The document provides details on a presentation for a course on global transformation and international governance, including requirements for a research paper on a topic related to stability, security, and development in complex operations. It includes an abstract for a proposed paper on the evolution of the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) from its origins as the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to its current organization under the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, discussing technology, innovation, and JIDO's future.

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3. 1
Stability, Security, and Development in Complex Operations (SSDCO) Course
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
GP 3100: Global Transformation and International Governance
Fall 2016
CHRISTOPHER ENG
LTC, US Army
Christopher.L.Eng.mil@mail.mil
22 November 2016
This course looks at global transformation and international governance. It also emphasizes,
albeit briefly, that understanding these themes requires a historical perspective. Its primary focus,
however, is on the contemporary world order. Particular focus will be on uneven-globalization
in terms of its implications for the often conflict-driven dynamics of sovereign nation-states,
many of which have lost much of their sovereignty—if they had any.
Research Paper: Students are required to submit a substantial research paper (3,500 to 4,000
words maximum) with a bibliography of at least (or up to?) 20 significant sources (a book, or a
substantial article, or chapter from an edited book—all meet the criteria of ‘significant source’).
Students are encouraged to select a topic on one or more specific issues relevant to the course,
but also relevant to their own experiences and the linkage between the ‘big picture’ and more
specific or particular civil affairs’ issues. The other option is a research paper on a topic related
to a future deployment, particularly if the student knows or is as certain as any of us can be about
where they may find themselves in the short- to medium-term.
What is the future of JIDO (Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization)? A Civil Affairs
perspective of the past, present, and future organizational evolution of JIEDDO (Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization) to JIDA (Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat
Agency) to JIDO under DTRA (Defense Threat Reduction Agency), with a discussion on
technology and innovation.

4. 2
Abstract
From JIEDDO to JIDA to JIDO under DTRA: Is JIDO adapting or dying? "Apto aut
Morior," Latin for "Adapt or Die," is the motto emblazoned on the seal of the Joint Improvised-
Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO), an organization that has evolved over the past 10 years, from
the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to the Joint Improvised-
Threat Defeat Agency (JIDA) to JIDO as subordinate to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(DTRA). Is the organization's evolution a result of innovation or circumstance?
What is the future of JIDO? This is a Civil Affairs perspective of the organizational
evolution of JIDO. In military wargaming doctrine, the side with the initiative starts the action-
reaction-counteraction cycle. The Red Team has had the initiative. How can we shift the
paradigm so that the Blue Team has the initiative? The idiom, "what's old is new again" applies
to innovation as a process, especially innovation in the technology sector. The problem and the
solution is in the human dimension. The first of the SOF Truths is that "Humans are more
important than Hardware." How will JIDO infuse its core identity into DoD of the future? The
Reserve military contributes subject-matter expertise in a budget-constrained environment.
Specifically, the Civil Affairs Army branch offers similarities to JIDO for leveraging a larger
community of action. Innovation means creating conditions for the future where the Blue Team
has the initiative. We have been playing a never ending chess match with adversaries who play
by their own set of rules. Perhaps the Blue Team should change the game to be more like a
gardener where it cultivates the environment for the future that it envisions, rather than
positioning chess pieces around on a multi-player chess board. Innovators create the future.
Adapters react to the environment that was created for them by circumstance.

5. 3
JIEDDO
2006-2015
JIDA
2015-2016
JIDO
2016 - present
DTRA/SSC-WMD
What is the future of JIDO (Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization)? This is a
Civil Affairs perspective of the past, present, and future organizational evolution of JIEDDO
(Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization) to JIDA (Joint Improvised-Threat
Defeat Agency) to JIDO under DTRA (Defense Threat Reduction Agency), with a discussion on
technology and innovation. JIDO was established as JIEDDO in 2006 and has evolved several
times over the last ten years of its existence. This essay will explore JIDO's continued evolution
for the near and long-term future.
I joined JIDA at a turbulent time in its organization's evolution in early 2016. I first
started as the Deputy Inspector General, working for the Inspector General who had been at
JIDA since it was JIEDDO in 2009. Fiscal year 2016 was the year of transition. JIEDDO had
just been renamed to JIDA as a combat support agency, but would spend the year 2016 preparing
to change its name again to JIDO, as a subordinate organization to DTRA, effective October 1,
2016. When the JIDA Inspector General decided to take a lateral transfer to become the
Inspector General at the Defense Logistics Agency, I stepped up into the role of Acting Inspector
General for the five and a half months before JIDO transitioned under DTRA. As a Department
of Defense (DoD) Joint Inspector General, my charter is to provide independent, relevant, and

