Needs_International_Relations_Theory

Why do states act the way they act in
international system: A foundation for
International Relations Theory in the
epoch of Realisation.
Abstract
International relations of contemporary world are primarily understood and analysed through
neorealist or neoliberalist presumptions. Waltz presumes the structure has a certain effect on
how a state acts the way it acts in international system. Nye and Keohane presume due to
complex interdependence states act certain ways.
I argue against those two premises. I argue that in this historical epoch that we are entering,
the Realisation, needs of the state as the basis for understanding and analysing relations
among states. Neither the structure nor the complex interdependence explains why a state acts
the way it acts within the system. Neither do concepts like state of nature, survival, national
interests, balance of power, or security explain the states’ behaviours.
As a case study, I apply the finding to the interests of the United States of its main trading
partners in the American continent, and across the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. The trade
volumes, which the United States carries with those states, is taken granted as a reliable
measure to value needs of the United States to go out and do businesses. I compare these
trade volumes of the US with the trade volumes that it carries with the economies of littoral
Indian Ocean. Further narrowing down the case study, I apply this foundation, needs, to
analyse the US-Sri Lanka relations. I explain why the United States is unable to restrain
China in the country. The finding will also explain why the United States is unable to
restraint China elsewhere too.
Why the state acts the way it acts comes down to the fact that the state has certain needs. How
the state acts within international system renders upon how much of that needs are, or are not,
being fulfilled within its own territory and resource endowment. It is a natural development.

Author: A.S. Amarasinghe Vidanage
Holder of a master degree in International Security and Law from
University Southern Denmark, and a honorary bachelor degree in
International politics from University of East London.
LinkedIn ID: dk.linkedin.com/pub/anuradha-sampath/45/4b4/9a7/
Date Published: 08 Nov 2014

Contents
Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................................5
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................5
The structure of this writing ...........................................................................................................7
Chapter 2 ............................................................................................................................................8
Historical development of international relations theories ...............................................................8
Realism and Liberalism ...................................................................................................................9
Niccolò Machiavelli .........................................................................................................................9
Thomas Hobbes ............................................................................................................................10
John Locke.....................................................................................................................................11
Kenneth Waltz...............................................................................................................................11
Nye Joseph and Robert Keohane..................................................................................................12
The Epochs: a reflection on the historical developments of IR theories.........................................14
The Realisation..............................................................................................................................17
Survival..........................................................................................................................................18
Needs ............................................................................................................................................19
Chapter 4 ..........................................................................................................................................21
How a state ought to think ...............................................................................................................21
Chapter 5 ..........................................................................................................................................25
Case Study - Interests of the United States.................................................................................25
Main trading partners of the United States..................................................................................26
Main trading partners of the United States in Indian Ocean........................................................27
Chapter 6 ..........................................................................................................................................28
Needs theory is tested......................................................................................................................28
Interests of the United States in Sri Lanka....................................................................................29
Theory in different cases...............................................................................................................33
Contemporary armed conflicts.....................................................................................................34
Chapter 8 ..........................................................................................................................................38
Needs as the founding principle and as an analytical tool of IR.......................................................38
Chapter 9 ..........................................................................................................................................41
Conclusion.........................................................................................................................................41

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Why do states act the way they act in
international system: A foundation for
International Relations Theory in the
epoch of Realisation.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Needs of the state reasons why it acts. The ratio of needs of the state and natural
endowment of its resource to provide for that needs shall determine the extent to
which it has to act, or do not have act, among other states. In this historical epoch
that we are entering, the Realisation, neither the structure nor the complex
interdependence explains why a state acts the way it acts. In the epoch of realisation
the states are to realise their truer capabilities reflecting their needs and natural
resource endowment.
Kenneth Waltz writes something works as a constraint on the agents (units/states) or is
imposed between them and the outcomes their actions contribute to – the structure. (1979.
p.39) Nye Joseph and Robert Keohane assert in the politics of interdependence, domestic and
transnational as well as governmental interest are involved – complex interdependence.
(1977. p.7) Furthermore, Nye and Keohane believe that many of the failures of American
foreign policy [this could be any state] have their roots in the limitations of realist
assumptions. (1977. p. xvi) Waltz, Nye and Keohane assert those theoretical frameworks are
useable as analytical tools to analyse international relations as well.
I asked following questions myself. Are the Chinese actions being restrained by the structure?
Or, one could asks, as Henry Kissinger adamant about it, why the actions of United States in
South China Sea are limited? Is that because the structure restricts the US’ action? Does the
complex interdependence reason how - rather why - a state acts? Are we to believe that if the
state is giving up the realistic presumption about other states, that state unleashes endless
potential towards interdependence?
In this article, I answer no to all the above questions.

Instead, I argue, it is the genuine needs of the state reasons way the state acts outwards in
international system. The state could not fulfil all the domestic needs of it itself within its
own resource endowment. States with smaller populations and relatively little resource
endowments could not set precedents in international system. In this article, I argue for needs
as basis to understand and analyse the state’s actions and international relations. A theory
based on needs could easily be devised as an analytical tool as well.
I argue, a normal state, even at the time of war, ought to act out in international system
according to its natural capabilities that reflected within its domestic needs and its resource
endowment. Survival is a relative term. The states’ actions ought to reflect its needs. Up until
recently these conditions, which this realisation is made possible, was not clear.
I call this epoch the Realisation. There is a makeable shift in this historical epoch that we are
entering today. It contrasts from the post-modernity. In terms of international relations,
conditions which favour the Chinese model of governance, makes this shift. The ideas of
unrestrained individual liberties and liberal democracy will officially become the things of
the past. Everything is legitimised by people like you and me, global multitude. We are
realising the time and space that we are living in, its limits and constraints.
Before this epoch ends, each state will have realised their natural capabilities. States could
measure their needs and resource endowment to provide for those needs. States will have
gone out fulfilling their needs that could not be fulfilled within their own territories. At the
same time, those states, which have been maintaining inflated appetites for centuries, not
reflecting the natural needs of their populations, will finally have deflated accordingly. For an
example a country like India is yet to define itself reflecting its natural needs upon its given
capacities to meet those needs. A country like the United States has to deflate accordingly
too. A country like Russia, it seems, is yet to be redefined too. The largest country on the
Planet Earth reaching its landmass from west to east but only accommodating 142 million of
population – it is less than half of the US population and even Bangladesh hosts more
population than Russia – even with its unfavourable rough terrain, is troublesome.
The concepts like survival, balance of power, power, and security are yet to be seen used with
their truer meanings at the end of this epoch. So will be the relevance of concepts like
interdependence, and cooperation.
In his Priorities for 21st
Century Defense, the President Obama clearly outlines the US’
intention to contain China in South China Sea. Could the United States perpetually stop
China gaining more than itself in international system? Why does the United States have not
much to do with India for example? India hosts the second largest population on the Planet
after China? Obama defines the US-India relations as one of the defining partnerships of the
21st century. Could the United States intentionally, for geostrategic reasons, increase
complex interdependence with India to the extent that it can contain China? Some reflections
would be drawn at the end of this writing.

The structure of this writing
I briefly outline the evolution of IR theories from medieval time to neo-neo theories and ask
what is enabling this shift from human nature, survival, structure, or cooperation to needs
based theoretical framework. Only the historical settings of the writings of Niccolò
Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke will be drawn into this end. Waltz and Nye and
Keohane deserve the most attention here. In terms of theories, I outline only the main
theoretical frameworks of Waltz, and Nye and Keohane. Enough justice could not be done to
any of them within a short article like this.
The writing will outline definitions of the realisation, needs and survival. What it means by
territory and resource endowment will also be defined.
Once the theoretical framework and definitions are outlined the interests of the United States
are brought in the writing as the case study. Main trading partners of the US are compared
against the trade volumes it carries with major littoral economies in the India Ocean.
Acknowledging the increasing engagement of China in Sri Lanka, the case is further
narrowed down to the US-Sri Lanka relations to reflect what the United States could do, and
could not do, even in a small country like Sri Lanka due to its shrinking capabilities. Few
broad remarks are made on how the theory could be applied in other cases.
The relevance of needs framework would be reflected broadly bringing China into the
discussion. Some remarks are made on contemporary armed conflicts. The armed conflicts
that are taking place within the pen-stroked-borders by distant powers. I question the
relevance of those armed conflicts as anything to do with international theories. The
conclusion will be followed.

