Common features among fed second chamber.pptx

Federalism and Federations?
- Federation and federalism are two separate concepts, each
describing different aspects of federal theory
Federalism:- an ideology or Value concept
- It Includes philosophical perspectives
- Organized principles which advocates ‘a multi- tiered’
government
- joining together some autonomous units
1
Chapter Two
Some Common Features Among Federations

Cont’d
• Combines – element of shared rule for some purposes and regional self-
rule for some other purposes
• Federations – an empirical reality
- descriptive system referring the actual system of
governance
- Refers to tangible institutional and structural facts and techniques for
achieving the goals of federalism
- Federalism as an ideology, federations as a political institutions, should
employ that the two are related.
2

Cont’d
• Common Features
1. At least two orders of Government
- one for the whole country
- the other for the regions
- Each government has direct electorate relationships
with its citizens
3

Cont’d
• Sub national units have many names
States- Australia
- Brazil
- Ethiopia
- India
- Malaysia
- Mexico
- Nigeria
- USA
4

Cont’d
•Provinces – Argentina
- Canada
- Pakistan
- South Africa
Lander – Germany
- Austria
Cantons– Switzerland
Regional Communities- Belgium
5

Cont’d
2. Written and Supreme constitution
- Federal systems presupposes a compact between and
among the constituent units
- desires both unity and diversity
- such type of compact is a result of a long process of
bargaining as concluded by mutual consent of all those
involved
6

Cont’d
• For the proof of which there is a need to have written record
• The terms of agreements – create federal and state governments
- distribute powers between them must
be enshrined on the federal constitution which is binding
• Neither of the two governments should be in a position to over ride
its provisions
7

Cont’d
• Both must be subordinate to the constitution
• The authority of one should not depend on another but must drive
from something supreme
8

Cont’d
3. Division of Power
 division of power between the center and subnational units-
vertically
Political power – Legislative
- Executive
- Judicial functions are constitutionally divided
between the federal government and the states
Both orders of government are autonomous with respect to the
powers granted to them
9

Cont’d
• One level should respect the authority of the other – principle of non-
interference
• There are 3 ways of power allocations
I. Enumerated – powers exclusively given to either levels of government
Enumerated power of federal government- currency making - military
power, declaration of war, international relations
II. Residual- - powers retained by one level once the power of the other is
enumerated , Powers not given either specifically to each level or
concurrently
10

Cont’d
iii. Concurrent- powers over which both the federal government and
the states have control
- Jointly exercised by the two levels
- Common policy making power
- Taxation power
11

Cont’d
• Three options of power division
a)Option 1, exhaustively listing central governments power leaving
residual powers to the states
- There is a tendency to empower the constituent elements
- Example USA,
12

Cont’d
b) Option 2, exhaustive list of the constituent states leaving the residual
power to the central government
- There is a tendency towards unity and a need to empower the central
government
- What if most of the powers are exhaustively listed and only few left for
residual?
E.g. Canada
13

Cont’d
c) Option 3, Exhaustive list of – federal
- state
- concurrent powers
- E.g India in case of conflicts, federal supremacy
* Nigeria – exhaustive list of federal governments power and concurrent power ,
In case of conflict federal supremacy
- Residual power to regions
- Does not fit anyone of the options
Ethiopia?
14

Some common Features among
federations
4. Rigid Constitution
- Requires formal procedure of changing
- Making amendment should not be passed in an ordinary law
making process
- At least the federal constitution should not be amended by
either levels’ of governments unilateral decision
- Federal constitutions must have provisions that ensure a
relative strictness in altering its contents especially those
relating to the power divisions between the two levels of
governments
- To ensure its supremacy, the constitution should not be
subject to unilateral alteration
15

Cont’d
• However federal constitutions differ – specific procedure they prescribe
and - the degree of state participation
• India- ordinary vote of federal parliament except for provisions vital for
distribution of powers which requires special majority vote of the parliament and
ratification by at least 50% of the states
•USA-
- proposedby two-third majority of each house in congress or
- Ratification;- approval by ¾ of the convention
- ¾ of the states
16

Cont’d
• Switzerland- initiation federal legislature
- by one house or 50,000 in some cases
Final decision through referendum
- Voters have a right to propose and also to ratify amendement
• Germany
The basic law prescribes amendment requires the two-third majority of
both the bundestage or bundersrate of the German parliament
17

