CML4150 GLOB_merged_document_2

CHIRINE HADDAD
7446267
CML4150 “GLOBALIZATION AND LAW”
PROFESSOR ERROL MENDES
2016-04-12

Corruption: the Cancer of Nations: Is Canada wining the fight? N 7446267
1
Introduction:
In 2013 the World Bank had confirmed that around US$ 1 trillion is being spent in bribery each
year1
, “while an estimated $2.6 trillion are stolen annually through corruption – a sum equivalent
to more than 5 per cent of the global GDP2
”. Yet there is no universally approved definition for
corruption. The challenge in coming up with a conventional definition is due to the fact that what
forms an act of corruption varies from state and culture to culture. The lack of consensus on a
conventional definition of corruption had led to the outburst of numerous definitions. The World
Bank defines corruption as the following:
“the abuse of public office for private gain. Public office is abused for private gain when an
official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. It is also abused when private agents actively offer
bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit. Public
office can also be abused for personal benefit even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and
nepotism, the theft of state assets, or the diversion of state revenues. This definition is both
simple and sufficiently broad to cover most of the corruption that the Bank encounters, and it is
widely used in the literature. Bribery occurs in the private sector, but bribery in the public sector,
offered or extracted, should be the Bank's main concern, since the Bank lends primarily to
governments and supports government policies, programs, and projects3
”.
Corruption is the cancer ravaging countries in their entirety. Writing about West Africa in 1961,
Franz Fanon underlined that “there is no soul down to the simple policemen or the customs
officer who does not join in the great procession of corruption4
”. Later on, in 1965, Arthur Lewis
reported that corruption spread in West Africa with the “vast pickings in bribes, state contracts,
diversion of public funds to private uses, and commissions of various sorts”. He conveyed that
“to be a minister in West Africa at the time was to have a lifetime’s chance to make fortune. In
time, bribery and corruption become a way of life accepted as a mean of getting by, earning a
1
Mendes, Errol, “Global Governance, Human Rights and International Law: Combating the Tragic Flaw”,
Routledge: London and New York, 2014 p. 177 [Mendes].
2
International Chamber of Commerce / Transparency International /United Nations Global Compact / World Economic Forum
Partnering Against Corruption Initiative. 2008, “Clean Business is Good Business”, online:
<http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/Anti-Corruption/clean_business_is_good_business.pdf>.
3
World Bank, “Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank”, (September, 1997) at p. 8, available
online: < http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm#note1>, [World Bank 97].
4
Meredith, Martin, The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence, Free Press: London, 2006 p.170.

2
living, obtaining a service or avoiding hassle5
”. The cancer of corruption extended even further
and was heightened by the long tradition of gift-giving in West Africa for performed services.
The “bigger” the “man” and the service provided the bigger the gift that was supposed to be
offered6
. As a result the disease of corruption was exacerbated in West Africa right after
independence. The practice of bribery and larceny stretched from top to bottom, from public
officials to tax collectors, custom officers, law enforcements and dispensary assistants. It
contaminated everything from job applications to license issuance and renewal, scholarships,
foreign exchange operations and placement of factories7
.
Another example of corruption occurred in the Philippines. The former president of the
Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos wanted to build a nuclear power plant in the Philippines. The
project was offered out to bidding. However part of the bid was to provide President Marcos
US$80 million as a bribe. Westinghouse Electric Corporation in the Philippines won the bid after
allegedly paying President Marcos the sum he required. The nuclear plant was built costing
US$2.3 billion, three times more than the equivalent one is South Korea. The plan never went
into operation for several reasons; the main reason is linked to the cancer of corruption. All the
contractors involved in that project were corrupt, even the person who provided the location for
the power plant was corrupt; it was built at the base of a volcano on an earthquake fault line.
Despite the fact that this power plant will never go into operation, the Philippines are compelled
to pay each day, since the 1970s until 2018, a sum of US$170,000 to finance this project pulling
dreadfully needed money in a poor country away from basic services such as education and
healthcare8
. It really demonstrates how corruption is a spreading cancer ravaging entire nations.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid at p.172.
7
Ibid at p.173.
8
Mendes, supra note 1 at p. 178.

3
As a spreading disease corruption has a dreadful effect on the economies of countries and their
political systems. Corrupt practices allow cheap and overpriced infrastructure to replace long-
lasting, profitable ones. It also erodes the rule of law and people’s belief in democratic
government. “Many experts say the global toll of corruption, in both lives and money, exceeds
that of terrorism9
”. Even in a place like Nigeria where a violent uprising has claimed the lives of
thousands, “corruption consistently leads security in public surveys as the most serious problem
facing the country10
”. The World Bank asserted that “[m]uch of the world's highest-value
corruption could not happen without institutions in wealthy nations: the firms that give large
bribes, the financial institutions that accept laundered money and the lawyers and accountants
who facilitate corrupt transactions11
”.
In order to assess the threat caused by this “cancer” called corruption, we will discuss the
economic and political instabilities it generates, the international initiatives led by different
stakeholders to fight this disease, to finally analyse the Canadian initiative through the
Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, Canada's Foreign Anti-Bribery Law.
1 - THE ECONOMY OF COUNTRIES:
As describe by the World Bank, “macroeconomic stability” is threatened by loss of government
revenue and extreme expenditure. This can occur with corruption in tax and customs divisions,
with debt arising from the lack of scrutiny on behalf of central banks and finance ministries, with
the awarding of contracts to high-cost bidders or in the absence of competitive tendering, and
with the weakening of expenditure control. “Excessive debt may be incurred through "white
9
Evan Dyer, “Foreign bribery cases of new RCMP crackdown”, CBC News (28 December 2014), online:
<http://www.cbc.ca/m/touch/politics/story/1.2878369>.
10
Ibid.
11
The World Bank, “Anti-Corruption”, (28 March 2016), online: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-
corruption> [World Bank 2016].

