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Article24(1) of theUN Charter placesprimary responsibility for the
maintenanceof internationalpeaceand security on theUN Security Council.
However, some would argue that theUN Security Council system, as it
stands, is poorly suited to addressing current internationalrealities.
Do you thinktheUN Security Council needsreform, and if yes, how effective
do you thinkany reform will be in addressing current international realities?
Introduction
The prospect for reform of the UN Security Council has never been far from the political
agenda since the UN’s conception in 1945. In the immediate aftermath of the second world
war, the UN had become nothing more than a high profile battleground for the beneficiaries
of the conflict, collectively known as the Grand Alliance, and thus it may be said that the
established Council system embodied a product of realism, a reinforcing agent meticulously
designed and constructed to consolidate a new international order1. While the vast majority
of attempts to reform the Council have produced only minor changes however, they have at
least served to demonstrate the inherently complicated and difficult nature of securing such
reform. It is also worth mentioning that reform of the Security Council can refer to several
different ideas: changing how the Council works, modifying the right of veto or
reconsidering the terms and conditions of its membership. The combination of these factors
means that there remains great dispute about how reform may be achieved under the
existing systemwhere any proposal brought before the Council may immediately be
dismissed by virtue of a veto by any one of the Council’s five permanent members (the P5,
namely the UK, the US, France, Russia and China).
The primary objective of this paper is to set out an often overlooked truth about reform of
the Security Council: calling for reform as a matter of principle is distinct from calling for
reform because of a genuine desire to establish a more transparent and more democratic
Council as a whole. It will also be argued that while the comprehensive failings of the UN are
now well-documented, such widespread failures are not necessarily indicative of a Security
Council in dire need of reform. This essay will seek to provide a detailed account of the
Security Council’s current position by considering its political background and emphasizing
1 K. Kufuour, ‘The African Union and the reform of the Security Council: some matters arising’[2006] 14(2)
African Journal of International and ComparativeLaw 288-292.

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the need to consider the Council within its appropriate context. This paper will proceed to
outline the Council’s mandate under Article 24 and show why reform of the Council, while
generally welcomed, has become so inherently difficult to achieve. While emphasizing the
need for reform of the Council, this essay will consider the most commonly-cited ground for
reform, namely the need to make the Council more representative of the global population,
and explain why such proposals are unfounded. Finally, this paper argues that reform of the
Council may be achieved by focusing on efforts to democratize the way in which the Council
operates and suggests that such reforms may be the most effective in addressing current
international realities.
The UN Security Council: Background and a brief note about its current
position
The first note of the UN Charter’s preamble states clearly that the people of the United
Nations are determined “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”2. In the
year 2000, after a series of peacekeeping failures stretching from the Eastern European
conflicts that followed the end of the Cold War to Rwanda, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Cambodia,
Mozambique and Sri Lanka, the General Assembly of the United Nations ordered a
comprehensive review of the Security Council’s obligations under the Charter in maintaining
international peace and security. The result, the Brahimi report3, states that the UN has
“failed repeatedly” to meet the challenge set out by Article 24 and recommends that the UN
Security Council reconsider its decision-making process in situations of armed conflict.
Moreover, in his work for the Center of International Diplomacy and Public Policy, Jacobsen
(2012) lists a number of ‘egregious failures’ of the UN across a series of deployments across
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in particular. Not only did the UN fail to secure any
meaningful political settlement to the country’s ongoing civil war (to this day, the mission
remains the UN’s largest ever operation with almost 19,000 troops deployed as of February
20164), the UN’s personnel have also been repeatedly accused of sexually abusing
thousands of vulnerable women and children. In early 2006, the UN’s Office of Internal
2 Full pdf availableat https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf p.2.
3 [UN doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809]
4 United Nations,‘Peacekeeping Fact Sheet’ (United Nations Peacekeeping, July 2010)
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml Accessed 8th April 2016.

