1. THE CONCEPT OF
INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR
REGULATORY BODY
BY
ABDULHADI ABDULLAHI Esq
NNRA Weekly Seminar March, 2011

2. BACKGROUND
• Arising from the accident on 26 April 1986 in unit 4, Chernobyl,
Nuclear Power Plant ( in the Former USSR) now in Ukraine which
was a major event that necessitates the need for effective
separation of nuclear power development from nuclear safety
oversight.
• Due to the safety concerns that nuclear accident in one place is
nuclear accident anywhere,
• Given its significant transboundary consequences the international
community will not allow the hitherto nuclear safety issues to the
States alone
• As a result, the IAEA adopted Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA
Safety Standards Series No SF-1 (binding and non binding)
international legal instruments whose fundamental safety objectives
are the protection of people- individually and collectively, the
protection of the environment without unduly limiting the operation of
facilities or conduct of activities that could give rise to radiation risks.
•
Recall the desire to established functional and technically
competent independent national nuclear regulatory body.

3. Background
• The concept of independent nuclear regulatory body, should be
clearly and legally instituted to enable it functions effectively,
efficiently and independently.
• Furthermore, the IAEA Safety Fundamental, Safety Series No 110,
The Safety of Nuclear Installations, provides that “ Countries that
are operating nuclear power installations now or that may be doing
so in the future need to apply the fundamental principles as set out
in this publications” The most crucial question being that, is it
possible in practice?
• Or in real terms to have “ independent nuclear regulatory body”
especially in developing Countries where institutional legal
framework are not available or where they are available, the
implementation is weak.

4. Why Independent Regulatory
Body?
• The use of nuclear energy involves many parties in various areas such as in
agriculture, oil and gas, manufacturing industries, health, water resources,
research and energy. Given the significant risks associated with the use of
nuclear materials, activities and operation of nuclear facilities.
• The IAEA in recognition of consequences arising from radiological
contamination of the environment transcending national boundaries;
initiated regional and multilateral international instruments adopted under
its auspices for measures to safe guide and protect people, society and the
environment from the harmful effect of ionizing radiation.
• The body whose functions is to regulate and licensed nuclear facility and
activities is identified as the “independent nuclear regulatory body”. This
important entity is charged with the additional functions and responsibility of
action during emergencies,safe disposal of radioactive waste, control over
orphan /legacy sources.
• The regulatory body shall be established in accordance with the national
legal framework of the State. For example, the IAEA Convention on Nuclear
Safety (CNS), Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management
and Radioactive Waste Management (Joint Convention), Safety and
Security of Research Reactors (NS-R-4) not only required the creation of
nuclear regulatory authorities but that they should be “ Independent” in
character.
•

5. The characteristics of independent
nuclear regulatory body
• The concept of independent nuclear regulatory body is predicated
upon its sound decisions on safety issues that are not or should not
be subjected to any other interference or influence from other
entities involved in the development, promotion, dealing or trading
in nuclear materials or operating nuclear facilities.
• In line with its functions, independent nuclear regulatory body is
expected to provide or involve the public, mass media,
stakeholders, legislators and other interested bodies with fullest
possible information concerning risks and benefits associated with
using nuclear materials for economic and social development.
• On the international scene, it is also recognized that due to threat
posed by non-State actors, terrorist organization, illicit trafficking,
prohibiting proliferation of nuclear material, illicit trafficking among
other acts required a high level of international coordination,
cooperation and understanding which only independent nuclear
regulatory body is recognized.

6. Characteristics
• The manner in which States organized their nuclear regulatory body
differs from one to another. However, the legislation should clearly
provide which of the government agencies has the power over what;
such power/functions should be clearly understandable to the
regulated, stakeholder and the general public with public safety as
an overriding interest.
• In establishing independent nuclear regulatory body by a State , the
term “ Independent” as a distinctive character must be clearly
incorporated in the national law establishing the regulatory body.
• In Nigeria, for instance the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection
Act. (NSRP Act) is being repealed to reflect the current safety
standard and international best practices as the Country prepares to
acquire nuclear power plants. The amendment was necessitated to
reflect international treaties sign and ratified by Nigeria.

