The Construct of Confidence

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The Construct of Confidence:
Subjective Time and Self-Perception - How
Perspective on Past Selves and Experiences
Inform Current Self-View and Future
Hypothetical Projections of the Self
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Arielle Herman
Professor Marilyn Boltz
Psychology of Time
9 March 2013
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Autobiographical Memory and Temporal Distance . . . . 4
2.1 - Wilson & Ross, 2002 . . . . . . . 5
2.2 - Wilson & Ross, 2000 . . . . . . . 6
2.3 - Wilson & Ross, 2001 . . . . . . . 7
2.4 - Wilson & Ross, 1998 . . . . . . . 9
3. Point of View and Recall Perspective . . . . . . 9
3.1 - Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005 . . . . . 10
3.2 - D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004 . . . . . 14
4. Mental Simulations and Counterfactual Thinking . . . . . 16
4.1 - Sanna & Meier, 2000 . . . . . . . 17
5. Self Esteem - Clinical Implications and Future Direction. . . . 21
Works Cited . . . . . . . . . . 25
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1. Introduction
A common adage of self-pity is the thought, “nobody knows me for who I really am”.
What is it, though, that defines an individual to him/herself in a way that is different from how
they are perceived by others? Part of this difference, of course, is due to the unique and complex
emotional world that lies within each human being. Sometimes, however, it is evident that an
individual has construed a past experience unrealistically—that is has been tinted with bias. A
construct called autobiographical memory (memory of former selves in past experiences in the
form of a life story) is the main contributor to an individual’s self-concept: a database of his/her
tendencies, abilities, personality traits, motives, beliefs, expectations, and social desirability
(Sedikides & Strube, 1997). The psychological phenomenon of displaying biased memories of
past selves and experiences ensures that an individual will maintain a coherent and favorable
self-concept, even if the distorted memories differ from the actual events. In this way, an
individual’s subjective memory of an incident could differ greatly from but seem equally as
tangible as an observer’s unbiased, objective perspective, creating a stark difference between
inward and apparent identity.
The process of biased recall is a two-way street: it contributes to an individual’s current
construction of him/herself, and is, in turn, shaped by the present self-concept it creates: the self-
relevant information that an individual remembers is determined by his/her current self-view,
beliefs, and goals such that memories of former selves and episodes support this subjective
identity (Wilson & Ross, 2003). Individuals will recall almost exclusively information from
their pasts that coincides with their desired self-image, and even “go as far as deceiving

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themselves in order to achieve this state” (Sedikides & Strube, 1997), misremembering their
motivations for and responses to past occurrences.
In short, Individuals are inclined to display subjectively biased recalls of past selves and
episodes, thereby constructing a subjective identity that creates and upholds a cohesive and
flattering self-concept in the present. The formation of this self-concept will be explored through
the lens of temporal distancing maneuvers in autobiographical memory and point of view in
recall of past experiences. An individual’s self-esteem (as a result of his/her current self-view)
affects his/her hypothetical self-projections into the future. This will be investigated through the
examination of characteristic differences in the use of mental simulations by high self-esteem
and low self-esteem persons. As a whole, this paper will analyze the effect of time perception on
the construction of a favorable subjective identity, and then explore the consequences of self-
esteem on abstract projections of the self through time.
2. Autobiographical Memory and Temporal Distance
Personal identity relies heavily on how one defines his/her life story. People determine
their current worth based on their past successes and failures, and analyze the attributes of their
present self based on how close or far they feel to those past selves. Wilson & Ross have
hypothesized that people are motivated to feel more distant from unfavorable past selves, and
feel temporally closer to past selves and circumstances that are favorable to their current self-
concept. Achieving this state could include belittling past selves, even considering them to be “a
different person” (Ross & Wilson, 2003). In 2000, Wilson & Ross performed a study on the
tendency to using inferior former selves to portray a present self as superior. They instructed
participants to describe their current selves either favorably or accurately, and found that