Chapter 2
Historical development of international relations theories
Kenneth Waltz has just passed away last year. But he has left us with a radically different
theory to understand and analyse international relations from his realist predecessors. He
deserves immense gratitude from all of us for his effort. So does the theory of Nye and
Keohane.
The evolution of their way of thinking reflected the certain conditions in the historical epoch
in which they lived in. There is nothing surprising about the inescapable reality that the time
and space place upon the evolution of our thinking. For example there has to be a reason why
Hans Morgenthau places human nature at the centre of his theory immediate aftermath of the
WW II.1
The scope of thinking could definitely have limitations. One who observes the wider
geostrategic changers around and how much of them have affected, or not affected, those
great thinkers, rare windows will be opened to observe the historical constraints that those
thinkers may have had in their times and spaces. It is however not to disregard the timeless
wisdom of natural principles.
Idealists generally assume that states inertly seek cooperation - or at least have potential to do
so. For them nature is cooperative for mutual interests. The father of the liberal political
theory, John Locke claims that in the state of nature everyone is equal. Realists, such as
Thomas Hobbes, generally presume human nature is wicked. These premises had set
precedents how we understand and analyse states’ actions for centuries. Classical liberals and
realists alike have been argued that what is at stake in relations among states is either survival
or peaceful coexistence.
When the question is put as what is the interest of a state, each contemporary theorist tend to
jump their guns and tries to form arguments with core definitions like human nature, power,
balance of power, cooperation, and security. Sadly, even those who try to define the concept
of national interest systematically, someone like Martha Finnemore, have ended up
entertaining trendy concepts like international social structures evidently showing the
difficulties of thinking fresh in any given historical context.
What conditions have made the concepts like human nature, and cooperation appealing
historically to observe the actions of states? Let us outline the historical contexts in which
those classical thinkers thought and wrote.
1
The WW II is referred to the Western War II. The WW I = The Western War I. Why that is explained in 7th
footnote.

Realism and Liberalism
When Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke were thinking, wars were all
around them. A part of the world, of what we now call the west, was going through
unprecedented changers due to an historical coincident occurred – the discovery of New
World. The chances of expanding their territories seemed to have had no end at sight for
some of the western monarchies. With these expansions the capabilities of so called nation-
states were constantly at shift.
Nothing seemed to have stopped the nature of their Monarchies. Machiavelli and Hobbes
were mainly reflecting on physical wars around favouring their rulers. Locke was doing the
same thing, favouring his monarch, but was reflecting on inner and outside religious wars in
his time to form his peaceful argument. How much the young Jewish Morgenthau may have
reflected on the nature of Adolf Hitler; wonder yourselves for a second now. He himself was
born in Germany in 1904, and lived there until he immigrated to the US in 1937. It is hard to
imagine that he had any chance of reflecting on international relations without contemplating
the raw power and human nature of Nazi leader.
Even if there was no more room left for endless territorial expansions at the aftermath of the
WW II, the overly accumulated capabilities of the United States had left the observers of
states relations with an image that its power - soft and hard – is endless. That was until when
China emerged as a main actor in international relations recently.
Those misgivings, rather the historical constraints of their thinking, whether it is idealist or
realist, are evident even in the writings of these original thinkers.
Niccolò Machiavelli
It is very significant where Machiavelli was born. He
came from Florence in Italy. The west did not mean
much at the time in 1513 when he was writing The
Prince.
The Italians were the ones having Renaissance, not the
Prussians or the English. Remember, his writing came a
century prior to the Westphalia Treaty in 1648.
In my mind his thought had been impaired by following
historical constraints.
It has been while since the reconsolidation of Ottoman
power disconnected western traders, mainly traders of Venice, having access to eastern trade
through, the Silk Road. Prior the Mongolians had offered a secure passage to these traders.
Picture source: Bio - biography.com

Thus, it was a busy time to find a way around to Far East to maintain the demand for those
lucrative products such as spice and silk. A Portuguese explorer, Bartolomeu Dias, had just
reached the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa in 1448 for the first time. It is about forty
years later in 1492 Christopher Columbus landed on the New World by a coincident. The
Christian theologians of the era, whom were closer to Spanish Monarch, had initially refuted
the Columbus’ journey because they believed the earth was flat.
The Prince had nothing to do with these distant realities. He was merely trying to regain the
office he lost from Giuliano de' Medici, the co-ruler of Florence, favouring him. None of
those broader changers seems to have had any lasting effect on him or on his writing.
Contradicting the traditional belief that the ruler does not have to be virtues to be a legitimate
ruler was the message delivered in The Prince. Does this hypothesis have any pretext today in
terms of international relations? The appeal of this hypothesis to understand how the
President Obama or the President Putin or the Chinese Primer Xi Jinping manages their
states’ relations with other states is more or less irrelevant today. It is a different question to
ask to what extent this hypothesis is relevant within the domestic political structures in this
writing.
Thomas Hobbes
What had Hobbes have in his mind when he wrote phrases
like a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that
ceases only in death, and such a war as is of every man
against every man in 1651? He was living in self-exiled in
France while he was writing Leviathan. He feared for his
own life because he suspected that his favouritism to
absolute sovereign in the English Civil War bring him
death. It seems he felt safer in France where the Thirty
Years of War waging was just coming to an end. It was war
everywhere, all around him. A social contract, one which
the monarch has absolute control, was seems to be the
solution for him to eradicate this perpetual war, which is
conditioned by human nature.
Some of his works concerned the slavery at the time, allowing us to observe that the scope of
thinking is being stretched with historical encounters.
Picture source: Wikipedia

John Locke
John Locke, a Scottish natural law philosopher, who was born in
1632, replying to Sir Robert Filmer, an English political figure
who defended the divine right of English King, wrote following
words in 1689; lack of a common judge, with authority, puts all
persons in a state of nature and again, Men living according to
reason, without a common superior on earth, to judge between
them, is properly the state of nature.
He was favouring King William III and wife, the protestant Mary
II, to gain the reign in England. The Bill of Right, which was
ratified in 1688 with some influence of Locke’s writing, had
paved the way to bar the Catholic members sitting in the UK
Parliament, and had guaranteed the Monarch for a protestant until
last year, 2013.
Kenneth Waltz
All of them, Waltz, Nye and Keohane, were born in the
United States. They should all have sensed the immediate
triumphalism of the US at the aftermath of the WW II, and
somewhat distant devastations across the Atlantic and the
Pacific Oceans. As Waltz was born in 1924, he should have
seen the most. Amid seventies their ideas are evolving. They
were in the middle of the Cold War; but had witnessed the
détente. The world was a bipolar world. They all have seen
the Korean War and Vietnam War, which were results of the
Cold War. When the writings of their first editions were
printed, the USSR was still a supper power in its old form.
Post-war institutions like the UN, WTO, IMF and the World
Bank were out in action.
The Waltz’s ‘Theory of International Politics’ was first printed in 1979.
His process of thinking to form a systemic theory was primarily shaped by initial questions
like - Should it [a state] spend more or less on defense?; Should it make nuclear weapons or
not?; Should it stand fast and fight or retreat and seek peace? (p.19) Answering those
questions himself, he wrote, something works as a constraint on the agents or is imposed
between them and the outcomes their actions contribute to. That is the structure. For that
reason, for him, an international relations theory could not be formulated as a mere
reductionist theory alone.
Picture source: Udaimonia -
udaimoniaonline.com

His shift from classical realism to neorealism lies right there where he looked for a structure.
His understanding of the system is composed of a structure and of interacting units. (p.79) He
writes structure is defined in terms of the primary political units of an era, be they city states,
empires or nations. (p. 91) Of changers in the distribution of capabilities across units changes
the structure of the system. (p.97) That is changes of the system. (p.101) According to that
expectations of units change as well. (p.97) In the structure there are few poles (states/units)
with great power, and their rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size
of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength,
political stability and competence. (p.131)
Waltz draws a clear line at what place the structure starts affecting the units, and what place
the units start affecting the structure. The capacities of greatest poles affect the units.
Answering his initial questions one could understand it as that those units with fewer
capabilities have to adopt accordingly to the structural constrains. The units start affecting
the structure when unites have to concert to find answers to global issues like Poverty,
Population, Pollution and Proliferation, his 5 P’s. (p.210)
A simple understanding of these jargons is like follow. Since it was the bipolar system at
observation, the United States and the USSR were the great poles. All the other unites have to
act accordingly because those two poles have great power shaping the structure. That is the
system. The changers in the distribution in capabilities of these great poles may affect the
system as a whole could be understood bringing China in to the system as a great pole, and
how the expectations of units change accordingly to the structural change.
Nye Joseph and Robert Keohane
The first edition of Power & Interdependence of Nye
and Keohane was printed in 1977.
Firstly, it has to be said, that the theory of complex
interdependence is not a theory that could be applied to
analyse national policies without modifications. It is a
theory analysing the world system. They themselves
assert that. (p.191) The analytical scope is further
narrowed when they stipulate the appropriateness of the
theory to industrialised and pluralist countries. (p.23)
In there may also lay the reason for obsolete theory of
theirs to analyse the today’s world system.
Their writing was primarily evolved answering
following two questions; what are the major features of
world politics when interdependence, particularly economic interdependence, is extensive?;
and how and why do international regimes change? (p.5)

