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Concurrent Distributed Authentication Model
(CDAM)
Aladdin T. Dandis
Information Security Compliance Officer
Jordan eGovernment Program / MoICT
1Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
Agenda
 Introduction
 CDAM Ver. 1.0
 Pros and Cons
 CDAM Ver. 2.0
 Pros and Cons
 Conclusions
2Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
Introduction
 This project was originally concerned about applying
security and privacy considerations in school
systems.
 The system is a web-database application.
 The target client was a private school in Amman.
 Problem
 the old system lacks security and privacy considerations.
3Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
Security
 A number of processes
and technologies applied
to prevent unauthorized
parties from accessing
sensitive resources
Privacy
 The human right to
control and manage data
about himself, without
being monitored by other
parties
4
Security Vs Privacy
Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
CDAM Ver. 1.0
5Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
Overview
 What?
 Concurrent Distributed Authentication Model
 Why?
 To authenticate online users.
 How?
 The username and password will be checked in many
separate authentication database servers rather than one.
6Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
Architecture
7Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
S1
Sender
Unit
Logging
Unit
Comparison
Unit
S2
S3
User
Legitimate
Login
False Login to
'Honey Pot'
Authentication
Servers Farm
The Object
System
False System
Characteristics
 Authentication model
 Built-in Authorization
 Authentication token is used:
 Token
 Role + Real User Name = Role User Name
 Example
 Student + Ahmad.d = SAhmad.d
8Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
Authentication & Authorization Algorithms
9Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
Enter UserName, Password and
Role
Check for the requested object
Extract Role from the Token
Check ACLs for
the Role
Authorize User
Deny user and direct to
HoneyPot
Authorization
Module
Calculate the Hash
Take the first 5 characters of the hash
Take integer values for username and password
and Role
Check the 5
characters hash
Server 1
Server 2
Server 3
Authentication
Server Farm
ASF
Authentication
Module
Y
Y
Y N
N
Pros
 Compromising one
authentication server will
not affect authentication
 Using Hashing
 Light authentication
Cons
 Repeated Cipher patterns
 No proof of origin
 Denial of service
 Vulnerable to sniffers
 Homemade hashing
algorithm
10
Pros and Cons
Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
CDAM Ver. 2.0
11Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
Overview
 Overcome Cons in CDAM Ver. 1.0
 Still under coding and testing
 Scalable for web applications
 Multiple open standard and strong encryption
algorithms
 M:N authentication acceptance
12Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
Architecture
13Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
S1
Sender
Unit
Logging
Unit
Comparison
Unit
S2
S3
User
Legitimate
Login
False Login to
'Honey Pot'
Authentication
Servers Farm
The Object
System
False System
Architecture
14Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
S1
Sender
Unit
Logging
Unit
Comparison
Unit
S2
S3
User
Legitimate
Login
False Login to
'Honey Pot'
Authentication
Servers Farm
The Object
System
False System
Architecture
15Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
S1
Sender
Unit
Logging
Unit
Comparison
Unit
S2
S3
User
Legitimate
Login
False Login to
'Honey Pot'
Authentication
Servers Farm
The Object
System
False System
Hashing Algorithm 1
Hashing Algorithm 2
Hashing Algorithm 3
Pros
 Compromising
one
authentication
server will not
affect
authentication
 Using Hashing
 Light
authentication
Cons
 Repeated Cipher
patterns
 No proof of
origin
 Denial of service
 Vulnerable to
sniffers
 Homemade
hashing
algorithm
16
Evaluation
Remedy
 Full cipher is
written
 SSL Certificate
 M:N
 Encrypted
channels
 Open standard
hashing
algorithms
Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
Future Work
 Integration with OTP
 Integration with Smart Card Systems
17Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
Thank You
aladdin.d@moict.gov.jo
18Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria

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Sice2011 cdam by aladdin dandis (final)

  • 1. Concurrent Distributed Authentication Model (CDAM) Aladdin T. Dandis Information Security Compliance Officer Jordan eGovernment Program / MoICT 1Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
  • 2. Agenda  Introduction  CDAM Ver. 1.0  Pros and Cons  CDAM Ver. 2.0  Pros and Cons  Conclusions 2Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
  • 3. Introduction  This project was originally concerned about applying security and privacy considerations in school systems.  The system is a web-database application.  The target client was a private school in Amman.  Problem  the old system lacks security and privacy considerations. 3Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
  • 4. Security  A number of processes and technologies applied to prevent unauthorized parties from accessing sensitive resources Privacy  The human right to control and manage data about himself, without being monitored by other parties 4 Security Vs Privacy Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
  • 5. CDAM Ver. 1.0 5Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
  • 6. Overview  What?  Concurrent Distributed Authentication Model  Why?  To authenticate online users.  How?  The username and password will be checked in many separate authentication database servers rather than one. 6Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
  • 7. Architecture 7Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria S1 Sender Unit Logging Unit Comparison Unit S2 S3 User Legitimate Login False Login to 'Honey Pot' Authentication Servers Farm The Object System False System
  • 8. Characteristics  Authentication model  Built-in Authorization  Authentication token is used:  Token  Role + Real User Name = Role User Name  Example  Student + Ahmad.d = SAhmad.d 8Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
  • 9. Authentication & Authorization Algorithms 9Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria Enter UserName, Password and Role Check for the requested object Extract Role from the Token Check ACLs for the Role Authorize User Deny user and direct to HoneyPot Authorization Module Calculate the Hash Take the first 5 characters of the hash Take integer values for username and password and Role Check the 5 characters hash Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Authentication Server Farm ASF Authentication Module Y Y Y N N
  • 10. Pros  Compromising one authentication server will not affect authentication  Using Hashing  Light authentication Cons  Repeated Cipher patterns  No proof of origin  Denial of service  Vulnerable to sniffers  Homemade hashing algorithm 10 Pros and Cons Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
  • 11. CDAM Ver. 2.0 11Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
  • 12. Overview  Overcome Cons in CDAM Ver. 1.0  Still under coding and testing  Scalable for web applications  Multiple open standard and strong encryption algorithms  M:N authentication acceptance 12Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
  • 13. Architecture 13Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria S1 Sender Unit Logging Unit Comparison Unit S2 S3 User Legitimate Login False Login to 'Honey Pot' Authentication Servers Farm The Object System False System
  • 14. Architecture 14Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria S1 Sender Unit Logging Unit Comparison Unit S2 S3 User Legitimate Login False Login to 'Honey Pot' Authentication Servers Farm The Object System False System
  • 15. Architecture 15Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria S1 Sender Unit Logging Unit Comparison Unit S2 S3 User Legitimate Login False Login to 'Honey Pot' Authentication Servers Farm The Object System False System Hashing Algorithm 1 Hashing Algorithm 2 Hashing Algorithm 3
  • 16. Pros  Compromising one authentication server will not affect authentication  Using Hashing  Light authentication Cons  Repeated Cipher patterns  No proof of origin  Denial of service  Vulnerable to sniffers  Homemade hashing algorithm 16 Evaluation Remedy  Full cipher is written  SSL Certificate  M:N  Encrypted channels  Open standard hashing algorithms Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
  • 17. Future Work  Integration with OTP  Integration with Smart Card Systems 17Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria
  • 18. Thank You aladdin.d@moict.gov.jo 18Aladdin T. Dandis / SICE2011 - Algeria