Burke 2001 hardin revisited a critical look at perception and the logic of the commons

P1: VENDOR/GEE P2: GCQ/FTK QC: FTK
Human Ecology [huec] PP316-361623 November 22, 2001 18:49 Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
Human Ecology, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2001
Hardin Revisited: A Critical Look at Perception
and the Logic of the Commons
Bryan E. Burke1
With perhaps controversial implications for theory and practice, this paper
suggests that the validity of Hardinian theories of the commons are dependent
on the implicit rational choice assumption that resource users are aware of re-
source degradation. Without an awareness of the collective costs of resource
use, there can be no dilemma between pursuing individual benefits and avoid-
ing collective ruin. In such situations, the dilemma of the commons cannot be
validly said to be the cause of resource depletion, and many traditional pol-
icy options to address common resource depletion may not be effective. Two
reasons for the lack of awareness about resource degradation are (1) fatalistic
beliefs that humans cannot harm a resource base, and (2) the growing com-
plexityandabstractionofmodernenvironmentalproblemsthathaveobscured
the collective costs of resource use from our individual and societal awareness.
KEY WORDS: common resources; perception; rational choice theory.
INTRODUCTION
Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” is a classic. He argues
that common resource situations usually lead to ruin because benefits ac-
crue to individuals and costs are collectively shared (Hardin, 1968). Some
authors have criticized Hardin and suggested that users are often more able
to cooperatively manage common resources than he suggests (e.g., Feeny
et al., 1990; McCay, 1995; Ostrom, 1990). This post-Hardinian perspective,
which has firmly emerged in the last 10 years, recognizes the potential for
“Tragedies of the Commons,” but emphasizes many mitigating sociocultural
and ecological factors that Hardin ignored.
1Department of Sociology, Washington State University, Pullman, Washington; e-mail:
wheelz@wsunix.wsu.edu.
449
0300-7839/01/1200-0449$19.50/0 C 2001 Plenum Publishing Corporation

450 Burke
This paper will focus on a previously unaddressed shortcoming of
Hardin’s theory of the commons2
and also of the post-Hardinian literature.
The literature fails to fully consider the effects of perception on resource
use. With implications for theory and policy, I suggest that to the extent that
common resource users are unaware of resource degradation, it is inappro-
priate to use the dilemma of the commons as an explanation of that resource
degradation.
Hardin agreed with this interpretation of his work and the literature
(G. Hardin, personal communication, November 5, 1997). If resource users
are not aware of degradation, there cannot be a dilemma between pursuing
individual gain and avoiding collective ruin because the users lack knowl-
edge of collective costs. Of course, when common resource users are not
aware of collective costs, ruin can still result. However, the reason is a lack
of awareness, not the dilemma of the commons. The failure to recognize this
role of perception in common resource use is likely to result in incorrect
predictions and misguided policy recommendations. For example, if com-
mon resource users are not aware of environmental costs, it does not make
sense to talk about privatization as a solution because the internalization of
costs through privatization is irrelevant. Also, as shown in Brightman (1987),
without an awareness of resource degradation a community will have difﬁ-
culty self-managing its commons because it is problematic to manage what
is not perceived. Furthermore, perceptions have implications for top-down
regulations. External sanctions can in theory deter resource use regardless
of perceptions of environmental costs. However, resource users can place
tremendous pressure on a government to undermine the enactment and en-
forcement of laws if they do not believe in the severity of environmental
costs (see Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Weale, 1992).
My broader argument is that the dilemma of the commons cannot be
generalized to all common resource situations as a potential cause of degra-
dation. While the literature has correctly stated that common resources need
not result in a “tragedy,” for the most part it still implicitly and incorrectly
suggests the dilemma (or the logic of the commons) is present in all com-
mon resource situations. Accordingly, it suggests that these situations have a
propensity to develop into “tragedies” unless offset by other logics, incentive
structures, or norms.
Instead,mypositionisthatthedilemmaofthecommonsisnotpresentin
many situations of common resource use. The dilemma is actually a
conditional set of perceptions and beliefs about resources, resource use, and
2I refer to Hardin’s theory of the commons because, of all individuals, he has done the most to
popularize the framework, although Lloyd (1833) and Gordon (1954) had earlier articulated
a similar framework.

Hardin’s Theory of Commons: A Critique 451
other resource users. These are shaped by larger paradigms; the biophysical
characteristics of a resource; relationships among resource users; and the
relationships of resource users with their resource base. To explain com-
mon resource degradation we should not default to a preformulated logic of
the commons, but we should strive to view resource use through the eyes of
local users and explore how local and non-local socioecological organization
shapes their perceptions.
Many post-Hardinian scholars seem aware of the relevance of percep-
tion to the commons (e.g., Hanna and Jentoft, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; Thomson
et al., 1992) but do not systematically examine how perceptions about re-
source degradation can influence resource use. Nor do most recognize that
resource users’ lack of awareness about resource degradation can undercut
the predictive and explanatory value of theories of the commons. This pa-
per is an attempt to expand upon the issue of perceptions in the commons
literature. First, I argue that an awareness of resource degradation is a funda-
mental rational choice assumption to theories of the commons, and I discuss
the theoretical implications of perception and rationality for these theories.
Second, to show the relevance of perceptions to common resource use, I will
discuss two sets of examples where it can be difficult for common resource
users to accurately perceive degradation. These are where (1) resource
users hold fatalistic beliefs about nature and (2) modern technology, the
division of labor, and the commodification of nature have resulted in com-
plex environmental problems obscure to individual and societal perception,
such as global warming. Third, I will discuss some theoretical and method-
ological ways to incorporate perceptions and beliefs into theories of the
commons.
THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
Hardin (1968) asks us to imagine a common pasture for all to graze
as many cattle as desired. Such an English medieval commons may work
when war and disease limit herd size, but herds eventually grow to exceed a
pasture’s capacity, and the “inherent logic of the commons” brings “tragedy”
(p. 1244).
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly,
more or less consciously, he asks, “What is the utility to me of adding one more animal
tomyherd?”Thisutilityhasonenegativeandonepositivecomponent.(p.1244,italics
in the original)
The positive component is the profit from each animal. The negative compo-
nent is the cost per animal for forage and overgrazing. Because each herder
receives the profits from adding animals while the costs are shared, it makes

452 Burke
sense for each herder to add more cattle, even though doing so contributes
to their collective ruin. Hardin wrote:
. . . the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue
is to add another animal to the herd. And another; and another . . . But this is the
conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein
lies the Tragedy. (1968, p. 1244)
This situation has been interpreted as the “dilemma of the commons” by
Dawes (1975) and others (e.g., Acheson, 1998; Douglas, 1991; Elster, 1989;
O’Connor and Tindall, 1990) where the dilemma is between maximizing
individual benefits and avoiding collective ruin. In the words of O’Connor
and Tindall (1990), “Individuals know that they are in a situation in which a
choice between cooperative and non-cooperative behavior must be made.”
Hardin suggests that because individuals are usually selfish, they choose non-
cooperative behavior that maximizes their own resource use. Regardless of
what others do, this is the most rational individual strategy. If everyone
else conserves, an individual can become quite wealthy through excessive
resource use, or, if everyone else maximizes his or her resource use, a lone
individual benefits very little from conserving.
Hardin suggests there are only two collective solutions to the “Tragedy
of the Commons.” Resources can be privatized so both benefits and costs
of resource use accrue to individuals (1968). However, some resources such
as water and air “cannot readily be fenced,” so tragedies must be prevented
through the second option of “mutually agreed upon mutual coercion.” In
this approach, an external “regulatory agency” must manage the commons
(Hardin and Baden, 1977, p. 49) by fees, taxes, or penalties at the request of
the “majority of the people affected” (1968, p. 1245).
However, the post-Hardinian literature correctly argues that users can
often self-manager their commons without privatization or outside regula-
tion. A commons with definable boundaries and smaller user groups seem
to be important for success. However, no type of land tenure can guarantee
sustainable management. This depends on the overall set of incentives and
meanings shaped by contextual factors such as the biophysical characteris-
tics of the commons and the norms, institutions, and organizations in which
resource use is embedded (Feeny et al., 1990; McCay, 1995; Ostrom, 1990,
1992).
DEFINING THE COMMONS
Because Hardin does not well define the commons, others have been
left with the task. While many typologies exist (e.g., Feeny et al., 1990;