Nye and Keohane formulated the concept of complex
interdependence as a base to understand and analyse
international relations. Contrasting from realists, they
believe; actors other than states participate directly in
world politics; a clear hierarchy of issues does not exist;
and force is an ineffective instrument of policy. (p.20)
However, when they write sometimes, realist
assumptions will be accurate, or largely accurate, but
frequently complex interdependence will provide a
better portrayal of reality the theory incorporates both
ends of the spectrum. (p.20)
They point out, placing the writing in a particular
historical context, détente showed the signs towards
interdependence, and the realists’ assumption of national
security is fading away as analytical framework. (p.5-6)
The areas like climate change and financial market showed ideal type of interdependence to
them.
Picture source: Ohio Wesleyan University -
http://news.owu.edu

Chapter 3
The Epochs:
a reflection on the historical developments of IR theories
At the beginning of 16th
century, about five hundred years ago, the world has to be a rather
mysterious place. That is even for en enlightening western mind. The constraint that time and
space played upon our thinking is a constant one. A physical example of that is that even in
the last quarter of the 18th
century the King Gorge III of England was still commissioning
voyages to find new lands to claim under his name. What else could a modernist thinker has
seen about the state affaires beyond the raw power of Monarchies and their unrestrained
desire for expansion? Even at the aftermath of the WW II, human nature had a great appeal to
explain states’ relations. Only today we could observe some of the historical constraints that
Waltz, Nye and Keohane, once lived through.
Realistic needs of the state is the last this they had in their mind. The development of
capabilities among main actors in international relations had not reflected the natural needs of
their local populations within the constraints of their resource endowments.
It is very clear for us now that in those historical epochs where those classical thinkers lived
the Planet Earth was yet to be explored and reclaimed. In that sense we are doing rather
injustice to those enlightenment thinkers brining them into to understand contemporary
international relations. They had no such sense of the world. It is that you and I have this
sense of world today due to increasing circulations of information within a fraction of the
time. The ill of applying the writings of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke to form theories of
international relations came about due to lack of understanding of their historical periods and
of those interpreters.
Human nature driven understanding of international relations was again at present at the
aftermath of the WW II. The writing of Morgenthau reflected the bitter truth of Hitler’s
expansionist attitude, and of his desire for spreading Aryan race. Those who argues today for
the re-emergence of Morgenthau’s theory, someone like Michael Charles Williams, has to be
very careful of not misinterpreting the actions of people like the Russian President as
something that driven off by his human nature. He is a product certain historical realities in
international system. He has been left with no other ways to secure interests of the state than
acting to bar the irrational expansionist attitudes of Europe in Crimea.
Let us reflect on the contemporary international theorists, Waltz, and Nye and Keohane.
It is puzzling to me that none of those thinkers derived their theories looking at the territory
of the state and the population it accommodates within its territory to find the reasons why
their state acts the way it acts. Like a child and a grown up man has same needs but in

different volumes, a smaller state differs from a bigger state in terms of the volume of its
needs. Some conditions bared them seen that their country had been developing its
capabilities for so long, and an historical coincidence had favoured that. To have an
undistorted view of the epoch that we are entering today what we have to know is what made
possible the development of capabilities of their state to the extent it did not reflect the
natural needs of the state.
The United States seems had the rigour and capabilities to make the whole world a free world
and a democratic one, or to bring the whole world under its knees if it wanted to. This is the
historical condition played on Waltz, and Nye and Keohane. The writings of Francis
Fukuyama, the End of History and the Last Man, is an innocent reflection of this epoch. Even
at the very last days of the last century the liberal values were seemed just about to take over
the whole world.
Waltz writes changers in the distribution of capabilities across units changes the structure of
the system. How could China, as a great pole, since it did not wage a war to expand its
capabilities, change its capabilities? What has to be understood is that what made the United
States to have greater capabilities than what it naturally deserves was based on a historical
coincidence – it is explained under the Realisation. In normal conditions, the capabilities are
extracted from natural resources. No eternal slavery or expansion is possible. The capabilities
of the state do not change that often. War is a way to expand the pool of resource endowment.
Technologies help it too. On the basis that each nation on this Planet has access to those
technologies, the nature given resource endowments of states, hence the capabilities derived
from them, has to be more or less fixed.
Those who were the victim of last epoch, generally speaking the post-modernity, have to be
the last of those generations which would not be able to pay attention to where their feet are
prior to observing international issues. Look at the ground you standing up, the size of the
population you belongs in, or you wish to belong to, and the resources you have around to
facilitate needs of people around you. Then find out how, and to what extent, your state ought
to act within international system.
Neither the structure nor the complex interdependence matters to the state. Neither liberal
democracy nor communist ideologies, whether it is mix of Chinese and Russians, matter
when it comes to provide for people within the state. Do you think that keeping 1.35 billion
people somewhat content is an easy task in the age of realisation? What has to be done has to
be done no matter what. That is why China is unstoppable – not because any ideologies it
follows. The states with larger populations, according to their resources endowments, shall be
going out looking to fulfil their natural needs no matter what. That is to me a legitimate cause
of action for states.
It is neither the structure nor the interdependence that reason a state to act the way it acts.

Waltz writes the greatest act of creation since the Adam and Eve is Richard Nixon’s
conferring superpower status on China in 1971. (p.130) He writes, China has more than 800
million people; Japan has a strong economy; Western Europe has the population and the
resources and lacks only political existence. (p. 130). A lot has changed since then. China is
the second largest economy in the world. It will soon surpass the United States economically
and militarily as well. Prior to consolidating military might, Germany has reasserted its
traditional power in West as an economic powerhouse. Japan has given up its post-war stance
as a pacific nation, and has taken up arms to defend its national interests.
Even if Waltz has clearly recognised, under the capacities of units that the size of population
and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability
and competence are to determine the capabilities of the state, for some reasons, countries like
India, China had gone missing from affecting his theory.
Even at the outset I was in doubt about the theoretical framework of Nye and Keohane. The
analysis of the theory in rather abstract cases such as ocean and money, and the United States
relations with Canada and Australia have nothing appealing to small nations, therefore bring
no any resourceful analysis to understand the theory out from industrialised and liberal states.
They themselves have asserted that. Since they assert it is a liberal and pluralistic world
system they have in mind, the theory has to be obsolete to analyse today’s world.
In addition to that, in the preface to their first edition, Nye and Keohane write we believed
that many of the failures of American foreign policy in these areas had their roots in the
limitations of realist assumptions. For the liberals the mistake the realists do is a rather
theoretical one as well as analytical. Nye and Keohane have gone to a great extent to
accommodate nuances in the international regime. But the very moment they believe in that
the realist’s core enforces restrictions upon the state on its actions they are explicit about the
state’s endless will for complex interdependence otherwise.
Nye and Keohane are mistaken in their core belief. If they are right, it implies that illiberal
economies are destined to have thinner – their own word – interdependence than to those
liberal thicker interdependence lines. That is not valid anymore. For example, according to
them, China could not be more interdependent, or to say have a thick line, in their theory.
A clear definition of the present epoch, the realisation is needed prior to proceeding further
with this writing. What I mean by needs has to be clearly outlined also against the concept of
survival.

The Realisation
The conditions of Realization appear at the end of post-modernity.
The following definition is sufficient, within international relations of states, to understand
what conditions the Realisation.
The capacity of the Planet Earth is more or less understood. Today, the four corners of the
world have been clearly drawn. It works as a constraint - a constraint which plays a role in
almost everyone’s mind regardless one lives in Congo in Africa or in North America. Alone
knowing the four corner of the world, it is also significant that the main actors, which already
play a greater role in international relations today, and those who will play increasing role in
near future - such as Turkey, Iran, Germany, China, India, Brazil and South Africa and so on
– have no significant boarder disputes. Their natural resource endowments will not be
changed before the end of Realisation. Therefore, the capabilities of top dozens of countries
are more or less fixed.
In my understanding the issues of Senkaku Islands and the border disputes of India and China
will have been faded away as the time passes. Even if the disputes will lead to armed
conflicts, they would be in rather insignificant scale in comparison to the WW II experience.
Whether they will lead to significant war(s) is another matter – had those issues being left for
regional actors to solve themselves, such as to Japan and China and India and China, they are
more likely to ceded away with less significance.
One of the other significant facts in the epoch, especially contrasting it from the post-
modernity, is that the liberalists’ dream of individual freedom is realized unattainable.2
As
China is becoming the dominant economic power it is to set the example for the desired
government for the rest of the states and transnational organizations. Like the United States
did aftermath of the WW II.
The economic dominance, which west once had opposing communist ideologies, has to have
a name. The liberal democratic, it was labeled. Rhetoric of it played the biggest role keeping
people flocking into the idea. The chosen attitude of United States seemed had unleashed
potential to empower entire global multitude.3
The un-fencing human nature has, and still
does, found real comfort in the idea. The legitimacy of the global multitude was therefore
easily came-by for post-war institutions such as United Nations, WTO and IMF. Those
western democracies and barrages of intergovernmental organizations seemed to have the
rigor to change the whole world for good. But they suffered the lack of political will and
aspirations among those political leaders to do so. They were mere appendages of needs of
those handful states. The exploitation of developing world continued. Reality fell far too
short to the rhetoric of theirs.
2
The limited globe seems to have an affect limiting human rights at some level too.
3
Read Empire and Multitude of Machel Hard and Antonio Negri