4
elephant" investment projects that owe their origin, in part, to bribes12
”. Corrupt transactions,
fraud in financial institutions have a detrimental effect on the macroeconomic stability of the
country deterring foreign investors from investing in the corrupt country and encouraging tax
evasion due to lack of trust13
. The economic productivity is undermined because of the unceasing
attention demanded of business by corrupt official. The public as well as foreign investors are
denied the advantages of a competitive market place because competition is becoming much
more focused on the highest bribe, thus eroded by the practice of corruption. The poor bear in
particular the disastrous effects of macroeconomic instability as reported by the World Bank:
“[w]hen access to public goods and services requires a bribe, the poor may be excluded. Given
their lack of political influence, the poor may even be asked to pay more than people with higher
incomes14
”. In Paraguay for instance, the poor pay 12.6% of their earnings to bribes whereas
high-income households pay 6.4%15
. The equivalent numbers in Sierra Leona are 13% and 3.8%.
“Every stolen dollar, euro, peso, yuan, rupee, or ruble robs the poor of an equal opportunity in
life16
”. The shift in government priorities correlated with corruption dampens spending on
services such as health, essential infrastructure, and education, with critical effect on the
country’s wellbeing. As the World Bank stated, when corruption creates inferior public services,
“the poor lack the resources to pursue "exit" options such as private schooling, health care, or
power generation17
”. The impact of corruption is also detrimental to small businesses, due to
limited consumption, lack of bargaining powers and influence to contest requests for bribes and
unlawful solicitations, scarcity of resources and smaller profit margins to comply with such
payments. Therefore, small enterprises, in certain countries, cannot always evade paying bribes
12
World Bank 97, supra note 3 at p.18.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid at p.19.
15
World Bank 2016, supra note 11.
16
Ibid.
17
World Bank 97, supra note 3 at p.19.

5
or other unofficial payments. The outcome of refusing to engage in corrupt practices may put a
small enterprise out of business18
.
The disastrous effects of corruption threaten the economic stability and political stability as well.
The following section discusses the devastating consequences of corruption on the political
system of countries.
2-THE HAZARDS OF CORRUPTION ON POLITICAL STABILITY OF COUNTRIES:
Corruption is a threat for “the stability and security of societies, undermining the institutions and
values of democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizing sustainable development19
”.
Once corruption transforms a state into a ‘weak’ country, the stage is then set for its eventual
collapse by the outbreak of conflicts. How can corruption upset political stability of a state?
Three manifestations can be detected: (1) corruption can increase calls for political changes, (2)
hinder conflict resolution mechanisms eroding the confidence in the rule of law as well as (3)
lead to rigged elections jeopardizing democracy.
Corruption can increase calls for political change: Corruption can exacerbate protests and
calls for political change throughout widespread support for violent political change: coup d’état.
According to the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) “actual or even perceived
massive corruption” is considered to be as one of the factors that aggravates “the vulnerability of
states to coup d’état and render a coup almost unavoidable20
”. Starting with the overthrow of the
regime in Togo in January 1963, West African countries by the end of 2004 had witnessed
18
United Nations Industrial Development Organization and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
“Corruption prevention to foster small and medium-sized enterprise development: Providing anti-corruption
assistance to small businesses in the developing world”, Vol I, Vienna 2007, p.9, online:
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2012/UNIDO-
UNODC_Publication_on_Small_Business_Development_and_Corruption_Vol1.pdf>.
19
United Nations Convention against Corruption, 9 December 2003, A/58/422 at 1, (entered into force 14
December 2005) [UNCAC].
20
Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, “Life after State House: Addressing Unconstitutional changes in West Africa”,
UNOWA, Issue Papers (March 2006), at p.15, online: http://www.agora-
parl.org/sites/default/files/addressing_unconditional_changes_in_africa.original.pdf [Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah].

6
“forty-four successful military-led coups, forty three…bloody failed attempts, eighty two
reported group plots… and as many as seven terrible civil wars21
”. However, in the majority of
cases those who brought down the ‘corrupt’ regimes were even more corrupt than their
predecessors, and had in turn been removed from office by another coup d’état. Sierra Leone
provides the right example for the relation between corruption and political instability. Sierra
Leone had been the battle ground for violent conflicts between 1991 and 2002. As described by
David Keen, Sierra Leone corrupt politicians plotted with smugglers to deprive the country of
significant funds intended for development22
. Keen reported a study by Care International in
2002 asserting that “contrary to the popularly held view that ‘diamond’ was the root cause of the
war, more evidence point…to corruption23
”. With increasing corruption “poverty and bad
governance” surged while the “corresponding need for food and security, justice, and the
creation of democratic mechanism capable of protecting the rights of ordinary citizens” ignored.
Anger mounted at corruption in Sierra Leone and “some [insurgents] seem to have concluded
that in an unfair system the only rational course was to grab a piece of the good life [by force]24
”.
Once the conflict began corruption was fuelling its existence. Corruption in the army weakened
the few units who confronted the insurgents25
. Some corrupt soldiers even took bribes from
rebels in return of their releases26
.
Corruption hinders conflict resolution mechanisms and undermines the rule of law: As stated
by Paul Dewar, Conflict minerals yield up to US$180 million per year for armed group “keeping
some militias in business” and he added that “up to 40% of those working in the mines are
21
Ibid.
22
Keen, David, Conflict and Conclusion in Sierra Leone, (2005) Palgrave: New York, at p.52 [Keen].
23
Ibid at p. 64
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid at p.83.
26
Ibid at p.89.

