MCTOG_3-40_01_NE_FINAL SD_160306

MCTOG Doctrine Circular 3-40.01
Network Engagement Activities
Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group
(MCTOG)
US Marine Corps
March 2016
This doctrine circular supports the academic curricula of the Tactical MAGTF
Integration Course (TMIC) Programs of Instruction. It is automatically
cancelled upon the official publication of MCIP 3-40.01, MAGTF Network
Engagement Activities.
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Throughout this document, masculine nouns and pronouns are used for the sake of simplicity. Except where otherwise noted,
these nouns and pronouns apply to either gender.
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ACTIVITIES
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MCTOG Doctrine Circular 3‐40.01. Network Engagement Activities
i MCTOG Doctrine Circular 3-40.01
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ii MCTOG Doctrine Circular 3-40.01

iii MCTOG Doctrine Circular 3-40.01
Network Engagement Activities
Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Nature of the Operating Environment
Overview......................................................................................................................................1-1
Complexity...................................................................................................................................1-2
Inter-Related Networks................................................................................................................1-3
Chapter 2. Network Engagement Considerations
Overview......................................................................................................................................2-1
How Networks Affect Operations ...............................................................................................2-2
Challenges of Understanding Networks ..........................................................................2-3
Network Considerations in Planning ...............................................................................2-3
Network Considerations in Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace .........................2-4
Network Considerations in Targeting..............................................................................2-5
Assessing Effects on Networks and Operations ..............................................................2-7
Network Engagement Across the Range of Military Operations ................................................2-8
Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence ........................................... .2-8
Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations .................................................2-10
Major Operations and Campaigns .................................................................................2-11
Chapter 3. Operational Environment Complexity
Overview......................................................................................................................................3-1
Understand the Operational Environment ...................................................................................3-1
Methods To Gain Understanding.................................................................................................3-2
Information Models .........................................................................................................3-2
Use of Information Models..............................................................................................3-3
Identifying Critical Variables ......................................................................................................3-6
Security. .........................................................................................................................3-11
Port Operations. .............................................................................................................3-11
Drug Trade.....................................................................................................................3-12
Chapter 4. Identifying and Understanding Networks
Overview......................................................................................................................................4-1
Network Terms and Structures ....................................................................................................4-1
Components of a Network ...............................................................................................4-1
Network Formation..........................................................................................................4-2
Characteristics of a Network............................................................................................4-4
Categorizing Networks ....................................................................................................4-6
Techniques of Network Analysis.................................................................................................4-7
Network Mapping............................................................................................................4-7
Network Templating........................................................................................................4-8
Social Network Analysis..................................................................................................4-9
Link Analysis.................................................................................................................4-11
Nodal Analysis...............................................................................................................4-11

iv MCTOG Doctrine Circular 3-40.01
Chapter 5. Engaging Networks
Overview......................................................................................................................................5-1
Network Targeting Considerations..............................................................................................5-1
Engaging the Network through Targeting ...................................................................................5-1
Decide ..............................................................................................................................5-1
Detect...............................................................................................................................5-4
Deliver..............................................................................................................................5-6
Assess...............................................................................................................................5-7
Chapter 6. Assessing Progress in Network Engagement
Overview......................................................................................................................................6-1
Plan ..............................................................................................................................................6-2
Establish a Baseline .........................................................................................................6-2
Objectives and Effects .....................................................................................................6-3
Develop Measures of Performance..................................................................................6-3
Develop Measures of Effectiveness.................................................................................6-4
Identification of Indicators...............................................................................................6-4
Monitor ........................................................................................................................................6-6
Considerations to Develop a Collection Plan ..................................................................6-6
Managing Collected Information.....................................................................................6-6
Evaluate........................................................................................................................................6-7
Application of Measures of Performance ........................................................................6-7
Application of Measures of Effectiveness.......................................................................6-7
Evaluate Metrics/Assessment Plan ..................................................................................6-7
Recommend .................................................................................................................................6-7
Direct............................................................................................................................................6-8
Appendices
A Network Engagement Enablers and Resources .............................................................. A-1
B Network Engagemet and Identity Operations................................................................. B-1
Glossary
References and Related Publications

1-1 MCTOG Doctrine Circular 3-40.01
CHAPTER 1
NATURE OF THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
OVERVIEW
In MCDP 1, Warfighting, Marine Corps doctrine calls for “a warfighting philosophy that seeks to
shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a series of rapid, violent and unexpected actions which create
a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope.” Our recent operational
experience has required us to shift our focus from defeating an overwhelming conventional
advisory (e.g. the Soviet Union) to dominating a hybrid threat exploiting a complex operational
environment (e.g. Hezbollah or Al Qaeda in Iraq). We have learned through hard won experience
that to achieve our military objectives; the Marine Corps needs to focus on engaging friendly and
neutral networks in addition to shattering the cohesion of the enemy. The enemy has adapted and
learned to hide from our superior combat power. By engaging the friendly and neutral networks,
we seek to isolate and illuminate the enemy in order to render him irrelevant at all levels of the
environment, whether by fire and maneuver or by political action. Network engagement (NE) lays
out a number of methods that support or amplify our current command and control (C2) processes
(i.e. intelligence preparation of the battlefield [IPB], the Marine Corps Planning Process [MCPP],
targeting, and assessment) to thrive and dominate this complex environment.
Future operations will require leaders to operate in environments that are extremely complex.
Commanders must leverage analytical capabilities in order to successfully operate in these
complex operational environments (OE).
The OE is defined as a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the
employment of capabilities and bear on the decision of the commander. Present within the OE are
inter-related human networks that are comprised of friendly, neutral and threat networks. These
networks consist of people, places, and actions, and should be considered during operations. The
actions taken by any member of a network impact the OE and its increasing complexity.
Marines are trained and educated in the maneuver warfare philosophy to enable them to operate
and thrive in chaotic environments. Network engagement complements Marines Corps training
and education by enabling them to cope with hybrid threats and the range of actors that they will
encounter. The application of NE requires the consideration of all potential domains, operational
variables (i.e. economic, political, social, environment, beliefs), actors (i.e. friendly forces, local
population, the host nation (HN) government, criminal entities, and the adversary), and the
appropriate application of force, ranging from lethal to non-lethal. To successfully accomplish
mission goals, Marines must equally consider the impact of actions on coalition and friendly
forces, the local population, and criminal enterprises, as well as the adversary. Intelligence may
provide the commander with the location of the adversary, but if planning does not consider the
impact of a strike on the local population, the adversary could gain twice the number of combatants
Network engagement is defined as interactions with friendly, neutral, and threat
networks, conducted continuously and simultaneously at the tactical, operational, and
strategic levels, to help achieve the commander’s objectives within an operational area.

lost during the attack. Additionally, a thorough and accurate understanding and template of the
neutral networks, and how they are inter-related with threat networks, provides operating forces
with greater opportunities to understand, penetrate, and target those threat networks. Regardless,
the consideration of all domains during operational planning and execution marginalizes the
adversary and decreases local support by eliminating the accommodating environment necessary
for the formation and sustainment of threat networks, and by increasing stability in the area of
operations (AO). Providing the commander with an array of lethal and non-lethal tools to shape
the battlespace allows for a variable response to the complex security environment.
MCDP 6, Command and Control outlines the theory and philosophy of C2 for the Marine Corps
and posits, “the intent is to describe how we can reach effective military decisions and implement
effective military actions faster than an adversary in any conflict setting on any scale.” It allows
Marines to gain and retain a positional advantage based on changing and adaptive networked
threats. The activities of NE outlined herein are responsive, adaptive, and enable the decentralized
execution of lethal and non-lethal actions. They support the commander’s ability to limit threat
networks and counter any threat faced across the range of military operations, while maintaining
balance and simultaneity.
COMPLEXITY
MCDP 1 describes complexity by recognizing that “war is essentially a clash between opposed
wills.” In reality, each belligerent is not a single, homogeneous will guided by a single intelligence.
Instead, each belligerent is a complex system consisting of numerous individual parts.
The challenges tactical level commanders will face in the future will require forces to operate
against hybrid threats in complex environments. These threats are comprised of various networks
that are adaptive to changes within the OE and do not operate within the confines of a single unit’s
battlespace. This dynamic presents a particular challenge to the commander and his staff, which
requires an even deeper understanding in order to operate and subsequently monitor the impact of
these operations on the OE. General Anthony Zinni stated that, “Our intelligence system is
designed to support a Cold War kind of operation. We are ‘Order-of-Battle’ oriented. It is
designed to examine an enemy. The situations you’re going to be faced with go far beyond what
you’re trained for in a very narrow military sense.” Current doctrine is being re-written to address
the complexities in the OE and gain a greater understanding of the human dimension. Network
engagement is designed to support these efforts and promotes consideration of the inter-related
networks that exist in the OE during the planning and targeting processes.
The analytical challenges posed to forces in the future are multifaceted and require the following:
 A holistic understanding of the OE through identification of environmental variables.
 Identifying the critical variables that have a direct impact on the mission.
 Understanding how the critical variables influence the inter-related networks.
 The ability to continuously monitor the OE to assess the impact of both the force’s
operations and actions taken by other networks.