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participants with a self-enhancement goal were much more likely than those with an accuracy
goal to include an inferior former self in their current self-descriptions. This provides evidence
that individuals may belittle former selves in order to create an illusion of improvement for
themselves without exaggerating their current abilities.
The subjective derogation of former selves has a direct relationship to actual calendar
time. The more temporally remote a former self is, the more critical individuals become of its
personality traits. Wilson & Ross write, “When people feel close to a past self, its successes and
failures psychologically belong to the present” (Wilson & Ross, 2003). Therefore, if an
individual no longer feels subjectively close to a temporally remote but highly favorable self, he/
she is likely to derogate that former self in an effort to create illusory improvement because he/
she can no longer take credit for the successes of that distant former self. If the individual does,
however, feel subjectively close to this temporally remote self, they are capable of bringing
forward the successes in subjective time, and similarly, distancing themselves from the failures
of a temporally recent former self (Ross & Wilson, 2003).
2.1 - Wilson & Ross, 2002
In 2002, Wilson and Ross performed a study to investigate whether people subjectively
distance themselves farther from past failings than past achievements of an equal actual temporal
distance. Student participants were instructed to report the best and worst grade they had earned
the previous semester, and then to denote how close or far they felt from these events, on a scale
from “feels like yesterday” to “feels far away”. Participants reported that they felt subjectively
farther away from the class in which they had received a poor grade than they did from their
most successful course, even though both courses had been taken the previous semester, so

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calendar time was the same. The asymmetry between the perceived temporal distances of
negative versus positive events supports the notion that individuals tend to push unfavorable
outcomes away from the subjective present and pull propitious outcomes closer (Wilson & Ross,
2003).
In 2000, Wilson and Ross wished to investigate whether memory revisions and temporal
distancing maneuvers affect participants’ assessments of their current selves. They
experimentally manipulated subjects’ feelings of temporal distance from past outcomes using
timelines as spatial representations of the subjects’ actual temporal distance from the event. Two
timelines were used, one spanning from birth to the present day, and the other from age 16 to
today. Participants were given one of the two timelines and instructed to mark on it an event of a
particular valence, such as a good or bad past outcome in high school. When the timeline
spanned many years, an event would appear to be much closer to the present than when it was
placed on a timeline of only a few years, thus implying temporal nearness. This was confirmed
by subjects’ responses on a temporal distance questionnaire: the students who had marked a
target event on the timeline spanning many years felt psychologically closer to the event because
it had been perceived as spatially closer to the present. The reverse was true for individuals who
had marked a target event on the less extensive timeline: the event was depicted as spatially
farther from the present, and therefore the individuals felt subjectively more removed from it.
This proves that visual representations of time can impact perceived psychological distance.
The second part of this study entailed a self-evaluation, which was used to assess the
impact of subjective temporal distance on current self-regard. According to the study, when

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individuals had been conditioned to feel closer to a past failure, their current self-evaluation was
reflective of a less favorable current self-regard. Likewise, when individuals had been
conditioned to feel subjectively closer to a past success, their self-evaluations reflected higher
confidence and a more favorable self-concept. The degree of temporal distance an individual
feels from past episodes is a form of memory bias. Therefore, this study suggests that memory
bias alone can dictate an individual’s current self-regard (Wilson & Ross, 2003).
The study that Wilson & Ross performed in 2002 indicated that individuals are motivated
to temporally distance themselves from negative events and pull favorable past outcomes
forward in subjective time. Considering this theory alongside the logic of the previous study
(Wilson & Ross, 2000) suggests that individuals actively shape their current self-concept by
adjusting the perceived temporal relevance of past failures and successes. Individuals may also
use this tactic to distance themselves from or associate themselves with former selves based on
how consistent they are with the individual’s current self-view. These cognitive selections are
generally made on the basis of what attributes an individual considers the most important.
In a 2001 study, Wilson & Ross investigated the relationship between apparent distance
of past selves and participants’ evaluations of these selves based on the attributes they deemed as
most and least important. The experimenters asked university students to evaluate their current
self and their self two months prior to this study. Through the wording of the prompts, apparent
time was manipulated. In order to promote a recent subjective time perspective, participants
were instructed to “think of a point in time in the recent past, the beginning of this term. What
were you like then?” Participants conditioned to view their former self as remote were asked to

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“think all the way back to the beginning of this term. What were you like way back then?”
Individuals who had been instructed to recall a “recent” former self praised this past self equally
as much as they praised their current self, while participants who had been primed to recall
themselves “way back” at the start of the semester criticized their former selves significantly
more, even though calendar time did not differ in the two conditions.
For the next part of this study, Wilson & Ross hypothesized that individuals have a
tendency to belittle past selves on the very personality traits that today they deem as the most
important. After asking participants to denote what they viewed as their most and least important
traits, they employed the aforementioned temporal conditioning method. It was found that
individuals are much more likely to denigrate psychologically distant and laud psychologically
recent former selves when asked to consider the dimensions that they view as most important. In
doing so, they create an illusion of improvement over time in these areas. Subjective temporal
distance had no effect on self-regard when individuals were asked to evaluate themselves on the
traits they nominated as least important. Additionally, individuals are more inclined to praise
recent selves to whom they feel a greater connection and whose values and attributes they see as
more similar to theirs in the present (Ross & Wilson, 2003).
It is important to acknowledge the fact that memory bias varies between individuals who
differ in their motivation to self-enhance. High self-esteem individuals are more likely to
employ temporal distancing mechanisms that maintain or enhance current self-regard than are
low self-esteem individuals. This means that high self-esteem persons are more likely to feel
closer to praiseworthy events and feel distant from unflattering episodes, while individuals with
low self-esteem are likely to feel distant from past successes and to perceive past unflattering