McCay, 1995), I find it useful to define common resources as any natu-
ral resource from which individuals directly accrue benefits while
sharing costs collectively. Although broad, this definition explicitly cap-
tures a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a dilemma of the
commons—the objective structure of individual benefits and collective
costs.
Either the social or biophysical world can produce common resources.
Derived from the social world, some resource regimes create the cost-benefit
structure of common resources. Open access resources are one such regime,
and an example is the “open seas.” This is a situation of non-property
where no one owns or regulates a resource, and it is open for all to use
as they desire. Another is common property. The distinction from the for-
mer is that common property implies property rights belong to a group
that can regulate access to its resources (McCay, 1995). There is also state
property where the state holds usage rights for all citizens. When the state
gives user rights to individuals, these individuals gain access to the benefit
of resource use, but all citizens share the costs of any resulting degrada-
tion of resources. The above types contrast with private property, which
creates a cost-benefit structure where both the costs and benefits of re-
source use accrue to individuals who rightfully control the access of
others.
Also, the biophysical characteristics of a resource can create a commons
despite societal attempts to privatize that resource, such as with large bodies
of water, rivers, fish, and other wildlife and air that are called common pool
resources. Their fluidity makes it difficult to divide these into parcels with
distinct bundles of property rights (McCay, 1995, p. 92). Consider the atmo-
sphere. Even where pollution permits are sold, it is not possible to carve out
a single piece of atmosphere to be polluted because the air above a factory
will soon be dispersed over a larger area. Only the right to pollute the atmo-
sphere has been sold, not a parcel of the resource itself. Non-common pool
resources such as soil and forage are more easily partitioned into bundles of
private property.
The term “common resources” is to refer to all the regimes of open-
access, common property, state property, and common-pool resources. I pre-
fer this definition because it provides a common point of reference in that
all of these regimes have a basic objective structure of individual benefits
and collective costs that can lead to a “Tragedy of the Commons.” Of course,
internally or externally applied sanctions can alter the overall structure to
discourage or control individual resource use, but they do not negate the
basic cost-benefit structure of the commons. They exist in addition to and
sometimes in tension with it.

454 Burke
THE LOGIC OF THE COMMONS, PERCEPTION, AND RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY
When authors in the commons literature invoke the logic of the com-
mons to explain resource degradation, seldom are they explicit about the full
set of structural conditions and assumptions underlying this logic. I suggest
that the two structural conditions are, first, a resource base must be too lim-
ited or fragile to maintain the given rate of extraction, and second, resource
uses must be interdependent in that one user’s utilization will degrade the
resources available to others.
Whenthesestructuralconditionsaremet,Hardinianandpost-Hardinian
theoristsassumealogic/dilemmaofthecommonswillunfoldamongresource
users that will result in the “Tragedy of the Commons” if not checked by a
management regime or set of cultural norms. However, I argue that this
logic is not inherent to all common resource situations. Instead it is contin-
gent upon a larger set of values, perceptions, and beliefs merely assumed
when the logic of the commons is invoked to explain resource degradation.
What are these assumptions? Implicit in the logic/dilemma of the commons
is that individuals are (1) selfish (Hardin, 1968, and others), but this alone
will not lead to a “Tragedy.” (2) Users must be maximizing in their con-
sumption. Although they may not be maximizing in the mathematical sense,
resource users prefer more resources instead of fewer. (3) The “logic of the
commons” also assumes resource users have some awareness of the costs
and benefits of resource use. This subjective awareness provides a crucial
theoretical link between the objective structure of the commons and the
observable resource use behavior. This awareness can be broken down fur-
ther. Resource users must perceive resource degradation. They must at-
tribute degradation to their own use of a resource and that of others. They
must realize that the benefits of resource use accrue to them as individuals,
and they must realize that individual resource use aggregates into collective
costs.Withoutsuchawarenessofresourcedegradation,userswouldnotbeable
to consciously or unconsciously compare the individual benefits of resource
use with their share of the collective costs. Of course, resource use might still
result in degradation, and traditions, norms, or other factors could explain
this degradation. However, the cost-benefit structure of the commons could
not be said to be a cause.
Most theorists in the commons literature implicitly or explicitly base
their discussions of common resource use on rational choice (RC) theory.
Stern (1992), Weale (1992), and Spaargaren (1996) also note this RC foun-
dation to theories of the commons. Hardin seems to concur: “As rational
beings, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain” (1968, p. 1244). How-
ever, is RC theory the best perspective for understanding common resource

use? An answer depends on the particular school of RC theory that is being
used. The various schools can be roughly placed on a spectrum of how ra-
tionality is constituted and whether the social actor or researcher does the
constituting. Evolutionary game theory is at one end of this spectrum with
sociological RC theory at the other. Since the first is mostly irrelevant for
sociological inquiry, I advocate the second for theories of the commons.
In the first, rationality tends to be seen as a formal set of logical rules
for pursuing specified goals, where these logical rules are defined by the re-
searcher regardless of any perceptions and beliefs held by the individuals in
question. As used by its normative practitioners, evolutionary game theory
is perhaps the best exemplified by Axelrod (1984), Forgo et al. (1999), and
Patrone et al. (2000). Such theorists do not assume that individuals need to
be rational, maximize utility, or make conscious decisions. Rather, individu-
als just as often pursue strategies because of standard operating procedures,
instincts, rules of thumb, or imitation (Axelrod, 1984). The goal of these
theorists is to find the decisions that have the most strategic optimality. This
strategic optimality is equated with rationality, and to the extent that indi-
viduals deviate from this optimality, they are viewed as irrational. As stated
by Forgo et al. (1999, pp. xii–xiii), game theory “is concerned with finding
the best actions for the individual decision makers . . . to provide a normative
guide. . . .” I am critical of this style of RC theory because it does not explain
social behavior. It views the “dilemma of the commons” as a “game,” and
then theorizes a hypothetical best way to play it, not why and how people
actually play it.
A more sociological approach to rationality makes the metatheoretical
assumption that individuals are inherently rational—a basic premise not to
be disproved (Bohman, 1992). Rationality is defined as individuals pursuing
what they value as effectively as they can, with the information they have
available, and within the opportunities and constraints they face. If individ-
uals behave in ways that researchers do not expect, this does not mean they
are irrational but that researchers have wrongly specified the values, beliefs,
available information, individual information processing, and the options
and constraints that individuals face. From such a perspective, the benefit of
RC theory is as a heuristic tool allowing the researcher to put her/himself in
the position of social actors to see the situation as they do (Bohman, 1992;
Coleman, 1990; Marini, 1992). In the case of common resources, simply be-
cause resource users are not aware of the collective environmental costs of
resource use does not make them irrational. It simply means their resource
use follows a rationale other than the logic of the commons—possibly the
logic of consuming more of a thing for which they have a preference.
SociologicalRCtheoryviewshumansasintentionalactorswitharational
correspondence among their perceptions, preferences, decision-making, and

456 Burke
behavior (Bohman, 1992; Coleman, 1990; Marini, 1992). It also recognizes
that individuals hold noneconomic preferences, such as for love and respect.
While the literature is not often explicit about its style of RC theory, Ostrom
(1990), Feeny et al. (1990), McCabe (1990), and Cordell and McKean (1992)
follow an approach consistent with sociological RC.
A good question about common resource situations is: Do resource
users have enough conscious awareness of the logic of the commons to jus-
tify the use of RC Theory? This question is best answered by noting that RC
theory does not demand complete conscious awareness by all social actors
at all times. John Elster notes that awareness and rationale need not be con-
sciously or explicitly articulated (1990, p. 23). For others, it can be mostly
intuitive, cognitive, or emotional. As Hardin writes, individuals “explicitly
or implicitly, more or less consciously” contrast the “negative” and “posi-
tive utilities” of resource use (1968, p. 1244). Nevertheless, the explanatory
power of RC theory depends on having enough users with enough awareness
about the costs and benefits of resource use to assume that the subjective
logic of the commons is the reason for the individual actions that lead to a
“tragedy.” Thus with greater awareness among more individuals, the logic
of the commons is more applicable.3
POST-HARDINIAN LITERATURE AND PERCEPTION
While the literature does not fully explore the issue of perception, many
authors note its relevance, at least in passing (Anderson and Hill, 1977;
Brown and Harris, 1992; Cordell and McKean, 1992; Hanna and Jentoft,
1996; McKean, 1992; O’Connor and Tindall, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Thomson
et al., 1992). Still, most authors employ little theoretical or methodological
rigor on perceptions, and say little about their specific content and how per-
ceptions aresocially constructedand influenceresource use. Mostgrievously,
the literature does not note that the validity of theories of the commons is
contingent on the assumption that resource users are aware of resource
degradation and their contribution to it.
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning two other questions that have been
productive and how they relate to perception: In the face of temptations to
free-ride, how can resource users cooperate to sustainably manage common
3Theories of the commons can also be applied when organizations are the unit of analysis and
individual awareness is not an issue. An example would be nation-states negotiating over the
global atmospheric commons. I will not go into detail about this except to say that suggesting
organizations are rational and/or aware of resource degradation is even more tenuous than
with individuals. See Perrow (1986) and Zey (1998) who have been highly critical of applying
concepts of rationality to organizations.