6. 4
timely oversight within the DoD that supports the warfighter. I promote accountability, integrity,
and efficiency, and enhance the readiness, warfighting, and mission capabilities of the
organization. Over the last six months, I have gained insight into JIDO's evolution, but for
purpose of this essay, a publicly releasable analysis, all the references and ideas I cite here will
come from publicly available sources.
In order to predict the organization's evolution for the future, it is necessary to revisit the
organization of the past. Before JIEDDO was created in 2006, it was a task force that the Army
started to counter improvised-explosive devices (IED). JIEDDO's charter document is DoD
Directive 20019.E.1
DoDD 20019.E is a 22-page document that defined JIEDDO's mission,
organization, responsibilities, functions, relationships, and authorities. JIEDDO's mission: "The
JIEDDO shall focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all Department of Defense actions in support of
the Combatant Commanders' and their respective Joint Task Forces' efforts to defeat Improvised
Explosive Devices as weapons of strategic influence." The Secretary of the Army was
designated as the DoD Executive Agent for JIEDDO, to provide primary administrative support.
Remember this for when we fast forward to the present, once JIDO transitioned under DTRA on
October 1, 2016.
1 https://www.jieddo.mil/content/docs/20060214_Directive_2000.19E.pdf

7. 5
JIEDDO's organization structure in the early days ~2006-20072
mainly comprised of a
COIC (Counter-IED Operations Integration Center) and JCOE (Joint Center for Excellence).3
Using the standard Joint Staff numbering system, J1 manages the organization's administrative
functions; J2 manages the organization's intelligence functions; J3 manages the organization's
operations functions; J4 manages the organization's logistics functions; J5 manages the
organization's long-range planning functions and interagency coordination; J6 manages the
organization's information technology functions; J7 manages the organization's training
functions; J8 manages the organization's acquisition functions; J9 manages the organization's
operations research and statistical analysis functions. The COIC was mostly a fusion of the J2
functions and J3 functions. The JCOE was mostly J7 functions. At this early evolution of
JIEDDO's organization structure, there were no J-Directorates, although that is a structure that
most organizations understand intuitively. The COIC provided fused intelligence and
operational data to the warfighters. The JCOE provided training to the force regarding TTPs
(tactics, techniques, and procedures) related to IEDs.
2http://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/images/
jieddo-org-1.jpg|||JIEDDO Organization, ~2006-2007
3 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/jieddo.htm

8. 6
JIEDDO ~20084
shows the J-Directorates in a more prominent role in the organization
structure. This organization structure added a Competitive Strategies Group, designed to do "red
team"/enemy analysis. Also notice that there is no Inspector General in this organization
structure.
4http://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/images/
jieddo-org-2.jpg|||JIEDDO Organization, ~2008

9. 7
This JIEDDO ~20095
organization structure from JIEDDO's 2009 Annual Report to
Congress placed the Internal Review section in the Special Staff of the Director, elevated from a
subordinate to the Chief of Staff, a change from 2008, above. In 2010, below, the Internal
Review section would revert back to be a subordinate of the Chief of Staff, reporting through the
CSIG XO. Not that this particular difference is of specific significance at this time in the
organization's evolution, but that it is evidence that the organization continued to evolve over the
years.
The Competitive Strategies Group of the 2009 organization structure dropped the
subheading of "Red Team" since its 2008 organization structure. On page 18 (PDF page 20 of
28) of the 2009 Annual Report, the CSG conducted Red Team and Blue Team predictive
analysis in war game scenarios. However, this is different than the Blue Team analysis that I
would recommend by the conclusion of this essay, because based on the way this section in the
5 https://www.jieddo.mil/content/docs/20090909_FULL_2009%20Annual%20Report_Unclassified_v1_lr.pdf

10. 8
2009 Annual Report reads, it operated on the assumption that the Red Team had the initiative.
To explain, in 2009, the CSG war gamed Red Force counter-countermeasures (CCMs) to defeat
Blue Force C-IED systems. Our current military doctrine for war gaming (Joint Publication 5-0
and Army Field Manual 6-0) says that the war game follows an action-reaction-counteraction
cycle. Actions are those events initiated by the side with the initiative. In 2009, being relatively
early in the fight against IEDs as tactical weapons with strategic effects, it made sense that the
Red Team had the initiative. However, fast forward to the present and planning how to position
ourselves for creating the future that we decide will become reality, it will require a paradigm
shift that the Blue Team has the initiative.