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events as closer to the present, or show no temporal bias whatsoever (Ross & Wilson, 2003). A
bi-directional link exists between the biased perception of past events and current self-
evaluation. Individuals may exclusively recall self-relevant information that coincides with their
current self-view because of this present self-concept (Sedikides & Strube, 1997).
Memory bias is not always regulated by self-enhancing factors. Real-world events such
as major life changes can also dictate the psychological remoteness of a former self. In a 1998
study by Wilson & Ross, it was found that life experiences (changing jobs, cities, romantic
partners) can cause a pre-transition self to seem psychologically distant. Subjects—students who
had relocated to a city far from home for college—were asked how far away they felt from their
17-year-old selves. Half of the participants were reminded of their moves by answering a
questionnaire, and half were not. The results showed that students felt significantly more distant
from their pre-transition selves if they had been reminded of the move than did students who
were not reminded. Transitions and milestones vary between individuals based on their life
experiences. Some may view a birthday as a milestone, whereas for others, a major life trauma
might create a subjective chasm between a past self and who they are today. The psychological
distance of past selves as a result of real-life experiences could result in the same temporal biases
that were mentioned in previous studies. According to the McFarland and Alvaro (2000) study,
the feeling of temporal remoteness could contribute to individuals’ derogation of pre-trauma
selves (Wilson & Ross, 2003). In summation, individuals “jump through a variety of mental
hoops” in order to remain psychologically close to past positive actions and to temporally

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distance themselves from events that they might find “shameful or embarrassing” (Libby,
Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005).
3. Point of View and Recall Perspective
As previously stated, autobiographical memory is irrefutably tied to self-concept due to
its life-story-forming nature. An important aspect of autobiographical memory is the visual
perspective from which a memory is recalled. Autobiographical memories can be visualized
from either a first-person or a third-person perspective. A memory visualized from a first-person
perspective is seen through the individual’s own eyes. First-person recollections are generally
associated with situations that cannot be removed from the emotional context in which they
occurred. Third-person memories are seen through the eyes of an onlooker, and often include
the subject within their own memory. Individuals are capable of viewing past selves and
situations more accurately and objectively through a third-person lens, which may also be used
as a distancing mechanism similar to temporal distance. Individuals’ reports of past selves
seeming like a “different person” generally coincide with third-person memories, and individuals
are more likely to view an event from the third-person perspective if they have experienced a
great deal of self-change in the time between then and now (Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005).
3.1 - Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005
Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich performed a series of studies in 2005 with the goal of
exploring the whether point of view in memories of past actions and experiences has a direct
influence on an individual’s current assessment of self-change. The participants in the first study
were college students that had undergone psychotherapy in the past. This pool of subjects was
particularly useful for this kind of study because individuals generally begin with psychotherapy

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because they wish to change an aspect of themselves. Participants were handed one of two
versions of a questionnaire that instructed them to recall their first day of psychotherapy from
either a third person or a first person perspective. The instruction for the first-person perspective
requested that participants visualize the event “from the same visual perspective that [they]
originally had”, “looking out at [their] surroundings through [their] own eyes”. The instructions
for the third-person condition asked participants to “visualize the event from an observer’s visual
perspective”, so that they could “see [themselves] in the memory, as well as [their]
surroundings”. Following the visualization exercise, participants were handed a series of yes/no
questions that corresponded with their conditioned point of view. These questions were intended
to elaborate on and maintain the constructed visual perspective. Questions for the first-person
perspective included: “Can you see any furniture in the room? Can you see anyone else in the
room? If so, what are they wearing?” The questions for the third-person perspective focused on
strengthening the individual’s observer perspective in the scenario: “Can you see what your
facial expression was? Can you see how you were wearing your hair? Can you see whether you
were standing or sitting?” Next, participants were instructed to hold their mental images in mind
and rate themselves on how much they had changed since their first psychotherapy session.
Participants were also asked to denote the month and year of their first (and last, if applicable)
treatment so that differences in treatment duration between participants could be accounted for.
The results of this study supported the obvious notion that individuals who have sought
treatment for a greater time period perceive greater self-change than individuals who received
treatment for shorter periods of time. In addition, participants who were instructed to view their
first psychotherapy treatment from the third-person point of view perceived more change in