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Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted a small-scale study of UN task forces in DRC following a
report by the Secretary-General5. Over just a 4 week-period, the Office investigated 217
cases of sexual exploitation and abuse against women and children, most of whom were
aged between 15 and 18, carried out by 75 UN peacekeeping troops6. Since then, the UN
has failed to take full responsibility for the misconduct of its troops and has systematically
ignored requests by the parent countries of the alleged abusers to conduct criminal
investigations7.
Why are these notes relevant for addressing the issue of Security Council reform? These
considerations are mentioned to highlight the dilemma the Security Council currently faces:
it seems that wherever the UN is deployed, its comprehensive and widespread failings
politically, diplomatically and morally suggest a UN in desperate need of radical reform. That
the UN is in need of reform therefore is undisputed and gives way for an entirely separate
topic area. However, these failings are not systematic; that is to say these failings are not,
however improper, negligent or unethical, necessarily indicative of a failed Security Council.
In other words, it would be naïve to consider the Security Council as being in some way
single-handedly responsible for such large-scale failings; it would be equally naïve therefore
to suggest that the Security Council ought to be reformed on this basis alone. This important
contextual observation captures the point made at the beginning of this paper: that calling
for Security Council reform, while generally welcomed, must only be taken seriously if the
intention of the reform is genuine i.e. to establish a fairer, more democratic and more
transparent Security Council system and not an opportunistic attempt to further the
political self-interests of a particular state. It is submitted that far too often the Security
Council is apparently held responsible for such failings when it is simply unreasonable to
attribute such widespread unethical conduct to the Council itself – rather, this is indicative
of a much deeper concern that encompasses the entirety of the UN’s principal institutions.
The mandate of the Security Council and its legislative reach
5 [UN doc. A/60/861]
6 [UN doc. A/61/841]
7 [UN doc. A/64/573]

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Under Article 39 and Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council may take
‘enforcement action’ against a state in instances where that state has posed a threat to the
peace or has acted in breach of the peace by committing an act of aggression. History would
suggest that the UN Security Council grants itself wide discretion in considering what form
of enforcement action may be taken – this may comprise military action (such as that
authorised against Korea in 1950 and Iraq in 1990/91), the imposing of economic sanctions
(such as trade embargoes against South Africa in 1977 and Serbia and Montenegro in 1992),
or other similar measures whether they be social, diplomatic or political (such as the
mandatory severance of air links across Libya following the Lockerbie bombing and the
partial embargo imposed on North Korea in 2006 following a series of unlawful nuclear
tests8).
An essential part of the Security Council’s mandate is its authorization over the use of
force9. Significantly however, the declaration of either a threat or a breach of the peace
rests upon a factual and political judgement, not a legal one10. This means that the Security
Council has the power, in theory, to act preventively: that is, to take action before a
sufficient enough threat to, or breach of, the peace arises. The Council has rarely done so,
which has led to many states believing that it ought to bypass the Council entirely due to a
lack of confidence in its effectiveness and a lack of objectivity in its decision-making process.
The solution however is not to condemn the Council to a future of irrelevance and
impotence; rather, it is to suggest ways of reforming the Security Council so that it
commands the respect and authority of member states and will therefore be better placed
to address current international realities as they arise11.
With these considerations in mind, the following section of this essay will provide a critical
analysis of the assumption entrenched in conventional political thought that an increase in
the Council’s membership, whether this be by increasing the number of permanent
members on the Council or by adopting some alternative approach in the allocation of
8 M. Dixon,Textbook on International Law (7th ed, Oxford University Press 2007) 7.
9 I. Brownlie,Brownlie’s Principles of International Law (8th ed, Oxford University Press 2012) 758.
10 Tadic [1995] 105 ILR 419,435. See also T. O’Donnell,‘Naming and Shaming: the sorry tale of Security Council
Resolution 1530 (2004)’[2006] 17(5) European Journal of International Law945-968,4.
11 C. Gray,‘A crisisof legitimacy for the UN collectivesecurity system?’ [2007] 56(1) International and
ComparativeLaw Quarterly 156-170,163.