7
children, who are exploited and abused. They then become prime targets for recruitment by
armed groups27
”. A state is supposed to settle conflicts arising on its soil through legitimate
public forums and mechanisms for peaceful debate. Corruption hinders conflict resolution
mechanisms, leading to the use of violence instead of resorting to courts and administrative
procedure to resolve disputes. The excessive use of violence as a mean for conflict settlement
will urge people to challenge the state legitimacy through violence. As summarized by the
OECD, “disappointed citizens might turn away from the state (…) or stand up against what they
perceive to be the corrupt political and economic elites28
”. Amnesty International reported that
impunity in both Guatemala and Canada has perpetuated state and corporate violence against
communities and individuals resisting mining projects, resulting in murders, assassination
attempts, rapes, land grabs, displacements and other forms of violence that were also prevalent
during Guatemala’s bloody internal conflict29
.
In a state where rule of law reigns, its citizen benefit from an equal standing under the law
regardless of their political affiliation, social status, economic power, or ethnic background. The
OECD asserted that “[r]ules and regulations are circumvented by bribes30
”. Arnone and Borlini
elaborate on the impact of corruption on the rule of law by asserting that corrupt practices
undermine the basic foundation of both, the representative mechanisms, critical to the separation
of powers, and human rights. “Since corruption generates discrimination and inequality, this
relationship [between human rights and government corruption] ... bears on civil and political
rights”. They add that for example corruption “strengthens the misappropriation of property in
27
Canada, Bill C-486, An Act respecting corporate practices relating to the extraction, processing, purchase, trade
and use of conflict minerals from the Great Lakes Region of Africa, 2nd Sess, 41th Parl, 2014, Historical,(defeated,
as of Sept. 24, 2014). Online: <https://openparliament.ca/bills/41-2/C-486/>.
28
OECD, The rationale for fighting corruption, CleanGovBiz, (2014) at p.4, online:
https://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/49693613.pdf .
29
Amnesty International, Guatemala: Mining in Guatemala: Rights at Risk, London (2014) at p.7.
30
Supra note 28 at p. 4.

8
violation of legal rights ... it likely leads to the rise of monopolies which either wipe out or
gravely vitiate freedom to trade31
”.
Therefore, corruption leads to the breakdown of the rule of law, which encompasses the
processes, norms, and structures that hold the population and public officials legally responsible
for their actions and impose sanctions if they violate the law. "The problem in Guatemala is not
the laws, per se, nor the structure of the legal system itself, but rather impunity," said Grahame
Russell, director of the Canadian and U.S.-based NGO Rights Action and he added what
Guatemala requires is "a fundamental transformation in its lack of democracy, its lack of rule of
law, and its corruption32
".
Least but not last corruption lead to rigged elections jeopardizing democracy: The state is
hijacked by the ruling elite through the practices of corruption. In countries where corruption and
impunity are becoming the norm, people seek political office primarily with the intention to gain
control of the state’s resources. In that case political battle among candidates is reined by
unhealthy competition that may lead to the use of violence. Access to public offices through fair
and free elections is virtually absent as the election process is usually rigged through vote buying
and bribing judges to settle electoral conflicts in favour of the ruling elite. Thus, corrupt practices
induce a government that had lost the trust of its citizens to remain in power. Substantial and
widespread corruption or manipulations by ruling elites, defiance of ruling elites to transparency,
accountability and illegitimate transactions within the population, are among the factors that
trigger state failure and the collapse of democracy33
.
31
Marco Arnone & Leonardo S. Borlini, Corruption: Economic Analysis and International Law (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton,
US: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2014) at 170–171.
32
Cyril Mychaljeko, Guatemalan Government, Canadian Mining Industry Responsible For violent Conflicts, October 8, 2014,
online: http://www.rightsaction.org/action-content/guatemalan-government-canadian-mining-industry-responsible-violent-
conflicts.
33
USAID, Corruption Assessment Handbook – Draft Final Report, Washington (8 May 2006) at p.18, online:
<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/USAIDCorAsmtHandbook.pdf >.

9
A better understanding of the economic, political and social costs of corrupt practices has
impelled recent international initiatives to combat corruption, promote transparency and
consolidate accountability. The following section will discuss the most important international
initiatives in fighting corruption starting with the American statute, the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA), which was the 1st
legislation adopted to combat bribery of foreign
officials in 1977, followed by a discussion of the OECD Convention against foreign bribery, the
UN Convention Against Corruption, the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, then a
discussion about the efforts exerted by one the most notorious civil society organisations,
Transparency International, in the international fight against corruption. We conclude this
section by discussing the role of a key international financial institution in fighting corruption,
the World Bank.
3-INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION:
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Prior to 1977, the US was a pioneer in the combat against
foreign bribery by enacting legislation particularly prohibiting the bribery of foreign official. As
professor Mendes said in his book “[t]he emergence of major corporate complicity in bribery and
corruption let the Government of the US to strike back in the form of 1977 Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act34
, with its extraterritorial reach to most of the major [multinational corporations
(MNEs)] in the world through their links with US capital markets35
”. In her paper, Annalisa
Leibold noted that “given the ease with which the U.S. government can bring charges against a
foreign company, coupled with the fact that such charges are usually settled as opposed to
litigated, the FCPA looks more like an international anti-corruption business tax, rather than a
34
Pub L No 95-213, 91 Stat 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g) to (h), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-
3, 78ff), amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, Pub L No 100-418, 102 Stat 1107, 1415 (1988)
(codified at §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff), and the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub L No 105-366,
112 Stat 3302 (1998) (codified at §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff) [FCPA].
35
Mendes, supra note 1 p.211.