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themselves over the time elapsed since their first treatment. This was not the case with
participants that were instructed to view their experience from the first-person perspective.
Visualizing a past experience from a first-person perspective places an individual in the
emotional and perceptual shoes of a former self, thereby creating an connection between the past
and present selves.
The second study in the series took the previous study a step further, with the intent to
analyze the effect of recall perspective not only on current self-evaluation, but also on an
individual’s overt behavior. The recruited subjects were undergraduate students at Cornell who
had reported that they were socially awkward in high school. Libby, Eibach, and Gilovich
supposed that individuals that feel more distant from their former awkward high-school selves
would feel better about their current social skills than would individuals who feel temporally
closer to their high-school selves. They hypothesized that, as in their previous study, when
subjects were instructed to view their former selves from a third-person perspective, they would
not only feel temporally farther away and perceive greater change and improvement from their
former selves, but they would also display more favorable social behavior in a way that is
consistent with their perception of greater change. In this way, they would be ‘living out’ their
psychological supposition of improvement.
For this study, self-assessment and observer-assessment strategies were used. For the
self-evaluation, the same visualizing instructions were used in requesting participants to recall a
situation from high school in which they believed they had behaved awkwardly. Instead of yes/
no questions, the visualization exercise was followed by a prompt that asked participants to
describe the image they had visualized in writing and in as much detail as possible. Next, they

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had to rate themselves on three dimensions: their social awkwardness in high school as compared
to now, their general social poise with their Cornell peers, and their present social skills in
relation to those of their Cornell peers in three areas—satisfaction with life, self-confidence, and
social ability. Following this test, the experimenter told each participant that since there was
extra time left in the session, they could complete another, unrelated questionnaire. The
participants were taken to another room in which a confederate was “waiting for the same
questionnaire”. The experimenter said that he had to go make copies and left the two in the room
together, where a tape recorder had been turned on to record their interactions. The confederate
did not initiate any conversation with the participant, but would respond if the participate did.
One measure of the participant’s sociability was the number of times the participant initiated
conversation. The other external measure was how the confederate rated the participant’s social
poise on three dimensions: the confederate’s general impression of the participant’s social
behavior, how often the participant made eye contact, and the value on a scale for six different
bipolar attributes: quiet-talkative, unsociable-sociable, friendly-unfriendly, extraverted-
introverted, confident-unconfident, warm-cold.
As predicted, participants who had been conditioned to view their former selves from the
third-person perspective evaluated their current social skills much more favorably than
individuals who had been instructed to view their former awkward experience through their own
eyes. In addition, confederates judged those individuals that had evaluated their social skills
positively (participants that had been instructed to recall from a third-person perspective) as the
most sociable, and scoring of the tape recording revealed that these individuals had initiated
conversation more frequently than individuals who had been instructed to visualize from a first-

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person perspective. From these findings, it can be theorized that individuals instructed to recall
unfavorable behavior of a past self from the third-person perspective were placed in a position of
subjective temporal distance from this previous self, and therefore felt that they related less to the
behavior of this individual. On the other hand, participants who viewed their former situation
from a first-person perspective felt more psychologically tied to that self-concept in the present
and therefore did not perceive as much of an improvement in social ability. This phenomenon
supports the idea that viewing previous selves from a third-person perspective causes individuals
to focus on the differences between current and former selves, whereas revisiting past events
from a first-person perspective emphasizes the similarities between the two selves, creating or
subverting, respectively, an illusion of change between that time period and the present. Overall,
this study supports the hypothesis that the visual perspective with which an individual recalls
past episodes can influence not only current self-assessment, but also the way in which an
individual behaves in relation to these dimensions (Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005).
3.2 - D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004
In a 2004 study, D’Argembeau and Van der Linden were interested in exploring the
“mental time travel” that people undergo when they re-experience their past and pre-experience
their future. The duo investigated the role of point of view on past and future episodes in relation
to subjective temporal distance from past episodes. The hypothetical relationship between
perceived similarity to past selves and subjective temporal distance of past episodes implies that
there is also a relationship between the perceived relatability of an individual’s past selves and
the point of view they take when recalling the actions of these previous selves. They cite a
previous study they had performed (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2003), in which they had