Cont’d
5. Umpiring the Federation
Equally important in a federation is the presence of a body that umpires
disputes concerning the constitutionality of laws in general and the division of
powers in particular
As R. Davis notes the ‘division of power is artificial, imperfect and a generalized
skeletal thing
Political life cannot be perfectly or permanently compartmentalized
18

Umpiring the Fede…
• Equally important in a federation is the presence of a body that
umpires disputes concerning the constitutionality of laws in general
and the division of powers in particular
• From the principle of constitutionally guaranteed division of power
and the supremacy of the constitution follows that the last word in
settling disputes about the meaning of the division of powers must
not rest either with the federal government alone or with the states
19

Cont’d
• Constitutionally entrenched division of power is the hallmark of
federations.
• However, the division of powers between the federal government and
the states cannot be delineated in such a way as to avoid all conflicts.
• As R. Davis notes the ‘division of power is artificial, imperfect and a
generalized skeletal thing.
• Political life cannot be perfectly or permanently compartmentalized.
• The words can rarely be more than approximate crude and temporary
guides to the ongoing or permissible political activity in any federal
system.’
20

• Certainly disputes about the terms of the division of power are bound to
occur.
• Besides, adaptation and the need to adjust and accommodate the
division to cope with the new, the unforeseen and the unintended
remains crucial and interpretation is one of such methods.
• In the United States this is achieved through the Supreme Court.
21

• In Switzerland the last word does not seem to rest with the federal
tribunal.
• It may decide cantonal laws to be invalid but it must accept the laws of
the federal legislature as valid.
• The constitutionality of federal laws is reviewed through a referendum.
• A law passed by the federal legislature must be submitted to the people
for approval when contested for its constitutionality.
• Only the people have the last word as to whether such a law shall
become effective.
22

• There should exist an organ independent of both the federal and
regional governments which has a final say on matters involving
constitutional interpretation and other constitutional disputes
Models
• Judicial review, USA
• Specialized constitutional court, Germany, South Africa
• Special consultative organ or quasi judicial, Finland
• Legislature the interpreter of the constitution, Sweden
• Ethiopian experiment
23

Cont’d
6. Bicameral Parliament
- Ensuring adequate representation of the member-states within the
federal government
- The upper house /second chamber/ - equal member of
representatives from each of the states
- Eg. USA and Australia – have bicameral parliament and in the upper
house(senate) each state is represented by equal member of senators
irrespective of the size of the population
24

Cont’d
• Balanced the possible imbalances in the lower house (HPR)
• Ethiopia? It is a majoritarian institution?
• Absence of legislative function makes its use as protector of the
interest of member states is questionable.
25

Cont’d
7. Intergovernmental Relations
The inevitability within federations of overlaps and interdependence
in the exercise by governments of the powers distributed to them has
generally required the different orders of government to treat each
other as partners.
This has necessitated extensive consultation, cooperation and
coordination between governments
Intergovernmental relations are the subjects of how our different
governments deal with each other and what their relative roles,
responsibilities, and levels of influence are and should be.
26

Cont’d
• Intergovernmental relations have two important dimensions.
• It can be described as vertical and horizontal.
• One is that of relations between the federal and unit governments.
• The other is that of inter-unit relations. Normally in federations both
kinds of intergovernmental relations have played an important role.
27

28
Rule by law (west vs d-ing countries) –
abuse/arbitrary power

Cont’d
• It is true that despite these common features some federations fail while
others succeed. As a result it raises the question as to why this is so.
• Several factors have been mentioned in this regard.
• Livingston argued that federalism goes beyond legal institutions.
• ‘The essential nature of federalism is to be sought for not in the shadings of
legal and constitutional terminology, but in the forces economic, social,
political, and cultural that have made the outward forms of federalism
necessary
• ... the essence of federalism lies not in the constitutional or institutional
structure but in the society itself. Federal government is a device by which
the federal qualities of the society are articulated and protected.
• By federal society he meant a territorially grouped diversity
31

Cont’d
• One other writer on the same line is Rufus Davis. He wrote ‘when at
some moment federal systems resemble or differ from each other in
some respect or the other, the reason though sometimes traceable to
similarities or differences in their constitutional structure, flow more
often than not from the things they share in common as societies or
the things that distinguish them as societies
32