While being a victim to those cumbersome old mechanisms, which roots belonged in the
colonial past, the United States reluctantly maintained the peace and security. Corruptions
and exploitation were the lubricant of this system.4
When the Chinese companies meet old
rotten structures we are to see the changers on ground - we have already seen some in across
Africa. Inevitable changers will also soon appear at the top levels in places like UN.
The Realisation is to say the capacity of the earth is realised. The capabilities of top dozen
states are not to change until the end of Realisation. The fact that human nature has to be
constrained is realised. I believe that not only at the top administrative levels across states but
also in ground among the global multitude consensus are developing that rhetoric of
liberalism is just a conjuring tool. So it goes the liberal democracies are the last places to
bring these effective changers to their constitutions and across their institutions. The demise
of the concept liberal democracy is guaranteed. The rise of more effective administrative
system is setting up the precedent in the epoch of Realisation.
In the desired type of administrative system - whether it is multiparty system or single party
system, whether the candidates are elected or chosen - the decisions, which concern the state
as whole, are made according to the principles. The Standing Committee of Chinese
Politburo and the principles of democratic centralism seem to be the ideal type of
administrative body and the principle that the state ought to adhere to.
The central point of this sort of administrative system is that the decisions are based on
principles. The principles happen to be based on true needs of the state, and have taken into
account where the state is, and where it wants to be in medium and long term future,
reflecting its realistic capabilities. The principles are not to be manipulated by the temporary
demands of its citizens. These demands will be addressed not compromising the principles.
However, the system as a whole will only survive delivering the fruits gained by adhering to
those principles, among its citizens fairly. Since, the global multitude is increasingly
becoming aware of the worldly and stately constraints, this sort of administrative system does
not have to be enforced upon them.
Below the definition of needs is outlined against survival. Only having a clear idea of what I
refer to as needs once could understand the argument.
Survival
What the traditional realists place at the centre of state’s reason of action is survival. Even the
hesitant Waltz writes following;
‘In any self-help system, units worry about their survival, and the worry conditions
their behavior.’ (p. 105)
Survival of the state is the bare minimum of its existence. The state possesses following
qualifications, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to
4
Read Making Globalization Works of Joseph Stiglitz

enter into relations with other states.5
A threat to any of those qualifications renders the state
taking legitimate actions to survive. War is justified under those circumstances.
Michael Walzer argues that at the extreme emergency the British bombing of German cities
were justified for a period of time. I would argue that the recent annexation of Crimea by
Russia is also justified under the same pretext of survival since the Russia’s largest naval port
in South is based in Sevastopol. For Russia the access to the Southern part of the globe is
only secured through Black See, and Sevastopol secures that. That shows even the concept of
survival is open for contextual interpretations.
Remind you the issue of Palestinian state. Some argue it does not have any of those
qualifications, except may be a permanent population. But it does not mean however that the
nature of illegality, which Israel exists as a state, bars the Palestinians acquiring state status.
In fact it is the illegality of Israel state confers the status of state to Palestine. It is none of
those above qualifications. Our consensus, the global multitude, of persistence endurance of
its people grants the legitimacy.
Needs
Needs are the needs of the state that the government in power has to address. The Indian
population of 1.23 billion people has needs. The US population of 318 million has legitimate
needs. So does the 1.35 billion people in China. Each government ought to provide for those
needs in order to be a legitimate government within historical settings.
It seems, the main difference between survival and needs is that needs are set in historical
settings. People decide what their needs are within the given historicity, historical context.
In that sense needs surpasses survival.
Needs could justify legitimate course of war. At the time when the legitimate concerns of the
population is not fulfilled within its own territory, and the resources are unable to acquire in
peaceful manner from international community, a certain state authority may have the right to
wage a legitimate war to acquire those resources. In the sense war is never over, far from it.
In fact the real meaning of concepts likes survival, national security, and balance of power
and so on, yet to be seen in full swing with their truer meanings. The condition of all states
realising their full capabilities makes the latter possible. It is most likely that we will
convince an epoch like that at the end of the Realisation.
Needs are material and spiritual in nature. There is no political, historical or cultural barrier to
realizing these needs. If needs are not being addressed by the relevant authorities domestic
political upheaval is guaranteed. Most importantly when a certain state is not addressing its
needs, which is set in historical settings, it provides a vacuum out there in the international
system which other nations could exploit. The best example of this sort is the puzzling
decision made by the Chinese statesmen not to explore further after those historical journeys
5
Art 1 - Montevideo Convention

made by Zheng He to Africa at the first quarter on fifteen century. It seems to me India just
has to be competence enough to see how much of its needs could be addressed within
international system. The eventual peril of the nation is guaranteed if it fails to deliver those
needs.

Chapter 4
How a state ought to think
The limits of neorealism and neoliberalism were outlined above. The historical epoch that we
are living in, the Realisation, was outlined, and explained why and how it differs from the
post-modernity, the epoch that those neo writers were born into and lived. It is explained that
the capabilities of states are not constantly in flask, given the fact that states have fairer
access to technologies. Nor structures - despite the fact that the main poles of those structures
may have been developing their capabilities unfairly for centuries, and may wish to maintain
them as they are - could constrain the other states for eternity from achieving what they
deserve, their truer needs. It was a result of a historical coincidence that have been conjuring
the minds of great thinkers to theories the states relations as many things. I pointed out, with
the actors like China and India are set to be significant players in international relations they
make us realise that why states ought to act is reasoned by the fact that states have needs
according to their populations. Given the fact that what each state has inherited from the
Mother Nature, its endowment of resource, is varies the state ought to go out beyond its
territory for looking to fulfill its natural needs that it could not fulfill within its own resource
endowment. This is why a normal state acts. I have made this argument above. Below I
elaborate it further.
Clear definitions of state and territory are required to proceed further. A clear definition of
resource endowment could be an advantage as well.
State within international legal terms;
‘the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications:
(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity
to enter into relations with the other states.’ (Art 1 - Montevideo Convention).
Territory within international legal terms;
‘(a) The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal
waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent
belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. (b) This sovereignty extends to the air
space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. (c) The sovereignty over
the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other rules of
international law. (Art 2 - United Nations conventions on the Law of Sea)
Resources endowment shall encompass following. It means how much of resources a certain
state could endow within its territory, and its human capacity. It includes the territory of the
state, and human capacity of the state. A larger territory does not necessary mean more

resources, and vice versa – ex Russia. A smaller population dose not necessary means a
smaller pool of human capacity, and vice versa – ex Denmark. What could be extracted from
the same resource pool within different states may differ according to the access of
technologies each state has. The capacity of an average individual could also be differed
according to the level of education an individual exposes. The constraints that the former and
the latter enforce upon a state in achieving its full capacity are temporary factors, I assert.
Ideally the resource to provide for needs of the state is to be born out of its own territory. Will
the spiritual existence of the population be healthier, if all needs are secured within its own
territory, is an unnecessary theoretical burden. The matter of the fact is that no nation on this
Planet is capable of providing for all of its needs within its own territory.
There two states meet. Each state wants to secure its needs from the other.
This is the natural encounter of states. That encounter does not have to be a material one.
Third parties, INGOs, NGOs and multinational companies may also play a role within the
legal frameworks bestow upon them - regardless whether those frameworks are loose, a lot of
loopholes or strict – by the states. This is the natural encounter of two states. It could be
many.
Needs is the reason why the state acts in international hemisphere. The state could not bother
to think if there is a structure out there or not. It is a mere necessity. If the structure
constrained the state’s actions for a decade, or for a century, that would be a temporary
passage of the state. We have already discussed that there was a hiccup in the middle of last
millennia that this natural reasons of why states act was distracted up until the post-
modernity.
Naturally speaking then, when the larger the population is, and the limited the resource
endowment to provide for that population within its own territory, that state shall naturally
have to go out seeking cooperation among states or acquire things by force. In that sense,
China (1.35 billion), India (1.23 billion), the United States (319 million) and Indonesia (253
million) and so on, have the largest pool of natural needs. Since an accurate calculation is yet
to be done to find out of what amount of resource an each individual may need to provide for
his or her wellbeing within his life span use the common sense approach for the time being.
Then it becomes obvious that the historical developments of past five hundred years have
made things pretty unnatural. It started with a coincidence – landing in the New World. 6
Maintained it with subtle and brutal powers hence. Accumulated wealth and power made new
thinking and technological advancements possible. Needs is the last thing those statesmen
6
Does luck describes this event than coincidence? I do not know. It seems, it will, if Columbus intended to find
anything. But he wanted to find India, not something else. See, if he found India that could have been lucky
because it was not even certain that at the time he will return back. When you go to a job interview, you
expect to get the job. Some level of luck will involve getting the job. Here you met your intended employer,
and you become lucky. But what if you ended up in a wrong interview room and you still get a job, a job better
than what you intended. I would not say that a luck. That is a mere coincidence.