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observed that positive or negative memories are more likely to be associated with an observer
(first-person) perspective than are neutral events, but that no difference in reported perspective
occurrs between positive and negative events. Curious as to whether or not the temporal distance
of these more emotionally involved events would dictate the point of view of recall,
D’Argembeau and Van der Linden performed this study to relate temporal distancing maneuvers
to point of view.
Participants were prompted to vividly recall a previous experience that fit a certain set of
detailed written standards, and to try to imagine specific occurrences that may happen in the
future. There were four conditions, for each of which a participant had to construct or
reconstruct a vivid mental scenery: a distant past event, a recent past event, a distant future event,
and a close future event. The proportions of observer versus field perspective for each category
reveal that there was a greater proportion of field perspectives for recent past or close future
(temporally near) events, while there was a higher proportion of observer perspectives for
visualizations of distant past or far future (temporally remote) events. In other words, the
temporal distance of an event (in both the past and the future) dictated the visual perspective
participants adopted in their conceptualizations of scenarios in these time frames.
The findings of this study are consistent with the notion that temporally distant episodes
are linked to psychologically remote selves (whether in the future or the past), and therefore
individuals are inclined to perceive less similarity between these projected selves and the current
selves, and identify less with them as a result (hence the observer, ‘other-person’ perspective.
This process could also work in the opposite direction, serving as a distancing mechanism that
implies a very different past (or future) concept than a participant’s current self-concept. The

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participant could be actively using the third-person perspective in an effort to create the illusion
of temporal distance from a former or far future self’s behavior that is incompatible with their
attributes in the present. This cognitive process can impact an individual’s self-esteem in
multiple ways. One example is through self-improvement: if an individual perceives a distant
superior self in the future, it could motivate him/her to make efforts to improve his/her current
self in order to fulfill that goal. Individuals could also utilize this distancing mechanism in a
self-enhancing manner, creating a subjective temporal remoteness of an unfavorable former self,
and thereby creating the illusion of improvement from this inferior state. The next section of this
paper will explore mental simulations, or hypothetical projects of the self into time, and their
relation to self-esteem (as a result of self-regard) (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004).
4. Mental Simulations and Counterfactual Thinking
Mental simulations are “imitative cognitive constructions of hypothetical events or
reconstructions of real events” (Sanna, 1999) that can be used for a variety of self-esteem
purposes, including mood-maintenance, mood-repair, self-improvement, and self-protection
(Sanna, Chang, & Meier, 2001). There exists a bi-directional link between mental simulation
and affect, which together govern and are governed by personality. Positive affect produces
downward simulations (constructing a hypothetical inferior present based off of past actions such
that reality is portrayed as favorable). An example would be, “at least I studied as hard as I did
for the exam, or I would be a lot worse off”. Negative affects produce downward simulations,
such as the thought, “If only I would have reviewed the study guide, I would be a lot better off
for this test”. The study of counterfactual simulations provides evidence for other side of the bi-
directional relationship: the impact of mental simulations on affect. Counterfactuals operate

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differently based on whether they are contrasted or assimilated with reality. When contrasted
with an individual’s current circumstances, upward counterfactuals (simulations of better
realities) elicit negative affect, whereas downward counterfactuals (simulations of worse
realities) elicit positive affect. On the flipside, when upward and downward counterfactuals are
assimilated with reality, they elicit positive and negative affect, respectively (Sanna, 1999).
Counterfactuals can have strong effects on an individual’s self-esteem in the form of
either self-improvement (used to better oneself or one’s situation) or self-enhancement (used to
maintain, repair or protect a desirable self-concept). Self-improvement may be served by
upward simulations, which would promote thoughts of how things could be better—the first step
to achieving superior outcomes. Simulation tendencies for self-enhancement are more complex
because self-enhancement can be broken down into three categories: mood repair, mood
maintenance, and self-protection. Mood repair can be achieved through downward simulations
(considering how things might be worse). Downward simulations can also be used for mood
maintenance when an individual wants to prolong a positive affective state. Self-protection
relies on buffering oneself from failure, or bracing for the worst. This can be achieved through
upward simulations (or the hindsight bias), prompting thoughts like, “I knew it all along”. These
thoughts protect the current self-concept from receiving a major blow to its confidence if a
situation does not work out for the better. Through the aforementioned cognitive strategies,
individuals can improve or maintain their current self-esteem, but as mentioned before, it is
important to note that motivation for the construction of self-esteem differs between individuals
(Sanna, 1999).
4.1 – Sanna & Meier, 2000