INTER-RELATED NETWORKS
A network is formed by a direct or indirect tie between two or more nodes which share a common
purpose. Specifically, a human network is an alliance of socially connected individuals who are
involved in activities to achieve some form of social, political, monetary, religious, or personal
gain. Networks can be large or small, local or global, domestic or transnational, cohesive or
diffuse, and centrally directed or highly decentralized.
Individuals are associated with numerous networks due to their individual identities. Examples of
these types of identities include location of birth, family, religion, social groups, organizations or
a host of various characteristics that define an individual. Therefore, it is common for an individual
to be associated with more than one type of network (i.e. friendly, neutral or threat). Individual
identities provide the basis that allows for the inter-relationship between friendly, neutral and
threat networks to exist.
Network engagement is designed around the principles of understanding the OE, understanding
the networks, engaging the networks, and NE enablers. This publication is organized to address
these principles and their relationship to existing processes, and promotes synchronization within
the staff. Although many of the principles are supported with analytical techniques and associated
to intelligence analysis capabilities, operations and fires sections must maintain continuous
visibility and access to these products in support of planning, targeting, and assessing operations.
Understanding the outputs from applying NE principles is important for subordinate units to
provide necessary feedback in the form of requests for information (RFI) to the intelligence
analysts and to maximize the opportunity to leverage the information provided to enhance staff
processes. Successful implementation of NE principles requires the full collaboration of the staff
and is not some specific tasks that can be assigned to one individual or staff section.

CHAPTER 2
NETWORK ENGAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
OVERVIEW
The primary purpose of NE is to consider the human dimensions – beyond the enemy or adversary
– that affect the situation in a unit’s battlespace. This is done by comprehensively studying the
human networks (i.e. threat, neutral, and friendly) in the battlespace and their interactions.
Network engagement is not a new process; it is an extension of existing but uncodified processes
that Marines have instinctively applied over time during operations.
Network engagement provides commanders and their staffs with proven concepts that are designed
to strip away the complexity and help organize information for use in the following staff processes:
 The intelligence cycle.
 The MCPP.
 IPB.
 The targeting process – decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A).
 Operations assessment.
Network engagement requires synchronizing the staff and integrating non-organic enablers that
provide both analytical and operational support. Network engagement enablers are addressed
specifically in Appendix A. The commander task-organizes and integrates the NE enablers based
upon the operation’s requirements. Figure 2-1 illustrates how the NE principles support the
intelligence cycle and subsequently support operational processes.
Figure 2-1. Network Engagement Support to the Intelligence Cycle.
MCWP 2-2, MAGTF Intelligence Collection, provides intelligence analysts with guidance on how
to support the force during operations. Network engagement enablers may be leveraged to support

the following steps of the intelligence cycle: planning and direction, collection, processing and
exploitation, production, or dissemination. Specific intelligence products that focus on analyzing
the OE and networks are in turn used by the staff for planning, targeting, and assessing. As these
processes occur, any additional information requirements (IR) are then provided for inclusion in
the collection plan.
HOW NETWORKS AFFECT OPERATIONS
Individuals associated with various networks (whether within or outside of the OE) possess the
potential to affect operations. Commanders usually do not possess the ability to directly influence
the actions of these individuals, and must therefore conduct contingency planning to mitigate
additional threats that may be created by their actions. Part of the contingency plan may include
engaging specific networks, which requires understanding the relationships that exist between
networks and how the networks formed and continue to sustain themselves.
“We must look upon our enemy as a bold and intelligent antagonist who will make the utmost use of his means as
influenced by the conditions.”
- J. F. C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War
External Network Effects on Operational Environments
Major General Fuller highlights from his quote that the enemy gets a vote. Although this is accurate, with the
rising complexity of operational environments and the inter-relationships of networks, it should be understood that
any individual gets a vote and can have an impact on both the environment and operations.
Terry Jones was the pastor of Dove World Outreach Center, a small non-denominational Christian church located
in Gainesville, Florida. In 2010, he gained national and international attention for his plan to burn Qur’ans on the
anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. Although Mr. Jones was not a member of any
specific network located in Afghanistan, his intended actions had immediate impacts on the operational
environment in Afghanistan. These impacts resulted in effects to operations, which required commanders to
increase their force protection posture during this period of time.
The dynamics and challenges of understanding and engaging networks is relevant at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels and must be considered during operational planning and execution. Comments made by US leaders
at the time highlight their understanding of this as well.
"I just want him to understand that this stunt that he is talking about pulling could greatly endanger our young
men and women in uniform who are in Iraq, who are in Afghanistan. We're already seeing protests against
Americans just by the mere threat that he's making."
- President Barack Obama
"It's regrettable that a pastor in Gainesville, Florida, with a church of no more than fifty people, can make this
outrageous and distressful, disgraceful plan and get, you know, the world's attention."
- Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
"It is precisely the kind of action the Taliban uses and could cause significant problems. Not just here, but
everywhere in the world we are engaged with the Islamic community."
- General David Petraus, International Security Assistance Force Commander

Challenges of Understanding Networks
Networks are comprised of socially connected humans and possess the ability to adapt to the OE
in order to grow and survive, which makes understanding and engaging them properly particularly
challenging. There is no doctrinal template that facilitates understanding human networks or the
certainty of their actions. Any individual can simultaneously belong to multiple and distinct
networks. An individual’s association with multiple networks makes those networks inter-related.
Due to the inter-relationships between networks within the OE, one person’s actions have the
potential to affect many networks in the OE, and thus can affect the OE as a whole. As the OE
changes due to those actions, the networks therein must eventually adapt to remain effective and
efficient. Essentially, actions against or within networks eventually change the OE, due to the
symbiotic relationship of actions on both the networks and the OE.
Network Considerations in Planning
Network engagement is specifically designed to support problem framing within staff planning
and supports gaining a greater understanding of the environment. Using a holistic approach to
gain an understanding of the OE, staffs have the ability to consider the entire human dimension
and the potential impact of actions by various networks. The NE methods for understanding both
the OE and the networks are addressed in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.
MCDP 5, Planning states that planning is the art and science of envisioning a desired future and
laying out effective ways of bringing it about. The MCPP is a six-step process designed to help
staffs organize and focus efforts during planning. The methods outlined in NE enhance the ability
to conduct planning, resulting in a better and more informed decision cycle for the commander.
Figure 2-2 illustrates the NE items that should be considered during the steps of MCPP.
Figure 2-2. Network Engagement Support to the Marine Corps Planning Process.
The initial integration of NE and the MCPP begins with IPB input to the problem framing step.
The analytical products that are built from integrating NE enablers to support the intelligence cycle
are used by the staff to understand and describe the OE. MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning
Process highlights the importance of the problem framing step by stating that since no amount of
subsequent planning can solve a problem insufficiently understood, framing the problem is critical.