7. The legal bases
• The conventions, treaties or protocol signed and ratified by the Federal
Government can only come into force when pass into law by the national
assembly. This is incompliance with Article 4 of the (CNS) which states that
“Each Contracting Party shall take within the framework of its national law,
the legislative, regulatory and administrative measures and other steps
necessary to implement its obligations under this convention.”
• In structuring the independent nuclear regulatory body in Nigeria, the draft
Nigerian Safety, Security and Safeguards Bill (NSSS Bill) provides for a
single regulatory authority.
• The NSSS Bill has elaborate provisions on finance, regulations, licenses,
inspections, staff salaries, trainings, enlightenment of public, stakeholder
etc. it provides for enforcement actions, engagement of consultants who will
serve as advisory bodies and external support when the need arises.
• This is not to say that structure of independent nuclear regulatory body must
be a single one all over the world. As a matter of fact it may consist of more
than one authority, what the law requires is a just arrangement that is clear
of duplications, absent of conflict or unnecessary meddling in the activities
of independent nuclear regulatory body. The placement of regulatory body
under an administrative supervision of a Ministry or under a government
department should not impedes on the independent characteristics.

8. The Position of DG/CEO
• A fundamental element to the concept of independent nuclear
regulatory body is the composition of administrative and technical
capabilities. The law of the regulatory body should provide a clear
provision of how the leadership of the regulatory body are to be
appointed or employed.
• Importantly the law should be certain as to experiences and
knowledge in specific disciplines either in law, science, nuclear,
physics, engineering etc. The DG/CEO must be an accomplished
administrator. For example the NSRP Act, provides inter alia in
Section 8 (1) of the Act, empowered the President of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria to appoint a “Director-General who shall be chief
executive of the Authority.
• The law further set the specific qualifications of the DG/CEO to
include a person of proven integrity “practical experience in the
application of nuclear energy and ionizing radiation in sciences and
technologies nuclear safety and radiation protection”.

9. Staff Capacity
• Closely related in support of the concept of independent nuclear regulatory
body are the poll of staff that would assist the DG/CEO in the day to day
regulatory activities , assessment of safety issues, enforcement, public,
mass media interaction, draft regulations among other functions.
• Assembling staff of regulatory body is not an easy task, due the specific
nature of the job schedule and required competences, the IAEA developed
what is known as the “Competency Framework” essentially for developing
training programmes for staff of independent nuclear regulatory body.
• The nature of the nuclear activities and operating facilities requires same
level or size of the regulatory body in a given State. However the size or the
organizational structure of independent nuclear regulatory body, it is still
open to undue influences if the staff and top management do not adopt or
have “The necessary qualifications….A questioning attitude…A personal
Standing” It therefore follows,that when employing staff of regulatory body,
certain qualities should be borne in mind, for example independent
personality character traits of the staff. Aside the employment criteria, a
deliberate programme of education and continues training are essential in
retaining the required staff competences.

10. Staff educational requirement
• Since 2003, the IAEA in collaboration with Asian Network for Higher
Education in nuclear technology, the European Nuclear Engineering
Network, the OECD/NEA and World Nuclear University (WNU) have
been put together to provide the necessary capacity building
required for the safety of nuclear industry.[
• Recognizing the important role of education to the safety, security
and sustenance of the nuclear industry, the NNRA in 2005
established in accordance with the Section 11-(1) of the NSRP Act,
the National Institute of Radiation Protection and Research in
collaboration with the University of Ibadan. The Institute is providing
the relevant educational qualifications in a developing Country
aspiring to acquire nuclear power for peaceful purposes. The IAEA
also provides assistance to the training needs of the Institute.
• Besides the core competences framework developed by the IAEA,
it therefore becomes expedient for each Country to determine its
basic area of required competences necessary to sustained the
safety role of independent nuclear regulatory body.

