Window of Opportunity for Disaster Policy Change in Chile

Window of Opportunity?
Disaster Public Policy Change in Chile, a case
study.
Cristóbal Mena A.
Supervisor: Professor Peter Sammonds
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Risk, Disaster and Resilience
Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction
University College London
Word count: 11.961
25 August 2016
LONDON’S GLOBAL UNIVERSITY

2
Declaration
“I declare the following work is my own and, where the work of
others has been used, it has been clearly identified.”

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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the development of a window of opportunity in the post-disaster
phase to introduce change in Disaster Public Policy (DPP) using Chile as a case study. It reveals
how policy change develops after the 27th February 2010 Earthquake (27F) and characterises
the depth of this process with the concepts of metamorphosis and social change.
For the above, it will address these leading questions: does the Chilean DRM system require a
change in their public policies after the 27F Earthquake? If so, did a window of opportunity
open after the disaster to introduce policy change and what is the role of policy entrepreneurs?
Which are the values and national mood perception towards DRR of policymakers,
government, organised civil society, academia and media in Chile? Did the inner logic of the
Chilean civil protection system suffer a metamorphosis or social change?
The research answers these questions using secondary sources such as reports, current major
legislation for DRM and bills in Chile, annual budgets for the National Emergency Office
(ONEMI), global policies and international guidelines. It also employs semi-structured
interviews as a primary source to determine stakeholder’s perception of change, agenda-
setting, participation, and values towards DRR.
Policy change conceptualised with Kingdon’s1 Multiple Streams framework, considers
problems, policy and politics as the elements that compound modification when a window of
opportunity opens for policy entrepreneurs to introduce change.
The research acknowledged a window of opportunity after the 27F disaster. The current bill
for Disaster Risk and Emergency Management and the increase in the budget of ONEMI, are
some of the examples that prove this process. Coupled with the latter, interviews revealed that
stakeholders also perceive a transformation in consideration of DPP’s after the disaster.
However, this investigation characterises the latter as change not a metamorphosis in the
system whose logic and focus is still in the response phase and not in building a preventive
culture.
Consequently, this dissertation challenges the assumption that change by itself improves the
overall prior conditions of “nonstructural” measures such as disaster public policies. The latter
sustains the hypothesis that policies are usually geared to respond solely to the last
catastrophe. Hence, this case study suggests that the institutional framework for DRR in Chile
requires a comprehensive and participatory revision. The research concludes that the Chilean
DPP context lacks disaster-policy entrepreneurs who can couple the three streams to allow
change with transformation2 in a manner that ultimately makes the country’s development
sustainable.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
To Professor Peter Sammonds, my supervisor, who provided sound advice and guidance
throughout this research.
I also wish to acknowledge the Chevening Scholarships, the UK government’s global
scholarship programme, funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and
partner organisations, who gave me the opportunity to undertake such a life changing
experience.
Likewise, I wish to express gratitude to all the politicians, civil servants, journalists, disaster
risk management professionals and academics that agreed on interviews for this research.
Finally, the MSc in Risk, Disaster and Resilience of which this dissertation is a part, is the
end and the beginning of a long journey that is only possible thanks to the everlasting
support of my wife, Javiera.

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LIST OF CONTENTS
Abstract..........................................................................................................................................................................................3
Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................................................................................4
Introduction................................................................................................................................................................................7
Background..................................................................................................................................................................................9
Disaster Public Policy and change..................................................................................................................................9
Chile and the February 27th 2010 earthquake.......................................................................................................12
Hazard profile..................................................................................................................................................................13
Normative context.........................................................................................................................................................13
The 27F...............................................................................................................................................................................14
Methods.......................................................................................................................................................................................16
Secondary sources: major legislation, regulations and budgets....................................................................16
Primary sources: semi-structured interviews. ......................................................................................................17
Questionnaire ..................................................................................................................................................................17
Interviewees.....................................................................................................................................................................17
Interview coding.............................................................................................................................................................19
Data analysis ....................................................................................................................................................................20
Results .........................................................................................................................................................................................21
Budget......................................................................................................................................................................................21
Major legislation and regulations ................................................................................................................................21
Interviews...............................................................................................................................................................................23
Discussion..................................................................................................................................................................................28
Focusing events and the window of opportunity .................................................................................................28
Disaster Public Policy change and policy entrepreneurs..................................................................................29
Ways to improve .................................................................................................................................................................32
Methods...................................................................................................................................................................................33
Conclusion.................................................................................................................................................................................35
Appendices................................................................................................................................................................................36
References.................................................................................................................................................................................37

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List of Figures
Figure 1. Diagram of the Multiple Streams framework...........................................................................................11
Figure 2. Chile 1990-2010 disaster frequency percentage....................................................................................13
Figure 3. Opinions about current DRR institutional framework & budget. ...................................................24
Figure 4. Positive vs. negative opinions on participation in DPP’s design. ....................................................27
List of Tables
Table 1. Top ten words of the National Plan of Civil Protection.........................................................................22
Table 2. Comparison between top ten words of the National Plan of Civil Protection vs. the Risk and
Emergency Management bill. .............................................................................................................................................22
Table 3. Comparison between top ten words of the current and prospective policies & major
legislation for DRR in Chile..................................................................................................................................................23
Table 4. Word count of most relevant and remembered disasters. ..................................................................23

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INTRODUCTION
Post-disaster recovery more often than not is conceived as the rebuilding of the built
environment after or during the impact of a hazard. However, overcoming a disaster is more
than just repairing the physical reality. Reconstruction after a catastrophe should not be
understood only as rebuilding the structural dimensions3 but also as the way in which we
improve the immaterial conditions that configure vulnerability4 within a group of
individuals in a particular geographical context. As such, disasters become the
crystallisation of the underlying vulnerabilities of the affected community caused by the
impact of a hazard. Therefore, these conditions require them to be interpreted and
projected in different ways5, allowing to make visible the more invisible aspects that
configure vulnerability such as the institutional structure and political values that frame the
possibility of a threat to turn into a crisis. Hence, recovery must also take into account a
revision of “nonstructural” measures6 such as policy, particularly disaster public policy
(DPP), regarding its shortcomings and strengths in light of the past catastrophe.
In the above sense, this research aims to determine if a window of opportunity develops
after a disaster to improve disaster-related public policies. Nonetheless, even if a window
of opportunity opens, it is necessary to comprehend the extent of the alleged improvements
that this phenomenon brings by analysing the logic of the system regarding how national
institutions and authorities conceive disaster risk reduction (DRR) actions7. The latter will
be categorised using the distinction that Beck8 makes between social change and
metamorphosis. Change is a conscious action towards modifying the current problematic
conditions, but replicating the past socio-political conditions. While the second concept has
an evolutionary and unconscious approach that changes the inner logic of political order for
instance; rendering into something different from its origins according to Beck’s definition.
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that disasters open a window of opportunity to look
into the inner progression of vulnerability4 within a country. Therefore, it allows policy
entrepreneurs1 to introduce change in disaster public policy when the latter fails to avoid
the event or manage its impacts in the way that the public and policymakers expect.
However, there is a caveat in change. The later is not necessarily positive, examples of
adverse changes abound. Hence, the breadth and quality of change after a window of
opportunity opens must also be analysed to determine if the so-called learning, changes the
logic of the system.
For the former, Chile is selected as a case study due to its attributes as a multi-hazard9
country that was struck by an 8.8 Mw Earthquake the 27 of February 2010 damaging almost
a fifth of its annual GDP10 and leaving more than 500 casualties11. Furthermore, Chile is
prone to several intensive and extensive risks 7 and lacks a disaster management or risk
reduction law12,13. Therefore, this country stands as a proper case study to analyse how,