resources without external regulation? And what types of biophysical and
sociocultural conditions facilitate the emergence of successful institutions to
manage common resources?
In her 1990 Governing the Commons, Elinor Ostrom provides answers
central to these questions. She notes that, contrary to Hardin, it may be
rational for common resource users to forgo individual benefits and cooper-
ate toward collective goals. Specifically, if individuals believe selfish exploita-
tion of the commons will result in collective demise, it can be rational for
them to persuade others to cooperate and forego resource use. However,
it takes substantial collective effort to negotiate a set of rules to manage
the commons which, in effect, creates a second-order dilemma. That is, the
establishment of a set of rules is a “public good” to which people may be
reluctant to contribute. Also, resource users will agree to such rules only if
they are confident that others will abide by them. To produce this confidence,
the monitoring and enforcement of behavior is typically required, leading
to yet a third-order dilemma.
In simpler terms, individuals cooperate toward collective ends when
they perceive that the economic and noneconomic benefits are greater than
the costs. Ostrom (1990, 1992), Eggertsson (1992), and others give expla-
nations that hint at the importance of perception. A nonexhaustive list of
such factors associated with the self-emergence of successful institutions for
managing the commons is as follows: (1) a resource base must be relatively
small with clear boundaries and reliable indicators of resource quality, so that
users can reasonably understand and agree about problems and solutions;
(2) the number of users must be sufficiently small and concentrated near
the resource so that the costs of communicating, monitoring, and enforcing
rules are not too high; (3) users are not greatly divided by conflicting needs,
cultural antagonisms, or differential exposure to the costs of resource use;
(4) existing organizations and institutions that can act as stepping stones for
building management regimes; and (5) government must allow local users
the freedom to self-organize.
Unfortunately, in the above list of factors affecting common resource
use, biophysical influences are discussed as a direct influence on resource use
without socially constructed perception as an intervening factor. In other
studies where perception is mentioned in concept, it is usually ignored in the
actualanalysis(e.g.,Cesar,1994).Forsimplicity,researchersmayassumethat
perceptions correspond closely enough to objective variables that the objec-
tive can be used as a proxy for the subject. These assumptions may sometimes
be necessary since perceptions are difficult to investigate, particularly with
historical data, but it is distressing that their validity is seldom questioned.
Despiteagenerallackoftheoretical,empirical,andmethodologicalrigor
regarding perception, there are some noteworthy exceptions. Psychologists

458 Burke
have suggested that the individual resource use patterns of laboratory sub-
jects are affected by their perceptions of the resource base and other users.
For example, laboratory subjects will adjust their use up or down to match
their perception of what others are doing, particularly when there is little
variance in a group’s perceptions. If subjects perceive a severly depleted re-
source base, they tend to lower their resource use, regardless of what others
aredoing.Likewise,iftheyperceivearesourcebaseisunderutilized,theywill
increase their use (see the literature review by Komorita and Parks, 1994).
Also, O’Connor and Tindall (1990) noted that, while laboratory subjects usu-
ally realized that they faced a dilemma between maximizing individual gains
and avoiding collective ruin, they misunderstood what it would take to re-
solve the dilemma. Most subjects thought they were cooperating to preserve
the resource base, but in actuality their aggregate consumption was too high
for sustainability. Stern (1976) presents laboratory evidence that educating
common resource users about the consequences of individual resource use
can lead to more sustainable use.
In addition, a few researchers have suggested that perceptions can in-
fluence collective strategies of resource use. These include rather general
statements by Ostrom (1992), Ostrom and Schlager (1996), and Palmer and
Sinclair (1996) that a mutual understanding among resource users about
the costs and benefits of resource use is important to establishing mutually
agreed upon rules of resource use and management. Cultural homogeneity
among resource users may facilitate agreement about the costs and bene-
fits of resource use. Likewise, a number of anthropologists have done some
exciting work on conservation and perception that will be discussed in the
next section.
FATALISM IN ABORIGINAL CULTURES AND
COMMON RESOURCE USE
I have argued that the logic of the commons is premised on the assump-
tion that users are significantly aware of resource degradation. In this and the
next section, I will describe situations where this assumption does not hold
and thus the “logic of the commons” cannot validly be used to explain re-
source degradation. In which case there must be other reasons for common
resource degradation. This section considers fatalism as a cause. Fatalism
refers to beliefs that the processes of nature (such as forest fires and popula-
tion dynamics of species) are due to spiritual forces that leave no room for
human influence. Resource depletion is accepted as destiny or the intention
of the gods. In this way, fatalism can prevent individuals from recognizing

that their resource use contributes to resource degradation. Fatalistic beliefs
existed in the preenlightenment West as well as in some past and contem-
porary aboriginal cultures (Berkes, 1987; Brightman, 1987; Carrier, 1987;
McCabe, 1990; Stocks, 1987; Worster, 1994).
Here the focus will be aboriginal cultures. This might appear to contra-
dict popular beliefs that indigenes had great respect for and understanding
of nature. However, it need not be contradictory. Many aboriginal cultures
had a respect for nature very different from western environmental val-
ues. Likewise, they held an understanding of nature different from modern
conservation biology’s proposition that depletion results if rates of deple-
tion exceed that of renewal (Berkes, 1987; Brightman, 1987; Carrier, 1987;
Edgerton, 1992; Hill, 1995; Stocks, 1987) implicit in the logic of the com-
mons. For example, Carrier (1987) states that the Ponams intimately under-
stood how to find and harvest fish, and Brightman (1987) comments on the
Algonquians’ deep respect for nature manifested through ritualistic har-
vesting of their prey, using it, and disposing of the remains in a spiritually
significant way. This is not contradictory. Knowledge and skills about har-
vesting resources are not the same as the knowledge and skills to sustainably
manage ecosystems (see Redford, 1991, for a similar argument).
The case of the boreal Algonquians of what is now Southeastern Canada
is worth discussing. As Brightman (1987, p. 131) suggests, in the early 1800s
the Algonquians were introduced to firearms, steel traps, and castor oil by
European for traders. For the first time, the Algonquians had both the tech-
nology to easily and severely deplete faunal populations and a desire to do
so because they could trade pelts for western commodities. However, the
Algonquians believed that “game animals killed by hunters spontaneously
regenerate after death,” that killing animals would increase their number.
These fatalistic beliefs did not permit them to recognize that their hunting
was decimating common faunal resources.
The Algonquians obviously noticed the decline in game populations,
but they attributed the decline to spiritual forces—not their own agency.
Nor did they adopt the conservation measures advocated by the Hudson
Bay Company, or try to stop invading hunters from other tribes that were
also contributing to the demise of local fauna. Instead, they responded by
fleeing to less depleted areas. As Brightman states,
Given the perspective in which events such as diminishing animal populations and
incursions by outsiders are governed by spiritual agencies, it is doubtful that either
warfare or conservation appeared practical. An effective conservation system [to
avoid a “Tragedy of the Commons”] presupposes both a knowledge of practical tech-
niques and conviction that (a) indiscriminate hunting causes faunal depletion, and (b)
controlled or selective predation will result in a reliable supply of game, none of which
appear to have existed on any scale prior to around 1850. (1987, p. 135, italics added)

