Social cognitive factors of unfair ratings in reputation

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Social cognitive factors of unfair ratings in reputation

  1. 1. Social Cognitive Factors of Unfair Ratings in Reputation Reporting Systems A paper by Rosaria Conte, Mario Paolucci(2003) A presentation by: Stathis Grigoropoulos 1
  2. 2. Contents • Introduction • Electronic Transactions: The Game Theoretic View • A Social Cognitive Model of Reputation • Factors of Memetic Decisions • Artificial Experiments Findings • Conclusion/Discussion 2/26
  3. 3. Introduction • According to Oxford dictionary, Reputation is the “Common or general estimate of a person with respect to characters or other qualities“(What others think of us) • Reputation is generally seen as a non-legal social mechanism enforcing a wide variety of desired behaviors, both economic and social – Brings Trust to a business transaction – Can Help You reach a given goal – Reputation can cost/provide a job position • Reputation has both cognitive properties and social aspects • We will concentrate on the potential of a Social Cognitive Model of Reputation for the optimization of electronic transactions 3/26
  4. 4. Electronic Transactions: The Game Theoretic View • Electronic media dramatically enlarge the number of people one may interact with. At the same time, they remove the connection between social acquaintance and physical contact. • With the increase of the interaction range, associated risks and Social Dilemmas increase. • It is no surprise that electronic auctions ( Ebay ) have been the first arena for the implementation of Online Reputation Systems. • Shelter users from the uncertainty of distance and anonymity Basically: – A transaction evaluation(TR), consisting of ratings (TR(b,s), TR(s,b)), (b=buyer, s=seller) 4/26
  5. 5. Electronic Transactions: The Game Theoretic View Online Reputation Systems: • A Reputation System Collects, Distributes, Aggregates information about a behavior • Expected: – Buyers are encouraged to sustain higher prices in order to receive the goods – Sellers are discouraged from cheating in order to keep reputation and prices high – Cooperation = f(Reputation) + Noise • Problems: – Misbehaving on the level of the reputation system – Unfair Ratings • High/low 5/26
  6. 6. Electronic Transactions: The Game Theoretic View A closer look on Reputation System: • Buyers and sellers evaluate each other after transactions • The evaluation is not mandatory and will never be removed • evaluation = a comment + a rating • comment = a line of text • rating = numeric evaluation in {-1,0,1} • Each eBay member has a “reputation” (feedback score) that is the summation of the numerical evaluations 6/26
  7. 7. Electronic Transactions: The Game Theoretic View A closer look on Reputation System: 7/26
  8. 8. Electronic Transactions: The Game Theoretic View A closer look on Reputation System: 8/26
  9. 9. Electronic Transactions: The Game Theoretic View A closer look on Reputation System: Remarks:  Simple, yet effective  Scores high in economic efficiency  Seller Reputation (not buyer) has a significant effect on the price • Bias towards Pollyanna evaluations and underprovision • Rate or not Rate, that is the question! • Only 50% of transactions are rated • Of the rated, only the 1% are negative (!) • Low score in social efficiency 9/26
  10. 10. Electronic Transactions: The Game Theoretic View A closer look on Reputation System: Possible Explanations: • Game Theorists are correct – Positive ratings because no one cheats – Does not explain the low rate of provision and leniency • Cheaters prosper thanks to both biases – A seller may cheat 20% of the times and maintain a monotonically increasing reputation value – A “positive” equilibrium is sustained mainly by reciprocity – Users provide positive ratings => optimism 10/26
  11. 11. Electronic Transactions: The Game Theoretic View Questions Raised: – To what extent is cheating harmful? – Which type of cheating is harmful and to whom? – To what extent Online Reputation Systems differ from reputation in natural societies, and about what? – Are there just two parts (buyer and seller) in the general game of reputation? 11/26
  12. 12. A Social Cognitive Model of Reputation • Both social evaluations concern other agents' (targets) attitudes toward socially desirable behavior, and may be shared by a multitude of agents. • Image is an evaluative belief – it tells that the target is “good” when it displays behavior b, and that it is “bad” in the opposite case. – Most software implementation describe image only • Reputation is instead a shared voice, i.e. a belief about others saying that a given target enjoys or suffers from a shared image. – Reputation is true when it’s actually spread, not when it is accurate 12/26
  13. 13. A Social Cognitive Model of Reputation ●image : – global evaluation owned by an agent about a target's property in relation with an agent's (or others') goal , e.g. a social norm ●reputation : – process and effect of the transmission of (a subset of) originally image based evaluation(s) (or forged ones) meta-belief, i.e. a belief about others' beliefs (either personal:”agent x says...”, or impersonal “it is said that...”) 13/26
  14. 14. A Social Cognitive Model of Reputation • mental decisions based upon them can be analyzed: – epistemic – pragmatic-strategic – memetic • Reputation does not bind the speaker to commit himself to the truth value of the evaluation conveyed but only to the existence of rumors about it • Only the acceptance of a meta-belief is required • And, unlike ordinary deception, reputation implies – no personal commitment (by no means stating that target deserved it) – no responsibility 14/26
  15. 15. A Social Cognitive Model of Reputation 15/26
  16. 16. A Social Cognitive Model of Reputation • 4 non-empty sets of agents are defined by their functional role: • Image – set E = evaluators – set B = beneficiaries (of the social norm) – set T = target • Reputation – Image sets + – set M = memetic agents, gossipers • Intersection between E & B is usually, non empty 16/26
  17. 17. A Social Cognitive Model of Reputation 17/26
  18. 18. A Social Cognitive Model of Reputation • 4 non-empty sets of agents are defined by their functional role: • Image – set E = evaluators – set B = beneficiaries (of the social norm) – set T = target • Reputation – Image sets + – set M = memetic agents, gossipers • Intersection between E & B is usually, non empty 18/26
  19. 19. Factors of Memetic Decision Memetic Decision • The decision about whether or not to participate in a given gossip (provision) – If Yes: what type of gossip to spread (over or underrating) • affects the probability that a certain gossip propagates • Provision is affected by(among others): – Responsibility – Benevolence 19/26
  20. 20. Factors of Memetic Decision • Responsibility – Gossip decreases with growing responsibility (perception) and accountability – Increasing commitment with first hand evaluations(G=E) • EBay transmissions are not second hand – Commitment is a function of: • Decreasing anonymity of the reports • Decreasing number of gossipers 20/26
  21. 21. Factors of Memetic Decision • Benevolence • The type of gossip is expected to vary according to the direction of benevolence – Beneficiary oriented: negativity bias • Transmit bad even if uncertain • Transmit good only when really certain – Target oriented: leniency bias • Transmit if good reputation • Do not transmit if bad 21/26
  22. 22. Factors of Memetic Decision Operationalise Social Cognitive Factors 22/26
  23. 23. Factors of Memetic Decision Operationalise Social Cognitive Factors: Extreme Example 23/26
  24. 24. Artificial Experiments Findings 24/26
  25. 25. Conclusions • Reputational systems work in different ways and are governed by different implicit rules, according to the structural conditions and their effects on cognitive biases. • Reputational systems can be valued according to at least two different criteria, i.e. efficiency of transactions, on one hand, and coalition and equity, on the other. • First-level, or material, cooperation is not necessarily a function of good reputation • We need to study not only the structural conditions per se, but also the cognitive factors implied in the varying of these conditions if we want to make predictions about the specific effects of reputation 25/26
  26. 26. Discussion • To what extend can we simulate natural reputation systems in order to optimize (electronic) transactions? Thank you! 26/26
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