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before and after the 2010 Earthquake, disaster public policies evolve and characterise the
products of change.
Finally, since most of the related research to policy change and disasters have been
concentrated in the United States of America; presenting a case study of a developing
country such as Chile provides a different perspective of the named process, enhancing the
incipient research on this topic. It will also allow analysing in the Chilean case, its political
context and, agency capacity of pressure groups to install in the agenda the need to enhance
DPP’s.
For the above, this research will present the theoretical approach in the form of the Multiple
Streams framework that structures policy change based on focusing events. It moves then
to describe the Chilean context in two main areas: the 2010 Earthquake and its impacts and,
the current normative framework in which DRR currently sustains in Chile. Then, a
description of the methods that were employed to obtain information from secondary
sources such as current major legislation related to the research topic, policies, bills and,
budgets and primary sources in the form of semi-structured interviews to five groups of
stakeholders. After presenting the results, a discussion around the guiding questions and
proposed improvements will lead to a conclusion that determines the breadth and depth of
change in disaster public policies in Chile post-27F.

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BACKGROUND
The way in which an emergency, crisis, disaster, or catastrophe a is defined and
comprehended differs greatly from the standpoint in which viewed. Hence, while a vast
majority may perceive a disaster negatively, it is also true that every crisis brings an
opportunity for someone. Therefore, it is correct to say that these events have a dual and
ambiguous conception. From the positive approach or emancipatory perspective as Ulrich
Beck8 suggests, ‘bads produces ‘common goods’’. Thus, it can be argued that after the
disaster, a window of opportunitye.g. 14–23 opens to introduce change when, for instance,
policy fails. Henceforth, disasters become a focusing event or a potential focusing event
which Birkland24 defines as:
“An event that is sudden, relatively rare, can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing
the possibility of potentially greater future harms, inflicts harms or suggests potential harms
that are or could be concentrated on a definable geographical area or community of interest,
and that is known to policy makers and the public virtually simultaneously.”
These incidents draw the attention of policymakers, advocates, policy entrepreneurs25 and,
the organised civil society towards the need to improve disaster-related policies to reduce
disaster risk, mitigate its impacts and/or enhance the coping capacities.
As for the term “window of opportunity”, it was originally coined in the political science,
specifically in the areas of policy change and agenda setting1,25. Therefore, from this
discipline, disasters as focusing events may create a policy window or ‘opportunities for
advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special
problems’1. So, assuming that catastrophes are focusing events and as such, they open a
window of opportunity to introduce change in disaster-related policies, it becomes essential
to comprehend the public policy change process.
DISASTER PUBLIC POLICY AND CHANGE
Public policies, defined as ‘a system of laws, regulatory measures, courses of action, and
funding priorities concerning a given topic promulgated by a governmental entity or its
representatives’26 constitute a vital element of the overall framework to reduce disaster
risk. Consequently, disaster public policy comprehends the stated definition of public policy
applied to the four phases of the disaster management cycle17.
This research, based on the recommendations that international disaster policies and
guidelinese.g. 27–29 state, understands that strengthening disaster risk governance and
institutions is key to reducing disaster risk and achieve sustainable development.
Therefore, change in DPP’s is a crucial step. It encompasses a process ‘to find the gaps,
mistakes and vulnerabilities that contributed to building the past disaster to extract lessons
a Although these terms have been defined separately and discussed extensivelye.g. 17,81, this
dissertation will use them interchangeably as near-synonyms.

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and hopefully, avoid past errors’30. Moreover, recovery is a unique opportunity to think the
way to improve the actions towards DRR by building back better27,31 not only the physical
reality but also the nonstructural6 one. In this way, DPP change becomes not only a set of
actions aimed to avoid a past catastrophe24 but as an opportunity to bounce forward.
Change with transformation. In contrast, bouncing back implies returning to the pre-
disaster conditions32.
The identified problem is that usually, from a post-disaster standpoint, policy change is
often conceived as a form of reaction to the impacts of the past event. Thus, it fails to
comprehend the full extent in the face of the whole disaster cycle. The reason for the latter
seems to lay in the characteristics of intensive risks7: high-intensity events, meaning high
mortality and economic loss but with low recurrence. Hence, decision-makers apparently
seem to be less willing to invest in such exceptional events before they happen16.
Consequently, the most common approach to DPP change is dealing with it from a
retrospective viewpoint. As such, disaster policy change renders as to be ‘geared to respond
the last disaster’24 and not to the future ones. Furthermore, risk perception and awareness
appear to be determined greatly by experiencing a catastrophe as Wachinger et al.33 suggest.
Then, to understand how public policy changes, there are several theories25 in political
science that have addressed the issue. Birkland24,16 is probably the main author for policy
change regarding post-disaster processes. However, even though the latter author has
tackled the issue, his scope is narrow being the cases treated exclusively from the United
States of America and directed only to some hazards such as earthquakes, hurricanes and
aviation accidents.
Therefore this research will employ Kingdon’s1 Multiple Streams (MS) framework to build
a theoretical device to characterise how change generates in Chile’s DPP’s and the role that
the window of opportunity has in the case study. The reason to choose the MS as the guiding
method is that is a proper tool to explain ‘how policies are made by national government
under conditions of ambiguity’34. In this sense, disasters as a social construct, have an
inherent ‘complexity and ambiguity’35 that demand comprehensive methods to analyse
them. The Multiple Streams approach turns to be an adequate tool to understand policy
change under these conditions. Also, considering that this research rests in a case study, the
MS has ‘unparalleled empirical richness…by the range of contexts, levels, and methods’36 in
which is applied.
Kingdon1 makes a conceptual device with the MS conceiving within national governments
and the policy arena three streams: problems, politics and policies. These elements, in the
face of a focusing event, are coupled by policy entrepreneurs, who can be individuals or
corporate actors, when a policy window opens1 (see Fig. 1). Let us look in detail these
components.

