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Memorandum of Law
To: Belva Lockwood
From: Byron Jeske
Date: December 17, 2016
Re: Imani Aberra; Accessibility Discrimination; ADA; File No. 16-324
Questions Presented
I. Under federal law, does Dr. Aberra have standing to bring a suit against Brittania Pharmacy
(Brittania) when: (1) Dr. Aberra was told she would not be able to receive 24/7 service in the
future because her power chair would not be permitted to go through the drive-thru; (2)
Brittania told Dr. Aberra this because of its policy of not allowing people in power chairs to
use the drive-thru; and (3) a court judgment in Dr. Aberra’s favor will force Brittania to
accommodate her in the future.
II. Under the ADA, does Dr. Aberra have a valid claim against Brittania when: (1) Dr. Aberra is
a paraplegic and thus substantially limited in performing major life activities; (2) Brittania
owns and operates a pharmacy; and (3) Brittania told Dr. Aberra that in the future she would
not be able to acquire 24/7 service using the drive-thru window while in her power chair,
even though she cannot drive a car.
III. Under the ADA, does Brittania have a successful legal defense when: (1) allowing Dr.
Aberra to use the drive-thru could pose a direct threat to others, and (2) adopting an
alternative method of service may require Brittania to serve Dr. Aberra without using the
drive-thru.
Brief Answer
I. Probably yes. Yet there is still a high degree of uncertainty regarding this question. To satisfy
the requirements of standing Dr. Aberra must prove: (1) she suffered an injury-in-fact, (2)
Brittania’s conduct caused Dr. Aberra to suffer an injury-in-fact, and (3) that a favorable
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court ruling could provide relief to Dr. Aberra. The uncertainty stems from the question of
whether Dr. Aberra suffered an injury-in-fact. The fact that Dr. Aberra did ultimately receive
her medication may be grounds to conclude that she did not suffer an injury-in-fact.
However, a possible interpretation of the case law suggests that if Dr. Aberra encountered a
barrier to her future patronization of a public accommodation, then she has suffered an
injury-in-fact. Unfortunately, the question of whether a threat to deny future service
constitutes an injury-in-fact has not been answered by the courts; so there is a substantial
degree of uncertainty.
II. Yes. It is likely that Dr. Aberra has a valid case against Brittania. To show that Dr. Aberra
has a valid case she must show that: (1) that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA,
(2) that Brittania is a private entity which operates a public accommodation, and (3) Dr.
Aberra was denied access to a public accommodation because of her disability. Dr. Aberra
can certainly prove that she is disabled, because she is bound to her power chair by her
disability. Likewise, she can prove that Brittania is a public accommodation because it is a
pharmacy, and pharmacies are public accommodations under the ADA. However, proving
that she was denied access to a public accommodation because of her disability will be
challenged by Brittania. Yet the law is clear that procedures or policies which tend to screen
out the disabled are prohibited by the ADA. Dr. Aberra can successfully argue that
Brittania’s failure to reasonably accommodate her disability constitutes discrimination.
III. No. It is unlikely that Brittania would be able to raise a successful defense. There are two
potential defenses that it may raise. First, it may argue that to serve Dr. Aberra in the drive-
thru would constitute a safety hazard to herself and others, because a collision might result
from it. This is a valid concern. However, the law mandates that Brittania must consider
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whether the risk can be mitigated by changing their policies or procedures. In this case the
risk can be mitigated by either opening the front doors for Dr. Aberra or sending staff outside
to take her prescription. Second, Brittania may argue that to provide Dr. Aberra one of those
accommodations would “fundamentally alter” the nature of the services, because it would no
longer be a drive-thru service. This is a weak argument. The court is likely to consider
providing medication to be the fundamental service provided by Brittania. The process of
using a drive-thru is not fundamental to the service of providing medication, because
medication can be distributed without the use of a drive-thru. Brittania likely has no sound
defense.
