2. 2
In 1989, students and others in Beijing and throughout China unsuccessfully protested
against the government. The protests began as a localized use of nonviolent methods. However,
it quickly became overwhelmed by its size, competing interests, and repressions by the
government. This essay examines the events and analyzes why it failed. It begins with a brief
background of China prior to 1989, followed by a survey of each major event in the protest. The
conclusion includes retrospect analysis in order to add to and clarify why this student movement
failed to achieve nonviolent change.
China in the 1980s became ripe for revolutionary change. By the mid-1980s, “China’s
economic reforms were facing serious problems.”1 Students and intellectuals bore the brunt of
these economic woes.2 They knew once they graduated the system provided them few
opportunities for economic mobility. At this time another group faced hardship born of the same
economic issues. In the mid-1980s, “a power struggle…at the top echelons of the regime”
developed.3 This group included “eight party veterans” who “were most concerned with ensuring
stability…even at the expense of reform.”4 This “Gang of Elders” belonged to the generation
associated with the Communist Revolution by Mao Zedong. However, this very Communist
Revolution dragged down the entire country.
Mao Zedong instituted various programs to move China towards a modern industrial
power. In their overview of twentieth century nonviolent conflicts, Peter Ackerman and Jack
Duvall explain that one of these programs, the Cultural Revolution, became an abject failure and
1 Kurt Schock, Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies (Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 98.
2 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 98.
3 Joshua Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle:20th Century
Practice and 21st Century Potential,by Gene Sharp (Dexter, MI: Extending Horizons Books, 2005), 253-54.
4 Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle,253-54.
3. 3
sowed the seeds of democratic change in China.5 Following the death of Mao in 1976 his
successor, Deng Xiaoping, initiated economic reforms aimed at trying to accomplish what Mao
failed to. Yet in the 1980s, students and intellectuals felt that “economic reform without
substantial political reform was contradictory” and democratic reforms needed to accompany
economic ones.6 All of this came to a head in 1989. During this year “the students of Beijing
shook off a long winter of complacency [and] moved suddenly to the center of the world’s
attention, and demanded democracy for China.”7 The students who started this nonviolent
movement soon found an event to rally around.
On April 15, 1989 the high ranking and influential leader Hu Yaobang died. Hu became
one of the few members of the government “who had tolerated student dissent.”8 Two days after
his passing, students “flocked to Tiananmen…in memory of Hu Yaobang.”9 The next day, April
18th, hundreds of students “began a sit-in at the Great Hall of the People and demanded to be
received by a ranking member” of the government.10 A sit-in remains one of the most basic
forms of nonviolence. The students soon realized that despite the nonviolent methods they used,
the government still viewed them as a disturbance. A report given to Party Central and the State
Council on April 20th said that the mourning activities for Hu Yaobang shifted to protest on the
18th “because of the destructive acts of certain people with ulterior motives.”11 The use of the
words “destructive” and “ulterior” quickly indicated that the government viewed the student sit-
in as a threat to their regime. This attitude became the dominant position the Chinese political
5 Peter Ackerman and Jack Duvall, A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict (New York, NY:
Palgrave, 2000), 422.
6 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 99.
7 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, 421.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle,254.
11 Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers, 1st ed. (New York, NY: PublicAffaris, 2001), 33.
4. 4
elite took towards the students throughout the movement. A report given on April 18th to the
Beijing Municipal Government summed it up this way, the government “[would] watch
developments closely” and “warn political manipulators against distorting the direction and
purposes of the mourning activities” for Hu Yaobang.12 Additionally, they pledged to “take steps
to block the activities of certain key persons.”13 The government sent a clear threat to the
students. They soon acted on that threat.
On April 20th the government instituted its first act of repression towards the student
movement. Early in the morning “the Chinese government ordered the mourning site for Hu
Yaobang cordoned off and any who wished to pay respects had to do so in orderly manner.”14
Accompanying this the government instituted temporary martial law “to get students back to
campuses.”15 This enraged students and the vast majority of them ignored the government’s
demands and stayed in Tiananmen Square. Once temporary martial law subsided and the
mourning period ended, the Politburo decided to modify their method against the students. This
shift included three objectives. First, get the students back into the classrooms. Second, punish
any and all students who used physical violence. Third, start a dialogue with the students.16
Unfortunately, the Politburo soon angered the students even more.