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The problem stream defines a series of public issues that policy makers and citizens want
to be addressed36 for instance, in the aftermath of a disaster, policy failures or
mismanagement of the emergency. Attention comes to these issues through indicators,
feedback or focusing events34. The latter, such as the 27F Earthquake, fixes the agenda due
to the role that media or policy entrepreneurs37 have in this process.
FIGURE 1. DIAGRAM OF THE MULTIPLE STREAMS FRAMEWORK30
.
The policy stream is a ‘finite but complex collection of ideas and possibilities’36. In this sense,
it is less probable before than after a disaster, the existence of several ideas on how to
improve public policy to reduce risk and streamline disaster management in a particular
geographical context. With that in mind, the question is why these solutions do not turn into
policy before the crisis. The explanation lays in the subcomponents of the policy stream,
particularly value acceptability and technical feasibility1. Measures to reduce disaster risk
‘take place in existing economic and political circumstances’38. Therefore the usualb ‘short
political mandates induce policymakers to take a gamble and put off investments to build
resilience’39.
Politics, on the other hand, is composed of three elements34: national mood, pressure-group
campaigns, and administrative turnover. Thus, catastrophe as a focusing event immerses in
a socio-political construction. In this sense, disasters to become such require ‘sufficient
political resources to influence public discourse and to attract attention of the elites’40.
b In Chile for instance, the presidential period is four years without re-election46.
Problem Stream
Focusing Events
Indicators
Feedback
Load
Politics Stream
National Mood
Party Ideology
Policy Stream
Value Acceptability
Technical
Feasibility
Integration:
- Access
- Mode
- Size
- Capacity
Policy Entrepreneurs
Access
Resources
Strategies
- Framing
- Salami Tactics
- Symbols
- Affect Priming
Policy Window
Coupling Logic
- Consequential
- Doctrinal
Decision Style
- More cautious
- Less cautious
POLICY
OUTPUT

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Therefore, problems in the disaster context appear to be usually ex-post issues. Also,
particularly relevant to this case study is the fact that a ‘combination of the national mood
and turnover in government exerts the most powerful effect on agendas’34 since the 2010
earthquake struck during an administrative turnover.
Despite the described structure and benefits that the MS approach has for this research, it
is relevant to state that this framework has certain limitations and concerns which
Zahariadis34 clearly depicts. In this sense, there are two main problems. The independence
that the streams have from each other has been a recurrent critic to the model. However, it
is important to comprehend that stream independence is only a conceptual device. The
relevance lays in the influence of policy windows and actions of policy entrepreneurs to
couple the elements for change.
Another issue that arises from the MS is how to test the hypothesis statistically that this
approach generates based on the classic debate between qualitative and quantitative
methods34. Most applications of the MS have been qualitative analysis36. This research is
also mainly qualitative although it incorporates mixed-methods. Therefore, as proposed by
Phillips41 who stands for more qualitative research in the disaster discipline, this approach
has been used in the context that this investigation holds. The MS framework is
‘theoretically driven and empirically validated’34. As such, it fits as a tool that works better
analysing past processes of change than predicting future ones.
Finally, the concept of change. This research will not delve into the complexities of the term.
It will distinguish between two main concepts, social change and metamorphosis, to
categorise the post-disaster movements in disaster public policies. In Beck´s 8 definition:
“Social change is about the reproduction of the social and political order, while
metamorphosis is about the transfiguration of the social and political order.”
In this sense, focusing on social change implies bouncing back and not giving the chance to
look forward8. Therefore, Lavell2 suggests a better way to assess change; against
transformation in the underlying factors that cause vulnerability. The latter means, as
Manyena23 proposes, to tackle issues such as lack of power of the agency in charge of DRM,
inadequate legal and institutional framework, and probably a cause of failure to integrate
development with DRR. This way, change with transformation can be achieved.
CHILE AND THE FEBRUARY 27TH
2010 EARTHQUAKE
Described in the last title was the theoretical framework in which this dissertation sustains.
It is necessary also to define the Chilean context in which this case study grounds. In this
sense, the 2010 Earthquake, its impacts, and recovery process are essential to
understanding the grounds in which this research stands. Furthermore, the normative
context in Chile is likewise relevant to frame the current state of the art regarding disaster
public policy, its shortcomings and the configuration of the change process.

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HAZARD PROFILE
In the above sense, regarding disaster risk, Chile is a disaster prone country due to its multi-
hazard context. The geographical location, next to a large subduction zone produces as
much as 45 daily tremors42, and flooding according to EM-DAT43 is the hazard that in the
last 30 years has produced more damages, acting as an extensive risk7. These two hazards
are just some examples of how exposed the country is to them as Fig. 2 shows.
FIGURE 2. CHILE 1990-2010 DISASTER FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE12
.
NORMATIVE CONTEXT
Now, due to the somewhat recurrent impact of several hazards, Chile has had a learning
curve; particularly with the seismic threat relating to building codes. This curve can be
traced back, for example, to the Law and General Ordinance about Constructions and
Urbanization of the year 1931 which was, in a way, a response to the 1928 Talca Earthquake
which caused more than 250 deaths44. As stated before, it seems that the majority of efforts
towards prospective risk management45 in Chile have been towards building codes to
increase seismic resistance.
The legal backbone for disaster risk management (DRM) in Chile is the Constitution of 1980
which establishes as a duty of the State to provide security and protection to its citizens46
as part of the social contract47. Nonetheless, most of the major legislation regarding civil
protection dates from before the Magna Carta. For instance, the National Emergency Office
of the Ministry of Interior and Public Security (ONEMI) was created by the Decree 369 in
the year 1974. After the 1960 Earthquake in Valdivia, the largest ever recorded with a 9.5
Mw magnitude42, Law 16.282 was promulgated in the year 1965 to establish permanent
dispositions in the case of earthquakes or other catastrophes. Therefore, after the 1980

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Constitution, there is no new major legislation introduced to the system regarding DRM
until the present day, although several disasters have struck Chile through this period such
as the 1993 Peñalolén landslide and the 2008 volcanic eruption in Chaitén to name a few.
Nonetheless, since 1977 Chile has had a National Plan for Civil Protection contained in the
Decree 155/1977, then modified by the Decrees 509/1983, 156/2002 and finally by Decree
39/2011 of the Ministry of Interior and Public Security that restructured the National
Emergency Operations Committee (NEOC). However, there is a caveat. Since these legal
bodies come from a Ministry, they have limited breath, and lack mandatory capacity;
meaning the latter, that they do not have enforcement abilities. These limitations became
more evident after an 8.8. Mw hit the south-central coast of Chile the 27th of February 2010.
Ambiguity and uncertainty overcame the NEOC due to poor management, lack of
information and overall unpreparedness48. Finally, after the 2010 Earthquake, a National
Platform for DRR was formed, and a national policy49 launched by the end of the year 2014.
THE 27F
As stated above, the 2010 Chile Earthquake or 27F as Chileans name it, was followed by a
tsunami with run-up heights of up to 29 m50. It marked a breaking point in the country’s
disaster risk management actions due to the impact, the failures in managing the
disaster48,51–54 but also to the, allegedly, extraordinary comeback from the catastrophe that
some authors10,55 argue. The effects of the disaster were considerable; 593 people died11
and almost 18% of the country’s GDP was damaged10. As for infrastructure, emergency and
normal communications were severely affected and Route 5-south, the only motorway in
Chile that runs parallel to the coastline in the middle of the country, was severed, splitting
the country in half48.
The location of earthquake rendered that the most populated areas of Chile were directly
affected. Cities like Concepción, Talca and even the capital Santiago faced the impacts of the
seismic event although due to the named building codes damage was lessened. Still, the
following tsunami caused extensive impacts in coastal areas and islands such as Mocha and
Juan Fernández in part, due to the non-existence of early warning systems and poor
communication protocols48. Media and policymakers raised these shortcomings in the
preparedness and response phase establishing, for instance, an investigative commission in
the Chamber of Deputies to determine failures and responsibilities that lead to the disaster.
As expected, reconstruction of the built environment turned into a priority and one of the
metrics by which the new government measured its success. President Piñera committed to
rebuilding within his administration period schools, roads, houses and, any other public
infrastructure10 damaged or destroyed by the disaster.
Civil society also organised after the catastrophe. Several NGO’s and organisations emerged
or gained further visibility after the disaster, having those different purposes. The

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Reconstruction Observatory, a project of the University of Chile, was created to oversee the
recovery process of the socio-material elements and support the community processes56.
Other associations born after the disaster were Fundación Proyecta Memoria focused on
protecting the patrimonial heritage in the face of disasters57, and Fundación Alto Rio whose
purpose to establish a DRM and seismic culture58. In this way, the 2010 Earthquake allowed
the emergence of groups of citizens to oversee the recovery process and put on the agenda
the term disaster risk management. However, it appears that policy change was not a
relevant issue to the organised civil society. Thus the lack of NGO’s to advocate to improve
the institutional framework.
Considering the described context in which this case study grounds and the theoretical
framework that guides the research, this investigation chooses a set of methods to analyse
the Chilean DPP system.