Statement of Facts
This memo attempts to determine whether Dr. Aberra can successfully plead
discrimination against Brittania under the ADA. To do that it attempts to answer three questions:
(1) does Dr. Aberra have standing to file suit against Brittania, (2) does Dr. Aberra have a valid
case, and (3) whether Brittania has a legal defense. Dr. Aberra came into our offices on October
25, 2016, and spoke with partner Baxter Schmidt. Dr. Aberra is interested in the possibility of
filing suit against Brittania Pharmacy for discrimination in violation of the ADA. These are the
facts that Mr. Schmidt related from the interview.
Dr. Aberra moved to Columbia in 2007. She works as a professor of political science at
the University of Columbia. Due to an unfortunate car accident, which occurred in 1998, Dr.
Aberra is a paraplegic. Dr. Aberra maintains her independence thanks to her power chair, which
she often uses to travel around town. Dr. Aberra cannot drive a car because of her paraphilia.
In 2016 Dr. Aberra began suffering from severe allergies. The doctor prescribed
medication for her ailment. Due to her schedule, she resolved to fill her prescription at Britannia
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after hours. She had listened to Britannia’s ads before which promised “potions, remedies, and
all other prescriptions available 24 hours a day.” It would take Dr. Aberra about an hour to travel
to Brittania. Dr. Aberra embarked on her journey at 9:30 p.m. It was an unpleasant endeavor;
during the trip her power chair ran out of energy, and she was forced to sit idly for thirty minutes
while it self-charged.
Finally, at 11:15 p.m., Dr. Aberra realized the fruit of her labor; she arrived at the store
only to find the forward doors shut and locked. Her eyes happened upon a sign which read
“Closed. No indoor shopping after 11 p.m. Please pull around to the drive-thru for 24/7
prescriptions.” Dr. Aberra pulled around into the drive-thru and pressed the service button. A
worker named Hal responded by yelling at her: vocally insisting that she vacate the drive-thru,
and stating that the drive-thru was not for “wheelchairs, bikes, or walk-ups.” Dr. Aberra had not
traveled for nothing, she insisted that her prescription be filled. Hal warned her of the danger of
being in the drive-thru, he worried that she may be hit by a car. Nevertheless, Dr. Aberra was
persistent, she refused to leave. Hal reluctantly took Dr. Aberra’s prescription and asked her to
pull up to the locked door.
Within fifteen minutes, the pharmacist, Gloria Susewind, came out of the door with Dr.
Aberra’s prescription. Ms. Susewind warned that the service was “one time only” and threatened
to call the police if Dr. Aberra tried to use the drive-thru again. Ms. Susewind impressed upon
Dr. Aberra the danger of being in the drive-thru; reciting an incident where a golf cart was struck
by an SUV in it. Ms. Susewind explained that this was the reason for the pharmacy’s policy.
Dr. Aberra did not accept this explanation of the policy. She reportedly yelled at Ms.
Susewind, declaring that she “had a right to use the pharmacy” and demanding that Britannia
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Pharmacy change its policy to accommodate her. Ms. Susewind was not receptive to that
suggestion.
Although Dr. Aberra has not returned to the pharmacy, she would potentially like to.
Brittania is near Hy-Vee, and she would like to visit both places in future trips. Dr. Aberra
desires a change in the pharmacy’s policy which would allow her to benefit from the pharmacies
24/7 service. She has already seen another lawyer, Justine Valore, who declined not to take the
case for lack of standing.
Discussion
Dr. Aberra probably can successfully plead discrimination under the ADA, if she can
overcome the challenge to her standing. Dr. Aberra’s standing will likely be the most contested
aspect of this litigation.
I. Under federal law, does Dr. Aberra have standing to bring a suit against Brittania
when: (1) Dr. Aberra was told she would not be able to receive 24/7 service in the future
because her power chair would not be permitted to go through the drive-thru; (2)
Brittania told Dr. Aberra this because of its policy of not allowing people in power
chairs to use the drive-thru; and (3) a court judgment in Dr. Aberra’s favor will force
Brittania to accommodate her in the future.
Dr. Aberra probably has standing to bring a suit against Brittania, although there is a
large degree of uncertainty surrounding the question. The power of the courts to hear a case is
limited to “actual cases and controversies” by the U.S. Constitution Article III, § 2.” Steger v.
Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 2000). To show Article III standing, a plaintiff bears
the burden of proving: (1) plaintiff suffered an injury-in-fact, (2) the defendants conduct caused
the plaintiff to suffer an injury-in-fact, and (3) that a favorable court ruling could provide relief
to the plaintiff. Id.
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In Dr. Aberra’s case, requirements two and three should not be in dispute. It satisfies
requirement two because if Dr. Aberra suffered an injury-in-fact, then it was caused by
Brittania’s threat of future denied service. Additionally, it satisfies requirement three because
the injury could be remedied by an injunction ordering Brittania to change its policy. However,
showing that Dr. Aberra suffered an injury in fact will be contested. Because Dr. Aberra
ultimately received her medication, Brittania will argue that she received no injury-in-fact.
Moreover, Brittania will argue that the threat of future injury is too intangible and conjectural to
satisfy the requirement of standing.
A. Injury in Fact
An injury in fact must be both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.” Steger, 228 F.3d at 892. A plaintiff must prove that she received a
direct injury or is in imminent danger of receiving a future injury because of the challenged
conduct. Id. A plaintiff need not engage in the “futile effort” of attempting to visit a building
with barriers to their service, but a plaintiff must prove that they have knowledge of those
barriers. Id. Barriers to service can include procedures or eligibility criteria which tend to screen
out the disabled and prevent them from acquiring services. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2)(A)(i)-(ii).
The plaintiff must prove they have an intent to return to the establishment if the barriers were
removed. Steger v. Franco, Inc. 228 F.3d 889, 892; Miller v. Ataractic Inv. Co., No. 11–03509–
CV–DGK, 2012 WL 2862883 (W.D. Mo. July 11, 2012).
The question of what constitutes and injury-in-fact arose in Steger v. Franco. 228 F.3d
889 (8th Cir. 2008). In that case five disabled persons with diverse disabilities filed suit against
the owners of an office building for numerous instances of non-compliance with the ADA. Id.
However, only one of the plaintiffs had been inside the office at the time the suit was filed. Id at
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893. He testified that he was unable to locate the restroom due to a lack of brail signage. Id. The
other four plaintiffs had either never been in the building or had never been in the building
before the suit was filed. Id. Nevertheless, they argued that they still possessed standing because
they might visit the building in the future. Id. The argument was rejected by the court because
those plaintiffs did not show that they had any knowledge of the barriers within the building, and
they could not show that they intended to visit the building in the future. Only the blind plaintiff,
who was unable to locate the restroom, had standing. Id.
Injury-in-fact was again challenged in Miller v. Ataractic Inv. Co., No. 11–03509–CV–
DGK, 2012 WL 2862883 (W.D. Mo. July 11, 2012). In this case the plaintiff, Mitchell Miller,
who was confined to a wheelchair due to cerebral palsy, filed suit against the owners of a
shopping center. Id at *2. While at the center, Miller claimed he had encountered several barriers
to his enjoyment of the goods and services offered, and alleged that he intended to visit the store
again in the future. Id at *3. At issue was whether Miller had suffered an injury-in-fact. Id. The
defendants argued that what was lacking was proof that Miller intended to return. Id. The court
disagreed with the defendants, stating that the plaintiff need not engage in the “futile gesture” of
returning to a building with known barriers. Id at *4 (citing Steger). All that the plaintiff need
prove is (1) knowledge of the barriers and (2) intent to return but for those barriers. Id. Miller
accomplished both requirements by (1) having encountered the barriers in the past, and (2)
alleging specific and definite plans to return even despite the barriers. Id.
Whether Dr. Aberra encountered a barrier will likely be the crux the argument concerning
standing. A key difference between Dr. Aberra’s case, and the cases discussed above, is that the
plaintiffs in those cases all encountered physical rather than procedural barriers. Dr. Aberra, on
the other hand, was not limited by any physical barrier, but by Brittania’s policy or procedure,
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which only allows people who can drive cars to benefit from 24/7 service. Procedures and
policies which discriminate against the disabled are equally prohibited by the ADA, so it is likely
that Dr. Aberra did encounter a barrier. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2)(A)(ii).
