federal statutes: The Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, the Wilson Tariff Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. US Antitrust Law applies to all companies and individuals doing business in the United States or affecting US commerce. 3 3.1 3.2
  • 5. National competition laws There are national competition laws to be considered by doing business in the corresponding country. These national competition laws are generally similar to the EC Competition Law and/or US Antitrust Law. You should contact the Roche legal department with any questions regarding the applicability of local law. Application of competition law The EU Competition Law applies to restrictions of competition within the EEA, which directly or indirectly may affect trade between the member states of the EEA, regardless of where the restrictions of competition have taken place. The same applies with regard to the US Antitrust Law if there is an unreasonable restraint of trade affecting the US market. Other national competition or antitrust laws apply to restrictions of competition of a purely national dimension, also regardless of where the restrictions of competition have taken place. Because of the world-wide business activity of Roche, all employees, regardless of their place of business, have to comply with the EC Competition Law, the US Antitrust Law, and any other applicable local competition laws, where the intended business transaction affects these territories, and, as a result, follow the Behaviour in Competition guide. Consequences of violations Violations of the competition laws may result in extremely serious penalties. The European Commission imposes fines according to the severity and the duration of the violation. The highest fines are imposed for violations by horizontal agree-ments, i.e. agreements restricting competition between competitors. For such viola-tions the European Commission may impose a fine of 10% of the annual world-wide turnover. The fine may be increased for every year of the duration of the violation. 3.3 6 Behaviour in Competition Competition law has to be observed by all players in the market. 4 5
  • 6. I. Introduction 7 Also violations in vertical agreements between the manufacturer and its distributors or customers may result in high fines. Violating the competition laws never pays off. Behaviour in Competition Furthermore, any agreement violating Article 81 (1) EC is automatically void. For a violation of US Antitrust Law, a company may be subject to very substantial fines in the amount of millions of USD. In addition, violations of competition law may also give rise to civil lawsuits which may result in substantial damage claims from customers and competitors. In the US, successful plaintiffs in antitrust lawsuits are entitled to triple their damages plus attorney fees. The violation of the US Antitrust Law and other national competition laws may also lead to criminal convictions of the involved employee. Individuals can be fined and/or given prison terms for criminal antitrust violations. Responsibility of the employees Compliance with the competition laws is the responsibility of every employee. Roche employees are forbidden to knowingly engage in practices that violate compe-tition laws. Each employee is responsible for acquiring a sufficient understanding of the compe-tition laws to recognise situations which may involve competition law issues. Where there is any question of whether a current business practice or a commercial decision might be in conflict with any competition law, each employee must consult the Roche legal department. Compliance with the competition laws is in the respon-sibility of every employee. In case of any doubt, the legal department must be consulted. 6
  • 7. Agreements and coordinated policies eliminating or restricting competition Article 81 (1) EC prohibits all agreements or understandings which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. The Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations or conspiracies that unreason-ably restrain trade. The form of agreement is of no importance. Not only written agreements are deemed to come within the scope of competition law but also verbal agreements or so-called co-ordinated policies, i.e. deliberate and intended collaboration between individual companies for the purpose of eliminating or restricting competition in a certain market. Restraints of competition are divided into two types: vertical and horizontal restraints. Horizontal restraints mean agreements or co-ordinated policies between companies acting on the same marketing stage, e.g. agreements with competing manufacturers. Vertical restraints mean agreements or co-ordinated policies restricting competition between companies acting on different marketing stages, e.g. agreements with dis-tributors and customers, licensees, suppliers or licensors which restrict the competi-tive freedom of the partners or third companies. Horizontal agreements Normally, agreements or co-ordinated policies between competitors which affect the terms on which they do business raise the most serious competition law concerns. The following general principles should be considered in connection with any deal-ings with competitors: II 1 8 Behaviour in Competition
  • 8. II. Agreements and coordinated policies eliminating or restricting competition 9 Prices and conditions of supply Every manufacturer is free to establish and change its own prices, and in doing so, it may take account of, in the absence of any co-ordination, the conduct of its com-petitors. However, it is a violation of competition law to agree or co-operate in any Do not fix any price-related conditions with competitors. Never discuss any aspects of pricing with competitors. Behaviour in Competition way with the competitors to fix or stabilise prices, particularly : It is prohibited to: • jointly determine selling or purchase prices • jointly determine price increases • jointly fix specific minimum or maximum prices or price ranges • jointly agree rebates, discounts and other conditions of supply It is generally prohibited to: • exchange price-related information with competitors unless it is merely historical (older than 12 months) In case of doubt, the Roche legal department should be consulted prior to any exchange of price-related information. Market sharing An agreement among competitors to share or allocate markets in any form is forbid-den. More specifically : It is prohibited to: • share or allocate markets between competitors in respect of specific territories, products, customers or sources of supply • fix production, buying and selling quotas between competitors Do not arrange any market sharing or allocation with competitors. 1.1 1.2 ✗ ✗ ✗