11. 9
JIEDDO ~20106
removed the Competitive Strategy Group from the 2008 organization structure,
although that function of conducting Red Team analysis would be seen again in JIEDDO's 3
Lines of Operation: Attack the Network (AtN), Defeat the Device (DtD), and Train the Force
(TtF).
Just by comparing the pictures of the 2010 organization structure to the 2008
organization structure, it appears that the deputy directors (flag officers and Senior Executive
Service) were given more direct authority in 2010 than they had in 2008, when the Director and
Vice Director had more direct authority.
At this point, JIEDDO was only 4 years old. There was an Internal Review section as
early as the 2008 organization structure, but still no Inspector General as of 2010. As the
6http://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/images/
jieddo-org-4.jpg|||JIEDDO Organization, ~2010

12. 10
organization matured, functions were added to comply with government requirements. The
Internal Review section's reason for existence comes from the Federal Manager's Financial
Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA of 1982).7
Internal Review conducts the Management Internal
Controls (MIC) program that prepares delivers an annual Statement of Assurance (SoA) due to
the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) (OUSD
(AT&L)) by the end of each fiscal year. The SoA will address four categories of internal control
deficiencies: (1) Control Deficiency; (2) Reportable Condition; (3) Material Weakness; (4)
Systematic Weakness. The objectives of the MIC program is to achieve (1) effective and
efficient operations; (2) reliable financial reporting; and (3) compliance with applicable laws and
regulations. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in consultation with the
Comptroller General, is required to establish guidelines for agency evaluation of internal
controls. The Executive Agency, in the case for JIEDDO, the Secretary of the Army,
consolidates the Statements of Assurance from all subordinate elements into a report to the
President and to the Congress as to whether the agency's system of internal controls provides
reasonable assurance that (1) obligations and costs are in compliance with applicable law; (2)
funds, property, and assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, or
misappropriation; and (3) revenues and expenditures applicable to agency operations are
properly recorded and accounted for to permit the preparation of accounts and reliable financial
and statistical reports, and to maintain accountability over the assets.
The existence of an Inspector General was not required for JIEDDO of 2010, but the
existence of Inspectors General comes from The Inspector General Act of 1978, which
established the statutory requirement for an independent office for each of the Presidential
cabinet-level departments. JIEDDO did not meet this threshold to require an IG at this time of
7 http://www.acq.osd.mil/pepolicy/pdfs/Training%20Presentation%20SOA%20(FINAL%202013).pdf

13. 11
its organizational evolution, but could have chosen to create a position for an IG at JIEDDO, in
the same way that every other position at JIEDDO was decided to be created; for functional need
or to comply with government oversight requirements. The purpose of the Internal Review and
Inspector General are similar, but nuanced in their differences. The IG Act of 19788
specifies
the purpose of the Inspector General as an independent and objective party to (1) conduct and
supervise audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations of the establishments
to which assigned; (2) provide leadership and coordination and recommend policies and
activities designed to (a) promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the administration
of, and to (b) prevent and detect fraud and abuse in, such programs and operations; and to (3)
provide a means for keeping the head of the establishment and the Congress fully and currently
informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and
operations and the necessity for and progress of corrective action.
Both the Internal Review and the Inspector General efforts result in reports to Congress
regarding efficiency and effectiveness. However, the Internal Review section would typically
work for the agency's chief of staff, whereas the Inspector General is an independent analyst of
the organization who would typically report directly to the agency head, but has specific
instructions to report beyond the agency head in certain scenarios. The IG Act of 1978 spells out
another nuance difference between IR and IG: In carrying out the duties and responsibilities
established under this Act, each Inspector General shall give particular regard to the activities of
the Comptroller General of the United States with a view toward avoiding duplication and
ensuring effective coordination and cooperation. The creation of the Inspector General office at
JIEDDO would come in a few more years of the organization's evolution.
8 https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/igactasof1010(1).pdf

14. 12
JIEDDO's Reach: Global IED Network and TTP (Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures) Linkages in Support of Each Geographic Combatant Command.
JIEDDO produced an annual report to Congress for fiscal year 2009.9
This report's topic
headings are, (1) Threats and Trends; (2) JIEDDO Mission and Mission Areas; (3) Resources;
(4) FY 2009 Major Accomplishments; (5) Competitive Strategies Group; (6) FY 2009 Transfers,
Transitions, and Terminations; (7) JIEDDO Field Teams; (8) Science and Technology. The
message from the Director summarized that JIEDDO provided significant capabilities to
warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as (1) enabling IED network attack, (2) enabling IED
detection and defeat, and (3) providing leading-edge counter-IED training to the force. These
three capabilities would come to be known as JIEDDO's 3 Lines of Operations: Attack the
Network (AtN), Defeat the Device (DtD), and Train the Force (TtF). Simply defined, AtN
recognizes that it takes a network of people and processes to get an IED to the battlefield, so that
9 https://www.jieddo.mil/content/docs/20090909_FULL_2009%20Annual%20Report_Unclassified_v1_lr.pdf