11. Financial capability
• Financial resources are required to ensure the protection of the live, society and
the environment and to assure the Government and the public that their nuclear
industry is safe. A crucial factor to the sustenance of independent nuclear
regulatory body is the availability of funds for regulatory activities.
• The requirement of financial availability to independent nuclear regulatory body
must be prescribed, predicable and reliable, even if it not enough to cover all its
regulatory activities. NSRP Act made provision for financial grant through
appropriation by the National Assembly to the NNRA , see Section 12 (1) ,(2) &
(3)of the NSRP Act.
• A new provision has been made in the draft NSSS Bill, for grant of funds
necessary for safety training and research development as a measured to
enhance the quality of staff ’in the nuclear regulatory body.
• Therefore to sustained the concept of independent nuclear regulatory body in
other not to subjugate the regulator to undue control by external body
“sufficiently predicable….reliable adequate” financial resources must made
independently available to the regulator. However, in Finland which is operating
civil nuclear power plant, the regulator, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
(STUK) has achieved a strategic advanced financial management which
provides them with correct data on regulatory cost to the operating nuclear
power plants. Here STUK usually recovered cost from the licensee on the hourly
bases for work done to the regulated.

12. Financial capability
• In some cases the financial requirement is
shared in what is known as “nuclear safety
regulatory cost”
• This concept is legally provided and practiced in
some Countries with NPP. It provides for the
operators of the NPP to share almost all the
nuclear safety regulation cost to sustain and
secured the role of independent nuclear
regulatory body.

13. Public information
• Access to correct and factual information bridge communication gaps. In
particular information regarding nuclear safety, security, and regulations
must found their way to the public domain in way that it can be easily and
clearly understand. In Nigeria, a clear provision on public enlightenment was
provided by the draft NSSS Bill “establish appropriate mechanism and
procedure for informing the public, mass media and other stakeholders on
the regulatory process of safety and security aspect of incidents or nuclear
accident” this is an improvement on the current NSRP Act which was not so
elaborate.
• It follows that by the above provision the NNRA would be require under the
draft NSSS Bill to communicate in an open manner its decisions, opinions
and in emergency situation directly with the public and other stakeholders.
• Today ‘s policy is to involve stakeholders in regulatory actions, this seems to
generate positive result” public opinion on nuclear matters can not be
ignored in developed Countries with NPP; this is due to the sensitive nature
of nuclear materials and activities.
• Therefore clear rules have to be set in advance of who is responsible to
inform the public during emergencies. Furthermore, “it is considered
destructive for accountability of independent nuclear regulatory body if
information is only revealed because of pressure from the public”

14. The legal basis of right to know -
• Besides members of the public, mass media and other stakeholders,
information to the legislators would go a long way in getting budgetary
appropriation for nuclear regulatory activities especially in developing, non-
NPP Country like Nigeria. Another point to note is that, public perception of
nuclear power is dependent on many factors specific to a given Country,
issues such as supply of electricity, waste, spent fuel, experiences of
nuclear incident and or accident and environment all play important roles in
determining or shaping public perception to the industry.
• There are the public participation principles as established by the 1972
Stockholm Declaration of United Nation Conference on Environmental
Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Sustainable Development and
participation recalling the Agenda 21 on access to information on products
and activities harmful to the environment, the 1991 Espoo Convention
providing for public participation on Environmental Impact Assessment,
(EIA) and decision making process. Inaddition to the above, the 1998 United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe- the Arahus Convention,
provides Access to Information, Public Participation in decision making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Issues.
• To ensure that independent nuclear regulatory body operate fairly, then the
old order of Decide, Announced and Defend (DAD doctrine) by govt would
no longer be fashionable in dealing with nuclear issues. The rights of
modern public to participate in the nuclear activities which will impact on
them are now in place, as a matter of fact, in Europe it is now practice.