460 Burke
About a similar situation in Papua New Guinea in the 1980s, Carrier (1987,
p. 153) writes:
[Ponams believed that] because humans had so little impact on the environment,
conservation was not really possible . . . Ponams objected to the government’s plan
because giving up the hunting and consumption of sea turtles would have been very
costly and would, they felt, bring nothing in return. If sea turtles were going to die
out, as the government said, it would be because God wanted them to. A halt on
hunting sea turtles would not change God’s mind but would be very costly to the
Ponams.
Thus, while having both a great respect for nature and a brilliant (but
selective) understanding of nature, some aboriginal cultures have unwit-
tingly hunted their prey to local extinction when given the western technol-
ogy and incentives to do so. It is interesting that their fatalistic belief systems
were originally well suited to their traditional lifestyle, technology, and pop-
ulation densities. Only after western contact did these beliefs become mal-
adaptive. The point is that the Algonquians’ and Ponams’ resource problems
were significantly due to faulty perceptions, not the logic of the commons.
There was little or no dilemma in their minds. They saw only the benefits and
were blind to the collective cost.
This is not meant to imply that all aboriginal cultures held, and still
hold, fatalistic belief systems. The point is that fatalism, when it does occur,
can make it difficult for cultures to recognize their impact on common re-
sources. Likewise, when researchers study common resources, they should
be aware that fatalistic beliefs can undercut the explanatory and predictive
value of theories of the commons and can make privatization or community
management of common resources a questionable option.
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AND THE CHANGING
OF THE COMMONS
Individuals in modern industrialized societies can also fail to under-
stand how their actions contribute to resource degradation, but fatalism does
not appear to be a predominant reason. Through public opinion research,
Dunlap and Van Liere (1978), Olsen et al. (1992), Milbrath (1984), and oth-
ers have suggested that a large majority of US citizens and those of other
industrial countries strongly or moderately believe that humans can have a
negative impact on nature and that nature is fragile, with limited resources.
Now the primary problem with perceiving the consequences of resource
use is not paradigmatic, but it is that environmental problems have become
increasingly obscure to individual and societal perception. No longer are
the commons a simple medieval cattle pasture. We are creating increasingly

complex ecological disruptions, with causes and effects that are distant over
time, space, and person, and with more causes and intermediate pathways
that cannot be directly observed. These changes are making it very difficult
for both scientists and the lay public to understand modern environmental
problems. (See also, among others, Beck, 1986, 1996; Burke, 1995; Dickens,
1996; Dunlap and Catton, 1994; Giddens, 1990, 1991; Ornstein and Ehrlich,
1989; Weale, 1992). These changes in the commons are both biophysical and
social. Biophysically, we are now faced with new types of environmental
problems involving regional and global common resources such as acid rain,
the greenhouse effect, and the ozone layer. Sociologically, the modern divi-
sion of labor has changed the relationship between common resources and
resource users, and subsequently has distanced people from their ecological
base of existence, obscuring the costs of resource use.
These changes in the commons can be illustrated by describing environ-
mental problems in terms of historical and modern environmental problems.
Historical environmental problems are those first encountered by humans
before urbanization and industrialization. Examples include the local ac-
cumulation of animal wastes, airborne smoke and particulates from the
burning of heating and cooking fuel, and resource depletion of animal for-
age, fish, game, and plants. For these historical problems it is typical that
their proximate causes, intermediate stages, and mechanisms of harm are
more easily observable with the bare senses that humans evolved for this
or similar purposes. Likewise, their causes and effects are localized in time,
in space, and among people, and the causes and solutions are rooted in the
activity of structurally homogeneous resources users in direct contact with
their resource bases.
Modern environmental problems emerged along with, and have been
caused by, modern technology, industrialization, and urbanization. These
problemsincludeozonedepletion,globalwarming,acidrain,andtoxicpollu-
tion. The human senses are poorly equipped to directly perceive these mod-
ern problems and their proximate causes, intermediate stages, and mech-
anisms of harm. Also, causes and effects are distant over time, space, and
person, and many of the socioeconomic causes are rooted in the modern
division of labor, which removes individuals from their ecological base of
existence and obscures their understanding of that existence.
No definite place in time divides the historical from the modern. In-
stead, they exist as a continuum of generally increasing abstraction, com-
plexity, and distant cause-effect relationships. In this context, historical does
not refer only to past environmental problems, but also environmental prob-
lems of the present that have characteristics of past environmental problems.
Likewise, most historical environmental problems of the past are still with
us today in some from. Although the later half of the twentieth century was

462 Burke
Table I. Socioecological Characteristics of Historical and Modern Environmental Problems
Historical environmental problems Modern environmental problems
Sources and consequences of danger were
for the most part directly accessible to the
bare senses
The causes and consequences of many
instances of danger are often not directly
accessible to the bare senses
Dangers tended to be localized in time,
space, and person
Causes and consequences of modern
dangers tend to be large in scope and
distant across time, space, and person
The structure of society was that the
consumers of commodities were also the
producers, thus making the
environmental causes and effects of
ecological alteration easier to observe
Now the consumers of commodities are
seldom the ones who produced them, thus
distancing many environmental causes
and consequences from consumers
Simple reflexive behaviors were relied upon
to address problems. These were largely
sufficient because sources of danger were
accessible to the bare senses and causes
were near consequences in time, space,
and person
Simple reflexive behaviors do not exist to
react to most modern environmental
problems, and thus the calculation of
probabilities and societal debates about
risk are more important if not necessary
There was less potential for value conflict
within society because society was more
structurally homogeneous
There is greater potential for value conflict
within society because society is much
more structurally differentiated
The mechanisms and consequences of
resource degradation were often
comprehensible and manageable through
common knowledge systems
There is now a differentiated and isolated
expert knowledge system to address
environmental problems that is largely
distinct from common knowledge systems
strongly characterized by modern environmental problems, some contempo-
rary problems have characteristics of both historical and modern problems.
Table I describes the changes in the commons from historical to modern
environmental problems.
One of these changes is that many of the causes and intermediate stages
of modern environmental problems are now outside our direct sensory per-
ception, including high levels of greenhouse gases, CFCs, radioactive waste,
and human-made toxins. How often do people taste pesticides in their drink-
ing water and infer a toxicity level? They never do, at least not at the concen-
trations in which pesticides typically occurring in drinking water in indus-
trialized countries. Of course, people can often directly sense the droughts,
skin cancer, and birth defects that are the end consequences of environ-
mental contaminants. However, not being able to directly perceive most of
the chemical antecedents (e.g., CFCs) and intermediates (e.g., free radicals
in the stratosphere) that lead to such consequences makes it very difficult
for society to understand modern environmental problems. This does not

imply that all historical threats were easily perceived and modern threats
are never perceivable, only that over time environmental problems have
generally become more obscure to the senses. In a substantial majority of
modern environmental problems, our bare senses appear to play a very mi-
nor role in our understanding of them (Beck, 1986; Burke et al., n.d.; Ornstein
and Ehrlich, 1989).
Arguably, the speciﬁc causes, mechanisms, and consequences of many
modern dangers can be known only through modern science. Nevertheless,
solid understandings typically elude scientists as well. Even to the extent that
science generates theories with predictive utility, such knowledge cannot be
equated with the truth, nor is it easily communicated to the lay public. For
such reasons, it often remains controversial in policy arenas.
Other fundamental changes are now associated with using knowledge to
manage environmental problems, particularly in how we now deal with un-
certainty. One such example is the uncertainty faced by common resource
users in having to decide if their resource use is degrading the commons.
Experts attempt to assess the uncertain consequences of ecological dis-
ruptions through methods of assessment risk. Through these methods the
calculation of risk is expressed as the severity of an event multiplied by
its probability of occurrence (e.g., 100 deaths × 0.0000001 = a risk
of 0.00001).
However, a 20-year research program on the social psychological di-
mensions of risk has produced the clear conclusion that when lay people
are confronted with uncertainty, they do not think in terms of the statistical
probability of outcomes times the magnitude of an occurrence (Shrader-
Frechette, 1991; Slovic, 1986, 2000). The public rebels “against being given
statements of probability rather than fact,” and they deny uncertainty by ei-
ther “making the risk seem so small that it can be safely ignored or by making
it so large that it should clearly be avoided” (Slovic, 1986, p. 405). To decide
which risks are small enough to be ignored and which are large enough to
be avoided, the lay public uses psychological and cultural heuristics instead
of probability-based risk calculations (e.g., see Heimer, 1988).
With modern environmental problems, cause/effect relationships have
become more complicated and distant across time, space, and person for
a number of reasons. While socioecological organization has always been
complex, there are now additional levels and dimensions of complexity in-
cluding modern technological systems as well as national and global political
and economic systems that “stretch” the relationship between cause and ef-
fect across time, space, and person (Giddens, 1990, 1991). Now people can
negatively affect the future wellbeing of each other from opposite sides of
the globe through an array of modern technologies including CFCs and
greenhouse gases (Burke, 1995; Weale, 1992).