15. 13
any disruption along that network can prevent IEDs from reaching the battlefield. AtN
methodology is also known as fighting "left of the boom"10
because in the continuum of time
that moves from left to right, the purpose is to prevent the explosion before it appears on the
battlefield. DtD is simply defined as focusing on defeating the explosive device, either by
detecting it before it explodes, or neutralizing its effects. TtF is simply defined as training the
warfighters on how to use the equipment that is fielded to defeat the IEDs and improving the
understanding of emerging IED threats. The 2009 Annual Report has more comprehensive
definitions. Additionally, future annual reports and strategic plans will serve to further articulate
JIEDDO's identifying characteristic known as the 3 LOOs.
The 3 LOOs would further cement JIEDDO's identity and reputation as its multi-billion-
dollar annual budgets that were authorized by Congress would be allocated by LOO for the next
several years. According to the 2009 Annual Report, JIEDDO was funded more than $12 billion
for C-IED effort over the three years from 2006 through 2008, averaging $4 billion per fiscal
year. The personnel and staffing subsection foreshadows its future challenges and opportunity
for success in its discussion of (1) Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations
on urgent need for oversight and direction, (2) heavy reliance on contractor personnel for
subject-matter expertise that is not easily found in the Services or through government civilian
recruiting, and (3) use of the Reserve Component military in order to enhance JIEDDO's ability
to meet warfighters' C-IED needs ... offering more "bang for the buck" (literally less bang, more
value for the warfighters) in a budget-constrained environment that we experience in the present
and foreseeable future.
This is where the Civil Affairs perspective comes in to offer lessons learned that can be
applied to assist JIDO to achieve a future of its own choosing, rather than be a victim of
10 http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=left%20of%20boom

16. 14
circumstance, as was the paradigm used by the CSG of 2009 when the Red Team started with the
initiative during war gaming. By 2008-2009, Civil Affairs became my fifth (unofficial) military
occupation specialty (MOS). Firstly, I commissioned as a Military Intelligence officer, at the
time when the officer basic course (OBC) still taught traditional Cold War tactics of two
adversaries of similar capacity and tactics who competed against each other in conflict.
Secondly, I commanded a military postal company, in the Adjutant General (human resources)
Army branch, in the Middle East (Kuwait) during Operation Iraqi Freedom I. Thirdly, my
unofficial MOS was computer network operations / cyber / certified ethical hacker by virtue of
the Reserve military units that I served in as a result of my civilian-acquired bachelor degree and
work experience. Fourthly, my appreciation for applying lessons learned began during my
second overseas deployment to the Middle East (Iraq) working for the Center for Army Lessons
Learned, developed further in recent years as I have become an observer/controller-trainer
(OC/T) of the Mission Command11
philosophy and warfighting function, and mastery in
influencing organizational change as I have become an Inspector General. Fifthly, my third
overseas deployment to the Middle East (Afghanistan), this time as a Civil Affairs team leader
on a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Nuristan province, I experienced the deliverables of
JIEDDO's efforts from the point of view of the warfighter.
Returning to the challenges and opportunities foreshadowed in JIEDDO's 2009 Annual
Report, Civil Affairs can offer lessons learned. By design, the Civil Affairs branch of the Army
is unique in that it is one of three Army branches that is a non-accession operational functional
category.12
The other two are Special Forces and Psychological Operations. In plain language, a
non-accession branch draws its officers from other branches, meaning they require experience in
11 Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, Mission Command, 2012
12 DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, 2014