Cont’d
• According to him the federal institutions are reflections of the federal
qualities of society.
• Livingston’s contribution was significant as he pointed out the fact
that the study of federalism goes beyond legal institutions. But others
have pointed out that his approach has its own shortcomings.
33

Cont’d
• Raoul Blindenbacher and R. Watts suggested that to consider federal
institutions as mere expressions of federal societies is one sided.
• Federal institutions once created in turn shape and influen
• There is a complex relationship, which is not unilateral, between
society, its institutions and its constitution.
• USA and Switzerland are two older federations emerged from an
earlier weak centre and certainly the new institutions had an impact
in transforming society.
34

Cont’d
• The post-1991 federal system in Ethiopia, too, has radically changed
the political process since then. Thus, the specific society under which
the federal system operates and the institutions matter.
• Nicolas Schmitt stipulates for a federation to be a successful political
structure it must be honest to its proclaimed nature.
• That is to say, it should be a federation in form as well as in
operational reality.
35

Cont’d
• Others have emphasized the importance of democratic pluralism and
the existence of decentralized party system. ‘Federalism cannot exist
without democratic pluralism which permits groups really to be
autonomous.
• It is sometimes argued that an authoritarian one party system which
by definition concentrates all political power in the hands of one
group at one central point, is incompatible with the federal concept
of divided power.’
36

Chapter Three
Federations and Second Chambers
 Bicameralism is correlated not only with the form, but also the size of the
state.
 In many countries, such as Britain and France, the second chamber has
developed from a system of class-based representation, where the “upper”
and “lower” chambers represented the respective classes.
 In contrast, in many federal states - such as Australia, Canada and the US -
the second chamber was designed to represent the regions or states
involved in the federation, whilst the lower chamber represented the
population as a whole.
37

Chapter Three
• It is argued that a second chamber based on a different
composition and representing the interests of states, more
specifically less populous states, is an institution that reflects the
normative diversity inherent in federalism.
• It is also suggested that second chambers reflecting the entrenched
representation of the states distinguishes federations from other
types of polities.
38

Chapter Three
• It is also suggested that second chambers reflecting the entrenched
representation of the states distinguishes federations from other
types of polities.
• It is argued that a second chamber based on a different composition
and representing the interests of states, more specifically less
populous states, is an institution that reflects the normative diversity
inherent in federalism.
• In the study of legislatures, little attention is given to the second
chambers of bicameral parliaments.
39

Chapter Three
Rational
What is the justification for a second chamber?
 Although bicameral houses can be found in unitary systems, owing to
the federal idea, second chambers are more common, if not inherent
in federations.
 Bicameral legislatures, in which there are two chambers involved in
the federal law-making process, are common in federations.
 The lower house is often uniformly organized on the principle of
proportional representation and there is a less strong federal element
in it.
But the upper chamber is often expected to reflect some federal
idea and its legislative role is defended for at least two reasons.
40

Chapter Three
- The first emanates from the qualified application of the concept of
sovereignty in federations.
 Stated otherwise, federalism as enshrining both unity and diversity
qualifies to a certain extent, the ‘one man, one vote’ principle of
democracy, particularly, in relation to the organization of the second
chamber.
 While there may be many circumstances in federations in which
majority rule is qualified, the point here is that federal arrangements by
providing second chambers based on a different organizing principle
from the lower house, limit majority rule.
 Watts has rightly pointed that ‘the distribution of seats in federal
second chambers in terms of units may appear to counter the
democratic majoritarian principle’ in favor of an equally important
value in federations, the promotion of diversity
41

Chapter Three
 The people are represented as whole and as parts
 Thus the federal parliament in a federation is expected to reflect
- the unity of the country in the lower house (elected by a popular vote) on
the one hand and
- the diversity of the country in an upper house representing the states or
some other regional interest, on the other
42

Chapter Three
 Federations are designed carefully with institutions that reflect the people as
a whole on the one hand and the people as parts, often identified as states,
on the other.
 The second chamber should be useful and strong or else it will be useless and
for it to be meaningful, it should represent the federal principle as distinct
from the democratic principle.
 The people then are taken as both united and as diverse. The dual existence
of unity and diversity is inherent in the federal principle
43