had in mind. The conjuring ideologies like liberalism largely kept the system afloat for last
century. Evidently showing the hypocrisy behind the concept, the disparity has been
increasing among the people in liberal states. The US power house, where the ideologies and
the raw power emanated from, has been struck at the heart of Manhattan. Now the United
States is a super power that has to think about flexing its muscles accordingly to its needs.
The vacuum which once was there increasingly is being filled by the actions of developing
nations. In that sense the countries like China and India with their large populations and
relatively larger resource endowments have the potential for economic and military
capabilities that the US will never able to have. These two countries alone together will close
any vacuum out there and even could go well beyond extracting what they need by other
means. The larger populations offer them the relative advantage to do so.
The bottom line is that that the natural resource endowment of the state does not grow just
because it wishes it to grow. The technology, which may try to be efficient all the time, may
do so. But whether it would be able to increase its efficiency in higher phase than the growth
rate of global population, and still would that be capable at all to carter everyone with the
resource needed to have their creative spaces to unleash their true potential is doubtable.
The aspiration of a statesman has to match the natural capacities that the state has been
bestowed upon him. The aspiration of President Obama is restricted by the size of his
population and the resource endowment of the state. Just because a grand theory presupposes
the other is evil, and, therefore you have to check and balance your power all the time against
other states, does not make the state’s natural capabilities grow. Just because some analysts
invite the President Obama to restrain the Chinese engagements in Africa or in the India
Ocean or in the South China Sea it does not mean that he could afford do that. The arguments
such as that the second strike nuclear capabilities of some states keep other states growth at
bay is an old myth. China was not. And India will not.
The argument also goes against the neoliberals. Just because the idea of complex
interdependence makes the world secure or peaceful or nicer, it does not mean the state has
the capacity to push itself beyond its needs of its population.
Let us ask few simple questions now which will in return pave the path towards case studies.
The population of the world today is about 7.1 billion. Could the Planet Earth provide for that
population? As I stated earlier, I discard the belief that the ability of constant and gradual
progress of technological capacities to provide for increasing world population. The
efficiency of technology may increase; but whether it may do so surpassing the population
grown rate, and will it matches the increasing aspiration of world population to share the
planet somewhat equally is always uncertain. There is also a belief that the population growth
rate is to be settled sooner or later, and subsequently it will start to decrease. Even the future
of state relations envisioned with those rather uncertain premises, the capacity of the Earth

will remain the same. Each and every single individual on this Planet deserves the creative
spaces to unleash their true potential.
Then the question could be narrowed down to ask if each and every individual on this planet
to be contented with their historical needs, and to what amount of resource has to be allocated
for each citizen to so. To what extent an each state could provide for itself within its own
endowment for that individual needs would not be hard to calculate. Then we will have some
numbers that we could also use to device which states are most likely to go out to fill up their
needs and what states are going to stay relatively closer to their geographical boundaries to
content needs of their populations. The natural developments of thin and thick lines of
interdependence are to determine that way.
How does the United States go about acting to provide for its local needs?

Chapter 5
Case Study - Interests of the United States
The United States is the third largest nation on this Planet. Its population is 318 million. That
is the fourth largest population on planet. But its economy is the largest in the world, about
$16 trillion in 2013. Picture that now within the total trade volume of whole world last year,
$87 trillion.
Needs of this 318 million people have long been contented. I take the liberty to say that. We
all know that, with a common sense approach - since we do not still have an accurate number
that how much of resource an each individual in this Planet needs to content his or her
material and spiritual needs fairly - the average GDP per capita of $58,000 of an US citizen
may go well beyond the point. The issues of unfair wealth distribution and other domestic
issues are outside of the scope of this writing.
The point of the matter here is how the United States goes about securing its needs in
international system. How does the United States go about doing its business? I bring the
trade volume of the United States to answer that question.
This epistemology will enable us to reach the desired ontology. This method will also offer us
an analytical tool to analyse any state relations. For further subtle analysis the export volume
and import volume could be separated in the epistemology. The volume of investment
between two countries could also help to bring further subtle understanding of relations. Here
in this article, I only take the duel trade volume of the United States as a measurement to
analyse how it is tied up to the rest of the world and to what degree. For the time being this is
an adequate epistemological tool.
The argument that the wealthy capitalists have already gone far beyond the traditional
boarders of nation-states with their investments in multinational companies, hence the trade
volume of a state is a misunderstanding method has no ground. The companies, regardless
how elusive their trades are, conduct within the legal frameworks of the states.
Below I outline the United States’ main trading partners in the world. I also outline the trade
volumes of significant economies among littoral economies in Indian Ocean to the United
States to understand how the United States is going out fulfilling its natural needs.
The answer to the latter question, how does the US do it business, shall offer us an entry point
to understand why the United States acts the way its acts within international system. I do not
believe that the United States acts in international system irrationally – not any more.

Main trading partners of the United States.
Remind yourselves the total GDP of the United States is about $16 trillion.
Its immediate neighbours Canada and Mexico are the first and the second largest trading
partners of it. According to 2012 data, the US-Canada trade volume amounted to $707
billion. And the US-Mexico trade volume amounted to $536 billion.
The United States meets its next largest trading partners across the Pacific and the Atlantic
Oceans. Now find a map of the globe, and place the US right middle of it, and then observe
those immediate neighbours and neighbours across two Oceans. You are looking at the main
blood veins of the United States.
The US economy is tied up to about 27 counties across the Atlantic Ocean in EU, the US
eastward trade, with an estimated $1.06 trillion of trade volume in goods and private services
in 2013.
The US economy is tied up following economies across the Pacific Ocean, the US westward
trade, in following manner - China, $579 billion; Japan estimated $290 billion; Korea, $129
billion; Singapore, $68 billion; Taiwan, $64 billion; Malaysia, $42 billion; Thailand, $41
billion; Indonesia, $29 billion; Vietnam, $29.7 billion; and Philippines, $24 billion.
The Middle East is an
exception. The US economy is
tied up to Middle East with a
trade volume of about $300
billion in total. That number is
an intelligent guess after
consulting few official
resources which I have already
referenced with other sources.
This number includes countries
like Iraq, Libya and the US-
MENA Trade members.
It is believed that this
unconventional trade relation is
to be radically changed in coming years due to US domestic Fracking. Scaling down the US
military operations in the region and its persistent hesitation to use the hardcore power, and
less oftern used hardcore power, is an evident of this changing US needs in the region.
Now, let us play some close attention to some of the main littoral trade economies of US in
the Indian Ocean.
Picture resource: Anthony Cohen - http://pbrnews.com

Main trading partners of the United States in Indian Ocean.
Main trading partners of the United States in Indian Ocean is as follow. The numbers are in
billion, or otherwise mentioned. The numbers represent two way trade relations. Numbers are
from year 2013.
 India is currently the US’ 11th
largest goods trading partner with $63.7 in total goods
trade.
 Australia is currently the US’ 26th
largest goods trading partner with $35.3 in total
goods trade.
 South Africa is currently the US’ 38th
goods trade.
 Bangladesh is currently the US’ 58th
goods trade.
 Pakistan is currently the US’ 62nd
goods trade.
 Sri Lanka is currently the US’ 72nd
goods trade.
 Oman is currently the US’ 73rd
trade.
 Kenya is currently the US’ 96th
trade.
 Tanzania is currently the US’ 124th
largest goods trading partner with $491 million in
total goods trade.
 Burma is currently our 154th
largest goods trading partner with $176 million in total
good trade.
 Nepal is currently the US’ 164th
largest goods trading partner with $110 million in
total goods trade.
Draw immediate inferences from the above set of the trade volumes. India is the outstanding
trading partner of US in the region. Australia is the second. The Burma’s trade relation with
US is one of the most insignificant. Sri Lanka stands as 72nd
largest trading economy of US.

Chapter 6
Needs theory is tested
A theoretical framework was outlined above to analyse international relations. The argument
was made it is the real and natural needs of the state that reasons why the state has to act in
international hemisphere. In this chapter, firstly, I explain the constraints posed to the existing
neo-neo theoretical frameworks of understanding states relations. Secondly, needs theory is
applied to the US-Sri Lanka relations. Some broad framework is outlined to explain how
needs of the United State could be analysed its relations to its regional trading partners. A
section is included arguing that a serious international relations theory does not have to
explain why armed conflicts are taking place in places like Middle East today.
The structure determines how states interact in international system. That is the Waltz’s
hypothesis. He also seems to admit, with some hesitations, survival of the state renders how
state acts in international system. According to complex interdependence the trade relations
have no restrains at all, Nye and Keohane profess. Most intriguingly, they believe if the state
is to get rid of realist belief, then the state is capable of unleashing endless potential to
cooperate with other states.
What sort of structural constraint bars the US-Sri Lanka relations? Does survival have
anything to do at all on how and why the United States acts the way it acts towards Sri
Lanka?
Are there no any constraints for the United States to trade with Sri Lanka in complex
interdependence? Or will the United States and Sri Lanka unleash endless potential towards
cooperation because they do not believe in the realist presumption of survival?
Bringing China into the spectrum to answer these questions brings new realisations. It does
not however mean that the needs base assessment on two state relations, or more, is
impossible to analyse without bringing third parties to the context. If one still obedient to the
Waltz’s idea of changes in capabilities among great poles one ought to understand current
changes as follow. The capabilities have been changed within the system, now China, as a
pole, has great capabilities, and according to that the expectations among nations are also to
be changed. Here the observer misses the point I made about the historical hiccup.
Some input was made regarding China under the section of the Realisation. Further
necessary input will be brought alone as the writing progresses. It is a well known fact that
China is, and has been, investing heavily in these littoral economies for last decade or so.
Let us observe the US-Sri Lanka relations within these developments.