17. 15
a basic branch before being accessed into these three advanced branches. Advanced branch
connotes the prerequisite that the officer have a foundational knowledge in one of the basic
branches in the broad categories of (1) operations division (Infantry, Aviation, Armor, Corps of
Engineers, Military Police, Chemical Corps, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery), (2) force
sustainment division (Acquisition Corps, Adjutant General, Finance Corps, Transportation
Corps, Ordnance Branch, Quartermaster Corps, Logistics Branch), (3) health services division
(Medical, Dental), or (4) operations support division (Public Affairs, Cyber, Space Operations,
Military Intelligence, Signal).13
One lesson learned that Civil Affairs provides the most bang for
the buck in a budget-constrained environment is by the fact that 95% of Army Civil Affairs units
exist in the Army Reserve component.14
As mentioned, this is by design, because expertise in
the Civil Affairs branch requires the prerequisite expertise in a foundational areas that are
applicable to the civilian population, such as improving the capacity for government leaders to
provide essential services (public administration, public safety, public health, infrastructure,
economic development, etc.). The Active Component would not be able to produce the kind of
subject-matter expertise that the Reserve Component is capable of generating. As it applies to
JIEDDO, a more deliberate organization structure for recruiting, retaining, and developing talent
from the Reserve Component and the civilian industry for certain subject-matter expertise,
earlier on in JIEDDO's organizational evolution, rather than relying so heavily on costly
contractor expertise, may have resulted in a different outcome than how JIDO is currently
structured, as a subordinate to DTRA.
13 https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/Officer%20Personnel%20Management%20Directorate
14 http://www.usar.army.mil/USACAPOC/

18. 16
JIEDDO produced an annual report to Congress for fiscal year 2010.15
The 2010 report
was similar in format to the 2009 report, with several critical differences. First, the 2010 report
offered less detail than the 2009 report as it pertained to each combatant command. The
combatant commands are customers of the services that JIEDDO provides to the warfighters. In
order for the combatant commanders to understand the "so-what" of what JIEDDO provides, the
vignettes specific to each combatant commands should have been continued in the 2010 report.
Both years of reports mention the T3 (transition, transfer, termination) process, both using
similar language to explain why it is important, but the 2009 version is better because it
specifically mentions the role of the combatant commands, whereas the 2010 version does not.
This had the effect of stakeholders such as the combatant commands and Congress being
15 https://www.jieddo.mil/content/docs/JIEDDO_2010_Annual_Report_U.pdf

19. 17
confused on who had the responsibility to fund an initiative throughout the various decision
points in the solution-development-delivery-sustainment life cycle.
The 2010 report highlighted a significant change to JIEDDO's organization structure
since 2009. Deputy Directors (one-star generals and/or their civilian equivalent from the Senior
Executive Service) were assigned to lead portions of the organization that generally aligned with
the 3 LOOs. The 2010 report explains this alignment to the 3 LOOs, but the titles for the Deputy
Directors did not plainly match the language of the 3 LOOs. Specifically, the Deputy Director
for Operations/Intelligence Integration (DDOI) was the lead for LOO1: AtN (Attack the
Network). The Deputy Director for Rapid Acquisition and Technology (DDR&T) was the lead
for LOO2: DtD (Defeat the Device). The Deputy Director for Training (DDT), in charge of the
Joint Center for Excellence (JCOE), was the lead for LOO3: TtF (Train the Force ). And there
was a fourth Deputy Director for Operations and Requirements (DDOR) (or DDOT, depending
on if you relied on the text explanation of the report, or the organization structure image) who
was the lead for synchronizing all the LOOs. This alignment with the Deputy Director titles to
the Lines of Operation could have been more plainly depicted, even simply by re-arranging the
ordering from left to right of the Deputy Directors in the organization structure such that LOO1
appeared to the left of LOO2 and LOO3. Alternatively, the Deputy Directors could have been
titled DD AtN, DD DtD, and DD TtF. Confusion in understanding JIEDDO's functions resulted
in further organizational evolution.
Both the 2009 and 2010 Annual Reports mention JIEDDO's unique budget appropriation
as of fiscal year 2007 that enabled JIEDDO to access funds over a three-fiscal-year period. This
uniqueness in funding, combined with continued organizational evolution, resulted in numerous

20. 18
audits, inspections, and investigations by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and
Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (DoD OIG).
GAO audit 12-280:16
Warfighter Support: DoD Needs Strategic Outcome-Related Goals
and Visibility over Its Counter-IED Efforts. JIEDDO was created as the answer for combating
the tactical weapons known as improvised-explosive devices that resulted in strategic influence
on the battlefield. Therefore, JIEDDO focused at the tactical level, to rapidly deliver solutions to
the war fighter within the first two years of a new IED threat emerging. But as an organization
matures, or if it has aspiration to mature into an enduring organization, it needs to articulate its
strategic goals and objectives, sooner rather than later. Hence, by 2012, GAO audited JIEDDO's
16 GAO audit 12-280. Warfighter Support: DoD Needs Strategic Outcome-Related Goals and Visibility
over Its Counter-IED Efforts. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-280
Figure 1: Instances of Incomplete or
Insufficient Counter-IED Strategic
Management from 2006 to 2011