The government sent mixed messages throughout the month and a half long protests. The
best example of this came on April 26th when “the state sent a clear warning” to the students “by
publishing a harshly worded editorial in the People’s Daily”, the main newspaper of the
Communist Party.17 In no uncertain terms the Communist Party “labeled the movement
12 Nathan and Link, eds.,The Tiananmen Papers, 28.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 30-31.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 50.
17 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 100.
5. 5
counterrevolutionary turmoil instigated by a small number of conspirators” with the threat of
troops to end the protests if necessary.18 At this stage of the student movement, the students used
little to no direct violence against the government or police. Such rhetoric only came from the
government. The students responded with a massive nonviolent demonstration of some “100,000
students, joined by 400,000 other citizens” from Beijing in Tiananmen Square.19 Again when
faced with threats from the government, the students acted peacefully. The real significance to
this protest became the support the students gained from citizens. Perhaps sensing the need for
more organization to support an ever growing movement, in late April 1989 leadership began to
emerge in the movement.
In late April 1989 the students formed leadership. Four came forward in the movement –
Wu’er Kaixi, Chai Ling, Li Lu, and Wang Dan.20 At this point in time they all shared similar
visions about what they wanted the movement to accomplish. However, a disturbing trend began
with these four that eventually undermined the entire movement. Of the four student leaders,
“none of them [were] elected by a reasonable number of movement participants.”21 For
nonviolent movements to succeed, leadership needs support from the majority of its participants.
Therefore, these four students acted as voices for the movement but lacked any real degree of
unity. As April passed into May, new challenges arose between the government and the students,
and this dearth of unity haunted the movement.
May 4, 1989 marked the apogee of the nonviolent student movement. The date holds
special significance in China, and especially for Chinese students. It marked the 70th
18 Ibid.
19 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, 423.
20 Ibid.
21 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 105.
6. 6
Anniversary of a 1915 student democratic movement in China.22 The author Joshua Paulson
pointed out that this 1915 student movement became a first of its kind “in China’s modern
history.”23 In commemoration of the anniversary the students decided to “renew the ‘May Fourth
Values of democracy, science, freedom, human rights, and rule of law’.”24 The “students” also
loosely adopted a four-point resolution. First, on May 5th they agreed to return to classes.
Second, talks with the government still remained the goal. Third, if negotiations regressed, then
they vowed to protest again. Fourth, they promised to educate people throughout Beijing about
them.25 Three problems arose in this resolution. First, since the leadership of the movement
lacked majority support, such a resolution only applied to whomever felt like adopting it.
Second, the language in the resolution clearly opened the door for the movement to continue.
Third, the students articulated no specific criteria for the point at which negotiations became
ineffective. The movement unofficially ended on May 5th for some of the students. Yet, “the
student movement entered a new phase” after May 4th, a phase “characterized by internal
division.”26 Failure in student leadership to draft a concrete resolution led to greater division.
While many students returned to classes on May 5th, the movement continued. The loose
grounds for continuing it, per the resolution, created new conflicts. Paulson writes that by “the
middle of May the Student Protest Movement had expanded to include workers and residents in
dozens of cities in China.”27 In nonviolent theory and practice, a movement works best when it
remains localized. However, if a movement becomes regional, national, or international the local
levels needs unified leadership. The student movement failed these three criteria. Up until the
22 Nathan and Link, eds.,The Tiananmen Papers, 113.
23 Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle,257.
24 Nathan and Link, eds.,The Tiananmen Papers, 113.
25 Ibid.
26 Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle,258.