10
domestic criminal law with limited extraterritorial applications36
”. The FCPA was passed in
1977 as a response to the so-called Lockheed scandal, in which executives of the American
aircraft manufacturer were found to be engaged in bribing high-ranking public officials in
several countries, among them, Japan, the Netherlands and Italy, while Lockheed required
financial support from the American government. A report from the House of Representatives
insisted that the legislation was crucial due to widespread bribery admitted by companies37
. An
anti-corruption statute was believed that it would “help U.S. corporations resist corrupt
demands38
”. The FCPA forbids the payment, offer of payment, or gift to a foreign official in
order to obtain or retain business in that country39
. This Act provides for criminal prosecution by
the Department of Justice. And if a corporation is publicly traded in the US, the FCPA provides
for civil prosecution by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). “In 2010, the SEC's
Enforcement Division created a specialized unit to further enhance its enforcement of the FCPA,
which prohibits U.S. companies from bribing foreign officials for government contracts and
other business40
”. However, after its enactment, many American corporations claimed a decline
in their business operations arguing that the Act had initiated a competitive disadvantage to their
businesses outside the US41
. The US Commerce Department and several US intelligence
agencies reckoned that in 1994-1995, US businesses lost US$11 billion in potential revenue in
36
Annalisa Leibold, The FCPA is a new international business tax on non U.S. companies, January 23, 2015,
online: <http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/1/23/paper-the-fcpa-is-a-new-international-business-tax-on-non-
us.html>.
37
US, House of Representatives, Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977 (HR Doc No 95-640) (1977) (“More than 400
corporations have admitted making questionable or illegal payments. The companies, most of them voluntarily, have reported
paying out well in excess of $300 million in corporate funds to foreign government officials, politicians, and political parties.
These corporations have included some of the largest and most widely held public companies in the United States; over 117 of
them rank in the top Fortune 500 industries”).
38
Ibid.
39
Sara Seck, “Unilateral Home State Regulation: Imperialism or Tool for Subaltern Resistance?” (2008) 46
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 565 at 569.
40
“SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases” available online: < http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-
cases.shtml>.
41
Lori Ann Wanlin, “The Gap Between Promise and Practice in the Global Fight Against Corruption” (2006) Asper
Rev of Int'l Bus and Trade Law 209 at para 5.

11
contrast to their counterparts engaged in bribing foreign officials42
. Subsequently the American
government began a strong movement to convince other governments and international
organizations to carry out measures identical to the FCPA.
“The focus of the attention in this regard was not the United Nations, where treaty obligations
have become diplomatic decorations”, as professor Mendes stated. Instead, as explained by
professor Mendes “the industrialised world gave the mandate to the OECD, the club of rich
industrialised nations of the world, together with some aspiring developing nations43
”.
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions44
: Founded in 1968, the OECD is an international economic organisation
whose main mission is “to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-
being of people around the world45
”. In May 1997 the OECD Ministerial meeting called for the
negotiation of a binding covenant to deal with the bribery of foreign public officials, and urged
Member States to propose legislative schemes to their national legislature in order to prohibit
such bribes and pursue their enactment by the end of 199846
. By June 21, 1997, leaders of the G-
7 countries, including PM Chrétien, released a statement in Denver advocating this approach and
timetable for the OECD. “To date, 41 states have ratified the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
including all 34 member states of the OECD and seven non-member states47
”. The OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention came into effect in February 15, 1999. Since then more than 300 individuals
42
Patrick Glynn, Stephen J Kobrin & Moisés Naím, “The Globalization of Corruption” in Kimberly Ann Elliott, ed, Corruption
and the Global Economy (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1997) at p.18.
43
44
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 17 December
1997, DAFFE/IME/BR (97)20, (entered into force on 15 February 1999).
45
OECD, The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, online: OECD.org <http://www.oecd.org/about/>.
46
Canada, Department of Justice, The Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act: a Guide, (Ottawa: Communication and
Executive Services Branch, 1999) at 1 [CFPOA Guide].
47
Global Affairs Canada, Canada’s Fights against Foreign Bribery: Fifteenth Annual Report to Parliament: Implementation of
the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, and the Enforcement
of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, (Ottawa: Global Affairs, September 2013 - August 2014) online:
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/other-autre/corr-
15.aspx?lang=eng#oecd.

12
and more than 100 entities were criminally prosecuted and held liable for foreign bribery in over
one-third of the State Parties. More than 80 of the penalised individuals were sent to prison for
engaging in foreign bribery in 1/3 of these State Parties. Around 400 investigations are still in
progress in over ½ of these State Parties48
.
The United Nations had conformed to the OECD’s approach through declarations, in 1996 and
1998, condemning bribery and corruption of public office holders. “In December 2004, the UN
General Assembly also adopted the wide-ranging but as yet unproved Convention against
Corruption49
”.
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)50
: It is considered to be the 1st
global in-depth covenant on corruption. Before the adoption of the UNCAC, it had been argued
that states should consider writing passive bribery legislations to complement the already
existing provisions against supply-side bribery51
. The UNCAC was signed by 111 states in
Mérida, Mexico in December 9, 2003; by 2013 the number of signatories had increased to 16752
.
It is noteworthy that Kenya, experiencing corruption and economic crimes, became the first
country to sign and simultaneously ratify the UNCAC committing itself to enhancing the fight
against corruption through the enactment of the necessary legislative, institutional and policy
framework required to toughen public accountability, transparency and integrity53
.
According to the 1st
article, the objectives of UNCAC are (1) to foster and enhance procedures to
preclude and fight corruption more efficiently and effectively; (2) to foster, enable and
48
Ibid.
49
50
UNCAC, Supra note 19.
51
Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evocation of the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J.
INT’L L. 233, 241 (1999) at 678; Guy Stessens, The International Fight Against Corruption, 72 REVUE INT’L DE DROIT
PENAL 892, 894 (2001) (Belg.) at 903
52
Mendes, supra note 1 at p.212.
53
Kenya
Kenya, Department of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs and Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, “Kenya:
UN Convention against Corruption: Gap Analysis Report and Implementation Plan”, (2009), at p. 3, online: <
http://www.eacc.go.ke/docs/kenya-uncac-gap-analysis-report.pdf>.