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In their two-part study in 2000, Sanna and Meier hypothesized that since individuals vary
in their desire to self-enhance, they vary in their use of simulations and therefore in the changes
in confidence levels that result when these simulations are employed. High self-esteem (HSE)
individuals are more likely to engage in self-enhancement strategies than low self-esteem (LSE)
individuals, and are therefore likely to use mental simulations that promote positive self-concept
and increased confidence. They hypothesized that the opposite would be the case for low self-
esteem individuals, who do not exhibit such strong tendencies to self-enhance. More
specifically, they theorized that HSE individuals use downward simulations more frequently than
LSE individuals, and furthermore, that the main difference between uses of simulations by the
two groups lies in the tendency of LSE persons to contrast upward simulations (conceptions of s
superior reality) with their current situation while HSE individuals tend to assimilate upward
simulations with reality, leading to increased positive affect.
In the first of these two studies, Sanna and Meier tested whether participants’ levels of
self-esteem would moderate the interplay between temporal confidence changes and mental
simulations. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale was used to assess the self-esteem of each
participant, all of whom were university students beginning a new semester. On the first day of
class (three weeks before the first exam) and on the day of the first exam, students were asked to
complete a rating of their estimated performance in the class on three dimensions: their
anticipated 0-100% percentile performance, their anticipated performances in the class in
general, and their level of confidence in their anticipated success in the course. Their affect on
both of these occasions was measured using a series of scales for positive and negative adjectives
in reference to how they felt about their upcoming performance (happy, satisfied, pleased,

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delighted, and good; gloomy, depressed, anxious, nervous, and bad). To measure mental
simulations on each occasion, students were asked to describe any antecedents or consequences
they could think of, as well as any ‘if only’ or ‘at least’ thoughts that came to mind.
Results showed that LSE individuals showed less confidence, felt worse, and generated
more upward simulations on exam day than HSE students did. Additionally, the confidence,
affect, and simulation generation differed between HSE and LSE students on exam day, but not
when the first assessment had been given three weeks prior. Thus, LSE students showed a
change in confidence, affect, and mental simulations from the first day of class to exam day,
while HSE students displayed negligible difference in these three dimensions. It was found,
more specifically, that LSE students generated more upward simulations on exam day than they
did three weeks prior. The intriguing part of this study is that when HSE students displayed
negative affect, they, too, showed an increase in upward simulations. When, however, their
confidence levels were high enough that positive affect was maintained, they still showed an
increased production of upward simulations, but did not display the resultant negative affect that
was caused in LSE individuals. In other words, there was a negative relation between upward
simulations and confidence for LSE students, but a positive relation for HSE students. This
phenomenon prompted Sanna and Meier to investigate in the second of these two studies how
upward simulations differ in use for HSE and LSE individuals.
Sanna and Meier suppose that the difference in utilization of upward simulations between
HSE and LSE individuals lies in the way they relate to these hypothetical superior realities.
They suggest that HSE individuals react positively to upward simulations because they
assimilate the hypothetical realities with their current situations, using these imitative

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circumstances as a goal to aspire toward. They think, “That could be me. How can I get there?”
Sanna and Meier hypothesize that the reason LSE individuals react negatively to upward
simulations is because of their tendency to contrast their present reality with their fantasies of
what could be, thus chastising themselves for existing in and prolonging their current situations
without considering the steps they could take to help their visions materialize.
In this study, Sanna and Meier attempted to reverse the self-esteem-mental simulation
process by experimentally imposing mental simulations on individuals and observing the effect
on their self-esteem levels. Subjects (university students) were divided into four groups, all of
which were told that they would have to perform a series of set tasks. The first group was told
that they would have to perform the tasks later that semester (delayed condition). The remaining
three groups were all told they would have to complete the tasks during the experimental session.
There were three conditions: the immediate-control group (simply completed the tasks), the
immediate, upward-assimilation group (completed the tasks after completing a visualization
activity meant to promote assimilation to upward simulations), and the immediate, upward-
contrast group (completed the tasks after being conditioned to have visualizations that contrast
reality with upward assimilations). HSE and LSE individuals were distributed equally
throughout the four conditions.
The upward assimilation visualization activity contained a series of ten statements
describing superior alternate realities. The upward-assimilation group was instructed to vividly
imagine the present simulations as they had actually happened, while the upward-contrast group
was told to consider their current feelings in comparison to the statements, as if they did not
happen. The confidence and affect questions that had been administered in Study 1 were again