464 Burke
Likewise, commodification and the modern division of labor have dis-
tanced individuals from their ecological base of existence, obscuring the costs
of resource use (Burke, 1995; Dickens, 1996; Freese, 1997). Historically, most
individuals grew and harvested their own food and fiber, and processed and
consumed it themselves. Now we buy such items in a store, and the ecological
damage from our resource use is not directly visible to us. This is because the
modern division of labor has differentiated resource use into numerous
societalroles:thosewhoextractresources(e.g.,agricultureandotherprimary
industries); those who make resources into usable products; those who study
the consequences of resource use (e.g., environmental scientists); those
who teach about the costs of resource use (e.g., activists, teachers, and the
media); those who advocate the use, protection, or preservation of resources;
those who regulate resource use; end-product users who consume resources;
etc. All are modern common resource users, but they differently affect com-
mon resources through their various societal roles. However, in general they
do have at least one thing in common: those who work in one stage/sector of
theindustrialeconomyaregenerallyjustasisolatedfromotherstages/sectors
as are consumers. This has been an outcome of increasing structural differ-
entiation in the roles of individuals within societies.4
These various types of resource users exert their influence on modern
common resources through state, national, and global political economies,
the media, and religious and educational institutions. Each creates addi-
tional incentive structures, layers of meaning, processes, opportunities, and
constraints that directly or indirectly influence patterns of modern common
resource use. That is to say, resource users do not use and manage common
resources in a vacuum. In addition to the logic of the commons, there are
many other competing logics, such as the capitalist logic of the “treadmill of
production” (Schnaiberg, 1994), that may reinforce, abate, or supersede any
logic of the commons (see Ostrom, 1985, for a similar argument). Likewise,
these competing logics may also distract from or otherwise obscure a re-
source user’s perception of the objective cost-benefit structure of common
resource use. However, Hardinian and post-Hardinian theorists typically
restrict their institutional analyses to the “logic of the commons” (although
there are exceptions such as Durrenberger, 1994). This narrow scope has
led to the incorrect assumption that where there are common resources, the
logic of the commons will be the most important influence on resource use.
Furthermore, as a result of the modern division of labor and increasing
abstraction of modern environmental problems, expert knowledge systems
about the environment have become increasingly isolated from common
4However, at the same time, globalization has led to more structural homogeneity among
societies.

knowledgesystems.Theconsequenceisthatforthemodern,lay,end-product
users (i.e., consumers), modern environmental science is largely inaccessible
to them to inform their resource use. This is unfortunate because, as men-
tioned by Beck (1986), science is the only way to understand many aspects of
modern environmental problems. However, being confused about resource
degradation is not unique to contemporary, lay, end-product users, but the
passive involvement of most modern, lay, end-product users in the man-
agement of the commons is new. Historically, lay end-product users (who
extracted, processed, and consumed resources) were also the most likely
to identify degradation and ﬁnd solutions, because, if they did not, there
was unlikely anyone else to do so. For example, Peffer (1951) describes
western livestock growers’ widespread understanding of overgrazing on the
historical western open range and their active pursuit of solutions through
informal agreements, range wars, and lobbying. This greatly contrasts with
many modern environmental problems. We only know that global warming
exists because scientists say it does (Rudig, 1995), and we have taken very
few individual initiatives to address it (Kempton, 1993).
GLOBAL WARMING AND OZONE DEPLETION
Here I will discuss global warming and ozone depletion as case stud-
ies of modern common resource problems. However, at least in the early
stages of global warming and ozone depletion as biophysical phenomena,
the logic of the commons cannot be applied. Lay end-product users and
much or all of society had not even heard of global warming and ozone
depletion, and thus could not have been aware of the environmental costs
arising from these phenomena. When CFCs were ﬁrst introduced as a re-
frigerant in the early 1900s, they were seen as a safe alternative to deadly
ammonia gas (Stern et al., 1992). Although ozone depletion had been oc-
curring since the 1960s, it was not until the 1970s that CFCs were suspected
of destroying ozone. Furthermore, human activity had been increasing the
concentration of greenhouse gases for centuries (Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, 1995) before their contribution to global warming
was hypothesized in 1938, receiving widespread attention only in the 1980s
(Newton, 1993).
However, since the 1970s and 1980s, the public has become widely
aware of ozone depletion and global warming. Nevertheless, I suggest that
most end-product users are too poorly informed about these phenomena for
Hardin’s theory of the commons to be fully applicable. Much of the public
has confused global warming with ozone depletion. Studies suggest most
people think that the greenhouse effect and deforestation are the primary

466 Burke
causes of ozone depletion, and that global warming is caused by nuclear
power (Dunlap, 1995; Kempton, 1993; Roper Center at the University of
Connecticut Public Opinion Online, n.d.). This suggests that the costs of
modern resource use will be misinterpreted and marginalized in daily behav-
ior, if not altogether ignored. With such little awareness about even funda-
mental issues, it is unrealistic to propose that the “dilemma of the commons”
among end-product users is the primary cause of ozone depletion and global
warming.
A worthwhile question is under what conditions do end-product users
gain more awareness and become more directly involved in managing mod-
ern common resources? A case study of the consumer boycott of aerosol
cans provides insight. Between 1975 and 1978, the boycott reduced the mar-
ket for aerosol cans by two-thirds, causing many manufacturers of aerosols
to switch to alternatives (Benedick, 1991). The success of the boycott is
at odds with my proposition that modern environmental problems are too
abstract for end-product resource users to become very involved. It is also
at odds with Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” that suggests individ-
uals will not participate because the beneﬁts of resource use are individ-
ual and the costs are collectively shared. So how did the end-product re-
source users learn about the abstract issue of ozone depletion? Why did they
participate?
First, the original Earth Day in 1970 appears to have contributed to en-
vironmental values becoming both salient and widely held. Second, although
the logistics of boycotters communicating with each other can be a barrier
to collective behavior, the mass media was effective at creating a collective
knowledge about aerosols, ozone, and the boycott that facilitated collection
action. The media made interesting and understandable an otherwise
abstract, dull issue of atmospheric chemistry. According to Benedick (1991),
it gave widespread coverage with “catchy lead-ins” of the irony of deodor-
ants threatening life on earth. Implicitly or explicitly, the media suggested
the solution was to stop using aerosol cans. Third, boycotters easily switched
to pump sprays with little inconvenience. Fourth, the rapid turnover of spray
cans allowed a massive consumer response to quickly build (Kempton, 1993)
before the public could lose interest.
These factors have not existed for other causes of ozone depletion and
for most other modern environmental issues. There was no mass boycott
of ozone-depleting chemicals used as refrigerants or pesticides (Kempton,
1993; Stern et al., 1992). Although recycling has become popular, Weinberg
et al. (1995) makes a compelling argument that consumers do not under-
stand the resource ﬂows involved and that recycling does little to conserve
resources.

BRINGING PERCEPTIONS INTO THEORIES OF THE COMMONS
I advocate that perception should be integrated into the analysis of com-
mon resource issues as an intervening factor between biophysical reality and
common resource use. However, I do not suggest the development of a new
theory of perception and common resource use. Instead I want to encourage
researchers and policy makers to use existing theories and methods of study-
ing perception to improve and be more explicit about the RC assumptions
of theories of the commons.
If RC assumptions are going to continue to underpin the theories of the
commons, it should be noted that a wide range of scholars criticize RC theory
by pointing out that individuals are seldom, if ever, rational decision makers;
that they do not have the information they need to make rational decisions;
that even when they have information they often do not make efficient
use of it; and that individuals often exhibit altruism instead of selfishness
(e.g., England and Kilbourne, 1990; Lutzenhiser, 1993; Stern, 1986). These
criticismsappearvalidandcouldbeaimedatsomeofthecommonsliterature.
A considerable amount of recent and not-so-recent rational choice literature
hasaddressedtheseissuesbybroadeningtheclassicaldefinitionofrationality
to include preferences other than economic, to view rationality as bounded,
and to stress self-interest instead of selfishness as a core assumption of RC
theory (e.g., Friedman and Diem, 1993; Ostrom, 1990; Simon, 1956).
There are three other complementary ways to broaden the classical
definition of rationality as it relates to perceptions of common resource
degradation. These are a mediative constructivist approach to the social
constitution of reality, ethnomethodology, and the use of existing theories
of perception to inform our specification of RC theory. I consider the first
to be a crucial element to any viable theory of the commons; the other two
are merely strong recommendations.
The mediative constructivist approach takes the position that while
there is an objective reality, our perceptions of that reality are mediated
by social processes (Woolgar, 1983). While our perceptions are social con-
structions, reality plays a role in shaping those perceptions. Biophysical re-
ality shapes social perceptions about itself through individuals reflexively
changing or accepting their perceptions contingent to their direct or indirect
experiences with reality. This should seem commonsensical. If a society is to
feedandclotheitselfandavoidecologicalruininthelongrun,theremustbea
predictive association between perceptions of biophysical reality and actual
biophysical reality. While constructivists (e. g., Greider and Garkovich, 1994;
Hannigan, 1995; Wynne, 1994) give lip service to the mediative approach,
they usually slip into strict constructivism in actual practice.