Network engagement methods can help commanders identify environmental variables that add or
detract from the problem, and affect friendly, neutral, and threat networks. This is accomplished
by gaining a greater understanding of the OE and the networks, enhancing support to each step of
MCPP. Within the course of action (COA) development step of the planning process, the COAs
that are built should include tentative plans to engage networks through targeting. This is
addressed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Network Considerations in Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
Intelligence analysis is continuous throughout MCPP, which includes refining intelligence
products (i.e. IPB, network analysis, etc.) to support the planning process. Network engagement
activities are intended to examine and consider the entire environment in a comprehensive manner.
This is accomplished by considering all of the networks (i.e. not solely the threat networks) and
their effects on both friendly operations and on the OE. Figure 2-3 depicts IPB and NE analysis
products that could be considered to enhance IPB and provide analysis of networks.
Figure 2-3. Network Engagement Support to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.
Defining the battlespace identifies the need for further analysis of specific features of the
environment, or activities contained within a unit’s potential areas of operations, influence, and
interest. Gaining a greater understanding of the OE and the inter-related networks helps
commanders to determine where they should operate, what they can influence, and what areas are
of interest. In describing the environmental effects, the G/S-2 and the rest of the staff are seeking
to make a determination on how the environmental factors within the battlespace affect both
adversary and friendly operations. To provide the commander with the best situational awareness,
NE is designed to consider all networks (i.e. friendly, neutral and threat) in gaining an
understanding of the environment. Without considering all network actions and the reciprocal
effects on the OE, it is highly probable that the adversary will find and exploit gaps and
vulnerabilities the commander and staff may not have anticipated.
Commanders and staffs must recognize that a threat to their mission may be manifested from any
friendly, neutral, or threat network within the OE. During IPB, analysts must identify and outline
all networks within the environment, realizing that the networks are non-linear, and that the

adversary templates in MCRP 2-3A, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace may
not be sufficient to gain an understanding of a particular network. Network analysis is a method
that uses various techniques to determine a network’s composition, structure, capability, and
intentions. Network analysis is further discussed in Chapter 4. The use of identity operations
techniques to support confirmation of individuals’ identities is outlined in Appendix B.
The final step of the IPB process is to determine the various adversary COAs. A detailed analysis
enables the staff to replicate the set of COAs that the adversary is considering; identify all COAs
that will influence the friendly mission; and identify those areas and activities that, when collected,
will indicate which COA the adversary has chosen. (MCRP 2-3A) Network engagement enablers
can provide additional insight on the potential COAs from any network, which can assist the staff
in conducting its analysis. Leveraging the NE resources and capabilities available can enhance the
level of detailed analysis provided to the commander for planning and targeting.
Network Considerations in Targeting
Targeting is a combination of intelligence functions, planning, battle command, weaponeering,
operational execution, and combat assessment. The D3A methodology facilitates the attack of the
right target at the right time with the most appropriate asset. Network engagement resources and
methods enhance the targeting process by providing options for staffs to analyze the information
available and provide the commander with greater situational and target awareness for making
decisions on who and how to target a node or network. Figure 2-4 illustrates NE support to the
targeting cycle.

Figure 2-4. Network Engagement Support to Targeting.
Targeting using the D3A process is necessary to engage networks successfully. Network
engagement enablers support the intelligence cycle, and the resulting intelligence products are used
throughout targeting. Decide is the most NE resource intensive step of D3A, requiring the use of
various intelligence products to decide who is to be targeted, the desired effects of engaging a
network, and the type of capability to use in order to generate those effects. The information on
the OE, network(s), and specific nodes provided by NE enablers supports the commander in
making these decisions.
Information requirements are submitted back into the intelligence cycle to support the detection of
a specific target. The intelligence products used to support the decide step of D3A are again used
to assist in the detection of the target. The deliver step includes the deliberate actions taken to
engage a target using lethal, non-lethal, or a combination of capabilities.
Determining whether engaging a network actually resulted in the effects desired requires
operations assessment. The measures developed to identify whether performance and
effectiveness were accomplished as intended are part of the operations assessment plan.
Assessment in targeting is focused on determining whether the desired effects on a network have
or have not been generated as an outcome of the deliver step. Using the intelligence products that
supported the decide step can provide the commander with the baseline conditions of the OE and
network prior to engagement. Collection on IRs through the intelligence cycle provides the
commander with the post-engagement conditions of the OE and the network. Monitoring and

evaluation using this information is used to determine the effects generated by the targeting efforts.
Engaging networks through targeting is further discussed in Chapter 5.
Assessing Effects on Networks and Operations
Assessing the effects of engaging networks must consider both the results of targeting on the
network(s) and the subsequent impact on friendly operations. Figure 2-5 depicts the assessment
process and identifies where an understanding of the OE and its networks can support the
commander in developing and implementing an assessment plan.
Figure 2-5. Network Engagement and the Assessment Processes.
The purpose of conducting an operational assessment is to understand how the tasks a unit
conducts are affecting the OE, and whether the effects desired are being achieved. The desired
effects are intended to support attaining the commander’s objectives by establishing conditions
necessary to meet the commander’s desired endstate. Conducting operations assessment requires
the commander to:
 Understand the current state and visualize the desired state of the OE.
 Monitor the OE during and after operations.
 Evaluate the changes within the OE to determine if a desired endstate is being established.
Network engagement methods for analyzing the OE, outlined in Chapter 3, support the staff in
gaining a comprehensive understanding of the OE, and help in conducting a refined analysis to
identify the critical variables that impact the commander’s objectives.
The purpose of conducting a combat assessment as it relates to NE is to understand whether the
desired effects on networks are being generated from the commander’s targeting efforts. This
assessment could also be used to identify if undesired effects are being generated, which can then
be used to provide additional guidance for future targeting efforts. Conducting a combat
assessment requires the commander to:

 Understand the current state and visualize the desired state of the network.
 Monitor the network being engaged during and after operations.
 Evaluate the changes to the network to determine if desired effects have or have not
occurred.
The NE methods for analyzing networks, outlined in Chapter 4, support the staff in understanding
networks, including the structure, associations, and capabilities of the networks and their
individual nodes.
NETWORK ENGAGEMENT ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
Marine expeditionary forces require the
capability and flexibility to conduct operations
throughout the conflict continuum and across
the full range of military operations.
Regardless of the type of operation being
conducted, Marines are required to engage
networks using lethal and/or non-lethal
capabilities. The complexity of the battlespace
requires that they understand the inter-related
human networks present in the OE, regardless
of where the type of operation falls in the range
of military operations. Figure 2-6 illustrates
the potential desired effects on a selected
network that a commander could decide upon,
depending on the type of operation, intent,
and objectives.
Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence
The following types of operations fall into the category of range of military operations
characterized by military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence.
Nation Assistance. With the various nations and international organizations that may be
involved in providing assistance, it is inherent that Marines are able to identify how these entities
impact the OE and their potential impacts on operations. In many cases, nation assistance is
conducted by a multi-national task force (i.e. possibly under the United Nations). US forces may
or may not be the lead effort of such a task force. Understanding and engaging the networks
present within the OE must be planned in a deliberate manner in order to maximize potential
opportunities and to mitigate challenges that may negate mission accomplishment.
Humanitarian Civic Assistance. US forces predominantly provide humanitarian civic
assistance to local populations in conjunction with military operations and exercises. Planning for
these types of operations requires a greater understanding of the local populace, which includes
historical considerations, cultural and societal norms, and their potential effects on operations.
This understanding is also a critical component for the deployed forces routinely engaging
networks during operations, whether conventional or special operations. Humanitarian civic
Effect
Support Influence Neutralize
promote
build
partner
resource
train
advise
assist
co-opt
inform
shape
deter
leverage
defeat
destroy
kill
capture
mitigate
disrupt
isolate
disorganize
deceive
Network
Friendly X X
Neutral X X
Threat X X
Figure 2-6. Potential Effects on Networks.