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seats, would automatically improve the current Security Council system and therefore allow
the Council to be more effective in dealing with current international realities.
The Security Council: A representative organ or an exclusive club?
The first formal proposal for reform of the Security Council was brought by 18 Latin
American countries in 195612. As an increasing number of states across the globe secured
independence, pressure mounted on the existing Council members and the current 15-state
composition was finally ratified by two-thirds of UN member states by 1965. The end of the
Cold War showed initial promise: a swift settlement to the Iran/Iraq crisis and relative
consensus (with some reservations) on the action to be taken during the Gulf Crisis of
1990/91 briefly suggested that an active and productive post-Cold War Council may succeed
in fulfilling its obligations under Article 24. However, as Morris points out, the UN now
found itself ‘on the horns of a dilemma’ – as the US increased its presence and influence in
Europe throughout the early 90’s and without a sufficiently influential Soviet Union on the
P5, the UN became increasingly reliant on the Western democracies (particularly the US)
both for material funding and political leadership13. This development paved the way for
non-permanent members of the Council and a raft of non-governmental organizations,
including the World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy, the Global Policy
Forum and the International Coalition for Responsibility to Protect14, to bring forward their
cases for reform of the existing Security Council system. While proposals differed in detail,
the vast majority were invariably linked to the Council’s composition, and by extension, its
enlargement.
However, it is important to note that increasing the Security Council’s membership (either
by increasing the number of permanent members or the 10 elected members) does not
necessarily entail that the Council be made more representative of the global population,
nor does it follow that such reform would enhance the Council’s effectiveness in addressing
current international realities. Allocating seats on the Council by virtue of geographical
region, for example, as has been suggested by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is
12 D. Bourantonis, The History and Politics of Security Council Reform (Routledge 2004) 76.
13 J. Morris,‘UN Security Council Reform: A critical analysisof the enlargement options’[2001] 18(2) Journal of
Third World Studies 149-169.
14 Center for UN Reform Education,‘Security Council Reform’ (UN Reform Topics n.d)
http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=securitycouncil <Accessed 9th April 2016>

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notoriously difficult. It would follow that either the UK or France surrender its seat on the P5
to allow for a single regional seat across Western Europe – a remote possibility at best15.
Moreover, opposition to such a proposal is unlikely to be restricted to these countries –
Germany for example, currently not a permanent member of the P5 but the UN’s third
largest funder and a frequent caller for permanent membership, would undoubtedly resist
such a proposal as it would further complicate the diplomatic process whereby it also
became a permanent member on the Council16. In addition, China is unlikely to take
favourably to the prospect of Japan, currently the UN’s second largest funder, becoming a
permanent member of the Council, and while there are also great calls for Brazil to be
granted a permanent seat, Argentina is likely to voice strong opposition against such a
development17.
Reforming the Security Council: Method, not members
It is folly therefore to suggest that reform of the Security Council may be achieved by
pursuing attempts to alter the current composition of the Council’s membership or the
allocation of permanent seats. Moreover, the existing P5 are likely to argue, should the
prospect of increasing the number of permanent seats on the Council become a genuine
consideration in future, that such an increase would further hinder the Council’s ability to
act quickly and effectively in addressing current international realities18.
It is clear from these conclusions that successful reform of the Security Council lies not in
reforming its membership, but in addressing the way in which it operates. Reassuringly, this
requirement has not gone unnoticed by the UN General Assembly, which has officially
recommended that the Security Council reform its working methods to promote democratic
decision-making and transparency in its operations19. Indeed, the so-called S5 initiative
(2008-2012) and the subsequent effort made by 22 national governments on improving the
council’s working methods “may be among the most important reform initiatives” in the
15 M. Mikhailtchenko,‘Reform of the Security Council and its implicationsfor global peaceand security’,[2004]
7(1) Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 10.
16 P. Schmidt, ‘A complex puzzle: the EU security policy and UN reform’ [1994] 29(3) The International
Spectator 53-66.
17 ‘Assessment of member states’contributions to the United Nations’regular budget’ [UN doc. A/67/238].
18 B. Fassbender,‘UN Security Council reform and the right of veto: A Constitutional perspective’ (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 1998) 235.
19 General Assembly decision 62/557.Full pdf available
http://www.centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/62%3A557.pdf