  • 9. Boycotts The refusal by a group of competitors to deal with one or more customers or sup-pliers in order to hinder such customer or supplier to do business in a market is prohibited. Joint ventures Joint venture agreements between competitors may produce useful efficiencies but can also affect or restrain competition. Consequently, such agreements must not be entered into without legal advice. Trade associations Joining a trade association where competitors meet is not prohibited, however, any meetings or other activities that involve sharing of information among horizontal competitors can raise antitrust risk. Accordingly, Roche’s participation in such asso-ciations must be monitored carefully. 10 Behaviour in Competition Do not exchange competitively sensitive information with competitors. 1.3 1.4 1.5 It is prohibited to: • mutually agree not to supply certain customers or not to purchase from certain suppliers • agree with competitors to make the supply or purchase of goods subject to certain conditions mutually agreed It is possible to: • have a competitor as supplier or customer at an arm’s length basis, provided that all other antitrust rules are observed Advice should be sought if you intend to: • enter into an agreement with a competitor on joint research and development • enter into an agreement with a competitor on joint manufacturing • enter into an agreement with a competitor on joint marketing It is prohibited to: • share information about prices, discounts, conditions of supply, profit margins, cost structures, calculation practices, distribu-tion practices, territories, customers, etc., during meetings of a trade association without having discussed it with counsel in advance It is possible to: • agree joint petitioning, government relation matters and similar topics within a trade association ✗ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✔
  • 10. II. Agreements and coordinated policies eliminating or restricting competition 11 It is possible to: • give a non-binding price recommendation for resale prices of branded products, if no direct or indirect pressure is exercised to enforce such recommendation • mark all statements of resale prices as ‘recommended resale prices’ Behaviour in Competition It is prohibited to: • fix or set the resale prices to distributors or dealers for any product • fix or set the resale prices in letters, offers and the like • state resale prices in order forms* • state resale prices in price lists, catalogues, displays, price labels, tags, packings, brochures, etc.* • require the distributor to adhere to the recommended resale prices • terminate the agreement with a distributor because of its refusal to adhere to the recommended resale prices* • coordinate the price policy with the dis-tributor according to the market situation • prohibit the distributor from granting any rebates or discounts • provide the distributor with formulas to calculate prices • state the profit margin of the distributor • prescribe maximum and minimum ranges for the resale prices ✗ Do not impose any resale prices. 2 2.1 Vertical agreements Vertical business partners include distributors, customers licensees, licensors and suppliers. With respect to agreements with such vertical business partners the following princi-ples should be considered: Resale prices The producer must not set the resale prices charged by the distributor. More specifi-cally : * May, under certain circumstances, be lawful in the US. Advice from the Roche legal department should be sought. ✔
  • 11. Exclusivity By entering into agreements to buy exclusively from one source or to supply exclu-sively to one customer (exclusive distribution, purchase, franchise or license agree-ments) certain principles must be considered: It is prohibited to: • prescribe not to passively supply customers from outside the territory* • forbid a distributor to accept a customer’s inquiry from outside the territory* • forbid a distributor to supply the products to other distribution channels upon corresponding orders* • refuse orders from distributors exporting the products with the argument of territory restrictions* * May be allowed in the US. Advice from the Roche legal department should be sought. The Roche legal department should be consulted prior to the establishment of an exclu-sive agreement. Parallel trade Parallel trade is the consequence of free trade within a market. * Territorial and customer restrictions may, under some circumstances, be permissible in the US. Advice from the Roche legal department should be sought. 2.2 2.3 12 Behaviour in Competition It is possible to: • grant an exclusive distribution, purchase, franchise or license right in a certain territory • prohibit an active marketing policy outside the agreed territory. Therefore, outside the contract territory and in relation to the contract goods, the partner can be obliged to refrain from actively seeking customers, establishing any branch or maintaining any distribution depot It is prohibited to: • impose export bans* • prescribe to the partner not to export the product upon a customer’s inquiry from outside the territory* • refuse orders from partners exporting the products with the argument of territory restrictions* It is possible to: • prohibit an active marketing policy outside the agreed territory • inform the partner about any differences affecting the product’s acceptance in another country or other legal requirements in another country • limit the amount of products sold to a partner under capacity reasons ✗ ✗ ✔ ✔