468 Burke
A true mediative approach has the potential to generate useful insights
into human interactions with common resources. Ungar (1995) and Mazur
and Lee (1993) suggested that the real world events of ozone depletion and
heat and droughts of the 1980s contributed, in part, to the public’s concern
about global warming. However, they also noted that a thinning of the ozone
layer had little, if any, direct impact on the greenhouse effect, and that the
heat and droughts during the 1980s were local weather events that cannot
be attributed to changing climate. Mediating social construction processes
involving the media, politicians, and activists drew a connection in the
public’s mind between these largely unrelated events that erroneously sug-
gested ozone depletion was a major cause of global warming and also incor-
rectly that the hot weather and droughts of the 1980s were proof. I will be
more explicit and generalize beyond Ungar and Mazur and Lee. Although
biophysical reality does in part shape our perceptions and beliefs, the aspects
of biophysical reality that most strongly shape our perceptions may often be
largely unrelated to the actual phenomena in question.
Likewise, the complexity of common resource issues can influence per-
ceptions about them. Zehr (1994) noted that the biophysical complexity of
the ozone layer misled scientists to a premature conclusion about the issue in
the early 1980s, and thus scientists overlooked the growing danger of CFCs.
How does this relate to common resource use? Contingent on a culture’s ex-
isting belief system and the relationship of resource users to their resource
base, the structure and dynamics of resource depletion and renewal often
have an impact on the perceptions of resource users.
Metaphorically restated, nature can be both a teacher and trickster. By
teacher, I mean that the biophysical world has real and durable character-
istics that foster societal understandings of the structures and processes of
reality. By comparing beliefs and assumptions about reality with experiences
of reality, it is possible to obtain a predictive (though not ontological) under-
standing of it. By trickster, I mean that certain characteristics of biophysical
reality can lead people to faulty conclusions about reality, as exemplified
above by the discussion of the ozone layer and global warming.
Conversely, strict constructivists treat social actors as ecological morons
who would not know a tree if a branch fell and hit them on the head. It is
implausible to suggest that loggers would not notice when their forests have
become so seriously depleted they can no longer make a living and that this
knowledge would not affect their behavior in some way. Strict constructivism
is directly at odds with theories of the commons that rest on the assumption
that resource users are capable of forming a perception with some degree
of resemblance to the objective cost/benefits structure of resource regimes.
Just as with the mediative constructivist approach, ethnomethodol-
ogy allows researchers in the commons literature to assume that resource

users are capable of significantly understanding the implications of their re-
source use. (Anthropology offers the very similar methodology/theoretical
approach of ethnography; see Rappaport, 1968.) While at odds with posi-
tivistic versions of RC theory, ethnomethodology is in many ways similar
to sociological RC theory. While ethnomethodologists view social actors
as rational, they do not view rationality as having “universal and enduring
properties” that “exist outside of, beyond, and even despite any particular
person or specific situation” (Boden, 1990, p. 197) very similar to socio-
logical RC theory (Bohman, 1992; Friedman and Diem, 1993). Instead of
giving the researcher a privileged position to specify social structure and its
influences on social actors, Boden suggests that “social structure does not
operate behind the backs of social actors . . . human actors are knowledge-
able agents, not cultural dopes, and that the meaning they attribute to their
joint actions both shapes and renews those understandings in consequential
ways” (p. 189). Nor does social structure deterministically shape behavior.
Structure and its influence are conditional to local interpretation.
However, in order for ethnomethodology to be useful to theories of the
commons, more theorizing is necessary. We need to expand on the concept
of social structure. Ethnomethodologists often shy away from the concept of
structure, but when structure is mentioned, it is usually viewed as inherently
flexible and locally, continually, and socially reproduced. However, there are
also ecological structures and processes such as those governing the rates of
depletion and renewal of resources (e.g., the declining beaver populations
faced by the Algonquians) not infinitely malleable in the hands of human
society. Likewise, I suggest a divergence from a strict ethnomethodological
perspective that might view the cost-benefit structures of common resources
as inherently knowable to social actors. Instead we must realize that socioe-
cological structures and processes often do operate without the knowledge
of local resource users. Regardless of Algonquian beliefs to the contrary, the
hunting and trapping of beaver populations caused the rate of depletion to
exceed renewal.
Research by Carrier (1987), Brightman (1987), and Stocks (1987) on in-
digenous resource use demonstrates an ethnomethodological flavor to var-
ious degrees. They suggest a theoretical and methodological approach to
understanding resource use from the user’s point of view. Themes that run
through their research include the need to better understand how resource
usersmakesenseoftheirworld,theirresources,theeffectsofuseoncommon
resources, and to whom or what they specifically attribute resource degra-
dation. They have concluded that indigenous resource users may not view
their own actions as a cause of degradation but instead see spiritual agencies
as the cause, such as the gods moving the shell beds to a different lagoon
(Carrier, 1987) or the spirits being angry at prior waste and overhunting

470 Burke
(Brightman, 1987). Furthermore, even if resource users are aware that they
have degraded their resources, it cannot be assumed that they understand
the specific reasons. For example, they may not recognize that depletion re-
sulted from specifically too many users, harvesting techniques, timing of the
harvest, or the intrusion of outsiders into the commons.
Regarding the consumption of modern common resources, the ethno-
graphic method used in the “folk quantification” of energy by Kempton and
Montgomery (1982) demonstrates much promise. They investigated utility
customers’ perceptions of the amounts of energy that they used and con-
served. According to Kempton and Montgomery, the public thinks about
energy very differently than do experts. The public does not have informa-
tion on the amount of energy consumed for each use, nor familiarity with
measurement units and conceptual ideas for accurate measurement. Thus,
they use rules of thumb, simplifying assumptions, and analogies to judge the
energy consumed or saved from each activity (also see Cordell and McKean,
1992; Dickens, 1996).
Instead of using the more accurate and reliable units of energy that
physicists use, such as kilowatt-hours or Ccfs, the public uses folk units such
as gallons, dollars, and months because these are familiar and easily visual-
ized. However, many of these units do not provide consistent measures of
the amount of energy consumed and can lead to less than optimal resource
use strategies. Those who use folk units may become frustrated when they
adopt conservation measures that fail to show the expected energy savings.
The problem with dollars as a folk unit is that it does not control for in-
creases in price, nor allow for comparison between energy types. Because
utility customers receive bills that aggregate energy costs over all uses, they
have difficulty quantifying the energy consumed by specific appliances and
strategies of use, which is analogous to having an aggregate grocery bill
and having to guess the price for each item. Even worse, when utilities are
included in rent, renters have no information about resource use.
The third way I suggest incorporating perception into theories of the
commons is to use existing theories of perception to more accurately specify
perception within the RC framework. Psychological research on the per-
ception of risk is one such literature. Although research has primarily been
in the laboratory, uncertainty is one characteristic of perception shown to
affect decision making and behavior. This is relevant because there is often
uncertainty about whether a particular type of resource use will result in a
“Tragedy of the Commons.” Ostrom (1990) pointed out that, under condi-
tions of uncertainty, instead of making decisions according to expert concep-
tualizations of rationality, individuals invoke mental heuristics as simplifying
assumptions with built-in biases (also see Heimer, 1988). For example, in-
dividuals tend to perceive that outcomes are more likely to happen if the