assistance activities have the potential to facilitate a greater understanding of the OE, which should
be considered for future operations and training.
Support to Foreign Internal Defense. Foreign internal defense involves the participation by
civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the actions taken by another government
or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and
insurgency. The conditions in the OE are the basis for the threat(s) present within the society
which must be identified and considered during planning. Engagement of all types of networks
may be required to support FID operations. For more information, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign
Internal Defense.
Maritime Security Operations. Maritime security operations protect sovereignty and
resources, ensure free and open commerce, and counter maritime-related terrorism, transnational
crime, piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration. Marines may
participate in maritime security operations by conducting visit, board, search, and seizure
operations, as in 2010 when elements of 15th Marine expeditionary unit recaptured the MV
Magellan Star and rescued its crew from Somali pirates. The complexity of the OE and the broad
nature of these types of networks make it necessary for units to leverage external resources to assist
in gaining a greater understanding of the networks. Network engagement enablers and resources
available to Marines may provide an understanding of the networks that are responsible for the
nefarious actions and their relationships to other networks. Targeting the specific nodes of a
network may result in the desired effects necessary to achieve the commander’s objectives.
Depending on the type of operation being conducted and the command relationships that may
exist, NE may be carried out by outside agencies in support of the operation.
Antiterrorism. Antiterrorism consists of measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals
and property to terrorist acts. These defensive measures include limited response and containment
by local military and civilian forces, such as fleet antiterrorism security teams. Friendly and
neutral networks inherently have a large contribution to these types of operations. An objective of
these types of operations may be to influence neutral networks to establish conditions within the
OE, making it more difficult for threat networks to conduct attacks.
Department of Defense Support to Counterdrug Operations. The Department of
Defense (DOD) supports federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies in their efforts
to disrupt the transfer of illegal drugs into the United States. Military forces assist in detecting and
monitoring drug trafficking, support interdiction efforts, provide intelligence and logistic support,
and integrating communications and intelligence assets dedicated to interdicting the movement of
illegal drugs into the United States. The threat networks responsible for drug trafficking must be
fully understood in order to facilitate Marine support to these types of operations. It may be
necessary for Marines to partner with US Government law enforcement agencies, as their
capabilities can be complimentary.
Support to Insurgency. An insurgency is an organized use of subversion and violence by a
group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force the change of a governing authority.
Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations) The United
States may support an insurgency against an oppressive regime that uses a mixture of political,
economic, informational, and combat actions to achieve specific political objectives. This is
accomplished by engaging networks using both lethal and non-lethal capabilities in order to set
conditions for achieving the identified objectives of the operation.

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations
Crisis response and limited contingency operations encompass a variety of military actions, often
in support of other government agencies (i.e. friendly networks), to contain or mitigate the effects
of natural disasters or calamitous human events. The OE may include a variety of non-
governmental organizations or the forces of other nations operating without benefit of a commonly
stated purpose or formally established divisions of responsibility and authority.
A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to a nation, its territories, citizens, military
forces, possessions, or vital interests which develops rapidly and creates a condition of such
diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of military forces and
resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations)
A contingency is a situation requiring military operations in response to natural disasters, terrorist
or subversive acts, or as otherwise directed by appropriate authority to protect US interests.
(MCDP 1-0)
Consequence Management. Consequence management consists of actions taken to maintain
or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and
catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. When conducted within the
United States, this is defined as defense support to civil authorities. The engagement of networks
depends upon the nature of the problem that is being mitigated, which must be considered as part
of problem framing. Use of lethal capabilities may be necessary if an objective for the operation
is to address a threat network directly. In the event of a natural disaster or catastrophe, the use of
non-lethal capabilities is predominantly used to engage networks.
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. Noncombatant evacuation operations involve the
use of DOD forces under the direction of the Department of State (DOS) or other authorities for
the evacuation of individuals, normally US citizens, who are located in a foreign country and faced
with the threat of hostile or potentially hostile actions. Such operations may also include the
evacuation of US military personnel, citizens of the host country, and third country nationals
friendly to the United States, as determined by the DOS. (MCDP 1-0) Specific lethal engagement
with networks may occur as part of the evacuation security plan, as alowed by the rules of
engagement (ROE). The unforeseen lethal engagement of networks through the operation may
result in operational or strategic level impacts for follow-on missions.
Peace Operations. Peace operations broadly refer to those military, multiagency, and
multinational actions to contain conflict, redress the peace, shape the environment to support
reconciliation and rebuilding, and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace
operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict
prevention efforts. (MCDP 1-0) Depending on the operation and objectives, the ROEs are
developed, and could be expanded or diminished, as a result of actions taken by networks and the
conditions within the OE. Friction points between different networks are routinely the source of
instability, precipitating the need for peace operations. Assistance to mitigate friction points may
be accomplished through engaging select networks in a lethal and/or non-lethal manner.

Major Operations and Campaigns
A major operation is a series of tactical actions, such as battles, engagements, or strikes, conducted
by combat forces of one or several services. It is coordinated in time and place to achieve strategic
or operational objectives in an operational area. These actions can occur simultaneously or
sequentially in accordance with a common plan. (MCDP 1-0) Depending on the type of operation
being conducted, a major operation could result in full-scale war with large conventional forces
being engaged that IPB is designed to support. Countering a hybrid threat requires an
understanding of a combination of conventional and irregular threat network(s). The challenge
with these networks is their ability to operate outside of the boundaries established for units,
making it difficult to directly generate effects on them.
During major combat operations, commanders are routinely focused on engaging and influencing
threat networks. However, the impact of operations on neutral networks should be considered for
Operation Restore Hope
In November of 1992, President Bush made the decision for the United States to take an active role in the
international crisis faced in Somalia, through coordination with the United Nations and the International
Community. As planning continued at US Central Command, LtGen Robert B. Johnston, the Commanding
General of I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), was selected and notified to lead the unified task force
(UNITAF) in Operation Restore Hope.
Operation Restore Hope was a complicated and unusual operation that required a plan to address both the
humanitarian relief and peacekeeping requirements within Somalia. The complexity of the OE and rapidly
adaptive inter-related networks posed unique challenges for planning and executing the operation. Many of
the network engagement principles were instinctively applied during Operation Restore Hope by UNITAF,
but they were done so in a ‘trial and error’ manner. Col Jack Klimp, the commander of Task Force
Mogadishu during the operation, explained that, “the final plan to secure Mogadishu made sense, but there
were various versions of this implemented until they finally got it right.”
UNITAF worked closely with and relied upon the capabilities of both friendly and neutral networks to
support the overall success of the operation. Prior to landing, Ambassador Robert Oakley conducted key
leader engagements (KLE) with the two predominant warlords in Mogadishu, prompting them to direct their
clans not to engage Marines as they came ashore. The success of these initial KLEs by a member of a friendly
network established a framework that UNITAF continued to use as it moved to secure outlying cities. The
primary effort and support for humanitarian assistance was provided by nongovernmental organizations
(NGO), which required daily engagement to synchronize efforts between these networks and military forces.
The NGOs had been in country long before the arrival of US forces, and working with them provided
UNITAF with a deeper understanding of the OE and the various networks’ structures and functions.
During an interview with Col James ‘Irish’ Egan, the UNITAF current operations officer, he described the
need for UNITAF to understand the networks and develop relationships between them during operations.
An example of this was the daily meetings hosted by BGen Anthony Zinni, the UNITAF operations officer,
with the leaders of major clans in Mogadishu. BGen Zinni was very directive during these KLEs, with
assurances that avoiding additional violence was in the clans’ and the Somali people’s best interests.
The majority of engagements in Somalia were of a non-lethal nature, and occurred on a daily basis with all
networks in the OE. UNITAF realized that the environment was fluid and that the complexity in Somalia
was further compounded by the arrival of a large United Nations (UN) contingent comprised of forces from
22 nations. The capabilities available today, combined with the potential to augment staffs with enablers
and the application of techniques learned over the past decade, would have been invaluable for the UNITAF
staff in planning and executing humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations.

planning later phases of the operation. Depending on the duration of the operation, commanders
should ensure that information about the OE is passed to follow-on forces for use in their planning.
Counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency refers to those military, paramilitary, political,
economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.
Counterinsurgency and insurgency reside within a broad category of conflict known as irregular
warfare. Network engagement is designed to support commanders conducting counterinsurgency
operations and enhances their ability to gain and maintain situational awareness of the OE.
Countering a threat network in this type of operation requires a combination of lethal and non-
lethal engagements with all networks. The ability to monitor and evaluate the conditions within
the OE is necessary to assess if a desired endstate is being achieved.
Defensive Operations. Although offensive action is generally viewed as the decisive form of
combat, it may be necessary or appropriate to conduct defensive operations. There are three types
of defensive operations—the area defense, the mobile defense, and the retrograde. Conducting
defensive operations requires an understanding of the types of threats that exist and which
networks are the nexus for these threats. Focusing specifically on the networks that are directly
responsible for the threat may not be adequate in creating the plan for the operations. Threats can
be of a lethal or non-lethal manner, which requires commanders to employ different capabilities
to defend or counter them. Network engagement provides the commander with an enhanced ability
to understand this threat and plan operations.
Offensive Operations. Offensive operations seek to gain, maintain, and exploit the initiative,
causing the enemy to react. Offensive operations focus on the enemy. There are four types of
offensive operations—movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. These types may
occur sequentially, simultaneously, or independently throughout the depth of the battlespace.
Network engagement methods can provide the commander with information on a specific enemy
in support of offensive operations. A challenge to Marines in the future will be understanding and
overcoming a threat that is hybrid in nature, which may include a combination of conventional and
irregular forces. A hybrid threat is comprised of multiple networks that must be understood prior
to engaging. The ability to assess the effects of the operations requires information attained
through the application of NE methods and support from NE enablers. Regardless of the shape of
the battlespace, either linear or nonlinear, NE methods can provide greater insight on the enemy
and overall situational awareness in the OE.