27 Ibid., 260.
7. 7
middle of May the only real organization within the movement with any credibility, the
Autonomous Federation of Students only “loosely coordinated student activities, [drafting]
documents and demands.”28 This group failed to manage the diverse crowds of students in
Tiananmen Square, and this new phase of expansion in the movement only worsened matters. As
the movement became more disorganized it began to also explore more radical ideas.29 On the
13th of May “some 3,000 students started a hunger strike in Tiananmen” and demanded a
meeting with the Chinese Premier, Li Peng.30 In conjunction with this hunger strike, a new
organization called the Hunger Strike Group formed and displaced the Autonomous Federation
of Students as the leading voice for the movement.31 When the Hunger Strike Group pushed out
the Autonomous Federation of Students, the movement quickly crumbled under weight of
competing interests. The Premier, Li Peng, met with some students on the 19th. In this
“nationally televised discussion…Wu’er Kaixi angered the premier.”32 In this uncertain situation
with a movement disorganized and crumbling, the May 19th meeting only exasperated the
situation. Hereafter the government moved swiftly and directly to combat the students.
One month into the student movement, the Chinese government reached their limit of
tolerance. In an excerpt from a Party Central meeting on May 19th, government officials agreed
that if they “[didn’t] put a stop to this quickly…it [would] be hard to assure that it [would] not
end in a way nobody wants.”33 At this time the Chinese government resolved to alter the
situation, but not to the point of direct violence. In an effort to not antagonize the students and
other protesters further, the government reassured the people of Beijing that same day that the
28 Ibid., 256.
29 Ibid., 259.
30 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, 424.
31 Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle,259.
32 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, 425.
33 Nathan and Link, eds.,The Tiananmen Papers, 225.
8. 8
“troops that have moved to the outskirts of Beijing are in no way directed at the students” adding
that their “purpose [was] to restore normal order in the life and work of Beijing.”34 Officially on
May 20th the government declared martial law in many areas of Beijing.
The student movement responded quickly. Soon after the martial law declaration
“hundreds of thousands of Beijing students and citizens set up roadblocks and checkpoints
around the city in an effort to prevent troops from moving in.”35 At this point each side
entrenched themselves to the point that a nonviolent end seemed unlikely. The Gang of Elders
became increasingly nervous at the slow pace of the martial law’s implementation. The President
of the PRC (People’s Republic of China), Yang Shangkun, reassured them of the martial law’s
success, adding that it “created a strong intimidating effect” on the students and other
protesters.36 An atmosphere of mistrust permeated the two sides, creating a climate where direct
violence seemed only a matter of when and who not if. On May 23rd another demonstration
occurred with some “three hundred thousand protesters, mostly from outside Beijing” in an
attempt to end martial law and to force the premier to resign.37 This protest became the first one
in the movement to incorporate a mostly non-Beijing crowd. Many local students who initiated
this protest returned to classes a couple weeks prior. Disorganization within the movement failed
to allow it to incorporate this new pool of support. This disorganization in the movement became
evident on May 27th when “Wu’er Kaixi and Wang Dan…called on the students to abandon
their occupation of the Square” altogether. However, “Chai Ling…broke with the others and
34 Ibid., 226.
35 Ibid., 237-38.
36 Ibid., 239.
37 Ibid., 285.
9. 9
supported staying.”38 The student movement failed to unite its base, incorporate new support,
and coordinate demonstrations.39 All of these failures became apparent to the movement as May
turned to June.
The climate of mistrust created by the martial law declaration on May 20th carried over
into June. On June 1st “every member of the Politburo received a copy of a report entitled ‘On
the True Nature of the Turmoil’” which “portrayed the unarmed students and the crowds of
citizens who supported them as terrorists who were preparing an armed seizure of power.”40
Because the government officially adopted this viewpoint of the students and other protesters,
the last hopes of nonviolent resolution by the government slipped away, the only hope rested
with the students. But by June 1st the students “exhausted, disorganized, and unlikely to take any
more large-scale actions” became incapable of influencing the outcome of the event towards
positive peace.41 Many who took part in the hunger strikes either abandoned it or succumbed to
fatigue. The movement crumbled, with no nonviolent solution coming from the students. On
June 2nd a Party Central Meeting concluded that the student’s “plot is to provoke conflict and
create bloodshed.”42 Perception became reality for the government in early June, now they
needed justification for force.