21. 19
efforts from 2006 to 2011 to develop a strategic plan in accordance with the Government
Performance and Results Act.17
The GAO's front-page summary acknowledged that JIEDDO
had made effort to produce strategic plans as early as 2007, but did not have an adequate
definition for measuring effectiveness. The summary page also acknowledged that JIEDDO
issued a strategic plan for 2012-2016, but that the plan failed to account for all other counter-IED
efforts DoD-wide, as is specified in JIEDDO's charter, DoDD 20019.E, that said JIEDDO's
mission was to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DoD actions in support of the combatant
commanders in their efforts to defeat IEDs.
Among the four recommendations that GAO recommended, one would remain in an open
status for the next four years, until myself and my predecessor Inspector General were able to
convince the GAO lead auditor that the recommendation for JIEDDO to establish a strategic plan
with outcome-related strategic goals and measures of effectiveness to gauge progress, would be
overcome by events of JIDA's transition to JIDO under DTRA. This recommendation was
recently updated to a "closed - not implemented" status due to JIDO's new effort to incorporate
JIDO's strategic plan as part of DTRA's process of updating their strategic plan for 2019-2023.
With JIEDDO's annual budget averaging $4 billion in those early years of existence,
JIEDDO could afford to spend money to buy solutions, or pay for contractor expertise, or
conduct research and development for potential solutions, but was criticized by external
stakeholders, such as GAO, for missing the mark for its specified mission task to perform in a
synchronizer role for all of DoD's C-IED efforts. The Civil Affairs branch is similar in that its
role is to synchronize civil-military and interagency operations efforts to enable the maneuver
commander to apply effective combat power simultaneously in combined arms maneuver and
17 http://www.gao.gov/products/GGD-96-118

22. 20
wide area security.18
Just as Civil Affairs attempts to serve as a leverager of host-nation entities
to achieve a specified non-lethal effect, rather than trying to serve in a doer role, JIEDDO may
have mitigated many of the GAO audits over those first few years of existence if it had
articulated how it would perform its specified task to synchronize all of DoD's C-IED efforts.
LOO 1: AtN (Attack the Network)
LOO 2: DtD (Defeat the Device)
LOO 3: TtF (Train the Force)
JIEDDO Strategic plan, 2012-2016.19
Although this strategic plan was published prior to
the final audit report of GAO 12-280, this plan did not meet the intent of the GAO's audit
recommendations. However, this strategic plan graphically presented the 3 LOOs with
JIEDDO's enduring capabilities, which resulted in a more comprehensive result toward JIEDDO
defining its core identity, meaning the essence of purpose that JIEDDO would hope to
promulgate throughout DoD and the rest of its stakeholders.
18 ADRP (Army Doctrine Reference Publication) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 2012
19 http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/20120116_JIEDDO_C-IEDStrategicPlan.pdf

23. 21
This organization structure of JIEDDO ~201320
appears in a RAND report, "Assessment
of Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Device Organization (JIEDDO) Training Activity." The
preface page of the RAND study says that it was a study funded by JIEDDO, with the objective
to assess duplication of effort among the military services and combatant commands for training
programs and functions related to IEDs. The key finding was that there was little duplication of
effort, that JIEDDO provides a unique capability. The concluding thoughts from this report said
that exploring the question of JIEDDO's continued existence was beyond the scope of this study,
although the report acknowledged the inherent tension that JIEDDO experienced regarding the
need to balance oversight and speed of delivering solutions to the warfighters. RAND
highlighted JIEDDO's unique process for rapid capability delivery, called JCAAMP (JIEDDO
20 RAND, Assessment of Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Device Organization (JIEDDO) Training Activity
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/.../RAND_RR421.pdf

24. 22
Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process). RAND's concluding thoughts said
that DoD could use the JIEDDO model, or some variant of that model, to respond to other
asymmetric, contingency-based challenges that require rapid response that is not already covered
by the military services' core programs, meaning that JIEDDO provides a unique capability [and
should continue to exist in some form, whether it be via its own organization structure, or via the
unique capabilities/processes that represent its core identity].