13
corroborate international cooperation and technical assistance in the preclusion of and combat
against corruption, including in asset recovery; (3) to foster integrity, liability and appropriate
supervision of public affairs and public property. The UNCAC endeavours to combat corrupt
practices in both the public (art.7) and private sectors (art.12). Its preventive measures
encompass the creation of anticorruption bodies, improved transparency in campaign and
political party funding, safety measures to guarantee effective and transparent management and
provision of public goods and services, codes of conduct and financial disclosure for public
officials, and transparency as well as liability in public financial transactions and in crucial fields
such as public procurement and the judiciary. The UNCAC also urges the civil society and the
general to participate in the fight against corruption. The UNCAC exceeds other instruments of
its type in that it does not only criminalize bribery of national public officials (art.15), bribery of
foreign public officials and officials of public international organizations (art.16) and
embezzlement (art.17). The UNCAC also criminalizes trading in influence (art.18), money
laundering (art.23), concealment of any profits resulting from corrupt acts (art.24), obstruction of
justice in the prosecution of such acts (art. 25). The UNCAC also lays emphasis on mutual legal
assistance between State Parties in collecting and transferring evidence and calls for signatories
to cooperate in identifying, freezing, seizing and confiscating the proceeds of corruption (art.
46). The most important breakthrough of the UNCAC was the asset recovery provisions in
chapter V. These stipulations will enable developing states to recuperate assets illegally acquired
from their coffers. The question becomes: how did State Parties implement the UNCAC?
In a Summary of the state implementation of the UNCAC, it has been established that the
Convention have led many State parties to adopt statutory amendments and structural changes
which have produced legislative and institutional reforms and enforcement, as well as potent

14
frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance and law enforcement cooperation54
.
However, after 13 years and until the time of writing this paper, we couldn’t point out a single
tangible achievement on the ground in terms of actual cases or convictions in light of the
UNCAC.
There have been other noteworthy regional initiatives to fight corruption. In March, 1996, the
Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the Inter-American Convention against
Corruption in Caracas, Venezuela.
The Inter-American Convention against Corruption55
: This covenant contains a set of
preventive measures similar to the OECD Convention. It criminalizes certain corrupt practices as
transnational bribery (art. VIII) and illicit enrichment (art. IX). It encompasses a series of articles
that strengthen cross border cooperation between signatories in areas such as mutual legal
assistance and mutual technical cooperation (art. XIV), extradition (art. XIII) as well as
identification, tracing, freezing, seizure and forfeiture of property or proceeds obtained, derived
from or used in the commission of acts of corruption among others (art. XV).
A number of civil society organisations are also leading the international combat against
corruption. Among the best known is Transparency International.
Transparency International (TI): TI was established in 199356
. It has been a pioneer in shifting
the topic of corruption “from a taboo topic to a talking point57
”. TI’s mission is to “stop
corruption, and promote transparency, accountability and integrity at all levels across all sectors
54
United Nations, Summary of the state of implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption:
criminalization, law enforcement and international cooperation, (19 August 2015), online:
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session6/V1505920e.pdf.
55
The Inter-American Convention against Corruption, 29 March 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-39, (entered into
force 6 March 1997).
56
Transparency International, “Our History: 2013 20 years, more to come” online: Transparency International
<http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/history>.
57
Transparency International, “Missions, Visions and Values”, online: Transparency International
https://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/mission_vision_and_values/.

15
of society58
”. In 1994, the OECD members adopted TI’s recommendations to criminalize foreign
bribery59
. TI involves 100 national chapters worldwide who cooperate with partners in
government, business and civil society to draw effective measures in to promote the anti-
corruption fight60
. In its annual report – “The Bribe Payers Index (BPI)” – TI rates the wealthiest
states in the world by the susceptibility of their businesses to participate in bribery across border.
These reports also describe the worst offenders. To reach the final index results, TI relies on
information provided by senior business executives from developed and developing states61
.
Each state is assigned a score varying from 0 to 10. The score ten shows that a country’s
domestic businesses never participate in foreign bribery. The score zero shows that a country’s
corporations are always participating in foreign bribery62
. TI’s work remains essential for the
enactment of binding anti-bribery statutes in countries like Russia, China, India, which all
require such legislation63
. TI’s monitoring procedures present effective awareness of the
guidelines that companies should put into operation in order to conform to emerging universal
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) corruption standards64
. TI’s reports compel governments
from all regions to be aware of corruption. A low ranking reveals an unfair system for awarding
contracts, narrow opportunities to grow a competitive private sector and perpetual reputational
58
Ibid.
59
Transparency International, “Our History: 1994 Going Global”, online: Transparency International
<http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/history>.
60
Transparency International, “Our Organisation: Overview”, online: Transparency International
<http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation>.
61
Transparency International, “Bribe Payers Index: First Launched in 1999, the Bribe Payers Index Evaluates the
Supply Side of Corruption – The Likelihood of Firms from The World’s Industrialised Countries to Bribe Abroad”,
online: Transparency International <http://www.transparency.org/research/bpi/overview>.
62
Transparency International, “Bribe Payers Index Report 2011”, online: Transparency International
<http://www.transparency.org/bpi2011/results >.
63
Margot Cleveland et al, “Trend in the International Fight Against Bribery and Corruption” (2009) 90 Journal of
Business Ethics 199 at 222.
64
Adefolake Adeyeye, “Universal Standards in CSR: Are We Prepared?” (2011) 11:1 Corporate Governance 107 at
114.

16
and financial risk for investors65
.
It is important to note that those international initiatives are supported by an important
international financial institution, the World Bank.
The World Bank initiatives against corruption: Considerable number and variety of WB and
World Bank Institute (WBI) surveys have been performed and provide valuable sources of hard
data. The WB became a partisan to anti-corruption initiatives in 30-40 states66
. The WB’s
approach to anti-corruption measures calls for action on 4 main fronts: (1) assisting states that
require support in combating corruption; (2) considering efforts exerted in fighting corruption as
a key focus of the WB’s inquiry and lending decisions for a state; (3) participating in
international initiatives combating corruption; and (4) striving to preclude fraud and corrupt
practices in Bank-financed projects67
. The WB’s efforts in fighting corruption regarding its own
landing portfolio are led by an independent unit, the Department of Institutional Integrity (INT),
which investigates fraud and corruption complaints in Bank-financed projects as well as claims
of staff-misconduct, and then reports its finding to decision makers i.e. the Bank’s Sanction
Committee in order to take action68
. In 201569
the INT reviewed and initiated 323 preliminary
inquiries concerning 86 states related to fraud, corruption and collusion in WB Group-financed
activities. Of those inquiries, 99 were selected for full investigation and investigators closed 81
of them. Out of the 88 external cases under investigation at the end of 2015, 65 involved
65
Transparency International, “How do Companies from your Country Behave Abroad?”, online: Transparency
International <http://www.transparency.org/bpi2011/results>.
66
Canadian International Development Agency, “Anti-Corruption Programming: Question and Strategies”, by
Bruce M. Bailey, June 2000, p. 22, online:
<http://www.acdicida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/HRDG2/$file/EngQ&S.pdf >.
67
World Bank Global Issues Seminar Series, “The Cancer of Corruption”, by Vinay Bhargava, at p.8, online:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/Corruption.pdf .
68
Ibid.
69
The World Banks Integrity Vice Presidency, “Annual Update: Fiscal year 2015”, at p.35 online:
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/pubdocs/publicdoc/2015/12/136451449168835691/INT-FY15-Annual-Update.pdf .