15. Challenges to independent nuclear
regulatory body
• The concept of independent nuclear regulatory body as defined by CNS, the
Joint Convention and the Safety and Security of Research Reactors (NS-R-
4). Conventions adopted under the auspices of the IAEA have similar
meaning.
• However the scope of the concept is concerned only with land based civil
NPP. This is buttressed by the provisions of (Article. 2) of the CNS, waste
management (Article.2) of the Joint Convention or (Para 3.2. NS-R-4) of the
Research Reactors. That been the case the role of independent nuclear
regulatory body is not an easy one.
• The “Independent” concept means that the “Regulator” is given the power of
overseeing actions and activities within the nuclear industry and deciding
which is complying, competent and responsible with nuclear materials or
activities.
• Given that the “independent regulator’s powers is statutorily provided, it
must therefore follows the law in executing the regulatory function/powers.
• Human resources in the developing Countries are critical to the successful
launching of independent nuclear regulatory body. It is estimated that for
Nigeria, a developing Country to successfully acquired NPP, it may take
between 12-15 years to build on the infrastructures, human resources in
NPP and the regulatory body inclusive.
•

16. Challenges
• The concept of independent nuclear regulatory body is such that
without it no Country can now be trusted to acquire civil NPP. A
classical example is the recent MoU between Gulf States of United
Arab Emirate (UAE) and the US on civil NPP. Thorium Power, an
American company is the consultant appointed to established UAE’s
Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR).
• In developed Countries with NPP, the major challenges are decline
in number of students graduating or taking course of studies in
nuclear, engineering and other related fields. Another major concern
is replacing those very experienced individuals who are retiring.
According to the OECD/NEA publication, “the shortfall between
supply and demand for graduates in the disciplines could reach
critical proportions in some Member Countries within a decade or
so, if no action is taken to preserve the present knowledge base…”
• Thus it would be suicidal to leave the training, retaining, educating
and recruiting of suitably qualified and experienced staff for the
independent nuclear regulatory body entirely to be determined by
external forces. In doing so the independent nuclear regulatory body
would be falling short of its responsibility.

17. Undue influence
• An important condition for the proper functioning of the regulatory
body in discharging its responsibility is its effective independence
from organisations or bodies that promote nuclear activities. This is
necessary so that its judgements may be made, and enforcement
actions taken without undue pressure from interests that may
compete with safety. Undue influence may come from different
sources from the operator (Article.8) CNS, from Government, from
other lobbying organisations, from political parties and politicians
with economic interest and so on. Let us consider where the State
could be the owner or shareholder of the NPP.
• There is the likelihood of conflict of economic interest versus safety
concern especially where both organs are supervised by the same
Minister. This conflict of interest would lead to undue influence
unless and until the State disposes it interest from the NPP
completely or pulls out of any form of involvement from the NPP; or
the independent nuclear regulatory body is completely separated
from the Ministry that supervises the NPP. As stated above failure to
do that, would render the concept of independent a nonentity.

18. How to check undue influence
• Consider that part ownership of the NPP belongs to the politicians
or even some legislators and the fact that promoters or owners of
NPP could try to use the politicians to “captured the regulator”i.e.
influencing regulatory decisions to compromised on safety issues,or
security concerns.
• To avoid the regulator being captured, there is need to separate and
free public administration from politics and political influence. This is
the reasons why DG of such bodies are usually allowed to function
for a specific years in office, basically to enable them concentrate on
the safety objectives.
• It is because the independent nuclear regulatory body is separated
from and given the legal and political will to act as independent that
it sometimes come under sever criticism from public, mass media
and other stakeholders. Now more than ever before, the public
demand openness, transparency and demand input into the
regulatory decisions making.
• Recall that our able DG/CEO was hugely criticized for closing down
some radiotherapy facilities and well-logging sites in Nigeria. Infact
the NNRA survived many undercover attempts to have it transfer to
ministry directly supervising promotional activities.

19. Challenges
• In 2008, the nuclear industry watched helplessly as political/
economic interest clashed due to raising safety concerns. One of
the best examples of independent regulator,Ms Linda keen was
fired late at night from her Job as the President of Canadian
Nuclear Safety Commission in what appears to be blatant political
interference by Canadian Minister of Natural Resource Mr Gray
Lunn.
• Keen’s dismissal as president was due to shortages of medical
isotopes produced by nuclear operator, Atomic Energy of Canada
Limited.(AECL) Keen had ordered the closure of the fifty years old
AECL reactor until emergency power systems are connected to
cooling pumps as required to prevent a meltdown during disasters
such as earthquakes.
• Here, the clashed between political and economic interest
succeeded against the spirit, intent and the concept of independent
nuclear regulatory body in Canada.