Reconnaissance and Security. Reconnaissance is the use of visual observation or other
detection methods to obtain information about the activities and resources of an enemy or
adversary. Commanders use that information to help them understand the larger environment and
the nature of the problem. Security is an essential component of all operations. It involves
measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed
to impair its effectiveness. Security measures may be offensive or defensive in nature. Offensive
security measures may involve targeting specific nodes with lethal and/or non-lethal capabilities.
Network engagement enhances the targeting process used to accomplish this. In these types of
operations, the information attained through the application of NE methods also supports the
commander’s operational assessment plan by providing an enhanced understanding of the OE and
the potential effects of friendly operations on the networks.
Network Engagement Activities during Counterinsurgency Operations
Company F, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines conducted counterinsurgency operations in the southern Helmand River
Valley area of Afghanistan from October 2009 until May 2010 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. During
the planning and execution of operations, the following significant tasks were identified as essential for mission
success:
• Partner with Afghan National Security Forces in all things.
• Close on the enemy morally, mentally, and physically each and every time that a friendly unit makes contact.
• Use night KLEs to gain information on the enemy, the history of the area, and to develop relationships with
the people.
• Reorganize the company staff to give depth and flexibility across all lines of operation.
• Leverage and cooperate with the district support team.
• Always use information operations (IO) to counter the enemy’s propaganda.
Marines simultaneous engaged friendly, neutral, and threat networks by employing a comprehensive engagement
plan using a balance of lethal and non-lethal capabilities. The commander intended to support both friendly and
neutral networks, influence neutral and threat networks, and subsequently neutralize threat networks.
Support to friendly networks occurred with partnering, training, and combined operations with Afghan National
Security Forces, while support to neutral networks occurred on a daily basis through medical assistance, repairs
to key infrastructure, and coordination of routine shuras for returning civilian leaders. Specific actions were taken
to influence the neutral network, with a clear IO messaging theme that was reinforced on a daily basis during
patrols and KLEs. Expanding on the KLEs with civic leaders, 11 members of the threat network were influenced,
resulting in their decision to reintegrate to the population. The threat network was aggressively engaged more
often in the early months of the deployment, with combat successes resulting in the return of formerly displaced
civic leaders.
During the period of operations, Marines specifically focused on producing the desired effect of neutralizing the
threat network in the AO. However, this was only realized by simultaneously engaging multiple networks. These
networks represented the human dimension of the OE, and due to the inter-relationships between them, the actions
of one network affected other networks. Network engagement principles were applied in a limited scope by the
company, which was primarily constrained by personnel availability, the size of its AO, its dispersion of forces,
and the time available. One of the primary challenges was simply the ability and application of techniques for a
small company level intelligence cell (i.e. CLIC) to analyze large volumes of information on a daily basis. The
integration of support available from non-organic enablers, as well as implementing NE principles as part of the
operations process, would help units to mitigate some of these challenges during future operations.
Captain Scott A. Cuomo, Fox 2/2 Company Commander
After Action Report, 21 April 2010

Stability Operations. Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and
activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national
power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment and/or provide essential
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. They
occur throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations. Stability
operations require a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment, including the
various inter-related networks, in order to support planning, targeting, and assessments. The
application of NE and leveraging NE enablers can provide commanders with greater insight that
supports these efforts.
Regardless of the type of operation being conducted, it should be understood that the operational
environment is complex and includes various networks that are inherently inter-related. Network
engagement is designed to provide commanders and staffs with options to better understand the
battlespace. This information and subsequent analysis enhance the existing processes used to
conduct operations. How NE is employed is completely at the commander’s discretion, based
upon the requirements determined necessary to attain specific objectives.

CHAPTER 3
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT COMPLEXITY
OVERVIEW
Complex environments include the totality of networks, actors, influences, and actions, coupled
with the rapid dispersion of information across the environment. The battlespace, comprised of
the areas of operation, influence, and interest, is further complicated by the inter-related and
overlapping nature of networks and global actors, both internal and external to the OE.
Regardless of the type of operation being conducted by Marines in the future, the operating
environment will be increasingly complex for numerous reasons. The blurring of lines between
the levels of war, restrictive ROEs, multi-national operations, and an ever-present media impacts
operations by adding complexity to the commander’s decisionmaking. Like conflict, networks are
rarely constrained to clearly defined geographic areas or to the identified battlespace, and operate
across boundaries and within cyberspace. Mission accomplishment in these environments requires
commanders to identify the correlation between the OE and their objectives.
UNDERSTAND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The MCPP requires the commander and his staff to apply design and critical thinking to gain an
understanding of the OE. An in-depth evaluation of the OE provides the commander with the
factors or variables that describe the OE. These variables are used to focus planning efforts, to
understand the second and third order effects that may be produced by targeting networks, and to
assess operations. Further evaluation of the OE from the perspective of the targeted network can
help identify the variables that support that network’s formation and sustainment. Due to the
variety of operations that may be conducted, establishing favorable conditions for mission success
requires engaging multiple networks to achieve a desired endstate.
The necessity for Marines to understand the OE extends beyond the physical dimension. The
commander must also consider the cognitive and informational dimensions of the OE (i.e. social,
political, cultural, and historical). This consideration allows an understanding of the OE that
facilitates more effective engagement of the various networks and a better understanding of the
impacts on the OE. Future expeditionary operations will take place in the world’s urban and littoral
regions, involving both higher population densities and greater numbers of organizations with their
own agendas and competing priorities. These organizations, as members of inter-related networks,
each add complexity that Marines will need to comprehend. Continuously monitoring the OE,
including the networks within it, provides the commander the necessary feedback to adjust
planning and execution.

METHODS TO GAIN UNDERSTANDING
The information available to describe the OE is extensive, and acronyms and information models
exist to support the evaluation and organization of the information. Each of these models were
developed to provide the user with a unique perspective focused on specific aspects of the OE,
which must be expanded in order to provide the commander with the necessary information to
support operations. Figure 3-1 graphically depicts some of the information models that are
available for use in evaluating the OE.
Figure 3-1. Information Models and the Complex Operational Environment.
Figure 3-1 depicts the multifaceted and interconnected elements of the OE, the base map (i.e.
geospatial intelligence foundation data), threats and vulnerabilities, host nations and neutral
population, and friendly forces and activities. Although no individual model alone is sufficient to
illustrate the complexities of the OE, the commander may elect to use various types of models to
support evaluating and managing information. A combination of the political, military/security,
economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) systems and the areas, structures,
capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) models is used to evaluate the OE due
to their ability illustrate a correlation between operational and mission variables.
Information Models
PMESII. The PMESII information model helps identify the operational variables of the OE.
Applying PMESII allows a staff to gain an understanding of the various systems present in the OE.