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UN’s history20. The new initiative, aptly named ACT for Accountability, Coherence and
Transparency, provides the foundation upon which genuine reform of the Security Council
may be achieved. It is for these reasons that it is submitted that such reforms would
significantly improve the Council’s working methods and thereby prove effective in allowing
the Council to address current international realities in a far more effective manner.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to provide a detailed analysis of the dilemma currently facing the UN
Security Council and has clarified its position within its appropriate legal and political
context. It has been explored why previous attempts to secure reform of the Council have
produced little in the way of workable results and has sought to uncover the reasons for
these failings. Finally, this paper has suggested that further to the general consensus among
the international community that the Council is in need of reform, such changes to the
existing may be attainable by moving away from efforts to alter the Council’s composition
and membership in favour of a new approach that places democracy and transparency in
the decision-making process as prerequisites for a reformed Council well-placed to address
current international realities.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that the Security Council, like the UN itself, is an
institution created by its members. Reform of the Council therefore shall only be made
possible if the existing P5 members demonstrate an increased willingness to put aside
political self-interests in favour of a more democratic system operation. Ultimately, it is the
current P5 that hold the key to reforming the existing Security Council system.
20 W.R. Pace, ‘Introduction’ in ‘Governing and managingchange at the United Nations’ (Center for UN Reform
Education 2013) Full pdf availableat:
http://centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/SC%20Reform%20Sept%202013%20publication.pdf

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Bibliography of sources
Journals
Gray, C., ‘A crisis of legitimacy for the UN collective security system?’ [2007] 56(1)
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 156-170.
Kufuour, K., ‘The African Union and the reform of the Security Council: some matters arising’
[2006] 14(2) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 288-292.
Mikhailtchenko, M., ‘Reform of the Security Council and its implications for global peace and
security’, [2004] 7(1) Journal of Military and Strategic Studies.
Morris, J., ‘UN Security Council Reform: A critical analysis of the enlargement options’ [2001]
18(2) Journal of Third World Studies 149-169.
O’Donnell, T., ‘Naming and Shaming: the sorry tale of Security Council Resolution 1530
(2004)’ [2006] 17(5) European Journal of International Law 945-968.
Schmidt, P., ‘A complex puzzle: the EU security policy and UN reform’ [1994] 29(3) The
International Spectator 53-66.
Books
Bourantonis, D., The History and Politics of Security Council Reform (Routledge 2004).
Brownlie, I., Brownlie’s Principles of International Law (8th ed, Oxford University Press 2012).
Dixon, M., Textbook on International Law (7th ed, Oxford University Press 2007).
Fassbender, B., ‘UN Security Council reform and the right of veto: A Constitutional
perspective’ (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1998).
Cases referred to
Tadic [1995] 105 ILR 419
United Nations documents
[A/55/305-S/2000/809] – Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.
[A/60/861] – Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.
[A/61/841] – Report of the Office of International Oversight Services on its investigation into
allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the Ituri region (Bunia) in the United Nations
Organization mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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[A/64/573] – Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on
Peacekeeping Operations.
[A/67/238] - Assessment of member states’ contributions to the United Nations’ regular
budget’.
G/A decision 62/557. Full pdf available
http://www.centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/62%3A557.pdf
Other documents referred to
Pace, W. R., ‘Introduction’ in ‘Governing and managing change at the United Nations’
(Center for UN Reform Education 2013).
Center for UN Reform, ‘Governing and Managing change at the United Nations’, available at
http://centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/SC%20Reform%20Sept%202013%20public
ation.pdf
United Nations, General Assembly decision 62/557, Question of equitable representation on
and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters. Full pdf
available http://www.centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/62%3A557.pdf.
Web sources
Center for UN Reform Education, ‘Security Council Reform’ (UN Reform Topics n.d)
<http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=securitycouncil> Accessed 9th April 2016.
United Nations, ‘Peacekeeping Fact Sheet’ (United Nations Peacekeeping, July 2010)
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml> Accessed 8th
April 2016.
United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of
Justice’, available at <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf> Accessed
7th April 2016.