17
allegations of corruption. To further promote corporate governance, as of September 2010, the
World Bank Group’s (WBG) default sanction is debarment with conditional release. In the fiscal
year of 2015, 71 firms and individuals were sanctioned by the WBG, 65 of which were debarred
for periods ranging from 6 months to 13 years70
. The WB’s work with sanctioned corporations
through the Integrity Compliance Office (ICO) to establish and develop their integrity
compliance programs is supporting large and small enterprises to make integrity and efficient
risk management a fundamental part of their activities. At the end of 2015, 47 corporations
debarred by the WBG were strongly involved with the ICO. Seven corporations had their
debarment lifted this year, having instigated appropriate compliance systems and satisfying other
conditions of their sanction71
.
In the midst of all these initiatives in fighting corruption, how did Canada react? How well is
Canada enforcing its Anti-Bribery provisions? Is it prevailing in the fight against corruption?
The following sections will discuss the Canadian fight against foreign bribery by zeroing in on
the Corruption of Foreign Public Official Act (CFPOA).
4-CANADA’S FIGHT AGAINST FOREIGN BRIBERY: THE CFPOA
The Canadian federal government had sought to prevent and sanction domestic corruption
through a federal statutes, parliamentary rules and administrative provisions. The Criminal Code
contained provisions which prohibited bribery, fraud on the government and influence peddling,
fraud or breach of trust in connection with duties of office, municipal corruption, selling or
purchasing office, influencing or negotiating appointments or dealing in offices, fraud,
laundering proceeds of crime and secret commissions. Internationally, Canada has joined the
fight against corruption through various international forums, including the OECD, the OAS and
70
Ibid at p. 2.
71
Ibid.

18
the UN. Canada ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in May 31, 2007. It had also
ratified the OECD convention on December 17, 1998, which triggered this covenant’s entry into
force on February 15, 1999. On February 14, 1999, the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials
Act (CFPOA)72
entered into force. Section 3(1) of the Act deals with the offence of bribing a
foreign public official and represents Canada’s legislative contribution to the international
initiative to fight foreign bribery. It criminalizes those who, “in order to obtain or retain an
advantage in the course of business, directly or indirectly gives, offers or agrees to give or offer a
loan, reward, advantage or benefit of any kind to a foreign public official or to any person for the
benefit of a foreign public official73
”. The CFPOA provisions apply when the offence is
committed in whole or in part in the Canadian territory, or when the perpetrator is a Canadian
entity, regardless of whether the entity acted directly or through an agent or a third party74
.
The enforcement of CFPOA resulted in one prosecution between 1999 and 2011, in R v Watts
(Hydro-Kleen)75
. In contrast, 227 cases were reported by the US in 2011 and 169 cases in 2010;
135 cases were reported by Germany in 2011 and 117 cases in 201076
. This embarrassing record
led TI and the OECD Working Group on Bribery in 2012 to criticize Canada’s weak role in
fighting foreign bribery by its insufficient implementation and enforcement of the OECD
Convention77
. As a response, Canada introduced Bill S-14 on February 5, 2013, to amend the
CFPOA and broaden its scope. It received Royal Assent on June 19, 2013. Six significant
amendments were included to the CFPOA. In the previous version of the Act the definition of
“business” was restricted to “any business, profession, trade, calling, manufacture or undertaking
72
SC 1998, c 34 [CFPOA].
73
Ibid at 3(1).
74
Susan M Hutton & Paul Beaudry, “Canada Takes Aim at Foreign Corruption” (2011) at 6, online: Stikeman Elliot
<http://www.stikeman.com/2011/images/core/ForeignCorruption_ALM.pdf>.
75
[2005] AJ No 568 (QB) [Hydro-Kleen].
76
Fritz Heimann, Gillian Dell & Kelly McCarthy, Progress Report 2011: Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, 4th ed (2011), [2011 Progress Report].
77
Ibid.

19
of any kind carried on in Canada or elsewhere for profit,” therefore, not taking into account
charities78
. The 1st
amendment of the Act removed the “for profit” requirement. This ensures that
the Act applies to all entities whether they are seeking profit or not79
. The 2nd
amendment
brought to the CFPOA raised the maximum sentence of imprisonment from 5 to 14 years80
. The
3rd
amendment eliminated an exception that had been in operation for the so-called “facilitation
payments”. However clause 5 of Bill S-14 stated that the abolition of the facilitation payment
exception will not take effect on Royal Assent but on the day to be fixed by order of the
Governor in Council81
. In contrast, the US kept the facilitation payment exception in the FCPA82
.
The 4th
amendment added in the Act a new offence for falsifying or concealing books or records
in order to bribe or conceal bribery of a foreign public official83
. The 5th
amendment, and
perhaps the most crucial one, added by Bill S-14 is the “nationality jurisdiction”84
as a basis for
Canadian courts to exercise jurisdiction over persons accused of violating the Act. This means
that under the amended CFPOA, two different regimes will apply depending on the
nationality/the residency of the perpetrator: (1) Canadian courts have jurisdiction over all
Canadian nationals and permanent residents committing acts, in Canada or abroad, against the
CFPOA; thus, they are captured under clause 5(1) of the Act on the mere basis of their
nationality; and (2) for a Canadian court to have jurisdiction over foreign nationals under the
78
CFPOA, supra note 72.
79
Canada, Bill S-14, An Act to amend the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, 1st Sess, 41th Parl, 2013, cl
2(3) (Assented to 19 June 2013).
80
Parliament of Canada “Legislative Summary of Bill S-14: An Act to amend the Corruption of Foreign Public
Officials Act”, by Robin MacKay (28 February 2013) at p.6: online: Parliament of Canada
http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/LegislativeSummaries/bills_ls.asp?ls=s14&Parl=41&Ses=1#a10.
81
Ibid.
82
FCPA , supra note 34 at s.4: this Act stipulates that it does not apply to any “facilitating or expediting payment to
a foreign official, political party, or party official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of
a routine government action by a foreign official, political party or party official”.)
83
Supra note 80 at p 6.
84
Ibid at p.7.