If Dr. Aberra succeeds in the argument, that Brittania’s policy constitutes a barrier, then
Brittania will argue that Dr. Aberra never suffered an injury-in-fact because she was ultimately
never denied service, merely threatened with denial in the future. This argument could present
problems for Dr. Aberra’s case. Does the mere threat of future denial of service constitute a
sufficiently “concrete and definite” or is it too “conjectural and hypothetical?” Steger.
Applying Steger to the question, the answer seems to be that the injury is definite enough
to satisfy the requirement of standing. Dr. Aberra only need prove that (1) she has knowledge of
the barriers and that (2) she is in immediate danger of receiving future injury. Steger at 892. The
threat of denying future services puts Dr. Aberra on notice of the barriers she will encounter
upon her return. To prove she is in danger of receiving future injury she must show that she
intends to return. Dr. Aberra’s testimony that she intends to return should be sufficient for this
requirement. Therefore, if the above arguments are sound, Dr. Aberra probably has standing.
However, the argument remains tentative, because there is no definite case or law that addresses
this question.
II. Under the ADA, does Dr. Aberra have a valid claim against Brittania when: (1) Dr.
Aberra is a paraplegic and thus substantially limited in performing major life activities;
(2) Brittania owns and operates a pharmacy; and (3) Brittania told her that in the
future she would not be able to acquire 24/7 service using the drive-thru window while
in her power chair, even though she cannot drive a car.
Dr. Aberra probably has a prima facia case of discrimination against Brittania. The ADA
was passed “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). To be disabled
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means to have a condition which “substantially limits…the major life activities of [an]
individual.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.105 (a)(1)(i). Title III prohibits “public accommodations” from
discriminating against the disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2)(A)(i)-(ii). Pharmacies are included
within the definition of “public accommodations” for the purposes of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. §
12181 (7)(F). Generally, public accommodations are required to make reasonable
accommodations to policies, practices, and procedures in order to provide service to members of
a disabled class, unless a public accommodation can show that the requested accommodation
would fundamentally alter the nature of the services. 28 C.F.R. § 36.302 (a).
To bring a claim of discrimination in violation of Title III of the ADA, a plaintiff must
prove: (1) that they are disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) that the defendant is a
private entity which operates a public accommodation, (3) the plaintiff was denied access to a
public accommodation because of her disability. Molski v. M.J. Cable, 481 F.3d 724 (9th Cir.
2007); Rose v. Springfield-Greene County Health Dept., 668 F.Supp.2d 1206 (W.D. Mo. 2009);
See also Amir v. St. Louis, 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir. 1999); Mershon v. St. Louis, 442 F.3d
1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 2006).
In Dr. Aberra’s case, the first criteria should not be in dispute. Dr. Aberra clearly falls
within the definition of being disabled, because she is confined to a power chair by her disability,
and this substantially limits some major activities of her life, such as driving for example. Nor
should the fact that Brittania qualifies as a public accommodation be in dispute, because
pharmacies qualify as public accommodations under Title III. 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (7)(F).
However, the third requirement will be disputed. Brittania will argue that Dr. Aberra was not
discriminated against on the basis of her disability, but rather because their 24/7 services are only
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offered to people driving cars, and this is not in itself discriminatory against people with
disabilities.
A. Dr. Aberra was denied access to Brittania’s service because of her disability.
The most similar case to Ms. Aberra’s represented in the literature is Bunjer v. Edwards.
985 F.Supp. 165, (D.D.C. 1997). In this case plaintiff, Mr. Bunjer, a deaf person, filed suit
against a McDonald fast food restaurant as a result of a dispute that took place between Mr.
Bunjer and workers. Id at 166. Mr. Bunjer claimed that McDonald’s drive-thru facility
discriminated against the hearing impaired because they could not hear the employees speaking
through the speakers. Id. The complaint further alleged that McDonald could easily
accommodate the disabled by placing a sign instructing all deaf people to pull up to the forward
window to place their orders. Id. Moreover, Mr. Bunjer claimed that McDonald’s staff were
inadequately trained to deal with deaf people. Id. The court found for Mr. Bunjer on all issues.
Id.
Furthermore, both Rendon v. Valleycrest Productions, Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir.