June 3rd finally gave the Chinese government the pretext necessary for using direct
violence. Under the suspicion that students killed a soldier in Beijing and injured several more,
“the regime sent 30,000 unarmed soldiers” towards Tiananmen Square.43 Nonviolent movements
become difficult to maintain and when an act of direct violent occurs, either real or contrived, the
38 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, 425.
39 Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle,264.
40 Nathan and Link, eds.,The Tiananmen Papers, 330.
41 Ibid., 353.
42 Ibid., 355-56.
43 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, 425.
10. 10
response from the opposition greatly outweighs what happened to them. Government troops
quickly realized by midday that the use of force to confront this “counterrevolutionary riot”
needed to occur.44 At 9 p.m. the government approved the People’s Liberation Army and
military police to use “all means necessary” to stop the protesters.45 The troops moving ever
closer to Tiananmen Square, meeting heavy resistance. The line between citizen and student
blurred. That distinction long since slipped away when the government labeled all protesters
“terrorists” and “revolutionaries.” One action of direct violence the government troops
encountered occurred when the 38th Group Army, the main group responsible to clear the
Square, encountered protesters throwing bricks at them on their way with obstacles obstructing
their way. Rioters also attacked them “with clubs and steel reinforcing bars while a sea of smoke
and fire arose” in front of the troops.46 Nonviolence ended on both sides, and the government
quickly ended the movement.
The next day, June 4th, proved the deadliest of all. Early on that day, Paulson points out
that “while most students remained nonviolent, many protesters fought back violently.”47 The
movement among the remaining students stayed nonviolent, but since the government broad
brushed the protesters, the masses who reacted violently to the troops became the students. At 6
a.m. students and others who left the Square reached an area west of it called Liubukou. At this
point “soldiers opened fire…killing eleven.”48 The objective of the troops soon became more
about restoring peace by any means necessary than just clearing Tiananmen Square. Official
death totals remain varied to this day. The Chinese government estimated some 300 deaths,
44 Nathan and Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers, 356.
45 Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle,265-66.
46 Nathan and Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers, 390.
47 Paulson, “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989,” in Waging Nonviolent Struggle,266.
48 Nathan and Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers, 383.
11. 11
“other reports claim as much as 2-10 thousand.”49 However small the number, the fact remains
that the government acted on its objective to end violently the student movement, and the
movement failed to change the situation before it grew too late.
In retrospect, the movement proved unsuccessful. The student’s actions translated into a
movement incapable of real nonviolent change. Many reasons make this abundantly clear. In his
survey of nonviolent movements in non-democratic states, Kurt Schock explained that the
“movement wasn’t resilient because it was disorganized and didn’t have a sufficiently
coordinated network to plan protests.”50 The methods primarily used by the students, the sit-in
and hunger strike, quickly became overused and unsuccessful. Without any real effective
leadership, no diversity of tactics became applied. Also their lack of organization best accounts
for the demands changing often to the government.51 A nonviolent movement works best when
the demands given represent clear, concise, and agreed upon conditions. When this failed to
happen no new borders of relations became drawn that satisfied the parties involved. Also
Schock mentioned that on top of disorganization and limited nonviolent methods, the movement
failed to gain international support, hindering its effectiveness.52 As stated before, a nonviolent
movement works best at a local level. When it becomes regional, national, or international it
requires strong leadership at its local core. Failing in this led to little to no international support,
and even if such support came who in movement really represented its voice? No single voice
emerged at any time during the protests. These failures led to the ultimate crumbling of the
movement and its incapability to translate nonviolent direct action into positive peaceful change.
49 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, 425-426.
50 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 104.
51 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict,424.
52 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 113.
12. 12
Bibliography
Ackerman, Peter, and Jack Duvall. A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict.
New York, NY: Palgrave, 2000.
Nathan, Andrew J., and Perry Link, eds. The Tiananmen Papers. 1st ed. New York, NY:
PublicAffairs, 2001.
Paulson, Joshua. “Uprising and Repression in China – 1989.” In Waging Nonviolent Struggle:
20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential, by Gene Sharp, 253-270. Dexter, MI:
Schock, Kurt. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies.
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.