20
FCPA, it must have jurisdiction over both the crime (through a substantial link to Canada85
) and
the person (by such person being physically present in Canada86
). The 6th
amendment included in
the Act asserted that officers of the RCMP (or a person designated as a peace officer under the
Royal Canadian Mounted police Act) have the exclusive authority to prosecute under the
CFPOA87
.
5-IS CANADA PREVAILING IN THE BATTLE AGAINST FOREIGN BRIBERY?
When Bill S-14 received Royal Assent on June 19, 2013, Minister John Baird explained the
rational for the amendments by asserting that they were aimed to “further deter and prevent
Canadian companies from bribing public officials […] and help ensure that Canadian companies
continue to act in good faith in the pursuit of freer makers and expanded global trade88
”.
However there has been limited jurisprudence in Canada under the CFPOA. The 1st
decision
under was in January 10, 2005, R v Watt (Hydro-Kleen)89
. The case concerns bribes paid by
Hydro Kleen Group Inc. an Alberta-based company, to a U.S. immigration officer who worked
at the Calgary International Airport. He pleaded guilty in July 2002, to accepting bribes from the
Canadian company. Hydro Kleen had bribed this officer to facilitate the entrance of its
employees into the U.S. and to delay the U.S. entrance of competitors’ employees. The
immigration official was paid approximately CAD$ 30,000 as bribes. Unfortunately, this case
does not offer specific guidelines regarding the boundaries of the offence since the officer
pleaded guilty. He received a six month sentence and was subsequently deported to the United
States. The company entered a guilty plea under section 3(1)(a) of the CFPOA and was ordered
85
Libman v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 178, at para 74.
86
Chowdhury v H.M.Q, 2014 ONSC.
87
Supra note 80 at p.7.
88
Canada, Global Affairs “Strengthening Canada’s Fight Against Foreign Bribery”, (5 February 2013) online:
<http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2013/02/05b.aspx?lang=eng>.
89
R v Watts, [2005] AJ No 568 (Alta QB).

21
to pay a fine of only $25,000. The 2nd
case prosecuted under the CFPOA is R v Niko Resources
Ltd90
. On Jun 24th
, 2011, Niko Resources Ltd, a publicly-traded company based in Calgary,
Alberta, pled guilty to a charge of bribery under the CFPOA in connection with events
surrounding a blast that occurred at Niko’s natural gas field in Bangladesh. At the time of the
explosion Niko was negotiating a gas pricing contract with the Bangladeshi government. The
specific conduct in question concerned 2 sets of benefits offered through Niko’s local subsidiary
to the Bangladeshi Minister of Energy: (1) a $190,984 SUV vehicle and (2) payment of a trip to
Calgary for business and on the way a side trip to New York and Chicago to visit relatives (the
total value of which benefits were in the range of $196,000). These sums were found to have
constituted “bribes” within the meaning of the CFPOA. The company was fined nearly $9.5
million and was placed under a probation order for 3 years to ensure that audits were completed
and to assess the company's compliance with the CFPOA. The case was perceived as the first
significant prosecution under the CFPOA. The 3rd
case prosecuted under the CFPOA is R v
Griffiths Energy International91
. Griffiths Energy International Inc. (GEI) was a small privately
held oil and gas company based in Calgary. Mr. Griffiths and one of his partners, Naeem Tyab,
spent 6 months in 2008 establishing contacts in Chad’s embassy and investigating about oil and
gas leases in the African country. The pair, together with Parvez Tyab, set up Griffiths Energy,
which contemplated bribing Chad’s ambassador to Canada in September, 2009. Instead, funds
were paid to a corporation ran by the ambassador’s wife, according to the agreed statement of
facts filed in court. GEI reported these irregularities and admitted to the bribery. The company
pleaded guilty on January 22, 2013 to one count of bribery under the CFPOA and was sentenced
on January 25, 2013 to pay a total penalty of $10,350,000. The 4th
case prosecuted under the
90
101 WCB (2d) 118, 2011 CarswellAlta 2521 (WL Can) (ABQB) [Niko Resources].
91
[2013] AJ No 412 (ABQB) [Griffiths Energy].

22
CFPOA is R v Karigar92
. In this case, Nazir Karigar, a paid agent for a group of Canadian
companies, arranged bribes to public officials in India to win a $100 million security contract
from Air India. Hackland J. of the Ontario Superior Court in Ottawa convicted Karigar in August
2013 for a conspiracy that dates back to 2005-2006. Hackland J. expressly mentioned that
“[t]here would appear to be no jurisprudence interpreting the CFPOA. This is the first
prosecution under this Act which has proceeded to trial93
”. After analysing the elements of the
offence in the Act, he held that the actus reus of the offence is “the agreement to pursue unlawful
objectives” and he inferred that “the use of the term "agrees" imports the concept of conspiracy
into the Act. In doing so, it meets Canada's obligations under the [OECD] Convention to
criminalize conspiracies to give or offer bribes to foreign public officials94
”. Finally he held that
in order to satisfy the actus reus of the offence, the accused need only to believe that a bribe has
been paid to a foreign official, independent of whether or not the bribe was actually paid95
. This
decision was considered a landmark bribery case as it marks the first sentence handed down
against an individual under CFPOA, and the 1st
jurisprudence that explained the Act and
established that a conspiracy or an agreement to bribe foreign public officials is in itself a
violation of the CFPOA.
Reviewing the cases above we are of the opinion that Canada had done so little to fulfill its
obligations under the OECD Convention in combatting foreign bribery via the CFPOA;
beginning with the Hydro-Kleen case, involving a corrupt border officer, the outcome was that
the company had to pay $25,000, a sum less than the bribe itself, and no other measure were
taken by the Canadian government in that respect. Then 6 years have elapsed with no
92
[2013] OJ No 3661, 2013 ONSC 5199.
93
Ibid at para 27.
94
Ibid at para 28.
95
Ibid at para 33.