2002) and National Federation of the Blind v. Target, 452 F.Supp.2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006) are
good examples of how procedures can discriminate against the disabled in violation of the ABA.
In Rendon, it was alleged that a television competition tended to screen out disabled members of
the public who were either hearing impaired or impaired from using the buttons to punch in their
answers over the phone. 294 F.3d at 1282. The court denied a motion to dismiss, finding that the
complaint validly alleged intangible barriers, such as eligibility requirements and screening
policies which prevent disabled people from enjoying the full services and benefits offered by
the show. Id at 1283. Similarly, National Federation of the Blind involved a suit against Target
which alleged that Target’s online website was not accessible to blind citizens. 452 F.Supp.2d at
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949. The court affirmed that intangible barriers to service are just as much a violation of the
ADA as are tangible ones. Id at 954. This court also denied a motion to dismiss. Id
Like the cases above, Dr. Aberra can argue that she was discriminated against because of
Brittania’s policy of offering 24/7 services only to people who are capable of driving cars.
Indeed, Bunjer, shows that drive-thru policies can be in violation of the ADA when they serve to
prevent disabled persons from utilizing a public accommodation’s service. Brittania’s policy, it
can be argued, tends to screen out disabled members of the public in the same manner as was
done in both Rendon and National Federation of the Blind. When a class of disabled persons are
screened out and prevented from enjoying the full benefits of a service, it is discriminatory
within the meaning of the ADA. Even if Brittania Pharmacy had no intent to discriminate against
Dr. Aberra, their policy effectively did. For this reason, a successful argument that Brittania
Pharmacy discriminated against Dr. Aberra can be crafted. Dr. Aberra likely was discriminated
against by Brittania’s policy.
III.Under the ADA, does Brittania have a successful legal defense when: (1) allowing Dr.
Aberra to use the drive-thru could pose a direct threat to others, and (2) adopting an
alternative method of service may require Brittania to serve Dr. Aberra without using
the drive-thru window.
Brittania probably does not have a successful legal defense against Dr. Aberra’s claim.
There are two potential legal defenses that Brittania may raise. First, it may argue that allowing
Dr. Aberra to use the drive-thru could be unsafe. 28 C.F.R. § 36.208 concerns the issue of when
serving a disabled person would cause a direct threat to the health and safety of others. 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.208 (b) states that the public accommodation must make an individual assessment of the
risk posed by serving an individual and deny service on that basis. The public accommodation
must also assess the possibility of mitigating that risk through reasonable modification of its
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procedures or practices. Id. Additionally, public accommodations are prohibited from adopting
an “eligibility criteria” which tends to screen out the disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2)(A)(i). 28
C.F.R. § 36.301 (a) elaborates that a public accommodation must not use an eligibility criteria
which screens out the disabled, unless such eligibility criteria can be shown to be necessary for
the provision of those services. Additionally, 28 C.F.R. § 36.301 (b) allows a public
accommodation to impose legitimate eligibility requirements if these requirements are for safety
purposes.
Second, Brittania may argue that any reasonable accommodations it may implement
would “fundamentally alter” the nature of the service provided. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2)(A)(ii)
prohibits the failure to make reasonable accommodations in order to provide services to disabled
individuals, unless those accommodations would “fundamentally alter” the nature of those
services.
A. Reasonable accommodations could be made to mitigate Brittania’s safety concerns.
A good example denying reasonable accommodations because of safety concerns is
exemplified in Rose v. Springfield-Greene County Health Dept. 668 F.Supp.2d 1206 (W.D. Mo.
2009). In that case the defendant, a hospital, refused to allow a plaintiff, Ms. Rose, to bring her
service monkey onto the premises. Id at 1216. The hospital made an individual assessment,
under 28 C.F.R. § 36.208, that allowing the monkey onto the premises would pose a direct threat
to the safety of patients. Id. The court held that the hospital was justified in doing so and ruled in
their favor on multiple grounds. Id.
In Dr. Aberra’s case the issue is not a service animal, but the principle remains the same.