Chapter Three
 Second chambers in federations provide a protective mechanism against
federal derogation and the overstepping of delegated authority, and the
impairment of the interests of one or more of the units.
 The protective mechanism is necessary because smaller and more sparsely
populated units feel potentially threatened by more densely populated states.
44

Chapter Three
 Representation by territories and representation by size of
population as distinct principles, operate in federations.
 It is for this reason that second chambers are defended.
45

Chapter Three
- The second explanation for the legislative role of second chambers
emanates from the idea that in federations political power is
constitutionally divided between the federal government and the states.
 Such division of power in itself is premised on the idea that federations are
principally organized on the concept of ‘self-rule’ for some purposes and
‘shared-rule’ for other purpose
46

Chapter Three
 Shared rule refers to shared competencies as well as shared
institutions through which federal units are accorded special
participation and input in the decision-making process at the level of
the encompassing entity
47

Chapter Three
 The United States Constitution clearly makes the Senate an integral
part of the legislature.
 It states, ‘All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives.’
48

Chapter Three
 The Swiss Constitution is even more explicit in guaranteeing the Cantons’
participation not only in the law-making but also in other federal affairs.
 ‘The cantons shall participate in the decision-making process on the
federal level, in particular in federal legislation.’
 The guarantee of the Cantons’ role in law-making is even more specifically
stated as follows: ‘Subject to the rights of the people and the Cantons, the
Federal Parliament is the highest authority of the Confederation.’
 And in another sub section it is stated: ‘it [federal parliament] has two
chambers, the House of Representatives and the Senate; which have equal
powers.’
49

Chapter Three
 The German Basic Law likewise guarantees the states participation in
the law-making and administration of federal law.
 It states, ‘The Länder participate through the Bundesrat in the
legislation and administration of the federation...’
50

Chapter Three
 The Indian Constitution equally states that parliament as a
composite law-making body consists of the Council of States and the
House of People.
 It declares, ‘there shall be a parliament for the union which shall
consist of the President and the two Houses, to be known
respectively as the Council of States and the House of the People.’
51

Chapter Three
 What is common to all is the fact that the upper chamber is
considered an important component of the federal law-making
process
 The 1995 Ethiopian Constitution stands in sharp contrast in this
regard
 It fulfils the minimum requirement of having a second chamber but
with a totally different function.
52

Chapter Three
 Although the Constitution guarantees the various nationalities
‘equitable representation’ in the federal government, close
observation of Articles 39(3) and 62 reveals that the right to
equitable representation in federal government only ensures the
various nationalities in the federal executive, in the mostly non-
legislative House of the second chamber and perhaps in other federal
agents, but not in the federal legislature.
53

Chapter Three
 Even though Article 53 states that ‘there shall be two federal houses, namely
the House of Peoples Representatives [HPR] and the House of Federation
[HoF]’ in the sense of having two chambers, the legislative power of the latter
is very much contested.
 The only provisions where one may by stretch of imagination trace legislative
functions are Articles 99, 62(7) and 105.
 Under the former, the HoF has concurrent power with the HoPR in the
determination of residual powers over taxation.
 In essence this provision refers to reserve powers regarding unspecified
future tax bases
54

Chapter Three
 Article 62(7) refers to the ‘division of revenues derived from joint Federal
and State tax sources and the subsidies that the Federal Government
may provide to the states’
 In both cases, it appears that there is a role to be played by the HoF, but
it is far from clear whether this role is legislative or otherwise
55

Chapter Three
 A less frequent but important power of the HOF is the role it plays in
the amendment of the Constitution.
 Except in these cases, which one can hardly consider to be legislative
functions, at least not within the list of law-making functions
entrusted to HPR under Article 55(2), the HPR remains the sole and
highest law-making authority of the federal government
56

Chapter Three
 the right to be represented in federal government stipulated by Article
39(3) could not be pushed further to include the federal legislature
 unlike the other federations, the Ethiopian Constitution fails to entrench
the states or to use the terms of the Constitution, the nations,
nationalities and the peoples to be part of the federal law-making
process.
 The consent of the HOF is not a precondition for the effectiveness of
federal legislation.
 Neither of the explanations indicated earlier, for having the second
chamber is incorporated in the Ethiopian Constitution.
57