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METHODS
The last chapter showed a description of how windows of opportunity emerge and how
evaluating change in disaster public policies requires a comprehensive methodological
approach, particularly a qualitative one as Phillips41 suggests. Therefore, this research used
primary and secondary sources in the shape of major legislation, regulations and budgets
for the latter and semi-structured interviews for the former. The analysis of both sources
was produced using NVivo, a qualitative data management and analysis software freely
available to UCL students. It also utilised Microsoft Excel to deliver some basic statistics and
generate graphs to show the research results.
SECONDARY SOURCES: MAJOR LEGISLATION, REGULATIONS AND BUDGETS.
The selection of secondary sources comprised the search of nation-wide major laws and
regulations related to disaster risk reduction and management in Chile. The research
omitted normative bodies not directly linked to the above topics such as building
ordinances and codes, general legislation and specific organisational laws. It also included
the allocated budgets for the National Emergency Office of the Ministry of Interior (ONEMI)
in the past ten years. The reason for the latter sustains on the assumption that policy change
is most discernible over periods of ten or more years59.
ONEMI’s budget will be considered solely due to the time and extension constraints that this
research has. The reason to select this and no other disaster-related monetary allocation
lays in the fact that the National Emergency Office is the official institution designated to
manage disasters and run the civil protection system as stated before. For the allocated
budget, the research considered a revision of the yearly budget laws from 2006 until 2016.
This timeframe allowed a ten-year view of the evolution in the monetary allocation for
ONEMI. Sums were corrected employing the Retail Price Index as the correction tool. The
research equalled the Chilean Peso value from the month in which each annual budget law
promulgates to the value that the named currency had by December 2015.
The major legislation, regulations and current bill were analysed performing a word count
in NVivo that had the following criteria: five letters minimum length, ten most frequent
words, and included synonyms. Appendix 1 includes the Stop Words list. The purpose of
this method is to discover the predominant concepts in this normative frameworks,
revealing their focus. Also, a comparative analysis was made between the named documents
to observe if there has been a change in the wording, hence the concepts. This research
assumes that the concepts embedded in laws and regulations reveal were the intended
focus is put.

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PRIMARY SOURCES: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS.
The semi-structured interview was employed as a primary source to get the perceptions
around the disaster policy change process in Chile. These dialogues were held individually
with stakeholders from five main groups: government, policy makers, organised civil
society, media, and academia. The number of requested interviews was 35 and 19 finally
performed. Appendix 2 contains the transcripts in Spanish.
QUESTIONNAIRE
The questionnaire was designed to obtain insight if a window of opportunity opened and, if
so, how. Also, the interviews looked forward to obtaining data on how the interest groups
have taken lessons to be learned after the 2010 Earthquake, what lessons did they obtain,
and finally if they have implemented or designed public policies for them. Likewise, the
semi-structured interview allows gathering knowledge if these stakeholders believe that
change regarding DRR was undergoing before the 2010 Earthquake or if it was a reaction
to it. It also explores the perception around the role of media in DRR and participation in
the design of DPP’s.
Since Chile’s official language is Spanish, the questionnaire was made and performed in the
named language. Because most of the interviewees were top-level managers, the instrument
was designed to take no more than 20 minutes to be applied and had a narrative approach.
The semi-structured interview format also allows to shorten or adapt the questionnaire to
the interviewee assuring answers to the key questions. Appendix 3 contains the
questionnaire.
INTERVIEWEES
Following is the list of individuals and organisations selected to participate in the interviews
and an explanation of the selection criteria.
Government. This research held interviews with the following directives of ONEMI:
- Director
- Deputy Director
- Deputy Director of Risk Management.
The investigation also applied the questionnaire to the staff members of ministries
designated to work in DRR topics. The made selection was considering the ones that
integrate the National Civil Protection and the Emergency Operations Committees60 and,
that fitted the research objectives and time constraints. Thus, these were the selected
ministries:
- Ministry of National Defence;
- Ministry of Energy;
- Ministry of Housing and Urbanism;

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- Ministry of Education;
- Ministry of Finance.
Policymakers. The members of the Chilean Congress, a bicameral system composed of the
Chamber of Deputies -the lower house- and the Senate, were considered policy makers. The
selected Deputies and Senators to be interviewed are the ones that, by the time of the
research, integrated the Commission of Government, Regionalisation and Decentralisation
of each chamber. This decision sustains is because these commissions are the ones
appointed to consider primarily bills regarding DRR. 13 members integrate the Commission
of the Chamber of Deputies, whilst five the Senate.
Civil Society. The research identified from the organised civil society, three organisations
linked to the investigation:
- The Network of Humanitarian Aid of Chile (RAHCH). A group of NGO’s recognised
by ONEMI, which works towards DRM and it comprises institutions such as the
Chilean Red Cross and World Vision Chile;
- The Emergency Network, which emerged as a Twitter account after the 2010
Earthquake and it has become one of the leading emergency communications
networks in the country;
- AIGELAC-Chile is the Chilean chapter of the Latin America and Caribbean Council of
the International Association of Emergency Managers.
Media. Access to journalist’s views regarding the disaster public policy change is crucial to
understanding the agenda-setting process and the role they have on focusing events.
Therefore, the research requested interviews to the most renowned journalists in the
country, three of them agreed to take part in the research.
Academia. The investigation considered three representatives of the principal research
centres and organisations addressing disaster-related topics:
- The Chilean Chapter of REDULAC (Latin-America and Caribean University Network
for DRR) is an academic network;
- The Vulnerabilities and Socio-natural Disaster Research Centre (CIVDES) of the
University of Chile;
- The National Research Centre for the Integrated Management of Natural Disasters
CIGIDEN a consortium composed of the universities Católica de Chile, Católica del
Norte, Andrés Bello and Talca.
All of the prospect interviewees were contacted formally via email, describing the project
and asking for a personal meeting to perform the semi-structured interview during the field
work which took place from the 16th to 26th of May 2016 in the cities of Santiago and
Valparaíso were the National Congress works. In the cases when the interviewee was not