If Brittania can prove that allowing Dr. Aberra to use the drive-thru poses a threat to the safety of
others, then it has a defense. However, it must also consider the possibility that these dangers
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could be mitigated by a reasonable accommodation. Dr. Aberra’s use of the drive-thru probably
poses a legitimate safety risk to herself and others. The facts stated that Dr. Aberra was
repeatedly warned that she may be struck by a car, and that this was the reason for the policy.
However, Brittania could easily employ a safe alternative. It could let her into the building, or
send staff to come out of the building and take her prescription. These alternatives would clearly
mitigate the risk. Therefore, it is unlikely Brittania will be successful with this defense.
B. Reasonable accommodations would not fundamentally alter the service provided by
Brittania.
In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) the plaintiff, Mr. Martin, who was
unable to walk, was denied the ability to participate in golfing tournaments because the golf club
would not provide him with a golf cart to help him travel the course. The golf club argued that to
provide Mr. Martin a golf cart would fundamentally alter the nature of the sport, which included
walking from hole to hole to produce fatigue. Id at 661. The Court was unpersuaded, and found
that the alteration was peripheral at best, but it did not lay out a universal test to determine when
an accommodation fundamentally altered the nature of the service. Id at 663-64.
In Dr. Aberra’s case, Brittania will argue that to provide Dr. Aberra service in an
alternative method will fundamentally alter the service it provides. The service it provides is 24/7
drive-thru service. To change that would fundamentally alter the drive-thru service by requiring
staff to come out of the building or allow Dr. Aberra to come into the building. It is doubtful that
this argument would be very strong. Like PGA Tour, Inc., the court would likely conclude that to
provide an accommodation for Dr. Aberra would not constitute a fundamental alteration to the
service Brittania provides, because the act of being in a car is not essential to filling a
prescription. Moreover, because Brittania has already reasonably accommodated Dr. Aberra in
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the past, it has already shown that it is quite capable of making an accommodation without
fundamentally altering the nature of the service. Therefore, this defense should be unsuccessful.
(word count: 2906)
Conclusion
There is substantial uncertainty as to whether Dr. Aberra can successfully plead
discrimination under the ADA. The uncertainty stems from the issue of whether Dr. Aberra has
suffered an injury-in-fact which is both concrete and definite enough to confer standing upon
her. The question turns on whether Brittania’s threat of denying service to Dr. Aberra in the
future constitutes an injury-in-fact. Brittania will argue that it is not, but applying Steger, Dr.
Aberra can argue that by threating her with future non-service she has encountered a barrier.
If Dr. Aberra is able overcome the burden of standing, then it is likely she will be able to
successfully prove that Brittania’s policy does violate the ADA. Brittania will argue that their
policy does not discriminate because of a person’s disability but by whether they are driving a
car or not. But by imposing a policy that tends to screen out disabled people who cannot drive,
Brittania’s policy constitutes discrimination in practice. Moreover, it is unlikely that Brittania
will successfully mount a defense. First, Brittania will argue that allowing Dr. Aberra to use the
drive-thru poses a direct threat to her and others. However, Brittania is required to consider
mitigating that risk by employing a reasonable accommodation. Second, Brittania will argue that
it cannot employ a reasonable accommodation without fundamentally altering the nature of its
exclusive drive-thru service. This argument is weak, because the nature of Brittana’s service is to
provide medicine and this can be done whether someone is in a car or not.
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Therefore, Dr. Aberra can probably successfully plead discrimination under the ADA if
she can overcome the standing barrier.
Table of Authorities
Cases:
Amir v. St. Louis, 184 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 1999).
Bunjer v. Edwards, 985 F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1997).
Mershon v. St. Louis, 442 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir. 2006).
Miller v. Ataractic Inv. Co., No. 11–03509–CV–DGK, 2012 WL 2862883 (W.D. Mo. July 11,
2012).
Molski v. M.J. Cable, 481 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2007).
National Federation of the Blind v. Target, 452 F.Supp.2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
Rendon v. Valleycrest Productions, Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002).
Rose v. Springfield-Greene County Health Dept., 668 F.Supp.2d 1206 (W.D. Mo. 2009).
Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2000).
Statutes:
42 U.S.C. § 12101
42 U.S.C. § 12181
42 U.S.C. § 12182