  • 12. II. Agreements and coordinated policies eliminating or restricting competition 13 Tying Tying clauses, which make the supply of a product subject to the acceptance of sup-plementary Behaviour in Competition obligations to buy other goods and/or services which, either by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of the contract, generally should not be used, especially where Roche has a significant mar-ket share in the first product. The Roche legal department should be consulted prior to the establishment of any agree-ment if the employee intends to implement any arrangement where multiple assets must be purchased together. Competition clause Under certain circumstances, it may be possible to forbid a distributor or licensee to sell or manufacture competing products: The Roche legal department should be consulted prior to the establishment of any agree-ment if the employee intends to implement a competition clause. 2.4 2.5 Where Roche has a significant market share in a product, it is prohibited to: • make the supply of the product conditional upon the obligation to buy other products of another nature • make the supply of the product subject to the obligation to enter into a service agreement for any kind of service It may be possible to: • require a customer to buy a full range of products including accessories • prescribe in license agreements to buy materials and special tools which are necessary for a technically satisfactory exploitation of the license It is prohibited to: • forbid the manufacturing and selling of competing products beyond the duration of the agreement It may be possible to: • forbid the manufacturing and selling of competing products during the term of the agreement ✗ ✗ ✔ ✔
  • 13. Patent, trademark, copyright By licensing patents, copyrights, know-how or trademarks, the following has to be considered: It is prohibited to: • forbid the partner to contest the secrecy of the licensed know-how or the licensed trademarks and patents • forbid the partner to contest the validity of the licensed patent • fix the price which the licensee charges for its product • reach agreements with other patent owners regarding royalties to be charged for competing patents It may be prohibited to: • condition the grant of a license upon the licensee’s agreement to purchase certain goods or to license other patents • forbid the partner to use competing technologies (no non-competition clause permitted) The Roche legal department should be consulted prior to the establishment of any agreement by licensing patents, copyrights, know-how or trademarks, unless the market share is lower than 25%. Improvements and new applications In patent licensing and know-how licensing agreements either party should generally be free to compete with its own developed products, improvements or new applications of the technology in question in so far as these are severable from the licensee’s initial know-how. 2.6 2.7 It is prohibited to: • restrict either party from competing with the other party in respect of research and development, manufacture, use or sale of any own developed product, improvement and new application of the technology in question 14 Behaviour in Competition ✗ ✗ ✗
  • 14. II. Agreements and coordinated policies eliminating or restricting competition 15 Supply agreements Obligations in supply agreements usually do not affect free competition unless the supplier is required to deliver the products exclusively to the buyer. Generally, requirements and arrangements referring to quality, specifications, quality control, raw materials, packing materials, quantities, terms of delivery, etc., may be made. However, if either the buyer or the seller has significant market share, entering into a long-term exclusive supply agreement may cause competition concerns. If the supplier uses technical auxiliaries and/or know-how of the buyer for the pro-duction, it is possible to oblige the supplier not to use such know-how or technical Behaviour in Competition means for other purposes than for supply of the buyer. However, it has to be stated that such obligation generally should be used only if the supplier was not capable of producing the corresponding products without the know-how and the auxiliaries of the buyer. That means that the exclusivity must not be agreed if the supplier is already in pos-session of the necessary auxiliaries and know-how or if the company only provides specification such as dimension, tolerance, weight, quality of the product, etc. In addition, it has to be considered that the buyer and the supplier have to be free to compete with their own developed products, improvements or new applications of the technology in question in so far as these are severable from the know-how of the supplied product. The Roche legal department should be consulted prior to entering into any exclusvie supply agreement. 2.8
  • 15. Prohibited abuse of dominant position Article 82 EC prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. The Sherman Act prohibits monopolisation, attempts to monopolise and conspira-cies to monopolise. Therefore, companies dominating a market have – besides the rules mentioned before – to pay special attention to some additional principles. Several factors are used to determine whether a company has a dominant position. However, the market share of the product involved is the main factor. To determine the market share, the relevant product market and the relevant geographical market have to be identified. It is not necessary to have a dominant position in an entire industry – it is enough to be dominant in a particular segment of that industry. As a rule, products belong to the same product market if they are ‘reasonably inter-changeable’. Furthermore, it is not necessary to have a dominant position throughout the entire European Union. The geographical market is defined as the area where there are the same or comparable conditions of competition. Such market, for example, may cover every single country of the European Union and even parts of such countries. Any market share exceeding 50% is in itself evidence of a likely dominant position. In certain circumstances, a company with a smaller market share may have a domi-nant position. For example, if there is a significant gap between the market share of the dominant company and the market shares of its competitors, that may be con-sidered as a confirmation of a dominant position. As a consequence, there may be a dominant position even with market shares around 30% in one single European country. Even though there is no precise rule for deter-mining when a company has a dominant position, if the company’s share exceeds 30%, it is prudent to take into account the principles set forth below. Under these circumstances, the prohibition of discrimination in particular has to be considered, i.e. the different treatment of distributors, licensees and customers is not allowed without justifying reasons under EC Competition Law. The company which dominates the market may not be discriminatory in its treatment of distributors, licensees and customers under comparable conditions unless there are reasons war- III 16 Behaviour in Competition The larger the market share, the more careful a company must be in certain practices.