19
able to attend a personal meeting, the dialogue has held via Skype call or, as last resort,
questionnaires by email was sent. A consent form was delivered acting according to the UCL
Research Ethics Committee.
INTERVIEW CODING
The main criteria to select the interviewees was that they had to have a direct relation with
the current and prospective DPP’s or be currently working in DRM.
Interviews had an anonymous format on the voice record and the following transcription to
foster trust and obtain more explicit answers. A code was developed to identify the
interviewees that had three sections as follows: AA-BB-CC.
The AA section refers to the stakeholder group:
a. PM for policymakers;
b. GO for government;
c. AC for academia;
d. ME for media;
e. CS for organised civil society.
The BB section relates to the institution or organisation within the stakeholder group:
a. DE for the Deputies Chamber of Chile;
b. SE for the Senate of Chile;
c. ON for the National Emergency Office of the Ministry of Interior and Public Security;
d. MH for the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism;
e. MD for the Ministry of National Defence;
f. MF for the Ministry of Finance;
g. ME for the Ministry of Education;
h. MN for the Ministry of Energy;
i. CI for the National Research Centre for the Integrated Management of Natural
Disasters (CIGIDEN);
j. CV for the Vulnerabilities and Socio-natural Disasters Research Centre (CIVDES);
k. RE for the Chilean Chapter of the Latin-America and Caribean University Network
for DRR (REDULAC);
l. TV for press media;
m. RE for the Emergency Network;
n. RA for the Network of Humanitarian Aid of Chile (RAHCH);
o. AI for the Chilean Chapter of Latin American and Caribbean Council of the
International Association of Emergency Managers (AIGELAC).
The CC section denotes the interviewee number in the organisation.

20
DATA ANALYSIS
The method to analyse the interviews was first to codify the sample by questions with NVivo
software. The questions were then read and codified by nodes. All responses, except the
ones from question one, where coded as: positive, negative, or undefined; by a group of
stakeholders and, by respondent. This technique allowed to obtain a general view of the
answers and establish the relation between the responses and stakeholders or individual
interviewees. In the case of question one, a word count was performed to find the most
predominant answers with the following criteria: four letters minimum length, ten most
frequent words, and included synonyms.

21
RESULTS
After applying the described methods, following are the key findings.
BUDGET
As Fig. 3 demonstrates since the year 2006 there has been a steady increase in the annual
budget of the National Emergency Office. However, a closer look to the monetary allocations
reveals that a significant part of the budget goes directly to finance the seismological
network run by the Physical and Mathematical Sciences Faculty of the University of Chile.
For instance, in the year 2010 the total budget for ONEMI was CLPc $8.914.510.000 but
almost half of this amount, CLP $3.976.638.000, was destined to the seismological
network61. After the 2010 Earthquake, the positive trend sustained, even there is a
contraction in the year 2011. Furthermore, there is a substantial decrease in the
seismological network budget for the years 2011 and 2012.
FIGURE 3. EVOLUTION OF ONEMI’S BUDGET 2006-2016<SUP>62</SUP>.
As for education, ONEMI’s average expenditure for the year 2006 to 2016 in programmes
under the allocation of civil protection for public entities was CLP $184.212.000 with a
standard deviation of CLP $68.211.000. The year 2016 has a substantial increase, almost
doubling the last year’s budget, having CLP $360.501.000.
MAJOR LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS
As the literary review found, three60,63,49 main normative bodies and policies in Chile are
relevant to disaster risk reduction and emergency management.
After a word count for the current legal instrument for DRM, the National Plan of Civil
Protection Decree 156/2002, the research found that the three most predominant terms
c Chilean Peso.
$1,000,000
$3,000,000
$5,000,000
$7,000,000
$9,000,000
$11,000,000
$13,000,000
$15,000,000
$17,000,000
$19,000,000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
THOUSANDSOFCLP$
ONEMI BUDGET
ONEMI BUDGET CLP$M
ONEMI BUDGET W/O SEISMOLOGICAL NETWORK BUDGET

22
are: emergency, report and protectiond; being the last probably linked to the fourth, civile,
forming the civil protection concept.
National Plan of Civil Protection
Word Count Similar Words
emergencia 328 emergencia, emergencias
informe 148 informe, informes
protección 145 Protección
civil 142 Civil
evento 137 evento, eventos
nivel 128 nivel, niveles
daños 121 Daños
recursos 114 recurso, recursos
información 108 información
desastre 103 desastre, desastres
TABLE 1. TOP TEN WORDS OF THE NATIONAL PLAN OF CIVIL PROTECTION.
The research performed a comparative analysis of the top ten concepts between the current
National Plan of Civil Protection and the Risk and Emergency Management bill in Table 2.
The results reveal an important variation in the terms, being emergency the only common
one, leading the word count. It also shows a change towards risk f , being the second
predominant word in the current bill. Probably, paired with the latter is the third one;
managementg, forming the risk management concept.
National Plan of
Civil Protection
Risk and Emergency
Management bill
Word Count Word Count
emergencia 328 emergencias 358
informe 148 riesgos 221
protección 145 gestión 220
civil 142 nacional 203
evento 137 servicio 125
nivel 128 comité 89
daños 121 sistema 89
recursos 114 provincial 82
información 108 política 77
desastre 103 ministros 63
TABLE 2. COMPARISON BETWEEN TOP TEN WORDS OF THE NATIONAL PLAN OF
CIVIL PROTECTION VS. THE RISK AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT BILL.
The current National Policy for DRM was also analysed with a word count and compared to
the above regulations and bills as shown in Table 3. It appears to be an alignment in the
d Transl. Emergencia, reporte and protección
e Transl. Civil
f Transl. Riesgo.
g Transl. Gestión.

23
concepts of the post-27F normative instruments, and a clear difference with the National
Plan created the year 2002. Cells with the same terms have similar colours.
National Plan of Civil
Protection
Risk and Emergency
Management bill
National Policy for Disaster
Risk Management
Word Count Word Count Word Count
emergencia 328 emergencia 358 desastres 166
informe 148 riesgos 221 riesgo 166
protección 145 gestión 220 nacional 144
civil 142 nacional 203 gestión 94
evento 137 servicio 125 política 92
nivel 128 comité 89 reducción 54
daños 121 sistema 89 emergencia 48
recursos 114 provincial 82 amenazas 46
información 108 política 77 ministerio 46
desastre 103 ministros 63 desarrollo 44
TABLE 3. COMPARISON BETWEEN TOP TEN WORDS OF THE CURRENT AND
PROSPECTIVE POLICIES & MAJOR LEGISLATION FOR DRR IN CHILE.
INTERVIEWS
The total number of agreed interviews were 22. One held via Skype and three delivered by
email. No reply from the latter was received. Therefore, the research performed 19
interviews.
Question 1. Most remembered disasters.
The leading remembered disaster are earthquakesh (Table 4), with a predominance of the
2010 event. In second comes landslidesi; particularly the ones in the north of Chile in 2015
and finally, volcanic eruptionsj tied with firesk.
17 interviewees answered this question.
Word Count Similar Words
terremoto 50 terremoto, terremotos
desastre 21 desastre, desastres
emergencia 17 emergencia, emergencias
aluviones 14 aluviones
atacama 12 atacama
región 12 región
estado 10 estado
erupción 8 erupción
incendio 8 incendio, incendios
iquique 8 iquique
TABLE 4. WORD COUNT OF MOST RELEVANT AND REMEMBERED DISASTERS.
h Transl. Terremotos
i Transl. Aluviones
j Transl. Erupciones
k Transl. Incendios