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given to participants to assess the impact of the experimentally imposed mental simulations on
these dimensions. The results of the study revealed that HSE persons under the upward-contrast
condition reported lower confidence and a more negative affect than HSE individuals under the
other three experimental conditions (whose results did not differ from each other) reported.
Likewise, LSE participants expressed lower confidence and more negative affect than HSE
individuals under the immediate-control and upward-contrast conditions, and reported lower
confidence than LSE individuals under the other two conditions expressed. Although
correlations still existed under the delayed condition, the relationship between confidence and
affect showed a much more significant correlation for the three immediate conditions.
This study also made a case for the hypothesis that self-esteem moderates the relationship
between upward simulations and confidence. Under the immediate-contrast condition, HSE
individuals behaved like LSE participants, showing significantly decreased confidence levels and
negative affect, and under the immediate-assimilation condition, LSE individuals behaved like
HSE persons, showing high levels of confidence and positive affect. This finding indicates that
the decreased confidence and negative affect that LSE individuals tend to exhibit is a result of
their tendency to contrast upward simulations with reality, while HSE individuals display
increased confidence and positive affect by assimilating the present with upward simulations.
This has potential clinical implications as a way of improving maladaptive coping strategies.
The difference in use of upward simulations can be related to the difference in coping
styles typical of HSE persons versus LSE persons. The coping style of HSE persons tends to be
more acquisitive, with a focus on gaining the approval of others, whereas LSE persons exhibit a
more protective coping style, aimed at defending sense of identity and avoiding disapproval.

Herman !22
Past research has suggested that mental simulations in HSE persons tend to serve the purpose of
self-enhancing mood repair after performing, but in addition, this study indicates that LSE
persons tend to use mental simulations in order to protect themselves prior to performance, in
order to brace themselves for what they see as their imminent failure. In this way, HSE
individuals can use mental simulations for self-improvement and for self-enhancement purposes
of maintaining or restoring a favorable self-concept, while LSE individuals tend to use mental
simulations more in the service of protecting their current self-concept and defending themselves
from information that counters their delicate self-beliefs (Sanna & Meier, 2000).
5. Self Esteem - Clinical Implications and Future Direction
Every human being has been familiar at some point with what it feels like to lack self-
esteem. Low self-esteem has been linked to depression, eating disorders, substance abuse,
sexual exploitation and teen pregnancy, academic failure, and criminal behavior, not to mention
the general loneliness that one feels when their confidence has been lagging. What are we lonely
for, though? It would be quite difficult for an individual to be lonely for him/herself. When we
feel lonely, it is because we are lacking the social acceptance we seek, and often because we are
perceiving social rejection in its place. In 1999, Mark R. Leary proposed the Sociometer Theory,
which asserts that the purpose of our self-esteem motive is not to maintain self-esteem, but
instead to minimize the likelihood of social rejection (Leary, 1999). The cognitive methods
individuals use to enhance or protect their current self-concept generally result in the individuals
behaving in ways that they feel will increase their social acceptance and relational value in the
eyes of other people in their lives. There is no negating the fact that individuals judge their own
self-worth based on how socially valued they feel. The Sociometer Theory claims that self-

Herman !23
esteem works as a cognitive gauge that monitors our perceived value in the lives of others based
on their reactions to our actions. Therefore, our self-esteem is inextricably intertwined with past
and future events that imply our relational value to other people in our lives. Clinical evidence
for this idea lays in the fact that programs for enhancing self-esteem always include mechanisms
of enhancing real or perceived social acceptance: physical appearance, social skills, interpersonal
problem solving, self-control, et cetera. The key concept here, however, is that if self-esteem is
governed principally by how individuals perceive their social acceptance. Thus, manipulated or
revised methods of perception of social relevance could help individuals view themselves as
holding much higher interpersonal worth and therefore increase their confidence.
All of the studies explored in this paper investigate the way in which individuals’
subjective biases about their identity through time help them to maintain a favorable self-
concept. This theory could be clinically applied by devising ways to help patients gain control
over their adaptive abilities to perceive past, present, and future events in the manner most
conducive to promoting positive perceptions of social worth. A good first step of this therapeutic
process would be to encourage individuals to relate unfavorable episodes in the third-person in
order to temporally distance themselves from the relevant prior selves. This would allow
patients the opportunity to let go of the social attributes with which they have associated
themselves in the past and move on to a new, more positive social identity. Another clinical
technique could be a program that trains low self-esteem individuals to automatically assimilate
with upward mental simulations. This would be an effective technique because the
D’Argembeau & Van der Linden study revealed that LSE individuals behave like HSE
individuals when they process information in the same positive manners. In order for successful