  • 16. III. Prohibited abuse of dominant position 17 Behaviour in Competition ranting such conduct. The restrictions on the conduct of monopolists is less clear under US Antitrust Law. However, quantity rebates, function rebates or price reductions for services which are not performed by other distributors, licensees or customers, for example, justify different treatment. Discrimination/Different sales conditions A company with a dominant position must not discriminate in its sales conditions when dealing with similar customers under comparable circumstances. ✗ Note: US law – Robinson-Patman Act – governing price discrimination is quite complex. Any rebate/discount programs should be reviewed carefully with US counsel. The Roche legal department should be consulted. Hindrance of competitors Imposing exclusive purchase commitments on customers Furthermore, market-dominant companies are not permitted to substantially restrict the access of competitors to customers or dealers by exclusive purchase obligations or fidelity rebates or rebates and bonuses having a similar effect (e.g. ‘target’ rebates). 1 2 2.1 It is prohibited to: • grant different sales conditions (prices, rebates) to distributors or customers meeting the same requirements It may be possible to: • grant different sales conditions (rebates) to distributors providing special services that are not met by other distributors • grant different sales conditions to distribu-tors of another stage in the distribution channel (wholesalers – retailers) as such distributors are providing different services Do not discriminate between your customers. Do not abuse your market power. ✔
  • 17. Fidelity rebates Fidelity rebates mean rebates which are granted to buyers on the condition that they obtain their supplies exclusively from the dominant supplier. It is prohibited to: • grant fidelity and target rebates by a company dominating the market Note: US law – Robinson-Patman Act – governing price discrimination is quite complex. Any rebate/discount programs should be reviewed carefully with US counsel. Rebates with similar effects Aggregated sales rebates which develop a so-called suction effect in favour of the company dominating the market and target rebates which individually are related to the sales volume of a specific customer are generally forbidden. It is prohibited to: • grant aggregated rebates on the overall turnover reached with the supply of goods belonging to separate markets • grant target rebates Note: US law – Robinson-Patman Act – governing price discrimination is quite complex. Any rebate/discount programs should be reviewed carefully with US counsel. Unfair or predatory pricing Prices that are lower than ‘average variable cost’ or above ‘variable cost’, but consid-erably lower than ‘average total cost’ with the aim of eliminating a competitor, must not be charged. English clause It is not allowed to stipulate an English clause specifying that the party bound by contract to the company dominating the market has the possibility of purchasing from a competitor – provided it has in advance informed the company dominating the market of the competitor, quantities and prices agreed upon. 2.2 2.3 2.4 3 18 Behaviour in Competition It may be possible to: • grant quantity rebates • grant turnover rebates based on the prior information about quantities of one product to be ordered It is prohibited to: • grant prices below cost (dumping prices) ✗ ✗ ✔ ✗
  • 18. III. Prohibited abuse of dominant position / IV. Intracorporate agreements 19 Behaviour in Competition It is prohibited to: • agree an English clause obliging the cus-tomer to disclose names and prices of competitors Refusal to sell A refusal to sell to distributors or customers may constitute an abuse of a dominant position. The following principles have to be considered: * US law may provide more flexibility in this area. If such an issue occurs it should be reviewed carefully with US counsel. 4 It is prohibited to*: • refuse to sell to a customer which meets the same requirements as other customers which are supplied • reduce supplies to comparable customers in different ways without objective justification It is possible to*: • refuse to sell to existing or new customers under a good business reason • refuse to sell to a new customer because of insufficient capacity Intracorporate agreements Agreements between affiliated companies do not in principle fall within the scope of competition law. Therefore, the above mentioned rules of competition are not applicable with respect to the relation of the parent company to its affiliates or between sister companies. However, it has to be considered that all information given by the parent company to its affiliates in order to be provided to customers, such as advertising material, brochures, price lists, internal calculating documents, marketing plans, etc., have to meet the requirements of competition law. IV ✗ ✗ ✔
  • 19. Annex 20 Behaviour in Competition TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTAB-LISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS Amsterdam, 2 October 1997 Article 81 (ex Article 85) 1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competi-tion within the common market, and in particular those which: (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; (c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void. 3. The provisions of paragraph 1may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: – any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; – any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings; – any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
  • 20. Annex 21 Behaviour in Competition Article 82 (ex Article 86) Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the com-mon market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
  • 21. © July 1999 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd Corporate Law Basel, Switzerland 7000320