While the operational variables are traditionally used for planning at the operational level of war,
they can be used to help categorize and analyze information to plan at the tactical level.
ASCOPE. The ASCOPE information model was originally designed for staffs to gain an
understanding of the civil considerations of the OE at the tactical level. The ASCOPE model
provides the commander with a list of mission variables that helps to describe the OE.
Use of Information Models
Figure 3-2 depicts the PMESII/ASCOPE cross-hatch, a tool that supports a commander’s ability
to organize, monitor, and evaluate the interdependency of both mission and operational variables.
The tool was developed to help gain a greater understanding of how the human environment
interacts with and is dependent upon the systems in the OE. The use of this tool is intended to
help identify the mission variables that not only have a direct impact on the mission, but also the
impact all of the networks in the OE.
Figure 3-2. PMESII/ASCOPE Cross-hatch.
The information contained in Figure 3-2 is not an all-inclusive list of variables, but an example of
variables that could be organized into the different areas represented by ASCOPE/PMESII.
Commanders may use the tool as provided in its entirety or modify it as necessary. The use of this
tool can assists the staff in gaining a better understanding of these variables. MCWP 5-1 outlines
variables for the staff to consider to gain a greater understanding of the OE.
Culture. The cultural dimension possesses certain attributes and characteristics that can be used
to comprehend the unique aspects of networks. Analyzing cultural information is not simply
intended to address cultural sensitivity or avoid social gaffes, it is about identifying culturally
significant characteristics of the environment that can impact operational effectiveness and either
degrade or enhance mission accomplishment. Understanding the OE identifies the current
I
Information
I
Infrastructure
S
Social
E
Economic
M
Military/ Security
P
Political
S
Structures
A
Areas
P
People
O
Organizations
C
Capabilities
E
Events
District/Provincial
Boundary
Government
Organizations,
NGOs
DisputeResolution,
Judges,Local
Leadership
ShuraHalls, Court
House
PoliceHeadquarters,
MilitaryBases
Cell/Radio/TV
Towers,PrintShops
Roads,Bridges,
ElectricalLines,
Dams
Mosques,Wedding
Halls
Bazaars, Banks,
IndustrialAreas
Elections,meetings,
Speeches,trials
IrrigationNetworks,
MedicalServices
Picnic Areas,
Bazaars, Meeting
areas
Bazaars, Farms,
RepairShops
IED/ Ambushsites,
Military/ Insurgent
bases
Governors, Council
Elders, Judges
Radio,Gathering
points, Graffiti,
Posters
Banks, Land
Holders,Economic
NGOs
Accessto Banks,
Development,Black
Markets
Coalition,HN, and
EnemyForces,
NGOs,OGAs
MilitaryPolice,
EnemyRecruiting
Potential
Weddings,Funerals,
Births, Bazaar Days
Civic/ Religious
Leaders,Elders,
Families
Tribes,Clans,
Families
LiteracyRate, Phone
coverage
Ability to build/
Maintainroads,
bridges,dams
Drought,Harvest,
Businessesopening
Traditional
Structures,Meansof
Justice
Bankers, Land
Holders,Merchants,
Criminals
Kinetic Events,
MilitaryPolice
Operations
Coalition,HN,
military/ Police
Leaders
Festivals, Project
Openings
Road/Bridges/
SchoolConstruction,
Well Digging
Civic/ Religious
Leaders,Family
Heads
Builders,
Contractors,
Development
Councils
Governmental
Ministries,
Construction
Companies
NewsOrganizations,
Mosques
NE 012

conditions from which the commander can assess progress; understanding the attributes of culture
provides a sector for use in an assessment plan.
Using ASCOPE to evaluate the social and political systems can help identify specific variables
that illustrate how these systems form, operate, communicate, interact, and compete within the
OE. Evaluating the cultural dimension is challenging, and commanders are encouraged to include
non-organic enablers (i.e. civil affairs, military information support operations, DOS assistance,
etc.) to assist the staff with these efforts.
Language. Spoken and written word are a predominant form of communication in many cultures
and must be considered to engage networks. Groups can arise from specific dialects of a language
and help identify social classes, political affiliation, status, or regional alignment. The relevance
of language in the OE is significant for planning IO, preparing for KLEs, conducting presence
patrols, or any other type of interaction with the networks in the battlespace. Planning should
potentially include language training, ‘smart books’ with key phrases, and identifying interpreter
requirements at appropriate levels.
Demographics. Demographic characteristics such as age, gender, political affiliation, length of
residency, education level, and country/region/city of origin are often seen as precursors and
indicators in network trends, tendencies, and opportunities. These assist a commander in gaining
understanding of the conditions that provide an accommodating environment and receptive
audience for network formation and sustainment.
Analyzing the people element of ASCOPE within PMESII systems can help the commander gain
a greater understanding of the demographics in the OE. The relevance of these variables to the
mission is further understood as problem framing occurs. Commanders are encouraged to leverage
non-organic enablers (i.e. civil affairs, military information support operations, DOS assistance,
etc.) to assist the staff in analyzing the OE.
Religion. Depending on the culture, religion may play a part in the political, economic, societal,
and information systems in the OE. The types of religions practiced in some cultures serve as a
catalyst for network formation and sustainment. The impact of religion in planning operations and
engaging networks (e.g. days operations are conducted, engagement practices, treatment of people,
and ROE limitations) should be considered by the staff as they evaluate the OE. Depending on
the type of operation, religious practices of other member nations of a multi-national effort should
also be considered during planning to reduce potential friction points.
Geography. Terrain is analyzed and described in IPB as it relates to the maneuver of friendly
and enemy forces. Understanding the geography and its impact on the development of the culture
is necessary to help commanders gain a better understanding of the OE. For example, by
examining the geography in the OE, it may be identified that certain tribes or clans have resided
in specific areas due to the inability to pass certain pieces of terrain, or that previous conflicts
between different networks may exist due to competing efforts for limited resources related to the
geography (e.g. water sources, fishing rights, grazing areas, farming areas, etc.).
Local Economics. Legitimate and illicit activities must be considered as components of the
economic system in the OE. The variables identified to describe the economic system may serve
as catalysts for network formation and help foster a receptive audience and accommodating

environment. Commanders possess limited resources to affect the conditions of economic systems
as part of their operations. Other organizations (e.g. DOS, Department of Justice, and the
Department of the Treasury) are resourced to engage elements associated with the economic
system. Commanders should ensure that their operations are synchronized with these
organizations in order to achieve desired effects in support of their objectives.
Key Actors. The capabilities and intentions of key actors are better understood through the
application of NE methods. The purpose of the network analysis techniques outlined in Chapter
4 support a unit’s ability to understand the human networks in its battlespace to support planning
and targeting efforts.
Security. Viewing security outside of the traditional force protection lens is necessary to truly
understand the inter-related nature of networks and the threats they present to a commander.
Security means a variety of things to different networks and individuals. It can be used to assess
the internal security posture for Marine commanders and their forces, to evaluate the security
climate within a local area, or to view the external security threats faced by a network. It is
important to analyze the security climate and the condition of the OE from all of these perspectives
and consider their impacts on the current mission, pending and future operations, and how they
influence or contribute to the accommodating environment and receptive audience needed to form
and sustain networks. The commander should consider the potential undesired or unintended
security impacts on other inter-related networks as a result of generating desired effects.
Climate. Climate is addressed during IPB and various intelligence estimates related to the
commander’s mission and the adversary. Networks may form and sustain themselves based in
whole or in part on climate conditions. Patterns of life may be driven with the seasonal changes
of the climate and could influence the type and timing of actions taken by networks. Commanders
can gain a greater understanding of the networks by considering of how climate relates to the
formation and sustainment of networks and its impact on their operations.
Time. Time is perceived differently between various cultures and has an influence on how
networks act, relate to the environment, socialize, prioritize activities, and organize themselves.
Commanders must realize the unique differences on how time is viewed that may exist between a
western culture (i.e. Marines’ culture) and the culture in the OE, as this shapes how networks are
engaged. Without considering the impact of time on networks, the potential exists to conduct
engagements that result in undesired or unintended effects. Time may also be viewed differently
by other member nations of a multi-national effort and should be considered during planning to
reduce potential friction points.
Historical Considerations. Much like the culture in the United States, other cultures have
been developed and influenced over time by a long history of events. Understanding the OE, the
inter-related networks, and key historical events that have impacted these components is necessary
for Marines as part of the planning process. Additionally, it is important to consider other
countries’ involvement or impacts on the OE, especially when operating as part of a multi-national
effort. As an example, if a country that is part of a multi-national effort had previously occupied
a country, members of the populace may possess preconceived perspectives about the forces from
that country. Planning on how to employ these forces must take such historical considerations into
account in order to mitigate undesired effects or to minimize or avoid potential friction points that
could manifest. Historical journals and country studies are resources that can be used to provide