24
Question 2. The current institutional framework for DRR.
There is almost a consensus as Fig. 3 shows, about the negative opinion that respondents
have of the current institutional framework for disaster risk reduction in Chile. Reactive,
centralised, inadequate, and limited are some of the terms that respondents expressed in
the interviews to characterise it. Just one individual had a favourable opinion about the
current institutional framework.
19 interviewees responded this question.
FIGURE 3. OPINIONS ABOUT CURRENT DRR INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK &
BUDGET.
Question 3. The current budget for DRR.
As in Question 2, the majority of the interviewees (Fig. 3) think that the current budgetary
allocation for DRR is insufficient. Some of the answers reveal that individuals consider the
response phase as adequately financed yet it lacks funding on preventive actions.
Question 4. Window of opportunity.
All interviewees but one had a positive answer when asked if a window of opportunity
opened after the 2010 Earthquake. As GO-MD-01 stated the event ‘opened a door, now
everyone is interested (in DRR)’ and also opens ‘opportunities for substantial
improvements’ according to the answer of GO-ON-02. Some interviewees such as PM-SE-03
and GO-MH-01 raised the point about how long the window of opportunity stays open.
18 interviewees responded to this question. Nonetheless, respondent ME-TV-03 gave an
answer to the query in question 2. Therefore 19 responses are considered.
Question 5. Lessons learned or to be learned.
Below are the key lessons learned or to be learned stated by each respondent.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Question 3.
Question 2.
Opinion about current institutional framework and
budgetary allocation
Positive Negative Undefined

25
CS-RA-01
- Improve damage assessment methods.
- Coordination.
CS-RE-01
- A centralised system is useless.
- Communications cannot be lost in an emergency.
GO-MD-01
- A cooperative work is required.
- Modify current protocols and laws.
- Incorporate the armed forces in the civil protection system.
GO-ON-01
- Improvement in the response capacities.
- Act with more risk aversion ‘in doubt; I would go to towards the worst scenario.’
- There is an institutional void.
GO-0N-02
- The country needs a normative to address DRM.
- Better organisational structures for emergency operations committees.
- Disaster risk reduction has to be a State policy.
GO-ON-03
- After every catastrophe, Chile generates institutional change.
- Better knowledge of tsunami hazard.
- More time is needed to understand the 2010 Earthquake and learn the lessons.
- Chile has a world class building code.
PM-DE-04
- Citizens are more risk aware.
- Need for urban planning that considers hazard zones.
PM-DE-11
- Every earthquake is a lesson, yet it is not time to keep on learning. Lessons should
have been learnt by now.
- A monetary fund must be developed to help affected people.
PM-SE-02
- The country was not prepared for any event.
- Chile has proper building codes.
- Nothing has been learned or just too little.

26
PM-SE-03
- A new institutional framework to face disasters is needed.
- Improve emergency communications systems.
PM-SE-04
- Respect the law.
- Do not allow building in high-risk areas.
PM-SE-05
- Failures in the communications system.
- Need to improve the decision-making process in the face of a crisis.
12 interviewees answered this question. However, it was not applied to the other seven
individuals since they manifested answers about this query in question 4. The research will
consider them in the discussion.
Question 6. DRR as a priority in the last ten years.
An evolutionary approach seems to dominate the perception around DRR in Chile. All
respondents acknowledge change during the past decade. They also recognise the effect that
the 27F had in producing the named modifications. Nevertheless, one policymaker raises
the issue regarding how interest in disasters fades after the initial attention that a
catastrophe produces.
Six interviewees answered this question.
Question 7. The role of media in DRR.
The interviews reveal that a majority (9) of the respondents consider the role of media
almost exclusively to reporting the disaster and criticise the sensationalist approach they
usually have. Mass media is expected to be a means for transmitting information about how
to respond to a present emergency and depict the situation. Few interviewees (3) propose
other roles that media can have in education or investigate the causes that lead to an
emergency.
Question 8. Participation.
Regarding the view of how participative is the DPP design process, there is no consensus on
the answer. As Fig. 4 reveals, it seems that while most of the policy makers consider
participative the construction of public policies related to DRR, the rest of the stakeholders
feel excluded from the process, even representatives from ONEMI.

27
FIGURE 4. POSITIVE VS. NEGATIVE OPINIONS ON PARTICIPATION IN DPP’S DESIGN.
Participation
PositivePM-DE-06
PM-DE-04
PM-DE-11 PM-SE-03
PM-SE-05
GO-MD-01
Undefined
GO-ON-02
Negat
ive
CS-
RA-
01CS-
RE-
01
GO-
ON-
01
GO-
ON-
03
GO-
MN-
01
GO-
MV-
01
ME-
TV-01
ME-
TV-03
PM-
DE-
03
PM-
SE-02
PM-
SE-04
AC-
RE-
01

28
DISCUSSION
So far, the research has analysed the current and prospective normative bodies regarding
disaster risk management and civil protection in Chile. It has also examined the budgetary
allocations for the National Emergency Office and the 19 interviews to individuals
representing five groups of stakeholders. The purpose of the latter is identifying the
elements that compound policy change according to the Multiple Streams approach and
explore the perception around the role of media in DRR and participation in the design of
DPP’s. A discussion of the several trends and shortcomings found in the named process will
follow.
FOCUSING EVENTS AND THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
Six years after the 27F disaster, the results of this research reveal that a window of
opportunity to introduce change in the national DPP system in Chile can be acknowledged.
The catastrophe certainly acted as a focusing event. The fact that the most remembered
disaster by the interviewees is the 2010 Earthquake sustains the capacity that this event
had to draw and keep attention towards the civil protection system and disaster
management ex-post. Therefore, from the first stages of recovery the window of opportunity
opened, as most of the interviewees in question four declared, to review and introduce
change mainly in the preparedness and response capacities.
An example of the above was the creation of an investigative commission by the Deputies
Chamber less than two weeks after the earthquake. Its role was to examine the current state
of the institutional framework about its response capacity, after the 2010 disaster and
consider new technological instruments48. The main recommendation of the dispatched
report is that the State of Chile should implement a policy that establishes clearly the
guidelines to face future natural catastrophes48. Focus from policymakers is then still in
strengthen the response capacities instead of reducing risk by tackling, for example,
vulnerabilities such as the multidimensional poverty which some studies64 say increased in
the disaster-affected areas. Furthermore, one of the Deputies had the opinion that the
window of opportunity opened only from the declarative point. Thus it seems, that the
occasion for change was only for the hardware, understood the latter as the physical
requirements to manage disasters such as satellite equipment or buildings as the new
headquarters for ONEMI, but not for the human capital as the representative of the
Emergency Network stated.
Nonetheless, the analysis of the major legislation reveals some interesting results.
Conceptual change seems to exist in the current National Policy for DRM and bill. There is
more emphasis on risk management, not risk reduction, compared to the 2002 National
Plan for Civil Protection. However, centralisation which was a recurrent issue in the