Interests of the United States in Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka is the 72nd
largest good trading partner of the United States with a $2.8 billion trade
volume in 2013. The trade volume alone does not do the justice to paint a complex picture of
relations between the United States and Sri Lanka. The rest - the geography, regional politics,
and recent cultural and political developments and so on – helps to build the complex picture.
The point is here, however, that at the end that none of those things matter but the trade based
on needs. Without the input of rest it is nearly impossible to draw connections and build up
an argument.
For the United States, even after realising that there remains some issues in Sri Lanka if
attended could bring significant changes to regional politics it is unable to do so. That is due
to the constraints it is enforced upon by its natural needs and resource endowment.
In the right middle of the Indian Ocean it is the US’ antipodal point. That is where Sri Lanka
is located. Because of that the geography becomes crucial to understand the US-Sri Lanka
relations. Reflecting this geographical reality the border of the western US Pacific Command,
68 E, lies right through the western cost of Sri Lanka.
The US has to circumnavigate half of the globe to meet Sri Lanka. The longitude of 79 E of
Colombo, capital of Sri Lanka, is one of the remotest places to US. Therefore, regardless
where you start flying from in the US, about 14,000 km of flying has to be done to Colombo.
The US statesmen are now increasingly paying greater attention to the geostrategic position
of Sri Lanka; that is after three decades of armed conflict concluded in 2009 by the Rajapaksa
Government. John Kerry is one of those first to realise the geostrategic significance of Sri
Lanka to US.
This attention is given not only because there is no armed conflict in the country, but the
geostrategic position of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean alone is a significant one. Sri Lanka
provides an easy access to littoral countries in the India Ocean. The half of the world
maritime trade is already taking place through the Sri Lankan water. For example the US
Pacific Command shall have realised that an establishment of naval port in Sri Lanka gets rid
of the logistical burden that Diego Garcia, a US Naval Support Facility, has in the Indian
Ocean.
The maritime flow in the India Ocean is to increase exponentially in coming decades. The
littoral economies of India Ocean are tied up to emerging economies like China, India and to
Australia. They have great potential increasing their trade volumes in coming decades and
century. This region is rich with natural resources too. Plus the oil supply line from the
Middle East to this region and towards Japan is uninterrupted. Sri Lanka is in the right middle
of all these changers.
Historically speaking, since the WW II, the US had very little encounters with Sri Lanka. On
the other hand, for Sri Lanka, the United States has been the main market for its rudimentary

export products. In return, the United States is maintaining a large budget deficit in Sri
Lanka. The last year alone it was about $2.1 billon.
In the Kerry’s report, it mentions that the United States has instead focused on political
reforms and humanitarian concerns of the country. (p.13) It points out that the United States
has not paid attention to the trade potential between two countries and geopolitical
significance of having Sri Lanka as a close friend to the US. The report writes following;
‘Along with our legitimate humanitarian and political concerns, U.S. policymakers
have tended to underestimate Sri Lanka’s geostrategic importance for American
interests.’
Meanwhile China is, and has been, investing heavily in the country’s infrastructures. As to
prove that this relationship is growing stronger on 16 September 2014 the Chinese Premier Xi
Jinping visited Sri Lanka.
He commenced the Colombo Port City Project, a brand-new city and a port from reclaimed
land from the sea. This investment, which amounts to $1.4 billion, is the largest foreign
investment in Sri Lankan history. Magam Ruhunupura Mahinda Rajapaksa, another harbour
project in Hambanthota is also been built with the Chinese investments. With its funding a
build a brand-new airport, Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, was also completed. The
country’s biggest electricity generator, 900-megawatt coal power plant in Norocholai, was
launched by Xi and Rajapaksa together. The funding, of cause, came from China. It seems Sri
Lanka is set to fly.
In the front of US-Sri Lanka relations, on 23 of September, the President Obama met with the
President Rajapaksa, while he was heading the Sri Lankan delegation for UN General
Assembly, in New York. On 24, Hilary Clinton had invited Rajapaksa seeking support for her
brand new Elephant Initiative. On 26, the President Rajapaksa sat down with a special
business delegation in New York, which included companies like Boeing, Citigroup and
Exxon Mobil. These US companies have shown interests entering into the Sri Lankan market.
There is nothing new in this sort of meetings at the outset. But there is something new in
these developments.
What is new here is that the US statesmen seems to show changing hearts towards Sri Lanka.
The US statesmen have consumed five years, since the end of war, to contemplate on the
relation of Sri Lanka. In fact, the last March 2014, the United States took a contradictory
initiative against the Rajapaksa regime hosting a resolution at the United Nations Human
Right Council (UNHRC), which in return set a historical precedent under its mandate.
On the top of that Sri Lanka is being drawn in to US regional politics, the Pivot to Asia, by
Japan and India. In that sense, Sri Lanka is also tied up to the concept - the US principle
national security shift to South China Sea area to preserve 21st
century US leadership in the
world. The United States has initiated a Trilateral Relations with India and Japan toward that.

The increased US military engagement in Darwin in Australia goes towards that as well. Sri
Lanka is closely linked to Australia too.
Thing is that Sri Lanka has very delicate relations with these regional actors. For example
President Rajapaksa defines the Sri Lanka-India relations as India is our relation and all
others are our friends. That says everything about Sri Lanka as a small island - fifty times
smaller to be exact with - in the India Ocean. Since 1952 Japan and Sri Lanka has a special
relation. J.R. Jayawardane, then Finance Minister later the Second President of Sri Lanka,
delivered a speech disclaiming war reparations at San Francisco Peace Conference that year.
The gravity of his speech to Japan has left his name in the memories of average Japanese
citizens’ minds that lasts until today. On the top of this traditional relations Japan is putting
extra efforts to be seen as a good friend of Sri Lanka because it wants Sri Lanka to secure its
crucial oil supply from the Middle East in Sri Lankan water. That goes towards containing
growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka as well. Because of these reasons Japan signed a
maritime agreement with Sri Lanka on 07 September. Sri Lanka is a good friend of Tony
Abort’s Australian government as well. Since Prime Minister Abort opposes people
smuggling religiously he needs Sri Lanka in the Indian to secure that interests.
Ideally, the United States would not want to unsettle any of these relations of Sri Lanka.
The whole point to take away from these evolving regional dynamics around Sri Lanka and
recent developments between the United States and Sri Lanka is - even thou Sri Lanka is a
small and geographically distanced nation - that Sri Lanka could potentially play a greater
role with the United States to secure US interests in the region. The appropriate question
looms that could the United States do anything great at all in Sri Lanka? According to the
neorealists and the neoliberals the United States ought to act in Sri Lanka.
Could the United States perpetually keep the Chinese influence at bay in Sri Lanka investing
in the country to surpass the Chinese investments? That would go alone the line of neoliberal
assumption. On the other hand, neorealists in the United States, at worst case, could look into
pressing the charges against Rajapaksa regime to indict him and his brother for those alleged
crimes, which is alleged to have been committed in the last phase of the armed conflict.
In a different note, it is interesting to see those interests of neo-neo converge at some point
there. Recall one of the idealists’ premise of a crime, even the alleged, shall be investigated
and perpetrators shall to be brought to justice. Same time there is this interdependency
principle they promote. What is; how is it; and who is deciding the priorities - it is you to
think? The realists want, no matter what, the best to be done to preserve the interests of the
state. The realists tend to be more pragmatic in this way.
So what would it be? Concluding the case study, I would argue as follow.