information on historical events for an area. The information gained from the journals and studies
could then be identified and organized using the events section of ASCOPE, with consideration of
the systems represented by PMESII.
Consideration of these factors provides the commander with a greater understanding of the OE.
The outputs from this analysis are mission variables that describe the OE. Further analysis is
required to identify how these variables relate to operational efforts and impact conditions for
network formation and sustainment. This information can then be used to support assessment,
including both the effects of operations (i.e. operations assessment) and the engagement of
networks (combat assessment).
IDENTIFYING CRITICAL VARIABLES
Critical variables are resources or conditions present in the OE which have a direct impact on the
commander’s objectives and may affect the formation and sustainment of networks. Achieving
the commander’s desired endstate is accomplished by affecting the critical variables of the OE.
Attaining the status of these conditions is realized through the development and implementation
of an assessment process, addressed in Chapter 6. Additionally, understanding the critical
variables related to networks provides key information that can be used to target and assess the
effects of engaging specific nodes and/or links that result in broader effects on networks. The
process to establish the context or relationship to each variable in a network is a collaborative
effort among the staff and is derived from cross-functional entities such as working groups or
operational planning teams.
A simple method to determine the impact of a critical
variable on a particular network is provided in Figure 3-3.
This method illustrates the critical variable as either
negative (-), positive (+) or having no impact (0) on a
specific network and is qualitative in nature. Full
application of this is provided in an example in Figure 3-8.
A critical variable that is used for planning and assessing
operations may result in the development of a
commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR),
but a critical variable alone does not constitute a CCIR in all cases. Through analysis by the staff,
recommendations can be made to the commander to identify the critical variables that could be
considered as CCIRs to support the commander’s decisionmaking cycle.
The following vignette provides an example of how critical variables could be identified and used
to engage networks.
Figure 3-3. Evaluation Legend.

Figure 3-4 depicts the initial evaluation of the OE which resulted in a list of mission variables.
This was accomplished with the application of the PMESII/ASCOPE cross-hatch tool to support
the evaluation and organize the variables.
Figure 3-4. Mission Variables – Vignette Evaluation.
I
Information
I
Infrastructure
S
Social
E
Economic
M
Military/ Security
P
Political
S
Structures
A
Areas
P
People
O
Organizations
C
Capabilities
E
Events
Port City Farming
Area SeaPort
Port City
Sea Port
DrugTrade Village
Elders
US Forces,NGOs
HN Forces
Private Companies
Gangs
HN Leaders
VillageElders
GangLeaders
CompanyOwners
Drought
Violent Strikes
Attack onHN
Forces
Sea Port Security
Sea Port
HN Security
US Forces
HN Forces
Private Companies
CompanyOwners
Violent Strikes
Attack onHN
Forces
Port City
FarmingArea
(IllicitCrops)
Sea Port
Sea Port
DrugTrade
NGOs
Private Companies
Gangs
CompanyOwners
DroughtViolent
Strikes
VillageElders
Gangs
VillageElders
GangLeaders
Port City
Sea Port
Sea Port
Port City
Sea Port
Literacyrate 33%
NE_014
Complex Operational Environment and Critical Variables Vignette
A force has deployed in support of a foreign humanitarian assistance operation due to a prolonged
drought in a country whose government has been challenged by gangs associated with the tribal
structure in the country. The gangs have been responsible for numerous attacks on host nation forces
and have intimidated the population through violence due to the lack of security being provided in the
area. The gangs in the area receive the majority of their financing through the drug trade, which is
supported through the production of illicit crops by local farmers. Due to the high unemployment
rate, many farmers see the growth of these crops as the only means to support their families. However,
the drug trade and actions associated with it severely undermine the ability for the host nation to
govern effectively. Nongovernmental organizations have been operating in the country prior to the
force's arrival providing basic humanitarian relief, but these efforts have been hampered by the
conflicts between the gangs and the host nation government. Due to the population’s literacy rate of
33%, the primary means of passing information is through village elders. A private company in the
country is responsible for operating the main sea port, which is the primary means for the movement
of goods within the country. This company has had a history of violent strikes over the working
conditions and wages being paid to its workers, but it is still a key source of employment in the port
city. Forces being deployed will work with host nation forces to re-establish security in key areas in
order to facilitate the NGOs resuming their humanitarian relief operations, and will prepare for a
transition to a follow-on force at a later date.

Figure 3-5 is the commander’s mission statement and tasks for the operation. This information is
used to support the analysis of the mission variables in order to identify the critical variables.
Figure 3-5. Vignette Mission Statement and Tasks.
Figure 3-6 depicts the networks that were identified within the OE in the vignette. The specific
composition of these networks and relationships can be identified with analysis techniques that are
included in Chapter 4.
Figure 3-6. Vignette Networks Present.
Figure 3-7 illustrates the variables identified as critical to the commander’s endstate, as indicated
by the bold blue text. With further analysis, the critical variables are delineated from the list of
variables previously identified, as a means to more efficiently and effectively understand networks
in order to engage them. This analysis of the mission variables is qualitative in nature and is
dependent upon the staff’s interpretation of the mission and tasks.

Figure 3-7. Vignette Critical Variables.
The information identified in different sections of the PMESII/ASCOPE cross-hatch may be
combined in a manner that is better suited for the commander. The various critical variables
identified have been refined and combined into the following:
 Security.
 Sea port operations.
 Drug trade.
The following are examples of narratives that describe the critical variables.
Security. The HN forces are incapable of providing security that would allow NGOs to provide
humanitarian relief to the population. The primary group responsible for interrupting these
operations has been the gangs in the area. The current lack of security is further highlighted by
the gangs’ ability to use violence to intimidate the population and also conduct attacks on HN
forces. This has ultimately provided the gangs with freedom of maneuver in the area. The current
state of this critical variable (i.e. security) is that the security situation provides an accommodating
environment for the gangs to take action; the situation is not accommodating for HN forces, the
population, or NGOs operating in the area. There have been no reports of gang interference with
operations at the port or with the private company operating it, resulting in a determination that
the critical variable does not impact these networks at this time. The current state of security
negatively impacts the tasks of providing security, establishing conditions for transition to a
follow-on force, and support to the HN forces’ ability to provide security.
Sea Port Operations. The capabilities of the private company operating the port are adequate to
support the requirements for both the humanitarian relief and military operations. There have been
I
Information
I
Infrastructure
S
Social
E
Economic
M
Military/ Security
P
Political
S
Structures
A
Areas
P
People
O
Organizations
C
Capabilities
E
Events
Port City
FarmingArea
Sea Port
Port City
Sea Port
Drug Trade
VillageElders
US Forces,NGOs
HN Forces
Private Companies
Gangs
HN Leaders
VillageElders
GangLeaders
CompanyOwners
Drought
Violent Strikes
Attack onHN
Forces
Sea Port Security
Sea Port
HN Security
US Forces
HN Forces
Private Companies
CompanyOwners
Violent Strikes
Attack onHN
Forces
Port City
Farming Area
(IllicitCrops)
Sea Port
Sea Port
DrugTrade
NGOs
Private Companies
Gangs
CompanyOwners
DroughtViolent
Strikes
VillageElders
Gangs
VillageElders
GangLeaders
Port City
Sea Port
Sea Port
Port City
Sea Port
Literacyrate 33%
NE_017

no reports of gang activity at the port. Previous historical data available indicates that although
this company is the largest employer in the area, they have attempted to pay their employees the
lowest wage possible, with work conditions that are very dangerous for the employees. Due to
these issues, new labor strikes similar to the previous ones (i.e. consisting of violent clashes
between the company and its employees) are considered to have the potential to affect port
operations in the future. The current state of the port operations is positive to the population from
an economic and humanitarian relief perspective; the NGOs are supported in their operations, and
the HN government’s political objective of enabling food distribution to the population is
supported. This critical variable has a positive impact on both ensuring security in the area and
maintaining logistics for both the humanitarian relief and the US force’s military operations.
Interruption of this current capability would result in a degradation of all operations in the area,
could negatively impact conditions in the OE, and could promote expansion of actions by the
gangs, resulting in their increased influence in the area.
Drug Trade. The drug trade is being supported by the gangs and elements of the local population
due to their financial gain from these efforts. The local farmers recognize the economic benefits
of growing illicit crops. The gangs influence through violence to ensure that support to the drug
trade continues. The gangs’ violent actions tie into the critical variable security, since they are
motivated to continue to make money from the drug trade. This has resulted in undermining the
HN’s ability to effectively govern and for its security forces to provide adequate security. This
critical variable negatively impacts the implied task of supporting counter-narcotic operations as
this directly relates to supporting the host nation government and their efforts to provide a secure
area for humanitarian relief efforts. The private company operating the port has not been effected
by these actions and will disregard anything that does not directly impact its own profitability.
The network interactions with the OE can be evaluated to provide the commander with information
that is useful in the assessment process. (Additional information specific to assessments is
provided in Chapters 6 and 7.)
Figure 3-8 illustrates the interaction of the networks identified with the critical variables. Each
critical variable has been evaluated from the perspective of each network identified.
Figure 3-8. Critical Variable – Network Relationship Matrix.
The following section provides a brief discussion on how the value of the metric was determined
in the evaluation.
Critical
Variables
Evaluation
Friendly Neutral Threat
US
Force
HN
Government
HN
Forces
Population Private
Company
NGOs Gangs
Security - - - - 0 - +
Port Operations + + + + + + 0
Drug Trade - - - + 0 0 +
Positive +
No Impact 0
Negative -
Relevanceto Network
NE_019