outcomes are more easily memorable because they are dramatic or highly
familiar (Scherer, 1990).
Another literature with insight for perceptions is cultural research by
anthropologists, some of which has also addressed risk (e.g., Douglas and
Wildavsky, 1982). Although the literature lacks empirical rigor, the cultural
attribution processes it suggests are intriguing. For example, the literature
suggests that people tend to perceive and place blame for risky situations
in the direction of existing social criticism. Societies tend to hold blameless
institutions and organizations held in high esteem while they place blame for
societal risks upon those of which they are already critical. The implication
for modern common resource use is that, in a structurally and culturally
differentiated society with many scapegoats, social criticism may be directed
away from the real causes of common resource degradation.
CONCLUSION
Researchers should be cautious not to wrongly specify resource users’
awareness about common resource degradation. The risks of doing so in-
clude compromising a theory’s predictive validity and recommending inap-
propriate policy options. While all past research is not necessarily invalid,
some of it may be and would beneﬁt from a reexamination. On a case-by-
case basis, researchers and policy makers need to consider the relevance of
the logic of the commons and carefully evaluate its assumptions. This is par-
ticularly important because of a history of policy-makers misusing theories
of the commons with disastrous consequences (Feeny et al., 1990; McCay,
1995; Ostrom, 1990).
Clearly, the terms “commons” and “common resource user” have differ-
ent meanings in modern society than in the medieval cattle pasture described
by Hardin. In addition to the increasing obscurity of environmental prob-
lems, contemporary resource users are inﬂuenced both by local structures
of common resource use and by that of larger institutions, structures, and
cultural communities including a modern capitalist economy, media, science,
and the welfare state to a degree not found even 50 years ago.
Tobetterunderstandhowresourceusersperceivetheirresourceuseand
resulting degradation, I have suggested using other theoretical perspectives
such as ethnomethodology, mediative constructivism, and studies of risk
perception. However, considering the complexity of modern environmental
problems, it may sometimes be that theories of the commons are irreparably
too simple, in which case, other theoretical perspectives may be better, such
as political economic approaches that focus on the institutions of capitalism
(e.g., Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994). As mentioned, simply because common

472 Burke
resources exist does not necessarily mean the best explanatory framework
is common resource theory.
Likewise, when the scope condition of significant awareness does not
well apply to situations of common resource use, other policy options are
needed in addition to privatization, self-management, and external regu-
lation. For the first two to be effective and the last to often be politically
feasible, a common understanding about resource degradation must first
be created among modern resource users through education and consensus
building.However,mostattemptsbyexpertsto“educate”thelaypublichave
failed (Sandman, 1987; Scherer, 1990; Slovic, 1986) and earned the reputa-
tion of being elitist with some justification. On the other hand, techniques in
conflict resolution/consensus building have had some successes (e.g., Maser,
1996).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I owe appreciation to Nathan Lauster, Jose Anazagasty, Lee Freese,
John Wardwell, Aaron McCright, Gene Rosa, Charles Tittle, Julie Wright,
and Denise Ortiz for their input and assistance. All suggestions and criticisms
were appreciated and helpful, including those not accepted in their entirety.
REFERENCES
Acheson, J. A. (1998). Lobster traps: A solution to a communal action problem. Human
Organization 57(1): 43–52.
Anderson, T. L., and Hill, P. J. (1977). From the free grass to fences: Transforming the commons
of the American west. In Hardin, G., and Baden, J. (eds.), Managing the Commons, W. H.
Freeman and Company, San Francisco, pp. 200–216.
Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York.
Beck, U. (1986). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, Sage, Thousand Oaks.
Beck, U. (1996). World risk society as cosmopolitan society? Ecological questions in a frame-
work of manufactured uncertainties. Theory, Culture and Society 13(4): 1–32.
Benedick, R. E. (1991). Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge.
Berkes, F. (1987). Common-property resource management and Cree Indian fisheries in sub-
arctic Canada. In McCay, B., and Acheson, J. M. (eds.), The Question of the Commons:
The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources, University of Arizona Press, Tucson,
pp. 66–91.
Boden, D. (1990). The world as it happens: Ethnomethodology and conversation analysis.
Frontiers of Social Theory: The New Synthesis, Columbia University Press, New York,
pp. 185–213.
Bohman, J. (1992). The limits of rational choice explanation. In Coleman, J. S., and Fararo, T. J.
(eds.), Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique, Sage, Newbury Park, pp. 207–228.
Brightman, R. A. (1987). Conservation and resource depletion: The case of the boreal forest
Algonquians. In McCay, B., and Acheson, J. M. (eds.), The Question of the Commons:

pp. 121–141.
Brown, G., and Harris, C. C., Jr. (1992). National forest management and the “Tragedy of the
Commons”: A multidisciplinary perspective. Society and Natural Resources 5: 67–83.
Burke, B. E. (1995). Paradigms Revisited: The Conﬂict Over the Interpretation of Nature and
Humanity’s Relationship With It, Masters Thesis, Iowa State University, Ames, IA.
Burke, B. E., McCright, A., and Xia, C. (n.d.). Empirical Support for the Distinction Between
Historical and Modern Environmental Problems, Manuscript in preparation.
Carrier, J. G. (1987). Marine tenure and conservation in Papua New Guinea: Problems in
interpretation. In McCay, B., and Acheson, J. M. (eds.), The Question of the Commons:
pp. 142–167.
Cesar, H. (1994). Control and Game Models of the Greenhouse Effect, Springer-Verlag,
New York.
Coleman, J. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Cordell, J., and McKean, M. A. (1992). Sea tenure in Bahia, Brazil. In Bromley, D. (ed.), Making
the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy, ICS Press, San Francisco, pp. 183–205.
Dawes, R. M. (1975). Formal models of dilemmas in social decision-making. In Chaplain, M. F.,
and Schwartz, S. (eds.), Human Judgment and Decision Processes, Academic Press,
New York, pp. 87–108.
Dickens, P. (1996). Reconstructing Nature: Alientation, Emancipation, and the Division of Labor,
Routledge, New York.
Douglas, R. (1991). The commons and property rights: Toward a synthesis of demography and
ecology. In Andelson, R. V. (ed.), Commons without Tragedy: Protecting the Environment
From Overpopulation—a New Approach, Barnes and Noble Books, Savage, pp. 1–26.
Douglas, M., and Wildavsky, A. (1982). Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Techno-
logical and Environmental Dangers, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Dunlap, R. E. (1995). Public perceptions of global warming: A cross-national comparison.
Presented at the Third Scientiﬁc Symposium of the Human Dimensions of Global Envi-
ronmental Change Programme, Geneva, Switzerland, Sept. 20–22, 1995.
Dunlap, R. E., and Catton, W. R., Jr. (1994). Struggling with human exemptionalism: The rise,
decline and revitalization of environmental sociology. American Sociologist 25(1): 5–29.
Dunlap, R. E., and Van Liere, K. (1978). The new environmental paradigm. Journal of
Environmental Education 9(4): 10–19.
Durrenberger, E. P. (1994). Shrimpers, processors, and common property in Mississippi. Human
Organization 53(1): 74–82.
Edgerton, R. B. (1992). Sick Societies, The Free Press, New York.
Eggertsson, T. (1992). The economic of control and the costs of property rights. In Hanna,
S., Folke, C., and Maler, K. G. (eds.), Rights to Nature, Ecological, Economic, Cultural,
and Political Principals of Institutions for the Environment, Island Press, Washington, DC,
pp. 157–175.
Elster, J. (1989). The Cement of Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Elster, J. (1990). When rationality fails. In Cook, K. S., and Levi, M. (eds.), The Limits of
Rationality, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 1–24.
England, P., and Kilbourne, B. S. (1990). A feminist critique of the separate model of the self:
Implications for rational choice theory. Rationality and Society 2(2): 156–171.
Feeny, D., Berkes, F., McCay, B., and Acheson, J. M. (1990). The tragedy of the commons:
Twenty-two years later. Human Ecology 18(1): 1–19.
Forgo, F., Szep, J., and Szidarovszky, F. (1999). Introduction to the Theory of Games: Concepts,
Methods, and Applications, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
Freese, L. (1997). Evolutionary Connections, JAI Press, Greenwich.
Friedman, D., and Diem, C. (1993). Feminism and the pro-(rational-) choice movement:
Rational-choice theory, feminist critiques, and gender inequality. In England, P. (ed.),
Theory on Gender, Feminism on Theory, A de Gruyter, New York, pp. 91–199.
Giddens, A. (1990). Consequences of Modernity, Polity Press, Cambridge.