29
interviews sustains. The legal project presented by the current government did not include
the municipal level in the system; it only reached up to the provinces. Likewise, even though
the bill states that the new agency will deconcentrate in the territory, it is also centralised,
which means that it bound to the Ministry of Interior and Public Security. This composition
does not correct the administrative centralisation problems that one of the representatives
of academia raised, stating that ‘ONEMI should have their own resources, to not depend on
the political power.’
DISASTER PUBLIC POLICY CHANGE AND POLICY ENTREPRENEURS
From the Multiple Streams framework components, the problem seems to be constrained
to the gaps and issues that emerged from the 2010 Earthquake. The research findings
demonstrate that a majority of the respondents have a negative opinion of the conditions
that existed before and during the disaster. Mostly in the expected response and
management capacities. They also acknowledge, that still the current institutional
framework and budget for DRR is not adequate. This finding is coherent with several
reports13,65,66 related to the state of disaster management and risk reduction in Chile. For
example, the national progress report on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for
Action 2011-201367 identified several general challenges to the Chilean civil protection
system. Some of them comprise the inclusion of DRR policies in development plans and
assure funds for it, and create mechanisms to decentralise responsibilities and resources to
reduce risk.
However, even though a year after the 27F Earthquake, the Chilean government presented
to the Chamber of Deputies a bill to establish a risk and emergency management system, it
failed to set the conditions to overcome the gaps that the civil protection system had. For
instance, the design of the named legal project was from a top-down and somewhat
hermetic approach, failing to include views from different relevant stakeholders and
anticipated policy entrepreneurs in the country. In its place, reports from international
organisations such as the Inter-American Development Bank, UNISDR and the global
consultancy agency Mc Kinsey & Co were considered68. The performed interviews confirm
this appreciation. The majority of the interviewees expressed they felt excluded, even
marginalised as CS-RE-01 stated, from the process and some as the representative of the
Ministry of Energy ‘lost track’ of the legislative process of the bill. The representative of
RAHCH said ‘there is no joint construction’ in the creation of the bill, for instance. However,
it is interesting to find dissenting views from the latter approach in government and policy
makers. GV-MD-01 expressed ´this public policy, notoriously, it has had a larger
participation.'
In the same vein, media as a primary institution for agenda setting69 appears to have a
limited role in DRR. Results show that interviewees see the press as means to depict an

30
ongoing disaster, transmit the authorities requests for the affected population and, only a
few, explore the possibility of media as a crucial element to dig into the failures of the system
that led to the catastrophe. However, if we keep in mind Olson’s et at.70 list of functions that
mass media can play in DRR, it appears that the Chilean system is missing the opportunity
to use this stakeholder as means to mainstream disaster risk reduction and foster a
preventive culture27. In this sense, the interviewees reveal an underlying critic to media. It
seems that a substantial number of them have the opinion that since, for instance, news
channels are business, they behave according to commercial interests instead of public
service. Hence, the predominance of interest in reporting ongoing disasters and,
particularly, graphic images compelling the public’s morbid fascination. Unfortunately, the
current and prospective DPP’s do not address the functions that media could have, at least,
in the response phase.
When the financial matters are analysed, even though a trend towards increasing ONEMI’s
budget is acknowledged, it seems modest in the face of the challenges that the Chilean civil
protection system has. A peak budget fewer than £21 million nationwide is insufficient.
What is more interesting, according to interviews is the outstanding costs that disaster
response has in Chile, financed with extraordinary emergency funds which even raised a
controversy in Chilean press71. In this sense, Chile is the OECD country that has the largest
disaster losses, as a percentage of the GDP, in average from 1980 to the year 201172.
Furthermore, one of the representatives of the national emergency office stated that
disasters in the year 2015 were so costly that they even hindered the development of the
President’s government programme.
In the above sense, global policies for reducing risk emphasise for instance, the need to
enhance disaster preparedness for effective response27. One of the directives of ONEMI
expressed that since 2010 ‘a lot has been done…at least in citizen preparedness’. However,
as stated before it seems that the latter affirmation stays in the declarative point. As the
results of the budget analysis revealed, an average of CLP $184.212.000l has allocated to
civil protection training in the last ten years. The sample shows dispersed probably because
the budget is doubling this year. However, the standard deviation of the period 2006 to
2015 is CLP$37.030.000 with an average of CLP$166.583.000. Therefore, there has not been
a relevant variation in this item except for this year’s budget. Furthermore, in the year 2015,
only 5.050 persons were educated by the National Academy of Civil protection of ONEMI in
Integral Risk Management and 1.137 the “Community Emergency Response Team” based in
the FEMA course73.
l A 2% of ONEMI’s total average budget in the same period (2006-2016).

31
From the interviews and analysis of secondary sources, it seems that there is much
expectation about the bill for risk and disaster management in its capacity to implement and
sustain proper actions towards risk reduction and emergency management. For instance,
one of the directives of ONEMI answering about lessons learned said that one of them is that
‘the country has to have a norm.’ However, it seems that even policy makers recognise that
the law project is insufficient. One of the interviewed Senators stated ‘we voted now
(approved in general) in the Senate this new institution but all the speeches said this is not
what we want, this not what we need…if you ask me, what has been learnt...unfortunately
little, too little.’ Moreover, the representative from academia state ‘is a bill in which we have
not participated in its discussion, they are the same structures as always’ and ‘public policies
have not changed’m.
Thus, besides the evident misalignment in the design process probably caused in part by
the lack of participatory mechanisms and no clear action of policy entrepreneurs, the
proposed DPP change is modest. As seen in this research, the budgetary increase is small.
Regarding institutional change, upgrading ONEMI from an Officen to a mid-level Agency as
the bill states raise questions of how powerful this institution will be to drive change within
the DPP system. In the same vein, as Mena74 observed, the initial law prospect kept the focus
on the preparedness and response phases.
Therefore, it seems that all the named problems and lack of correct solutions in the shape
of policies derive in an element of the MS approach that has is not adequately considered.
The role that policy entrepreneurs have to couple policies for resolving problems in a
particular political context seems underestimated. As stated in the above discussion, the
DPP change process in Chile is selective and hinders participation. Hence, this investigation
can conclude that policy entrepreneurs for disaster risk reduction issues have a limited
margin for action. Also, as Zahariadis34 points ‘when windows open, policy entrepreneurs
must immediately seize the opportunity to initiate action. Otherwise, the opportunity is
lost’.
Nonetheless, to achieve the latter these individuals or corporate actors need access to
politics and policy makers34. However, the research revealed that even organisations that
should act as coupling agents, for example, ONEMI, express through their representatives
that this institution ‘was never taken into account’o in the design of the bill. Therefore, a
recommendation to this and future post-disasters processes is to foster the existence of
policy entrepreneurs. This way the opportunities that focusing or potential focusing events
deliver can be taken to push metamorphosis further and create change with transformation.
m Quotes of AC-RE-01 from answer to question 6.
n It is the lowest institutional level in Chile’s administrative structure82.
o Quote of GO-ON-02 from answer to question 8.