Herman !24
clinical programs to be constructed on the social front, however, more research would have to be
performed on the social aspect of memory bias and perceptual subjectivity. The mechanisms
behind automaticity of mental simulations would have to be investigated for the aforementioned
mental-simulation-retraining program to be a practical consideration.
Another interesting question for research is in what direction the relationship between
personality, affect, and mental simulations exists. Do people develop a certain personality that
predisposes them to a particular affect, which, as a result, moderates mental simulations? Or
does personality first lead to the mental simulations, which then create affect and mood? Is
personality merely a result of mental simulations and affect? (Sanna, 1999). Temporal distancing
maneuvers could even be pulled to the other side of social cognition and research could be
performed on whether perceptions of subjective temporal distance affect an individual’s
judgment of other people. The studies referenced in this paper cited some of the above ideas as
possible directions for future research, but I feel the clinical route, with a focus on the use of
mental simulations in improving the coping mechanisms of certain personalities, would be the
most productive path for this field of research to follow due to its practical application.
The D’Argembeau & Van der Linden study showed very clear evidence that the mental
state of an individual with a tendency to adopt a negative affect can be altered merely by
experimentally manipulating the way in which he/she uses mental simulations. This offers
support for the clinical argument that an individual with poor coping mechanisms can learn to
think about situations differently and emerge with constructive coping mechanisms. It all comes
down to changing the way they think about things—training their brain. Mental simulations
apply in the classroom (confidence about exams), in weight loss, in recovery from illnesses, and

Herman !25
in overall success in an individual’s professional and romantic world. Mental simulations are
capable of altering an individual’s demonstrated self-esteem (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden,
2004), and therefore the entire way an individual goes about living and perceiving their life. If
low self-esteem individuals are trained to automatically assimilate their present circumstances in
a self-improvement-oriented manner with upward simulations, these individuals will demonstrate
increased confidence and thus competence in many aspects of their life. Once important nuance
to consider is that, if an upward simulation is assimilated prematurely (seen as reality before
efforts have actually been made to bring this about), individuals will no longer display the
motivation necessary for them to take the initiative to work toward this goal—they will already
be fantasizing about it as if it were reality. Continued research on this topic would flesh out
these nuances and perhaps arm the world of academic and clinical psychology with novel ways
to confront subjective self-esteem and as a result prevent many of the self-image-related issues
the world faces today.
!

Herman !26
Works Cited
D'Argembeau, A., Van der Linden, M., (2004). Phenomenal characteristics associated with
projecting oneself back into the past and forward into the future: Influence of valence and
temporal distance. Consciousness and Cognition. 13 (4), pp.844-858
Leary, M.R., (1999). Making Sense of Self Esteem. Current Directions in Psychological
Science. 8 (1), pp.32-35
Libby, L.K., Eibach, R.P., Gilovich, T., (2005). Here’s Looking at Me: The Effect of Memory
Perspective on Assessments of Personal Change. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology. 88 (1), pp.50-62
Roese, N.J., Vohs, K.D., (2012). Hindsight Bias. Perspectives on Psychological Science. 7 (5),
pp.411-426
Ross, M., Wilson, A.E., (2003). Autobiographical Memory and Conceptions of Self. Current
Directions in Psychological Science. 12 (2), pp.66-69
Sanna, L.J., (1999). Mental Simulation, Affect, and Subjective Confidence: Timing is
Everything. Psychological Science. 10 (4), pp.339-345
Sanna, L.J., Chang, E.C., Carter, S.E., Small, E.M., (2006). The Future Is Now: Prospective
Temporal Self-Appraisals Among Defensive Pessimists and Optimists. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin. 32 (6), pp.727-739
Sanna, L.J., Chang, E.C., Meier, S., (2001). Counterfactual Thinking and Self-Motives.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 27 (8), pp.1023-1034
Sanna, L.J., Meier, S., (2000). Looking for Clouds in a Silver Lining: Self-Esteem, Mental
Simulations, and Temporal Confidence Changes. Journal of Research in Personality. 34

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(2), pp.236-251
Sedikides, C., Strube, M.J., (1997). Self-Evaluation: To Thine Own Self Be Good, To Thine
Own Self Be Sure, To Thine Own Self Be True, and To Thine Own Self be Better.
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. 29, pp.209-269
Sweeny, K., Carroll, P.J., Sheppard, J.A., (2006). Is Optimism Always Best? Future Outlooks
and Preparedness. Current Directions in Psychological Science. 15 (6), pp.302-306
Wilson, A.E., Ross, M., (2003). The identity function of autobiographical memory: Time is on
our side. Memory. 11 (2), pp.137-149

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