20. challenges
• In Nigeria, the NNRA supported by the Federal Government,
banned SPDC and its contractors from the use of radioactive
sources at any of SPDC unregistered sites.
• Besides the banned, SPDC and its contractors were further
dragged to Abuja Federal High Court and prosecuted for non-
compliance with the regulations and NSRP Act.
• However, there exist a lacuna in the NSSS BiIl, where the NNRA is
expected to tow the line if a directive of a general nature is given to
it. This is highly unacceptable to the industry rules.
• Also, a policy / promotional body has circulated memos to relevant
stakeholders claiming it has responsibility for the development and
harmonization of single comprehensive nuclear law for the entire
country.
• To date, the promotional body has drafted and circulated a new bill
prescribing and ascribing function/powers of the NNRA. A clear
case of attempt to captured and weaken the powers of independent
nuclear regulatory body.

21. Recommendation
• For developing Countries without NPP, like
Nigeria, to sustain the concept of “independent
of the regulatory body” it has to be entrenched in
the national legal system.
• To achieve the concept of independent nuclear
regulatory body, many factors outside regulatory
frameworks also come into play.
• Establishing independent regulatory body could
take the form of US NRC as a good example.

22. Recommendation
• Training and retaining in knowledge management be
accorded high priority, the IAEA assist in that regard.
• Know the methodologies for knowledge management
and tools for its preservation. The IAEA should lead the
way, having come far in its dual capacity in the nuclear
field.
• Addressing shortages of competent personnel Staff both
in developed and developing nuclear countries is now
imperative, The scope and numbers of intake should be
expanded into the annual School of nuclear knowledge
management at the AbdusSalm ICTP.

23. Recommendation
• Due to renewed interest in nuclear power from
developing countries around the globe.
Increased support for the intake be given to the
developing countries into the World Nuclear
University Summer Institute.
• The IAEA and OECD/NEA should consider the
up grade of International School of Nuclear Law
into degree awarding institution.

24. Recommendation
• It is also recommended that IAEA and OECD/NEA should
collaborate with a University in Africa for the establishment of an
international nuclear institution capable of awarding degree and up
to masters’ level in nuclear law, administration and other technical
and engineering concerns.
• In establishing the independent nuclear regulatory body that can be
sustain especially in developing country; the enabling law should
provide for the provisions that will enable it engage the services of
necessary technical and consultancy services from where it lacks
expertise or has short fall in its personnel. However such experts
must have minimum degree of independent from bodies engaged in
the development or promotion of nuclear energy.

25. Recommendation
• As noted previously, “Independence” is a relative concept, method,
rules, acts or organizational structures are not enough to guarantee
the concept; they however provide boundary conditions that are
likely to assist in projecting “Independence” within the nuclear
regulatory body.
• The regulator must and should distance itself from promotional
energy matters otherwise it will loss focus.
• For the regulator to be independent and effective it must build trust
and confidence with the mass media, stakeholders and the public.
• To sustain the concept of independent nuclear regulatory body it
must employ competent staff, demonstrate its regulatory action and
activities transparently. It must based its regulatory decisions on
sound scientific and legal bases.

26. Recommendation
• There are so many different levels on
which the independent of nuclear
regulatory body can function, asides its
clearly assigned powers/ functions,
resources allocation and its leadership
“each State has to individually determine
the extend to which its nuclear regulatory
body’ can be independent.

27. Finally
• One of the most important attributes of an independent regulatory
body is its freedom from unwarranted interference in its regulatory
functions; this concept has been included in the draft NSSS Bill Part
1, as follows
• Section 2.-(d) “shall exercise its function effectively independent
from those of any body or organization concerned with the
promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.”
• Section 7(f). Board shall – ensure that the Authority has adequate
staffing and financial resources to discharge its assign
responsibilities, and “developed and submit for the approval of the
President appropriate condition of service concerning
remunerations, fringe benefits, pension scheme and other benefits
which will enable it to attract and retain high quality manpower.”

28. The End
• THANX FOLKS