Chapter Three
 The non-inclusion of the states may pose the question of legitimacy of the
federal government
 The division of authority between the center and the states may not be
enough to preserve the union
 Ethiopian Constitution ‘betrays’ the federal idea significantly
 The territorial units have neither the minimum participatory role nor the
even greater functions assigned to upper chambers
58

Chapter Three
COMPOSITION
 In terms of the basis of composition of second chambers, there are
range of variations
 In the United States, the Senate embodying the principle of equal
representation of the states, notwithstanding disparities in their
population, was the price that the larger states had to pay for the
participation of the smaller states in the federation.
 Federal power is not permanently controlled by the few more
populous states
59

Chapter Three
 The less populous states often fight to safeguard their interests from
being swamped by the legislature composed by a popularly elected
lower house.
 Accordingly, second chambers based on equal state representation
are instituted to take care of the concerns of the less populous states.
 Article 1 section 3 of the US constitution provides:
the Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from
each state
 The Senate with such equality among the states is designed to check
the potential of majority tyranny coming from the lower house
60

Chapter Three
 The same principle is adopted under the Swiss Constitution, except
for introducing the notion of full and half Cantons.
 It states, ‘The Senate shall consist of 46 delegates of the Cantons.
 Six half Cantons elect one and the remaining twenty each shall elect
two senators.
61

Chapter Three
 The German federation represents a different principle that tries to
balance the interests of the most populous states on the one hand and
those of the less populous ones on the other.
 The Basic Law stipulates: ‘The Bundesrat consists of members of state
governments which can appoint and recall them ...’ and in another section
it provides, (Article 51)
- ‘each Land has at least three votes;
- Länder with a population between two to six million inhabitants have four,
- Länder with more than six million inhabitants five, and
- Länder with more than seven million inhabitants six votes.’
- As can be seen from the provision of the Basic Law, the Bundesrat’s seats
are allocated on a weighted basis giving some advantage to the less
populated Länder but falling short of the principle of equal representation
of states
62

Chapter Three
 In sum, he concludes, ‘The principle of equality of citizens is eroded
where the equality of regional representation is entrenched
 The principle of equality of regions is eroded where precedence is
accorded to citizen equality.
 In a democracy, it is distinctive that citizens enjoy a right to vote on an
equal basis.
 In a federation, viewed as a particular type of democracy, it is distinctive
that representation of regions is in some manner entrenched.
 Federations incorporate necessarily and unavoidably some degree of
inequality between the citizens of the different regions.’
 German Basic Law attempt to minimize the gap in the inequality
between the citizens of the different states
63

Chapter Three
Ethiopia?
- Article 61(2) of the 1995 Constitution stipulates ‘each Nation,
Nationality and People shall be represented in the House of
Federation by at least one member
- Each Nation or Nationality shall be represented by one additional
representative for each one million of its population.’
- Accordingly, the organizational principle of the HoF is the same with
the HoPR except that there is a significant difference in the number
of constituencies, 100,000 for the former and one million for the
latter.
- The provision does not even apply any rational upper limits like the
German one.
64

Chapter Three
Ethiopia?
- According to this arithmetic, the population or ethnic group with the
largest number will have as many seats as its size may allow in the HoF,
as in the Lower House, and
- this puts into question the rationale for setting up a second chamber in
a federation
65

Chapter Three
Ethiopia?
- More populated nationalities have more seats
and that there is as such no upper limit to the
number of seats.
66

Chapter Three
Ethiopia?
- The composition of the upper chambers varies significantly, from the
nearly majoritarian House of Federation in Ethiopia to that of minority
protection in the US and Switzerland, with the German and Indian
Houses balancing the tension between territorial and citizen equality, in
between
67

Chapter Three
SELECTION OF MEMBERS
- Similar variations exist among the federations in the manner in which the
members of the upper house are brought to office.
- United States originally members of the Senate were indirectly elected by
the state legislatures
- This was a remnant of the federal legislature dependency upon the
government of the states.
68

Chapter Three
- An amendment of the Constitution introduced in 1913, finally declared that
Senators are directly elected by the people there of.
- The Swiss Constitution follows the same principle of direct election of members
of the Senate.
- In both federations the citizens of the states directly elect the members of the
second chamber
69