474 Burke
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self-Identity, Stanford University Press, Stanford.
Gordon, H. S. (1954). The economic theory of a common-property resource. Fishery Journal of
Political Economy 62: 124–142.
Greider, T., and Garkovich, L. (1994). The social construction of nature and the environment.
Rural Sociology 59: 1–24.
Hanna, S., and Jentoft, S. (1996). Property rights and the natural environment. In Hanna,
S., Folke, C., and Maler, K. G. (eds.), Rights to Nature, Ecological, Economic, Cultural,
and Political Principals of Institutions for the Environment, Island Press, Washington, DC,
pp. 35–55.
Hannigan, J. A. (1995). Environmental Sociology: A Social-Constructionist Perspective,
Routledge, New York.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science 162: 1243–1248.
Hardin, G., and Baden, J. (1977). Managing the Commons, W. H. Freeman and Company,
San Francisco.
Headlow, T. N. (1997). Revisionism in ecological anthropology. Current Anthropology 38:
605–630.
Heimer, C. (1988). Social structure, psychology, and the estimation of risk. Annual Review of
Sociology 14: 491–519.
Hill, K. (1995). Commentary provided at the end of the article by Alvard, M. (author) Intraspe-
cific prey choice in Amazonia. Current Anthropology 36: 789–818.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1995). IPCC Second Assessment: Climate Change
1995, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva, Switzerland.
Kempton, W. (1993). Will public environmental concern lead to action on global warming?
Annual Review of Energy and Environment 18: 217–245.
Kempton, W., and Montgomery, L. (1982). Folk quantification of energy. Energy 7: 817–827.
Komorita, S. S., and Parks, C. D. (1994). Social Dilemmas, Brown & Benchmark, Madison.
Lloyd, W. F. (1833). On the checks to population. In Hardin, G., and Baden, J. (eds.), Managing
the Commons, W. H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco, pp. 8–15.
Lutzenhiser, L. (1993). Social and behavioral aspects of energy use. Annual Review of Energy
and Environment 18: 247–289.
Marini, M. M. (1992). The role of models of purposive action in sociology. In Coleman, J. S.,
and Fararo, T. J. (eds.), Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique, Sage, Newbury
Park, pp. 21–48.
Maser, C. (1996). Resolving Environmental Conflict: Towards Sustainable Community Devel-
opment, St. Lucie Press, Delray Beach.
Mazur, A., and Lee, J. (1993). Sounding the global alarm: Environmental issues in the
US national news. Social Studies of Science 23: 681–720.
McCabe, J. T. (1990). Turkana pastoralism: A case against the tragedy of the commons. Human
Ecology 18(1): 81–103.
McCay, B. J. (1995). Common and private concerns. Advances in Human Ecology 4: 89–116.
McKean, M. (1992). Management of traditional common lands (iriaichi) in Japan. In Bromley,
D. (ed.), Making the Commons Work: Theory and Practice, ICS Press, San Francisco,
pp. 63–98.
Milbrath, L. W. (1984). Environmentalists: Vanguard for a New Society, State University of
New York Press, Albany.
Newton, D. E. (1993). Global Warming: A Reference Handbook, ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara.
O’Connor, B. P., and Tindall, D. B. (1990). Attribution and behavior in a commons dilemma.
The Journal of Psychology 124(5): 485–494.
Olsen, M. E., Lodwick, D. E., and Dunlap, R. E. (1992). Viewing the World Ecologically,
Westview Press, Boulder.
Ornstein, R. E., and Ehrlich, P. (1989). New World New Mind: Moving Towards Conscious
Evolution, Bantam Doubleday Publishing Group, New York.
Ostrom, E. (1985). Issues of definition and theory: Some conclusions and hypotheses.
In the Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management,
pp. 599–615.

Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Ostrom, E. (1992). The rudiments of a theory of the origins, survival, and performance of
common-property institutions. In Bromley, D. (ed.), Making the Commons Work: Theory
and Practice, ICS Press, San Francisco, pp. 293–318.
Ostrom, E., and Schlager, E. (1996). The formation of property rights. In Hanna, S., Folke, C.,
and Maler, K. G. (eds.), Rights to Nature, Ecological, Economic, Cultural, and Political
Principals of Institutions for the Environment, Island Press, Washington, DC.
Palmer, C. T., and Sinclair, P. (1996). Perceptions of a ﬁshery in crisis: Dragger skippers on the
gulf of St. Lawrence. Society and Natural Resources 9: 267–279.
Patrone, F., Garcia-Jurado, I., and Tijs, S. (2000). Game Practice: Contributions from Applied
Game Theory, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.
Peffer, E. L. (1951). The Closing of the Public Domain: Disposal and Reservation Policies
1900–50, Stanford University Press, Standford.
Perrow, C. (1986). Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, Random House, New York.
Rappaport, R. A. (1968). Pigs for the Ancestors; Ritual in the Ecology of a New Guinea People,
Yale University Press, New Haven.
Redford, K. H. (1991). The ecological savage. Cultural Survival Quarterly 15(1): 46–48.
Roper Center at the University of Connecticut Public Opinion Online (n.d.). Available through
Lexis/Nexis as File 468 under RPOLL.
Rudig, W. (1995). Public opinion and global warming, Strathclyde Papers on Government and
Politics, No. 101, Department of Government, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.
Sandman, P. M. (1987). Risk communication: Facing public outrage. EPA Journal 1987: 21–22.
Scherer, C. W. (1990). Communicatingwater quality risk. Journal of Soil and Water Conservation
45(2): 198–200.
Schnaiberg, A. (1994). Environment and Society: The Enduring Conﬂict, St. Martin’s Press,
New York.
Schnaiberg, A., and Gould, K. (1994). The political economy of environmental problems and
policies. Advances in Human Ecology 3: 23–64.
Shrader-Frechette, K. S. (1991). Risk and Rationality, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Simon, H. A. (1956). Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychological
Review 63: 129–138.
Slovic, P. (1986). Informing and educating the public about risk. Risk Analysis 6(4): 403–415.
Slovic, P. (2000). The Perception of Risk, Earthscan Publications, London.
Spaargaren, G. (1996). The Ecological Modernization of Production and Consumption: Essays
in Environmental Sociology, Thesis, Landau Universiteit Wageningen.
Stern, P. C. (1976). Effects of incentives and education and resource conservation decisions
in a simulated commons dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 34(6):
1285–1292.
Stern, P. C. (1986). Blind spots in policy analysis: What economics doesn’t say about energy use.
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 5: 200–227.
Stern, P. C. (1992). Psychological dimensions of global environmental change. Annual Review
of Psychology 43: 269–302.
Stern, P. C., Young, O. R., and Druckman, D. (eds.). (1992). Global Environmental Change:
Understanding the Human Dimensions, National Academy Press, Washington, DC.
Stocks, A. (1987). Resource management in an Amazon Varzea lake ecosystem: The
Cocamilla case. In McCay, B., and Acheson, J. M. (eds.), The Question of the Commons:
The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resource, University of Arizona Press, Tucson,
pp. 104–120.
Thomson, J. A., Feeny, D., and Oakerson, R. (1992). Institutional dynamics: The evolution and
dissolution of common-property resource management. In Bromley, D. (ed.), Making the
Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy, ICS Press, San Francisco, pp. 129–160.
Ungar, S. (1995). Social scares and global warming: Beyond the Rio convention. Society and
Natural Resources 8: 443–456.
Weale, A. (1992). The New Politics of Pollution, Manchester University Press, Manchester.

476 Burke
Weinberg, A. S., Schnaiberg, A., and Gould, K. (1995). Recycling: Conserving resources or
accelerating the treadmill of production? Advances in Human Ecology 4: 173–205.
Woolgar, S. (1983). Irony in the social study of science. In Knorr-Cetina, K., and Mulkay, M. J.
(eds.), Science Observed, Sage, London, pp. 239–266.
Worster, D. (1994). Nature’s Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas, 2nd edn., Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Wynne, B. (1994). Scientiﬁc knowledge and the global environment. In Redcliff, M., and Benton,
T. (eds.), Social Theory and the Global Environment, Routledge, London.
Zehr, S. C. (1994). Accounting for the ozone hole: Scientiﬁc representations of an anomaly and
prior incorrect claims in public settings. The Sociological Quarterly 35(4): 603–619.
Zey, M. (1998). Rational Choice Theory and Organizational Theory, Sage, Thousand Oaks.

Burke 2001 hardin revisited a critical look at perception and the logic of the commons

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (20)

Similar to Burke 2001 hardin revisited a critical look at perception and the logic of the commons

Similar to Burke 2001 hardin revisited a critical look at perception and the logic of the commons (18)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Burke 2001 hardin revisited a critical look at perception and the logic of the commons