23
convections under the Act. In 2011, TI published a report that criticized Canada for failing to
implement its foreign anti-bribery legislations underlining that the “Canadian legal system and
courts do not handle complex white collar criminal cases very well96
”. This followed, a report
issued by the OECD Working Group on Bribery in March 2011 which concluded that “Canada’s
regime for enforcement of the [CFPOA] remains problematic in important areas97
” As a response
Canada amended the CFPOA through Bill S-14 as discussed earlier. In 2013, the GEI case
surfaced; however the violation of the CFPOA was not discovered by the RCMP. Instead the
GEI new management team presided by CEO Mr. Gary Guidry detected the company’s alleged
bribe, and an internal investigation was conducted98
. Hadn’t Mr. Guidry led his team to further
investigate and report to the RCMP, would they have found out this offence? In our opinion this
self-reporting case could merely mirror Canada’s adherence to the foreign anti-bribery fight.
Thus, we can fairly say that only two basic convictions occurred under the CFPOA, which fail to
show Canada as a lead in fighting corruption. The lax enforcement of the foreign anti-bribery
legislation is further revealed by the SNC-Lavalin case. In April 2013, the WB Group announced
the debarment of SNC-Lavalin Inc. for a period of 10 due to the company’s misconduct
regarding the Padma Multipurpose Bridge Project in Bangladesh, as well as misconduct under
another Bank-financed project99
. According to the WB the SNC, which is one of Canada’s top
engineering firms, was involved in a conspiracy to pay bribes and in misrepresentations when
96
Bruce Cheadle “Canada gets failing grade for lax enforcement of anti-bribery laws”, Thestar.com Business (24
May 2011) online:
http://www.thestar.com/business/2011/05/24/canada_gets_failing_grade_for_lax_enforcement_of_antibribery_laws.
html.
97
Ibid.
98
Brian Hutchinson, “Calgary Oil Company paid $2M Bribe for Access to Oil Fields in Chad, Court Told” National
Post (1 January 2013), online: http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/calgary-oil-company-paid-2m-bribe-for-
access-to-oil-fields-in-chad-court-told.
99
The World Bank, “World Bank Debars SNC-Lavalin Inc. and its Affiliates for 10 years” (17 April 2013),
available online: < http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/04/17/world-bank-debars-snc-lavalin-
inc-and-its-affiliates-for-ten-years>.

24
bidding for Bank-financed contracts in violent of the WB’s procurement guidelines100
. Despite
referring the matter to the RCMP no conviction had occurred. In 2015 SNC a 2 of its affiliates
were charged with fraud and corruption under the CFPOA in a case related to its operations in
Libya. In December 2015, SNC entered into an agreement with the federal government under
which, SNC will be able to participate in bidding and winning contracts to provide goods and
services to the Canadian government pending on the final result of those charges101
. This
approach with a company that was already blacklisted by the WB, reveals a huge failure on
behalf of the Canadian government in the enforcement of its anti-bribery rules.
Conclusion:
The fight against corruption has not only become more pressing, it has also become more
noticeable as the degree of its influence is growingly apparent. Not only does corruption
bankrupt economies, jeopardize democracy and undermine the rule of law, it nourishes terrorism
and organized crime. These far reaching outcomes clearly show that the war against corruption
cannot be waged at the national level alone. Corruption is without doubt a disease of
international interest as it strikes developed and developing countries alike respecting no
boundaries. All anti-bribery initiatives discussed in this paper are a product of this heightened
consciousness of corruption as a growing and indiscriminate threat. if steps were taken to halt the
trillion dollar scandal reported by the WB, they could free up revenues which, based on the data
from the Lancet Commission on Global Health, would: “Help avert 3.6 million death per year
between 2015 and 2025 in low-incomes countries; Help avert 4.3 million deaths per year
between 2015 and 2025 in lower middle countries, putting the world track to end preventable
100
Ibid.
101
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, “Anti-Bribery and corruption: global enforcement and legislative developments
in 2016”, GI ABC guide 2016 at p .32.
http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Campaigns/GI/content/GI%20ABC%20guide%202016.PDF.

25
child deaths in these countries by 2030102
”. Furthermore, winning the war against corruption in
Sub-Saharan Africa alone would generate revenues to “ [e]ducate 10 million children per year;
 [p]rovide antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) for over 11 million people living with HIV/AIDS; Pay
almost 165 million vaccines103
”.
However, on April 2016, the Panama Papers provided detailed information about more than
214,000 anonymous shell companies used for unlawful purposes including sovereign and
individual fraud, drug trafficking and illegal tax evasion104
: it all adds up to a global scandal that
has to be stopped.
To conclude, one should seriously question whether MNE’s particularly in Canada, have the
intention to abide with the Canadian and international initiatives in fighting corruption,
specifically foreign bribery, while they will most certainly face competitive disadvantages in
every bidding against companies from other countries with more lax legal and regulatory
systems (i.e. the absence of anti-bribery rules and regulations)?
In our opinion it is highly unlikely.
102
One, “The Trillion Dollar Scandal” (3 September 2014) at p.2, online: http://www.one.org/international/policy/trillion-dollar-
scandal/.
103
Ibid.
104
Lizzie Dearden, “Panama Papers: What are they, who is involved and why are they important?”, Independent (4 April 2016),
online: < http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/panama-papers-what-are-they-who-is-involved-and-why-are-they-
important-illegal-legal-tax-avoidance-a6967176.html>.

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