32
WAYS TO IMPROVE
Considering the results and the above discussion of them, it seems appropriate to explore
some ways to improve the disaster public policy change process. Also, a critical approach to
the research methods will allow to ponder them and find future investigation paths.
The findings of this research reveal that problems in MS terms exist in the civil protection
system in Chile. There is a negative opinion of the current institutional framework and
budgetary allocation which, coupled with the failures and vulnerabilities that the 2010
Earthquake exposed, pushed change due to the opening of window of opportunity caused
by this focusing event. However, the base of available policies to correct the system have
embedded values that still centre actions in the response phase and the lessons learned, or
to be learned, that the disaster gave. The latter, considering a poor participatory process has
rendered disaster public policy change as one without transformation. Therefore, we
propose some ways to improve this and future DPP change processes.
Considering the findings that sustain the hypothesis of public policy change geared to the
last disaster, it appears fundamental to have a real participatory process. The latter allows
first, to have a more comprehensive analysis of the shortcomings of the system that need
improvement. More relevant is considering that as focusing events can open a window of
opportunity to introduce change, participation can be an opportunity to present
vulnerabilities not biased by the past disaster hence allowing a real bounce forward,
incorporating root causes and dynamic pressures4. This enables improving not only the
particular risk drivers related to the catastrophe, but others kept under the policy radar.
As for the actual public policy solutions; the Risk and Emergency Management bill, the
budget for ONEMI and, the National Policy for Disaster Risk Management lacks elements
that contemporary global disaster policies27,29 consider fundamental to reduce disaster risk.
For instance, it is critical raising the budget for DRR. The current bill does not have any
relevant increases in the new ONEMI, the National Agency for Risk and Emergency
Management75. Also, the research revealed that the current monetary allocation for ONEMI,
which is only a 0,03% of the national budget, is considered inadequate by most of the
interviewees including some of the emergency office top-level managers. Although
investing to reduce risk is fundamental, it is also prime to implement risk transfer
mechanisms such as catastrophe bonds or further insurance to avoid affectation to the
country’s development as GO-ON-03 declared about the hindered government programme.
Thus, a real transformation of the system must be sustained with proper financing to shift
the focus from disaster management to risk reduction and sustainable development. In the
above sense, to avoid recreating or exacerbating vulnerabilities it is necessary not only to
build back better31 but forward better30 considering not only the built environment but also

33
the socio-political one. Hence, it becomes critical improving the current bill so it can
encompass all the phases of the disaster cycle17. Including the recovery and reconstruction
phase and ensure prevention as a leading principle as the bill has incorporated due to the
legislative process76.
Nonetheless, a preventive culture must also become an inclusive one. This research found
relevant gender issues. The selected list of professionals to interview revealed a substantial
gender disparity in decision makers and individuals that work in disaster management and
risk reduction. For instance, by the time of the 27F, the National Emergency Office was run
by a female Director. Nowadays, there are no women in national directive positions in this
organisation and out of the 15 regional directions, female professionals manage only three.
In the same vein, the current bill does not have any explicit references to gender and the
national DRR policy names it only once under the equality principle. This finding shows that
DPP change must also involve a shift to assure equal access in a broad sense to the design,
implementation, management, and evaluation processes of this kind of policies.
METHODS
A brief discussion around the research methods this dissertation employed seems
appropriate for further improvement and prospective investigations. For instance, the
semi-structured interviewees coded for anonymity proved to be an effective way of
obtaining more straightforward answers. Several unexpected quotes such as the one from
an ONEMI directive who recognises that before the 2014 landslides in the North of Chile
were not properly considered, even though Chile has a track record of disasters triggered
by this hazarde.g. 77,78. However, due to the time and resource constraints, a more extensive
sample to interview was not feasible. Therefore, this research encourages further
investigation to other representatives of the selected groups of stakeholders to obtain a
more comprehensive vision of the national mood and values that the Chilean disaster public
policy system has.
Almost half of the original list of interviewees agreed to undertake the questionnaire. These
results pose a reflection about how to achieve a better response rate, particularly for
policymakers and civil servants. Nonetheless, this investigation considers that the reply rate
still allowed to accomplish the objectives that the method had.
This survey has also examined only ONEMI’s budget, assuming that it represents the
country’s expenditure in disaster risk reduction as the national progress report did67.
However, more extensive or focused future research may include other budgets such as the
ones for the emergency response services, private entities or other government institutions
that can have DRR programmes. Unfortunately, the characteristics of this investigation did
not allow the latter.

34
In conclusion, does the Chilean civil protection require a change in their public policies after
the 27F? Certainly. Did a window of opportunity open to introduce that change? This
research can acknowledge that a window of opportunity opened after the disaster.
However, the extent of modification appears to be limited; it seems that change and not
metamorphosis is in place. Change without transformation2 observes in the Chilean case.
The values and national mood towards DRR are bound to an increase in technological
sophistication and development of emergency preparedness and response tools in the last
six years. In the same vein, even though the current bill appears to make efforts to
decentralise DRR, the local level is still heavily underfinanced and lacks real decision-
making powers. Thus, although changes post-disaster must be recognised, they have failed
to produce a metamorphosis of the system. There is no transformation on the DPP scheme,
in its inner logic.
Possibly, the latter is the product of almost inexistent disaster policy entrepreneurs that can
couple the identified problems and other vulnerabilities that for instance academia may
have, with certain policies and through the political stream when a window of opportunity
opens. As such, focus on response still prevails over prevention; the seismic bias restrains
an all-hazards approach, and the emphasis is still in the hazards and not in the progression
of vulnerability4 within the Chilean society.

35
CONCLUSION
This research has revised the current major legislation, budgets and bills that constitute
disaster public policies in Chile. It has also performed a set of interviews with policy makers,
government officials, representatives of the organised civil society, academia and media to
determine if and how policy change developed after the 2010 Earthquake. The results
reveal that a window of opportunity opened after the disaster and that a problem stream in
the Multiple Streams framework terms, emerged, being possible to define the issues that it
contains.
Nonetheless, fruitful and sustainable recovery appears to be possible only if the underlying
vulnerabilities of the affected individuals, and their communities in a broader sense, are
addressed. In that sense, the post-disaster phase is a unique opportunity to evaluate and
challenge disaster public policies to move towards reducing disaster risk and avoid
catastrophe recurrence by inducing a comprehensive review of the current system.
The Chilean case revealed that after the 2010 Earthquake, which damaged nearly one-fifth
the country’s GDP and caused 532 deaths, the civil protection system in place was not
prepared to manage this foreseeable disaster. Therefore, the catastrophe acted a focusing
event towards DPP’s and laid the conditions to introduce modifications. Nevertheless, as
this research demonstrated, even though change in this case study is being introduced
slowly in disaster-related public policies, the evidence shows that the logic of the system
remains the same. The focus is still in the preparedness and response phases. Coupled with
the latter, a lack of national consensus on how the institutional framework and recovery79
has to take place lead to failure in generating a real metamorphosis of the system towards
disaster risk reduction and resilience80.
Furthermore, the research can state that change without transformation is the apparent
ongoing process in the Chilean DRM system. Hence, this dissertation considers that since
focusing events that effectively open a window of opportunity for change, as the 2010
Chilean Earthquake, are scarce they must be used to produce a comprehensive review of
the current disaster public policies. If done the latter, not only the shortcomings that the
catastrophe expose can improve but also the underlying drivers of risk. A prospective
approach must then be used to foster change with transformation, building forward better
and ultimately achieving a more sustainable development.

36
APPENDICES
Please refer to the following link for the appendices:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ku8t6a3g7o5k27e/AACCv32iN4fXs6EXu3GfALe4a?dl=0
alternatively, through this QR code:

37
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