25. 23
JIEDDO to JIDA to JIDO:
Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (DoD OIG) report DODIG-2016-
12021
is an audit published in August 2016. It audited JCAAMP's effectiveness and determined
that overall it is an effective process, but that it required some improvement in the areas of
documenting management decisions and assessment of the solutions after they are delivered to
the battlefield.
In March 2015, JIEDDO realigned to be a Combat Support Agency and was renamed
JIDA (Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency). The part of JIEDDO's name "explosive device"
was dropped for the organization's name change in recognition that improvised threats can come
from sources that are not exclusively explosive devices. The name change to JIDA would last
for just over a year, because Congress, via the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016,
directed that JIDA be transitioned again into an organization subordinate to an existing agency,
DTRA, by October 2016.
21 http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7065

26. 24
JIDO 3 Core Functions:
CF#1: Assist Situational Understanding
(of threat-network activities).
CF#2: Enable Rapid Capability Delivery
(RCD) to Implement DoD Accelerated
and Urgent Acquisition Models.
CF#3: Enable DoD Responses to
Improved Weapons.
JIDO 3 Levels of Effort (LOE):
LOE#1: Global Situational Awareness (in Base)
LOE#2: Regional-Focused Support (in Base)
LOE#3: Decisive Effort - Quick Reaction
Capability (Surge)

27. 25
The JIDO CONOP,22
published in 2016, represents a large shift in its approach since the
RAND study of 2013. This Concept of Operations was published during the year of transition
before JIDA became JIDO under DTRA, but referenced the pending transition that would
become effective in its near future. This CONOP describes the mission that addresses
improvised threats beyond those that are explosive devices. The paragraph describing JIDO's
expanded scope puts a positive spin on the language that describes its sustained contractor-
services framework as easily expandable when support requirements are validated and quickly
contractible when missions terminate. This is in contrast to the spin on language that was used in
the 2009 Annual Report that described JIEDDO's heavy reliance on contractors and need to
reinforce government oversight as a reason for needing to expand its government civilian
workforce.
The JIDO CONOP represents a similarity to Civil Affairs efforts in that the scope of
JIDO's mission includes leveraging broad Communities of Action (CoA) that include DoD, other
US Government (USG) departments and agencies, key coalition allies and partners, and, when
appropriate, academia and the private sector, to leverage their capabilities, expertise, access, and
authorities. Civil Affairs also leverages a broad CoA that includes military and civilian
interagency, international, non-governmental organizations, and the civilian populace in order to
offer non-lethal options that synchronize with the combatant commanders' lethal efforts.
JIEDDO's 3 LOOs are replaced by JIDO's 3 Core Functions and 3 Levels of Effort. This
represents a large shift in the core identity of JIDO in that the 3 Core Functions more explicitly
specify JIDO as an enabler for DoD, compared to its mission from JIEDDO's charter document,
DoDD 20019.E, that said JIEDDO would lead, advocate, and coordinate all of DoD's C-IED
efforts. The Civil Affairs community knows something about being an enabler. Civil Affairs
22 https://www.jieddo.mil/content/docs/CONOP.pdf (or https://www.jida.mil/content/docs/CONOP.pdf)

28. 26
doctrine23
states the role of Civil Affairs as a force multiplier because of its unique ability to
influence the populace and enable host-nation governance while furthering US interests within
the area of operations.
JIDO's FY 2017 budget24
is allocated by its 3 Core Functions in contrast to being
allocated by the 3 LOOS in previous years. The FY 2017 budget is $408 million, a significant
decrease from the early years of a $4 billion annual budget. In a sense, JIDO must figure out
how to do more with less money, since the mission scope is expanded to include improvised
threats beyond those that are exclusively explosive.
This organization structure was proposed in the JIDO CONOP, but it may or may not be
its enduring organization structure when the transition under DTRA is effective. The JIDO
23 ATP 3-57.50, Civil Affairs Civil Information Management, 2013,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/atp/atp3-57-50.pdf
24
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2017/budget_justification/pdfs/02_Pro
curement/JIDO_PB17_2093D_J-Book_SCOMBFinal_Feb16.pdf