Chapter Three
- In Germany, by virtue of Article 51 of the Basic Law the members of the
Bundesrat are delegates of their Land cabinets,
- Each Land Government sends members of its cabinet to represent the
interests of the Land in the Bundesrat.
- As these officials are simultaneously delegates for the Bundesrat and
officials of the Land government, they can be instructed and recalled by the
Land government
- It appears that they represent the Land government, and more specifically
the regionally governing party.
70

Chapter Three
- In India, members of the federal second chamber are for the most
part indirectly elected by the state legislature.
- Federal appointments are also provided as a means for ensuring
representation of some particular interests and for this reason it
provides for twelve such appointments out of an overall total of 250
members.
71

Chapter Three
- IN ETHIOPIA?
- In the Ethiopian situation Article 61(3) envisages two possibilities.
Members of the House of Federation may be elected indirectly by the state
legislatures or the state legislature may decide the members to be elected
directly by the people.
- So far experience indicates that all members are indirectly elected (by the
states
72

Chapter Three
- Article 61(1) of the Ethiopian Constitution provides that the HoF is composed of
representatives of nations, nationalities and peoples.
- Membership in the HoF appears to be not based on the principle of territoriality
but on what the Constitution defines namely nations, nationalities, and peoples.
- But the net effect as such may not be significantly different, because the
Constitution defines the states in terms of ethno-linguistic identities.
73

Chapter Three
- If a certain ethnic group does not have a state of its own, owing to its
number or due to any other administrative factor, then it will have a
local administration at a lower level.
- As can be observed from the Preamble and Article 8 it does not begin
by the familiar formula of ‘We the people of Ethiopia.’
- It rather stipulates ‘We, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of
Ethiopia
- In the words of Fasil, the constitution defines Ethiopia expressly as a
nation of nations
74

Chapter Three
- Article 8, one of the fundamental principles of the Constitution, seems to
reinforce this assertion.
- It unusually declares that all sovereign power resides in the nations,
nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia.
- Actually the Constitution is considered as nothing more than an expression of
their sovereignty.
- It is, therefore, claimed that what is represented are the nationalities, the
authors of the Constitution.
75

Chapter Three
Generally, it can be stated that the federal role of the second chamber
may range from:
- being the forum for expressing the preference of state governments
(Germany)
- to being an institution directly reflecting a pattern of electoral
preference weighted in favor of the residents of the smaller units of
the federation (Switzerland and the US) and
- pretension of house of nationalities in Ethiopia.
76

Chapter Three
POWERS
The difference between second chambers is even more obviously seen
- on constitutionally assigned roles in the law-making process
and
- On other particular powers
77

Chapter Three
- Does it function as co-equal legislature as in the lower house or play subsidiary
role?
A three-fold classification can be made in this respect:
1). The two chambers are co-equal in power and are directly elected
USA, Switzerland
- It has equal powers in all bills
- approval of treaties concluded by the President (2/3)
- role in the appointment of ambassadors, or other ministers,
consuls, and judges of the Supreme Court
78

Chapter Three
2). The German Bundesrat belongs to the second group.
- It represents one of the more effective houses in a parliamentary system.
Composed of representatives of the executives of the Länder, usually
ministers of the Land cabinet,
- it has perfectly combined the participatory role as well as the protection
function.
- Its particular membership as well as the fact that it has absolute veto over
all federal legislation involving administration by the Länder has
contributed to the success of this house
- The type of bill proposed determines the power exercised by the Bundesrat
79

Chapter Three
Federations and Second ChambersChapter Three
3). The second chamber of India with subsidiary power and playing a
precipitate function in the law-making process represents a third
group
What is the Difference Between German and Indian Experience?
80

Chapter Three
Ethiopia?
 With a completely different role, the Ethiopian HoF appears to stand
as a fourth category
 HoF does not have a legislative function
 Some of the important powers conferred to the House under Article
62 include constitutional interpretation and organizing the Council of
Constitutional Inquiry
81

Chapter Three
- Constitutional interpretation(Ethiopia) is considered as a political rather than a
judicial function
- Explanations can be inferred from Articles 8 and 61.
- Article 8 stipulates, ‘All sovereign power resides in the nations, nationalities and
peoples of Ethiopia.’
- And Article 61(1) provides the fact that the House is composed of such diverse
nationalities.
- By inference it can be concluded that, if sovereignty is placed on the nationalities
and because the nationalities are sources of sovereignty, the house, which
reflects their sovereignty, must interpret the constitution.
82

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