In fact the US interests in Sri Lanka is insignificant compare to its interests among its main
trading partners. It means, according to new hypotheses, the United States is fulfilling very
little from Sri Lanka towards its needs.
Will the United States invest in a new harbour project in Sri Lanka, or in an airport, or a
power plant? I doubt that. The United States’ needs are being long contented from
surrounding economies. The United States is unable to stretch its resource endowment
towards Sri Lanka, even if it wanted to, to gain the crucial relative upper hand against China.
It does not make any sense for the US to do so either. As some analysts argue that US ought
to secure its interests in Sri Lanka with economic investments is not based on the analysis of
the United States needs in Sri Lanka. It could not build airports or harbours in Sri Lanka. It is
simple and strait forward as that. It does not however mean that those US companies
gradually going to build up a niche trade relations with the country.
Nye and Keohane have taken grated that if the realist presumption is given up by the US
statesmen that would unleash potential towards perpetual interdependence. Does this mean
the United States could not survive without depending on Sri Lanka? Just because the US
statesmen have beautiful, peaceful and changed hearts towards a state it does not mean every
relationship is equally significant to the United States. It is needs of the state that matters, not
the beauty, peace or hatred in international relations. Those analysts, who have inflated ideas
of interdependence, are not capable of reflecting on a particular relationship within the real
needs of the state.
Even if we consider for a moment, the converging interests of the neo-neo in Sri Lanka, in
terms of US interests, pursuing the criminal charges against the Sri Lankan regime, the
United States do not possess the unilateral power to enforce its will in the epoch of
Realisation. Russia and China restrict any of Security Council resolutions brought against the
Rajapaksa regime. In the previous epoch, just after the Second World War or even after the
immediate collapse of Soviet Union, the United States may have pursued this path
unilaterally. At the beginning Realization the United States has been restrained by its
resource endowment. It could no longer afford to go beyond its natural needs like it was
doing before.
No structures could constrain other states forever when the other states are driven by genuine
concerns of theirs, needs. Nature given resource endowment of the state does not change in
long haul even if the state may wish to maximise the capabilities with best available
technologies. In the long run even the legitimacy for such state actions, attempts to reach its
maximum capabilities, is also granted by the international consensus among its multitude.
The constraints, which the structure could be put upon on a state, are temporary. That is due
to the fact that that sort of structure is not made out by poles reflecting their truer needs
within their own resource endowments. The post-modern structure had some ills. It does not
matter the size of the state, each and every single state has genuine rights to fulfil their needs.

It goes without saying that no state has endless resource endowments for unrealistic realist or
liberal agendas.
Theory in different cases
Some would argue that the US-Sri Lanka relations may be the last place a systemic
international relations theory could be applied, and any fruitful analysis could be drawn to
generalise the theory. For some critics the distance between countries and the size of the
countries may also seems to be problematic. For those reasons I briefly outline the theory in
different cases, in the US-India relations and US immediate trading partners.
The United States is adamant about the common values of the largest democratic nation on
Planet, India. But the United States is unable to address any of the India’s main concerns – its
over population, and its restricted access to natural resources. The rest of the issues of the
country derive from those two main problems.
Addressed the India Parliament in 2010 the President Obama has asserted that the US-India
relations is as one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century. That hints at the intention
of Obama to draw India into the game of containing China in India Ocean, and in South
China Sea and so on. Pointing at the dilemma that the United States faces in this US-India
relationship Hilary Clinton, the Secretary of State at the time, summed up the increasing US
engagement in India as a strategic bet – this issue is with a great gravity; intends to address in
detail in a separate writing.
Coming back to the line of thought we are developing in this article, I ask, could the United
States restrain India from developing into a super power. The realists will stress US has to be
concerned. Or could the United States be cooperative with India in this so-called complex
interdependence. Simple answer is the United States is unable to do any of those things in
those grand scales that some professes it to do.
Meanwhile, Xi Jinping, after visiting Sri Lanka, strait went to the birthday celebration of the
India Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his home town in Ahmedabad in Gujarat, and
announced more than $20 billion in investments in developing India’s road sector. Both
signed about 12 more agreements, one including on the usage of the outer space in peaceful
manner. Ask yourselves now if it makes any sense for the United States to follow the suite.
The extent to which the United States’ ability to stretch that far, either cooperatively or
otherwise, is restrained. Why is it restrained; it is restrained because the United States do not
have the luxury of that resource endowment, and it would not make any sense for the US tax
players to follow any of those extremes.
Neither the complex interdependence nor the structure means much to this US-India
relationship. The India just has to realise its true potential as a great nation in international
system, and achieve maximum capabilities within its resource endowment, and go elsewhere
fetching them to fulfil the rest. Before the end of Realisation, I assume, India could have done
so.

The relations of United States with its immediate neighbours in the continent, and across the
two Oceans, countries like Canada, Mexico, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and Korea
and so on, require nuance analysis. I am not in a position to attend to any of those relations in
such details within the given time scale. Following remarks would however be useful for
such analysis.
The relations of US with these trading partners are driven by mutual needs of theirs. The
relations of United States with its immediate neighbours are significant to it. That goes
without saying that those relations are significant to those countries at the other end of them
as well.
Since the WW II, the United States has been developing extensive economic relations in this
region. Until few years ago, some of these economies, including the US one, seemed
unstoppable with their innovative financial derivatives. They had found a way to develop for
eternity on paper. Those things are becoming things in the past. They had nothing to do with
the natural needs of local populations and the states’ natural resource endowments. Since the
finance crisis in 2007 some of these countries are developing in rather slower phases, and
others are not developing at all or deflating. These countries are increasingly faced with
higher unemployment rates and higher welfare costs.
These unsettling processes will only be settled when each country will find their natural
needs and resource endowments ratio. The countries that are most likely to bring troubles for
themselves, and therefore for the region as whole, are the ones those who are trying to
maintain former grandeurs. They are the once those who most likely to involve in money
laundering for rich and accommodate those richer classes within their borders. It is not hard
to imagine that these types of countries will increasingly become ideal targets to all sorts of
extremists. Those countries which try to delay the process of deflating their economies to
reflect true needs bases relations with other states, by use of numerous conjuring
mechanisms, will be the hardest hit, and pose great dangers to whole region.
These economies are great case studies to analyse for their truer needs, and for how much of
their needs could be contented within those naturally bestowed resource endowments of
theirs.
Contemporary armed conflicts
The prevailing armed conflicts within the border lines that were not drawn by the local power
structures and with the involvement of local people are what I have in mind - mainly in the
Middle East. It may be the centuries old former colonial masters that had drawn those lines or
they were drawn by the post WW II idea of self-determination. What they have in common is
the absence of local power structures merged within, horizontal and vertical. The
development of those local power structures has been distracted by distant power structures
elsewhere.

With pessimism or optimism, both the liberals and the realists, and the analysts and policy
advocates alike tend to observe these conflicts to understand how international relations
works.
I assert that since these landmasses do not fit the concepts of nation-states due to lack of
home grown local power structures the conflicts unfolding within them could not be subject
interests of international relations. A theory of international relations ought to observe nation-
states. Therefore, those conflicts which are bubbling across the world today could hardly be
observed within a proper theoretical framework. For sure, the conflict analysts and policy
advisors have busy time explaining these phenomenons to their respective employers and
governments.
Could a theory based on needs explain these conflicts? Simple answer is no. It will not. It
does not have to be. The change in capabilities of the United States has created a power
vacuum in these areas. The lack of its interests in this region due to domestic fracking and its
shrinking economic leverage to act as it did before have created this power vacuum. Plus, the
best thing the Washington and rest of the power brokers did for this region, in recent years, is
the miscalculations they did of the gravity of taking away regional stabilising figures like
Muammar Gaddafi. It is the grievances of local populations, which have been betrayed by
global and local power structures, to correct those historical misgiving drive these conflicts.
The cadres of those armed groups do not try to conquer the world. They are trying to get rid
of decades old miserable and inconsistent local power structures, which were favoured by
Washington, London, and Paris.
What those power brokers do not realise is that sooner the those boarders are redrawn by
local power structures with local people involved is the better. Thing is that their eroding
interests still find it difficult to do so. But in terms of understanding international relations
accurately these conflicts are just mere distractions. I believe Beijing sees them that way.
Who wants to live within the borders that you, or your ancestors, were not part of making?
Nobody. Blood has to be shed to create nation-states. Greater the suffering endured harder to
brake them later. These are the untold rule of the game of nation building.
Since the WW II, the United States, either directly or indirectly, has been the major player in
maintaining peace and security in the world. The Charter of the United Nations stipulates
volumes for that. For a second, remind yourself that maintaining is inherently a conservative
project. Not only the United States but states like Russia, Britain, France, and China have
been engaging in this maintaining business. While some engaged in it a lot, some did not.
China had no colonial ambitions as such. Therefore, it has been careful to engage, within and
outside the system, only to the extent it wants to secure territories that once belonged to it.
That is why none-intervention is the mantra of Chinese statesmen. This point is rather
significant to understand. This is the reason why I assert that a theory of international
relations does not have to explain the prevailing armed conflicts within its parameters. If