29. 27
CONOP dedicates a paragraph to articulating its value proposition, stating that it offers value to
the DoD via a quick reaction capability (QRC) for materiel solutions and non-materiel solutions
[and should include process-based solutions, such as JCAAMP, a talent management process, or
innovation process, that are distinct from the non-materiel category (software, training)].
However, the JIDO CONOP may not have served its intended purpose to justify its continued
existence, as evident by the Army standing up a Rapid Capability Office25
just days after JIDO's
transition under DTRA in October 2016. The Army was the Executive Agent for JIEDDO, but
when JIEDDO became JIDA and then became JIDO under DTRA, the Army decided to create a
RCO that seemingly duplicates at least one of the core functions articulated in the JIDO CONOP.
In February 2013, the White House published a 6-page statement, titled "Countering
Improvised Explosive Devices"26
that reaffirmed that the threat from IED use is likely to remain
high in the coming decade to evolve in response to our abilities to counter them. Despite this
affirmation, rather than increasing funding for JIEDDO, DoD awarded a $937 million contract to
Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) to implement at Global Threat Mitigation Program (GTMP)27
as of
this press release from October 2015:
" The GTMP task order requires Booz Allen to conduct regional strategic
planning as well as threat and intelligence analyses and assessments. Specifically,
Booz Allen will assist in the development and implementation of an enterprise-
wide methodology and approach for training management and curriculum
development. In addition, the firm will continue to provide Counter-Improvised
Explosive Device (C-IED) training support at U.S. Army home stations and with
partner nations using live, virtual, constructive and gaming training methods."
The GTMP task order sounds similar to JIDO's 3 Core Functions. Meanwhile, DoD (via GSA
FEDSIM) awarded BAH a budget of more than double JIDO's FY 2017 budget of $408 million
25 https://www.army.mil/article/174290/army_launches_rapid_capabilities_office
26 https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cied_1.pdf
27 http://www.boozallen.com/media-center/press-releases/2015/10/booz-allen-hamilton-wins-937-million-
dod-global

30. 28
to do a similar mission to JIDO's. To be fair, there may be space for BAH to conduct the GTMP
such that it doesn't compete with JIDO's value proposition (a topic for a follow-on essay), but the
GTMP and the Army standing up a RCO recently are events that present a challenge for JIDO's
future organizational evolution.
This analysis was intended to be an emphasis on JIDO's future with regards to technology
and innovation, which will/may be explored more in depth in a second volume because first the
historical evolution of JIEDDO to JIDA to JIDO describes some critical lessons learned that
share similarities with the Civil Affairs perspective. As a preview to the topics that would be
analyzed if this essay were to be continued in a second volume, it would include the DoD's Third
Offset strategy,28
DoD's Innovation Initiative of 2014,29
the Defense Innovation Unit
Experimental (DIUx)30
, and the Secretary of Defense's Force of the Future.31
JIDO's future
existence will depend on how it interacts with these strategies and clearly articulates its proposed
niche role as an enabler for DoD's counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and C-IED efforts.
Innovation has become somewhat of a buzzword around DoD in recent years. The idiom,
"what's old is new again" applies to innovation as a process, especially innovation in the
technology sector. Specifics to be discussed on request. With the Third Offset strategy, there
are a lot of investments that will be in the technology sector, such as artificial intelligence and
machine learning. However, the Third Offset strategy says that the advancements of machines is
for the benefit of humans who will still be the decision-maker, yet enhanced by harnessing the
power of smart machines to do analytics on the overwhelming volumes of data and information
that otherwise cloud our ability to clearly evaluate our choices. The SecDef's Force of the Future
28 http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606641/the-third-us-offset-strategy-and-
its-implications-for-partners-and-allies
29 http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/OSD013411-14.pdf
30 https://www.diux.mil/
31 http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0315_Force-of-the-Future

31. 29
includes an Office of People Analytics,32
which highlights the importance of the human
dimension, a lesson that Civil Affairs constantly preaches. If JIDO were to have some function
of an Office of People Analytics, it would serve to return the Blue Team to the position of having
the initiative for war gaming, in contrast to how JIEDDO's Competitive Strategies Group of 2009
war gamed with the Red Team having the initiative. But then again, the mission statement
would also need to use language other than counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and counter-
IED, because "counter-anything" indicates that the Red Team has already made the first move.
The US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)
(USACAPOC(A)), having a close relationship with Special Operations Command (and
incidentally similar organizational evolution challenges that JIDO experiences today due to
USACAPOC(A)'s shift of parent organization from USASOC to USARC),33
means that Civil
Affairs tends to subscribe to the SOF Truths, of which the first one is a lesson for the future of
JIDO with regard to technology and innovation. The first of the SOF Truths34
is that Humans
are more important than Hardware.
The motto in JIDO’s seal is “Apto aut Morior,” which is Latin for “Adapt or Die.” This
rings true for the organization’s future existence as well as for the warfighters it helps to adapt on
the battlefield.
... to be continued (perhaps) in the next volume of this essay, since this one exceeded the
assignment's target word count. (I subscribed to the second of the SOF Truths: Quality is better
than Quantity.)
32 http://www.nextgov.com/defense/2015/11/pentagon-rolls-out-new-office-devoted-people-
analytics/123901/
33 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/ca-psyop.htm
34 http://www.soc.mil/USASOCHQ/SOFTruths.html