Security
US Forces. The current state of security in the OE is perceived as negative to the US force’s
mission, due to the intimidation of the population by the gangs, attacks made on HN forces, the
undermining of the HN government, and the negative impact on the NGOs’ ability to conduct
humanitarian relief operations. Due to this evaluation, the security critical variable is considered
negative for US forces at this time.
Host Nation Government. The gangs’ ability to undermine the HN government and exert their
will upon the population has resulted in a negative state of security. Due to this evaluation, the
security critical variable is considered negative for the HN government at this time.
Host Nation Forces. The gangs’ ability to openly and effectively attack HN forces, which has
been difficult for HN forces to counter with their current capabilities, has resulted in a negative
security environment. Due to this evaluation, the security critical variable is considered negative
for HN forces at this time.
Population. Due to the limited capabilities of HN forces, gangs have been able to exert their
wills on the population and create a security environment that inhibits the population’s ability to
establish a normal pattern of life. Due to this evaluation, the security critical variable is considered
negative for the population at this time.
Private Company. Security at the port is adequate and has not had a negative impact on
operations, resulting in the private company maintaining a neutral position on the current security
in the area. Due to this evaluation, the security critical variable does not have an impact on the
private company at this time.
Nongovernmental Organizations. Lack of security in the area has hampered the NGOs’
ability to provide humanitarian relief to the population. However, due to their associations with
the tribes in the area, some limited relief operations have continued. Due to this evaluation, the
security critical variable is considered negative for NGOs at this time.
Gangs. The gangs have freedom of maneuver in the area and routinely attack both HN forces
and the population in their efforts. Due to this evaluation, the security critical variable is
considered positive for gangs at this time.
Port Operations
All Networks Except the Gangs. Operations at the port at this time are adequate to support
operations in the area, and are viewed as positive for US forces, the HN government, HN forces,
the population, the private company, and the NGOs. Ensuring that port operations continue is
critical to the US commander’s mission, as well as to other networks within the OE. Due to this
evaluation, port operations has been determined to be positive at this time for US forces, the HN
government, HN forces, the population, the private company, and the NGOs.
Gangs. The port operations in the area have no impact on the gangs and they have not focused
any violent efforts in this area of the country. At this time, the gangs have a neutral position toward

the sea port and operations around the port. Due to this evaluation, port operations does not have
an impact on the gangs at this time.
Drug Trade
US Forces. The drug trade directly supports the gangs in the area that are opposed to the HN
government and HN forces. Supporting the HN is an integral part of the US force’s mission.
Therefore, the drug trade is something to be considered, but it does not have a direct impact on the
US mission, and is viewed as slightly negative in its current state. Due to this evaluation, the drug
trade critical variable is considered negative for US forces at this time.
Host Nation Government. The gangs in the area that directly oppose the HN government
receive the majority of their finances from the drug trade, which is open in the area due to the lack
of security. Due to this evaluation, the drug trade critical variable is considered negative for the
HN government at this time.
Host Nation Forces. Similar to the situation with the HN government, the gangs’ financial
supplement from the drug trade has provided them capabilities to attack HN forces, and is therefore
viewed as a negative in its current state. Due to this evaluation, the drug trade critical variable is
considered negative for HN forces at this time.
Population. Due to people’s limited abilities to provide income for their families and the societal
relationships between the gangs and large parts of the population, the drug trade is viewed as
slightly positive by the population. Eliminating illicit crops would be detrimental to the
population’s financial well-being. Due to this evaluation, the drug trade critical variable is
considered positive for the population at this time.
Private Company. There has been little to no impact on the private company in regard to the
drug trade in the area, and it has a neutral position on the variable. Due to this evaluation, the drug
trade critical variable has no impact on the private company at this time.
Nongovernmental Organizations. The humanitarian relief operations occur in highly
populated areas, away from any of the illicit crops being grown in the area. Since the NGOs do
not operate in areas associated with the drug trade, it has had no impact on them or their operations.
Due to this evaluation, the drug trade critical variable currently has no impact on the NGOs.
Gangs. The drug trade is the primary financial source for the gangs to support their anti-
governmental operations; therefore, it is currently very positive for them. Due to this evaluation,
the drug trade critical variable is considered positive for the gangs.

CHAPTER 4
IDENTIFYING AND UNDERSTANDING NETWORKS
OVERVIEW
A network is formed by a direct or indirect tie between two or more nodes which share a common
purpose, as defined in Chapter 1. While the study, analysis, mapping, and targeting of networks
are relatively new concepts within military processes, networks have existed throughout history
and have been studied in various academic realms. Recent operations highlight the need to better
understand networks’ (i.e. friendly, neutral, and threat) characteristics, components, behaviors,
relationships, and their effects within the environment. Adaptations of early methods developed
in academia are successfully applied by various law enforcement agencies. Network analysis
provides commanders with techniques to gain a better understanding of the networks’ structures
and functions.
NETWORK TERMS AND STRUCTURES
Human networks are comprised of socially connected individuals who are involved in activities to
achieve some form of social, political, monetary, religious, or personal gain. Networks can be
large or small, local or global, domestic or transnational, cohesive or diffuse, and centrally directed
or highly decentralized.
Components of a Network
Regardless of the type of network (i.e. friendly, neutral, or threat) a unit is attempting to identify
and understand, they all share common structural components and features, as displayed in figure
4-1. The basic components are described below.
Node. A node is an element of a system that represents a person, place, or physical thing.
Link. A link represents a behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. These
relationships may be connections, associations, or some type of involvement that serve as conduits
for information sharing or interaction between nodes. An example of this is the command or
supervisory arrangement that connects a superior to a subordinate. Since links are based on
relationships, they may be characterized as familial, proximal, virtual, or specialized.
Dyad. A dyad is defined as two nodes connected by a link, and is the smallest form of a network.
Multiple unique dyads may exist to form larger networks. The analysis of individual dyads may
help to further understand these larger networks.
Cell. A cell is a subordinate organization formed around a specific process, capability, or activity.
Recent operations have characterized a cell as a component of all networks. However, while the
potential exists for one or more cells to form or organize within networks, not all networks require
the formation of cells. Therefore, a cell is not a primary component of networks.

Figure 4-1. Network Components Legend.
Network Formation
Networks are typically formed at the confluence of three conditions:
 The presence of a catalyst.
 A receptive audience.
 An accommodating environment.
Catalyst. A catalyst is a condition or variable in the OE that could motivate or bind a group of
individuals together to take some type of action to meet their collective needs. Units may identify
these catalysts as critical variables when they evaluate the OE. A catalyst may consist of a person,
idea, need, event, or some combination thereof. A catalyst may change over time to adapt to
changing conditions in the OE.
Receptive Audience. A receptive audience is a group of individuals that feel they have more
to gain by engaging in the activities of the network than by not participating. Additionally, in
order for a network to form, the members of the network must have the motivation and means to
conduct actions which address the catalyst that generated the network. Depending on the type of
network and how it is organized, leadership may or may not be necessary for the network to form,
survive, or sustain collective action. The receptive audience originates from the human dimension
of the OE.
Accommodating Environment. This refers to the conditions within the OE that facilitate the
organization and actions of a network. Proper conditions must exist within the OE for network
formation to fill a real or perceived need. Networks can exist for a time without an accommodating
environment, but without it the network will ultimately fail.
If a commander decides to engage a network, the critical variables that represent the catalyst,
receptive audience, and accommodating environment must be identified. Understanding these
critical variables help focus targeting efforts on individual nodes or operations to achieve desired
effects within the OE.

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