Beijing has nothing to do with them, these conflicts could not be setting parameters for an
international relations theory.
Washington, being a big time victim to the oil supply from Middle East, reluctantly
maintained the structures that had been put in place by former colonial powers. Or timely
those local structures had to be twisted accordingly. The annual reminders of the United
States urging reforms in those places in Middle East, even in places like Saudi Arabia, goes
long way to prove that US was a rather hesitant player dealing with those old power
structures.
Meanwhile, the people on the ground, within those strait line borders, which were drawn by
stokes of a pen, in places like Iraq, Syria, Mali, Libya, and elsewhere, have been waiting so
long expecting conjuring concepts like regime change, liberal democracy, human rights, and
free markets will uplift their lives for good. That is despite the fact that no local structures
were in place to do so. Those dreams never realised.
Now the United States is fracking within its own boarders it could afford to go home. The
United States seems to have reached it economic capacities. The ambition and aspiration are
relative terms that reflect the capabilities of the state. Mainly, a combination of these two
factors is increasingly forcing it to loosen up the fists of it on the ground in distant lands, and
its engagements in global governance. The prevailing armed conflicts shall be analysed in
this context. For example, the further the analyst distances himself from this broader context
to analyse a particular conflict his analysis tend to become more abstract and irrelevant.
It is not to say that these sorts of analysis and policy oriented understandings do not serve a
purpose. These sorts of analysis offer access to temporary remedies that are increasingly
difficult to implement due to shrinking resource pools across those capitals. Drones may keep
them going for while. These short of analysis however hinder the changing dynamics in
broader geopolitical sense.
For example an analyst who analyses the Islamic State (ISIL/ISIS) today asserts that it is an
extremist terrorist organisation – extreme than al Qa’ida they say. He tries to identify the
leading individuals behind it, ideologies, regional connections, and how the operations are
financed and so on. This analysis in return shall offer a clear basis for targeted killings,
counter ideologies, and an access to a coherent counter strategy to fight back. However, none
of those things are materialised to the extent that those local grievances are to be eliminated.
The targeted killings create more extremism. A killing one without giving him a fairer chance
to fight back is not only proved to be cowardliness but also it does not settle the enemy to
accept the defeat. In a conventional war there is a clear victory and defeat. The looser admits
the defeat. He is a proud loser because he fought it. In a drone attack, before the drone attack
he was, and after the attack suddenly he is not. What does it leave in the mind of his fellow
cadres and family members? Probably hated, and more determination. It is not a way of
fighting a war. The defeat will never be accepted until the enemy is given a fairer chance to
lose it. We all know that we do not have a counter ideology as such anymore. If a strategy is

scrambled the regional players are absent. And someone somehow tunnels the funding for the
operations.
What is lacking behind in these sorts of analysis is the hope - the hope that the capacity local
people to shape and contribute to build their own nations, and the humility into their enduring
willingness to fight for their freedoms. If one enables to see these potentials in unlikely places
he will also enable to see the safest exit strategies for Washington, London and Paris. One
who observes things in this way may also see new dynamics in places like in Iraq - a majority
Sunni state right next to Shia Iran, and finally the Southern part of the Iraq getting its
business done – and in Libya.
The ideologies used are not the ends. They are only the means of cumbersome vehicle. We all
have been in this exact path few hundred years ago. None of those emerging nation-states in
places like Middle East or elsewhere are going to be super powers anyway. The sooner the
we have the local power structures emerge within those borders, may be with new nation-
states, is the better.

Chapter 8
Needs as the founding principle and as an analytical tool of IR
Increasing actions of China are to change how the international relations are understood and
analysed. Its actions have made us realised that larger countries with larger populations tend
to have large pool of needs to fulfil. Therefore, they have to be naturally active in
international system. The legitimacy for their actions is also granted by the international
multitude because it is the common sense development of the state.
Countries like India too are going to be significant players in coming decades. With these
changers how the international relations are understood and analysed have to be changed. The
emergence of countries China as a main actor in international system ought to refresh how we
understand international relations as a subject matter as well.
Needs of the state is the reason why the state acts in international sphere.
The absence of nations like China, with larger populations and bigger appetite, had distorted
the development of international relations as a subject matter since the modernity.
The whole concept of international is seemed to have been referred to describe regional
developments of west in last five hundred years or so. A definition of international could not
be outlined if the main players are not being spattered around the globe. The existence of
Japan and Korea within the established academia as actors of international politics does not
qualify it to refer to as international. Having the actors across the globe has to be one of the
minimal thresholds of the definition. If not, then, we are in the matters of regional relations,
and how that is affected around the globe. Think about then, a definition of international,
which includes actors like China and India, and the effect that their role could have in
international relations in coming decades and centuries.
Throughout history, where there are full of small and big coincidence, the development of
international relations as a theory and as an analytical sphere reflected the capabilities of
main actors in those particular historical settings, be they city states, empires or nations.
Since the end of Middle Ages the development of capabilities among western nations has not
been reflected the natural needs of their populations within. This unbalance development has
made countries like China and India absent from the international hemisphere for centuries.
That this vacuum that the absent of resistance reflecting natural needs of nations helped the
handful of nations to go beyond their natural needs, and had tricked the minds of great
thinkers to argue numerous things as the reasons why states act the way they act in
international hemisphere. The human nature was brought up as the reason why the state acts.

Due to the variations stances one could take upon the latter, it was able to argue that the state
is either peaceful or warmongering.
The concepts changed as the historical epochs changed. In other words, the vacuum, which
was there, was getting smaller and smaller as history passed by. The concepts like national
interests, power, and security replaced the old concepts as different epochs conjured different
things in great minds. In that sense the last batch of theories radically contrasted away from
those traditionalists. When someone like Waltz argues that it is the structure causes the state
to act in certain ways he differed radically from the old bunch. So did the Nye and Keohane
when it is argued that it is the complex interdependence that renders the way the state acts.
Today, you and I are entering into a new historical epoch, the Realisation. At the beginning
of this historical epoch China is to set the rule of the game. The ultimate demise of the liberal
democratic model is guaranteed before this epoch parishes. An administrative system that
mostly likely to cooperate attributes of the Chinese administrative system will replace the
latter as an effective and a legitimate mechanism within states and outside. This is an ongoing
transition. A lot could change even before the first ever truer World War shifts the power
from West to East decisively.7
This First World War will make the shift guaranteed. Even the
idea of unrestrained individual liberties – thou it never was - would be a thing of the past.
This increasing Chinese engagement - or the lack of engagement - in the international system
begs revision of the foundation of international relation theories. The world, in which people
share their thoughts instantly, where the limits of the globe are increasingly realised, it begs
for a realistic framework to understand and analyse states’ relations.
Each state has its needs. Needs are the needs of its population. Why the state acts is reasoned
by this natural needs. Could the state provide for its needs within its territories, and to what
extent, shall determine the extent to which actions of a certain state in international system.
Unlike the concept of survival the states’ needs are set in historical settings. The desire to
have the best could not be tainted by the fact that now the world is better known. What is
happening with the increasing actions of China with other states is that this historical
condition, the Realisation, makes us to realise the foundation of the state action in its real
sense. This Realisation constrains nothing. It does not mean that just because it is realised the
world is going to be more peaceful or less warmongering. It will depend on how the main
actors feel about of their true potential in future - at the end of Realisation, where the truer
needs are fulfilled and their truer capabilities are realised.
Therefore, an international relation theory based on needs does not assume war is obsolete.
War is alive and well for eternity.
7
The world wars could not have happened regionally. The containment of Germany, Italy and Japan could not
constitute world wars. That is regardless that those armed conflicts were fought within their colonies
elsewhere and needed materials were extracted from those distant colonies to fight those wars. The
engagement of larger actors, which spattered around the globe, could only constitute a truer World War.

The war is alive and well does not mean that each armed conflicts are to be affecting the
subject matter of international relations theory. For example the armed conflicts in Middle
East and elsewhere could not affect the formulation of a theoretical framework to understand
international relations. The first reason is for that is that Beijing has nothing to do with those
armed conflicts. India got nothing to do with those conflict either. Those armed conflicts are
enabled by the loosening grip of old power structures in the region. None of those armed
conflicts could be subject interests of a serious international relations theory.
Before the epoch of Realisation ends, the main actors and the rest will have, more or less,
secured their natural needs accordingly. Wars, miseries, exploitations, and redrawing new
border lines will not be new in the epoch. There would be a time comes when the concepts
like balance of power will truly be contemplated in the system where the players like India,
China, and Brazil will have realised their capabilities fully. That is when one will truly
observe international relations in its truer sense.
The long term policy objectives of governments, intergovernmental, and transnational
organisations of varies sorts – politics and humanitarian alike – shall be reflected accordingly
to this changing dynamic in international relations, and needs shall be brought in as the
benchmark for setting missions and visions.
For example we have to observe needs of each state scientifically within their resource
endowments, and to what extent the each nation could provide for their natural needs. That
will also offer us an insight into to what extent the each nation has to go shopping outside of
its borders. An intergovernmental body such as United Nations is ideally suits for these tasks.
In terms of long term policy applications, those relatively larger states with limited resource
endowments, may find policies towards population control is appealing. These dynamics will
however not confer much change to the Security Council for example. Which countries hold
the status of Permanent Membership shall reflect the capabilities of states. Therefore, the
inclusion of India to a permanent member status shall be met soon. Having a nation from the
Middle East, and Brazil from South America as Permanent Members may reflect the
inclusion within and integrity of the Security Council in long run. It could also set long term
policy objectives towards to reflect needs of each state and their constraints. It would be a
stepping stone to realise the amount of resource needed for an each individual to realise truer
potential of him or hers offering them the creative spaces needed within their lifespan. The
appeal of long terms policies, such as population control, and global concerns such as
pollution, within states and outside, shall ideally stem from the Security Council.

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